The Rural Development Project for Ngöbe-Buglé Communities
was launched in March 1994 and will end in December 2001. Its design and
execution have yielded lessons that will undoubtedly be of use for the
design of a new project for the Ngöbe-Buglé Comarca, which
the Government of Panama has requested from the International Fund for
Agricultural Development (IFAD), as well as for other projects of the
Government and of IFAD in similar regions.
A number of activities remain to be carried out in order
to consolidate the actions undertaken. These activities will be completed
during the current year by the Project Executing Unit (PEU) and the public
sector entities involved in the project's execution.
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Background
The Rural Development Project for Ngöbe-Buglé
Communities was a complex project in that it included an ethnic rights
objective-legal recognition of the Ngöbe-Buglé Comarca-which
endowed the project with very special political characteristics stemming
from the involvement of indigenous leaders in the Steering Committee and
the provision of training to prepare those leaders to carry out planning
and administration for the Comarca. As a result of the latter, the project
succeeded in forming human capital among the Ngöbe-Buglé population
(technicians, leaders, and producers), which will certainly continue yielding
results in the future. The project also envisaged activities that posed
a significant technical challenge, such as the improvement of family incomes
based on agricultural production in an agriculture-ecological environment
with restrictions and the establishment of the Capitalization Fund to
finance productive activities, which was to be administered by grass-roots
beneficiary organizations that lacked an organizational tradition and
had weak administrative and managerial capacity.
The project was carried out in a favourable macroeconomic,
political, and climatic context, characterized by moderate but sustained
growth of the national economy. In addition, monetary and price stability
prevailed, thanks to the government's recognition of the unfair distribution
of wealth among the Panamanian population and its especially detrimental
effect on the indigenous populations, the formulation of social policies
targeting the poorest groups, stability of domestic agricultural prices,
and the absence of climatic disasters, except for some negative effects
of the El Niño phenomenon in 1997.
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Conclusions and
lessons learned from the experience
The execution of the project yielded several lessons
of importance for the Government of Panama and IFAD, which will surely
help improve the design and execution of the new project planned for the
Ngöbe-Buglé Comarca.
Legal recognition of the Ngöbe-Buglé Comarca:
One of the project's most important accomplishments is its contribution
to the recognition of the Ngöbe-Buglé Comarca, since the achievement
of that legal status will ensure effective protection of the territories
of the Ngöbe-Buglé people, establishment of their own forms
of government, and maintenance of their way of life and traditions. The
most noteworthy activities in this area were the economic and logistic
support provided to the Intergovernmental Commission of the Ministry of
the Interior and Justice and to the indigenous leadership, the dissemination
of laws 10 and 69 and Charter of the Ngöbe-Buglé Comarca,
and the logistic and financial support for the various General and Regional
Congresses held during the project execution period.
Organization for project execution: During the
execution period of the project there were three different elected governments,
which led to significant institutional, political, and economic changes.
These modifications and the changes in government themselves had repercussions
for the project, but it was expected that the participation of representatives
of the Ngöbe-Buglé General and Regional Congresses on the
Steering Committee would lend a degree of stability to the Executing Unit.
However, because the representatives of the Congresses on the Steering
Committee also changed frequently, this was not entirely the case. The
approval of the Charter of the Comarca, which establishes longer terms
of office for the Congresses, will help improve the stability of the new
project.
Participation by the beneficiaries: A highly positive
aspect of the project was the participation of the beneficiaries in the
planning, monitoring, and evaluation of activities. Mechanisms for beneficiary
participation were built into the design, but new forms of participation
were also added as a result of the evolution of the beneficiary organizations.
The basic mechanisms for participation were: (i) formulation, monitoring,
and evaluation of the annual work plans of the development centres by
the producers councils, composed of leaders of grass-roots groups and
community organizations; (ii) inclusion of four Ngöbe-Buglé
leaders on the Steering Committee, the supreme decision-making body for
the project; and (iii) participation of Ngöbe-Buglé representatives
on the Regional Credit Committees.
Gender perspective: The project achieved important
effects and impacts in the adoption of the gender perspective, which for
several of those interviewed signified a positive break with tradition,
since Ngöbe-Buglé culture assigns women a secondary position
in the social milieu. The evidence of this positive impact can be seen
in the participation of women in the beneficiary organizations, their
access to leadership positions within those organizations, the appointment
of women to key posts within the PEU, and also their participation in
important positions in the political-administrative entities of the Comarca.
Cross-cutting application of the gender perspective by the technical team
of the PEU contributed the achievement of these results.
Community development plans: The project promoted
the execution of participatory rural assessments and the formulation of
five-year community development plans, which served as a guide for the
preparation of annual community plans, which, in turn, formed the basis
for the annual work plans for the project. However, these plans were not
updated or used as input for the participatory evaluation processes. This
detracted from the coherence and long-term vision of the activities, and
their contribution to the sustainability of the processes engendered by
the project was therefore limited.
Co-executing institutions from the public sector:
The overall performance of the project depended more on the performance
of the public institutions that collaborated in its execution than on
the functional organization of the PEU, and the failure of some of those
institutions to fulfil their commitments limited the project's sphere
of action. As a result of these failings on the part of the co-executing
institutions, many activities were not carried out or were left to the
PEU, whose technical staff was overburdened with responsibilities. The
Ministry of Agriculture (MIDA), the Agricultural Research Institute of
Panama (IDIAP), the National Environmental Authority (ANAM), and the Ministry
of Public Works (MOP) lacked the internal organizational capacity and
resources to fulfil their commitments to the project, and the PEU was
not always in a position to make up for the shortfall in resources. Moreover,
the agreements provided only a frame of reference for interinstitutional
cooperation. Future agreements should include, at a minimum, the activities
to be carried out, the specific goals and expected outcomes (effects and
impacts), and also the indicators that will be used to verify the achievement
of those outcomes. The agreements should also be revised and adjusted
annually.
It also became clear that some public institutions did
not have the capacity to provide appropriate services to the indigenous
population because they were not knowledgeable about the predominant production
systems and they lacked a suitable technological-productive proposal and
extension methodologies that took account of the characteristics of the
beneficiary population (e.g., language, high level of illiteracy). In
the future, it would therefore be desirable to consider employing alternative
systems that utilize community members who have received intensive training,
who live in the communities, and who are able to communicate in their
own language. This means establishing an appropriate training programme
and mechanisms for providing refresher courses for the promoters trained.
Stability of the PEU staff: The Government of
Panama, IFAD, the Andean Development Corporation (CAF), and the co-executing
institutions endeavoured to overcome the technical, organization, and
functional limitations of the project. However, these efforts were unsuccessful
in many cases, owing mainly to the high staff turnover within the PEU.
The foregoing difficulties delayed start-up of the project, which was
launched in 1994, but it was not until 1997 that all the components finally
got under way. It is noteworthy that 1997 was also the year that Ngöbe-Buglé
professionals joined the executive management of the PEU. An indicator
of this high turnover is that the 8 key positions within the PEU were
held by 32 different people, who served for an average of 14 months each,
although it should be pointed out that 8 of those 32 people were promoted
from lower positions within the PEU. Obviously, the learning period for
the new staff meant that the PEU's performance of functions and services
did not improve over time to the degree expected.
Administration of the PEU: The organization and
implementation of the project management unit was not very well suited-in
terms of annual expenditure level-to the administrative activities required.
Proof of this was the appreciable delay in the disbursement of funds for
IFAD loan 331-PM-so much so that the amount authorized for the Special
Account was disbursed in 1995, but only in 1997 was the first replenishment
of funds solicited. Despite these problems, however, thanks to timely
action by the Social Emergency Fund (FES)/Social Investment Fund (FIS),
the entire counterpart contribution was paid on time, which made it possible
to maintain project operations when the IFAD loan funds could not be disbursed.
The design should specify the administrative and accounting procedures
to be used and the staffing needs for the project and should also identify
the computer capabilities required to administer several sources of financing.
Social organization: The Rural Development Project
for Ngöbe-Buglé Communities was a demand-oriented project,
and support for and formalization of existing organizations-before creating
new organizations-facilitated organizational strengthening of the population
and increase the possibilities for sustainability. As a result of the
work in the area of social organization, there are currently 20 community
organizations, almost all of them legally established, including 14 cooperatives
and 4 producer associations with a total membership of close to 1 000.
In addition, this component of the project served 336 grass-roots groups
composed of farmers, artisans, environmentalist committees, and pro-works
committees, several of these groups were never consolidated and almost
40% later broke up. This organizational achievement is quite noteworthy,
given that the Ngöbe-Buglé cultural tradition emphasizes family
work, not group work. In addition, support for the producer councils,
which emerged as a local initiative, fostered the empowerment of the beneficiaries
and provided elements that will help ensure the sustainability of local
development processes.
Training: More than 3 300 training events were
carried out under all project components. In the case of the training
for production development and environmental protection, a "cascade
training" approach was applied. However, this approach was not sufficiently
accompanied by other activities to assure in-service training for those
who would be expected to replicate the knowledge and abilities they have
learned in order to ensure the quality of the training received by people
at the lowest levels of the "cascade." Moreover, provision was
not made for the training of more than one representative or leader per
organization, which hinders the continuity of processes when leaders are
replaced in the natural course of events.
The training for production development had limited
impact because: (i) short-term training with broad coverage was important
for disseminating new technologies, but greater relative emphasis should
have been placed on more intensive training with fewer participants; (ii)
training for technicians and producers, especially the leaders of organizations
devoted to the marketing of products, should have incorporated matters
relating to markets and marketing; (iii) although it is logical for several
components to include training activities, the central role of the training
component should have been clearly established with regard to the prioritization
of contents, types of beneficiaries to be served, and coordination of
the training with the rest of the activities; and (iv) the quality of
the training was not controlled as part of the monitoring activities,
which hindered in-depth analysis of the activities and their outcomes.
The exception was the Sustainable Agroforestry School
programme for training in organic and conservation-oriented agriculture,
which included formal courses and in-service training, and was also was
intensive, systematic, and sequential. A total of 326 producers participated
in the programme between 1998 and 2000, with 210 (64%) graduating as promoters,
thus laying the foundation for an extension service in the Comarca.
Production development: The activities for production
development included training, supply technical assistance, and technology
assessment; Assistance was provided with regard to traditional crops,
new productive activities, and complementary activities, targeting groups
of women in particular. Some non-agricultural microenterprises were also
promoted. These activities resulted in access to technical assistance
and training for more than 3 000 indigenous families belonging to 507
producer groups, the majority of whom had never received such services.
In addition, many families launched new productive activities that improved
the availability of foods for family consumption. These results were encouraging
but limited in scope because the MIDA assigned only 10 extension agents,
who lacked vehicles and adequate equipment, and the IDIAP researchers
had little experience with the prevailing production technologies and
conditions among the Ngöbe-Buglé population.
Capitalization Fund: There were serious difficulties
in establishing and administering the Capitalization Fund, as a result
of which the initial financing was not disbursed until 1997. The amount
approved as of 31 December 2000 was 728 000 balboas, distributed among
10 cooperatives, 1 producer association, and 258 grass-roots groups. However,
because of the lengthy procedures for authorization and disbursement of
the funds, as of that date only 341 000 balboas had been disbursed to
4 cooperatives, 1 producer association, and 124 grass-roots groups, benefiting
1 518 indigenous families. The impact of these loans cannot be established,
owing to the short duration of the programme and the fact that the beneficiaries
received a single loan. Moreover, the Fund's institutional and financial
sustainability is doubtful because the interest rates were not sufficient
to cover the costs of administration, currency devaluation, potential
default, and capitalization. Furthermore, accounting practices for the
project and the community organizations were deficient in that they did
not allow for good monitoring of the Fund.
The reasons for these limited results are attributed
to the following factors: (i) lack of specialized institutional capacity
to administer the fund in accordance with accepted technical standards;
(ii) application of a financial policy for the project was difficult because
social interests prevailed which were at odds with financial management
standards; the role of the project should therefore have been mainly to
formulate policies and then contract for administrative services from
a specialized financial entity; (ii) as specified in the design, the loans
were made in kind in order to control investments by the beneficiaries,
but the experience of other projects with regard to this modality of disbursement
has not been positive because the borrower's management capacity is underestimated
and also because direct responsibility is assumed in the financed activity,
which increases the transaction costs (transport, storage, losses, and
others; and (iii) no provision was made for a savings component, although
experience with microfinance has shown that an intermediation system is
not sustainable in the long term without mobilization of the users' own
resources; furthermore, those savings may serve as an element for client
selection and may be used as collateral.
Physical infrastructure: The results of this
component were the construction of 11 development centres-one more than
expected; improvement of 83 km of rural roads, and arranging with other
institutions for an additional 54 km of road improvement; construction
of 7 suspension bridges for use by pedestrians and beasts of burden; improvement
of 23 walking paths (93.5 km); and execution of two road studies, one
for a road between Cerro Sombrero and Llano Tugrí, future seat
of government for the Ngöbe-Buglé Comarca. The development
centres and suspension bridges were built by private contractors. The
community contributed the labour for improvement of the paths, and the
MOP collaborated in improving the roads, although subsequently the PEU
was obliged to take over the works. Responsibility for maintenance of
the bridges, paths, and some lesser works in the development centres and
on the roads was assumed by the pro-works committees created under the
project. All the works were well executed, with the exception of the road
improvements, in which case the technical specifications were not followed
and the needed maintenance was not performed. Consequently, the roads
deteriorated rapidly (within two years) and will need to be rehabilitated
again.
The lessons learned from the execution of the component
were that: (i) when co-execution modalities with public institutions are
established, the project should have guarantees of the technical capacity
and the availability of resources from the co-executing institution; (ii)
the commitments of the various parties should be clearly spelled out in
the agreements, as should the mechanisms for evaluation, revision, and
adjustment; and (iii) the effective participation of the communities,
through the pro-works committees, in the selection of the works to be
carried out and in their later maintenance contributed significantly to
the positive effects achieved.
Environment and forestry development: The principal
environmental protection activities were training for technicians and
beneficiaries, awarding of fellowships for student leaders from the Comarca,
promotion of the formation of several environmentalist groups, three environmental
studies, and a latrine-building programme. However, the environmental
situation assessments envisaged in the design were not carried out, which
made evaluation of the component difficult. The lessons learned were that:
(i) lack of information on the environmental situation at the outset limits
the ability to assess the effects and impacts of the project and hinders
the development of indicators to guide decision-making during project
execution; and (ii) the lack of medium- and long-term plans impedes the
continuity of activities, especially when there is a change in personnel.
This planning, which should be updated periodically, should be the starting
point for the annual work plans developed jointly with the beneficiaries
and the environmental authority. The Forestry Development component enabled
beneficiaries to receive training in reforestation methods and implementation
and management of test plots; however, the results (105 ha reforested)
were insufficient in terms of the expectations included in the design.
Monitoring and evaluation: The activities carried
out in this area focused on annual operational planning, monitoring of
annual work plans and monthly work programmes, and evaluation. Training
was also provided to enable beneficiaries to participate in these activities.
The baseline study, which was to be used for the strategic planning of
the project and for its final evaluation, was not contracted for until
1999. However, the work was not completed and the final report is not
available. In addition, the design of the monitoring and evaluation system
was not prioritized, either. The system was not was developed until late
1997, and it was only partially implemented. Hence, the project did not
have a true system of monitoring and evaluation because the evaluation
and monitoring activities were not linked; rather, they were carried out
in an isolated and not very systematic manner and did not utilize the
project objectives and community plans as a basis.
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Agreement at completion
point
These agreements are aimed at consolidating the project's
achievements. Some can be taken on and executed by the project, though
others will require the participation of the governmental institutions
involved in project execution, whose mandate is to assist in the development
of the Ngöbe-Buglé Comarca.
Monitoring and evaluation: The information available
in the project monitoring and evaluation system should continue to be
systematized. It is also important apply the methodology used in the baseline
survey for the final evaluation, as doing so will yield more consistent
and reliable information for determining the effects and impacts of the
project. In addition, bearing in mind that a plan for development of the
Comarca is being prepared, it is important to link the community development
plans and the annual work plan of the project with the plan for the Comarca,
which will make it possible, in the final evaluation of the project, to
assess not only the degree to which the its objectives were achieved,
but also its concrete contribution to the development of the Comarca.
Training: With regard to building local capacity
for development, an evaluation of the training system is needed to provide
a basis for programming training activities under the new project. That
evaluation should analyse the strengths and weakness of the communities
and the beneficiary organizations in terms of the achievement of the long-term
objectives of the community development plans and the plan for development
of the Comarca. In order to reinforce the learning achieved, it is important
also establish mechanisms for ensuring in-service training and follow-up
with the producer councils and the producers involved.
Production development: In order to assure the
sustainability of the effects and impacts achieved and contribute to the
creation of a better extension system in the future, the following actions
are recommended:
a. Transfer, to the extent possible, equipment, materials, and means of
transport to the development centres , which could be managed by the producer
councils;
b. Consolidate the productive activities fostered by the project, reinforcing
the training on conservationist technologies and marketing processes;
c. Ensure the participation of the promoters trained at the Sustainable
Agroforestry Schools in a future IFAD project in the Ngöbe-Buglé
area;
d. Promote the modality of volunteer technical assistance used in the
JICA programme.
Capitalization Fund: The activities planned under
this subcomponent were not completed, and new credit regulations are still
being drawn up and preparations are ongoing for the establishment of a
second-tier organization of cooperatives to manage the revolving funds.
In addition, close to USD 500 000 approved by the Steering Committee and
approximately USD 550 000 in available fresh funding remained undisbursed.
The mission believes that this second-tier organization is not very feasible
in the short term. Moreover, the community organizations have little experience
and need to be strengthened with an eye towards their consolidation. It
is therefore recommended that a nongovernmental organization with credit
experience in the area be retained to manage the funds, which would be
accessible to community organizations in the Ngöbe-Buglé Comarca,
both for their own productive activities and for the extension of loans
to members or grass-roots groups. It is important that the latter not
have direct access to the Fund and that the conditions for sub-loans,
including interest rates, be established by the community organizations.
Future use of the road machinery: The machinery
was acquired to improve and maintain the roads of the Comarca with the
ongoing participation of the MOP. However, this did not fully occur, which
led to problems that affected the quality and stability of the works.
This situation makes it essential to consider new ways of utilizing and
operating the machinery in order to ensure that it remains in the Comarca
and is operated efficiently.
Environment and reforestation: The environmental
protection and forest development activities should be part of a plan
for environmental management of the Comarca. It is therefore recommended
that the ANAM develop such a plan, in fulfilment of its mandate. The plan
should also identify and appraise the productive activities compatible
with rational use of natural resources with a view to restoring and preserving
the ecological balance in the Comarca.
Administration: The current accounting records
are inadequate to complete the administrative closing of the project.
Hence, it is recommended that accounting practices be normalized during
2001 so that the project's assets can be transferred, as appropriate,
to beneficiary organizations. This transfer of assets should be based
on an updated socio-economic assessment of the applicant organizations.
Budgetary and financial issues: The budget approved
for fiscal year 2001 (USD 1 000 000) is clearly insufficient to complete
the execution of the project activities under way, which include preparation
and updating of the community development plans, implementation of a system
for ensuring the sustainability of the Capitalization Fund and transfer
of the development centres (equipped and in good repair), in addition
to ensuring that the road machinery remains in the Comarca. Accordingly,
it is recommended that the FIS and the MEF take the necessary steps to
obtain a budgetary increase as soon as possible in order to conclude the
activities during 2001. IFAD might also consider modifying the pari-passu
for the remaining loan funds.
