| Source of technology and funding | Research conducted by national agricultural research systems (NARS) in West Asia and North Africa (WANA) in collaboration with the International Centre for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA) and the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), and cofinanced by IFAD and the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD) |
| Expected Benefit: | Improving the decision-making environment within which rural producers make their decisions. |
| Subject: | Property rights |
| Agro-ecological zones: | Arid and semi-arid zones (200 to 350 mm/year rainfall) |
| Target region and countries: | West Asia and North Africa – Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia |
| Keywords: | property rights; land improvements; investment; tenure security; West Asia and North Africa; arid and semi-arid |
Developing the agricultural sector has long been a major concern of all the governments of the West Asia and North Africa (WANA) region. Many institutional reforms were promoted to enhance the performance of rural households and communities in conducting their cropping and herding activities. After many reforms, however, there continues to be a perception that existing property rights systems in the rural areas constrain agricultural development and hinder farmers from investing on their lands and adopting new technologies. This Technical Advisory Note explores whether these concerns are justified, by evaluating the effects of existing land rights on long-term land improvements and assessing the level of that investment.
Land tenure systems in WANA countries are a blend of Islamic, colonial and post-colonial land policies. The structure of the land tenure systems differ only in the approaches used to promote efficiency, equity and environmental sustainability in the low-rainfall areas. Institutional and legal reforms were perceived as important policy instruments for providing incentives and enhancing the ability of rural households to manage and sustain their resources and production systems. However, each country had a different vision regarding the nature and extent of institutional reforms, that ranged across full privatization, partial privatization and agrarian reform.
The governments of Morocco and Tunisia prioritized privatization as the major instrument for promoting rural development, by granting private rights to both tribes and individuals. However, in Tunisia, the privatization process moved very rapidly by dividing tribal lands and granting individual private rights to tribal members. In Morocco, tribal members were granted perpetual-use rights on their tribal lands, except for those under irrigation. These were fully privatized.
The partial privatization approach was mainly applied in Jordan and Lebanon. Here, the state retained land ownership while the beneficiaries were granted use-rights. In Jordan, the holder of such a right has the capacity to transfer use-right through inheritance, rent or sale. In Lebanon, however, the municipalities and village committees were vested with the management of these lands, while village members were granted use-rights.
Agrarian reform was one of the most widespread instruments used to promote equity and agricultural development, and was applied in Algeria, Iraq, Libya and Syria. Agrarian reform was also conducted in Morocco and Tunisia, but mainly on lands that had been confiscated or purchased from colonial owners. The importance of agrarian reform resides partly with its equity implications, because many poor and landless farmers and herders received lands, and were also organized into cooperatives to facilitate their access to credit and inputs.
Surveys were conducted in Jordan, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia between January and May 1997. Households were randomly sampled from selected villages following Rapid Rural Appraisals (RRAs) in 42 communities. The surveys focused on household-, field- and crop-level data to capture the livelihood and production strategies of herders and farmers. Complete censuses of fields, livestock, feed sources, production and income generation strategies were carried out for each household. Probit analysis was used to assess the propensity of farmers to make long-term investments and Tobit analysis to evaluate the level of that investment. The costs of improvements were real costs and 1975 was used as the base year.
Land rights and ability to improve
Completeness of ownership is based on the customary concepts of ownership of the resource (mulk al Ayni) and ownership of the use-rights (mulk al manfaa). Complete ownership rights, which mean that one or more individuals owns the resource and its use, corresponds to private property in the Western sense. Incomplete rights, which consist of partial ownership over either the resource or its use, include perpetual-use-rights obtained on tribal collective lands (Morocco); ownership rights (meeri) obtained on state lands (Jordan); agrarian reform and state lands (Syria); and rented and appropriated lands.
Land improvements included any long-term investments made by farmers to enhance farm productivity since the acquisition of the plot. These improvements, which included de-stoning, tree planting and well installation, applied to 25% of the plots in Jordan, 29% in Morocco and 46% in Syria. As expected, the propensity to make long-term land improvement was significant in all three countries, with higher marginal effects in Jordan (Table 1). Similar results were found for meeri rights (Jordan) and perpetual-use-rights (Morocco), unlike agrarian reform lands, which were positive, but not significantly so. In general, existing land rights in the low rainfall areas are not preventing farmers from investing in their land.
Table 1. Marginal effects on the probability of making long-term investments
* Marginal effects were obtained using the dprobit procedure
in Stata.
( ) were not significant at the 10% significance level
Plot- and village-specific characteristics, which were included in the
analyses, are not reported here.
Similarly to the results from the probit analysis, investment in privately-owned land was significant in all three countries, with higher levels in Jordan. Farmers with meeri rights in Jordan and perpetual-use-rights in Morocco were able to invest in their land. In Syria, however, the level of investment was not significant (Table 2).
Table 2. Total Investment (1975-1996).
( ) were not significant at the 10% significance level.
Plot- and village-specific characteristics, which were included in the analyses, are not reported here.
Research results from the three countries showed that present land tenure systems provide enough incentives to farmers to invest in enhancing the productivity of their land. Moreover, the fact that holders of complete and incomplete land rights alike are removing rocks, planting trees and digging wells demonstrates conclusively that the rights on croplands are secure. Hence, the perception of insecurity surrounding land rights on croplands in the low-rainfall areas of the WANA countries is not justified. This does not, however, preclude the need for new policies that would enhance the capacity of holders of incomplete rights to have better access to formal credit systems and land markets.
