ACCESS TO GOVERNANCE AND POLICY PROCESSES:
WHAT ENABLES THE PARTICIPATION OF THE RURAL POOR?

BACKGROUND PAPER FOR IFAD RURAL POVERTY REPORT 2011

Andy Sumner, Andres Mejia Acosta, Lidia Cabral, Ritika Kapur, Aditya Bahadur, Savitri Bobde, Karim Hussein and Anne-Sophie Brouillet

31 March 2008
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Poverty is about politics. Access to governance structures and participation in policy processes has both an instrumental and intrinsic value to the rural poor and rural poor organisations (hereafter referred to as RP).

The desired outcome we argue is pro-poor governance, by which we mean policy processes within which the RP participate and influence and achieve change through policy implementation.

To use the IFAD framework, the primary ‘challenge’ is access of the rural poor to governance structures and policy processes. However, access to policy processes is necessary but not sufficient. There are four ‘sub-challenges’. These are the mobilisation of a RP-led policy narrative, access to and the capacity to engage and influence policy processes and capacity to achieve change via policy implementation.

The exact nature of each of these ‘sub-challenges’ is determined by the interaction of actor-specificity (interests, capacities) and context-specificity (institutions, incentives and constraints).

The various actors involved are likely to have previously established power dynamics and networks dictated by political, economic, social and cultural interactions, which will impact the access and influence that they have to public policy processes in general, and participatory approaches specifically. The impact of participatory processes is thus likely to be greatly intertwined with the overall nature of democratic inclusiveness, political culture and accountability.

We found in our case studies that successful RP participation in policy processes is a function of innovation, incentives and inequality.

The rural poor - compared to its urban counterpart - faces additional structural constraints (distance, political invisibility, weak/lack of coordination) for mobilising and affecting policy processes. The rural poor also face many of the same issues as its urban counterparts - such as literacy, confidence, resources, institutional resistances and capacity to understand the issues that hinders any participation in high-level technical policy discussions - but do so more acutely due to the prevailing nature and level of rural poverty.

In sum, public policy processes matter for rural poverty reduction. Inclusive democracy has intrinsic value because of poverty-governance linkages (rights, freedoms, voice, participation and public services delivery are common to both discourses). Inclusive democracy is likely to facilitate faster poverty reduction but the rural poor faces additional structural constraints for mobilizing and affecting change via participation in the policy process.
CONTENTS

1. SECTION I: SETTING THE SCENE
   a. Introduction
   b. How are the ‘fundamentals’ changing?
   c. What is governance?
   d. What governance structures are to be accessed by the rural poor?
   e. Why does access to governance structures matter to the rural poor?
   f. Governance, gender and children
   g. What are the challenges and sub-challenges of access to governance structures?
   h. Actor and context specificity

2. SECTION II: FACTORS FOR SUCCESS
   a. Our case study approach
   b. What factors mediate citizen participation in policy processes in general?
   c. What factors mediate RP participation in policy processes?
   d. Examples of success stories

3. SECTION III: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND ACTION
   a. Targeting relevant policies and policy processes
   b. Assembling the interests of the RP and articulating a pro-rural poor narrative
   c. Accessing policies and policy spaces
   d. Driving pro-rural poor policy change – the need for an institutionalised pro-rural poor bias
   e. Rural poor people-centred monitoring and impact assessment

REFERENCES

ANNEX: CASE STUDIES TEMPLATES
SECTION 1: SETTING THE SCENE

a. Introduction

What is governance? What are policy processes? Why does access to them matter to the rural poor and rural poor organisations (RP)? What do case studies of participation of the RP in policy processes tell us? This paper is concerned with the access of the RP and their organisations to policy processes and governance structures. Section I sets the scene. It addresses how the ‘fundamentals’ are changing, what governance and policy processes are and why they matter to the rural poor. The IFAD ‘Challenge Framework’ is then used to identify ‘key challenges’ and ‘sub-challenges’. Section II seeks to identify factors for ‘successful’ participation drawing on cases from published and non-published studies including IFAD’s own projects. Finally, Section III outlines the implications for policy and action.

b. How are the ‘fundamentals’ changing?

The world is changing fast. Imagine it is 2015. China has just overtaken the US as the world’s largest economy (on PPP estimates). India is not far behind. Some of the MDGs were met. Some were not. The MDGs on income and education were met globally but with huge disparities. Progress in Africa accelerated following large aid flows but repayments are looming. The other MDGs were missed though not as badly as expected. Climate change/chaos has intensified with many of the impacts felt in developing countries. Urbanisation is accelerating. What does all this mean for governance and policy processes?

The world of governance is changing particularly fast and not only in governance fundamentals themselves (such as the changing roles of civil society and social movements) but in non-governance factors that will have a direct impact on governance and policy processes. For example, there are major shifts in economic fundamentals (such as the rise of China et al., and rises in commodity prices) that will impact on governance. There are also major shifts in environment (such as climate change, biofuels, etc.), changes in demographic and social trends (such as urbanisation, migration, etc.) and major shifts in technology and innovation (such as ICTs, biotechnology, etc). All will play some role in reshaping governance and policy processes in the future.

Governance has – of course – been influenced by events of 9/11 in the US which have played a significant role in shifting the context for development. There has been a visible retreat of democracy, free elections, civil liberties and democratic space in many countries noted by Freedom House (2008). In some countries space for civil society has been squashed by counter-terrorism legislation at a time when claims to rights and voice are increasing around the world. Indeed, one might note the emerging and increasing voice of a range of non-state actors, notably producer organisations and civil society groups. There is also the changing global governance context. There is the aid effectiveness agenda, the alignment country’s and donors frameworks and harmonisation of donors approaches to consider.

In terms of shifts in economic fundamentals, there is the rise of a number of emerging economies, notably China and India which is in part fuelling a commodity price boom and having various other market impacts on other developing countries and international markets. The role of emerging economies (e.g. the BRICs and others) is expanding beyond economic influence as some are emerging as new donors
themselves. In terms of rural development in particular, there is a changing context for financing agriculture at national and international level, new actors in agriculture – foundations such as the Gates Foundation, the UN MDG Africa group and – possibly – a major new fund for agriculture and Africa. Public aid too is set to increase dramatically. There are major moves to regional integration and regional economic communities (such as ECOWAS, SADC, NEPAD, MERCOSUR, etc). There are also the EU EPA and the emergence of public-private partnerships as a modality of service delivery. Further, intra and inter-country remittances as a result of migration patterns are increasingly important both at household and national level. One might also note that inequality is increasing in many countries – a possible source of conflict that governance will need to manage. In totality, the governance impact of the shifting economic fundamentals are the emergence of new actors, changing political relationships between old and new actors, and the context of a commodity price windfall that Collier (2007), for one, argues leads to democracy malfunctioning.

In terms of environmental and natural resources fundamentals, one might note arguably the single most important shifting fundamental - climate change and adaption and responses to it. It is likely, even with a range of possible scenarios, that there will be major shifts in agriculture production patterns, disease infections and commodity price changes. There will be changes too due to the expansion of bio-fuels and the spread of bio-technology globally. There is also the AGRA – the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa – led by Kofi Annan and feeding into the UN MDGs groups. The governance impact of such shifting fundamentals are likely to mean all governance structures and processes will take place in a context of major livelihoods changes and policy processes will need to manage likely higher levels of conflict and exclusion within and between countries.

In technology and innovation, one might reiterate the uncertain consequences of the rise of biotechnology (and its pirating) in crops and livestock practices, forthcoming nano-technology and the new roles of ICTs such as mobile phones in shaping developmental pathways (for example replacing banking systems in developing countries) which are all likely to play a significant role in future development. The governance impact of such shifting fundamentals might include greater claims to voice and rights by citizens with access to international media and new civil society networks emerging and using technology to build solidarity networks.

There are also major changes in terms of urbanisation, migration and demographic shifts in terms of population growth and expanding older populations. The major migration and urbanisation shifts will mean increasing importance of remittances, trans-national societies and identities, pressure on urban public services and rural labour gaps. There is also the HIV/AIDS impact on demographics of reducing the size of the working age population and increasing dependency ratios. The governance impact of such shifting fundamentals are policy will need to appeal to youth and aged populations at the same time as well as more urban and mobile citizens.

What is certain is that international development policy making will continue to take place in the context of significant and likely rising uncertainty. One might argue some level of uncertainty in policy making is endemic. However, the extent of uncertainty in different contexts can vary considerably. Such uncertainty frames policy processes in developing countries and fragile states in particular. There has been a recognition that policy making in Southern contexts is qualitatively different to policy-making solely in Northern contexts because of greater levels of uncertainty in the policy-making process. These levels of uncertainty can be due to commonalities from the above ‘fundamentals’ such as,
• shifting contexts (sometimes rapidly so) due to processes such as decentralization and democratization,

• changing actors roles such as the changing roles of civil society and donors,

• changing trends in policy discourses (notably donor’s different frameworks and priorities for example),

• low demand for, and supply of, evidence (and access to it) and thus limited technical capacity to factor for uncertainty,

• changes in technology which may have unpredictable impacts in shifting and diverse contexts,

• weaker structures for aggregating /arbitrating interests of society which may lead to exclusion and/or conflict.

There is a further complexity peculiar to development governance and policy processes: it is a product of the interaction of both Northern and Southern contexts. Development policy involves donors – i.e. Northern contexts – as well as actors in developing countries – i.e. Southern contexts. On the one hand ‘ownership’ via budget support is shifting the emphasis to Southern contexts. On the other hand donor’s still exert considerable visible and invisible influence.

c. What is governance?

The inclusion of a political dimension in existing development strategies has been a growing trend observed in major governance declarations adopted since the first Rural Poverty Report in 2001 (hereafter referred to as RPR01). In 2000/1 the agendas of governance, poverty and participation in policy processes were parallel streams. They are now very much evolving into one stream. RPR01 was ahead of the trend. It contained a chapter focused on governance and policy. The chapter noted that rural poverty is political because it relates the issue of redistribution, not just of resources but of power too. It argued institutions are/can no longer be conceived as neutral or value free but are a reflection of the preferences of those who built them: the resource rich, the urban, the well informed (IFAD, 2001:223). The RPR01 identified the critical link between governance and poverty when it discussed the roles of institutions and the need for building coalitions to end rural poverty (IFAD, 2001:191 onwards). At the time, the RPR01 clearly identified the need to improve access to financial, political, and informational resources to facilitate the influence of the poor on the policy process (IFAD, 2001:224). The analysis focused on three mechanisms to improve the policy impact of the poor: a) decentralization and devolution of power, b) the activation of financial tools – such as microcredit - available to the poor, and c) the importance of establishing partnerships or coalitions between the poor and other agents of the policy process – including NGOs, and national governments. One prominent issue in the RPR01 was the possibility that a ‘pro poor’ initiative or instrument may be vulnerable to state or elite capture, ‘unless some safeguarding measures’ such as broader participation of actors are deliberately introduced (IFAD2001:223). Since the RPR01 there have been an array of governance declarations (see box 1). These declarations demonstrate the range and evolution of definitions of governance which tended initially to focus on normative
recommendations (regarding rule of law, rights, anti-corruption, electoral democracy, etc.) but more recently have evolved more into defining governance by its agency dimensions (i.e. citizenship, participation, representation, etc).

Box 1. Selected Governance Declarations and Milestones Since RPR01

2000 UN Millennium Declaration and MDGs

Millennium Development Goal 8, target 12 is to ‘develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system (including a commitment to good governance, development, and poverty reduction, nationally and internationally).


Governance is ‘the system of values, policies and institutions by which a society manages its economic, political and social affairs through interactions within and among the state, civil society and private sector’ (UNDP, 2004:2).

2005 The Commission for Africa’s Report, Our Common Future

‘Without progress in governance, all other reforms will have limited impact’ (CFA, 2005:133).

2006 DFID’s White Paper on Making Governance Work for the Poor

Good governance ‘is about good politics…. …it is about how citizens, leaders and public institutions relate to each other in order to make change happen’ (DFID, 2006:20).

2007 The World Bank Governance Strategy

Governance is ‘the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the common good’ (Kaufmann and Kraay, 2002:5).

As box 1 illustrates there are a range of definitions of governance. What are the commonalities? Governance is about the relationship(s) between governments and society. Governance is not the same of government and the solutions to poor governance are not solely in the domain of governments. Governance is not the same as management and governance is about more than just corruption (and corruption is an outcome of poor governance). Governance is about who decides/who sets the rules, when and how. Graham et al (2003:1, 2) define governance as: ‘the traditions, institutions and processes that determine how power is exercised, how citizens are given a voice, and how decisions are made on issues of public concern’. Hyden et al (2004:5) define governance as ‘the formation and stewardship of the rules that regulate the public realm – the space where state as well as economic and societal actors interact to make decisions’. They note the changing emphasis over time in table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Emphasis</th>
<th>Focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950s-60s</td>
<td>For the people</td>
<td>Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960s-70s</td>
<td>Of the people</td>
<td>Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>With the people</td>
<td>Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990s-date</td>
<td>By the people</td>
<td>Politics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. The Changing Emphasis of Governance and Development

In the World Bank’s work, governance is ‘the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the common good’ (Kaufmann and Kraay 2002:5). Within this definition governance has six dimensions (see box 2)

Box 2. The World Bank’s Dimensions of Governance

- Voice & accountability – political, civil and human rights;
- Political stability and absence of violence – the likelihood of violent threats to government;
- Government effectiveness – competence of the bureaucracy;
- Regulatory quality – the incidence of market-friendly policies;
- Rule of law – the quality of the police and the judiciary;
- Control of corruption – the abuse of public power for private gain.


In definitions of governance it is the relationship between state and society and how accountable the state is to citizens that is crucial. Accountability can be described as having two aspects: answerability and enforcement. Schedler (1999) states that answerability consists of accountable actors having to explain or justify their decisions; while enforceability involves accountable persons having to bear the consequences for their decision, including negative sanctions. Accountability has been categorized into three types by Newell and Wheeler (2006) although aspects of all of these tend to overlap. There is political accountability (checks and balances within the state), social accountability (check and balances between state and citizens) and managerial accountability (financial accountability and indicators to monitor performance).

Goetz and Jenkins (2005:16) point to the beginning of a ‘new accountability agenda’. This new agenda is broadly characterized by three elements: (i) a more direct role for ordinary people and their associations in obtaining accountability, using (ii) an expanded repertoire of methods, sometimes in new accountability jurisdictions, in the pursuit of (iii) a more exacting standard of social justice. They explain that while citizens and civil society have traditionally been relegated to participation in vertical channels of accountability, such as voting, they have now begun to take part in horizontal channels and the search for new roles by citizens and their associations has caused the vertical-horizontal distinction to blur. In sum, governance is about who decides - who sets what rules, when and how. Such rules are no-longer the preserve of the state alone. Citizens have moved ‘from being simply users or choosers of public services policies made by others, to ‘makers and shapers’ of policies themselves.’ (Gaventa, 2004:150). The trend has moved from representative or formal democracy (i.e. indirect participation) towards more mechanisms for ensuring citizens voice in the decision-making processes. There are new arenas for citizen participation at various levels. At a local level in programmes of democratic decentralisation (i.e. planning, budgeting and monitoring), at a national level (in sectoral programmes, poverty policies and PRSPs) an at a global level in policies of global governance and

Accountability mechanisms may function either along a ‘vertical’ or ‘horizontal’ axis. Vertical accountability involves external mechanisms used by citizens and non-state actors to hold policy makers to account. Along this axis, there is also ‘downward’ accountability where those with less power may hold those with more power (i.e. those ‘higher up’) to account for their actions and decisions. Horizontal accountability involves institutional oversight, check and balances internal to the state.
treaties and conventions and summits. Such trend have changed the role of states to creating an ‘an enabling environment – an environment in which the poor have an incentive to mobilise’ (Moore and Putzel, 2002:16). Indeed, the participation of the poor in defining their own priorities via participatory poverty assessments and advocating them in policy has gained considerable ground since the RPR01 as the discourses of governance and participation have merged into what Gaventa and Valderrama (1999:2) call ‘citizenship participation’ or ‘direct ways in which citizens influence and exercise control in governance’. This means that people can assert their citizenship through seeking greater accountability via participation in policy processes and claiming such activities by right rather than by invitation.

**d. What governance structures are to be accessed by the rural poor?**

When we talk of RP access to governance structures or participation in policy processes what exactly is to be accessed or participated within? Policy processes are notoriously difficult to define. Cunningham (1963:229) famously described policy as an elephant – you know it when you see it. Policy has both ‘concrete’ and ‘non-concrete’ components. ‘Concrete’ are the actual programmes and implementation of policy, whereas ‘non-concrete’ components include factors such as statements of intent that may or may not be (currently) feasible. Further, policy can also be deliberate or unintended inaction, and rarely is policy-making a specific decision made by a single decision-maker and seldom do governments speak with one voice.

In light of the above we take a broad and multi-layered definition of policy processes. There are different levels, stages and spaces of policy making that interact to create ‘entry points’ for the RP to access (see table 2). One might think of a 5 x 5 x 5 cube with the 5 dimensions of levels, stages and spaces. Entry point are then specific points of the surfaces of the cube. We can say there are 5 notable levels of policy processes, 5 stages of policy processes and there are (at least) 5 types of policy spaces. Policy processes involve 5 levels – local, district, regional, national and international. Often policy processes transcend the national policy making arena and critical interactions take place at local, district and regional levels. Policy processes involve various stages such as agenda setting, formulation, decision-making, implementation and evaluation.

Though an approach to policy analysis based entirely or primarily on such stages is discredited as too linear and unrealistic, the different stages do provide a heuristic device (see discussion in Sabatier and Jenkins Smith, 1993) to compare reality too. Policy processes also involve (at least) 5 spaces. These are spaces in which policy is discussed by some or all actors, depending on the space type (Brock et al., 2001; Gaventa, 2006; Grindle and Thomas, 1991). These can be conceptual in nature – i.e. conceptual spaces (where new ideas can be introduced into the debate and circulated

---

2 There are various schemas for making sense of the complexity of policy processes. For example, the Gaventa (2006:24) ‘power cube’ draws on Lukes (1974) three forms of power – visible (i.e. observable decision making), hidden (e.g. setting the political agenda) and invisible (shaping meaning and what is acceptable in the discourse). These forms then need to be understood in relation to the spaces they occur – closed, invited, claimed/created - and Gaventa’s levels of policy processes – global, national and local.
through various media), or bureaucratic in nature (i.e. bureaucratic spaces – formal policy-making spaces within the government bureaucracy/legal system, led by civil servants with selected inputs from external experts) or political/electoral in nature (i.e. formal participation in elections) or invited spaces (consultations on policy led by government agencies involving selective participation of stakeholders) or popular in nature such as protests and demonstrations that put pressure on governments (KNOTS, 2006:46).

Table 2. What are the RP to Access? (What are Policy Processes?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels of policy</th>
<th>Stages of policy</th>
<th>Spaces of policy</th>
<th>‘Entry points’ for policy influence by the rural poor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local District</td>
<td>Agenda setting</td>
<td>Electoral</td>
<td>Formal policy processes such as PRSPs, interim-PRSPs, SWAps, reviews, budgeting, and national development plans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional National</td>
<td>Formulation</td>
<td>Popular</td>
<td>Wider macro-policy processes such as decentralisation, conflict mediation and international and regional treaties (e.g. NEPAD/CAADP, WTO and EPAs).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>Decision</td>
<td>Consultative</td>
<td>Informal and innovative tools for influencing policy processes (that create new spaces for influence) such as social movements, PPAs, immersions of policy makers, CDD, and different roles of producer organisations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>Bureaucratic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>Conceptual</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Each of the above may be – closed, invited or claimed in nature or visible, hidden, or invisible in nature.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
e. Why does access to governance structures matter to the rural poor?

Voice in policy processes by RP has both intrinsic and instrumental value to the RP. Voice in decision-making that affects one’s life (or lack of it) is a key dimension of well-being (and lack of it poverty). In fact when one takes the governance and poverty literatures there at least three areas of clear over-lap. The following are common to both and are ‘new’ dimensions of poverty particularly evident since the Voices of the Poor and the World Development Report 2000/1:

- Poverty is about a lack of participation and voice in decisions affecting one’s life (in governance this is referred to under dimensions such as accountability, responsiveness, inclusion);
- Poverty is about a lack of rights and freedoms (relevant governance dimensions are labeled fairness, equity, decency, human rights, the rule of law, police, judiciary and the absence of violence);
- Poverty is about a lack of access or poor quality access to public goods and services (in governance this is referred to as state capabilities, performance, efficiency, effectiveness, transparency, control of corruption, delivery of public goods and services).

In many cases, these shared dimensions are also presumed to have a causal relationship. Improved voice and participation for the poor, beyond their intrinsic value, are likely to reduce poverty because the poor have a greater say in budget formation and public expenditure priorities. This approach is associated in particular with Robert Chambers (1983; 1997; 2006) who argues that the perceptions of poor people (rather than of rich people or members of the development community) should be the point of departure because top-down understandings of poverty may not correspond with how poor people themselves think about their well-being. Such participatory approaches resonate strongly with IFAD’s focus on inclusive participation and promoting responsive institutions. Similarly, policies that enhance rights and freedoms are presumed to have a beneficial impact on poverty because they will expand the kinds of rights and freedoms typically valued by people. A focus on rights joins governance and poverty by framing, ‘the achievement of human rights as an objective of development… (invoking) the international apparatus [of] rights accountability in support of development action.’ (Maxwell, 1999:1).

Sen (see in particular 1999), Nussbaum (see in particular 2000) and UNDP (1990-2007) have consistently argued that development is not, as previously conceived, based solely on desire fulfillment (utility or consumption measured by a proxy for income – GDP per capita) as this does not take sufficient evaluative account of the physical condition of the individual and of a person’s capabilities. Instead, ‘development consists of the removal of various types of unfreedom that leave people with little opportunity of exercising their reasoned agency… Development can be seen… as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy… the expansion of the ‘capabilities’ of persons to lead the kind of lives they value - and have reason to value’ (Sen, 1999:xii, 1, 3

---

3 These rights are universal, rooted in the Human Development and Capability Approach, and codified in various United Nations agreements, in particular the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These rights include the right to food, shelter, education, health care, and so on.
Capabilities consist of the means, opportunities or substantive freedoms which permit the achievement of a set of functionings – things which we value ‘being’ and ‘doing.’ Although there have been numerous attempts to construct specific lists of capabilities (see for discussion Alkire, 2002), Sen resolutely refused to name them, although he did identify five basic freedoms (1999:38). These are clearly very relevant to participation and governance concerns, notably (a) and (d) and possibly (e):

a. political/participative freedoms/civil rights (e.g. freedom of speech, free elections);
b. economic facilities (e.g. opportunities to participate in trade and production and sell one’s labor and product on fair, competitive terms);
c. social opportunities (e.g. adequate education and health facilities);
d. transparency guarantees (e.g. openness in government and business and social trust);
e. protective security (e.g. law and order, social safety nets for unemployed).

Such approaches sit alongside rather than are fully incorporated into the contemporary MDG framework. The MDGs themselves are relatively limited on participation and governance (see box 1). That said the Millennium Declaration of 2000, upon which the MDGs are drawn, and all countries are signed up to do include freedom and equality as fundamental values in themselves.

f. Governance, gender and children

Why do we need to take a particular focus on the gender dimensions of governance? First, poverty and governance have gender-specific dimensions that men and women experience differently. Second, reductions in gender inequality are linked to wider poverty reduction. The IFAD (forthcoming) Gender and Agricultural Livelihoods Sourcebook shows the depth of gender governance inequalities. Women are less able

---

4 In this view, poverty is a lack of freedom or opportunities to achieve the ‘beings’ and ‘doings’ that individuals value. Individuals have a set of endowments (assets owned – physical and self – financial, human, natural, social and productive) and exchanges (production and trade by the individual), which allow them to secure entitlements (command over commodities). These entitlements can then be converted into opportunities (capabilities) in order to achieve a set of functionings (outcomes of well-being). Escaping poverty implies a set of capabilities that achieve functionings in a variety of conditions, including being fed, healthy, clothed and educated.

5 The Millennium Declaration is based on six ‘fundamental values’. These were freedom (incorporated into MDG 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6); equality (MDG 2); solidarity (MDG 8); tolerance (no MDG), respect for nature (MDG 7) and shared responsibility (MDG 8) though as noted not all these dimensions are included in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). However, as we move closer to 2015 space will likely open to consider post-2015 development and participation and governance could play a more central role.

6 For example, a review of rural development aspects of 12 PRSPs found only half mentioned gender issues and only a quarter had a detailed discussion. It also found gender-related targets and indicators are usually absent in the PRSPs. Further, a review of 7 Rural Development Strategies found only half include substantial discussion of gender-related issues including specific recommendations. Finally, women globally accounted for only 17% of MPs, 14% of ministers and 7% of heads of government in 2006.
to claim their rights, enjoy fewer freedoms, participate less in decision-making than men and often suffer poorer quality of goods and services due to the ‘triple burden’.

How can we define gender-sensitive governance? Goetz (2003:29) proposes thus,

the conditions under which public affairs are managed so that women are included equally in the ‘publics’ served by the government, and so that gender equality is one of the goals or results.

This then has four components. First, sensitivity to gender differentials (public policy recognises and responds to different the needs of individuals based on their gender so that gender inequalities reduce). Second, gender specific interventions (reforms and services targeted at needs that only women or men face such as reproductive health services). Third, contributing to women’s empowerment (reforms than seek to strengthen women’s capacity to overcome gender inequalities). Fourth, transformative approaches that seek to change gender relations in society as a whole by addressing attitudes and norms. There are then various gender-sensitive governance mechanisms (see box 3).

It is also important to place attention on the child dimensions of governance. A large proportion of the rural poor are children. Children, governance and policy processes raise a range of issues. Children in developing countries (taking the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child definition of people under the age of 18) account for on average 37 percent of the population and 49 percent in the least developed countries (UNICEF, 2005:12). Moreover, UNICEF estimates suggest that a disproportionately high proportion of the poor - up to 50 percent of those living on less than $1 per day - are children under 18 years (Gordon et al., 2004:11).

Box 3. Selected Examples of Gender-sensitive Governance Mechanisms

**Electoral Politics**
- Affirmative action (quotas, reservations)
- Electoral systems
- Women’s wings in political parties
- Recruitment, mentoring and leadership development in parties
- Party-independent bodies that provide financial and moral support to feminist candidates
- Women-friendly institutions (timing of meetings, type of pay, safety in travel, child support, etc)
- Gender caucuses in legislative bodies

**Local Government**
- Gender quorums in community meetings
- Training and support programs for local representatives
- Lengthening reservation periods

**Public Administration**
- Affirmative action
- Equal opportunity structures (e.g. anti-discrimination bureaus, merit protection agencies, equal opportunity commissions)
- Ministries/agencies of Gender in national and local governments
- Gender focal points
- Inter-ministerial coordinating committees
- Gender-responsive budgets
A growing body of research argues addressing childhood poverty is important not only for reducing childhood poverty but also for disrupting poverty transfers over the life-course and inter-generationally (e.g., Harper et al., 2003). What are the childhood poverty and governance linkages? If we take core dimensions of governance and poverty as participation and voice in decisions affecting one’s life, rights and freedoms and access or poor quality access to public goods then children’s experiences are distinct and differentiated. Children enjoy fewer rights and freedoms that adults, have less voice and less participation in decision making and suffer poorer public service delivery than adults. Under the UN CRC, which almost all countries are signed up to, children's participation in decision making (article 12) which impact on their lives is a key component. The UN General Assembly’s Special Session on Children in 2002 (including the national and regional processes leading up to the final meeting) highlighted children’s right to voice their views and be heard. Children’s participation can take various forms (see box 4).

Box 4. Modalities of Children's Participation in Policy Processes

- Consultation (for child and/or adult decision-making),
- Research (by children and/or with children),
- Advocacy (through reports to, presentations to, and discussions with commissions, policy-makers, etc),
- Campaigning (writing emails and postcards, petitioning, art exhibitions, protests, demonstrations, media and other forms of public presentation),
- Lobbying (meeting with policy-makers as individuals or small groups),
- Programme and Project Planning, Designing, Implementing and Monitoring and Evaluating.

However, the acceptance of the principle of children’s participation is controversial on theoretical and practical grounds because it challenges traditional paternalistic models of children’s needs based on adult knowledge and whether such a universal right is applicable in all contexts and whether children can articulate their ideas. The counter-argument is that at even an early age many children have complex productive, care and work responsibilities (Jones and Pham, 2007:1).

g. What are the challenges and sub-challenges of access to governance structures?

The IFAD Challenge Framework assists identification of challenges and sub-challenges to RP access to, in this case, governance structures. The over-riding challenge is access to governance structures. For this to happen is participation in policy processes sufficient? Participation in policy processes is no guarantee of influence. Participation can be (i) a cosmetic label (i.e. tokenism); (ii) a co-opting practice (‘they’ – local people contribute time/resources to ‘our’ project), or (iii) an empowering process – local people do their own analysis, take command (Chambers, 2002). In terms of defining participation, many refer back to Arnstein’s (1969) ‘Ladder of Participation’ (see figure 1).
Arnstein’s ‘ladder of participation’ had eight rungs. To simplify there are three stages, non-participation, tokenism and effective action. The issue is how meaningful agency is or is not exercised or the fruitfulness of participation – does it empower or disempower? Participation is one stage on the ladder to empowerment. The question is how do we get to empowerment?

‘Empowerment’ is one of the most widespread and pervasive concepts in contemporary development discourse (World Bank, 2005:1). Indeed, ‘empowering’ poor people and women in particular is a common aim of projects. In the mid 1990s, Rowlands (1995:1) argued that that ‘empowerment’ was ‘often used… …but rarely defined’. Since then there has been at numerous attempts to define ‘empowerment’. Recent research has evolved from Moser’s (1989) power ‘within, with and to’ towards a wider understanding. In the most recent review of ‘empowerment’ Ibrahim and Alkire (2007:7-8) note 33 definitions of empowerment of which there are two types of definition. These are empowerment as the expansion of agency and empowerment as the opportunity to exert that agency fruitfully (see box 5 for examples). In short, empowerment is the capacity to make a choice as well as the capacity to transform the choice into desired action/outcome.

**Box 5. Definitions of Empowerment**

The World Bank (2002:v-vi) Empowerment Sourcebook defines empowerment as ‘the expansion of freedom of choice and action… the expansion of assets and capabilities of poor people to participate in, negotiate with, influence, control, and hold accountable institutions that affect their lives’. Such agency is a product of individual assets and capabilities (human, social capital etc) as well as collective assets and capabilities (voice, organisation, representation and identity).

Alsop and Heinsohn’s (2005:6) definition, has implicit echos of Amartya Sen’s and UNDP’s ‘Capabilities’ or ‘Human Development’. Empowerment is ‘enlarging people’s effective choices’. Empowerment is function of the opportunity structures – the institutional climate (information, participation, accountability, local organisational capacity) and social and political structures (openness, competition and conflict). This opportunity structure is a function of the permeability of the state, the extent of elite fragmentation and the states implementation capacity.

Moore and Putzel (2002:13) argue it is the empowerment of poor people that matters: ‘increasing the political capabilities of the poor: personal political capabilities, self-

---

**Figure 1. Arnstein’s ‘Ladder of Participation’**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Citizen control</th>
<th>Citizen power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Delegated power</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Partnership</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Placation</td>
<td>Tokenism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Consultation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Informing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Therapy (‘curing citizens of their pathology’)</td>
<td>Non-participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Manipulation (‘illusory participation’)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---
confidence, capacity for community organisation, recognition of dignity, and the collective ideas available to support effective political action’. We argue in a similar vein that access to governance structures and participation in policy processes is not sufficient for empowerment. We argue that the ‘challenge’ of ‘access’ to governance structures can be sub-divided into four ‘sub-challenges’ (see figure 2). To use the IFAD framework, the primary challenge is RP access to governance structures. The sub-challenges are then capacity to generate a RP-led policy narrative, the capacity of the RP to access policy processes, the capacity to engage in and influence policy processes and the capacity to achieve RP-led change in terms of policy implementation.\(^7\)

Figure 2. What are the Challenges and Sub-challenges?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRIMARY CHALLENGE: ACCESS OF THE RURAL POOR TO GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUB-CHALLENGE 1: MOBILISATION</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generating a RP-led policy narrative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How can the RP mobilise their policy narrative?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At a first stage (even before access to policy processes are considered) the mobilisation the rural poor’s policy narrative is required. By this we mean the self-identification of RP problems ideally via various forms of participatory learning such as PPA, PRA, etc. Karl (2002:32) proposes a list of questions at this and later stages to include, what are the RPs livelihood priorities? What policies affect the RP and their livelihoods? What kinds of policies would be supportive of RP livelihoods? At which level is policy (change) needed? Where in the policy process is the need for change most pressing – policy formulation (planning, information gathering, analysis and decision making), implementation or monitoring and evaluation?

At the next stage – access of the RP to (formal and informal) policy processes the question is how can the RP get access to the spaces/arena/room? Important questions to ask, again drawing upon Kark (2002: 32) are what types of democratic structures

\(^7\) It is worth noting this maps somewhat with the stages of policy making. Mobilisation is somewhat similar to agenda setting. Access and influence to policy formation and change to policy implementation. There is also resonance with Gaventa’s (2006) policy cycle. Mobilisation is somewhat similar to ‘pre-conditions for voice’. Access and influence to ‘amplification of voice’ and ‘receptivity to voice’. Finally, joint civil society initiatives to our change stage.
and institutions exist? Are there effective laws, legal frameworks and functioning legal institutions? Does political commitment to rights and the possibility to exercise these rights exist? Is there effective decentralization that brings decision making closer to the local level? Is there political commitment to policy reform? What mechanisms exist to influence policy through political structures? Are there existing or potential development programmes and projects that could work with government to facilitate policy reform? Are bureaucracies dominated by people from a particular disciplinary background, geographic area, academic institution, etc.? Are there particular patterns linking the bureaucracy to political parties or the private sector? Are bureaucracies organized in such a way that cross-sectoral approaches are possible? Do bureaucracies operate transparently? Does bureaucratic capacity exist for policy reform?

The third stage – engaging in and influence of the RP in (formal and informal) policy processes - we need to consider how do the RP gain have the capacities to engage in policy? We could ask what groups and organizations exist at the local level (e.g. farmers’ organizations, women’s organizations, village associations, cooperatives)? Who do these groups and organizations represent? Are there under-represented or excluded segments of the local population (e.g. women, children and the very poor and indigenous people)? What can be done to enable the under-represented or marginalized groups to participate? What are the power relations and dynamics among and within groups and organizations? What is their political capital in relation to local, district and national government and governance institutions? What experience do they have in policy processes? What human, social and financial capital can they draw on to participate in policy making? What skills do they possess that would enable or enhance their participation? The final stage – change via policy implementation again relates to the assets and capabilities that enable the rural poor to participate and thus a similar list.

h. Actor and context specificity

There are a bewildering array of theories and frameworks for the analysis of the policy-making processes with some major differences. Some authors provide conceptual domains to guide research, whilst others provide actually theories of how policy changes (or not). There are (fortunately) some clear commonalities in analytical frameworks. These are - broadly speaking - power relations around the two-locking domains of the IFAD framework – actor and context specificity:

8 There are the older linear/rational models (e.g. Lasswell and Lerner, 1951), bounded rationality models (e.g. Simon, 1957), incrementalism, disjointed incrementalism and ‘muddling through’ models (e.g. Lindblom, 1959), middle ground or mixed scanning models (e.g. Etzioni, 1976), garbage can theories (e.g. March and Olsen 1976), argumentative models (e.g. Fischer and Forester 1993), interceptor/receptor models (e.g. Hanney, 2005), the three inter-connecting streams model that shape the political agenda and decision agenda (e.g. Kingdon, 1984), the ladder of utilization and receptors receptivity model (e.g. Knott and Wildavsky 1980), the interactive or problem solving/engineering models (e.g. Grindle and Thomas, 1991), the political economy approach of de Janvry and Subramanian (1993), the structuration model (e.g. Keeley and Scoones, 2003), and the Research and Policy In Development (RAPID) research-into-policy model (Crewe and Young, 2002). See for review of frameworks Sutton (1999).
Actor specificity - the policy actors and their networks - their political interests and incentive/disincentive structures and capabilities - i.e. the drivers or coalitions of change.

Context specificity - the policy process context and institutions or ‘system imperatives’ and how the socio-economic, political and cultural environment shapes policy processes and the formal/informal ‘rules of the game’ i.e. the windows of opportunity or forums for policy dialogue, contestation, negotiation and influence.

The actors within policymaking are those individuals and groups that possess a degree of agency, in that they are able, at least conceptually, to choose among various strategic options at each stage. This distinguishes actors from those whose capabilities are limited. Limited actors are constrained by regime institutions, socioeconomic structures, or overarching narratives. In such cases, the actors have lost their agency, and the appropriate unit of observation is the background regime, structure or narrative. The analysis of policy actors includes those who are formally (i.e. elected) and informally (non elected, invisible) involved in the decision making process. It matters not only the total number of actors involved, but most importantly an understanding of what their interests are, what do they want, and what are the formal and informal powers and capabilities available to them to realize their goals. When we talk of policy actors and networks we would refer to such matters as the extent to which the ruling party is ideologically driven, the extent of ‘special interests’ (business, unions, etc.), the level of professionalism of the civil service, the extent of strength of civil society and the extent of influence of donors in policy making. We might ask who is involved and how are they connected? What are their political interests and capabilities? In terms of the participation of the rural poor and their organisations, further questions that might be asked are, who participated? who decided who participated? Who decided the agenda and terms of discussion? Who framed the outcomes/report of the process?

We need to consider two aspects of actors in particular, their interests and their capacities. Interests can be material, in the sense of the distribution of resources, and non-material, in the sense of political power, cultural cohesion, or group norms. Both kinds of interests are closely related to the structural and ideological context from which individuals and groups emerge. What is important is to consider the way these structures and ideologies shape the contribution of actors to pro-poor governance. The second aspect of actors to consider is their capacity. Capacity refers first to technical skills, information, and resources to engage in policymaking. In policy areas in which pro-poor governance can be advanced, the technical requirements are often high. Public finance, social policy, and development strategy include highly specialized capacities. Capacity also refers to political capacity, in the sense of the power to convince others through persuasion, negotiation, pressure, or cooptation. Especially for the poor, political capacity requires organization; by definition they lack the material resources that wealthy individuals can use to influence policy. Organizational capacity is not available in equal measure. The rural poor, often the poorest members of society, are frequently ignored within public policy, as they face significant obstacles to political organization and communicating their interests to the public sphere.

We can propose a typology of rural actors in rural and national policy processes. Rural policy processes include a complex range and diversity of actors. If we take
non-state actors we can identify rural civil society by primary functions of groupings as follows:

- Groups whose primary identity is by a shared source of economic livelihood - for example, agriculture co-operatives, producer organisations, trade unions, self help groups, private sector associations, micro-credit organisations including rotating savings and credit associations and INGOs. It is important to note many of these also have a role in political representation too.
- Groups whose primary identity is by political ideology - for example, social and political interest groups, political organizations, and political parties.
- Groups whose primary identity is socio-cultural - such as religious groups and ethnicity group. These too may have a political representation role.
- Groups whose primary identity relates to community development - for example, village development associations, user groups for natural resource management, groups related to public service provision and program implementation. These too may have a political representation role.

Often it is solidarity between civil society groups and building social movements that can be a major source of voice for the RP. Social movements can be particularly influential in contesting cultural politics – i.e. discourses which frame the ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ poor. Movements can challenge stereotypes and be a major source of mobilisation. Social movements have become increasingly vocal as collective, organized, sustained, and non-institutional challenge to authorities, power holders, or cultural beliefs and practices. Social movements have shifted from ‘old’ social movements assumed to be class-based to ‘new’ social movements constituted around symbolic, informational and cultural struggles. Such movements tend to be loosely organized, actively link discontentment to a certain rationale and employ extra-institutional means of protest. Resistance strategies and protest movements employ an ideology that explains the social condition that they seek to change, this ‘ideology’ also helps construct particular strategies of action and feeds into the formulation of the objectives of such movements. Finally, there are the government’s agencies themselves - the executive branch - president/head of state, prime minister and cabinet, national ministries (including but beyond the agricultural and rural development ministry) and local government agencies as well as the legislature and the judiciary. We can then add donor agencies both bilateral and multi-lateral. If we focus just on global organisations relevant for agriculture, we can see the extent of the complexity and range of actors (see table 3).

Institutional boundaries include and exclude potential actors, define the options that exist at any given moment, and set the likely outcomes of strategic choices. Institutions are closely related to the broader political regimes, in which democratic or authoritarian contexts severely bias institutional forms. The key points to analyze institutions are the incentives and constraints placed on actors. Incentives make certain actions and strategies more appealing. In terms of understanding the institutions or formal rules of the game, it matters to know what they prescribe, whether institutions enjoy legitimacy from all actors, whether they are effectively or selectively enforced, and whether they have stood the test of time or are the vulnerable to political and economic changes. Institutions are the rules of the game for interaction, which present actors with a series of strategic options and outcomes from their actions. For example, we would refer to the degree of party competition or
democratic openness, the use of multi-year development plans, the level of centralisation of political decision making, and the degree of academic and media freedom. We might ask how does the context shape policy processes? What are the formal and informal ‘rules of the game’? In terms of participation of the rural poor and their organisations, questions that might be asked are, how was the policy process initiated? What was the nature of the participation?

Table 3. Types of Global Organizations Relevant for Agriculture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector/ Specialization</th>
<th>Intergovernmental organizations</th>
<th>Nongovernmental organizations and networks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Private sector enterprises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Organizations with mixed membership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialized organizations in the agricultural sector</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)</td>
<td>Global networks of farmers organizations (for example, International Federation of Agricultural Producers [IFAP], Via Campesina)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)</td>
<td>Multinational agribusiness enterprises (for example, Monsanto, Dow Chemicals)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>World Organization for Animal Health (OIE)</td>
<td>Supermarket chains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>World Food Program</td>
<td>Consultative Group on International Agricultural Development (CGIAR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Global Donor Platform on Rural Development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-sectoral organizations that include agriculture</td>
<td>Codex Alimentarius</td>
<td>Harvest Plus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development organizations and funding agencies with agricultural programs</td>
<td>World Bank Group</td>
<td>Private foundations and funding agencies (e.g., Rockefeller; Gates Foundation) and nongovernmental development organizations (for example, Oxfam)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialized environmental organizations</td>
<td>United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)</td>
<td>Environmental NGOs (for example, World Wide Fund for Nature, Greenpeace)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change</td>
<td>International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Global Environmental Facility</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialized organizations in other sectors</td>
<td>World Health Organization, World Trade Organization, United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM)</td>
<td>Multinational pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies and International Organization for Standardization (ISO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General global governance bodies</td>
<td>G-8 Summit and United Nations Secretariat, Assembly and Security Council</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Incentives encourage certain kinds of strategies and behaviors. Constraints limit agency by ruling out certain options. Requirements for voting, such as literacy or property requirements, can be a highly exclusionary institutional rule that particularly discriminates against the poor. It is worth noting that institutions are both formal and informal. Formal institutions are usually written, either as legal rules or as bureaucratic requirements, and tend to be enforced with sanctions that are public and backed by state power. Changing formal rules to increase incentives to pro-poor governance is often the stuff of politics, as in adoption of international treaties and human rights legislation. Informal institutions operate on the margins and behind closed doors. These are the norms and processes by which actors modify formal rules, using informal relationships and understandings to either complement or undermine formal rules. Informality could potentially improve pro-poor outcomes, in cases in which informality allows discriminatory legislation to be ignored. Still, informal institutions are less transparent, and informality may be prejudicial to the poor.

We can propose a typology of contexts for rural policy processes. Moore (2001) proposes three levels of analysis for mapping political systems. First, foundational issues – relating in particular to basic political stability – i.e. territorial, resource dependence, social structure and constitutionality – i.e. does the government control of the territory? Do the justice and police systems function widely? What are the main sources of government income? What extent is the government dependent on taxpayers? What is the social composition (middle class, ethnic groupings, etc)? Does the government observe the law and constitution? Second, institutional issues – i.e. how well institutionalized are the government apparatus, policymaking processes, political parties and civil society organisations? Is political competition ‘civic’ and open to a broad segment of people? How is power distributed across institutions, including the military, legislature, judiciary, public enterprises, the mass media, civil society and religious organisations? Third and fourth, government capacity and accountability – i.e. does government exercise authority over the bureaucracy, military, raising public revenue, and policymaking? Is government accountable to citizens and to different parts of the state apparatus? We can then add these to types of public administration (see table 4) for example, traditional, ‘new’ public and response governance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citizen-state relationship</th>
<th>Traditional public administration</th>
<th>New Public Management</th>
<th>Responsive governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Obedience</td>
<td>Entitlement</td>
<td>Empowerment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source of accountability of senior officials</td>
<td>Politicians</td>
<td>Customers</td>
<td>Citizens and stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guiding principles</td>
<td>Compliance with rules and regulations</td>
<td>Efficiency and results</td>
<td>Accountability, transparency and participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criteria for success</td>
<td>Output</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key attribute</td>
<td>Impartiality</td>
<td>Professionalism</td>
<td>Responsiveness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UN/AF (2005:7).

The New Public Management approach replaced a traditional public administration model and focuses on the private sector management approaches in public agencies. Citizens are customers. We now see a desire for responsive public administration noted in the earlier discussion.
SECTION II: KEY FACTORS FOR SUCCESS

a. Our case study approach

Studying participation in policy processes is not easy. Studying RP participation in policy processes is even harder. Many studies are incompletely or badly documented. Most studies are of urban citizen participation. Holmes and Scoones (2000:33) state ‘despite the widespread rhetoric of participation, there are remarkably few well documented cases that systematically encourage participation in policy making.’ Williams (2004:103) adds more recently ‘there is a marked absence of constructive political analysis within current evaluations of participatory development’. We certainly noted this constraint in our case studies. Rarely did we find all or most of the details we needed to assess cases.

So, how did we choose which case studies to include and not to include? We took the broad IFAD criteria of ‘successful’ case studies (as outlined in the terms of reference). We solicited cases from IFAD projects and publications. Studies were also drawn from the IDS Participation Resource Centre, the British Library of Development Studies, ELDIS Development Gateway and the Future Agricultures Consortium. Cases were chosen which were examples of rural citizens participation in policy processes. We took the broad definitions of ‘participation’ and ‘policy processes’ as outlined earlier. We took an inclusive approach to case studies and include cases even if documentation was limited (see annex for case study summaries).

b. What factors mediate citizen participation in policy processes in general?

There are a number of different factors that may influence the impact of participation itself. The actors involved and their interests, incentives and capacities, the institutions and context (or the ‘space’) in which participation occur are important. The various actors are likely to have previously established power dynamics and networks dictated by political, economic, social and cultural interactions, which will impact the access and influence that they have to public policy processes in general, and participatory approaches to policy reform specifically. The impact of participatory processes is thus likely to be greatly intertwined with the overall nature of democratic inclusiveness, political culture and accountability.

The conditions under which institutions are accountable vary by country and context. Key cross-cutting factors that can improve the responsiveness to the poor and marginalised groups are legal and constitutional provisions, histories of citizen engagement, democratic space, cultures of accountability and state-market relations (particularly with attention to natural resource incomes). Newell and Wheeler (2006) argue that accountability can rarely be provided from above. More effective reforms will be those that harness existing momentum within civil society, connect to existing government and citizen initiatives, and engage the private sector in a fuller debate about its responsibilities. Often these are informal, local and political in contrast with traditional approaches which tend to be national in focus, narrowly targeted at institutional reforms and regarded as technocratic interventions.

Goetz and Jenkins (2001:369) explain that citizens’ accountability initiatives need to seek partnership with the state in order to be effective and have an impact beyond the local level. They suggest key conditions for making citizen-state accountability
partnerships effective as follows. First, legal standing for non-governmental observers within institutions of public-sector oversight. Second, a continuous presence for these observers throughout the process of the agency’s work well-defined procedures for the conduct of encounters between citizens and public-sector actors in meetings. Third, structured access to the flow of official documentary information and fourth, the right of observers to issue dissenting reports directly to legislative bodies.

Various authors have noted important factors in making institutions for community participation viable and effective. For example, Mahmud (2007:72) notes rights awareness raising, the role of language, political commitment to the participatory process, financial support, grassroots mobilization and awareness-raising. In sum, poor people see themselves as having very limited responsibility and even less ability with respect to participation in public processes... People lack confidence in questioning government action since their knowledge about state delivery mechanisms is limited and they are unable to assess how the state operates. The realization that participation requires time and energy dampens enthusiasm and propensity for action (Ibid., 2007:58).

In a similar vein, Cornwall (2007:33) argues citizen participation is enabled by an overarching political project in which there is an explicit ideological commitment to popular participation as well as legal and constitutional rights to participate, committed bureaucrats, a strong and well organized civil society organization, and effective institutional designs that include procedures for broad-based civil society organization.

Moore and Putzel (2002:16) argue there are four conditions for success: tolerance (of collective action by the poor), credibility (the poor feel that the people in question can be relied upon), predictability (stability over time) and rights (the extent to which the benefits are recognised as moral or legal entitlements).

What factors mediate women's and children’s participation in policy processes in particular? Horowitz (2007) argues three factors matter most: First, initiatives generally fail when gender equity is not recognized to be a political project. Second, social and cultural transformation lies at the root of governance transformation. Finally, political, social, and institutional contexts will affect the shape and success of any single mechanism across multiple places. Horowitz (2007), in reviewing the literature argues that women's participation is mediated by institutions in particular. For example,

(i) political culture - left-leaning or progressive political parties are more receptive to feminist public policy goals as well as to higher levels of female representation,

(ii) prevailing gender norms - attitudes that women’s sphere of concern is the private for example,

(iii) affirmative action – she notes 97 countries currently have some combination of constitutional, electoral, or political party quotas in practice (according to the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, which maintains a Global Database of Quotas for Women),

Horowitz notes in particular how local government is often seen to have the greatest
opportunities for women's participation. She draws upon decentralisation in India when one million women came to power in the early 1990s because the new Panchayat system of village, block, and district councils reserved one-third of seats in Panchayat councils as well as one-third of council presidencies for women. There is also a small literature on gender and decentralization in African countries (Uganda, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Ghana, Senegal and Nigeria) but little research in this area in Latin America where levels of women's participation are much higher. Major barriers identified in many studies are illiteracy and language barriers, time constraints and lack of confidence related to class and caste (and similar findings were identified in Africa). Jayal (2006:24) notes,

without exception, every single piece of survey research on this question cites the recognition of women representatives that they would have been better able to contribute to the proceedings and activities of the panchayats had they had the advantage of schooling.

Horowitz (2007:23) also notes the importance of capacity development for women to understand the 'scope, structure, and laws governing the institution they were a part of'.

Hart (1997) argued, using Arnstein’s ‘Ladder of Participation’, that there are different levels of children’s participation. These range from false (manipulation) to shallow (consultation to inform adult decision-making) to deep (child-initiated, child-led organising). At the false end of the spectrum participation is symbolic only. Genuine participation occurs at the deep end with empowerment. Jones and Pham (2007:1) note the ‘lack of knowledge about the factors that facilitate or hinder the translation of children’s voices into… more child-sensitive policy content and programme implementation, in different political and economic contexts’. However, it seems children face many of the same obstacles to participation in policy processes as marginalised groups. Such as literacy, confidence, resources, inequality and capacity to understand the issues. Consultations with children and youth in PRSPs formation was evident in Kenya, Tanzania and Honduras. These demonstrated the importance of creative methodologies (e.g., role play, art, puppetry, mock debates) to explain core concepts and policy processes to children (Jones and Pham, 2007:2).

c. What factors mediate RP participation in policy processes?

We found in our case studies that RP participation in policy processes is a function of innovation, incentives and inequality. The rural poor – compared to its urban counterpart - faces additional structural constraints (distance, political invisibility, weak/lack of coordination) for mobilizing and affecting the policy process. The rural poor also face many of the issues noted previously but more acutely due to prevailing levels of poverty (take for example the role of literacy in participation and generally lower literacy level among the rural poor compared to the urban poor). Table 5 summarises our findings from the rural case studies we analysed (see annex for summaries of cases). Many of the successful case studies were at local level with links to the national level. Most were in popular or consultative spaces rather than formal electoral spaces. Key entry points are mobilising rural producer organisations, CDD and other innovative approaches. In terms of actors, donors matter especially so for funding participation and opening democratic space. In terms of institutions and context, a history of social mobilisation and social movements is important to success.
Finally, exposure to international discourses on rights and participation matter as does the driving idea that change is possible.

At mobilisation stage enabling factors are supporting establishment and development of RP CSOs to articulate their demands. Grassroots ownership of RP CSOs via political parties, producer organisations and social movements are important too. Institutions matter in terms of the establishment of rights (and a legal framework) such as freedom of association and a history of social mobilisation and social movements can make a big difference.

At the access stage enabling factors are awareness raising of RP on institutional and legal processes and the political commitment/leadership on the process of participatory policy processes. Donors can be significant in opening spaces for PR CSO participation and funding such processes (particularly in financial support to RP CSOs to access policy spaces and incentives for RP CSOs to participate). Institutions matter in terms of over-coming bureaucratic resistances to RP CSO participation and the transparent establishment of rules, legal statures promotes participation. Key entry points are mobilising producer organisations, social movements, CDD and other innovative approaches.

Table 5. Summary of Case Studies: RP Participation in Policy Processes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enabling factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actors/networks</strong> (Capabilities and interests)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mobilisation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Supporting establishment and development of RP CSOs to articulate their demands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Grassroots ownership of RP CSOs via political parties, producer organisations and social movements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Access</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Awareness raising of RP CSOs on institutional and legal processes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Political commitment/leadership from government on the process of participatory policy processes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Donors who open space for PR CSO participation and fund such processes (particularly in financial support to RP CSOs to access policy spaces and incentives for RP CSOs to participate).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Influence</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Capacity development for RP CSOs to engage in policy debates via technical, advocacy and language skills and skills in negotiation, lobbying, and communication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Access of RP CSOs to information necessary to participate (policy history, etc) and access to good evidence to support their case.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Availability to RP CSOs of means of communication to make the voices of the rural poor heard, and to network with other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutions / context (Incentives and constraints)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• RP CSOs who are credible to government as legitimate representatives of RP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Capacity development for RP CSOs to engage in monitoring and evaluation of policy implementation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Built-in monitoring procedure to provide feedback to key partners periodically.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Establishment of rights (and a legal framework) such as freedom of association.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• A history of social mobilisation and social movements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Awareness raising of RP CSOs right to participate and exposure to international discourses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Over-coming bureaucratic resistances to RP CSO participation (via political leadership and legitimacy of CSOs for example).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Transparent establishment of rules and legal statuses to promote participation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Key entry points are mobilising producer organisations, social movements, CDD and innovative spaces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Receptivity to voice from governance structures, bureaucracy and politicians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Most successes cases were in popular or consultative spaces rather than formal electoral spaces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• A defined and publicized procedure for providing feedback and support in the fulfillment of roles in policy implementation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Effective local and regional co-ordinating mechanisms.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the influence stage enabling factors are capacity development for RP CSOs to engage in policy debates via training in technical, advocacy and language skills and skills in negotiation, lobbying, and communication. Also of importance is access of RP CSOs to information necessary to participate (policy history, etc) and access to good evidence to support their case and the availability to RP CSOs of means of communication to make the voices of the rural poor heard, and to network with other stakeholders. In terms of institutions, receptivity to voice from governance structures, bureaucracy and politicians as a result of political leadership and/or legitimacy of RP CSOs who are seen as credible representatives of RP is important.
At the implementation stage enabling factors are capacity development for RP CSOs to engage in monitoring and evaluation and built-in monitoring procedures to provide feedback to key partners periodically. Institutions matter in terms of a defined and publicized procedure for providing feedback, support in the fulfillment of roles in policy implementation and effective local and regional co-ordinating mechanisms.

d. Examples of success stories

We can illustrate how innovation, incentives, and inequality mediate participation of the RP in policy processes across the case studies with some success stories. In our case studies we can identify successful cases studies at each of the stages (of mobilisation, access, influence, and implementation) on the ladder of empowerment.

First, one example of successful mobilisation is IFAD, FAO and NGOs support to involve farmers’ organizations in the EC Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations. The initiative derived from a specific request made by farmers’ leaders at the Farmers Forum at IFAD and at a EuropAfrica campaign seminar in 2006. IFAD provided grant support to each region, with the overall aim to develop a lobbying campaign which would bring together various actors (farmers organisations, NGOs, CSOs and, eventually, governments) in favour of an EPA strongly oriented towards sustainable development. One result was that the Winward Islands Farmers Association devised a communication strategy and toolkit to enable an information campaign to inform farmers in the region about the EPA process. Overall, the support provided by IFAD-FAO-EuropAfrica in this initiative provided an opportunity for farmers organisations from ACP countries to interact with each other and with national and international actors in policy processes. It has also provided an opportunity for them to exchange views on issues of common interest, and to raise such issues to international attention.

Second, one example of access of the RP to policy processes can be drawn from Reseau Impact cases in establishing national dialogues in Senegal on Pastoral Law via a national process of defining the legislation and consultation with rural poor organisations to write a national law. This was enabled by supported by the French government and other donors. The CNCR (national body for rural cooperatives) effectively represented 3.5million producers. Major causes of success were CNCR had a high level of technical expertise and CNCR was viewed as 'legitimate' voice by government. Another successful example of access of the RP to policy processes comes from Viet Nam and the participation of rural children in a PPA/Policy maker immersion as part of the country’s primary national development document. Thuy et al., (2005) findings were that space for children’s voices in policy formation had been made but participation was mediated by inequality in terms of gender, ethnicity, age, disability, marginalisation (e.g., street children) as some children felt it an inhibiting environment in which to express opinions. In particular, it was children’s capacities to participate with ease and confidence in group discussions that was a key issue. The exercise certainly impacted on local and national leaders and donors about the issues faced by children situated as it was at an intersection of PPA and immersion of policy makers.

An example of RP capacity to influence is citizen’s juries in Zimbabwe and India. Imaginative approaches make a big difference. Take for example, Prajateerpu, the citizens jury in Andhra Pradesh (AP), India. This was an exercise in deliberative democracy. It was devised as a means of allowing those affected by the government’s
Vision 2020 for food and farming in AP to shape a vision of their own. Vision 2020, a new government policy for sustainable development poverty reduction had been put forward by AP chief minister and was being backed by the World Bank. It proposed to consolidate small farms and rapidly increase mechanisation and modernisation, including GMOs. The number of people on the land would be reduced from 70% to 40%. The aim of the Prajateerpu event was to discuss the implications of this policy and possible alternatives and give those most likely to be affected a voice. Participants included representatives of small and marginal farmers, small traders and food processors, and consumers. The jury included indigenous people and over two thirds of the jury were women. Representation on the jury was purposely discriminated in favour of the poor and marginalised. The main donors involved were the World Bank and DFID. Members of the government, the corporate sector and civil society were all given equal time to present their case to the jury. News and media professionals were also invited to the Prajateerpu event to relay information and the deliberation and outcomes to a wider audience. Further, a group of external observers oversaw the process to ensure that it was fair, unprejudiced and not captured by any interest group. Even though there was much diversity of opinion, there were several statements on which there was widespread agreement among the jurors.

Fourth, an example of RP participation in policy implementation is service user groups in Brazil known as Management Councils. These are forum in which citizens join service providers and government in defining public policies and overseeing their implementation. The setting up of the Local Health councils, over two years, involved the mobilisation of over 2500 people to participate in at least one monthly meeting. The councils consist of 24 effective and 24 substitute councillors, half of whom represent civil society, and the other half the government, service providers, and health workers. The spectrum of participants proved to be more comprehensively diverse where there were project managers committed to participation as a political project. Institutional design played a key role in deepening democratic potential by improving the process of council member selection. A characteristic that enabled success was the presence of a mobilised civil society. Variables that restricted success include the legacies of a lingering political culture and bureaucrats resistance to power sharing.

A similarly case of RP participation in policy implementation can be drawn again from participation in AP, India where it is evident that incentives of the RP to participate are particularly important. Some kind of demonstration that change is possible is important because poor people often do not have the time to participate and cannot see benefits of doing so. Jones et al., (2007) found that there was greater participation of the rural poor in policy implementation via health and education service user councils. However, this very much tempered by the context of inequality across caste, gender and income which shaped who participated and how. Those working as daily labourers simply did not have the time to participate due to the loss of earnings that would be incurred and in a similar vein to be a committee chair overseeing implementation of services was impossible for the poor because of the time and money need to get elected and conduct duties.
SECTION III: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND ACTION

This section draws out the policy implications of the case-study analysis in the previous chapter. It discusses how governments, donors and civil society organisations, such as those of the rural poor, can contribute to enhancing the participation by the rural poor in different stages of a policy process, from agenda setting through to policy implementation and impact assessment. Various dimensions of the act of ‘participating’ are taken into account, including, inter alia: awareness of the rights to engage with policy processes, knowledge about the issues at stake, ability to articulate the demands of the poor (generate voice) and to lobby for their interests, and capacity to influence the course of policy leading to the delivery of pro-rural poor outcomes.

The discussion of policy implications needs to be placed in the context of shifting economic, political, demographic and environmental fundamentals (discussed in Section I) which pose new challenges to the participation of the rural poor in policy processes. The proliferation of global aid initiatives and vertical funding mechanisms means that the rural poor in aid dependent countries will have to rely more on decisions taken further away from the field at international fora. Climate change represents a particularly heavy burden to the rural people and adaptation to changes in climate will require diversification of the rural economy and access to new technologies. It will be a challenge to ensure that the rural poor are included in fair terms in such adaptation processes. The high and in some cases rising levels of uncertainty, to which the poor are particularly vulnerable, will make the identification and targeting of relevant policy and policy processes increasingly difficult. On a positive note, increasing interconnectedness across the globe enables better access to global information, knowledge and technology.

a. Targeting relevant policies and policy processes

What are the issues? In searching for ways to engage the rural poor in policy processes the first question arising is: what are the most relevant policies and policy processes for the rural poor? Answering this question requires a good understanding of the assets, income earning opportunities and vulnerability of the rural poor, as well as of how these might be affected (expanded or reduced) by certain policies. The question then becomes: which policies are most likely to have an impact on the assets, livelihood options and vulnerability of the rural poor?

But relevant policies and policy processes are not always easily detectable. The process of formulating and implementing policies is far from being linear and not all important policy decisions are disclosed in a transparent way as there are hidden policy spaces. Furthermore, policy processes are often highly unpredictable in developing countries, due to quickly shifting priorities and development fads, limited technical capacity, limited demand and supply of evidence, and volatile political systems. Such uncertainty represents an obstacle to the understanding of what is at stake – understanding what policies actually entail and how they might affect the rural poor.

Hence the challenge is not only about identifying policies which are likely to have an impact in the lives of the rural poor but is also about identifying spaces and moments where and when key policy decisions are likely to be generated.
Recommenedations:

(i) Those interested in the impact of policies on the rural poor need to target policies beyond the conventional rural policy framework. Relevant policies are not only the ones targeting directly the rural poor. In fact, key policies might be far distant from rural poverty concerns. Trade policies (which affect food prices), migration policies (which affect remittances), international development assistance policies (which determine the way aid is delivered) are example of policies that can have significant impacts on the livelihoods of the rural poor.

(ii) There needs to be stronger investments on rural poverty-focused policy research and evidence gathering and make this available to those doing policy advocacy on behalf of the poor – linking research/evidence and demand for sound policies.

(iii) The shifting fundamentals and growing levels of uncertainty require a permanent monitoring of how different policies and policy processes – at local, regional and international levels – might impact upon the rural poor.

(iv) Those advocating for pro-rural poor policies should build and nurture relationship with policy makers (governments and donors) in order to be better position to detect hidden policy spaces.

b. Assembling the interests of the RP and articulating a pro-rural poor narrative

What are the issues? Voice in decision making that affects one’s life is a key dimension of well-being. Lack of voice and right to participate are attributes of the poor. But generating voice and establishing an enabling environment for the poor to exercise their rights and freedoms are difficult undertakings. There are many challenges to assembling and articulating the interests of the rural poor, including the fact that:

- The rural poor are a highly diverse and heterogeneous group. The rural poor include smallholder subsistence farmers, landless or casually employed wage labourers, nomadic pastoralists, female-headed households and many children – almost 700 million children in developing countries are living in absolute poverty and rural children face much worse living conditions than those in urban areas, according to a 2003 UNICEF report (Gordon et al. 2003). Rural poor people’s entitlements, needs and capabilities are highly diverse and can not be easily synthesised into a single pro-rural poor policy narrative.

- The rural poor may have limited interest or incentives to participate (or being represented) in policy processes. Poor people are often excluded and detached from governance processes and feel have little to gain in engaging with policy debates – they often have no time to afford or do not see the benefit of participating. It is also important to remember that a significant proportion of the rural poor are children – Thuy et al. (2006: 2) note that “the principle of children’s participation challenges traditional paternalistic models of addressing children’s needs”.


• There is a risk of mismatch between the interests of the rural poor and the perceptions and motivations of those representing their interests. For a number of reasons (including cultural and language barriers as well as more practical reasons such as time availability), the rural poor hardly participate directly in policy processes and their views and interests are instead represented by intermediary organisations, such as CSOs of various kinds. The risk of misrepresentation and co-option is significant. There is also the risk of poor accountability in relation to those whose interests are being represented.

Despite these sizeable challenges, there is significant scope for improving the conditions for better articulation of the interests of the rural poor. Different actors have an important role to play. Available evidence suggests that CSOs can be very effective in building voice and mobilising the interests of the poor where there is a history of social movements. Governments have a central role in creating the enabling environment for participation through policies that enhance people’s rights and freedoms and encourage association and participation. Donors can play a role in opening spaces for participation by providing the support needed to build the capacity of those associations representing the poor. What ever is done it is important that the perceptions of poor people are the point of departure as top-down understandings of poverty may not correspond with how poor people themselves conceptualise changes in their well-being (Chambers, 2006).

Recommendations:

(i) There is scope for promoting, creating and expanding spaces for open expression which are truly accessible to the rural poor. Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPAs) are an example of approaches used to enable the poor to express, analyse their knowledge of life and conditions, to plan and to act. These should be complemented by the establishment of more continuous and spontaneous spaces which build as much as possible on local community practices. Community radio and popular arts can be powerful means for generating public interest and understanding.

(ii) The incentives for the rural poor to participate should be enhanced. Informal and innovative forms of participation (such as farmer trials, citizen juries and other described in the case-studies) can be effective in capturing poor people’s interest.

(iii) Special attention needs to be directed to those particularly vulnerable and voiceless amongst the rural poor, particularly the landless, the unemployed, nomadic pastoralists, the physically challenged, elderly people, women and children. Formal and informal organisations and movements which assemble and articulate the interests of the poorest of the rural poor need to be stimulated.

9 The term Civil Society Organisation (CSO) is used here to refer to different types of civil society organised groups operating locally, nationally or internationally. These include NGOs, community groups, research institutes, think tanks, advocacy groups, trade unions, academic institutions, parts of the media, professional associations and faith-based institutions.
(iv) Power inequalities shape all forms of participation and there needs to be a constant effort to ensure representation and equal participation of the rural poor in the organisations and movements representing their interests.

(v) There is also the need to create oversight mechanisms which monitor and assess interventions by non-governmental actors and other organisations and movements representing the rural poor in order to keep asking questions about legitimacy, accountability and effectiveness of their actions.

(vi) Finally, access to international thinking is important in the formation of a local pro-rural poor policy narrative and there is a case for strengthening the links between local and global advocacy organisations of the rural poor.

c. Accessing policies and policy spaces

What are the issues? The case-study analysis in Section II suggests some general enabling conditions to effective access to and engagement with policy processes. These include, amongst other, a history of social mobilisation and social movements, a political system and legal framework favourable to participation and accountability and exposure to international knowledge and discourse on rights and participation. The analysis also found that successful participation by the rural poor is most likely to take place at the local level, through popular or consultative spaces (rather than electoral, bureaucratic or conceptual spaces) and in relation to the agenda setting and formulation stages of a policy process. Evidence suggests that CSOs can be quite effective in influencing agenda setting on behalf of the poor, particularly where there is a history of social mobilisation. Access to information and evidence is essential and bridging local and international knowledge can be enabling. The analysis also suggests, however, that there are considerable obstacles restricting access and participation by the rural poor, such as the lack of information and capacities (by the rural poor or those representing them) to understand the issues at stake and to influence policymakers. Policy engagement and influence requires a particular set of skills different from those CSOs working with the rural poor typically rely upon. Policymakers frequently doubt the feasibility and practicality of proposals made by CSOs which tend to be based in soft evidence, based on anecdotes and case-studies rather than hard empirical research (Court et al. 2006). Furthermore, the increasing importance of global development initiatives creates new challenges in the access to the relevant policy spaces by the rural poor and the agencies representing them.

Recommendations:

(i) Governments should promote political freedoms and make policy spaces more transparent and open for engagement at different stages of the policy process. So far some progress has been made at the agenda setting and policy formulation levels, as the experience with PRSPs illustrates. Significant work is still required to take participation experiences beyond conventional top-down consultative episodes and towards more direct forms of engagement by the rural poor – Goetz and Gaventa (2001) talk of “moving consultative processes to more direct forms of influence”.

(ii) Donors should encourage and support recipient governments to open up political contexts and make policy processes more evidence-based, results-oriented and inclusive.
(iii) Donors have also a more direct role to play in opening up policy spaces concerning the delivery and management of development assistance. The Paris agenda on aid effectiveness is a case in point. So far it has been excessively focused on the aid relationship between donors and recipient government and has left little scope for considering interaction between domestic stakeholders (government and non-governmental actors) in aid delivery and management. CSOs are now being brought into the debate but it is important to make sure that those truly representing the rural poor reach this international policy arena.

(iv) On their part, CSOs representing the poor need to be more proactive in getting involved in government policy discussion forums and in gathering relevant and robust evidence. To be effective in accessing and influencing policy processes they need to improve their own understanding of the policy process, and their capacity to use evidence (concerning the impact of certain policies in the livelihood option of the rural poor) and to do it a constructive and compelling manner. Robust evidence can be a powerful policy influencing tool if communicated effectively.

(v) By acting alone, however, CSO impact is limited in scope, scale and sustainability. It is important to build partnerships and networks which connect them with other policy process players. Effective networking allows CSOs to access specific capacities they lack (Court et al. 2006). For example, if a CSO lacks the capacity to generate high quality research, then networking with the research community will enable it to generate credible policy-relevant research and devise effective evidence-based policy engagement strategies.

(vi) Different policy engagement strategies will be required to participate in different policy spaces at different stages and governance levels. For example, the strategy to participate in the design of a micro-finance project in a rural district region will be considerably different from that to influence country CAADP roundtables or international high-level forums on aid effectiveness. Legitimacy and accountability become more challenging the higher the level of the policy process to influence, and the more distant the policy space is from rural poor people’s realities.

(vii) Donors can provide support to address CSOs’ financial and technical capacity constraints which hinder their ability to influence policy. Capacity building would be particularly useful with regards to evidence gathering and communication for policy engagement. Donors should diversity support to CSOs and ensure that cooperation and networking among CSOs is encouraged and duplication avoided. Donors should also facilitate and support the creation of policy research networks to strengthen the linkages between research policy and practice.

(viii) In difficult political contexts, where political rights may be limited or policy processes closed, CSOs can still influence policy. Court et al. (2006) suggest three possible CSO responses in challenging contexts: campaigns to improve policy positions and governance contexts; ‘boomerangs’, by working via external partners to change national policy; and policy pilots to develop and test operational solutions to inform and improve policy implementation.
d. Driving pro-rural poor policy change – the need for an institutionalised pro-rural poor bias

What are the issues? Despite signs of increasingly open and accessible policymaking processes, there is little evidence that this is driving policy change which is improving the lives of the rural poor. Part of the problem is the disjuncture between stated policy intentions and implementation which is due to a number of factors, including financial constraints, institutional capacity limitation, lack of political commitment and weak public demand for pro-poor policies. Hence, although many policy documents place pro-rural poor objectives at the top of the agenda it is often the case that there is little evidence showing that such objectives are being effectively pursued on the ground.

The redistributive implications of policy generate disincentives from dominant societal groups to drive truly pro-poor development. Those who do not have direct voice in the decision-making process, are not properly represented by policymakers, or are not represented in defined constituencies, have little scope for challenging the decisions taken by those in power.

Research on the ‘drivers of change’ emphasises the primacy of politics in development and poverty reduction efforts. Main findings of drivers of change studies’ include: the prevalence of personalised politics; state capture and elite domination of policy processes; low levels of ‘stateness’ with demoralised and politicised bureaucracies; superficial commitment by those in charge to strategies, interventions or goals for the elimination of poverty; and limited political demand for reforms to improve conditions for growth, governance and service delivery (Leftwich, 2006).

Despite the considerable structural and institutional constraints to pro-poor policy change, a number of the studies have identified potential ‘drivers’ or agents of change in the form of groups and organised interests in civil society and reform-minded elements amongst the political, bureaucratic and professional elites, showing some potential for exercising pressure (ibid).  

The main conclusion of the drivers of change stream of work is the need to encourage the emergence of political institutions, processes and practices through which pro-poor programmes and policies can be devised, implemented and sustained. A central question concerns the distribution and control of the sources and forms of formal and informal power, and how they interact across different institutional spheres to

---

10 ‘Drivers of Change’ work was an initiative started by the UK Department for International Development in the early 2000s to improve the understanding of the deeper structural and institutional factors which frame the political context within which individuals and organisations act and of how the changes occurring will impact the poor. For an overview of the approach see Warrener (2004).

11 Fukuyama’s term.

12 Duncan et al. (2003) make the distinction between four categories of agents of change: (i) ‘drivers from within’, such as the private sector, the media, the policy research community and professional association; (ii) ‘drivers from below’, including civil society organisations, churches and trade unions; (iii) ‘drivers from above’, comprising Parliament and reform-minded elements of political parties, traditional leaders and the civil service; and (iv) ‘drivers from outside’, including international agencies, expatriate citizens and regional actors.
promote or hinder developmental policies and practices. Leftwich (2006) makes the distinction between the notion of politics and that of politics of development, the latter being a special and more challenging case of politics which is about how development can be mobilised and how a developmental bias can be institutionalised in new rules and procedures that will help to achieve developmental goals. The politics of development is about the processes whereby people change the way they use, produce and distribute resources to enhance growth and improve welfare.

But how to introduce and sustain a pro-rural poor bias into (politicised) structures, institutions and relationships shaping development paths and outcomes?

Recommendations:

(i) There needs to be a better understanding of the political dynamics of pro-rural poor change. Driving pro-rural poor change might not entail an automatic improvement in policy content (such as budget increases, passage of new legislation, etc.) but rather ‘procedural changes’ (Jones and Villar, 2006) in policy process dynamics which can lead to gradual pro-rural poor policy reforms over time, such as, for example, improved dialogue with state and other influential actors.

(ii) Building a pro-rural poor bias into development processes is a long-term endeavour and donors, CSOs and other actors pushing for pro-rural poor change should ‘stay the course’ and be willing to commit to a long haul. In order to do this, it is important to develop relationships of trust between government and those organisations representing the rural poor in the lengthy process of consensus building.

(iii) The institutional location of pro-rural poor analysis and policy design is critical in overcoming bureaucratic resistance to changing policy. Securing political support from the more powerful actors, such as ministries of finance and political elites, is essential in the effort to drive pro-poor policy change (Hickey 2006).

(iv) Global actors and thinking can exert a significant influence over national level decision-making, particularly in low income countries. Donors and international non-governmental agencies have a role to play in promoting policies benefiting the rural poor people.

(v) Donors can also support strengthening the capacity and scope of action of agents of (pro-rural poor) change, noting that the role of members of Parliament, political elites and the private sector in driving pro-poor change has been particularly overlooked.

3e.Rural poor people-centred monitoring and impact assessment

What are the issues? Monitoring progress and assessing the impact of policies is a key stage of a policy cycle. It is the moment to assess actual change against stated objectives and thus to judge whether a particular policy has been successful or not.

There has been significant progress in developing monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems throughout the developing world. PRSP processes have been an important driver of systemic reforms to M&E in many countries. Despite progress, M&E are
often top-down and government or donor-led processes and there is still relatively few independent and poor people-centred assessments of development interventions.

In response to such problems more pluralistic forms of monitoring and evaluation have been developed, in line with the proliferation of participatory approaches and practices in development in general. Participatory monitoring and evaluation (PM&E), developed towards the late 1990s, involves the assessment of change through processes that involve people or groups affecting or affected by the impacts being assessed. Guijt (1999: 10) notes that “PM&E is not just a matter of using participatory techniques within a conventional M&E setting. It is about radically rethinking who undertakes and carries out the process, and who learns or benefits from the findings”. The expectation is that such participatory methods contribute to empowerment of stakeholders to take action, improved public accountability and improved information provision for strategic planning at different levels. But in order to reach these objectives a number of common mistakes have be borne in mind. For example, many participatory monitoring systems are put in place with the assumption that local people will be keen to be involved. However, they are not necessarily interested in the same kinds of information as an NGO, government department or researcher. If the community are to be involved it is important that the information collected has some direct value for community members (ibid).

In order to inform and have an impact in decision-making, participatory M&E should be policy-focused and relevant. This is a significant challenge as the feedback loops from M&E into policy formulation are generally quite weak and participatory M&E experiences remain largely confined to NGO or donor-sponsored initiatives rather than government policy making processes. Cornwall and Guijt (2004) noted that tackling societal challenges (such as inequity) entails more that simply group based learning. It requires ‘bringing together a range of unlikely comrades in multi-stakeholder processes of joint fact-finding, negotiation, planning, reassessing, and refocusing’ (p.166).

Recommendations:

(i) Governments should make their M&E systems (selection of key indicators, data collection and analysis) more open to diverse stakeholders, particularly the ultimate beneficiaries of public policies (i.e. the poor).

(ii) CSOs can help by fostering a culture of participatory approaches, attitudes, behaviours and methods to monitoring policies and assess their impact centred on the rural poor. But it is important that such initiatives produce evidence which is compelling and is effectively communicated to policymakers.

(iii) Donors should promote the creation of multi-stakeholder fora bringing together the research community, policy makers and those representing the rural poor in order to ensure that M&E is pluralistic but that it is also feeding back effectively to decision-making processes.
REFERENCES


Cleveringa, R. et al. (undated) Advocacy for community rights to land and water in Lushonkwe. IFAD: Rome.


Cleveringa, R. et al. (2006) Local Governance to secure access to land and water in the lower Gash Watershed. IFAD: Rome.


Cleveringa, R. et al. (2004) Restoring land use through local water governance and
technology in High Andes communities. IFAD: Rome.


oversight in India. Public Management Review. 3(3).


IFAD. (undated) FSA Benin. Rome: IFAD

IFAD. (undated) Appui au ROPPA dans le Mise en Œuvre de la Politique Agricole de L’UEMOA/Support of the ROPPA in putting into place the agricultural policy of UEMOA. IFAD: Rome.

IFAD. (undated) Comités Communaux de Concertation (CCC)/Communal Consultation Committees. IFAD: Rome.


IFAD. (undated) Diapositif pour le renforcement des capacités d’innovation collectives/Reinforcement of collective Innovation capacities. IFAD: Rome.

IFAD. (undated) Farine de Manioc Non Fermentée/ Unfermented Manioc (Cassava) Flour. IFAD: Rome.

IFAD. (undated) Fiche d’innovation/ Innovation form II. IFAD: Rome.

IFAD. (undated) Fiche d’innovation/ Innovation Form III. IFAD: Rome.

IFAD. (undated) L’information sur le marché d’exportation de l’ananas/ Information on the market for the export of pineapple. IFAD: Rome.

IFAD. (undated) Les champs de diversité pour la conservation in situ/ Fields of diversity for conservation in situ. IFAD: Rome.

IFAD. (undated) Points D’Information Villageois (PIV)/ Village information points. IFAD: Rome.

IFAD. (undated) Points de collecte de riz étuvé/ Collection points for braised rice. IFAD: Rome.

IFAD. (undated) Professionnalisation des organisations paysannes/ Professionalisation of Farmers Organisations. IFAD: Rome.


IFAD. (undated) Unité de production et de commercialisation de lait végétal/Technical support in production and commercialisation of vegetable milk. IFAD: Rome.

IFAD. (undated) Approche Ciblage des bénéficiaires/Targeting beneficiaries. IFAD: Rome.

IFAD. (undated) Appui à l’émergence de l’offre locale de service paysanne/ Support to the emergence of local provision of services offered by peasants. IFAD: Rome.
IFAD. (undated) Comité de gestion auto finance du matériel/Self-finance of material by the management committee. IFAD: Rome.

IFAD. (undated) Fabrication artisanal provene/Local poultry farming. IFAD: Rome.

IFAD. (undated) Fiche d’innovation Form of innovation I. IFAD: Rome.

IFAD. (undated) Les trois affiches/The three posters. IFAD: Rome.

IFAD. (undated) Partenariat agribusiness/Agribusiness partnership. IFAD: Rome.

IFAD. (undated) Participation active des OPPA à l’élaboration de la politique agricole de la CEDEAO/ Active participation of the OPPA in the elaboration of the agricultural policy of the CEDEO. IFAD: Rome.

IFAD. Community Driven Development. IFAD: Rome.

IFAD. (undated) Identifying and sharing innovation in Western and Central Africa : Agribusiness Partnership. IFAD: Rome.


Leftwich, A. (2006c) From Drivers of Change to the Politics of Development: refining the analytical framework to understand the politics of the places where we work – Part 3: final report. Department of Politics, University of York.


Ragas, C. Thematic Note 2 Institutionalizing Gender in the Agriculture Sector: Review of Experiences. IFAD: Rome.


Toulmin, C. and Gueye, B. (undated) Transformations In West African Agriculture And The Role Of Family Farm. Paris: OECD.


