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Appropriate Institutional Arrangements for Project Implementation Various Ministries were given the responsibility of being the main implementing agencies; this was to be realised by means of coordinating committees and, at the field level, by respective line agencies. However, in practice the coordination function was invariably ineffective. Many of the projects relied on project management structures which were either substantially aided or completely controlled, by expatriate Technical Advisers. This contributed to a lack of integration of the project implementation into the national institutions and structures, and worked against sustainability and continuity. Although NGOs were given nominal roles at the design stage of many of the projects, in practice there were few examples where they played a major part in project implementation. Local government departments, where they were involved, tended to make significant contributions to implementation; this was important in 199-LE and 104-ZA, where the Provincial Secretary was head of the PIU. Most of the projects had large numbers of man-months of Technical Assistance (176-BT, SRS-008-MZ, 199-LE) including 206-ZA, which had over 250 mm of TA. In Botswana (076-BT), Lesotho (199-LE) and Swaziland (121-SZ), expatriate advisers took direct responsibility as project managers or coordinators. In Malawi, an expatriate was in charge of the Smallholder Fertiliser Revolving Fund (120-MW). In Uganda (080-UG) an emergency inputs supply programme (originally 18 months, but in fact stretched to 30 months) was organised by appointing expatriate managers and an expatriate procurement agency: this proved very successful as a means of meeting the short term programme needs. In Rwanda (232-RW) NGOs were sub-contracted for group formation and training, and were very effective, but their activities took place independently of other project interventions because of the lack of coordination - the Government did not appoint the officers designated to coordinate project activities. |
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Overall, coordination mechanisms did not function as anticipated; lack of coordination was probably the root cause of many project delays and failures. In particular good coordination is essential for multi-component projects executed in parallel by different line agencies. There was generally an inability to transfer management skills to national staff using the route of expatriate advisers; project TA needed to include specific mechanisms and training functions in order to ensure that necessary short-term assistance led to long-term management gains. Local government support for project activities is essential, but needs to be divorced from political manoeuvring and direct access to project benefits. - Institutional arrangements have an important bearing on the successful implementation of projects; in general the simplest structure, involving the minimum of coordination requirements is to be preferred. - Quality of Project Management, in terms of experience, qualifications, managerial capacity, authority and continuity is also an important factor in project success. Counterpart funding constraints, timely payments, adequate incentives, housing, training, equipment and field transport have all detracted from management performance and need to be guaranteed if projects are to succeed. - The role of TA needs to be clearly defined, not only so that technical shortfalls are filled, but also so that there is a responsibility for training and skills development of counterpart staff. TA contracts also need to be sufficiently flexible so that inputs and timing can respond to project demands. - Beneficiary attitudes are greatly affected by management's ability or inability to deal with implementation problems; this requires that contact staff must have adequate authority (or access to authority) and give sufficient priority to dealing with farmers queries. eferences: 1. Botswana - Arable Lands Development Project, 076-BT R076BTBE, Interim Evaluation, 1992. 2. Lesotho - Local Initiatives Support Project, 199-LE R199LEAE, Mid-Term Evaluation, 1992. 3. Malawi - Smallholder Fertilizer Project, 120-MW R120MWAE, Mid-Term Evaluation, 1987. 4. Mozambique - Second Agricultural Rehabilitation Project, SRS-008-MZ S008MZAE, Mid-Term Evaluation, 1990 5. Rwanda - Gikongoro Agricultural Development, 232-RW% R232RWAE, Mid-Term Evaluation, 1993 6. Swaziland - Smallholders Credit and Marketing Project, 121-SZ R121SZBE, Interim Evaluation, 1992. 7. Uganda - Agriculture Reconstruction Programme, 080-UG, Mid-term Evaluation, 1984. 8. Zambia - Smallholders Services Rehabilitation Project, 206-ZA%R206ZAAE, Mid-Term Evaluation, 1992.
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