

Sri Lanka

Post-Tsunami Livelihoods Support and Partnership Programme

Project Completion Report Digest

Sri Lanka - Post-Tsunami Livelihoods Support and Partnership Programme

| Item | Assessment Remarks | Rating |
|-----------------------------------|--|--------|
| Country & Project Name | Sri Lanka - Post-Tsunami Livelihoods Support and Partnership Programme | |
| Loan No.: | 694-LK | |
| Project Id. | 1351 | |
| Board Date | 19 April 2005 | |
| Effectiveness Date | 09 March 2006 | |
| Original Closing Date | 30 September 2009 | |
| Final Closing Date | 30 September 2010 | |
| Total Project Cost USD(M) | 4 698 | |
| IFAD loan US\$(M) | 4 698 | |
| Cofinanciers (if any) | None | |
| Implementing Agency | Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Land and Irrigation and Ministry of Fisheries, Aquatic Resources and Christian Affairs | |
| Principal Components | PT-LISPP has only one major component, but that consists of several activities. In order to expedite the availability of IFAD's financial assistance for the victims of the tsunami, resources will be provided for priority infrastructure development using the same design and implementation modalities for the priority community infrastructure development component of DZ-LISPP. The incremental funding will be used to finance the immediate recovery of essential infrastructure, including housing, settlement infrastructure, social infrastructure and fisheries roads. | |
| Project Performance | | |
| Relevance | The Programme was highly relevant to the needs of the Tsunami affected people. The substantial support for fishermen affected by the Tsunami was also appropriate and consistent with the overall national policies and practices related to the tsunami recovery programme. A flexible community-based approach was applied in the housing construction, which was widely accepted by the beneficiaries. A Programme redesign took place in late 2006, as in some districts there was a low demand for housing related to activities, and thus the original target were revised in terms of geographical areas (districts) and targets. However, Programme's relevance has been reduced by two main important issues: i) the targeting issue (as better explained below); ii) the inadequacy of the M&E system as well as the lack of emphasis on the monitoring of results. | 4 |
| Effectiveness | The Programme was not successful in achieving its development objectives, especially with regard to the objectives of: i) strengthening the tsunami affected communities as well as of sustainably managing coastal resources; ii) improving women's participation in social and economic activities. The objective of providing essential social and economic infrastructure to tsunami families was partially achieved, although serious issues concern the final beneficiaries of these infrastructure. In percentage terms, the Programme's efforts concerned: new houses (67%) and damaged houses rehabilitated (7%); provision of toilet facilities (34%); access roads improvement (58%); rainwater harvesting (5%). Interestingly, the constructions of dug wells stood at 198%, and the settlement of roads and drainage systems was at 106% of the original targets. | 3 |
| Efficiency | The average time lapse between loan approval (April 2005) and loan effectiveness (March 2006) was only 10.9 months, which - according to the PCR - is considered lower than the IFAD average of 14.5 months and the regional average of 11.4 months. However, the Programme had difficulties taking off, due to a long staff recruitment process, exacerbated by high staff turnover, which caused loss of institutional memory and lack of continuity in implementation. The delays in getting the counterpart funding from the Treasury, the long-time necessary for the approval of the housing rehabilitation activities, the absence of a M&E system, and no management information in place were other issues which seriously constrained project's efficiency. Thus, the Programme effectively started on 1st March 2007. Disbursement was low over the Programme's implementation course and started to pick up only in 2008, amounting to 98% at the Programme's closure. According to the PCR, the programme cost of Programme's operations per beneficiary family was US\$225, which would indicate an acceptable level of efficiency. The PCR also reports that an area where there has been a marked efficiency was in the execution of social and economic infrastructure investments, especially in the case of housing constructions. However, there are no data to substantiate these findings and no comparisons have been made which could prove the level of efficiency. | 3 |
| Project Performance | | 3.5 |
| Partner Performance | | |
| IFAD | Few information is available on IFAD's performance. IFAD has provided guidelines and some support on organisational management roles of partners and procedures of project implementation. Since June 2007, with the introduction of the Country Facilitation Office (CFO), the Programme was supervised directly by | 4 |

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| | the IFAD's CFO in Sri Lanka. According to the PCR, the staff turnover was marginal in IFAD direct supervision thereby maintaining continuity and quality of the advice. Conversely, IFAD had an average of 60 days for processing Withdrawal applications (WAs) from the Programme. This led to several situations where there was a shortage of funds which negatively affected Programme's implementation. The PSRs from 2007 to 2009 have highlighted the serious Programme's shortcomings, although the 2010 PSR provides an overly positive picture of Programme final achievements. | |
| Cooperating Institution | During the early implementation of the Programme, UNOPS was the Cooperating Institution. However, due to lack of available information, no assessment can be made of its performance. | n.a. |
| Government | According to the PCR, the Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources as IFAD's main partner agency in the national government has maintained a close dialogue and cooperation with the IFAD management. The Ministry provided valuable support to all supervisions and reviews conducted by the Missions. On the less positive side, the Government is deemed responsible as its financial contribution was not provided as agreed, since there was a shortfall of 67% on counterpart funding on a cumulative basis from the start of the Programme. This - together with the above mentioned issues under the Efficiency section - caused a delay in implementing Programme's activities. Moreover, on several important issues, the Programme was not in compliance with loan covenants and IFAD's procedures, mainly with regard to: i) financial management capacity; ii) asset management; iii) internal control system; iv) accounting system; v) audit; vi) procurement procedures. | 3 |
| NGO/Other | The UN-Habitat and National Housing Development Authority (NHDA) have been partners in implementing the housing sub-component of the Programme through which a partnership has been developed. Apart from the description of their interventions, no information is provided in the PCR to assess the quality of the performance of these two local partners. | n.a. |
| Cofinancier(s) | | |
| Combined Partner Performance | <i>The PCR does not provide information on this theme.</i> | n.a. |
| Rural Poverty Impact | | |
| Household Income and Net Assets | The Programme main impact on income is attributed to: i) community paid labour work on project initiated infrastructure activities such as housing, roads, wells, community wells, etc.; ii) increased fishing; iii) regained labour work in the fishing activities. As far as the social and economic infrastructures provided to the various beneficiaries (roads, wells, dug, fishery roads, etc.) no studies have been conducted to assess their monetary value. In rating Programme's impact on this domain, it has been considered the serious issue of who the final beneficiaries were and how poor they were, as expressed in the below section about targeting. | 3 |
| Food Security | Programme's impact within this domain mainly concerned: i) improved fish catch due to facilities and other interventions provided by the project; ii) opportunity of resuming fishing and other income generating activities with the provision of a suitable house, roads and living environment; iii) larger housing plots with more appropriate soil conditions providing opportunities for limited cultivation of fruits and vegetables; iv) improved cooking facilities in the new or renovated houses with access to safe water. In rating Programme's impact on this domain, it has been considered the serious issue of who the final beneficiaries were and how poor they were, as expressed in the below section about targeting. | 3 |
| Ag. Productivity | No impact has been detected on this domain. | n.a. |
| Agricultural Productivity and Food Security | | 3 |
| Natural Resources and Environment | The use of garbage bins, recycling of waste, availability of space for home gardening, tree planting activities on road ways had a direct impact on the environment. In many cases it was observed that people use the garbage bins to make compost and use the recycled waste for the home garden cultivation. In rating Programme's impact on this domain, it has been considered the serious issue of who the final beneficiaries were and how poor they were, as expressed in the below section about targeting. | 4 |
| Human, Social Capital and Empowerment | In terms of <u>human capital</u> , programme impact positively reflected on: i) good quality housing for the beneficiaries who were earlier under temporary shelter, with adequate water and sanitation facilities and improved well ventilated, more free kitchens that ensures good health conditions; ii) safe and comfortable transport by using the roads constructed under the programme; iii) an improved physical environment for the fisher families by the provision of infrastructure facilities such as drainage schemes, electricity and water schemes. In terms of <u>social capital</u> , the Programme only intervention concerned the formation of the Community Development Councils and the Community Action plans which strengthened the cohesiveness among programme beneficiaries and they found identities through their organizations. However, these were short lived and formed mainly to serve a definite purpose. In rating Programme's impact on this domain, it has been considered the serious issue of who the final beneficiaries were and how poor they were, as expressed in the below section about targeting. | 3 |

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| Inst. & Policies | No impact has been detected on this domain. | n.a. |
| Markets | No impact has been detected on this domain. | n.a. |
| Project Impact | | 3 |
| Overarching Factors | | |
| Innovation | The only innovation highlighted in the PCR has been the partnership envisaged between the UN-Habitat and the National Housing Development Authority (NHDA), which has been considered as an innovative approach introduced under the Programme. | 3 |
| Replicability and Scaling-up | According to the PCR, several donors have replicated the Programme's strategies, mainly with regard to the construction of houses for the tsunami victims. GTZ, ASP Group, NECORD who have built 1000, 60 and 112 houses respectively, have used the participatory approach of the Programme. | 4 |
| Innovation, Replicability and Scaling-up | | 3 |
| Sustainability and Ownership | The sustainability of the benefits generated by the Programme has to be considered for two different perspectives. The sustainability of the housing construction and other amenities which are <u>personal to the family</u> is likely to be sustained. The same situation does not apply to the <u>common infrastructures and amenities</u> (roads, water schemes, etc.), as the Programme did not concentrate in building up either institutions or leaving behind viable institutional framework that could probably take care of the common amenities. The sustainability of the common amenities depends on the doubtful ability of the local authorities to allocate adequate budgetary resources for future Operation and Maintenance (O&M) activities. | 3 |
| Targeting | The target group of the programme was the Tsunami-affected poor rural women and men who experienced loss of lives of relatives and/or loss of physical and financial assets. The Programme was not successful in its targeting strategy. According to the 2008 IFAD's Supervision Missions, "the Programme lacked exclusive poverty focus and it was ineffective in properly selecting target groups for the activities carried out. No efforts were detected to include poverty focus in completed or future feasibility studies for assets creation". The same criticism is expressed by the 2009 Supervision Mission which stated that "there is a tendency to allocate programme resources to uses which in itself are useful but which are not poverty or gender targeted and not related to the tsunami. On the other hand, there are still hundreds of genuine victims of the tsunami waiting in temporary shelters for support in house construction". | 2 |
| Gender | Although the focus on gender was embedded in one of its specific development objectives, the Programme did not directly focus on women's special needs, as women were considered as active participants together with men in the development process. Thus, women benefitted from more general interventions such as: provision of wells and compost pits; construction of water supply schemes; promotion of vegetable and herbal backyard gardens. The consolidation of dwelling house after tsunami was seen by many as a means of strength for women to initiate other livelihood activities. | 4 |
| Overall Performance | | 3 |
| Estimated number of beneficiaries | | |
| PCR Quality | | |
| Scope | The PCR is partly in line with PCR Completion Guidelines, as several annexes are missing. | 3 |
| Quality | The PCR is seriously affected by an overall lack of supporting data and information for the Programme, together with a weak M&E system. This is reflected in a PCR which is incomplete and fairly simplistic in its assessments. | 3 |
| Lessons | The lessons learned mainly deal with the Programme's fiduciary-related aspects. Other important issues have not been taken into account. | 3 |
| Candour | The PCR provides a too positive assessment of the Programme's achievements. In some cases, contradictions have also been detected. | 3 |