The aim of the Interim Evaluation Mission (IEM) was to review the
implementation of the Toledo Small Farmers Development Project (TSFDP)
in relation to the stated hypotheses, strategies, targets and budget;
to identify the crucial factors influencing implementation; and to evaluate
the degree to which project objectives have been achieved. On the basis
of implementation experience the IEM was to recommend whether a second
phase to the project was warranted, and, if so, to propose future project
concepts, strategies and broad design features.
Background
The Toledo district, which is the most southerly of Belize’s
six main administrative units, is bordered on the west and south by Guatemala
and to the east by the Caribbean Sea. Of its total area of 4 650 km2,
about 100 000 ha are suitable for annual crops, fruit trees and pastures.
The district is composed of flat coastal plains, gently rolling foothills
and undulating lowlands, and the relatively high Maya Mountains reaching
about 1 000 metres in elevation. Four main rivers, which are noted for
rapidly rising water levels during the wetter season, make access to the
southern half of the district by land almost impossible. Main access to
Belize City and Belmopan, the capital, is by road (340 km), half of which
is unsealed.
The uplands are classified as wet sub-tropical, with annual precipitation
of 3 000 to 4 500 mm, while the lowlands, with a yearly
rainfall of 2 000 to 3 500 mm, have a wet tropical climate.
Severe storms, which sometimes significantly damage crops, occur in the
wetter season (June to November). Soils are quite deep in the lowlands
but generally shallow in the hill areas. In south-western Toledo, where
farmers are concentrated, soils are quite fertile.
The total population in the Toledo district was about 14 100
in 1985 and 17 500 according to a 1991 census. Of the 2 710
households estimated in 1985, some 78% were rural, living in villages
and settlements ranging from 12 to 430 persons. The largest group, the
Ketchi Maya, increased from 32% to nearly 41%, while the second largest
group, the Mopan Maya, decreased from 25% to 22% from 1985 to 1991. This
change in proportions of the two groups may have been affected by refugees
and economic immigrants predominantly of Ketchi Maya extraction settling
in the project area. In 1991 the Mestizo, Garifuna, East Indian and Creole
ethnic groups represented 11.9%, 10.0%, 7.9% and 5.7% of the population,
respectively.
Project design
The Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) stated that in Toledo district, a
priority area in the Government of Belize's (GOB) overall plans, the main
constraints to agricultural production were poor marketing, lack of transport
infrastructure, inadequate services and the unavailability of inputs.
With specific reference to the Maya Indians, the SAR noted that shifting
subsistence slash-and-burn cropping was practised and that with increasing
land pressure, it was no longer sustainable. The project was designed
to replace the shifting cultivation, which prevailed among small farmers,
by demonstrating and assisting with the implementation of improved, stabilised
farming systems. Technical packages of proven practices, some of which
were already in use within the district, were said to be adequate and
available.
Basically the project was to focus on providing the small farmers
with access to essential services and improved production technologies.
This was to be achieved by improving government services in the areas
of farm credit, extension, input supplies and marketing facilities. To
improve services the project would support increases in staff numbers,
staff training, better extension-research coordination, the establishment
of retailing and marketing depots and the provision of credit.
The basic objectives of the project were summarised in the SAR as
follows:
to improve the income and consequently the standard of living of
a group of small, mostly subsistence farmers now living in isolation,
by bringing them into modern agriculture;
- to increase their agricultural production and productivity, as well
as their involvement in the economic and social activities of the country;
- to strengthen the institutions which provide support to the farmers,
including agricultural extension and credit; and
- to augment the physical infrastructure for handling, processing and
marketing the main crops.
Of the 2 110 rural households in 1985, an estimated 1 620
or about 78% were considered to be small farmers, a number which was expected
to increase to about 1 700 by the time the project commenced, according
to the SAR. The farm income of the target group was estimated at USD 1 000
per household per year or USD 175 per capita. Child mortality was 66.5
per 1 000, which was much higher than the national average of 40,
while infant malnutrition in Toledo district at 49% was the highest in
Belize.
The SAR was originally conducted in 1985. Because of the need to coordinate
with the USAID financed project, the Toledo Agricultural Marketing Project
(TAMP), the loan agreement was signed in 1987 and the project did not
become effective until August 1988. Its envisaged five-year duration was
extended twice, initially until October 1993 and later until April 1995
(activities to be closed by October 1994). The project's total budget
was some USD 2.9 million, plus USD 1.0 million through TAMP. IFAD's original
contribution was approximately USD 2.2 million.
Main project outputs
The project’s performance has been quite erratic. As noted in
the Mid-Term Evaluation (MTE) in January 1992, the project had a very
slow start-up, with little being achieved before 1991 and a successive
build-up in loan allocation and disbursements once several misconceptions
in project design had been overcome. It also was characterised by variable
performance in staffing, including a permanent lack of extension officers,
insufficient experience of SMSs and excessively frequent turnover of project
technical staff. The project's major outputs are summarised in the following
paragraphs.
Expenditure. According to IFAD records, 75% of project funds
had been disbursed by the end of June 1994, compared to 41% at the time
of the MTE conducted in January 1992. The overall disbursement is relatively
poor, considering that project life has been extended by two years. The
low disbursement in the credit category (43%) which amounts to 31% of
the project’s funding, together with an under-utilisation of funds
for M&E and consultants services, has heavily affected overall disbursement.
Facilities. Although there were delays, the project infrastructure
was built as stipulated in the SAR. It built two marketing depots, a feedmill
and livestock holding facilities, took over facilities established by
a previous project at Blue Creek as the project’s operational centre,
and provided housing for project staff and extension officers.
Staffing. The project clearly suffered from a lack of direction
until the appointment of a new PD in March 1991, after which project performance
picked up. In terms of staff technical assistance (TA), the positions
stipulated in the appraisal were filled, except for the Accountant (not
filled until 1991) and the Marketing Specialist. The situation with counterpart
staff for the project's Farm Systems Specialist and Livestock Specialist
provided under TA, and Extension Officers (EOs) who were to be provided
by the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), was variable. After some delays
counterpart staff were provided, but their involvement in project activities
diminished after the departure of the TA specialists, and for a period
in 1993 both counterpart positions were unfilled. The MOA at no time
staffed the district adequately with EOs. Overall, staffing (both
in number and quality) has been one of the least positive project features.
When it became apparent that the MOA was unable to provide adequate
advisory services, the project, in response to a suggestion by OPS, instigated
a Village Farmer Helper (VFH) scheme. Key farmers in remote areas, chosen
by their peers and the project/MOA, received some training and are expected
to provide advice to their fellow villagers in the future. This methodology,
provided the VFHs receive adequate support, has several advantages, i.e.:
it could help overcome the MOA staffing problems; through feedback from
VFHs, it could also provide a better understanding of farmers' aspirations
and limitations; thirdly, it could help overcome communication problems
related to language barriers or to the disinclination by villagers to
cooperate with government officials. Progress with the VFH scheme is encouraging,
but better training as well as continuing material and technical support
will be needed.
Agricultural Development. The project has made progress toward
its objectives of increased production and encouragement of sedentary
agriculture through the provision of advice, better genetic material,
credit and the allocation of surveyed plots of land to farmers under individual
title. Activities not entailing borrowing from TSFDP-provided funds are
difficult to quantify, particularly as the project's M&E component
was almost totally ineffective. Enterprises requiring credit (especially
for medium- to long-term development loans) are easier to quantify.
Over 1 600 farmers attended training courses from 1991 to 1994, on
topics as diverse as the safe use of chemicals, livestock husbandry and
land preparation for rice. The project also procured and distributed improved
strains of poultry, pigs and cattle, as well as some seed throughout the
district. A kitchen vegetable garden scheme recently promoted by the project
now involves women in 12 villages and has the potential to further involve
women in development. The impact of training on production is uncertain,
except for rice.
Data available to the IEM showed increased crop production only
in the case of rice. As it evolved, the project concentrated on rice
with 83% of loans (in number) and 67.3% of the loan value going to rice-based
enterprises. By facilitating the surveying and allocation of over 230
blocks of land and providing more than 100 development loans for rice
(together with about 130 crop loans), the project contributed to the expansion
of mechanized rice in Toledo district, where estimated total rice production
(paddy) increased from 3 137 tons in 1988 to 4 113 tons in 1993.
GOB price policy on rice also played a major role in such production
increase. Until 1993/94 the Toledo rice producers were in a relatively
favourable position, since rice production in Belize did not meet domestic
demand and BMB was paying a subsidised price, on average, of over B$ 0.22/lb
paddy which was well above the world price equivalent. However, if national
production in 1994/95 rises to over 14 000 tons compared to 9 600 tons
in 1993/94 (BMB estimates), it is conceivable that Toledo will have trouble
selling rice. The GOB is faced with a serious dilemma on how to dispose
of a potentially huge surplus of rice and how to deal with the increasing
burden on its budget due to its price policy on rice.
The uncertain sustainability of the current level of price subsidies
on rice has led the IEM to be very cautious about the present success
of TSFDP in increasing production of mechanized rice by concentrating
most of its resources on this investment. It would appear from the data
presented to the IEM that few mechanised rice producers could withstand
a substantial drop in price. With lower prices, rice cultivation can only
remain profitable with high yields. Yet, weeds and a drop in the amount
of fertiliser used are likely to become limiting factors, making it necessary
to fallow or rotate land; in addition, the issue of drainage is still
unsolved. If mechanized rice production becomes unprofitable, the repayment
of a large share of DFC portfolio under TSFDP will be in jeopardy.
At this stage suitable alternative enterprises have not been confirmed
as financially viable. The 37 citrus and 18 cattle loans are still in
the development stage, therefore they have not contributed to production
as yet. Their financial outcome with respect to viability and sustainability
is still uncertain.
Conclusions
Achievement of project
objectives
The primary objective of the project was to improve the income and
consequently the standard of living of a group of small, mostly subsistence
farmers by introducing new agricultural practices and inputs. Thus their
agricultural production and productivity would be increased and they would
be more involved in the economic and social activities of the country.
Assuming that the granting of a legal lease on land and approval
for development loans are valid indicators of a shift from slash-and-burn
farming to sedentary agriculture, by June 1994 the project had reached
a maximum of 235 households. Since some of these leases have undoubtedly
gone to farmers already engaged in sedentary farming (and others, including
public servants and businessmen from Punta Gorda), the proportion of farmers
within the target group that has been introduced to settled farming is
small. Nevertheless, the project has kindled interest among other shifting
agriculturalists to obtain their own individual leases, if not for increased
productivity, at least to have their own land. Therefore, the project
has introduced a relatively small number of farmers to sedentary farming
and raised the possibility of more following the same path.
There is little information on whether the income and standard of
living of project beneficiaries has actually been improved, partly due
to a lack of monitoring by the project. Given the current level of subsidies
on rice, mechanised rice for farmers achieving yields of 2 500 lb/acre
or more are profitable, and some 230 loans (development and crop) have
been granted for this activity. It is too early to assess the impact of
cattle and citrus loans, but the prognosis (for the latter certainly)
is not encouraging.
A second objective was to strengthen the institutions which provide
support to the farmers, including agricultural extension and credit. In
this respect the IEM's main conclusions are as follows:
- while the project enhanced the operational capacity of the district's
MOA, its effects with regard to training and improvement in the
mode of operation appear limited;
- the build-up of the DFC's institutional capacity has benefitted from
the provision of an additional staff member and better operating means.
Yet, in spite of the excellent performance of its staff in Punta Gorda,
the DFC still suffers from a limited capability to operate effectively
in servicing loans, providing technical advice and supervising loan
repayments in the field; and
- the project enhanced the Ministry of Natural Resources' operational
capability and its ability to relate to farmers.
The project's third objective was to develop the physical infrastructure
for handling, processing and marketing the main crops. While providing
most of the stipulated infrastructure, the project's achievements fell
far short of its aspirations. Aside from the organic cacao development,
the project has achieved virtually nothing in the way of identifying produce
markets and marketing channels. The failure of the GOB to sanction
the employment of a marketing specialist has caused serious setbacks in
the project.
On the positive side, the project has helped coordinate marketing
of rice through the Belize Marketing Board's milling facility and appears
to have defined a niche to market "organic" cacao. It established
two marketing/input supply depots and has trained personnel in the management
of these, in addition to the one built by TAMP. The depots have essentially
served as input suppliers and have not achieved any marketing function.
Under the guidance of the project, management of the depots is improving,
but their viability is tenuous, given their presently limited function.
Relevance of project design
The original design was based on a number of assumptions,
some of which proved to be valid, e.g. the following:
- that Toledo district was a marginal area where most inhabitants (mainly
Maya Indians) were eligible for IFAD assistance;
- that the traditional slash-and-burn cultivation system was not sustainable
in the long run and had to be modified; and
- that the demand for credit was important enough to launch a credit
program as an essential part of the TSFDP.
Other SAR assumptions were not validated during the course of implementation.
These include the following:
- that the technology for modifying the existing slash-and-burn system
was available and ready for dissemination to the project's target group.
This proved incorrect and, in what appeared to be a conscious policy
decision, the project switched much of its efforts to mechanised rice
farming (where it was possible) as a first step in sedentary farming;
- that the two cash crops promoted, cacao and annatto, were financially
attractive. The opposite proved to be the case, due to changes in world
prices and the absence of internal mechanisms of price stabilization;
- that DFC, as it was structured, was ready to be used as TSFDP's credit
delivery system. While it was essentially correct to assume that credit
was a major bottleneck to development, the design did not appear to
be aware of the consequences on targeting objectives implied by the
need for legal individual access to land as a collateral for borrowing
from DFC for development loans. Given land tenure arrangements on (real
or supposed) Maya reservation land, the SAR did not consider the target
group's need of credit delivery, supervision and management mechanisms to be compatible with traditional socio-economic structures and communal
land ownership, especially on the hills; and
- that TAMP and TSFDP were to complement each other in marketing development
with some critical interaction between staff members. In reality, the
envisaged cooperation never took place and the marketing components
of both projects fell short of their goals.
The SAR assumed that the farmers belonging to the target group were
aware of increased population pressure on land and therefore, were prepared
to change their farming systems. While an objective assessment indicates
that currently much of the target area cannot sustain a cycle of seven
years' fallow followed by one year's cropping, farmers appear to be far
from convinced that their traditional method of farming is being eroded
because of land pressure. However, as a result of the project, some villages
promoted land titling on what the villagers considered their communal
land, and are beginning to realize that land shortages are becoming a
reality.
With regard to coordination, the SAR assumed that through
the mechanism of the National and District Coordinating Committees, without
any single line of control, the district's MOA and the project could coordinate
their activities and act essentially as one. This did not always prove
to be the case. It was probably unrealistic of the design to expect a
degree of cooperation and coordination without a single authority being
ultimately responsible for implementation.
The assumption that DFC could effectively reach and service small
farmers, whose cash requirements for inputs were small, was too optimistic.
DFC would not lend without land security and, for reasons of costs, it
was not interested in small loans to individuals. Other lending mechanisms
were obviously needed if the bulk of the target group were to be reached.
Sustainability
The sustainability of the programmes and activities established and
promoted under the project is likely to depend on the future performance
of marketing, credit, advisory services and, with regard to subsidies
(particularly on rice), of government policies. The identification and
promotion of new and modified farming systems will be critical to attain
sustainable agricultural production.
Recommendations
Because the IEM is convinced that population pressure eventually
will impose substantial changes to traditional shifting agriculture, and
that enterprises established under the project need further support, a
second phase of the project is recommended but only with major shifts
in emphasis and only under certain conditions. Because of the numerous
problems identified in the course of implementation of the first phase,
IFAD should negotiate procedures and means as to avoid the recurrence
of the same problems in the future. Some guidelines are given by the IEM
in this respect, as specified below.
General recommendations
Extreme care should be exerted when attempting to incorporate fundamental
changes to existing farming systems. The assumption must not be made that
changes appearing necessary and logical to planners coincide with the
views and aspirations of the target group. Instead, a programme of field
problem analysis, applied research and field demonstrations should be
undertaken in consultation with the target group at all times. A time-frame
of at least seven years should be allowed for such a programme.
Before allocating implementation responsibilities, the mandate of
the organisation selected should be carefully scrutinised to see if it
has the means to carry out the proposed tasks. For instance, DFC required
land collateral and was ill-equipped and unenthusiastic about making small
loans to small farmers since the beginning of TSFDP.
The project should not give excessive significance to cooperation
and coordination between implementing agencies without the presence of
a single line of authority. The MOA was designated as the implementing
agency, with responsibility for the overall coordination of project activities.
Yet, it was unable to assure an adequate level of coordination between
the TSFDP and the other implementing agencies. As regards extension activities,
the IEM recommends that such inability be avoided by unifying the two
functions of project director and district's MOA into a single line of
authority.
Follow-up project
The second phase should focus on the farmers in the foothills and
hills, but should also develop assistance to farms supported during the
first phase, as a period of consolidation will be necessary. Should
IFAD management approve a second phase, it should be preceded by a number
of essential studies and clarifications by GOB on several issues (see
below, section 2.a) and it would include some key issues, as explained
below (section 2.b).
(a) Pre-project activities
The following studies are recommended prior to final project preparation
(these could be conducted as part of a further extension to phase one,
should it be granted) and approval:
- Marketing. This critical activity represents the marketing
TA that was not implemented in phase one. The study would aim at the
identification and appraisal of marketing opportunities and mechanisms;
it would form the linchpin for future activities. Given that the Toledo
district is disadvantaged, particularly with regard to communication,
a specialist, with the help of the MOA and commercial organisations,
should clearly identify any advantages that Toledo has in enterprise
development. Conversely, it should rigorously exclude enterprises where
the district has a comparative disadvantage. The assessments, while
focusing on the needs of the Toledo district, should not be carried
out in isolation but should take into account the overall policies that
the GOB is reportedly in the process of developing;
- Rice Policy. The existing rice policy should be reviewed,
with particular reference to a number of elements including production
patterns (milpa and mechanized rice), future price policy, national
self-sufficiency, quality control, technologies used, and impact of
actual/proposed policies on the different regions and ethnic groups
of Belize. Inter alia, an action plan for rice production by
small farmers in Toledoshould also be defined by GOB;
- Credit. In order to assess the effectiveness and health of
its portfolio in Toledo, DFC should carry out a survey on the impact
of its credit activities (including technologies used and recovery policy)
on the productivity and income of beneficiaries;
- DFC. An assessment is needed of whether DFC, given its mandate,
can realistically lend to small farmers, particularly individuals without
legal access to land. Should DFC prove unequal to the task of lending
to small farmers, other mechanisms (i.e. NGOs) should be sought;
- Teaching/Research Facility. While the project headquarters
will be the project-sponsored office block near Punta Gorda, a detailed
study into expanding the current project headquarters at Blue Creek
into a training and research facility is recommended. The purpose of
the centre should include: (a) agricultural training for school drop-outs,
farmers and their children, MOA staff and, in particular, Village Farmer
Helpers (VFHs), and (b) a small research facility to serve as a base
for on-farm investigations to be promoted during phase two;
- Drainage. As poor drainage is likely to limit other agricultural
activities on a significant proportion of the land currently used for
mechanised rice, a clear picture of the actual situation is needed.
A study on the implications of poor drainage, methods and costs of improving
drainage is recommended;
- Roads/Civil Engineering. As the IEM is recommending improved
access to remote areas through a modest road programme, a plan with
cost estimates and priorities of roads suggested should be prepared;
and
- Monitoring and Evaluation. An M&E system appropriate to
the needs of a phase two project, that can be easily handled by project
personnel, should be developed. A study for this purpose, which will
include proposals on staff training, is recommended. The possibility
of contracting a non-government agency for M&E purposes should be
considered given the past poor performance of the institution in charge
of the implementation of this component (MED).
(b) Phase two: project proposals
The components of a phase two and the manner in which they are implemented
will depend to a large extent on the pre-project investigations now being
proposed by the IEM, as well as on the preliminary negotiations that IFAD
should have with the GOB before the appraisal of a potential second phase
(e.g. on inter-agency coordination, quality and quantity of staffing,
political commitment of GOB to project objectives, credit delivery, extension,
etc.). They will, however, contain some key elements which are summarised
in the following paragraphs.
As an overall strategy, the second-phase project would use the
village’s social structure to promote development activities
and assure that the views of the village are fully recognised and taken
into account in project design, rather than concentrate on individual
households.
The project would concentrate on promoting development activities
in the foothills and hills, where lives most of the target group that
was not reached by phase-one TSFDP, while consolidating activities in
foothill and lowland areas that already benefited from the project services.
To promote development in the foothills and hills, it is recommended
that the following measures be adopted:
- use adequate technical assistance to identify alternative farming
systems suited to hillsides and test them on site as necessary. It is
essential that a farm system and a village approach, and not an individual
crop and household approach, be adopted;
- to ensure that identified markets, credit delivery channels and mechanisms,
and mainly technologies can be adequately tested and promoted,
a project life of seven years, with a thorough interim evaluation after
two years, is recommended;
- develop a technology transfer system including the village community
as a whole through the VFH system as well as individual farmers as necessary;
- considerably extend the village household garden programme, both
because of its potential to improve household nutrition and to provide
a stepping-stone for future activities;
- in order to facilitate socio-economic development in remote villages,
initiate a road improvement programme; and
- retain the TSFDP facilities at Blue Creek as a training and modest
research centre.
If positively assessed by the second phase MTE, the VFH system should
be extended to other districts after the VFHs are properly trained at
the TSFDP Blue Creek Centre.
The project would promote credit mechanisms which are more "user-friendly"
than those currently used by DFC, but only for activities proven to be
viable. Supervision of all loans provided under the project would be actively
promoted. The project would elicit cooperation between DFC (or another
agency if necessary) and the village community in promoting and supervising
activities and encouraging loan repayments.
The farming activities established by TSFDP would be supported and/or
modified as necessary. The longer term future of both rice and citrus
appearing precarious, the project would endeavour to increase the profitability
of those enterprises by promoting better crop husbandry, while at the
same time instigating alternative complementary activities. In this manner
rice, as a mono-culture, would be de-emphasised.
Should the recommended studies confirm economic feasibility, the
project would assist in the establishment of a small citrus processing
facility and promote a drainage network wherever appropriate.
Subject to economic and environmental sustainability, livestock production
should be promoted, partly through the financing of an abattoir.
Using the strategies developed in the recommended study looking at
developing the facilities at Blue Creek as a training/project research
centre, the project would concentrate on developing the VFH extension
concept more fully. To effectively do this, training would be critical.
Technical assistance would be used as necessary to train Subject Matter
Specialists (SMSs) and Extension Officers (EOs) both in technical matters
and extension methodology. The VFHs would be trained by the EOs and SMSs
with some direct input from TA.
As far as project organization and management is concerned,
the following approach is recommended:
- the MOA would have overall responsibility for coordinating project
implementation;
- at the district level, the duties of Project Director (PD) and District
Agricultural Officer (DAO) would be carried out by the same person.
This person would delegate much of his routine duties to a deputy DAO.
In this manner the project would have a single line of control and be
more likely to stay "on course". It is critical that the PD/DAO
be a competent and dynamic senior person with similar capabilities to
the TSFDP's current PD;
- the coordinating committees would be convened as necessary, generally
at the request of the PD/DAO, and meet with supervising missions;
- a substantial amount of TA would be used for training, adaptive research
and marketing. The TA personnel's terms of reference should be clear.
Such personnel should not be overburdened with a multitude of tasks.
They would report directly, and formally, to the PD/DAO; and
- GOB would prove its capacity to effectively monitor project activities
along lines agreed with IFAD.
These proposals are essentially in line with the MOA's policy of
introducing effective agricultural training programmes, developing an
aggressive market information system and promoting agro-processing in
the project area.
