Share

Journal of Agrarian Change, Vol. 11 No. 1, January, pp. 3-28, Tiba, Zoltán (2011)

The lack of timely intervention by ADMARC in the food markets, when maize prices were abnormally surging, was more the cause for the Malawi famine in 2002 than any sharp decline in production.

Malawi experienced one of the worst famines in 2001/02, much more severe in intensity in comparison to the Nyasaland famine that occurred in 1949, when Malawi was a British colony. One important contention that emerged in the post-famine assessments is regarding the intensity of the food crisis, whether there was actually a famine or only a specific ‘maize crisis’. The other important debate that the Malawi famine generated was regarding the causes of famines in modern times. In the literature on famines, there are different perspectives on famines being caused by decline in food availability leading to severe food shortages as opposed to being an ‘entitlement’ problem, where large sections of the population do not have the purchasing power to buy food.
           
Tiba undertakes an examination of the Malawi famine and some of the relevant issues. First, the study probes the intensity of the food crisis that occurred in 2001/02 and whether it qualifies to be designated as a famine. Secondly, the paper looks at pre-famine trends in food production and prices and compares them with those in Malawi during 2001/02 to determine the causes behind the famine i.e. whether the Food Availability Decline (FAD) hypothesis holds or the entitlement approach of Sen is more relevant. The other intriguing issue is that Malawi experienced her worst famine in the newly formed democratic regime and did not have any such crisis during the long authoritarian rule that lasted for three decades after Malawi’s independence in 1964. This calls for an examination also of the institutions, including the government parastatal ADMARC (Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation) and their functioning during and prior to the 2001/02 food crisis.
           
The study is based on a fieldwork in a famine affected village in Zomba district in South Malawi. Both qualitative and quantitative techniques were used to gather information and analyze the data. The qualitative techniques included key informant interviews, focus group discussions and household case studies. A census survey of the village households using a questionnaire was also conducted. The questionnaire focused on household demography, poverty and ownership of assets, production and sources of food, the impact of the famine, and food aid receipts. A specific characteristic of the surveyed village is that the households mainly cultivated rice. Maize, which is commonly used for consumption, was procured from the markets including ADMARC outlets, or as kind wage payments in exchange for casual labour (ganyu).
           
The severity of the 2001/02 food crisis is amply illustrated by indicators of malnutrition and education for the hungry months of early 2002. The number of children under 5 years suffering from malnutrition recorded by the nearby Namasalima health centre was 390 in February, 2002, nearly 10 times the figure in February, 2001. Similarly, there was a sharp decline in school enrolment ratios in 2002, particularly for the first and second standards. Additionally, a staggering 93 percent of the pupils in primary education failed their final examinations, while the failure rates were 30 to 50 percent in the preceding five years. By all counts, the crisis qualified as a famine and official estimates of famine deaths need to be revised upwards.
           
The reasoning that the government offered during the 2001/02 crisis was that there was no serious food crisis; rather a decline only in maize production and the starvation that occurred was more due to the inflexible food consumption patterns of Malawians. The examination of food production reveals a massive decline in maize production by 32 percent in the famine year. However, accounting for rice and roots and tubers (like cassava and sweet potato), the deficit production is much lower. Significantly, it is lower than 1998, when also production had considerably declined without any occurrence of starvation. Thus, food availability decline cannot be singled out as the primary reason for the famine.
           
What is more interesting is the study of relative food prices during the pre-famine years and their comparison with the 2001/02 famine year. This clearly reveals the steep decline in the purchasing power of rice farmers and casual agricultural and non-agricultural labour in the study village. Maize prices increased around eightfold from MK 5 per kg in June, 2001 to MK 42 per kg in February, 2002. The prices of rice also increased, though to a lesser extent. Cassava prices and that of fruits and vegetables also increased significantly indicating there was a general lack of food in the markets relative to the demands.
           
While in July, 2001, it was possible to buy 1.53 bags of maize with 1 bag of rice, in February, 2002, only 0.38 bags of maize could be exchanged for a bag of rice. On the other hand, the real wages for ganyu declined fast in the famine year as kind payments (in form of maize bags) were quickly replaced by entirely cash payments, that too remaining constant in nominal terms. Around 52 percent of the households in the village reported that they could not find employment during the hungry months. This is expected as with the surge in maize prices, rice farmers who mostly provided ganyu employment also slipped into a crisis.
             
 Finally, the fieldwork reveals that the large sale of maize stocks in the open markets in the year before the famine by ADMARC was a major institutional reason for the famine. A similar decline in food production in 1998 did not witness a famine, primarily due to the supply of around 245 metric tons of maize (nearly the entire stock capacity) by ADMARC. However, ADMARC reduced its scope of intervention in the food markets by drastically lowering stocks (sold off 76 metric tons of maize) in the preceding year. The low maize stocks implied that ADMARC could not play the desired role of regulating maize prices in the markets during the famine in 2002.

The author concludes that along with the reduction of purchasing power due to high maize and other food prices, the functional capitulation of ADMARC during the ‘hungry’ months were also a central cause behind the Malawi famine in 2001/02.