The project aimed at raising the living standards of a rapidly increasing population while arresting land degradation resulting from an influx of refugees from the drought-stricken northern regions.
The planned project activities were:
- the construction of wateryards along the stock routes was given the highest priority;
- the provision of veterinary services so as to minimize the trade impediments due to livestock epidemic diseases and reduce the risk of infectious diseases among exported animals;
- project administration;
- technical assistance, including vegetation monitoring services to support decisions regarding the use or non-use of the routes depending on the availability of grazing.
The goal was to stimulate meat production among traditional meat producers and to meet the demand of urban and export markets by ensuring flows of marketed livestock, with minimal trekking losses, from the project areas.
The economic policy aspect of the project rationale – to increase the volume of livestock trade – revolved around the fact that the high net foreign-exchange earnings from the exportation of livestock and livestock products were threatened because of the growing domestic, especially urban, demand.
The project also aimed to provide more of a balance in regional development as it would assist parts of Sudan that are less well endowed than are those parts of the country benefiting from irrigated development. Furthermore, in the project area, population growth was putting pressure on the land, and the income from periodic sales of livestock might be the only source of funds so that subsistence farmers could invest in crop inputs and good husbandry practices to protect soils.
Specifically, the project set out to renew and extend water supplies
and veterinary services along livestock trade routes. The estimated financial
benefits that would accrue to livestock raisers and traders included a
reduction in livestock holding costs, a reduction in trekking weight losses
and a reduction in livestock mortality during trekking.
Outcome
The project achieved its main goal of establishing wateryards along the livestock market route, and the number of animals trekking on the route increased. The construction of veterinary service stations was seriously delayed and eventually downsized. It was estimated that there was sufficient demand for water from livestock traders, as well as from local inhabitants, in almost all 50 of the operating wateryards, but water prices were a key issue that, at the time, jeopardized financial viability of the privatized Livestock Route Company (LRC).
The distribution of the wateryards was well planned and enabled the animals to obtain water, thereby reducing losses due to mortality and lower weights. The project also had a positive impact by diminishing the trek times along the route, cutting trekking and holding costs and boosting the marketable meat value and the incomes of pastoralists and livestock traders.
| It was recognized that the Government of Sudan needed to be relieved of the growing burden of the development of rural water supplies and their efficient operation and maintenance. Thus, an innovative organizational arrangement was established that was endorsed by the Government and that could serve as a model for future development projects. The project would be implemented over a five-year period by the Livestock and Meat Marketing Corporation on behalf of the LRC. The LRC would eventually operate the wateryards as a commercial venture owned by the project beneficiaries, thus ensuring the continuation of the operation and the effective maintenance of the facilities after implementation. | ||
Planned |
Achieved |
|
To establish a private company, the LRC, to implement the project. The Government of Sudan was to sell 80% of its equity holdings in the LRC to livestock traders and producers by 1989. To provide technical assistance and staff training consisting of 50 person-months for a hydrologist and a chief engineer, 68 person-months of short-term international consultancy, and staff training in administration and engine mechanics. |
The privatization of the LRC was seriously delayed, and the commitment of the Government to the project in general and to the privatization of the LRC was often questioned. The privatization process that was outlined during project design had not been fulfilled by 1989, when the Government replaced the director of the LRC, thereby undermining the authority and financial management capacity of the company. However, by 1992, there had been notable improvements both in the operational and financial management of the company and in the commitment of the Government to the privatization. Four international consultants were recruited through the project to fill the posts of chief engineer, hydrologist and supervising civil engineer. The chief engineer stayed with the project for about 36 months, and the other two positions were filled for 30 months by one company. The hydrologist position was filled for equal periods of time by two candidates. In addition, three senior staff were trained in project implementation, and several short courses for mechanics were carried out. |
|
Access to inputs and infrastructure
| The Sudanese economy relied heavily on the commerce in and the exportation of livestock as a source of foreign currency. The development of water sources along traditional trekking routes to livestock markets was a very interesting proposition. There were initially concerns about the condition of the rangelands along the route and also about the technical viability of the project, i.e., the availability of water, on the main northern route. Thus, the parallel development of a secondary dry season route in the less arid southern part of the project area was also endorsed. The condition of existing water sources was less than satisfactory.
There were more than 600 wells in the project area, most abstracting
from four sedimentary formations which underlay about 60% of
the northern stock route and 50% of the dry season route. Though
most wells were equipped with diesel-operated lift pumps with
a long record of proven reliability in Sudan, many yielded less
than the designed production due to aging equipment. |
||
| Planned |
Achieved |
|
| To construct 59 wateryards with about 83 tube wells on two main routes over a distance of about 2 000 km. The wateryards were to be equipped with water-storage tanks, selling facilities, staff housing, vehicles for delivery of supplies, and radio equipment. People who live close to the wateryards would have access to them, as would the transhumants on seasonal migration. To establish facilities for project administration, including
the construction of an office, store and staff housing in El
Obeid, the provision of vehicles, equipment and incremental
staff. |
The construction of
wateryards was the most important component of the project.
At project completion, 50 wateryards were operating, and two
had been completed, but were inoperative due to security concerns.
Notwithstanding the success of implementation, some of the problems
observed were as follows: The construction of the LRC office in El Obeid was not carried out. Instead, offices were rented instead. Staffing targets were fulfilled, and vehicles and equipment were procured. |
|
| Range conditions were generally poor to very poor along the greater part of the existing trade routes and around all major water points and settlements. | ||
| Planned |
Achieved |
|
| To monitor and evaluate range conditions and trends along and adjacent to the stock routes so as to define the status of vegetation and seek patterns of use on the routes to promote improvement in vegetative density and quality. |
A report on range conditions and the impact of water development was commissioned in 1987. The report concluded that wateryard locations were based largely along existing routes without regard to range conditions. However, traders were using considerable judgement in their choice of routes, and there was sufficient flexibility to permit deviations depending on the availability of water and grazing. Where the project would increase these options, this would have a favourable effect by spreading the intensity of range use. The need for the establishment of a range-monitoring system and the appointment of range staff was also stressed in the report. By 1991, two professional staff had been allocated to rangeland monitoring, the collection of range condition data and oversight of the execution of a green-fencing programme. The findings of the 1987 report on impact were
reaffirmed in the Project Completion Report, which stated that
the wateryards caused little or no damage to the environment.
There was evidence that the growth of vegetation near some yards
was better than the growth in more distant areas. It was surmised
that there were two reasons for this: the soil fertility in
these areas was high due to the accumulation of animal manure,
and the provision of water encouraged cattle movement earlier
in the year, thereby reducing the grazing pressure on rangelands
in the south-west. |
|
| There is no information available on the health of animals trekking the stock routes or the impact of the project on animal health. However, the project recorded a success in the reduction of weight loss and mortalities. The rationale behind the establishment of veterinary stations along the stock routes was to avoid the spread of animal diseases, especially among animals that would be exported. | ||
| Planned |
Achieved |
|
| To establish veterinary service stations equipped with office buildings, staff housing, drugs, vehicles and equipment. | Higher priority was given to the creation of wateryards rather than to veterinary services. Because of delays in tendering civil works for the project in general and because of the already stretched implementation capacity of the LRC, it was decided that the number of veterinary clinics should be reduced. However, by project completion, none of the buildings for the veterinary stations had been built. | |
- Government interference hindered the privatization process. The Government should have enforced regulations on the provision of basic services (such as water), while safeguarding the financial viability and managerial autonomy of the private companies that procure the services.
- Water use was not adequately monitored. In the absence of water meters, it was not possible to measure the cost of water during various seasons.
- The provision of infrastructure that supports the functioning of markets can have a sustainable, positive impact in the lives of the rural poor.
- Despite the concerns of the Sudanese Government that conflicts would arise between sedentary populations and pastoralists along the dry season route, there has been no report that such conflicts have occurred, perhaps because local communities have also benefited from the development of water sources, and apparently their interests have been considered in the development of the wateryards.
- Opportunities to broaden the revenue sources of the project and thus achieve financial autonomy and profitability were missed due to insufficient expertise in livestock management among the project staff. The livestock consultant’s report was issued late in the project cycle and identified opportunities for the sale of drugs and feed, as well as an opportunity for the staff at wateryards to run a sheep-fattening enterprise during the slack dry season when very few animals were trekking the route.
- The sustainability and positive impact achieved by this project
are largely due to the fact that the project widened the options of
herders looking for critical inputs for their animals, such as water
and feed, on their way to market. The range was not overgrazed because
(a) the herders had a stronger incentive to keep their animals moving
towards the market rather than staying on the rangeland; (b) the herders
could choose the route they would follow thanks to the good spatial
arrangement of the wateryards; and (c) the development of wateryards
along the southern route provided an alternative route; thus the herders
responded to signals about the availability of fodder and moved the
animals accordingly.
The privatization of the Livestock Route Company proved to be much more difficult than envisioned in the project design because of the lack of technical assistance, staff experience in commercial management, and Government commitment. - The project has demonstrated a successful model for investment in water production facilities, as well as successful operation, maintenance and cost recovery. There is evidence that the success of the Livestock Route Company has influenced the relevant national policy of the Government of Sudan. The water department has substantially increased water charges, and government policy supports the full recovery, from users, of the costs of water provision. This change in attitude was of major importance because, according to estimates, about 60% of the wateryards in Sudan were not operational at any one time due to insufficient revenues are recovered to meet operating and maintenance costs.
- The integrated approach used in the development of wateryards and drilling sites:
- involved the communities;
- took account of water and land-use rights;
- established water points at appropriate distances one from the next;
- relied on and conducted hydrological surveys;
- proved to be sustainable and successful.
