The Core Learning Partnership and the Users of the Evaluation 1
In 2004 the Office of Evaluation of IFAD conducted an Interim Evaluation of the Special Country Programme Phase II (SCP II) in Ethiopia. An approach paper was discussed with partners in Ethiopia in May 2004, and a pre-mission socio-economic survey was fielded between June and August of the same year. A core learning partnership was formed comprising representatives of the Ministry of Water Resources, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, the SCP II PCU, UNOPS and the IFAD Region for Eastern and Southern Africa (PF). The main evaluation mission took place 13th September-14th October 2004. A draft evaluation report was distributed in December 2004. A final evaluation workshop was organised on 24th February 2005 in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) to take stock of the evaluation findings and prepare this Agreement at Completion Point (ACP). The workshop was attended by the members of the core learning partnership and other stakeholders. The ACP illustrates the stakeholders’ understanding of the evaluation, findings and recommendations, their proposal to implement them, and their commitment to act upon them.
The Main Evaluation Findings
Quantitative Achievements. According to the UNOPS 2004 report2 , 31 out of 55 small-scale irrigation schemes had been completed by April 2004. Discussions held by the evaluation mission in the field suggest that 49 out of 58 schemes were complete by September 2004. The water management component (introduced after MTR) is reported by UNOPS 2004 to be substantially complete, with the exception of registration and legalisation work in relation to WUAs, and several elements of local training. The development of WUAs has been less than satisfactory because of the way in which traditional water management structures have been ignored during implementation, and because of the failure to reconcile the aims and legal status of WUAs and cooperatives. The UNOPS 2004 report paints the general picture of very limited project achievements in the agriculture component, the most alarming single area being that of soil conservation.3
This is an area of real concern: limited transfer of knowledge through the present extension system has prevented farmers from achieving higher yields. In addition, as the rate of cropping intensity of land increases, it becomes crucial to compensate for the extraction of soil nutrients and prevent a decline in soil fertility and, eventually, soil erosion. The final component, Capacity Building/Coordination, is reported by UNOPS to be well-progressed (achievement of target varying from 66% to 83% across the various sub-components). In financial terms, up to July 2004, Regional disbursement of funds varied from 40% to 70% of totals budgeted.
Major strengths (i) relevance. The project is relevant to the needs of farmers in traditional irrigation schemes which are located near to markets, and to those farmers who are able to benefit from expansions to these schemes. The project has been well targeted in the sense of working mainly in woredas defined as highly or very highly vulnerable to drought and food insecurity. The project fits well with government policies on water resources development and food security. It is also highly relevant to IFAD’s principles and strategic thrusts in East and Southern Africa.
Major strengths (ii) integrated design. Successful irrigation does not simply consist of the application of water to land for the production of crops. In rural Ethiopia a set of complementary activities is essential to the achievement of beneficial and sustainable impacts. While 70% of the SCP II budget is devoted to the improvement and expansion of small-scale irrigation schemes, the remaining 30% is for soil conservation, the development of women’s vegetable gardens, agricultural support services, and capacity building. Each of these complementary activities, and those added since the initial project design (such as the strengthening of credit services and market access), is either essential to the successful performance of the irrigation schemes, or adds significantly to the overall impact and likelihood of that impact being sustained over time.
Major strengths (iii) impact. The evaluation (see main report) provided some evidence of crop diversification, yield and production increases, and corresponding increases in agricultural income. It also concluded that, in the limited number of cases where women’s gardens have been developed, this has had a very significant impact on the women and families who have directly benefited. In some cases physical assets other than the irrigation schemes and soil conservation works – roads - have been improved.
Major strengths (iv) sustainability. During the evaluation many examples of the strong commitment to the project by Federal Government, the Regions and the Project Coordination Unit were evident. This has resulted in a willingness to learn, and to modify procedures on the basis of that learning. Particularly impressive has been the honest awareness, in some Regions more than others, of the existence of design and operation and maintenance challenges, and the willingness to find ways to solve these problems. In the best cases, co-ownership of schemes with farmers and provision of post-construction support have more than compensated for the naivety of the scheme designers who believed that schemes could be “fully demand-led”, “self-sustaining”, “self-managed” and “self-directed”.
Major weaknesses (i) in design. Weaknesses in project design are set out in the evaluation report, and only four points are highlighted here since they have particular relevance to the future. First, many assumptions have been made about the weaknesses of traditional irrigation systems, without the foundation of detailed investigation and diagnosis. It may be that less capital-intensive interventions to improve traditional systems could spread benefits more widely. Second, a significant number of economic assumptions made at appraisal were clearly optimistic. In particular the high yields, high producer prices, low post-harvest losses, no water scarcity, and no maintenance costs assumed at appraisal. It would be unfortunate if actual project performance were to be judged against measures which were themselves grossly unrealistic. Third, little was said at appraisal about the importance of realistically assessing market potential, and selecting sites within close proximity of existing or potential markets. Fourth, the notion, already highlighted, that modern small-scale irrigation schemes can be designed and constructed using specialist skills, equipment and materials, then handed over to farmers with no post-construction support or back-stopping, is unrealistic and unworkable.
Major weaknesses (ii) in implementation and impact. Six areas are highlighted here. First, the success of commercialised small-scale irrigation schemes depends crucially on access to credit and input and output markets. Promotion of cooperative membership has only partially achieved this access, and only for some farmers. Second, traditional water management structures have not been exploited effectively in the establishment of ‘modern’ WUAs and cooperatives. This threatens the viability of the modern structures, and is disempowering of the traditional organisations. Third, despite some real impact of the development of women’s vegetable gardens, too little of this project component has been undertaken. Much more remains to be done in this important area of empowerment and household-level impact. Fourth, much more attention needs to be paid to soil management issues, both within and outside the irrigation schemes. Agricultural services in general, especially generalist extension advice, trials and demonstrations, and seed availability, need to be enhanced. Fifth, the issue of competition, and in some cases conflict, between upstream and downstream water users is of major concern. Sixth, the evaluation found a significant number of cases where farmers are worse off than they were without the project. Not all ‘modern’ irrigation development has benefited all of the target farmers. Mistakes have been made in particular when engineers have ignored the knowledge or wishes of farmers, when hydrological assessments have been flawed, or where upstream developments have deprived schemes of water.
Major weaknesses (iii) in project management. Three specific weaknesses in overall project management are emphasised here. First, there is no agreed project logical framework or equivalent, setting out the hierarchy of project objectives and activities, together with indicators of achievement, means of verification, and risks and assumptions. Because of this, there is no general agreement on what to monitor and how to do so. Consequently no-one knows exactly what the project has achieved. The supervision process has not been an appropriate vehicle for putting an agreed monitoring system in place, and nor has short-term TA. Only a long-term substantive partnership could have solved this problem, by allowing IFAD to engage in a participative process with the key stakeholders.4
Second, too short a time-horizon has been taken by the project partners. Long term commitment is needed. A six year project is too short to achieve significant impacts. It has taken until PY5 to reach a peak in irrigation scheme construction, and longer in the agriculture component. Benefits to farmers will take another 6-10 years to realise. Third, there has been too little sharing of institutional knowledge 5. This applies at two levels, (i) between Regions and woredas, and (ii) between the project, Federal Government and other donors. The first of these would allow the spread of good practice from the best-performing Regions to others, while the second would allow forward movement in policy, strategy and donor coordination.
Main weaknesses (iv) in partner performance. The evaluation has highlighted here two important weaknesses. First, Federal Government commitment has not always been as constructive as at present, and even now stronger adherence to the spirit and letter of agreed responsibilities would enhance project performance considerably. Consistency and strength of commitment are needed. Second, the evaluation expressed concerns about the institutional processes involved in the ‘partnership’ between IFAD, UNOPS (the supervising organisation) and GoE. Specifically, too little time was invested in the supervision function, and the technical assistance provided on occasions failed to develop a partnership characterised by trust, support and constructive engagement. These weaknesses are not unique to this project and these external organisations, but they nevertheless should be taken seriously.
Recommendations Agreed upon by All Partners
Strategic Issues
Summary Recommendations
Suggested timing: immediate, and throughout future GoE involvement in small-scale irrigation development.
Partners involved: MoWR, MoARD, CPO, IFAD, UNOPS, PCU, Regions, woredas, WUAs, other donors.
The Process of Formulation of Phase III
Summary Recommendations
Partners involved: IFAD, MoWR, MoARD, PCU, Regions, other donors
Studies and reviews of operational issues
A number of aspects of the project have been highlighted in the evaluation report as subjects which require more detailed study or review, leading to detailed recommendations for implementation or management, or acting as input to future project formulation work. In some cases there is a wide range of experience and informed judgment within the Regions and woredas which, if brought together, can lead to sound outcomes. In other cases some specialist external support would be of value, to supplement the experience of the National stakeholders. In both cases, the process of debate and dialogue would benefit from assistance by a skilled facilitator. Each of the areas of study listed below is a key area of direct relevance to project design, implementation or management. Each study/review should be conducted in a manner which encourages the participation of all stakeholders with relevant knowledge and experience.
Catchment level planning and targeting
Although in some cases there is a real attempt to manage water in an integrated manner at the catchment level, in others water is simply taken on a first-come-first-served basis. Conflict will inevitably increase, and it will be particularly bad in dry years. There is relevant existing legislation, but it appears that it is not implemented.
Although most of the SSI schemes selected for development were targeted in vulnerable or food-insecure woredas, not all were sufficiently close to markets to assure their sustainability in commercial terms. It is important that schemes are selected according to a realistic balance between need and viability.
Summary Recommendations
Partners involved: farmers (WUAs), woredas, Regions, PCU, MoWR, CPO, IFAD, other donors
Traditional water management associations and low-cost intervention strategy
Water management structures existed in most traditional irrigation schemes even before the project provided assistance. Modern Water Users Associations tend to be introduced without reference to these traditional structures. The stakeholder charged with responsibility for strengthening WUAs is only interested in promoting cooperatives. Although cooperative membership is in principle voluntary, farmers are put in an invidious position when they choose not to join. Although many would prefer not to join, if they do not, then they may be seriously disadvantaged, and excluded from some of the benefits which they would expect to receive as members of a Water Users’ Association. In many cases WUAs are seen by the authorities as temporary transition arrangements which should evolve into “irrigation cooperatives”. Neither WUAs nor cooperatives fully represent the water users farming within irrigation command areas. This confusion in social organisation between traditional structures and ‘modern’ WUAs and cooperatives needs urgent resolution.
More needs to be known about the weaknesses and strengths of traditional irrigation systems, in order to target assistance according to need. It may be that lower-cost, better-targeted interventions could enable project funds to be spread more widely, with greater overall impact.
Summary Recommendations
Partners involved: farmers (WUAs), woredas, Regions, PCU, MoWR, CPO, IFAD, other donors
Agricultural Support and Soil Management
The present evaluation has highlighted serious limitations in two main areas: (i) ) trial and demonstration sites have been used with a limited range of crop combinations and at unrealistically high input investments; and (ii) Development Agents often have limited experience and their deployment in three specialisms (livestock, crops and natural resources) seems impractical.
Summary Recommendations
Partners involved: farmers (WUAs), woredas, Regions, PCU, MoWR, IFAD, other donors
Financial Issues
Concerns were expressed by many informants to the evaluation team that the cumbersome nature of some of the financial procedures creates significant obstacles to efficient project management.
It is very difficult to arrive at true capital and recurrent costs of the SSI schemes, accounting for real overheads and ‘hidden’ costs ofmaintenance. In particular the distinctions between completion costs, and costs of maintenance and rehabilitation need to be established, as do the true share of maintenance costs borne by farmers and irrigation authorities.
Summary Recommendations
Suggested timing: as soon as possible, if SCP is to enter third phase.
Partners involved: woredas, Regions, PCU, MoWR, IFAD, UNOPS, other donors
Immediate tasks
SCP II will continue to run through 2005 (or longer if the first recommendation below is accepted). A significant amount of work remains to be done, and it is not the intention of these recommendations to add unnecessarily to the burden of work at PCU, Region and woreda levels. However, a minimum set of actions is necessary to achieve a satisfactory closure to SCP II.
A significant amount of the project funds remain unspent, and the evaluation team is concerned that in the haste to disburse this money the quality of both ‘hardware’ and ‘software’ aspects may suffer. The evaluation team expressed concern about the limited expenditure so far on agricultural support services, including women’s vegetable gardens, and encourages a re-dressing of the balance between engineering and agricultural support.
The weaknesses in project monitoring have been widely referred to. Because of this, end-of-project reporting will be challenging. Steps have been taken to address this problem, and the evaluation team urges the completion of this work to a high standard. Further measures should be taken to ensure consistent and accurate reporting from the Regions in the final months of the project
Soil erosion is a major environmental threat to the irrigation schemes and in the catchments more generally, and SCP II could have a major beneficial impact in this area. Soil erosion threatens the viability of both rainfed and irrigated farming. SCP II includes a significant component of soil conservation work, but very little has been achieved so far. Intensive multiple cropping in irrigation command areas will lead to soil degradation. Without specific measures to manage soil fertility, such as rotation including legumes, and use of fertiliser and manure, soil nutrients will be rapidly depleted.
Summary Recommendations
Suggested timing: immediate.
Partners involved: PCU, Regions, MoARD, MoWR, CPO, Woredas, other donors.
1/ This agreement reflects an understanding among the key partners to adopt and implement recommendations stemming from the evaluation. The agreement was formulated in consultation with the members of the Core Learning Partnership (CLP). The CLP members that attended the workshop were: H.E. Mesfin Tegene, Hon. Vice Minister, Ministry of Water Resources; Mr. Adugna Jebessa, Head, Irrigation & Drainage Development Studies Department (MoWR); Mr. Dejene Demissie, Head, International Finance and Development Institutions Division, Multilateral Cooperation Department (Ministry of finance and Economic Development); Ms. Yeworkwha Abate (MoFED); Mr. Ayalew Abate, Coordinator SCP II; Mr. Dele Ilebani and Mr. Robson Mutandi (UNOPS, Nairobi); and Mr. John Gicharu (CPM, IFAD/PF). The workshop was also attended by Mr. Fabrizio Felloni, Lead Evaluator, OE and Prof. Richard C.Carter, consultant, Evaluation Mission Leader, who presented the main evaluation findings and recommendations. A complete list of the participants is provided in the appendices to the main report.
1/In the absence of a sound monitoring system, the supervision reports constitute the best source of quantitative data on project achievements.
3/ Undoubtedly the UNOPS estimate of 6% of target achieved is an under-estimate (if only because of the omission of Amhara in these data), but discussions in the field confirm that this is an important area of under-achievement. The fact that agricultural interventions normally follow the completion of irrigation schemes is not an adequate explanation. Some interventions, such as soil protection, can and should be started before the construction of a scheme.
4/ Short missions, with little stakeholder participation, producing different sets of prescriptions, are of very limited value. Long term partnership, using consultants who are trusted and respected by both partners, or through more substantial direct involvement, would have been more effective.
5/ The main exception being the Project Workshop in Adama (Nazaret) in August 2004.