Interim evaluation

The aim of the Cotagaita San Juan del Oro Agricultural Development Project (PCSJO) is to increase the incomes and living standards of the rural population of the provinces of Nor Chichas, Sud Chichas and Modesto Omiste, in the Department of Potosí in Bolivia. The target group comprises 10 400 peasant families engaged in agricultural activities. The total cost of the project is USD 17.38 million, of which USD 12.0 million is financed by IFAD. The remainder is provided through contributions from the OPEC Fund (USD 3.0 million), World Food Programme (WFP) (USD 0.5 million) and through local funds (USD 1.88 million). The main executing agency is the Potosí Regional Development Corporation.

The main components of the project are credit, fruit nurseries, marketing, land rehabilitation, small agro-industries, roads, health and support services for agricultural production. The loan was signed in 1985, and the Bolivian Government formally began implementation in 1986. However, implementation was initially very slow due to the country's difficult economic situation. In September 1990, an operational reorientation of the project was approved, changing its structure and substantially improving its management.

Originally intended to last six years, from April 1985, following successive extensions, it is now scheduled for completion in 1994.

Project implementation

Two stages may be distinguished: before and after the operational reorientation of the project in September 1990.

The first stage was characterised by: (i) slow progress towards achieving the project's physical and financial targets (after 66% of its intended life, only 33% of the resources had been spent); (ii) problems with other executing agencies (by 1990 only one of the original five remained); (iii) administrative and financial anomalies, which required changes in the managerial staff; and (iv) excessive administrative centralisation.

This stage coincided with the introduction of drastic stabilisation measures and a major opening of the economy, as a response to the crisis which hit the country in the first half of the 1980s, culminating in the hyperinflation of 1984-1985. This situation affected the execution of the Project by weakening the financial position of the executing agencies. Furthermore, the crisis in the mining sector considerably reduced the demand anticipated from the miners themselves.

The second stage was characterised by a much more active management, aimed at the achievement of specific goals. In three years, the Project carried out a number of actions, in all of the components, to the benefit of the hundred communities (about 6 900 families in all) with whom the project works. During the first phase, the Project disbursed an average of USD 1 453 000 per year (38.5% in the form of loans); in the second phase, average disbursements increased to USD 3 638 000 (4.7% as loans).

The Project has achieved a high level of credibility, acting as a catalyst for the efforts of both public and private agencies in the three provinces covered. This has allowed it to benefit from the resources of other institutions, which have made use of the logistical structure provided by the Project. In all, USD 1.8 million has been received from eleven institutions and programmes.

A positive aspect of the Project has been the formation and maintenance of a nucleus of well-qualified managers and technical staff. This has been achieved through an agreement with the Inter-American Institute for Agricultural Cooperation (IICA), which provides the financing for 15 project staff. Another important element has been the decentralisation of the Project's administration in four areas, and the delegation of responsibility to their respective heads.

This is essential in view of the Project's dimension (approximately 20 000 km2).

Results

In general the Project has shown positive results. The Land Rehabilitation and Micro-Irrigation components have been the most successful, benefiting 4 317 families through the defence or rehabilitation of 1 704 ha (as against a target of 1 640 ha) on the riversides. This represents an increase of nearly 18% of the total cultivable area in 1985. In addition, permanent irrigation has been provided on over 2 200 ha (target 600 ha). These actions have increased the productive resources of 62 peasant communities.

Under the roads component nearly 180 km of new roads have been constructed (against a target 87 km) and 300 km were repaired or maintained, permitting 4 500 inhabitants in 96 communities to transport their produce to the market more cheaply and quickly.

The agricultural extension work covered 1 812 ha of cultivable land (target 3 000 ha), while livestock extension reached more than 150 000 heads of cattle (the target being 20 000), benefiting 3 407 families (62% of the original plan). These activities achieved an additional annual production of 4 400 tonnes, and increases in agricultural incomes of some 45% for the vineyards and 122% for potatoes (1991-1992 harvest). The credit component provided 1 727 loans for a total amount of some USD 1.9 million. However, a significant proportion of these loans (62%) are in arrears.

One noteworthy result of the Project, as a result of activities carried out under the health component, has been the virtual elimination of the 'Vinchuca', an insect which carries the Chagas disease virus. This was achieved partially through improvements to some 20 000 homes (benefiting some 12 150 families) where the physical condition of the houses had allowed the insect to prosper. It might be noted that this activity was not in the original design of the Project.

As part of the food aid component, 19 million meals, equivalent to 3 800 tonnes of food, were distributed in 342 schools, benefiting around 24 000 pupils. In addition, 167 Lorena kitchens, 12 classrooms and 10 dining rooms have been constructed, and 15 classrooms were repaired. Forty-three school vegetable gardens and 27 training courses have been run for members of the School Support Councils (JAEs), to improve food preparation and hygiene. The WFP-funded food-for-work activities represent 138 000 man-days of work, for which 5 700 tonnes of food have been distributed.

Benefits and impact

The total number of beneficiaries receiving agricultural extension has been 3 407 in about a hundred peasant communities, or 63% of the 5 500 foreseen at project design. In almost all the communities, the view was expressed that the Project had increased incomes. Mission estimates suggest that, allowing only for increases in the production of maize, potatoes, vegetables, peaches and grapes, the average family income increased by 34% compared with the base year (1982).

It is relevant to note that this goal was achieved despite a fall in agricultural prices during this period.

Through the primary transformation sub-component, the beneficiaries have learned to make greater use of goat- and sheepskins by salting them, so that they now receive five times the previous price, at a marginal increase in cost.

As a result of the food aid component, the nutritional standard of children in the area has improved. A study by the Health Ministry's Nutritional Epidemiology Monitoring System (SVEN) in 1991 shows that the prevalence of under-nourishment fell from 45.0% in 1987 to 41.7% in 1990. The report attributed the improvement to the actions carried out by the Project and by the WFP-supported Food Aid Programme. The number of students dropping out of school also declined.

The success of the Vinchuca Eradication Programme is highly significant, since the Chagas disease (transmitted by the Vinchuca) formerly represented the main cause of death among young people (80% of deaths between the ages of 20 and 30). In December 1992, re-infestation rates were below 10%.

A very positive result of the project, which also contributes to its sustainability, is the strengthening of beneficiaries' organisations and the development of training activities. In the hundred or so communities with which the Project works, monthly planning and evaluation meetings have been established, with a high level of participation by women. The communities have also set out annual community operational plans (POACs) which serve to guide the Project's activities.

The beneficiaries appreciate the fact that many of the Project officers are local residents. This is the case for the (UCOC) promoters, in particular, who are chosen from the peasant communities. It has been said of them that "they are the spearhead of the Project".

Through these promoters, the Project is achieving a strong increase in the development of local capacities.

Outstanding problems

A principal shortcoming concerns the Project's credit component, which has been virtually paralysed since 1991, when the Bolivian government closed the Bolivian Agricultural Bank (BAB). This, together with the government's measures for deferment and partial cancellation of debts, have led to substantial loan arrears: 61% of the value (72% of the actual number of loans extended).

Due to the fact that many of the Project's actions began with the operational reorientation, they are only mid-way through implementation and thus results have not been consolidated or their impact observed. The marketing component requires particular attention, as it lacks a good system of price and market information.

With regard to extension activities carried out under the Project, there is a lack of consistency in the recommendations offered (even for communities with similar characteristics). Likewise, there is a lack of analysis of the profitability of the various technological options. The monitoring and evaluation system has been effective in its support to the Project's management and in the monitoring of physical targets; but it has neglected activities aimed at measuring the impact of the Project, particularly in terms of productivity and incomes.

An important shortcoming, so far neglected, is that in some cases the water used in irrigation schemes developed under the Project is contaminated by chemical waste discharged into the river by the mines. The effects on the soil, agricultural products and health are not known.

Recommendations

From the above analysis, the Interim Evaluation Mission makes the following recommendations.

1. A second phase of the Project should be implemented, to consolidate the activities which are currently being implemented, taking advantage of the favourable macro-economic and institutional context.

2. In this second phase, the successful elements of the Project should be maintained: its relative operational independence from the Regional Development Corporation; its administrative decentralisation; community participation in project planning, implementation and evaluation activities; and the stability of the administrative and technical staff.

3. The main components of the second phase should be: organisation and training of the beneficiaries (including agricultural extension activities); roads; credit; marketing; provision of drinking water; land rehabilitation and irrigation.

4. A study should be carried out to analyze the effects of chemical pollution on: the rivers as a result of the discharge from the mines; the land; agricultural produce; and on health. Necessary prevention and conservation measures should be identified and adopted.

5. The scope of the Project should be broadened, reducing efforts in those communities closest to self-sufficiency, and including others which have so far received little or no support.

6. It is essential that the project recovers its existing credit portfolio and, in conjunction with other IFAD projects in Bolivia, contributes to the search for an overall solution. Special measures are required for the Villazón Area, including an emphasis on loan-recovery, the recovery of the machinery withdrawn from the Project area, and the application of the relevant legal measures.

7. Under the extension component, two aspects should be improved: (i) a detailed extension strategy should be set out, defining the scope, objectives and targets; (ii) mechanisms should be established to appropriately validate and disseminate the results of the experiments which the extension workers carry out using simple local technologies.