

## **Ghana**

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### **Ghana Agricultural Sector Investment Programme**

#### **Mid-term Review**

#### **Main report and appendices**

Mission Dates: From 22/02/2018 to 16/03/2018

Document Date 03/06/2019

Project No. 1100001678

Report No. 5059-GH

West and Central Africa Division  
Programme Management Department

## Abbreviations and Acronyms

<b>AWPB</b>	Annual Work Plan and Budget
<b>ASAP</b>	Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme
<b>BAC</b>	Business Advisory Councils
<b>CA</b>	Conservation Agriculture
<b>CCR</b>	Climate Change Resilience
<b>COSOP</b>	Country Strategic Opportunity Programme
<b>DDA</b>	District Departments of Agriculture
<b>DVCC</b>	District and Village Coordinating Committees
<b>EOI</b>	Expression of Interest
<b>EPA</b>	Environment Protection Authority
<b>FBO</b>	Farmer Based Organisation
<b>GADS</b>	Gender and Agricultural Development Strategy
<b>GALS</b>	Gender Action Learning System
<b>GASIP</b>	Ghana Agriculture Sector Investment Programme
<b>GIDA</b>	Ghana Irrigation Development Authority
<b>GOG</b>	Government of Ghana
<b>GPS</b>	Geographic Positioning System
<b>ICO</b>	IFAD Country Office
<b>ICR</b>	Inter Cycle Review
<b>IFAD</b>	International Fund for Agricultural Development
<b>LTB</b>	Letter to the Borrower
<b>M&amp;E</b>	Monitoring and Evaluation
<b>MED</b>	Monitoring and Evaluation Directorate
<b>METASIP</b>	Medium-Term Agriculture Sector Investment Plan
<b>MFI</b>	Micro Finance Institution
<b>MIS</b>	Management Information System
<b>MG</b>	Matching Grant
<b>MOF</b>	Ministry of Finance
<b>MOFA</b>	Ministry of Food and Agriculture
<b>MOTI</b>	Ministry of Trade and Industry
<b>NGO</b>	Non-Government Organisation
<b>NO</b>	No Objection
<b>NPC</b>	National Programme Coordinator
<b>NPSC</b>	National Programme Steering Committee
<b>NRGP</b>	Northern Rural Growth Programme
<b>OVCF</b>	Outgrowers Value Chain Fund
<b>PCU</b>	Programme Coordination Unit
<b>PDR</b>	Programme Design Report
<b>PFI</b>	Participating Financial Institution
<b>PFJ</b>	Planting for Food and Jobs

<b>PIM</b>	Programme Implementation Manual
<b>RCB</b>	Rural Community Banks
<b>VCC</b>	Value Chain Committee
<b>VCF</b>	Value Chain Facilitators
<b>WA</b>	Withdrawal Applications
<b>WIAD</b>	Woman in Agricultural Development

## A. Project Overview

Region:	West and Central Africa Division	Project at Risk Status:	Actual problem
Country:	Ghana	Environmental and Social Category:	B
Project Name:	Ghana Agricultural Sector Investment Programme	Climate Risk Classification:	2
Project Id:	1100001678	Executing Institution:	Ministry of Food and Agriculture
Project Type:	Credit and Financial Services	Implementing Institutions:	not available yet
CPM:	Hani Abdelkader Elsadani Salem		
Project Director:	Dr. John Manful		
Project Area:	National		

Approval Date:	08/04/2014	Last audit receipt:	24/05/2018
Signing Date:	18/05/2015	Date of Last SIS mission:	15/02/2019
Entry into Force Date:	18/05/2015	Number of SIS Missions:	9
Available for Disbursement Date:	16/12/2015	Number of extensions:	0
First Disbursement Date:	21/12/2015	Effectiveness lag:	13 months
MTR Date:	22/02/2018		
Original Completion Date:	30/06/2021		
Current Completion Date:	30/06/2021		
Financial Closure:	not available yet		

## Project total financing

IFAD Financing breakdown	IFAD	\$40,831,386
	ASAP Trust Fund	\$10,000,000
	IFAD	\$36,600,000
Domestic Financing breakdown	Local Government	\$1,661,000
	National Government	\$7,628,000
	Beneficiaries	\$4,625,000
	Domestic Financing Institutions	\$17,474,000
Co-financing breakdown,		
Project total financing:		\$118,819,386

## Current Mission

Mission Dates:	From 22/02/2018 to 16/03/2018
Days in the field:	3

Mission composition:	<p>IFAD:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o Esther Kasalu-Coffin, Mission Leader</li> <li>o Detlev Puetz, Value Chain Development</li> <li>o Edward Heinemann, Institutional arrangements</li> <li>o Luabeya Franck Kapiamba, Value Chain Financing and M&amp;E</li> <li>o Amath Pathe Sene, Climate Change Resilience</li> <li>o Theophilus Otchere Larbi, Infrastructure and Conservation Farming</li> <li>o Mariko Nakayama, Gender and M&amp;E</li> <li>o Akinyi Nzioki, Gender and Targeting</li> <li>o Mikael Anderson, Financial Management</li> <li>o Daniel Pasos, Financial Management</li> <li>o Mr Masahiro Kishi, Procurement</li> </ul> <p>MOFA:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Angela Dannson, Director, Project Coordination Unit, Co-Mission Leader</li> <li>• Felix N. Darimaani, Dep. Director, M&amp;E</li> <li>• Patrick Ofori, Dep. Director, M&amp;E</li> <li>• Theresa Wayo, Deputy Director, Gender and Targeting</li> <li>• Kingsley K. Amoako. Deputy Director, Climate change</li> <li>• Joseph Tommie, Climate and Infrastructure</li> <li>• Edward Inkansah, Policy and Institutional Arrangements</li> <li>• Inusah Musah, Policy and Institutional Arrangements</li> <li>• Ebenezer Acheampong, Procurement</li> <li>• Ben Johnson, Financial Management</li> <li>• Prof. Ramatu Mahama, Rural and Agric. Finance</li> <li>• Dr. Joseph Jojo Baidu-Forson, Value Chain Dvelopment</li> <li>• Alphonsus Belane, Value Chain Development</li> <li>• Kwasi Korboe, Value Chain Development</li> <li>• Pius Sanyare, Value Chain Development</li> <li>• John Manful, Value Chain Development and Policy and Inst. Arrangements</li> <li>• Galina Okartei Akko, Value Chain Development and Rural Finance</li> <li>• George Amoasah, Climate Change and Rural Value Chain Infrastructure</li> <li>• Chelteau Barajei, Rural Value Chain Infrastructure</li> <li>• Kingsley Agyeman, Climate change and Conservation Farming</li> <li>• Klutse Kudomor, Gender and Targeting</li> <li>• Richard Twumasi-Ankrah Gender and Targeting</li> <li>• Mark Awiah, Finacial Management</li> <li>• Dominic Tano, Procurment</li> <li>• David Modzaka, M&amp;E</li> <li>• Edwin Fayorsey, M&amp;E</li> </ul>
Field sites visited:	Northern Ghana, Central Ghana and Southern Ghana

## B. Overall Assessment

Key SIS Indicator #1	Ø	Rating	Key SIS Indicator #2	Ø	Rating
Likelihood of Achieving the Development Objective		3	Assessment of the Overall Implementation Performance		3

<b>Effectiveness and Developmental Focus</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>Project Management</b>	<b>3</b>
Effectiveness	3	Quality of Project Management	2
Targeting and Outreach	3	Knowledge Management	3
Gender equality & women's participation	3	Value for Money	2
Agricultural Productivity	3	Coherence between AWPB and Implementation	3
Nutrition	2	Performance of M&E System	3
Adaptation to Climate Change	3	Requirements of Social, Environmental and Climate Assessment Procedures (SECAP)	4

<b>Sustainability and Scaling-up</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>Financial Management and Execution</b>	<b>3</b>
Institutions and Policy Engagement	2	Acceptable Disbursement Rate	2
Partnership-building	2	Quality of Financial Management	3
Human and Social Capital and Empowerment	3	Quality and Timeliness of Audit	
Quality of Beneficiary Participation	3	Counterparts Funds	3
Responsiveness of Service Providers	3	Compliance with Loan Covenants	3
Environment and Natural Resource Management	3	Procurement	3
Exit Strategy	2		
Potential for Scaling-up	2		

<b>Relevance</b>	<b>5</b>
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## C. Mission Objectives and Key Conclusions

### Background and Main Objective of the Mission

From 22 February to 16 March 2018, the Government of Ghana (GoG) and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) undertook a joint inter cycle review mission to GASIP. The objectives of the Inter Cycle Review (ICR) were to (i) review the overall physical and financial progress; (ii) review outputs, outcomes and impacts; (iii) refocus priorities, if necessary, to better achieve its objectives and to enhance and sustain outcomes and impacts; and (iv) propose modifications to the original design where appropriate to enable more efficient and effective implementation of the programme.

Following an initial briefing by the IFAD Country Director at IFAD Country Office (ICO) the mission paid a courtesy call on the Hon. Minister of Food and Agriculture, Dr. Owusu Afriyie Akoto. The Minister addressed the poor performance of GASIP and welcomed the ICR Mission objectives of how to modify GASIP, where deemed necessary. The Minister also shared MOFA's achievement of having generated an income of \$267 million by reaching 202,000 farmers in 2017 through the implementation of one of GoG flagship programmes the "Planting for Food and Jobs (PFJ) Campaign". The target is to reach 500,000 farmers in 2018. The Minister requested the mission to align GASIP to PFJ to contribute to achieving this vision.

The Mission spent a total of 15 work days in Ghana. The first week of the mission was spent with the GASIP Programme Coordination Unit (PCU) reviewing the progress of programme implementation, highlighting key constraints, and finalizing the programme for field visits. For the following week, the mission was divided into 4 groups (1 group for the Northern Zone, 2 groups for the Southern Zone and 1 group for Central Zone) and visited many stakeholders of GASIP; among others the Savanna Agricultural Research Institutes, value chain drivers (Josma, Shinkafa Buni, Caltech), Input dealers, irrigation scheme supported by the Ghana Irrigation Development Authority, selected FBOs, PFJ seed growers, financial Institutions also involved in PFJ activities, regional and district agriculture directorates.

Back in Accra, the Mission spent the third week with the PCU staff to review progress reports, discuss implementation constraints and solutions to address them. The Mission also held discussions with the following organizations: Global Affairs Canada; WIAD (Women in Agricultural Development); Monitoring and Evaluation Directorate of MoFA; the Agribusiness Unit of MoFA; to better understand complementary activities.

This Aide Memoire is a summary of the Mission's activities and findings as well as recommendations and agreed actions that arose from the discussions with MOFA, the PCU, potential implementing partners, stakeholders, including primary beneficiaries. Preliminary findings and observations were discussed by the mission at a technical meeting on 13 March 2018, attended by the Honorable Minister and representatives from MOFA.

A Wrap-Up meeting, chaired by the Honourable Deputy Minister George Oduro (the Supervising Deputy Minister for GASIP), was held on 16 March 2018 at MOFA and in attendance were Hon. Dr. Sagre Bambangi (Deputy Minister) and representatives from the Ministries of Food and Agriculture and Finance. Subsequently, IFAD will issue a Management Letter to the Government of Ghana, highlighting key management actions to be undertaken for effective and efficient programme implementation. This Aide Memoire has been signed ad referendum, pending the endorsement of Senior Management of IFAD. IFAD appreciates MOFA's strong participation in the mission, as well as the cooperation and support by the leadership of the Ministry.

### Key Mission Agreements and Conclusions

In line with IFAD procedures, the extent of GASIP low performance after 3 years of implementation, warrant consideration to close the project and design a new investment. However, the Mission has concluded that the Development Objective of GASIP and the focus on demand-driven value chain development remain relevant to Ghana and are in line with Government priorities. Opportunities and potential are still there. Most importantly, the government has demonstrated strong political support and commitment to move GASIP forward and improve its implementation performance.

The mission agreed with the Government that going forward, GASIP

1. *maintain the sector-wide approach, but focus on key commodity value chains (rice, cassava, vegetables, maize and soya), contribute to MOFA's flagship programme, the "Planting for Food and Jobs Campaign" (through seeds, extension services, mechanization and irrigation, and marketing of produce), and draw up a revised AWP&B for the period up to December 2018;*
2. restructure through better operationalizing value chain activities and bringing together the full range of GASIP instruments for clients and beneficiaries, validating facilitation and backstopping services on the ground, and focusing on the target group of smallholder farmers and FBOs, in particular women and youth; and launching value chain activities in 4-5 value chain clusters;
3. align GASIP implementing arrangements to the envisaged MOFA-wide framework for managing development partner-financed projects; and concretize proposals for collaboration between GASIP and MOFA and decentralized agriculture delivery institutions; and

4. put in place a strong PCU team led by a qualified and dedicated Coordinator through a rigorous recruitment process. All future staff should be assessed based on proven track records of past performance in similar projects and contracts should be based on concrete programme outputs and contributions to programme outcomes achieved; contract extension of current PCU staff should be based on independent performance reviews.

Programme progress would be reassessed jointly by IFAD and the GoG in the last quarter of 2018 to determine how to proceed with the implementation.

## D. Overview and Project Progress

The Ghana Agricultural Sector Investment Programme (GASIP) is implemented by the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA) to (i) promote the Programme as a standard-setting approach for value chain development; (ii) serve as a core investment for value chain development in Ghana; (iii) drive its efforts to harmonize value chain intervention tools; and (iv) mobilize additional parallel financing, following modalities preferred by interested Development Partners. The Programme is also designed to mainstream climate change resilience approaches in Ghana, in particular in the Northern Regions financed under the Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme (ASAP).

The overall goal of GASIP is to contribute to sustainable poverty reduction in rural Ghana. The Programme Development Objective is to enhance the profitability and climate change resilience of agribusinesses, with focus on smallholder farmers and SMEs. At grass-roots level, 4000 FBOs were expected to be better linked to domestic and export markets, agro-industries, input suppliers and at least 150 participating financial institutions (PFIs). These linkages were to be established through 200 agribusiness arrangements resulting in a total outreach of approximately 514,000 people. The design was to build on the achievements of RTIMP and NRGF and to use the first cycle of GASIP to develop tools for a flexible sector-wide approach. GASIP was also expected to enable other potential financiers to contribute or to align their investments to the Programme and to scale-up successful value chain investment approaches nationwide.

GASIP was designed to be implemented in cycles of three years each and the current design is for two three-year cycles. This ICR covers the first three years of implementation.

### Overall Assessment

**GASIP's overall implementation progress is significantly below planned levels in terms of outputs and outcomes achieved.** With minor exceptions, physical implementation of planned activities has yet to begin. The first cycle was not used to develop appropriate tools and harmonized concepts and approaches to operationalize a flexible, sector-wide value chain approach in Ghana, nor to mobilize additional parallel finance. The Programme largely failed to institutionalize mechanisms to develop decentralized value chain infrastructure; to promote matching grant mechanisms to leverage investments in equipment, in particular among IFAD's target population; and to support innovations (the latter in the form of 'challenge grants'). A planned climate change vulnerability analysis was not completed.

Performance of all three Programme components – value chain development, value chain infrastructure and knowledge management, policy support and coordination – was poor (see next section for details). Among the few things that were achieved are the selection of 10 recommended proposals from firms to serve as value chain cluster 'drivers' – meant to form the core of better linking farmers to agri-businesses in selected commodities – and 57 recommended ideas (Expressions of Interest) for various forms of value chain upgrades and support, as well as a draft report on climate vulnerability assessments and several adaptive crop trials on climate-resilience.

**The Programme does not have a consolidated strategy for targeting smallholder farmers and mainstreaming gender and youth.** GASIP lacks gender champions and adequate capacity to appreciate the magnitude of gender and social inclusion as core to its activities. Its demand driven design could promote elite capture, thus leaving out the original targeted smallholders. Better geographic targeting, self-targeting through relevant value chain selection, target group capacity building and empowerment, and direct targeting through instruments and mechanisms adequate for these groups would be instrumental to reach IFAD target groups.

**The analysis of Programme expenditures in the last three years shows highly inefficient use of resources compared to achievements.** The consequences of the low performance are reflected in the rate of disbursement of the IFAD financing. On one hand, disbursement for salaries and allowances and operating costs has reached 38% and 75% respectively – reflecting the use of these funds by the PCU; while on the other, disbursement on two of GASIP's key delivery mechanisms – training and grants – amounts to 6% and 0% respectively. **The Programme has not established a procurement system based on a correct understanding of procurement process**, due to the lack of management initiative. There were many instances where low value procurement was carried out without seeking advice from the procurement unit, and thus ending with poor results. **In terms of sustainability, GASIP did not put in place any enduring systems and processes to ensure synergistic partnerships and local ownership after exit**, including linkages with the Ministry of Agriculture (MOFA), its Agribusiness Unit or Women in Agriculture Development Directorate, or with other relevant Ministries (such as Trade and Industry) and public-sector delivery services at regional and district levels.

**Poor Programme performance is largely attributed to the very weak PCU leadership and technical skills to roll-out the Programme.** This was exacerbated by the failure of the National Programme Steering Committee (NPSC) and the executing agency to take timely and necessary measures to address the very well-known issues, at the time. An international firm that was recruited at high cost to provide competent expertise, strategic advice and backstopping services did not perform, and the PCU took more than a year to terminate the firm's contract after its failure became evident. Still to date the position of the key value chain manager is yet to be filled which strongly contributed to delayed implementation of Programme activities. **Repeated efforts by the ICO and supervision to improve performance were not well utilized or followed-up on by the PCU.** Detailed recommendations and implementation improvement plans by various supervision and implementation support missions in 2016 and 2017 were not implemented. The technical

expertise of a value-chain consultant brought in by the ICO in 2016 was not well utilized. In retrospect, IFAD did not sufficiently exercise its non-objection to ensure good quality of calls for EOIs and proposals.

In sum, GASIP was unable to use the first cycle to develop effective tools and approaches for value chain development to benefit smallholders, women, youth and SMEs, and to mobilize additional funds for a sector-wide VC approach. Experiences and lessons learnt from earlier IFAD projects in Ghana were not well utilized. Overall performance was very poor, mainly due to management failures and inactivity from the NPSC.

## PROJECT COMPONENT PROGRESS

**Sub-component 1.1 for Agribusiness Linkage Development** is the driver of the Programme. It aims at formalizing agreements between agribusinesses and smallholder farmers. Yet not much was achieved, mainly due to the absence of PCU leadership and a VC manager and lack of finalization of targeted VC commodities and clusters, firms and beneficiaries for support. Also, the process flow for developing VC linkages included laborious steps that did not respond well to the actual situation on the ground. Some preparatory activities started in several VC clusters, primarily to identify and sensitize existing FBOs and Value Chain Committees (VCCs). But the process of recruiting value chain facilitators to work with stakeholders on the ground was not completed which handicapped the work. Required partnerships, particularly with MOFA staff, District Departments of Agriculture (DDA) and Business Advisory Councils (BAC) are yet to be formalized. The project made many implicit assumptions on VCCs, FBOs and relationships between value chain actors on the ground that would require better understanding. Few efforts were made to consider the whole range of instruments at GASIP's disposal, including matching grants, infrastructure, rural finance, technical assistance, training and demonstrations. **Agreed actions** to move forward include the gradual and immediate start of field work in 4-5 value chain clusters, including on-the ground analysis of buyer-seller relationships, preferred target groups and the identification of appropriate GASIP support mechanisms and activities; the recruitment of field staff and facilitators; and the fast-tracking of identifying solid proposals and firms for support from the recommended 57 EOIs for value chain upgrades and support.

There was also no significant progress in the **Value Chain Financing Sub-component 1.2** designed to increase access to short-and long-term financing for value chain agribusinesses, including smallholder farmers and SMEs, through various financial products. Planned outputs included research, capacity building and financial support, such as through matching grants (MG). A draft manual for the implementation of MG was developed but is still in draft form. Three factors contributed to low performance in this component: (i) poor PCU capacity as it did not include the position of a rural or agribusiness finance specialist; (ii) no clarity on the menu for strategic interventions in VC finance beyond matching grants; and (iii) missing implementation procedures and targeting mechanisms for matching grants. **Agreed actions** include the recruitment of a full-time agribusiness finance specialist, systematic studies and establishment of linkages with relevant professional organizations and other projects to develop and prioritize suitable financial instruments and products for the target groups.

**Sub-component 1.3 on Climate Change Resilience** aims to mainstream climate change adaptation into the selected value chains. Planned outputs included the promotion of conservation agriculture, efficient water-use techniques in irrigation, institutional capacity building and enhanced awareness on climate change resilience by public and private value chain actors. Very little has been achieved during the first programme cycle and none of the outcome targets at the end of the first cycle were met. Supervision and implementation support recommendations were not followed. Only two out of the 28 planned activities for 2017 were implemented, one of which was engaging CSIR-SARI to undertake adaptive trials on rice, maize, soybean and cowpea value chains in nine districts in the Northern Region. The poor performance of this component is largely attributed to the limited activity in the main value chain development component as climate change resilience and conservation agriculture were to be mainstreamed. Yet, many activities could have been implemented with a bit of proactivity on the part of the climate change adaptation manager. **Agreed actions** cover the reinforced mainstreaming of climate change resilience into all GASIP components and their expansion *beyond* conservation agriculture, to include climate resilient seeds and planting materials, climate information services and agro-forestry. Secondly, to ensure better synergy and coordination with other projects and district-level officials and extension agents; and thirdly to advance with procurement of support service providers, such as FAO, SARI and others.

**The aim of component 2 (Enabling Rural Infrastructure)** is to encourage investments in commercial infrastructure and to finance enabling public infrastructure for selected value chains, including roads and small-scale irrigation. Progress of implementation under this component is virtually nil. Progress in implementation was constrained by the time taken to identify, appraise and initiate value chain cluster development. One hundred and twenty kilometres of feeder roads (out of 1000 km planned) and 13 commercial infrastructure projects (out of 50 planned) were identified for construction. But, in the case of commercial infrastructure, the proposals did not clearly define the management and ownership arrangements which so far have not been settled. This stalled the process. For public infrastructure, designs for the feeder roads were completed in 2017 but procurement problems and high costs of initially submitted proposals led to delays. In terms of public electrical infrastructure, only 1 km of an electricity line has been extended to a Guinea fowl production facility in the Northern region (out of 450 km planned). No progress was made at all in developing 250 planned hectares of land with reliable water access. **Agreed actions** include consideration of FBO ownership as an additional option for the commercial infrastructure component, and, secondly, to enhance the template for requests of EOIs and proposals for commercial infrastructure to ensure realistic expectations by proponents, clarity on ownership of structures and better targeting.

**Component 3 for Knowledge management, harmonization and policy support** aimed at creating an enabling

environment for smallholders to participate in profitable and climate change resilient value chains through support to (i) GoG data management and policy analysis, with special emphasis on climate change; (ii) institutional FBO capacity development, such as for advocacy; and (iii) enhanced internal knowledge and learning (K&L). There were no major policy or K&L related activities carried out beyond some minor studies, such as a regional cassava VC analysis for Brong Ahafo Region. The main reasons for limited engagement were few project activities to analyse, no institutions to support, and the limited attention by the Policy/M&E Manager to this component. The goals of this component remain valid.

**Recommended action.** Since IFAD's experience is that policy activities are most effective when they follow implementation, activities supported under this component should not receive high priority at this moment. Highest priority is recruitment of a Policy / M&E Manager and for that staff to develop a KM Strategy.

## CONTINUED RELEVANCE

**Despite poor performance, the Mission established that GASIP design is sound, remains relevant and provides for a lot of room to innovate.** The new Ghana Government Administration that assumed office in 2017 offers new opportunities for reversing the negative trend in project performance. The Honorable Minister of Agriculture himself undertook decisive measures to address the weaknesses in GASIP implementation and to turn the programme around. A part of PCU staff was asked to leave, including the PCU coordinator. This led to the appointment of an interim PCU coordinator and several interim team members to fill vacancies.

The mission has established that once GASIP will put in place an adequately qualified team and will improve its focus, activities and processes in line with the recommendations and agreed actions of this ICR, **the opportunity for a sector-wide approach with significant impact potential remains.** GASIP could make a valuable contribution to MOFA's flagship Planting for Food and Jobs (PFJ) campaign, in particular by providing strong VC orientation through its support to seeds, extension services, mechanization and irrigation, and marketing of produce.

## E. Project implementation

### a. Development Effectiveness

#### Effectiveness and Developmental Focus

Effectiveness	Rating: 3	Previous rating: 4
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#### Justification of rating

Development Effectiveness is rated as (3), moderately unsatisfactory. There have been almost no outputs and outcomes as planned during the first three-year cycle. Appropriate tools for value chain development have not yet been developed. The failure has been largely attributed to very weak Programme management. A first set of decisive mitigation measures have recently been taken in terms of Programme management changes to turn the situation around.

#### Log-Frame Analysis & Main Issues of Effectiveness

GASIP's overall implementation progress is significantly below planned levels in terms of outputs and outcomes achieved, mainly due to very weak Programme leadership and management. With minor exceptions, physical implementation of planned activities has yet to begin. The updated project LogFrame of Dec. 2017 shows that the achievement from the first cycle is limited to 1 km of rural electrical connections (out of 450km planned) and 2,185 individuals engaged and participated in climate risk management activities. Performance of all three Programme components – value chain development, value chain infrastructure and knowledge management, policy support and coordination – was equally poor.

The first cycle was also not used as planned to develop appropriate tools and harmonized concepts and approaches to operationalize a flexible, sector-wide value chain approach in Ghana, nor to mobilize additional parallel finance. The Programme largely failed to institutionalize mechanisms to develop decentralized value chain infrastructure; to promote matching grant mechanisms to leverage investments in equipment, in particular among IFAD's target population; and to support innovations (the latter in the form of 'challenge grants'). A planned climate change vulnerability analysis was not completed.

The Programme now has the full attention of the Honorable Minister of Agriculture himself who undertook decisive measures in late 2017 to address the weaknesses in GASIP implementation.

#### Development Focus

Targeting and Outreach	Rating: 3	Previous rating: 4
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#### Justification of rating

Targeting is rated as moderately unsatisfactory (3). Some efforts to introduce targeting mechanism have been made, but not systematically. Programme design encourages the participation of targeted individuals, agribusinesses and FBOs; however, without proper guidance on how the resource poor and vulnerable groups are to be included, and without specific assistance extended to target groups to apply for calls for proposals and expressions of interest. The planned socio-economic analysis studies, and profiling of FBOs, which were meant to identify and describe the target subgroups according to their diverse socio-economic characteristics (e.g. with attention to gender and youth), are yet to be done.

#### Main issues

By mid-term GASIP should have reached 62,900 smallholders and 3,140 FBOs in 134 districts. GASIP targeted at least 50% women; 20% youth (15-24 years) and 30% young adults between 25-34 years. The PDR provides some targeting tools through empowerment and capacity building. The 'demand driven' Programme design in principle encourages participation of targeted individuals, agribusinesses and FBOs, but without proper guidelines on how this should happen.

14 value chain (VC) clusters for GASIP activities were identified, out of which 4 are in the North that is vulnerable to climatic shocks, in line with geographical targeting. Some vulnerability assessments have been conducted. The evaluation of business proposals for VC drivers and other firms for VC support had one key criteria whether the firms are doing business with smallholders.

Beyond these measures, there have been very few activities on the ground to ensure participation, empowerment and capacities of smallholder farmers, rural poor, women and youth. GASIP extended no special assistance for target groups to apply in the calls for proposals and EOIs for VC support carried out so far. A database for monitoring and impact assessment is yet to be developed. TORs are ready for carrying out socio-economic studies of the direct programme beneficiaries and capacity/needs assessments of FBOs. The mission recommends developing a clearer definition of and targets for farmers, FBOs and SMEs that the Programme would work with in its Value Chain and Infrastructure

components, disaggregated by gender, age and other socio-economic status such as ownership of land (for instance in terms of a target shares of support for these groups).

There is a risk that GASIP design could promote elite capture, thus leaving out the original targeted beneficiaries. The mission recommends the development of a feasible and operational targeting strategy with a systematic approach of putting in place different instruments, i.e. **geographic targeting** for area-based activities; **self-targeting** through value chains most relevant to smallholders, women or youth; **capacity-building and empowerment** to enable the poor, women, and youth to equally participate and benefit and; **direct targeting**, through making matching grants work for resource poor smallholders, women, youth and SMEs. To prevent benefit leakage, it is especially important to commence building capacities of FBOs, VCCs and PFIs. Specifically, GASIP should support targeted groups to develop proposals and appropriate business plans.

GASIP should adopt guidelines to clearly define smallholders who the Value Chain Drivers will work with (disaggregated by gender, age and socio-economic status such as ownership of land) and the modalities of operating and targeting through FBOs. The guidelines and proposals should further define how the smallholder farmers, women and youth will benefit. The use of the Gender Action Learning Systems (GALS) is crucial for empowering beneficiary communities and households.

## Gender equality & women's participation

Rating: 3

Previous rating: 4

### Justification of rating

Gender equality and women's participation is rated as moderately unsatisfactory (3). GASIP lacks gender champions and adequate capacity for gender mainstreaming. The design document provides guidelines for mainstreaming gender and targeting women and youth through Gender/Youth Action Plans but these are yet to be expanded and implemented. The mission in May 2017 made a recommendation to recruit a gender specialist, but the procurement process is yet to be completed. Specific indicators for measuring gender equality and women's empowerment will need to be incorporated in the logical framework and M&E system.

### Main issues

It is acknowledged that rural women, and youth, are among the most vulnerable groups and especially the effects of climate change could worsen the existing gender and youth disparities. GASIP lacks gender champions and adequate capacity to appreciate the magnitude of gender and social inclusion as core to its activities. A Gender Specialist is yet to be recruited to help develop Gender and Youth Action Plans. The Gender Specialist should be placed in the GASIP M&E Unit, so should the 'Targeting, Gender, and Youth' function for GASIP in general, with clear terms of reference and adequate financial resources to coordinate and implement gender/youth activities. According to GASIP design documents gender and targeting objectives were supposed to be mainstreamed by all staff and would include gender/age disaggregated monitoring and reporting. Attention was to be paid to the gender perspective at every step, from production to the sharing of benefits, and not only in commodities where women or youth may be dominant. It is not clear from Mission observations that these objectives have been incorporated by all staff in their work. In future, all staff should be held accountable for reaching and reporting on gender and youth targets. This responsibility should be incorporated in their performance contracts.

It was already agreed during the Implementation Support Mission of May 2017 that GASIP will incorporate the Women in Agriculture Empowerment Index (WAEI) in the baseline studies. Data collection templates, disaggregated by sex and age, have been developed and deployed to zones but are currently not being used because of delayed interventions along the value chains. With the revision of the logical framework, GASIP should incorporate gender sensitive indicators against which to monitor/evaluate outputs, outcomes and impacts.

It is noted that, although GASIP has been working with MoFA's Women in Agriculture Development (WIAD) and Youth in Agriculture and Aquaculture Production (YAAP), this is not done in a structured way. The Mission recommends that the planned GASIP gender strategy should review and incorporate the relevant aspects of GADS II and the National Agricultural Policy on Youth. Among others the Mission agreed with GoG counterparts in the aide-memoire, to develop engagement terms between GASIP, WIAD and YAAP; contract a Gender Specialist for the next 3 years to backstop the programme and build gender capacity of all technical staff to ensure gender awareness/focus in the programme.

## Agricultural Productivity

Rating: 3

Previous rating: 4

### Justification of rating

The Agricultural Productivity is rated as unsatisfactory (2). GASIP has so far implemented 1 km of electrical infrastructure, extending to a Guinea fowl production facility at Kumbungu in the Northern region connection. While the electrification of a production facility has improved agricultural productivity; compared against the original design, the impact of the

improvement in the agricultural productivity has not yet materialized as the implementation of the programme is very limited.

<b>Nutrition</b>	<b>Rating: 2</b>
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#### **Justification of rating**

The nutrition is rated as unsatisfactory (2) since nutrition sensitive interventions are not being implemented. At the time of the design, soy beans were selected as one of the value chains that have potential impact on nutrition. Investment on soy beans has not been started.

<b>Adaptation to Climate Change</b>	<b>Rating: 3</b>	<b>Previous rating: 3</b>
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#### **Justification of rating**

Adaptation to Climate Change is rated as moderately unsatisfactory (3). GASIP has poorly delivered results on the climate sub component as per targets established during the formulation stage. Main achievements on the climate component are trainings and workshops on climate change and no physical outputs as planned after 3 years of implementation. The climate component was poorly managed and not well mainstreamed across all components and the entire value chains as opposed to be more results-based and integrated into the bigger and coherent programme goal. Key activities on climate resilient agriculture including the recruitment of a new climate change manager are yet to be completed..

#### **Main issues**

The ASAP which aims to mainstream climate change into GASIP was seen as a standalone component and has failed to produce the results expected during the implementation. Additionally, the poor coordination and lack of coherence between the ASAP funded activities and the other components have limited the catalytic role the climate change component could have played as a base for structural changes and for building the resilience of smallholder farmers against the climate change.

Mainstreaming climate change into agricultural value chain requires a strong leadership and coordination skills which normally leads to better alignment and coherence between the implementation and the physical results on the ground. The leadership of the environment and climate team has been limited. The climate change manager did not renew his contract at the end of December 2017. There is an opportunity for his successor to engage with the PCU and sub component team leaders in identifying the right entry points along the value chains, in creating the synergies and coordination with other initiative to build climate resilient value chains within GASIP.

The Inter Cycle Mission agreed to refocus the support more on smallholder farmers and better align the ASAP component and GASIP as a whole on government priorities. Hence, additional activities to be included are climate resilient seeds, planting materials development system, climate information services and agro-forestry.

It is also agreed to promote conservation agriculture in the central regions and include other adaptation practices in agriculture such as crop rotation in the North and procure technical assistance from FAO, No-Till Centre, SARI and other Institutions for CA demonstration and scaling up.

To ensure 100% mainstreaming of adaptation measures across the different components of the program, the environment and climate manager should take a lead and to redistribute all planned and new activities in each of the component while prioritizing on the most impactful interventions proposed by the ICR.

Finally, the mission agreed to finalise the recruitment of the new climate change adaptation manager to manage all activities related to the ASAP component. A distance induction with the lead environment and climate of IFAD should be organised to provide strategic guidance. Depending on the pace of implementation, technical assistance may be required to support and accelerate the delivery of the project.

## **b. Sustainability and Scaling up**

<b>Institutions and Policy Engagement</b>	<b>Rating: 2</b>	<b>Previous rating: 4</b>
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#### **Justification of rating**

The quality of Institutions and Policy Engagement is rated as unsatisfactory (2). The Programme Coordination Unit of GASIP was not well equipped with staff and expertise and did not function at the satisfactory level. It did not engage much with the Ministry of Agriculture, neither at national nor at the zonal levels, Policy engagement has been minimal.

Institutional structures for Programme oversight have not been working well until recently.

## Main issues

**Issues to date:** There has been limited ownership and oversight from the National Programme Steering Committee (NPSC). It has met infrequently, failed to provide strategic guidance to the PCU and hold PCU accountable. Not only the establishment of NPSC was significantly delayed, but it was not engaged to play a role as a governing body to provide a much needed oversight to GASIP's programme implementation. Additionally, GASIP has stood apart from the main body of MOFA and not sought to collaborate with the technical departments; this has resulted in lack of MOFA knowledge of, and support for, GASIP.

GASIP's PCU was never fully staffed during the first cycle of the implementation. The recruitment process for PCU and zonal staff was slow and there remain a number of key posts that have neither been filled, nor refilled following the departure of the incumbent to date. The post of the Value Chain Manager has remained vacant since June 2016 – with the Value Chain component making up 65% of the 2017 AWPB. The leadership of the PCU has been weak and ineffective, characterized by a lack of operational protocols and procedures and causing low moral, lack of team spirit and clarity of purpose.

There has been a limited knowledge transfer from NRGF, which was supposed to be the model to be replicated, to GASIP. Limited experience of the PCU staff with a demand-driven value chain development and agribusiness finance also contributed to slow down to set up the required institutional structure in place. The selection of value chain drivers and formation of the value chain clusters have not taken place to date.

**Way forward:** MOFA is in the process of establishing a project delivery unit with responsibility for managing all donor projects in Ghana. The ICR mission fully supports the proposal, recognizing that it can provide a solution to the key weaknesses of the GASIP PCU, which has proven to be distant from MOFA. It is suggested that MOFA Agri-business Unit (ABU) could form a key function in institutionalizing a more business and demand-driven approach to agriculture in MOFA. The Unit would require some institutional and strategic support so that it could play its role more effectively to oversight the implementation of the programmes such as GASIP.

All current contracts of PCU and Zonal Office staff are due to expire on 30 June 2018. For those posts without an incumbent, there is need to recruit staff; for those posts occupied by incumbents. Their performance would have to be independently reviewed before issuing new contracts.

## Partnership-building

Rating: 2

### Justification of rating

Partnership building is rated as unsatisfactory (2). GASIP has not successfully established working partnerships with agribusinesses, smallholder farmers, nor with policy and research institutions to evaluate parts of its progress, to access new technology and to promote knowledge and learning as planned in the design document. Attempts were made by organizing workshops for PFIs but these events did not materialize to establish working partnerships. There has been an ongoing discussion to collaborate with FAO under the component 1.3: Climate Change Resilience. There were no partnerships with other IFAD funded projects (namely, REP) or other programmatic initiatives working in similar areas (such as USAID ADVANCE, USAID FinGAP). GASIP did not seek collaboration with the technical departments of the Ministry of Agriculture and its Agri-business Unit, neither at national level nor in the regions and districts.

## Main issues

**Planned partnerships at the time of Design.** The Programme set out to enhance Public Private Partnerships and linkages between smallholder farmers and agribusinesses. The PDR explicitly saw the involvement by agribusinesses, input dealers, financial institutions and commercial farmers as crucial to ensure effective access for smallholders to productive assets, capital, services, know-how and markets. Cycle 1 was supposed to produce 100 partnerships with PFIs (universal banks and RCBs). Knowhow on commercial climate change adaptation technologies for smallholders was supposed to be gained through focus on commercial demonstrations in partnership with agribusiness and out-growers.

The PCU was also expected to seek partnerships with research institutions to evaluate parts of its programme and to access new knowledge that could improve its delivery. In general, learning and knowledge management – which are at the heart of IFAD's partnership efforts and policy dialogue with Government were supposed to play a central role in GASIP's innovation mainstreaming and scaling up agenda and building partnerships with other major agricultural policy initiatives to support a coherent approach to policy support.

Partnerships with other IFAD funded projects such as the Ghana Rural Enterprise Programme (REP) were encouraged by the PDR to supply equipment and seeds to adopt improved practices at local level. At an advanced stage, GASIP was expected to seek to introduce voluntary sustainability certification (Fairtrade, Organic, Rainforest Alliance etc.) through the development of certification-based supply chain partnerships following the approach developed by the SAMCERT grant.

GASIP was also supposed to seek collaboration with public sector institutions on the ground to build capacity and enhance its delivery, mainstreaming and scaling up.

**Actual Implementation:** Due to the general poor performance of the Programme none of these planned partnerships were achieved. Where partnering was started, such as in the case of the recruitment of VC cluster firms, initial efforts were not followed up by the necessary steps to link them effectively to smallholders. GASIP has stood also apart from the main body of MOFA and not sought to collaborate with the technical departments; this has resulted in lack of MOFA knowledge of, and support for, GASIP. There was minimal linkage to the Ministry's Agribusiness Development Unit.

The ICR mission met with representatives from the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MOTI) that promotes businesses at district level and is also responsible for the REP (IFAD funded Programme); the Advance project, implemented by ACDI/VOCA in charge of an FBO-based model for a smallholder access to services, equipment and finance; and the Agriculture Policy Support Programme, sponsored by USAID. All these institutions, programmes as well as others could be valuable future partners for GASIP and a recommendation was made to this effect in the ICR section on Institutional and Policy Engagement.

## Human and Social Capital and Empowerment

**Rating: 3**

**Previous rating: 4**

### Justification of rating

Human and Social Capital and Empowerment is rated as moderately unsatisfactory (3). There has been no empowerment and capacity building by GASIP of major target groups. Inadequate support has gone to FBOs in terms of capacity development and strengthening them for better targeting and inclusion. The value chain committees (VCCs), meant to be social and capital platforms for actors within specific value chains at decentralized local district levels, are yet to be formed.

### Main issues

GASIP's investment in human and social capital is assessed against empowering measures in place – including information and communication channels being used, capacity and confidence building of smallholders, women and youth, and organizational support to empower and encourage more active participation and inclusion of the targeted vulnerable groups.

GASIP's planned measures for human and social capital include: i) information and mobilising campaigns, using mass media and local information meetings to ensure activities and services are accessible to all and to enhance transparency; ii) empowering women FBOs, VCCs, and providing leadership training; iii) Sensitizing District Assemblies; iv) adequate capacity building in targeting of gender and youth for core staff and implementing entities. GASIP is to use Gender Learning Systems (GALS) – an empowerment methodology which aims to give the targeted groups (i.e. women and youth) more control over their lives and catalyse sustainable gender equality. These measures are yet to be implemented.

The Mission recommends training for PCU and implementing partners on targeting aspects, gender and social inclusion - to ensure their support for target groups in general, and for women and youth's active participation in the programme in particular, in making decision in FBOs/VCC/District Assemblies. Specific targets should be set for their inclusion. Awareness campaigns on GASIP at national or district levels should equally reach all the intended beneficiaries and; when selecting a media for a specific purpose (i.e. calls for EOIs and proposals). GASIP should ensure that the tools used are accessible, taking into consideration language skills, and literacy levels and mobility among target groups.

It is especially important to build capacities of FBOs, VCCs and PFIs to provide better chances for target groups to access project activities and benefits, preferably by using of Gender Action Learning Systems (GALS).

## Quality of Beneficiary Participation

**Rating: 3**

**Previous rating: 4**

### Justification of rating

Quality of beneficiary participation was rated as moderately unsatisfactory (3). There is no consultation mechanism in place to ensure that the views of smallholders, SMEs, women and youth are sought and systematically reflected in planned activities and neither is the participatory M&E feedback system in place. Because of the delayed intervention along the value chains, there is little evidence to show quality of beneficiary participation; and information outreach, in terms of whether the target group is well informed of the programme's opportunities. Nevertheless, it is noted that during the field verification of the VC firm business proposals consultations were held with outgrowers, other farmer groups and community members where targeted support services and infrastructural needs were identified.

### Main issues

The Mission recommends that GASIP should hold regular consultations with smallholder farmers. The priorities/needs

and constraints of smallholder farmers, agribusiness SMEs, women and youth should be better reflected in the Value Chain Development component and sub-components (e.g. Agribusiness Linkages Development, Rural Financial Services, and Climate Change Resilience) and; Rural Value Chain Infrastructure component and sub-components (e.g. Productive Infrastructure and Facilities, Enabling Public Infrastructure).

Quality participation of the targeted groups should lead to specific outputs and other results that should be well included in the GASIP LogFrame and M&E systems (i.e. smallholder farmers, women and youth are making decisions and their needs/priorities are captured during consultation meetings held with FBOs, VCCs and District Assemblies). Additional measures should be put in place to increase outreach to women, male and female youth through MoFA field staff and NGO group promoters, especially in the Northern and Upper East Regions where mobility may be limited.

Through its M&E system, GASIP should put in place a systematic way of providing equitable feedback, grievance and redress mechanisms easily accessible to all community members' rural smallholder farmers, women, female and male youth.

<b>Responsiveness of Service Providers</b>	<b>Rating: 3</b>	<b>Previous rating: 4</b>
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#### **Justification of rating**

Responsiveness of service providers is rated as (3), moderately unsatisfactory. So far, GASIP has recruited two service providers; i) one institution to conduct climate change resilient pilot demonstration under Sub-component 1.3 and ii) one company to manage Sub-component 1.1 and Sub-component 1.2. Performance of these two service providers was found to be poor due to contract management issues. The company recruited for the management of value chain development services provided a value chain manager and two value chain specialists, but the quality of the services provided by their lead consultant was not satisfactory. MoFA terminated the contract with the firm in July 2016, only nine months after entry into force, and failed to recruit an individual Value Chain Manager as agreed afterward with IFAD.

#### **Main issues**

The PDR envisaged that core function of PCU and ZPOs will be coordination, while specialized services will be largely outsourced to value chain facilitators, public services, specialized technical service providers and PFIs on the basis of performance-based contracts. In line with decentralization, coordination will gradually be mainstreamed into the regional and district structures during the second cycle, on the basis of recommendations made by the IRM. However, the PCU failed to successfully outsource specialized services for the implementation of all components. Value chain facilitators were not recruited with a clear mandate and targets to support implementation of activities planned for value chain linkage development. The PCU also failed to build partnership with PFI to implement the MG facility and facilitate access to financial services by agribusiness actors; consultants were not recruited on a contractual basis to manage the majority of technical assistance activities under subcomponent 1.2, With respect to implementation of activities under climate change resilience Subcomponent, GASIP did not proactively sought collaboration with the relevant actors including VCF, VCC, MOFA, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Ghana Meteorological Agency (GMet) and Ghana Irrigation Development Agency (GIDA) as envisaged in the PDR.

<b>Environment and Natural Resource Management</b>	<b>Rating: 3</b>	<b>Previous rating: 3</b>
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#### **Justification of rating**

Environment and natural resource management was rated as moderately unsatisfactory during the inter-cycle review as the majority of the activities were yet to be implemented. No assessment was yet to be taken to examine if any adverse changes are made to the natural resources surrounding the 1km of electrification completed or the demonstration of climate resilient agricultural practice. SECAP stated that GASIP interventions in the target areas will have mostly positive social, environmental and climate change impacts.

<b>Exit Strategy</b>	<b>Rating: 2</b>	<b>Previous rating: 4</b>
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#### **Justification of rating**

Exit Strategy is rated as (2) unsatisfactory. The project has not yet implemented majority of the programmes. At the time of the design, the exit strategy was aimed to 1) focus on establishing a value chain linkages that are formal and contract based 2) drive the demand driven approach as well as its intervention through the private sector stakeholders, namely FBOs, PFIs and other service providers; 3) form VCCs as local facilitators between stakeholders; 4) provide supports to smallholders on commercial terms 5) focus on agribusiness activities that will be fully integrated in the local and regional market economy 6) mitigate risks through institutional capacity building of value chain stakeholders. GASIP could

leverage the lessons from NRGp and RTIMP to reformulate the exit strategy.

<b>Potential for Scaling-up</b>	<b>Rating: 2</b>	<b>Previous rating: 4</b>
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#### **Justification of rating**

Potential for Scaling-Up was rated as unsatisfactory (2). GASIP so far has not been successful influencing the policy or institutional framework through the enhancement of smallholder participations in policy processes, the production or utilization of evidence in policy processes, the production or utilization of evidence in policy processes and or the increased policy capacity of government to design and/or implement policies. The programme implementation has not reach to a stage to consider a potential scaling up.

### **c. Project Management**

<b>Quality of Project Management</b>	<b>Rating: 2</b>	<b>Previous rating: 3</b>
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#### **Justification of rating**

The quality of project management was rated 2, unsatisfactory. Implementation is substantially below target with less than 50% of major outputs being expected to be reached by the mid-term cycle review.. The leadership of the PCU has been very weak and ineffective. The international consultancy firm recruited to support Component 1.1: Value Chain Development failed to deliver and their contract was terminated without replacement. ICO and mission support and recommendations were repeatedly not well utilized and followed.

#### **Main issues**

The leadership of the PCU has been very weak and ineffective, characterised by lack of operational protocols and procedures; lack of team spirit and low morale; as well as a lack of shared understanding of the project approach and of clarity of purpose. This is not a universal criticism of all PCU and zonal staff however, a substantial proportion of whom have been professional and committed in their work.

Poor GASIP Programme performance is largely attributed to the weak PCU management and lack of technical skills to roll-out the Programme. The recruitment process for PCU and zonal staff was slow, resulting immediately in implementation delays, and there remain a number of key posts that have either never been filled, or not refilled following the departure of the incumbent. This has led to long-standing and critical gaps in management and implementation capacity.

The contracted international consultancy firm AESA - recruited to provide competent expertise and critical backstopping on VC development - performed extremely poorly, particularly in terms of both the first person it supplied to the post of VC Manager and its inability to replace him.

Weak management was exacerbated by the failure of the National Programme Steering Committee (NPSC) and the executing agency to take timely and necessary measures to address the management situation. The PCU took more than a year to terminate the ASEA's contract after its failure became evident. Still to date the position of the key value chain manager is yet to be filled which strongly contributed to delayed implementation of Programme activities.

Repeated efforts by the ICO and supervision to improve performance were not well utilized or followed-up on by the PCU. Detailed recommendations and implementation improvement plans by various supervision and implementation support missions in 2016 and 2017 were not implemented. The technical expertise of a value-chain consultant brought in by the ICO in 2016 was not well utilized.

In the meantime, the Executing Agency has started to address weaknesses in Programme management. A part of PCU staff was asked to leave in late 2017, including the PCU coordinator. This led to the appointment of an interim PCU coordinator and several interim team members to fill vacancies.

*Please refer to section on institutions and policy engagement for related recommendations and agreed actions.*

<b>Knowledge Management</b>	<b>Rating: 3</b>	<b>Previous rating: 4</b>
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#### **Justification of rating**

Knowledge management is rated as moderately unsatisfactory because a knowledge management (KM) strategy has not been developed for the programme, project learning systems are inadequate and few KM activities are planned in the

Annual Work Plan and Budget. Also, there are no staff responsible for this activity. At this stage of programme implementation (midterm), practically no activities have been implemented to generate knowledge and from which lessons can be deduced to inform the programme in its second cycle of implementation

### **Main issues**

The Programme aimed at creating an enabling environment for smallholders to participate in profitable and climate change resilient value chains. In order to achieve this, it was expected to (i) strengthen GOG capacity for data collection and database development., policy analysis/ development., and harmonization of value chain tools; to (ii) provide institutional support to FBOs and strengthen multi-stakeholder processes for advocacy; to (iii) use knowledge management for internal learning and evidence for programme implementation and policy development – documenting of progress, sharing and dissemination and (iv) earmarked ASAP funding to be used to target institutional and policy issues related to climate change adaptation and NRM. Implementation was expected to be the responsibility of Policy and Monitoring and Evaluation Manager.

There were no policy-related activities carried out. A few KM activities were reported, such as a cassava VC analysis for Brong Ahafo Region. The main reasons for limited engagement were few project activities to analyse, no institutions to support, and the limited attention by the Policy / M&E Manager to this component because of his additional responsibilities as Operations Manager.

Going forward, it is acknowledged that policies aimed at creating an enabling environment for smallholders to participate in profitable and climate change resilient value chains remain important for GASIP, but also to provide MOFA with evidence in exercising its policy responsibility. GASIP through the planned Project Delivery Unit will collaborate with the MoFA Department for Policy, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation and the Coordination Unit of the Agriculture Sector Working Group to promote (operational) policy coherence across projects. But it is also IFAD's experience that policy activities are most effective when they follow implementation. For this reason, they should not receive high priority at this moment. For GASIP highest priority is recruitment of a Policy / M&E Manager and for that staff to develop a KM Strategy.

### **Value for Money**

**Rating: 2**

### **Justification of rating**

Value for Money was rated as moderately unsatisfactory (2) because of the delay in the project implementation, high operating costs, cost increases versus the planned costs specially for component 3(programme coordination) with 36% of the total budget disbursed to date with limited programme investment costs and outputs.

### **Main issues**

The following table summarizes GASIP's financial performance. During the past three years of the implementation, 1 km of rural electrical connections was constructed and 2,185 people participated in climate risk management activities. A rough estimate suggests that one individual to participate in the climate risk management activities costed 112 USD (sub-comp 1.3). The impact of the training is yet to be measured. 1 km of electrical connections costed 25,500 USD (Sub-comp 2.2). This is too high compared to the prior programmes funded by IFAD in Ghana.

A consultancy firm was recruited to manage the implementation of value chain development activities, but the contract was ultimately terminated few months after effectiveness. While these activities were not implemented, GASIP incurred the cost of \$0.8 million. GASIP also spent over \$150,000 in sensitisation campaigns throughout the country without real impact in terms of knowledge of programme's objectives, opportunities for support and eligibility criteria by targeted beneficiaries.

### **Coherence between AWPB and Implementation**

**Rating: 3**

**Previous rating: 3**

### **Justification of rating**

Coherence between AWPB and implementation is rated moderately unsatisfactory because the low usage of the budget and slow implementation of AWPB. Over the last three years, GASIP implementation performance has remained significantly low compared to it AWPB. The project has systematically encountered challenges in adhering to the AWPB both in terms of timeliness and implementation of budgeted activities. This low performance is partly due to the delay in the recruitment at critical management positions and optimistic timeline set for the implementation. The corrective actions are taken to revisit the timeline and required resources to implement 2018 AWPB.

### **AWPB Inputs and Outputs Review and Implementation Progress**

GASIP's project implementation against AWPB has been slow throughout the first cycle. Often, the output targets are so

ambitious without real implementation capacity in place (inadequate PCU staffing, slow contracting process with specialized service providers, limited collaboration with implementing partners, etc.).

Critical activities such as the recruitment of value chain facilitators as well as the execution of impact assessment on 14 value chains are yet to be undertaken to complete the procurement process. With the implementation of component 1 (making up 65% of the 2017 AWPB) lacking behind, GASIP has struggled to implement activities planned annually under the rest of the programme components.

Most of the data for components 1, 2 and 3 for actual physical progress and implementation of activities measured against AWPB is zero. Appendix 1: Physical progress measured against AWP&B provides data on the AWPB implementation indicators and the actual activities implemented by the PCU as of December 2017. On the basis of the data provided by the PCU and the analysis above, the [November] mission concluded that there is no coherence between the ASPB and implementation as of 30th November 2017.

<b>Performance of M&amp;E System</b>	<b>Rating: 3</b>	<b>Previous rating: 3</b>
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#### **Justification of rating**

The performance of the M&E system is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory. Although the key activities are identified to implement the M&E system by the mission conducted in November 2016, the web-based M&E system is yet to be implemented. The primary reason for the slow implementation is due to the limited attention given to the M&E activities by the M&E team. The M&E and the policy manager held a dual responsibility in the PCU. He had to serve simultaneously as operations manager for the value chain sub-components 1.1 and 1.2, resulting in limited focus on implementing the M&E activities. Additionally, the procurement of the consultancy services was either slow or halted due to the lack in competitiveness of the procedure.

#### **M&E System Review**

Overall, the progress of the implementation of sub-component 3.2, Monitoring and Evaluation is slow. The original design of GASIP outlined the key activities to establish the M&E system of GASIP. The activities included the development of M&E manual, operational plan, a web-based M&E system and a unique identification code for farmers in collaboration with MoFA. Key activities carried out in the cycle 1 of GASIP included; definition of indicators in the logical framework, staff trained on monitoring & evaluation, data collection instruments developed, website established and various TORs for engagement of consultants developed. The M&E Manuals and the operational plan however, have not been developed yet. This has consequences for the development of a web-based database system that the Programme intends to develop which was agreed in the mission of November 2016. In this regard, an MIS consultant was invited in May 2017 and conducted an initial scoping study for the system.

The slow implementation of M&E activities had two reasons. Firstly, the M&E manager held the additional duties as operations manager who handled the operations of the Programme. This resulted in limited focus on M&E issues by the M&E team. The M&E manager later resigned in November 2017. Secondly, the initial process to outsource the development of the operational plan/manual was halted due to uncompetitive recruitment process. A plan to use internal resources to develop the operational plan commenced but was halted due to the change in management. Based on the recommendations of the mission in December 2017, an interim M&E manager has been assigned by MoFA to support the implementation of the M&E activities up to June 2018.

Going forward, GASIP, led by the interim M&E manager should finalize the operational plan, review the logical framework and develop a gender sensitive M&E manual immediately. GASIP should complete the process of recruitment of a consultant to finalize the web-based M&E system based on the M&E/operational plans. Terms of Reference for technical assistance to develop the system have already been developed.

Additionally, the mission recommends that GASIP M&E team should enhance the coordination with Monitoring and Evaluation Directorate (MED) of MoFA as outlined in the draft M&E operational plan. The mission visited MED, Regional Agricultural Department (of Greater Accra) and District Agricultural Department (Dodowa) and was informed that data is collected by technical officers at districts collated by a Management and Information Systems Officer (MISO) and transmitted to the District Assembly with a copy to the regional offices. Especially, there is an opportunity for GASIP M&E team to leverage the existing data collection mechanism in MoFA and hence eliminate the duplication of efforts.

<b>Requirements of Social, Environmental and Climate Assessment Procedures (SECAP)</b>	<b>Rating: 4</b>
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#### **Justification of rating**

Requirements of SECAP were rated as moderately satisfactory (4). SECAP related documents have been produced and

the quality of mitigation measures is adequate. The climate change risk is rated as Moderate risk given the interventions to address the risks is built within the project component 1.3: climate change resilience. The key activities of the component to be implemented includes: (i) mainstreaming commercial climate resilient agricultural production within the value chain approach; (ii) promoting training support and knowledge sharing amongst smallholder farmers; consequently, there is considerable potential for replication and up-scaling as these lessons learned are transferred to other localities; (iii) promoting more efficient water use in water management schemes, also in commercial value chains; (v) encouraging the active participation of government staff in the implementation of GASIP interventions and the development of planning and strategies for climate change adaptation that is country-specific and aligned with national priorities.

## d. Financial Management & Execution

### Disbursement by financier

Type	Name	Current Amount	Disbursed Amount	Actual Rate
Domestic Financing breakdown	Local Government	\$1,661,000		
	National Government	\$7,628,000		
	Beneficiaries	\$4,625,000		
	Domestic Financing Institutions	\$17,474,000		

### Acceptable Disbursement Rate

Rating: 2

Previous rating: 2

### Justification of rating

The project is in its fourth year of implementation (completion date 30th of June 2021) and its disbursement rate, for the IFAD loan and for the ASAP grant combined, stands at 19.2%

### Main issues

**Overall Financial Performance:** As at February 2019, the project has disbursed USD 8.7 million out of the available USD 75.6 million (all financiers included), yielding a financial performance rate of only 11%. The IFAD Loan has disbursed approximately USD 5 million while the ASAP grant disbursed approximately USD 3.2 million. Total amount disbursed is calculated including the initial advances.

**Submission and quality of WAs:** In 2018 the project has submitted 15 WAs for the ASAP grant and 5 for the IFAD loan amounting to SDR 1.6 million and SDR 1.3 million respectively. Two WAs application are currently under preparation, one for the Loan and one for the Grant, for a total estimated amount of SDR 0.26 Million. The mission reviewed WAs No 14, 16 and 18 (two direct payments and one replenishment) for a total amount of USD 0.85 Million. These WAs have been found to be acceptable, although the mission has made a number of recommendations to improve the quality of the supporting documentation to be provided.

**IFAD Loan / ASAP Grant status of funds** The status of funds under the IFAD loan shows a limited utilisation of all categories except for the "Operating Costs" one which is expected to be disbursed to 116% when the next WA will be submitted by the project. The reallocation will be finalized within the context of broader exercise to be completed considering the mission findings and indications. Even if the expenditures on salaries are in line with the maturity of the project, the overall expenditures on recurrent costs compared to the amount initially allocated (62%) are still very high compared to the expenditures in investment costs (11%). Therefore, a significant effort will need to be deployed by the Project to focus more on investments until project closure.

**AWPB 2018:** At year end, the implementation rate of the AWPB 2018 was 22%. In terms of financial commitments by components, The Knowledge Management, Policy Support and Coordination Component was realised up to 67% while the Value Chain Development and Rural Value Chain Infrastructure achieved 27% and 5% respectively. In terms of categories, the project failed to disburse any funds on the category "Works" and on "Grants and subsidies", while it exceeded its disbursement target on "Goods, Services and Inputs".

**AWPB 2019:** The approval process of the AWPB 2019 is still ongoing. A fast approval of this document will be key to facilitate the project in meeting its disbursement objectives for 2019.

<b>Agreed Action</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>Agreed Date</b>
<b>Financial Management &amp; Execution</b>		
<b>AWPB - Submit 2019 AWPB for NO</b>	PC	02/2019
<b>Funds reallocation</b> A request for funds reallocation needs be submitted to IFAD approval	PCU and MOF	03/2019
<b>Improve the efficiency by focusing in the AWPB on investment activities and by introducing cost savings with regards to operating costs.</b>	PCU	

## Fiduciary aspects

**Quality of Financial Management**

**Rating: 3**

**Previous rating: 4**

### Justification of rating

Basic FM arrangements are in place and ensure an almost acceptable level of functionality. However some FM areas are in need of substantial improvements

### Main issues

1. **Staffing:** The absence of a full time Finance Manager undermines the overall quality of FM at PMU level. The recruitment process of the new Finance Manager is ongoing. The finance unit is sufficiently staffed with three accountants; two of them should be decentralized to the zonal office when these are revamped. Of the three current staff, two have been recently recruited and still have limited understanding of IFAD FM rules and procedures. It has been recommended to undertake the FM e-learning training and in general dedicated training to finance staff needs to continue to be run on a regular basis.
2. **Accounting and Financial Reporting:** The project follows a cash basis of accounting and no accruals are taken into account. Payables are not regularly monitored. In this regard it has been recommended the set-up and maintenance of contract monitoring forms, effective contract register and proper customization of the accounting software. A Double Entry accounting software (ISCALA) is being used by the project; the software has been customized to allow automatic generation of financial reports and Withdrawal Applications (WAs). Financial statements are produced through the extraction of accounting transactions from ISCALA and manipulation of these in MS Excel. 2018 draft annual financial statements have been reviewed and found acceptable, but substantial improvements have been recommended. Preparation of Interim Financial Reports was discontinued after the departure of the former Finance Manager and now needs to be resumed.
3. **Internal control system:** The absence of a full time Finance Manager undermines the quality of the internal control system. Asset management as well as contract management is weak and needs substantial improvements. Use of vehicles needs to be further improved. Segregation of duties is sufficiently effective, including the expenditures authorization process and bank reconciliations. The provisions of the financial manual are mostly respected. A fixed Assets register is maintained but contains many inconsistencies, physical verification of fixed assets has not been conducted since a long time; overall fixed assets management is weak. Suggestions have been given to improve in this area.
4. **Treasury and funds flow:** The project has two designated accounts in USD to receive IFAD funds and three project accounts in GH¢ for operational purposes (for the IFAD loan, the IFAD grant and the counterpart funding). To increase the accountability and ownership, GoG has now moved all the project accounts to Bank of Ghana. Due to delays for the release of the 2018 counterpart contribution, the project has temporarily transferred a total of USD 60 000 from the IFAD Loan account to the counterpart funding bank account, Now that the counterpart funding has been released, the USD 60 000 are in the process of being transferred back to the IFAD loan account. The mission has recommended the interruption of such a practice. The supporting documentation of WAs is not completely satisfactory and needs improvements. The overall disbursement rate of the project is not satisfactory. The project is using ICP; no major issues to report.
5. **Internal audit:** MoA internal audit unit visits regularly GASIP and issues reports. The quality of the review performed and the related reports are unsatisfactory. There is no added value from the activities performed by internal auditors. Relevant suggestions have been provided to the internal audit team.
6. **Reallocation:** as result of the mission findings a reallocation may be necessary to accommodate implementation needs.
7. **Ineligible expenditures:** An amount of USD 5.250 has been declared ineligible by previous missions. The project is committed to refund the IFAD Loan account of the above mentioned amount transferring funds from the

counterpart account. The refund process has been already initiated while the mission was ongoing. The process should be finalized by the end of February 2019.

<b>Agreed Action</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>Agreed Date</b>
<b>Financial Management &amp; Execution</b>		
<b>Internal controls - to ensure that in all cases the payments of contracts are processed upon receipt and acceptance of activity reports.</b>	PC/PMgr	02/2019
<b>Improve Fixed Asset Management: Conduct an inventory exercise annually and provide the report to MoFA. Ensure all programme assets including vehicles are only used by programme staff and for programme activities.</b>	PC, Finance Manager	03/2019
<b>Staffing</b> Recruit to fill in vacant positions	PC	03/2019
<b>Ineligible expenditures</b> Settle ineligible expenditures and inform IFAD on the outcomes of the litigation	Finance Team	03/2019
<b>Refund</b> Refund USD 60 000 to IFAD Loan account and communicate it to IFAD	Finance Team	03/2019
<b>Ensure that project's payables are properly monitored</b> Ensure that project's payables are properly monitored	Finance Team	03/2019
<b>log-books and monitoring of fuel consumption.</b> Improve the use of project's vehicles, with proper use of log-books and monitoring of fuel consumption.	Finance Team	03/2019
<b>Fixed asset register set-up</b> Set-up of a proper fixed asset register and perform a detailed fixed assets verification to be signed off by management.	Finance Team	04/2019
<b>Interim Financial Reports submission</b> Regular preparation and quarterly submission to IFAD of Interim Financial Reports	Finance Team	04/2019
<b>FM e-learning</b> Finance team to undertake the FM e-learning training to increase understanding of IFAD FM procedures and transmit certificates to IFAD.	Finance Team	04/2019
<b>Staffing: The zonal accountants are to be deployed to the zones as soon as the operations in the respective zones resume</b>	PC and FC	

Quality and Timeliness of Audit

Rating:

Previous rating: 4

<b>Counterparts Funds</b>	<b>Rating: 3</b>	<b>Previous rating: 3</b>
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#### Justification of rating

As per the Financing Agreement, Government of Ghana (GoG) committed to support GASIP with an amount of USD 5.3 Million to cover tax and duties not included in the tax exemption. At the date of this mission GoG has contributed to the Project for a total amount of 2 million GHs, equivalent to approximately USD 0.49 Million. Overall, the actual amount provided by the Government to the project corresponds to 9% of the total commitment negotiated in the financial agreement.

#### Main issues

Due to the delay in the submission of counterpart funding for 2018 and in order to cover for GoG financial commitments toward the project, Project Management decided to transfer a GH¢ amount equivalent to USD 0.06 Million from the IFAD Loan operational account to the GoG counterpart account on a temporary basis. The process to transfer this amount back to the IFAD Loan account has started upon receipt of 2018 counterpart contribution. The counterpart contribution due for 2019 has not yet been received by the Project. The additional in-kind contribution provided by GoG in the form of office space and vehicles is not accounted for. The same is applicable to beneficiaries contribution. Relevant recommendation have been issued.

<i>Agreed Action</i>	<i>Responsibility</i>	<i>Agreed Date</i>
<b>Financial Management &amp; Execution</b>		
<b>To start the accounting for in kind-contribution at GoG and beneficiaries level</b>	Finance team	03/2019
<b>Counterpart financing to be provided in a timely manner - 2019 counterpart contribution to be provided to GASIP by 30 June 2019.</b>	Mo	06/2019
<b>Counterpart funds to be provided on a timely manner</b> Continuous action	PCU and MOF	02/2020

<b>Compliance with Loan Covenants</b>	<b>Rating: 3</b>	<b>Previous rating: 3</b>
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#### Justification of rating

Compliance with loan covenants was rated as moderately unsatisfactory (3). The programme has complied with the key covenants of the Financing Agreement with the exception of: (i) absence of the tax exemption; (ii) lack of counterpart financing, iii) delay in submission of AWPB. The observed non-compliance issues may have an adverse effect on the Programme implementation and must be solved as soon as possible. In this regard, the mission notes that the tax Exemption Application is currently at the Cabinet for approval and subsequent submission to the parliament.

#### Main issues

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<b>Procurement</b>
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<b>Procurement</b>	<b>Rating: 3</b>	<b>Previous rating: 3</b>
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#### Justification of rating

The major reason for the current rating of Moderately Unsatisfactory is that GASIP as a whole has not established a procurement system based on a correct understanding of procurement process, due to the lack of management initiative. Often the procurement unit has been excluded by management when carrying out "de-facto" procurement related activities. There were also many instances of lack of proactive, focused and prioritized actions. Consultancy procurement for "Value Chain Facilitators" has taken more than 1 year since initiation, and yet the contract has not been issued. There were also many instances where low value procurement was carried out without seeking advice from the procurement unit.

#### Procurement Review

The Mission notes that the procurement at GASIP over the last 3 years has not made substantial progress contributing to the successful project implementation and disbursement. While the areas for improvement identified by the mission in the past, continued to be addressed and improved by the Procurement Unit, the major reason of the current status is because GASIP as a whole has not established the procurement system mainly due to lack of management initiative based on correct understanding of procurement process. There were many instances where the procurement unit was excluded by the management in carrying out "de-facto" procurement related activities (For example, EOIs for Value Chain Actors and Agri-Businesses, and signing MOUs). There were also many instances demonstrating lack of proactive, focused and prioritized actions. For example, consultancy procurement for "Value Chain Facilitator" has taken more than 1 year from its initiation, and yet the contract has not been issued. Furthermore, there were also many instances where low value procurement was carried out without seeking for an advice from the procurement unit, and thus ended with inefficient result.

Following the January 2017 change of Government leadership in MOFA the new Minister has implemented measures to improve the performance of GASIP, key to which is the review of GASIP Management that led to resignation of the Programme Coordinator. Procurement of five (5) items was finalized this month, evidence of some of the improvements taking place, which confirms a more proactive approach and team work.

In order to increase the efficiency based on this momentum, the Mission recommends that the Procurement Unit of GASIP forms a working group with the procurement units of WAAP/GCAP, the two MOFA projects located in the same premises (World Bank funded). This approach will lead to no additional cost to the projects involved and has a huge potential to enhance the existing channel of decision making and information sharing, as well as improved performance of procurement systems in the three projects and MOFA as a whole, based on synergy.

It is also recommended that, as matter of urgency, a procurement officer be hired to assist the Procurement Manager. The Procurement Officer must have a sound procurement background and be capable of dealing with daily work with minimum guidance from the Procurement Manager. The Procurement Manager then will be able to navigate the Organization to a correct direction in terms of procurement, to give procurement policy advice to the Project Coordinator, and to continue to find appropriate mechanism that will help increasing efficiency of the Procurement Unit. In order to secure a procurement officer with the required expertise, it is essential to consider the salary level equal to other officers in GASIP.

## F. Relevance

Relevance	Rating: 5
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### Justification of rating

Relevance is rated as satisfactory (5). GASIP is highly relevant for and in line with Ghana's COSOP as well as with several GoG policy initiatives; namely, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, the Medium-Term Agriculture Sector Investment Plan II (METASIP), the Gender and Agricultural Development Strategy (GADS II) and the National Agricultural Policy on Youth. GASIP is also highly relevant for the new agriculture flagship programme 'Planting for Food and Jobs' launched in 2017. GASIP is also highly relevant for several IFAD policies and strategies.

### Main issues

GASIP remains highly relevant for the policy agenda of Ghana as well as IFAD's objectives, overall and as related to targeting, gender and youth. The Programme is aligned to the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper as well as the Medium-Term Agriculture Sector Investment Plan II (METASIP). Furthermore, the programme remains relevant in term of IFAD policies; namely, IFAD's country strategy for Ghana (2012-2018) as well as IFAD's corporate policies in the areas of: (i) Private Sector Development and Partnership Strategy; (ii) Rural Enterprises Policy; (iii) Rural Finance Policy; (iv) Targeting Policy; and (v) Gender Policy.

During the ICR mission, the team worked closely with MoFA to align GASIP to the Government's flagship programme 'Planting for Food and Jobs (PFJ)'. PFJ aims to modernize Ghana's agriculture to ensure food security, achieve food self-sufficiency in selected staple crops and provide job opportunities. The initiative consists of 5 pillars; provision of seeds, provision of dedicated extension services, mechanization, marketing and e-Agriculture. GASIP is very relevant to the majority of these pillars and can significantly contribute to PFJ with enhancing smallholder market linkages and orientation and related tools.

In terms of relevance of GASIP design, the core concept inherited from NRGP was sound, and GASIP's planned institutional structures and objectives - albeit only partially implemented - are still relevant for an enhanced PCU and work on the ground, provided the Programme takes account of the recommendations and agreed actions from this MTR. Successful implementation would particularly require better quality tools and targeting mechanisms for implementing activities to support selected value chains.

On the key issues of gender and youth, GASIP would be highly supportive to implement the GoG Gender and Agricultural Development Strategy (GADS II) which is aimed at mainstreaming gender in the sector and developing and disseminating gender-sensitive appropriate technology and agri-businesses along value chains, including climate smart practices. GASIP also would significantly contribute to the Government's priority to launch interventions for attracting youth to modern agriculture and related value chains as a viable career opportunity and business option.

Mainstreaming conservation agriculture (CA) and other climate smart technologies through the GASIP climate change component is highly relevant for building smallholder resilience against the negative impact of climate variability and change. These activities are well aligned with national and agricultural sector climate change policies and strategies such as the National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy, National Climate Change Policy and the National Climate-Smart Agriculture and Food Security Action Plan of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture. CA is also one of the programme areas of the agriculture and food security section of the Ghana Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement.

## G. Project Modifications

Responsibility	Modification Type	Description
PCMU/ICO	Logical Framework	Prior to the ICR and following the revised RIMS framework, few modifications were made to the original logical framework of GAASIP to improve its quality and coherence and to ensure that it reflects the programme logic and corporate requirements, and that it includes relevant results indicators. To this effect, key core indicators of outputs and outcomes were retrofitted. No other major modifications were made during the ICR.

## H. Lessons Learned

### **Institutional linkages to the Ministry of Agriculture and other public delivery institutions at all levels are crucial when working through PCUs**

The Programme was executed by a PCU that failed to establish appropriate working relationships with the Ministry of Agriculture and with decentralized delivery institutions at all levels. This prevented institution building and the mainstreaming of knowledge and learning. It led to the setting up of parallel structures and processes.

### **Successful replication and scaling-up may require adapted approaches and continuous guidance**

The successful application of proven approaches or methodologies for replication and scaling up such as District and Village Coordinating Committees (DVCC) and Matching Grants under the GASIP predecessor and IFAD-funded Northern Rural Growth Project (NRGP), cannot be taken for granted in a situation where there is serious management failure to implement such approaches.

Yet, more emphasis on ensuring the availability of an up-to-date operations manual suitable for the replication and scaling up of the previous project could have helped, instead of using the same manual. This should have included - from Programme inception - clearer and more specific guidelines, mechanisms and targets for extending services with priority to smallholder farmers (well defined in terms of area cultivated or), women and young people, the primary target groups as well as appropriate targeting mechanisms through FBOs.

Once calls for proposals and expressions of interest have been issued and responses have been received it is difficult to revert. To prevent the issuance of highly deficient calls for EOs and proposals for key project activities, as happened in GASIP, IFAD should exercise its non-objection with high prudence and expertise.

### **No compromise on strong PCU team and political will**

The main lesson learnt from the three years of GASIP implementation is that IFAD cannot compromise on competent and committed project staff that carry out their responsibilities diligently and produce outcomes for the target beneficiaries in the field. Specifically, GASIP experience has underscored once again that to effectively implement a project, it is critical to put in place a strong PCU team, led by a competent and committed Coordinator.

Related to this is the importance of the Steering committees and the Implementing Agency to play their critical roles in addressing constraints. Successful project implementation requires political support to address constraints when institutional systems fail. Political support to take action only became available when the Administration changed.

## I. Agreed Actions

<b>Agreed Action</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>Agreed Date</b>
<b>Financial Management &amp; Execution</b>		
<b>AWPB - Submit 2019 AWPB for NO</b>	PC	02/2019
<b>Internal controls - to ensure that in all cases the payments of contracts are processed upon receipt and acceptance of activity reports.</b>	PC/FMgr	02/2019
<b>Improve Fixed Asset Management: Conduct an inventory exercise annually and provide the report to MoFA. Ensure all programme assets including vehicles are only used by programme staff and for programme activities.</b>	PC, Finance Manager	03/2019

<b>Staffing</b> Recruit to fill in vacant positions	PC	03/2019
<b>Funds reallocation</b> A request for funds reallocation needs be submitted to IFAD approval	PCU and MOF	03/2019
<b>Ineligible expenditures</b> Settle ineligible expenditures and inform IFAD on the outcomes of the litigation	Finance Team	03/2019
<b>Refund</b> Refund USD 60 000 to IFAD Loan account and communicate it to IFAD	Finance Team	03/2019
<b>Ensure that project's payables are properly monitored</b> Ensure that project's payables are properly monitored	Finance Team	03/2019
<b>log-books and monitoring of fuel consumption.</b> Improve the use of project's vehicles, with proper use of log-books and monitoring of fuel consumption.	Finance Team	03/2019
<b>To start the accounting for in kind-contribution at GoG and beneficiaries level</b>	Finance team	03/2019
<b>Fixed asset register set-up</b> Set-up of a proper fixed asset register and perform a detailed fixed assets verification to be signed off by management.	Finance Team	04/2019
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<b>Counterpart financing to be provided in a timely manner - 2019 counterpart contribution to be provided to GASIP by 30 June 2019.</b>	Mo	06/2019
<b>Counterpart funds to be provided on a timely manner</b> Continuous action	PCU and MOF	02/2020
<b>Improve the efficiency by focusing in the AWPB on investment activities and by introducing cost savings with regards to operating costs.</b>	PCU	
<b>Staffing: The zonal accountants are to be deployed to the zones as soon as the operations in the respective zones resume</b>	PC and FC	

## Ghana Agricultural Sector Investment Programme

### Logical Framework

Results hierarchy	Indicators							Means_of verification			Assumptions
	Name	Baseline	Mid-Term	End Target	Annual Result (2018)	Cumulative Result (2018)	Cumulative Result % (2018)	Source	Frequency	Responsibility	
<b>Outreach</b> Ghana Agricultural Sector Investment Programme	1.b Estimated corresponding total number of households members									PCU Estimation	
	Household members	300 000	374 000	514 200	46 256	54 996	10.7				
	1.a Corresponding number of households reached									PCU Estimation	
	Households	44 000	55 000	75 600	11 564	13 749	18.2				
	1 Persons receiving services promoted or supported by the project									Value Chain Facilitator	
	Males	25 000	31 450	43 200	20 968	21 929	50.8				
	Females	25 000	31 450	43 200	8 085	9 309	21.5				
	Young	25 000	31 450	43 200	5 844	5 844	13.5				
	Total number of persons receiving services				29 053	31 238					
<b>Project Goal</b> Contribute to a sustainable poverty reduction in rural areas of Ghana	% decrease in the incidence of rural poverty in Ghana							Ghana Statistical Services			Favourable macro-economic environment (A)
	Rural population below the poverty line	29			24.5						
	Increase in the agricultural GDP							Ghana Statistical Services			
	Increase in the agricultural GDP (GHS million)	16 687			6 892	0					
	% of children under 5 suffering from malnutrition weight for height)							Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) - UNICEF			
	Children underweight	14			13						

Results hierarchy	Indicators							Means_of verification		Assumptions
	Name	Baseline	Mid-Term	End Target	Annual Result (2018)	Cumulative Result (2018)	Cumulative Result % (2018)	Source	Frequency	Responsibility
	Average crop yields for cassava (in MT/ha)							Farmers book tracer study		
	MT/ha	9.4	18	16.4	20.78					
	Average crop yields for maize (in MT/ha)							Farmers book tracer study		
	MT/ha	2	3.8	3.5	2.12					
	Net farm income for cassava (in GHS/ha)							Farmers book tracer study		
	GHS/ha	212	425	875						
	Net farm income for maize (in GHS/ha)							Farmers book tracer study		
	GHS/ha	37	362	875						
	Additional volume of cassava marketed by smallholders (in MT)							Farmers book tracer study		
	MT	0	36 000	216 000	0					
	Additional volume of maize marketed by smallholders (in MT)							Farmers book tracer study		
	MT	0	7 000	40 000	0					
	Poor smallholder household members supported in coping with the effects of climate change									Value Chain Facilitator
	Males				3 236	4 197				
	Females				3 059	4 283				
	Total household members		5 000	10 000	6 295	8 480	84.8			
Development Objective										

Results hierarchy	Indicators							Means_of verification			Assumptions
	Name	Baseline	Mid-Term	End Target	Annual Result (2018)	Cumulative Result (2018)	Cumulative Result % (2018)	Source	Frequency	Responsibility	
<b>Outcome</b> Outcome 1: Smallholders have formalized commercial linkages to factor and output markets, including small agribusinesses, and have access to essential private and public infrastructure	Number of agribusinesses experiencing sustainable growth							Tracer study			
	Agribusinesses		180	270	0						
	Number of farmers linked to markets by programme										
	Farmers	45 000	55 000	80 000	0						
	Number of FBOs reaching category four (4) status (sustainability)									Value Chain Facilitator	
	FBOs	0	300	800	0						
	% of VCCs established fully functional and sustainable									Value Chain Facilitator	
	VCCs			100	0						
	Number of hectares under improved production techniques									Value Chain Facilitator	
	Hectares of land	0	30 000	74 300	12	12	0				
<b>Output</b> 1.1. Value Chain Committees (VCCs) and FBOs are established/capacitated and value chain actors are linked	Number of VCCs established									Value Chain Facilitator	
	VCCs established	43	34	180	0						
	Number of agribusinesses supported									Value Chain Facilitator	
	Agribusinesses	105	200	300	0						
	Number of FBOs involved									Value Chain Facilitator	
	FBOs	0	3 100	4 300	0						
	Number of farmers trained (Men)									Value Chain Facilitator	
	Males	0	15 000	30 000	16	16	0.1				
	Females	0	15 000	30 000	9	9	0				
<b>Output</b> 1.2 Commercial infrastructure is improved	Km of rural roads rehabilitated (RIMS)							ZPO			
	Length of roads	0	1 000	1 200	0						
	Km of rural electrical connections							ZPO			

Results hierarchy	Indicators							Means_of verification			Assumptions
	Name	Baseline	Mid-Term	End Target	Annual Result (2018)	Cumulative Result (2018)	Cumulative Result % (2018)	Source	Frequency	Responsibility	
	Length of roads	0	450		0	0					
	Number of storage facilities constructed/rehabilitated							ZPO			
	Storage facilities		50	100	0	0	0				
<b>Output</b> Output 1.3. Essential, enabling public infrastructure are constructed in support of growth and value chains' viability	2.1.6 Market, processing or storage facilities constructed or rehabilitated							ZPO			
	Market facilities constructed/rehabilitated	0	50		0						
	Processing facilities constructed/rehabilitated				0						
	Storage facilities constructed/rehabilitated				0						
	2.1.5 Roads constructed, rehabilitated or upgraded							ZPO			
	Length of roads	0	1 000	1 200	0						
	Number of water harvesting and management systems constructed (ASAP)										
	Systems constructed				0						
	Number of livestock watering points constructed (ASAP)										
	Watering points				0						
	Number of km of rural electrical connections							Value Chain Facilitator			
	Rural electrical connections	0	450		0	1					

Results hierarchy	Indicators							Means_of verification			Assumptions
	Name	Baseline	Mid-Term	End Target	Annual Result (2018)	Cumulative Result (2018)	Cumulative Result % (2018)	Source	Frequency	Responsibility	
<b>Outcome</b> Outcome 2: Increased and systematic access to and use of short and long term financing for value chain businesses	Value of loans facilitated by GASIP with tenure <=1 year								PfIs quarterly reporting		Low capacity of programme to interest PFIs in financing value chains (R) PFIs have liquidity (internally or through credit lines (A))
	Loans		1 500	1 500	0						
	Value of loans facilitated by GASIP with tenure > 1 year								PfIs quarterly reporting		
	Loans		500	750	0						
	1.2.5 Number of persons reporting using rural financial services								Funds and PFIs quarterly reporting		
	Clients accessing leasing, equity, investments or other products	0	4 000	10 000	0						
	Clients using structured trade financing	10 000	30 000	50 000	0						
	1.2.6 Partner financial service providers with portfolio-at-risk ≥30 days below 5%								PfIs quarterly reporting		
	Percentage				0						
	Percentage of supported PFIs reaching operational self-sufficiency								PfIs quarterly reporting		
	Households				0						
<b>Output</b> Output 2.1. Rural and community banks receive strategic and operational development support and linked with commercial banks	1.1.6 Financial service providers supported in delivering outreach strategies, financial products and services to rural areas							ZPO			
	Service providers	50	100	150	0						
	Number of PFI staff trained (men and women)							ZPO			
	Men and Women	0	500		0						
<b>Output</b> Output 2.2. A matching grant scheme is established and operated to support value chain actors	Value of loans leveraged by matching grants							ZPO			
	Loans	0	7 000	20 000	0						

Results hierarchy	Indicators							Means_of verification		Assumptions
	Name	Baseline	Mid-Term	End Target	Annual Result (2018)	Cumulative Result (2018)	Cumulative Result % (2018)	Source	Frequency	Responsibility
	1.1.5 Persons in rural areas accessing financial services								Funds and PFIs quaterly reporting	
	Total persons accessing financial services - savings	30 000	50 000	70 000	0					
	Total persons accessing financial services - credit				0					
	Value chain actors supported through the matching grant mechanism									
	Males				0					
	Females				0					
<b>Outcome</b> Outcome 3: Value chain stakeholders and local production systems increase their resilience to climate change	Land under climate-resilient practices									
	Land area	0	7 500	10 000	12	12	0.1			
	Irrigated land using efficient technology									Value Chain Facilitator
	Hectares of land	0	200	1 000	0					
	Yield from conservation farming for maize (in tons/ha)									Value Chain Facilitator
	Yield	1	2.5	3	2.7					
	Number of direct beneficiaries having improved water management practices (ASAP)									Value Chain Facilitator
	Beneficiaries	0	1 000	4 000	0					
	Yield from conservation farming for soja (in tons/ha)									Value Chain Facilitator
	Yield	0.7	1.6	2	0.6					
	1.1.2 Farmland under water-related infrastructure constructed/rehabilitated									
	Hectares of land	0	250	350	0					
	Households supported with increased water availability or efficiency									
	Households			1 081	0					

Results hierarchy	Indicators							Means_of verification			Assumptions
	Name	Baseline	Mid-Term	End Target	Annual Result (2018)	Cumulative Result (2018)	Cumulative Result % (2018)	Source	Frequency	Responsibility	
	Production and processing facilities supported with increased water availability and efficiency										
	Facilities			50	0						
<b>Output</b> Outputs: 3.1 Adaptative trials and demonstrations of modern conservation agriculture and water-efficient irrigation techniques are undertaken	Number of demonstrations undertaken (ASAP)									Value Chain Facilitator	
	Demonstrations	0	30	50	30	30	60				
	Number of WUAs trained/supported									Value Chain Facilitator	
	WUAs	0	30	50	0						
	Individuals engaged in NRM and climate risk management activities									Value Chain Facilitator	
	Total	0	10 000	15 000	6 295	8 480	56.5				
	Males	0	5 000	7 500	3 236	4 197	56				
	Females	0	5 000	7 500	3 059	4 283	57.1				
<b>Output</b> Output 3.2. Climate change resilient production technologies and practices are promoted among rural producers	Number of agricultural/livestock production groups formed/strengthened										
	Production groups			4 300	30	30	0.7				
	Number of persons in these agricultural/livestock production groups (men/women)										
	Males				254	254					
	Females				346	346					
	1.1.4 Persons trained in production practices and/or technologies										
	Men trained in crop			30 000	3 236	4 197	14				
	Women trained in crop			30 000	3 059	4 283	14.3				
	Young people trained in crop				3 613	3 613					
	Not young people trained in crop				2 682	2 682					

Results hierarchy	Indicators							Means_of verification			Assumptions
	Name	Baseline	Mid-Term	End Target	Annual Result (2018)	Cumulative Result (2018)	Cumulative Result % (2018)	Source	Frequency	Responsibility	
	Indigenous people trained in crop				0	0					
	Non indigenous people trained in crop				0	0					
	Men trained in livestock				0	0					
	Women trained in livestock				0	0					
	Young people trained in livestock				0	0					
	Not young people trained in livestock				0	0					
	Indigenous people trained in livestock				0	0					
	Non indigenous people trained in livestock				0	0					
	Men trained in forestry				0	0					
	Women trained in forestry				0	0					
	Young people trained in forestry				0	0					
	Not young people trained in forestry				0	0					
	Indigenous people trained in forestry				0	0					
	Non indigenous people trained in forestry				0	0					
	Men trained in fishery				0	0					

Results hierarchy	Indicators							Means_of verification		Assumptions
	Name	Baseline	Mid-Term	End Target	Annual Result (2018)	Cumulative Result (2018)	Cumulative Result % (2018)	Source	Frequency	Responsibility
	Women trained in fishery				0	0				
	Young people trained in fishery				0	0				
	Not young people trained in fishery				0	0				
	Indigenous people trained in fishery				0	0				
	Non indigenous people trained in fishery				0	0				
	Total persons trained in crop				6 295	8 480				
	Total persons trained in livestock				0	0				
	Total persons trained in forestry				0	0				
	Total persons trained in fishery				0	0				
<b>Outcome</b> Outcome 4 : The policy framework for smallholder farmers has improved	General satisfaction with the policy framework among value chain actors (scale 1 - 6)							Participatory outcome assessment		
	General satisfaction (scale 1 - 6)			5	0					
<b>Output</b> Outputs: Policy development supported	Number of policy forums held									PCU
	Policy forums	0	3	6	0					
	Number of white papers addressing key policy issues									PCU
	Papers	0	3	6	0					

## **Ghana**

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### **Ghana Agricultural Sector Investment Programme**

#### **Mid-term Review**

#### **Appendix 1: Financial: actual financial performance; by financier by component and disbursements by category**

Mission Dates: From 22/02/2018 to 16/03/2018  
Document Date 03/06/2019  
Project No. 1100001678  
Report No. 5059-GH

West and Central Africa Division  
Programme Management Department

## Appendix 1: Financial: Actual financial performance by financier; by component and disbursements by category

Table 1A: Financial Performance By Financiers (USD'000) as at 28 February 2018

Financier	Appraisal (USD '000)	Disb. (USD '000)	Per cent disb.
IFAD Loan	36,600	4,030	11%
ASAP Grant	10,000	994	10%
Government 1	5,300	414	8%
District Assemblies	1,661	0	0%
PFI's	17,474	0	0%
Beneficiaries	4,625	0	0%
<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>75,660</b>	<b>5,438</b>	<b>7%</b>
IFAD Loan 2	35,000	0	0%
Government 2	2,328	0	0%
<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>37,328</b>		
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>112,988</b>	<b>5,438</b>	<b>5%</b>

**Table 1B: Financial Performance By Financiers by Component (USD'000) as at 28 February 2018**

No.	Component Description	IFAD LOAN I			ASAP GRANT			Government			Domestic			Total		
		Appr.	Actual	%age	Appr.	Actual	%age	Appr.	Actual	%age	Appr.	Actual	%age	Appr.	Actual	%age
<b>C1</b>	<b>Value chain development</b>	16,755	637	4%	7,750	245	3%	1,462	39	3%	20,533	0	0%	46,499	920	<b>2%</b>
<b>C2</b>	<b>Rural Value Chain Infrastructure</b>	13,110	36	0%	1,510	5	0%	2,944	0	0%	3,227	0	0%	20,792	41	<b>0%</b>
<b>C3</b>	<b>Knowledge Management, policy support and Coordination</b>	6,735	2,169	32%	740	0	0%	894	376	42%	0	0		8,369	2,545	<b>30%</b>
<b>Total</b>		36,600	2,843	8%	10,000	250	2%	5,300	414	8%	23,760	0	0%	75,660	3,507	<b>5%</b>
Authorised Allocation			1,500			800								0	<b>2,300</b>	
<b>Total IFAD Financing</b>		<b>36,600</b>	<b>4,343</b>	<b>12%</b>	<b>10,000</b>	<b>1,050</b>	<b>10%</b>	<b>5,300</b>	<b>414</b>	<b>8%</b>	<b>23,760</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0%</b>	<b>75,660</b>	<b>5,807</b>	<b>8%</b>


**Table 1C: IFAD Loan Disbursement by Category (SDR'000) as at 28 February 2018**

<b>Cat</b>	<b>Category description</b>	<b>Original Allocation</b>	<b>Revised Allocation</b>	<b>Disbursement</b>	<b>WA10 Pending</b>	<b>Available Balance</b>	<b>Per cent disbursed</b>
I	Works	7,590,000	7,590,000	70,831	3,002	7,516,167	0.97%
II	Equipment And Materials	770,000	770,000	78,375	6,732	684,894	11.05%
III	Goods, Services And Inputs	0	-	-	-	0	
IV	Consultancies	4,350,000	4,350,000	290,755	36,259	4,022,986	7.52%
V	Training	3,900,000	3,900,000	254,800	-	3,645,200	6.53%
VI	Grants And Subsidies	2,090,000	2,090,000	-	-	2,090,000	0.00%
VII	Operating Costs	400,000	400,000	306,008	39,054	54,937	86.27%
VIII	Salaries And Allowances	2,230,000	2,230,000	820,077	130,151	1,279,772	42.61%
	Unallocated	2,370,000	2,370,000	-		2,370,000	0.00%
	Authorised Allocation	0	-	1,083,306		(1,083,306)	
<b>Total</b>	<b>Total IFAD Financing</b>	<b>23,700,000</b>	<b>23,700,000</b>	<b>2,904,153</b>	<b>215,197</b>	<b>20,580,651</b>	<b>13.16%</b>


**Table 1D: ASAP Grant Disbursement by Category (SDR'000) as at 28 February 2018**

<b>Cat</b>	<b>Category description</b>	<b>Original Allocation</b>	<b>Revised Allocation</b>	<b>Disbursement</b>	<b>WA Pending</b>	<b>Avaliable Balance</b>	<b>Per cent disbursed</b>
I	Works	900,000	900,000	-	-	900,000	0.00%
II	Equipment And Materials	1,590,000	1,590,000	-	-	1,590,000	0.00%
III	Goods, Services And Inputs	880,000	880,000	-	-	880,000	0.00%
IV	Consultancies	510,000	510,000	97,666	-	412,334	19.15%
V	Training	1,970,000	1,970,000	38,611	-	1,931,389	1.96%
VI	Grants And Subsidies	-	-	-	-	-	
VII	Operating Costs			-	-	-	
VIII	Salaries And Allowances			-	-	-	
	Unallocated	650,000	650,000		-	650,000	0.00%
	Authorised Allocation	-		577,763	-	(577,763)	0.00%
<b>Total</b>	<b>Total IFAD Financing</b>	<b>6,500,000</b>	<b>6,500,000</b>	<b>714,040</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>5,785,960</b>	<b>10.99%</b>

**Figure 1: IFAD loan/grant disbursement, comparisons between original and revised allocations and actual disbursement**



**Figure 2: ASAP grant disbursement, comparisons between original and revised allocations and actual disbursement**



## **Ghana**

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### **Ghana Agricultural Sector Investment Programme**

#### **Mid-term Review**

#### **Appendix 2: Physical progress measured against AWP&B**

Mission Dates: From 22/02/2018 to 16/03/2018

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Project No. 1100001678

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West and Central Africa Division  
Programme Management Department

## Appendix 2: Physical progress measured against AWP&B

Component/ Sub-component or Output	Indicator	Unit	Period: 2 <sup>nd</sup> Jan. 2017 to 31 <sup>st</sup> December 2017			Appraisal Target	Cumulative Actual	%	Remarks
			AWP&B	Actual	%				
Component 1: Value Chain Development									
Sub-component 1.1: Agribusiness Linkages and Development									
1		No. of functional VCC's	Number	50	0	0	134		<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Existing VCCs identified are commodity based<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>2 VCCs (rice and livestock) identified in the SZ;</li><li>4 VCCs (pineapple, citrus, mango and chilli) identified in the CZ</li></ul></li><li>Various VC actors have been identified with some interaction on GASIP's mandate. Yet to organise actor-meetings to select representatives to the DVCCs</li></ul>
		No. of agribusinesses supported	Number	43	0	0	200		<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>14 clusters selected earlier and 57 Eols selected after an evaluation and pending potential impact study on their businesses.</li><li>Various individuals and firms are submitting Eols and preliminary assessments are being taken on smallholder linkages to the proposals</li></ul>
3		No. of FBOs Involved	Number	1,395	0	0	3,100		<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>219 FBOs have been identified (82 in the SZ/and 137 in the CZ).</li></ul>
4		No. of farmers trained	Number	2,000	0	0	30,000		<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Term of Reference (TOR) for the engagement of the Department of Agriculture of the various MMDAs has been developed.</li></ul>
Sub-component 1.2: Rural Financial Services									
1		Number of active PFIs	Number	22	0	0	100		<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Sensitisation conducted for 18 Universal Banks and Rural and Community Banks in the Southern Zone and yet to be conducted for the other two due to budgetary constraints.</li><li>The 18 have been presented with the call for Expression of Interest template.</li></ul>

Component/ Sub-component		Indicator	Unit	Period: 2 <sup>nd</sup> Jan. 2017 to 31 <sup>st</sup> December 2017			Appraisal Target	Cumulative Actual	%	Remarks
2		Amounts of Marching Grant disbursed	Amounts	\$1.5m	0	0	\$7.0m			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Six (6) agribusinesses including FBOs have provided Proforma Invoices requesting introductory letter to their financial institution on GASIP MG leveraging.</li> </ul>
<b>Sub-component 1.3: Climate Change resilience</b>										
1		Number of clients trained in CCR (ASAP)	Number	4,500	0	0	10,000			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Consulting firm has been engaged to do the training for 120 clients</li> </ul>
2		Hectares of land under conservation agriculture practices	ha	4,500	0	0	7,500			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>10 sites selected for the CA learning centre. FAO to be engaged before the end of the year</li> </ul>
3		Individuals engaging and/or participating in climate risk management activities, disaster risk reduction efforts and/or a collective shift towards less climate-sensitive livelihoods	Number	6,750	2,185	31	15,000			
4		Yield from conservation farming (by crop)	MT/Ha	M - 1.68 S - 1.1	0	0	M: 2.5 S: 1.6			
5		Hectares with reliable access to water (ASAP), under GASIP	Hectares	112	0	0	250			
6		Number of functional WUAs (ASAP) supported by GASIP	Number	22	0	0	50			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>8 sites have been selected and Feasibility studies is currently on-going. These areas will be used for the piloting</li> </ul>
<b>Component 2: Rural Value Chain Infrastructure</b>										
<b>Sub-component 2.2: Enabling Public Infrastructure to support selected value chains</b>										
1		Length of rural roads rehabilitated	Km	34	0	0	900			
2		Length of rural electrical connections done	Km	1	1	100	450			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Kumbungu Guinea Fowl Center, one of the 14 clusters selected, was connected to the national electricity grid</li> </ul>

## **Ghana**

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### **Ghana Agricultural Sector Investment Programme**

#### **Mid-term Review**

#### **Appendix 3: Compliance with legal covenants: status of implementation**

Mission Dates: From 22/02/2018 to 16/03/2018

Document Date 03/06/2019

Project No. 1100001678

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West and Central Africa Division  
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### Appendix 3: Compliance with legal covenants: Status of implementation

Section	Loan Covenant	Target/Action Due Date	Compliance Status/Date
<b>Section B. Par 6</b>	Opening of 2 Designated Accounts with BoG in USD	October 2015	Done
	Deposit of Authorized Allocation of USD	22 December 2015	Done
<b>Section D. Par 17</b>	Programme GHS Account	27 January 2016	Done
	Programme Zonal GHS Accounts		Not Done
<b>Section B. Par 7</b>	GoG Counterpart Account Opened	27 January 2016	Done
<b>Section E. Par 2(c)</b>	National Programme Coordinator has been duly appointed	1 December, 2014	Done
<b>Section E. Par 2(c)</b>	Financial Manager has been duly appointed	10 April, 2015	Done
<b>Section 7.01</b>	Submission of AWPB each year to IFAD for approval	Annual (by 31 Oct)	Submitted with considerable delays
<b>Section 7.08</b>	Insure all goods and buildings.		Partially Done
<b>Section 8.03</b>	Submission of Project Periodic Progress report to IFAD	Annual	Done
<b>Section 8.03</b>	Mid-Term Review (MTR) carried out jointly by Borrower, IFAD	May 2018	Conducted in Feb-Mar 2018
<b>Section 9.02</b>	Submission of Annual Financial Statements to IFAD	30 April each Year	Done for FY2015, 2016 and 2017.
<b>Section 9.03</b>	Audit of Programme financial Statements in accordance with Programme guidelines by an independent Auditor	30 June each Year	Done for FY2015, 2016 and 2017.