Completion evaluation report summary
The project area comprises two distinct swamp areas located 7 km apart
on the southern banks of the river Gambia. The climate, soils and topography
are favourable for intensified rice cultivation. At the time of project
formulation, most of the Jahaly swamp covering some 1.230 ha was already
cleared and levelled as a result of previous development interventions.
The Pacharr swamps, covering about 1.050 ha was more or less in its natural
state. Smallholder farmers in the JP area produce a variety of crops during
the short rainy season, mainly groundnuts (the main cash crop) and cereals
(millet, sorghum, maize) in the rainfed upland areas and rice in the lowland
swamps. The upland cropping productions are based on traditional shifting
slash and burn cultivation with fallow. Opportunities for production in
the longer dry season are scarce and this made the cultivation of dry
season irrigated rice attractive.
Project objectives and design
Target group
The target group comprised 1.000 compounds in some 40 villages with
an estimated population of 15.000 "having user rights" in the
two swamps. Women, regarded by the appraisal as principal beneficiaries
under traditional systems of swamp rice production, were expected to "receive
major benefits from the project".
Objectives and components
The JPSP set out to increase Gambian national self-sufficiency in
rice production, improve food security and raise farm families incomes.
The components were:
- land development: 1.510 ha of swamplands were to be developped.
Pump irrigation would comprise 560 ha and "improved rice"
950 ha. In an average year, 380 ha could be tidally irrigated in the
wet season and 240 ha of these could be tidally irrigated in the dry
season. Land would be reallocated on the basis of submissions by villages
of their traditional land rights, existing use rights and existing areas
cultivated by compounds.
- training and institutional support: the development of a local
institutional capability was considered important far irrigation-based
agriculture and related extension.
- credit input supply and crop marketing: the credit scheme
was to be administered by the Gambia Cooperative Union (GCU). The cooperatives
were also to handle actual input supply and crop marketing.
Then, the project was to fund the construction of five cereal banks
and two day-care centres to take care of children of working mothers.
A monitoring and evaluation unit was to provide the project management
unit and the coordinating commitee with regular information concerning
the performance of the project.
Expected effects
and assumptions
Yields would increase up to 3,3 t/ha on improved swamp land (1,2 t/ha
without project), to 4 t/ha on pump irrigated land for the wet season,
4,5 t/ha on pump irrigated land for the dry season. Production was expected
to rise to 7.874 t (PY 6). Incomes were expected to rise from 247 USD
without project to 1.079 USD with project.
The project was based on strong assumptions as to the permanence of
the economic environment prevailing at the outset. Asumption was also
made that other aspects of compound production and income would not affect
rice production and income and that the main interest of farmers was in
rice production even during the rainy season.
Evaluation
Implementation context
The 1985 structural adjustment programm led to significant policy
changes in the Gambia's tariff and tax structure. Relative agricultural
output and input prices turned against input intensive, high yield rice
production. The reduction of price subsidies had doubled fertilizer cost
in real term.
Natural conditions for rainfed upland agriculture improved which contributed
to reduced food shortages and less demand for water-controlled rice production
in the lowlands.
Project achievements
Land development: a total of 1.392 was developed, 545 ha for
pump irrigation, 703 ha for tidal and 144 ha of improved rainfed land.
The total area that may be double cropped under tidal irrigation is 364
ha.
Irrigation and drainage: they were both pump-based. The command
areas were hermetically sealed off through raised ciment levees. A total
of 13 pumpsets were procured, 11 installed and 2 spares. Water delivery
and drainage inefficiency have been seriously compounded by little maintenance
and sabotage of the pump-irrigated areas' infrastructure.
Input supply, credit, marketing and loan recovery: the GCU
was responsable for input supply,credit and onward marketing. Initial
performance was quite satisfactory. Between 1984 and 1987, loan recovery
rates for seasonal credit averaged not less than 97% at Jahaly and 83%
at Pacharr. In 1897, paddy production and loan recovery rates dropped
(loan recovery rate: 30%). In 1988-89, the GCU withdrew from the rice
sub sub-sector. The project became responsable for input supply, credit
administration, loan recovery and marketing. There were a break down in
input supply and credit delivery.
Revolving funds: the GCU deposited a proportion of recovered
water and land charges and loans into two revolving funds. Lack of clarity
about the accounts and the amounts involved have persisted since 1985.
GCU retained control over funds accumulated in the revolving fund accounts,
despite its withdrawal from the project.
Extension and agronomy: a modified T&V system of extension
has been used. Meetings are held weekly between the extension staff and
chosen "contact" farmers. One progressive farmer is chosen for
each 10 ha block of the scheme. In addition, there is a demonstration
plot at each swamp. Communications between farmers and extension staff
were not easy because of the rigid water scheduling and became less than
cordial when the staff in recent years had to undertake additional responsabilities
over and above their primary extension activities (collecting loan repayments,
organising water scheduling and sharing and maintenance of primary canals).
Cereal banks have not been built. JPSP day care centres never operated
properly and are now defunct.
M&E: the technical and socio-economic M&E has been
fragmentary. The data collected were of limited use in improving project
performance, water scheduling and extension recommendations.
Effects assessment
and sustainability
Beneficiaries: land developed under the project is presently
available to 2.200 registered leaseholders from 1.253 compounds, dispersed
over 67 villages. Current direct and indirect beneficiaries of the project
are estimated at between 19.000 and 22.000 members of farm households.
Poorer farmers were successfully targeted. In 1991, smaller households
cultivated a larger per capita area in the project than larger ones. The
number of participants in upland villages which used to be marginally
involved, or not at all, in swamp or irrigated rice cultivation is considerably
higher than expected because of the precarious food situation between
1983 and 1984.
In the early years 1984 to 1986, pump irrigated rice production performed
very well. Average rice hields per hectare were significantly higher than
anticipated at appraisal: 6.5 t/ha during the dry season and 5.4 t/ha
during the wet season. But, between 1987 and 1992, average yields reached
only 4.65 t/ha for the dry season and 2.28 t/ha for the wet season. The
recent IFAD completion evaluation survey (CES) found even lower yields
for 1990 and 1991: for the dry season, interviewed farmers reported yields
between 3.3 (1991) and 3.7 tons per hectare (1990). Average wet season
yields were between 1.7 and 1.8 tons/ha. In the end, low production caused
low loan repayment rates of project charges by farmers. Eventually, this
led to a cancellation of all ploughing, puddling and irrigation activities
in pump-irrigated plots for wet season 1992. In wet season 1991, on average
only 74 percent of all irrigated plots were cultivated. But for the dry
season, a remarkably high cropping intensity was recorded of 95 percent.
On improved swamp rice plots (tidal-irrigated and improved rainfed
swamp), yields of 2.5 to 3 tons/hectare can be achieved during the wet
season. Yet, there are many plots in this production system where yields
are significantly lower; many fields present yields hovering around 1
ton per hectare, particularly those which are purely rainfed, not transplanted,
or where water-control through tidal irrigation is insufficient.
Effects on beneficiaries incomes: in 1985-86, the average
household with a plot in the project area recorded a net increase in household
income of 13%, compared to those without such land in the project area.
But, in 1991, farm average gross margins per hectare and personns per
day did not exceed those achieved in traditional swamp rice production.
One of the major accomplishments of the J.P. project is the beneficial
impact of increased food security during the traditional lean or "hungry"
season between June and September. By providing an additional dry season
crop, the project increased level, and stability, of food consumption.
Specifics effects on women: the nutritional status of children
and women improved, as measured by body weight and growth. The project
diminished mothers' seasonal stress that is caused by increased workload,
low food intake, and increased disease prevalence during the rainy season.
A deliberate attempt to put women in charge of pump-irrigated plots by
formally registering them as lease-holders was not successful. The net
impact of the J.P. project on women's access to resources is difficult
to assess. Overall, women certainly gained from the increased availability
of food in the household and the significant reduction of back-breaking
labour through mechanical land preparation.
Effects on the environment: the SAR referred to the threat
to cultivation along the River Gambia because of an upstream movement
of the salt water mixing zone associated with pump irrigation. But, when
pumping was carried out on JPSP, the position of the salt water mixing
zone was not monitored. This means, at least in theory, that the environmental
impact over the project period could be negative.
Sustainability: the technical assistance had not transferred
skills to national staff. Farmers' interest in rice cultivation decrease
because of the declining profitability of paddy cultivation and lead to
the break down of input and credit delivery. Farmers have limited interest
in paying user charges and allocated their time on canal maintenance.
The scheme's physical infrastructure and technical support system are
deteriorating rapidly. There is no institutional structure for assuring
stable and adequate credit, agro-input supplies and marketing facilities
necessary for viable scheme operation. There is no beneficiary organisation
in place for overall scheme management and field-level water management.
This project does not seem to be more sustainable than the three previous
interventions to develop rice production in the area.
Main issues
The project design is not adapted to the situation.
Project design must tie in with farmers' strategies and respect their
comparative advantage in production by season, crop and intensity of effort.
Farmers long term comparative advantage in cultivation, by crop and season
had not been understood, and, as well, the probability of an imminent
reduction of rice production support subsidies had not been taken into
account. Pump irrigation in the wet season was an essential feature of
project design, in spite of the uncertain nature of farmers' demand for
such cultivation.
The design of the irrigation component permitted little or no
flexibility in response to varying preferences in production and water
demand.
The design of th irrigation component was not a "least cost"
alternative. Design engineers opted for a total water control approach.
Irrigation and drainage were pump-based. The local land form was radically
and irreversibly transformed. The possibility was blocked of a reversal
to tidal irrigation or to swamp cultivation. Bay must be completely flat
to prevent the creation of ponds; to secure even-wetting for cultivation
and seeding; and to obtain optimal drainage. Farmers have difficulty in
fitting levelling into a tight cultivation schedule at a point in time
when soils are workable. The flat bay system heavily restricts the type
of crops which can be grown, since it is suitable only for flood irrigation.
For tidal irrigation, the effectiveness of the watering system rests on
the degree of skills in controlling water supply, and timeliness of opening
and closing flood gates. Although the technology is relatively simple
and cheap, tidal dependence and the variation in water levels places a
premium on rigid scheduling and farmer cooperation.
The high initial yields in pump irrigated rice were not sustained.
The project was not well prepared for the sequence of unfavourable agronomic
and economic conditions that started around 1986-87. Despite water controlled
conditions, production in the scheme became more risky. Early rains and
crop pests cut rice yields in dry and wet season 1987 almost by half,
starting a cycle of loan default and delayed planting. Economic conditions
turned against rice production (see 8). Input supply became more erratic
after the withdrawal of GCU from the project in 1988. Improved climatic
conditions for alternative, rainfed crop production of groundnuts and
upland cereals further eroded the attractiveness of water controlled rice
production for many producers in the area.
Recommendations
and lessons learned
Under present technical, market and socio-economic conditions, in
the Gambian agricultural sector, the most realistic scenario for future
project operations is to: (i) support continued dry season rice production;
and (ii) to seek to improve the technology of low-cost tidal irrigation.
In the short-to medium-term, the project should focus on the preferred
production technologies, which means less emphasis on pump irrigation
in the wet season, a scaling down of such irrigation, or its elimination.
The situation could change were a repeated and prolonged drought to reoccur,
negatively affecting upland crops and food availability. Hence, the longer-term
scenario would be to maintain at minimal level a pumping capacity also
for wet season irrigation.
Dry season production should focus on enhancing household food security
for a maximum number of farm households, in low and upland villages. Wet
season production should be targeted for women in the tidal/rainfed command
area, who have the lowest opportunity costs and the highest interest in
rice production during this period.
The schemes require considerable investment to rehabilitate pumping,
water conveyancing and plot water control systems to improve their performance.
If these physical investments are not carried out, the scheme will deteriorate
at an accelerated rate over the next few years. These investments are
necessary before any of the functions or responsibilities are transferred
to the farmers, i.e. the scheme should function to design specifications
if farmers are expected to pay for services.
A reorganization of the institutions concerned with operation of
the JPSP is necessary to meet the post-project situation. With the premise
that: (i) beneficiary farmers themselves would be responsible for at least
partial management of water services and preferably land preparation through
draught animal traction; and (ii) support services would be taken over
by line ministries, the future role of the PMU should be redefined. With
the premise that management functions would be assumed by beneficiary
farmers themselves, the setting for developing farmers' organisations
needs to be explored.
Lessons learned:
When an investment project includes heavy infrastructure development
like important irrigation schemes and expensive equipment (pumps and tractors),
project design must be preceeded by a far more careful analysis including
sensitivity test for major changes in economic and institutional environment.
Stated project risks should be reviewed carefully against lessons learned.
Risks considered major and which would impact negatively implementation
should be clearly spelt out. Proposals for alternative design(s) need
to be considered, before a final decision is taken. In this kind of project,
remedial actions have limited or negligible effectiveness once the project
has been already designed.
Farmers' decision criteria need to be derived through a farming systems
analysis. Gains to production and productivity must reflect the behaviour
of the economic agents to optimise returns on scarce assets. Yield maximization
may fail as long as land as a productive asset is not yet scarce. Farmers'
portfolio of activities must be fully ascertained, and their economic
returns on the different assets indicates their opportunity costs. If
empirical data have not been systematically collected, or cannot be referred
to, for use of on-farm labour in alternative activities (including non
agricultural activities), a targeted study for such a purpose should be
undertaken as part of formulation.
The rules for appointing consultancy firms need to be far stricter, even
if bilateral co-financing on a grant basis is involved. Because of vested
interests and potentially conflicting interests, a single consulting firm
should never be engaged by the project to carry out feasibility studies,
engineering design, agricultural design, supervision of contractors during
construction, as well as be in charge of agricultural management of the
project. Expatriate technical assistance should never be permitted to
assume managerial roles at the outset of a project. There is then little
scope for the nationals to gain experience in decision-making, and hand-over
is always delayed.
Mechanisms must be developed within IFAD, to ensure that resources are
made available to follow-up at the field level recommendations from evaluation
missions to modify project design. Otherwise, such exercises with recommendations
become purely academic exercises.
Beneficiaries must be involved in the design and eventual re-design through
a structured process for participation. Self-reliance and self-management
of production systems can only come about by putting the proposed grass
roots institutions firmly in place from the outset, as it takes a long
time for them to reach maturity. Participation in managing project assets,
or cultivating the land, is strongly linked to the economic environment.
When the economic environment shifted from rice towards upland crops;
the economic surplus in rice production fell, interest for rice cultivation
in the wet season subsided. The interests of participants in sharing,
or assuming the responsibility for service provision, let alone cost recovery,
diminished.
Projects which seek to promote the socio-economic development of the
relatively underprivileged and powerless will meet with conflicts. They
have to be designed with particular care. There is little or no guarantee
for that the target group can successfully compete with more influential
members of the local community and assimilate and consolidate gains arising
from project implementation. For this reason, a detailed design and full
transparency is required with regard to the activities related to: (i)
distributing the most sought after asset, the irrigated land; and (ii)
collecting and using core indicators with which the management can monitor,
or ensure, that those less privileged continue to draw lasting benefits
in the use of their assets. Administrative regulation of land tenure at
the level of a project can not easily dominate the practices of customary
land tenure. This is definitely the case with regard to changes to support
the rights of women as against customs or controls exercised by household
heads, or men. The preferences by gender for type of crop, and land use,
generally reflect relative labour inputs and associated cash returns coupled
with preferences for food security. Clear commitment to promote equity
is required from the Government and other involved agencies. If such commitment
is not obtained, project management is bound to be caught in the role
of mediating local vested interests without adequate political support.
