Mid-term evaluation

The Chuquisaca Sur Project (218-BO) is located in the provinces of Cinti Norte and Cinti Sur, in the Southern part of Bolivia. The target group consists of 4 260 small peasant families, with areas of less than 5 ha, and a smaller number of producers with up to 10 ha. The aims of the project are to increase the production and productivity of the small producers and thereby to improve their incomes, employment opportunities and general standard of living.

To achieve these objectives, the Project comprises the following components: supervised credit, agricultural extension, radio, infrastructure (roads, irrigation and buildings), food aid, external technical assistance and monitoring and evaluation. The total cost is USD 9 000 000, of which SDR 5 500 000 is contributed by IFAD, USD 2 000  000 by through an OPEC Fund loan, and USD 248 100 by WFP. WFP support was increased by USD 1 000 000 and the OPEC Fund has approved an additional contribution of USD 150 000 to finance a Chagas disease control programme.

Project implementation

Project implementation has faced numerous problems, related to the institutional instability and public spending reduction, which have confronted Bolivia since the mid-1980s. Three stages may be identified: (i) from January to December 1989, characterised by a slow and disorganised start-up; (ii) from early 1990 until mid-1992, marked by the withdrawal of some implementing agencies (the Agricultural Bank of Bolivia (BAB)), the National Road Service (SNC), the Bolivian Institute of Agricultural Technology (IBTA) and Loyola Cultural Action (ACLO); and rapid staff turnover; (iii) from mid-1992, in which an operational reorientation of the project was initiated, and its technical and professional staff was strengthened. As a consequence, there was a significant improvement in its implementation.

Overall, and taking into account the difficulties noted above, the implementation of PCHS may be characterized as satisfactory, but with marked differences between project components.

The extension component has made significant progress. Its implementation, by the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) since the withdrawal of IBTA, has overcome the constraint of its former top-down approach, to respond better to beneficiaries' needs, as expressed in the Peasant Operational Plans (POCs). It has promoted the incorporation of "peasant extension workers" and the use of practical demonstrations to facilitate the spread of new technologies, many of them requiring few imported inputs (which is very important given the lack of credit). However, it is still necessary to specify and systematise the proposals developed, and to carry out an economic analysis of them.

In the initial phase, the credit component experienced problems in making loans, due to the lack of property titles, overestimation of the demand for credit, and lack of coordination with the extension component. The closure of the BAB in July 1991, led to the suspension of this activity. The portfolio currently amounts to USD 284 000, of which 23% is in arrears (37% of the number of loans). In view of the suspension of this component, the PIU undertook, on an experimental basis, lending activities through alternative mechanisms called Revolving Funds for Peasant Initiatives (FRICs). Despite their small scale, this experience has demonstrated the positive role which peasant organisations can play in the selection of borrowers, as well as in the supervision and recovery of loans. It also demonstrates the diversity of beneficiaries' demands for credit (which is not only agricultural), and the importance of a flexible credit scheme. The possibility of carrying out a pilot project should also be considered.

The marketing component was not well designed, resulting in implementation being delayed until 1990, when bulletins containing price information were issued. This had no effect on marketing.

Subsequently, disparate actions were taken, such as promotion of direct sales of agricultural products and the provision of packaging materials and labels. In 1992, with the appointment of a national consultant, an innovative proposal was developed, centred on support for beneficiaries' organisations, training of leaders, and the formation of Peasant Shops (CCIs). This proposal met with initial success, and needs to be consolidated, strengthening its connections with the other components.

The promotion component has given particular attention to the formation of women's groups (46), training them in activities related to health, nutrition, hygiene and improvements in living conditions, as well as by promoting productive activities, most notably weaving.

While these activities have motivated women who lack support, they have reinforced their reproductive role, neglecting their contribution to local production and community management. The promotion of weaving requires both an economic analysis and a market study to be undertaken. The radio programme included in the design of the project did not work. Given the dispersion of the households and the high transport costs it is important to study the possibility of reactivating this programme.

The infrastructure component, executed by the PIU, has made great progress in the construction and improvement of roads, exceeding the original objectives, helped by active community participation and WFP support. However, it has failed to construct some sections linking important areas. The Irrigation Sub-component has experienced delays, caused by shortcomings in its design and its over-ambitious objectives. The PIU proposes changes in the programme, to include small projects which will have a greater impact in this area. The Infrastructure Unit barely maintains coordination with the project' management, which has had a negative effect on the efficiency of the project.

The food assistance component has been in operation for only one year (since the increase in WFP support). It has strengthened the implementation of community activities such as road construction, sheep dips, etc; and it is also having a favourable effect on basic education through the provision of school meals. Supervision needs to be strengthened, and the paternalistic image of providing food should be avoided. Similarly, there should be a study of the consumption patterns and food supply in the area.

The Project's management has improved by decentralising its activities to three sub-areas, although there is a lack of decentralisation in the budget and in decision-making. The inclusion of qualified personnel has been affected by political interference, by the remoteness of the project, and by the lack of selection criteria in the Chuquisaca Regional Development Corporation (CORDECH).

The procurement process has improved with the transfer of this responsibility from Sucre to Culpina, but problems remain with the isolation of the project headquarters. There is a need to establish a system of management information; to update the Organisation Manual and produce a Manual of Procedures; to computerise the Administrative Unit; and to train Unit staff.

Through the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) component, implemented by the PIU, progress reports on the Project have been produced. However, these are unsystematic, including only a description of what has been done without a comparison with the original programme. They also lack financial information and an analysis of implementation to date. The fact that the M&E Unit was under the control of CORDECH prevented better support to the Project's management, which has been corrected now that it reports directly to the Project Director. The turnover of technical staff and the inclusion of staff without experience was another unfavourable factor for M&E. This has now been overcome by the fact that the head of the unit is hired directly by the Inter-American Institute for Agricultural Cooperation (IICA). There is a need to incorporate outcome indicators, to carry out an economic analysis of the technological proposals, to produce case-studies of issues relevant to the Project and to systematise the expressed needs and views of the beneficiaries.

Results

The most notable achievements of the project have been: (i) an increase in the production and productivity of some goods such as potatoes and peaches, and an improvement in sheep management, as a result of the extension activities. The most widely adopted recommendations have emphasised the dissemination of technologies requiring limited imported inputs; (ii) the construction of a network of low-cost roads, which has surpassed the original project objective, including small tracks constructed by local labour; (iii) the involvement of the beneficiaries as a primary motivation behind the project's actions, particularly since the reorientation of the Project, which established the POCs as the basis for the prioritisation of the activities carried out by the communities themselves; (iv) the support provided for the organisation and training of women, with particular emphasis on craft activities; (v) the improvement in the living conditions of families in the area, through increased production and its effect on nutrition, support to education by the provision of school meals, and other specific actions; and (vi) the strengthening of local institutions and the project's technical team, providing a basis for its future sustainability. In the last agricultural year, nearly twice as many beneficiaries until 1992 received technical extension, bringing the total number of beneficiaries to 2 100.

Lessons Learnt

The main lessons derived from project implementation are:

(i) the necessity of analysing more thoroughly the socio-political context of the country and its institutions, changes in which can seriously restrict project implementation, as with the closure of BAB and the changes in other institutions proposed as executing agencies (IBTA and SNC). It is also necessary that the design of projects should take greater account of the issues of institutional capacity, and bureaucratic constraints. At the same time, there is a need to analyze the key constraints on the peasant economy, so as to propose a combination of actions to help overcome the main bottlenecks which restrict its development. In the PCHS, the exclusion of livestock, marketing, forestry and soil conservation activities led to deficiencies in implementation of the project;

(ii) it is important to simplify feasibility studies, and to shorten the periods for formulation and financial negotiation, avoiding the artificial separation between formulation and implementation. This should facilitate the re-programming of the project, incorporating those aspects which cannot be foreseen at the time of its formulation;

(iii) the need for a broader conception of what is to be considered as "rural", so as to allow room to include essential support to "rural towns" which, like Culpina (where the project headquarters is located), lack the conditions to provide services which are indispensable for future agricultural development;

(iv) experience in the implementation of the extension component signals the necessity of checking the validity of assumptions concerning the availability of technologies appropriate for the target group as well as a clear definition of the extension methodology.

(v) The experience of the PCHS demonstrates the necessity of including peasant participation in each stage of project implementation (from programming to evaluation); in this context, the "peasant promoters" represent a resource which widens the impact of the Project and facilitates its future sustainability.

Recommendations

To improve the implementation, and to ensure the achievement of the project's objectives, the Mid-Term Evaluation Mission recommends:

(1) enhancing and completing the process of Project Reorientation, by:

(i) making explicit the elements of the new strategy, centred on productive development, working methods to strengthen the organisation, and operational aspects;

(ii) the definition of a core area of work for productive development, comprising extension, irrigation, credit and marketing, supported by actions towards forestry and soil conservation;

(iii) combined action in promotion, training and organisation, to strengthen project operation, including the establishment of specific actions in support of women; and

(iv) extending the process of decentralisation, so as to facilitate the operational strategy;

(2) strengthening the PIU by: (i) sustained training of the technical team in areas where their basic training is considered weak; and (ii) the appointment of a rural development expert to assist the Project Director;

(3) guaranteeing the continuity of the Project, through greater stability of personnel; the establishment of technical criteria for staff selection; greater transparency and autonomy of the PIU, to increase efficiency in decision-making and project operation; and reorientation of supervisory activities of the Andean Development Corporation (CAF), with clear agreements between IFAD and the CAF.

Two characteristics of the Chuquisaca Sur Project should be noted: firstly, the project team is young and enthusiastic, but has limited experience; and secondly, the project is remote from the regional decision-making centres. These characteristics offer both great potential, but at the same time could represent a source of weakness.

The potential is provided by the greater scope (relative to other projects) for trying new working methods, in both technical and social aspects. There are large parts of the project area where no development institution has worked and where there is economic potential and a good level of peasant organisation.

However, the characteristics of youth and remoteness may also create problems: without supervision and stimulation, there is a risk that the work may lack depth and thoroughness. Accordingly, it is essential to carry out a vigorous training programme for project staff and to develop interactions with other development projects.