Interim evaluation
The Minya governorate constitutes
a project area of 223 500 ha of which about 188 120 ha
are under cultivation. The cultivated area is generally flat, with
fine to medium textured relatively fertile alluvial soils. The climate
is characterized by a cool winter from November to March and a hot
summer from May to September. The population in 1991 was estimated
at 3.50 million, compared to 2.06 million in 1986.
The majority of land is cultivated by small farmers operating as owners,
registered tenants, and sharecroppers or as a mixture of all three. In
1991, 44% of all farms were less than one feddan in size and 81% were
under three feddans. The cropping pattern (at SAR) was based on a well
established two to three-year rotation which had, until recently, been
determined by government policy. The main crops are wheat, cotton, berseem,
broad beans, maize and soybeans. Livestock are important, with 245 000,
305 000 and 604 000 cattle, buffalo and small ruminants respectively
reported in 1991. This reflects a marked increase since the early 1980s
in cattle and buffalo and a decrease in camels and donkeys, as a consequence
of mechanization.
Project design and objectives
Target group
Smallholder/tenant farming families cultivating holdings of less than
three feddans, with an average per capita income, from farming, of USD 75
or less were the target group. While the project was designed to allow
extension services to make contact with virtually all farmers in the project
area, only about a third (115 500 farming families) were expected
to actually benefit from contact with project activities. As well, institutions
and their employees are expected to benefit from training, better operating
means and incentive payments additional to their salaries.
Objectives and components
The SAR stated that the project "supports the major objectives of
the Government's agricultural policy which is to attain as much self-sufficiency
in food as possible and to generate foreign exchange". Furthermore,
the project was to provide the agricultural sector with the means to increase
farm incomes and the standards of living of the people. Crop production
increases were to be achieved primarily through improved farm practices
rather than increased inputs. The contention was that currently available
technology for crop production was adequate but that many farmers needed
access to it. To provide access, the project was to re-organize
the extension (and to a lesser degree, research) service using the Training
and Visit (T&V) System of Extension. To ensure that the recommended
crop packages could be implemented, the project was to strengthen some
aspects of crop inputs supply and credit facilities. By taking these actions,
the project would assist the Government of Egypt (GOE) in implementing
its policy of merging research and extension at the governorate, district
and field levels.
The project was to achieve its objectives through investment in institutional
strengthening; provision for a better supply of a range of agricultural
inputs; and through credit. Project activities were to be phased over
a six-year period to ensure that sufficient time was allowed for the installation
of the T&V system and the procurement and physical construction of
all the necessary infrastructure. The following components and sub-components
were to be included:
Agricultural development
- Extension
- Research
- Rural stores credit
- Farm development machinery credit
- Machinery repairs shop credit
- Seed processing
- Seed testing and inspection
Livestock development
- Rabbit production
- Chick rearing units
- Animal health service
- Abbassieh vaccine centre
- Artificial insemination
- Feed mixing plant
Project Coordination Unit (PCU)
Technical Assistance
Expected effects
and assumptions
In terms of production, the project was expected to increase the output
of most crops grown for which a proven technological package of improvements
already exists. By project maturity (Year 9), average increases for
all crops were to be about 25% and would range from 44% in the case of
maize to only 11% for cotton which has good potential for yield increase
but whose production was constrained by government policies. Production
benefits from ruminant stock were to result principally from improved
fodder availability and improved reproduction performance. Meat production
was expected to increase by 40% and milk by 21%, while poultry meat production
was expected to increase by about 22%. It was expected that net income
increases for farmers highly responsive to project activities would rise
by 92% and, for those below average receptivity, by 33%.
The existing extension service was to be reorganized and the T&V
system introduced under the guidance of an internationally recruited T&V
extension specialist. Where possible, women extension agents were to be
recruited to promote small livestock enterprises and better nutrition.
Village Extension Workers (VEWs) were expected to reach women engaged
in farming activities through their contact farmers. The replicability
of the T&V system for other parts of Egypt was to be assessed on the
basis of its performance under MADP.
Links between extension and two research centres were to be strengthened
through the training and the development of on-farm research based on
assessments of farmers' needs.
Evaluation
In accordance with the terms of reference the mission focused on agricultural
development essentially as affected by the project's innovative extension
system, the appropriateness of crop recommendations developed by research,
the extension/research link and the projects' credit component. Agricultural
development was taken primarily as crop development; though not part of
the focus of the evaluation, some consideration was given to livestock
and project management as well. Major policy changes have taken place
in Egypt since the inception of the project ten years ago; thus what may
have been considered to be appropriate at appraisal may not be appropriate
today. For instance, agricultural input supplies were largely government
provided and the large-scale commercial production of livestock was in
government hands, two situations which are being changed. The mission
has tried to keep policy changes in mind during its deliberations.
In order to assess the overall status of the project, the mission reviewed
IDA’s supervision reports, progress reports prepared by the project
and reports prepared by consultants contracted by the project for specific
activities. The assessment of the MADP was carried out together with a
similar assessment of the Fayoum Agricultural Development Project (FADP)
so that experiences from these projects, which have many similarities,
could be taken into account by a forthcoming Livestock Production Intensification
Project (LPIP) appraisal mission. The mission spent nine days in the project
area during which it visited all the nine districts, the two relevant
research stations, credit banks and conducted a workshop on T&V experiences
which included senior staff at governorate and district levels.
Implementation context
In the context of the general economy the project was conceived at the
end of a period of economic boom but implemented during a period of relative
austerity. This situation almost certainly contributed to problems with
local funding.
By August 1992, some 62.7% of the IFAD loan had been disbursed. Major
delays in utilizing funds (particularly the "unallocated" category
(not used at all), credit, vehicles and equipment) were caused by government
bureaucratic procedures, inter-ministerial delays and difficulties with
the letting of tenders under internationally competitive bidding. During
the first half of the project life, implementation was constrained by
interrupted flows of local funds for incentive salary payment to extension
staff, lack of funds for the strengthening of research and extension linkages
and for the establishment of the M&E unit (MEU). This situation
seriously impeded the proper implementation of the project.
In order to overcome this financial constrain, a grant of USD 752 000
was provided in December 1986 by the Government of the Netherlands through
IFAD. The grant was used to complement the local fund contribution
of the GOE by financing part of the incentive payments to the extension
service staff, all research and extension linkages incentive payments
and other recurrent costs incurred by the research scientists and all
expenses of establishing an MEU under the PCU.
Project achievements
The project has been instrumental in increasing farm output and strengthening,
through the T&V system, the MOALR's advisory service. However, the
base for the strengthened extension service as it stands, is fragile and
dependent on regular incremental funding.
Infrastructure. The extension centres (and a training center in
Minya) have been successfully completed; they provide suitable bases for
district staff to operate from, as well as locations for routine VEW training.
The MADP had enormous difficulties, however, in implementing activities
which involved the production of detailed engineering designs and advertising
tenders according to internationally accepted standards and procedures.
Staffing. The project successfully recruited VEWs from within
existing complements of field staff. In July 1992, there were some 1 300
VEWs working with the MADP. As well, the necessary numbers of Village
Extension Supervisors (VESs to supervise VEWs) and Subject Matter Specialists
(SMSs to train the VESs and VEWs) were successfully recruited. Training
of SMSs by researchers substantially improved the ability of the latter
to teach VEWs existing and new agricultural technologies. Intensive training
increased the confidence and ability of the VEWs, and this, combined with
incentive payments, better working conditions and a set programme, motivated
and enabled the extension service to communicate better with farmers.
Monitoring and Evaluation. The establishment and re-location (from
Cairo) of the MEU has added a valuable dimension to the project. Regular
surveys on adoption and re-adoption of recommendations as well as farmers'
attitudes have been conducted since project inception. However, survey
results need more critical evaluation so that full benefits can be made
of the mass of data collected.
Effects assessment
and sustainability
Effects on Production. Total production has increase very substantially.
While much of this upsurge in production must be attributed to other factors,
including better varieties and better crop prices, the fact that yields
for wheat and maize exceed national averages and the fact that adoption
and re-adoption rates for extension recommendations are high strongly
points to substantial project impact. The fact that production has increased
at a substantially higher rate than population implies that a positive
effect on food availability has occurred. Average farm incomes have risen
substantially in nominal terms. The deflated income increase for a typical
form model corresponds approximately to the SAR's target. There are no
data available on what proportion of the increased production was generated
by the project's target group, i.e. farmers with less than three feddans
of arable land.
Effect on Institutional Strengthening. The project directed substantial
attention to supporting the extension activities, both in terms of training
and the provision of better operational facilities. As well, the technical
capacity of the project's VEWs has been raised, and they are now in a
much more secure position when interacting with farmers. While still less
than desirable, the linkage between extension and research has been improved,
mainly with regard to training. The MADP showed that direct contractual
links with research institutes were an effective way of developing specific
crop packages and conducting on-farm trails. This example should be generalized
for further improvements in future.
Sustainability. One of the objectives of the projects was to
develop a sustainable T&V system which could be replicated in
other governorates. While there is no doubt that the T&V system is
a substantial improvement on the pre-project situations, it has been dependant
on substantial incentives and to a lesser degree, expensive inputs of
transport. The mission accepts that with the very low wages, incentives
are essential (and, indeed, can be usefully manipulated to improve performance)
but doubts whether the GOE is prepared to fund and maintain them at a
sufficiently high level to sustain the T&V system in its present form.
The MOALR within the governorates is grossly over-staffed (there are
numerous employees outside the T&V system). A much smaller cadre of
T&V workers who are better trained, better paid and adequately
equipped is likely to be more cost-effective in transferring technology.
However, it is unlikely that the authorities would accept substantial
sudden staff reductions to allow the establishment of such a T&V force.
This is a critical issue as to whether an effective extension system
can be developed and sustained. Without project funding the T&V system
in its current form is not sustainable.
Main issues and recommendations
The rationale between the LPIP and the MADP is, in essence, the
same. The following recommendations apply to the LPIP and similar rural
development projects.
Organization and Management
The operation of the project was hampered by MOALR's hesitancy in delegating
the authority for implementation to the governorate. The two major lessons
learnt are, firstly, that the authority and full responsibility for decision
making and financial expenditure should be with the governorate, and secondly,
that projects should have effective representation at national level.
An effective National Coordinating Committee (NCC) could have dealt with
the issue of GOE local funding. Thus, projects should ensure that project
control (both the financial and implementation authority) is at governorate
level. However, to ensure that the projects programs can be implemented,
co-operation (particularly regarding financial cash flows) needs to be
secured at national level. For this purpose, a functional NCC should be
set up. It should be possible to improve the implementation efficiency
in future projects by streamlining project organizational arrangements.
In particular, the position of Project Coordinator, which is redundant
should be suppressed. The PCUs should continue to act as service units
run by Managers while Governorate PCCs should assume the full and ultimate
authority for the coordination of project implementation. The line agencies
would bear full responsibility for the implementation of their programs.
To facilitate relationships between the NCC and the project, a Project
Services Office (PSO) should be located with the MOALR's Foreign Agricultural
Relations Offices; it should not have financial control for the
project. Its responsibility would be to provide services for the governorate
PCUs.
The project would have benefitted had its senior officials been better
briefed about organization and management; a short-term "project
(turn-key) start up" contract, to translate the SAR into a working
document and to organize workshops for senior field staff would have been
useful. Thus, the appointment of a short-term "turn-key" rural
development consultant at the commencement of new IFAD projects is recommended.
As the procurement of vehicles has been a major bone of contention, the
purchase details for vehicles have to be accurately defined at SAR; conversely
there must be some flexibility in the ability of a project and IFAD to
agree on the purchase of alternative vehicles locally in the interest
of a project.
Technology Transfer
While the project adopted and modified the T&V system, a considerable
number of problems and weaknesses occurred which led to delays in, and
modification to, the programs of work. However, the high level of activity
attained by the VEWs and increased production by smallholder provides
a clear indication of the merits of the system for Egypt.
The immediate weaknesses to be resolved in the extension system are the
increased involvement of farmers in localized adaptive-research constraints
analysis and on-farm trials; the broader development of the contact farmers
and their individual sub-societal farmers' groups away from the co-operatives
to be more representative of the marginalized communities; the establishment
of a lasting and effective working research and extension at governorate
level; the establishment of a permanently staffed agricultural extension
training center for staff and leading farmer training; the establishment
of a productive Development Support Communication Section; the development
of a well researched women's extension programme of activities; the provision
of transport and an operational budget including, in the prevailing economic
situation, incentives; an overall improvement to the system and effectiveness
of organization and management, and the frequent, objective, monitoring
and self-evaluation by management of field programme activities.
Whilst many of the above mentioned weaknesses can be rectified, the major
improvements can never be achieved until such time as GOE is able to undertake
a complete revision of the civil service bureaucracy, reducing the number
of extension field staff by at least 75% and increasing the salaries and
allowances within the service to levels appropriate to the economy, in
association with the provision for locally planned annual work programs
with adequate operational funds and transport.
In line with the GOE's policy of reducing the number of public servants
and in recognition of the fact that a small but well motivated and better
trained extension force could effectively man a modified T&V extension
system it is recommended that the ratio of VEW to farmer be increased
to at least 1:500.
To allow such a modified system (or indeed any T&V system) to function
on a sustainable basis, the following key subsidiary recommendations are
made:
funds for realistic levels of incentives must be secured. At negotiation
this must be a "critical issue";
payment of incentives for all personnel involved in the project must
be linked to performance be it in training or field performance; or
both;
all SMSs and VEWs must be trained to a higher level in areas specifically
related to the project;
the responsibility for agricultural regulatory functions must be transferred
away from T&V VEWs;
a fully illustrated T&V extension manual should be developed for
the LPIP project illustrating the system of operations; and
technical material should be developed (and/or simplified) and distributed
as well as illustrated technical packages to farmers and village schools.
Much more use must be made of communication through radio, television
and the audio-visual media.
As a prerequisite to implementing productive women's activities, the
following steps should be taken:
a well qualified and experienced woman should be appointed as the women's
development advisor to each of the governorate's PCCs; whilst at the same
time advising the Directors of Extension and the Heads of Women's extension
programming;
the involvement of women should be developed and managed through the
formation of a Women's Working Group at governorate level, combining the
available resources of extension with those of all the Non-Government
Organizations (NGOs) in the governorate working on women's activities
at village level;
a detailed socio-economic survey of the rural women's situation should
be undertaken. The results of this survey together with a "pooling"
of locally available experience and the identification of reasons for
the failure of women's activities would establish a more solid basis for
project activities; and
the proposal, in the LPIP, to establish women's centres (ten in each
district of the three governorates) should be placed in abeyance until
the actions recommended have been undertaken and conclusions drawn.
Regular monthly workshops should be held at district level involving
senior extension staff, district SMSs and all other agencies, including
Bank for Development and Agricultural Credit (BDAC), involved in development
to formulate detailed monthly work programs which would then be implemented
in a cohesive manner.
The LPIP assumed that there was adequate livestock technology available
and that it merely needs to be applied. The appraisal team should check
this assumption thoroughly.
Credit
The main credit line (machinery) was ill-conceived, with the result that
the 1 000 or so beneficiaries (out of 228 000 farmers in the
governorate) received average loans of about Egyptian Pound (LE) 5 600
and represented the largest 3-4% of landowners. Thus, on the basis of
MADP experience the following is recommended:
funds should be directed at specified smallholder activities geared to
match the resources of the farmers and a ceiling should be placed on the
size of loans to help in spreading potential benefits;
while there are proven activities accepted by BDAC, others need to be
presented as commercially viable packages while some need further commercial
testing. To strengthen BDAC's capacity to update activities and to strengthen
new ones, funds should be made available to the recruitment of a practically-oriented
person from the private sector specifically for this task; and
a mechanism allowing non-heizah cardholders to access BDAC funds
for viable activities should be developed.
With specific regard to credit in the LPIP, the following recommendations
were made:
the appraisal mission should firstly confirm that lack of credit is,
in fact, constraining smallholder livestock activities. PBDAC has numerous
credit lines through its own sources as well as foreign assistance monies
available particularly for traditional types of credit such as poultry,
goats and sheep. These livestock make up 60% of the proposed loan portfolio
in the LPIP;
some of the assumptions made in formulating the lending proposals should
be re-examined at appraisal. For instance, the numbers of goats and sheep
to be purchased through the project amount to about one-third of the governorates'
current numbers; as well, the project is to lend for about 17 times the
total number of chickens present;
both financial soundness and logistical supports requirements for smallholder
poultry enterprises need to be carefully examined at appraisal. In the
light of experience are poultry, given the now high cost of feed, a viable
enterprise for small farmers; and
the LPIP Formulation Report concluded that buffalo enterprises are not
financially sound; the mission calculated, on the assumption that the
animal is fed by farm produced fodder and crop residues (which it did
not cost), that the enterprise could accumulate a substantial net benefit.
As well, the fact remains that the buffalo is popular with rural dwellers;
it is recommended that the appraisal should look more closely at the economic/social
importance of the buffalo in the smallholder farming system.
Lessons learned
Given that a T&V system along classical lines (ie low VEW to farmer
ratio) cannot be locally funded an alternative system, based on a much
wider VEW to farmer ratio, serviced by a better trained, better paid and
adequately equipped extension force is likely to be more cost effective.
IFAD, in conjunction with other donors, should encourage the GOE to move
along these lines. Any future IFAD interventions in extension should gear
the size of its operations for the amount of recurrent operating costs
that the borrower is able to fund.
Project design should ensure that project control (both the financial
and implementation authority) is at governate level. To ensure financial
cash flows, especially, projects need effective representation at national
level. To facilitate relationships between a functional National Coordinating
Committee and the project, a Project Services Office should be located
with the MOALR's Foreign Agricultural Relations Offices; it should not
have financial control. Its role, solely, would be to look after the projects'
interests at national level.
The project would have benefited had its senior officials been better
briefed about organizational management. Thus a short-term "project
(turn-key) start up" contract, which translates the SAR into a working
document and organizes workshops for senior field staff, should be a first
step in project implementation.
In the context of the very poorly paid Egyptian public service, realistic
levels of incentives must be assured. These incentives must, however,
not be seen as "rights" but must be related to performance.
Incentives should be a key issue at negotiation.
Producing detailed engineering designs, advertising tenders according
to internationally accepted standards and procedures and the procurement
of vehicles are major bones of contention. The necessary mechanisms and
standards should be clearly defined at negotiation. Realistically, in
the matter of vehicles, there should be some flexibility in the interest
of a project, should inordinate delays occur in the tendering process,
for purchasing vehicles locally.
While projects should endeavour to develop farmer/extension/research
linkages as a mechanism for conducting on-farm trials, the mechanism of
using contracts between the project and a research institute (without
excluding the farmer/extension/research linkage) to conduct targeted research,
should be used where appropriate.
In the area of credit it is evident that small farmers can service loans
for proven activities. As well BDAC is quite capable of targeting a particular
segment of the farming community if given the appropriate incentive. Given
this positive situation IFAD should promote the identification and development
of more financially profitable activities and, secondly, help BDAC develop
mechanisms for increasing its clientele by including farmers, who are
not landowners or official tenants, as potential borrowers.
