



Investing in rural people

Fostering inclusive rural transformation in fragile states and situations

by

Karim Hussein

Global Forum for Rural Advisory Services

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A decorative graphic in the bottom left corner consisting of several stylized wheat stalks in a light brown color, rendered in a silhouette-like style.

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Abstract

This paper seeks to answer three main questions:

- (i) What are fragile states and situations and how do they relate to issues of inclusive structural and rural transformation?
- (ii) In three selected case studies of diverse fragile situations (in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Republic of Haiti and the Republic of the Sudan – drawing on IFAD-financed programme and country experience), what have been the key elements of structural and rural transformation and to what extent has rural transformation been inclusive?
- (iii) In these cases, how does fragility affect the inclusiveness of rural transformation? Which policies and approaches can successfully promote inclusive rural transformation in fragile situations?

This paper focuses on the relationships between fragile states and situations and structural and rural transformation in different contexts, and the degree to which inclusive rural transformation can be observed, understood and fostered in such situations. It provides an overview of the relationship between fragility and structural and rural transformation, and then proposes a focus on fragile situations rather than on fragile states. It identifies key issues that affect inclusive rural transformation in a diversity of fragile situations, considering short-term and long-term dynamics.

After using the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) list of fragile states and economies for the purposes of selecting case study countries for this paper, the paper focuses on a review of rural transformation processes and interventions to support more inclusive rural transformation in three fragile situations in Africa and Latin America: the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan and Haiti (for a summary of factors of fragility in these countries, see Annex 1). The narrative then draws from this analysis to provide an overview of issues for inclusive rural transformation and summarizes a number of key messages to inform policies, strategies and programmes. The paper concludes with eight key messages on fostering inclusive rural transformation and fragile situations.

The overall argument of this paper is that approaches to foster inclusive rural transformation in fragile states and situations need to be addressed on a case-by-case basis. It is necessary for development actors to better understand the diversity and distinctive aspects of fragile states and situations, and consequent upon this, tailored approaches are needed in order to effectively support inclusive rural transformation in these contexts.

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Introduction

Addressing the challenges posed by fragile states and situations (FS) for development processes and investments has become a priority for the international community, and fragility is recognized to be as important a problem for agricultural development and rural transformation as for other areas of development. FS generally experience the most intractable development issues, combined with entrenched socio-economic issues, poverty and inequality with some combination of vulnerabilities related to environmental hazards and natural disasters (e.g. hurricanes, earthquakes, tsunamis, floods), low levels of social cohesion, very limited capacity of the state to deliver basic public services, weak policies, institutions and governance, corruption, political instability and/or insecurity.¹ FS are, by their nature, changeable environments that rarely display an obvious pattern, so the impacts on structural and rural transformation are specific to context, the populations involved, and the period of analysis.

The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) characterized fragile states in the 2006 Policy on Conflict Prevention and Recovery, as follows:

Fragile states are characterized by weak policies, weak institutions and weak governance, resulting in meager economic growth, widespread inequality and poor human development. Fragile states are more exposed to the risk of outbreaks of violence than are non-fragile states. Fragile states may be well endowed with natural resources or be resource poor (IFAD, 2006).²

Some fragile countries are low-income countries, others are middle income. Some have situations that undermine the government's capacity to govern, while others possess strong state institutions albeit affected by protracted crises in particular regions of the country or by their vulnerability to natural disasters, climate-related shocks and extreme weather events, e.g floods, hurricanes and severe drought.

IFAD also recognizes that, broadly speaking, fragile states can be characterized by climate and environment-related stresses and disasters, poor governance, limited institutional capacity, weak policy frameworks, and civil or border conflict, although not all of the features are present in all countries defined as fragile, and circumstances in a given country can change over time (IFAD, 2008). The rural poor are particularly at risk in fragile states and situations, often located in remote locations and highly dependent on government services (IFAD and IOE, 2015a). Fragile states and situations are more vulnerable to internal and external shocks (economic crises, climate-related shocks and natural disasters), suffer from weak institutions and corruption, and international support is often required to meet people's basic needs.

1. See, for example, World Bank, 2011a.
2. While there is no universally agreed definition of fragile states, over the last 10-15 years international development organizations have sought to adapt programming and investments to the specific development challenges faced in these contexts (e.g. the OECD, the World Bank and the African Development Bank). Most definitions of fragile states and situations emphasize a number of common features: weak policies, institutions and governance; corruption; insecurity; and very limited capacity of the state to deliver basic public services (see e.g. World Bank, 2011a; OECD, 2015).

Structural and rural transformations are observed in fragile situations, but these transformations are usually not inclusive nor do they contribute to a positive dynamic of inclusive structural rural transformation. Rather, the livelihoods of poor and excluded rural people are often disrupted, contributing to increased rural-urban migration, spurred by the need for security, employment opportunities and access to basic services.

Fragility is particularly important in any analysis of structural and rural transformation. If structural transformations in economies are inclusive, and accompanied by inclusive governance and institutions, they are perhaps less likely to be undermined by fragility and subsequent rural transformations may have more potential to be inclusive.

The development challenge posed by fragile states and situations

More than 40 per cent of people living on less than US\$1.25/day are located in fragile situations, and by 2030 nearly two thirds of the world's poor could be living in countries affected by fragility (OECD, 2014: 15). In 2015, there were 50 fragile countries and economies according to the criteria used by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 29 of which were African (OECD, 2015). This number had risen from 47 countries in 2013 (OECD, 2013). These countries were home to some 1.4 billion people, or 20 per cent of the world's population, with projections indicating that their populations will grow to 1.9 billion in 2030 and 2.6 billion in 2050 (OECD, 2015: 31). However, fragility is not a synonym for poverty or for a total absence of economic transformation: half of the countries that have ever been classified as fragile are considered to be middle-income countries.

The OECD report on *States of Fragility 2015* (OECD, 2015) notes that fragility is an issue of universal character that can affect any country, and stresses the need to broaden the analysis from fragile states and economies to *fragile situations* to address their multidimensional nature. The 2015 OECD definition is useful, as it demonstrates that fragility fundamentally affects any possibility for inclusive transformation and leads us to examine the complexity of fragile situations that can exist within and beyond national borders. These principles and guidelines have acknowledged that there is no one-size-fits-all approach for engagement in fragile situations. FS are, by their nature, changeable environments that rarely display an obvious pattern, so the impacts on structural and rural transformation are specific to context, the populations involved and the period of analysis (Chandy, 2011).

Fragility prevented a wide range of countries and people from meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and critically affects the likelihood of the world being able to meet the universal post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Challenge-related fragility will have to be addressed directly in order to meet the proposed SDG16: "Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels".

The *State of Food Insecurity in the World 2015* report notes that the prevalence of undernourishment in countries affected by protracted crisis situations is over double the average for other developing countries, i.e. 39 per cent as compared with 15 per cent (FAO, 2010; CFS, 2015). This gap hardly changed between 2010-2012 and 2005-2007 (FAO, IFAD and WFP, 2015: 37). Often linked to fragility, the number of people displaced by war, conflict or persecution reached a record high of nearly 60 million in 2014 (UNHCR, 2015). Fragile states and situations often have the highest rates of urbanization, partly due to the massive population movements from rural to urban centres caused by conflicts.

Fragile situations and the drivers or factors that characterize fragility are diverse and context-specific. In the face of such diversity, there is a need to develop differentiated approaches, tools or instruments to support inclusive agricultural and rural transformation across a wide range of fragile situations. Relatively strong and well-functioning states with effective institutions can often contain the impacts of, and areas affected by, instability and fragility over a shorter or longer period of time; in fragile states, containing the effects of fragility is much more difficult.

Focus of this paper

This paper seeks to answer three main questions:

- (i) What are FS and how do they relate to issues of inclusive structural and rural transformation?
- (ii) In three selected case studies of diverse fragile situations (in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Republic of Haiti and the Republic of the Sudan – drawing on IFAD-financed programme and country experience), what have been the key elements of structural and rural transformation and to what extent has rural transformation been inclusive?
- (iii) In these cases, how does fragility affect the inclusiveness of rural transformation? Which policies and approaches can successfully promote inclusive rural transformation in fragile situations?

This paper focuses on the relationships between fragile states and situations and structural and rural transformation in different contexts, and the degree to which inclusive rural transformation can be observed, understood and fostered in such situations. It provides an overview of the relationship between fragility and structural and rural transformation and then proposes a focus on fragile situations rather than on fragile states. The paper identifies key issues that affect inclusive rural transformation in a diversity of fragile situations, considering short-term and long-term dynamics.

After using the OECD list of fragile states and economies for the purposes of selecting case study countries for this paper, the paper focuses on a review of rural transformation processes and interventions to support more inclusive rural transformation in three fragile situations in Africa and Latin America: DRC, Sudan and Haiti (for a summary of factors of fragility in these countries, see Annex 1). The narrative then draws from this analysis to provide an overview of issues for inclusive rural transformation and summarizes a number of key messages to inform policies, strategies and programmes. The paper concludes with eight key messages on fostering inclusive rural transformation and fragile situations.

The overall argument of this paper is that approaches to foster inclusive rural transformation in fragile states and situations need to be addressed on a case-by-case basis. It is necessary for development actors to better understand the diversity and distinctive aspects of fragile states and situations, and consequent upon this, tailored approaches are needed in order to effectively support inclusive rural transformation in these contexts.

Case studies of rural transformation in fragile situations: overview

Introduction

This paper will analyse three case studies of rural transformation in fragile situations to illustrate the challenges related to a specific fragility context: DRC, Haiti and Sudan. All of these countries are considered fragile according to the OECD (OECD, 2015). These cases were selected based on a review of critical factors of fragility, key data on poverty and development trajectories (see Table 1), and the desire to reflect a *diversity* of fragile situations. A summary of the critical factors of fragility in the three countries is presented in Annex 1.

Other factors that justified the selection of these case studies included: their inclusion in official international lists of fragile states and situations;³ a review of core socio-economic data on development trends (see Table 1 and the figures); a review of secondary literature, including IFAD's Corporate Level Evaluation on IFAD's Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-affected States and Situations (IFAD, 2015a); and consultation with selected practitioners in IFAD working to implement inclusive rural development programmes in these countries. All three countries are considered to be among the 25 countries most challenged by corruption.⁴ The figures following Table 1 provide an overview of the trends of selected indicators of rural transformation in the three countries considered here to provide examples of fragile situations from 1980-2014 compared with the general trend for the region in which the country is situated. The data focus on four aspects of agricultural and rural transformation: labour productivity; share of agriculture in gross domestic product (GDP); agricultural total factor productivity; and land productivity in terms of yield in cereals.⁵

Table 1: Key economic, agriculture and rural development data on the case study countries

Country	Year	GDP per capita (US\$ ppp, in 2011)	Share of agriculture in GDP (%)	Urban population (%)	Share of agriculture in employment (%)	Poverty rate urban (%)	Poverty rate rural (%)	Inequality (GINI)
DRC*	2005	602	22.4	37.5	-	61.5	75.7	44.4
Haiti	2012	1 603	-	54.8	50.5	40.6	74.9	** ⁶
Sudan	2009	4 206	26.3	33.0	-	26.5	57.6	35.3

* Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Source: IFAD Rural Development Report 2016 analysis.

3. These three countries are all listed in the 2015 OECD report on *States of Fragility*, in the Fund For Peace's *Fragile States Index 2014* (index above 90), and the World Bank, African Development Bank and Asian Development Bank *Harmonized List of Fragile Situations FY15*.
4. See Transparency International's *Corruption Perceptions Index 2014*. Available at www.transparency.org/country (accessed on 20 August 2015).
5. Data drawn from the World Bank World Development Indicators, except for data on Total Factor Productivity, drawn from the United States Department of Agriculture/Economic Research Service. I am grateful to Lorenzo Motta, SKD, for the figures.
6. The GINI coefficient for Haiti is one of the highest in the world. Source: Haitian Institute of Statistics and Informatics (www.ihsi.ht/pdf/compte_economique/C_E_2012.pdf).

Figure 1: Labour productivity – agriculture value added per worker (1980-2014)




Figure 2: Trends in share of agriculture in GDP (1980-2014)




Figure 3: Agricultural total factor productivity – index (1980-2014)





Figure 5: Land productivity – cereal yield (1980-2014)



Case study: Democratic Republic of the Congo⁷

(i) Development context

The second largest country on the continent, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is landlocked and bordered by nine countries with high population densities in the east and very low densities in other regions. Although organized violence continues particularly in the north-east, DRC has been considered a “post-conflict” country since 2009. More than one million refugees and internally displaced persons had returned to DRC by then. War and violent conflict since 1996 had involved seven regional armies and caused the deaths of more than 3 million people. Following a peace process, control was restored to two thirds of the country, and the first election in 40 years was held in 2006/2007. An agreement to eradicate armed groups in the region was signed between DRC, Rwanda and 12 other states in July 2012. Nonetheless, in January 2014, an estimated 2.9 million people remained displaced within DRC, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNDP, 2014).

DRC continues to suffer from instability, and social conflicts and the risk of natural disasters (flooding, erosion, landslides) is high where urbanization is rapid and construction unregulated. DRC has poor road and transport infrastructure and suffers from marked socio-economic inequalities. While the majority of the population lives in rural areas, living conditions are far worse there in terms of access to employment, energy, decent housing, water and sanitation. These areas also have little access to electricity and clean water, inhibiting the establishment of modern health centres and schools (see AfDB, OECD and UNDP, 2015).

The national economy has grown strongly since 2010, i.e. 8.9 per cent in 2014. This was due to the dynamic extractive and manufacturing industry sectors. The extractive sector accounted for 99 per cent of total Congolese exports, 64 per cent of the government budget, 24 per cent of formal employment, and 13 per cent of GDP in 2012.⁸ Artisanal and small-scale mining is widespread; estimates of the number of people employed by this sector vary between 500,000 and 2 million. Many of these miners are still involved in agriculture. Illegal artisanal mining has degraded soils and polluted water tables, led to deforestation, the diversion of rivers, and the disappearance of arable land.

Only 1.75 per cent of the national budget was allocated to agriculture and rural development in 2012;⁹ however, agriculture is still an important part of the economy. DRC benefits from good climatic conditions for agriculture, which is the main economic activity in rural areas, employing the majority of labour in the country and 70 per cent of the rural population. The agriculture sector grew by 4 per cent from 2013 to 2014, although its share of GDP fell by 2 per cent in the same period. Coffee and oil palm production increased significantly in this period, as did fruit and vegetables (AfDB, OECD and UNDP, 2015: 4). The sector’s weak performance is partly due to poor transport infrastructure and lack of access to necessary equipment and technology, with the exception of plantation agriculture. Because many areas of the country are remote and isolated, transporting agricultural products to markets is difficult, resulting in food losses and limiting the possibilities for smallholders to improve their incomes. These conditions have contributed to migration from rural to urban areas since the 1990s and a reduction in labour available for agriculture. In eastern DRC, this process has been accompanied by competition and conflict between ethnic groups and armed conflict, often over the use of natural resources.

7. The section on DRC was informed by the insights of IFAD Country Programme Manager for DRC, Rasha Omar.

8. See Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative: <https://eiti.org/countries>.

9. Relief Web, 2012 (<http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/drc-cuts-budget-agriculture>).

According to national data, 63.6 per cent of the population was poor in 2012.¹⁰ According to UNDP (2014), in 2012, the depth of poverty remained higher in rural than in urban areas (29 and 20 per cent, respectively), as did the severity of poverty (15.7 and 9.7, respectively). Almost 67 per cent of the poor can be found in rural areas (UNDP, 2014: 38). Most rural people continue to rely on forests for daily livelihood needs, and agriculture remains principally based on slash and burn practices, limiting yields per hectare. War, population displacement, insecurity in areas under environmental protection, and the collapse of institutions have had a devastating impact on the environment, and nature reserves are threatened by mining, wood cutting, encroachment and destructive industries.

(ii) Nature of fragility

Key aspects of fragility faced by DRC include: insecurity, organized armed conflict and military intervention; widespread poverty and inequality; vulnerability to natural disasters; political disruption; weak government and civil society institutions, and major governance challenges at national and local levels; widespread corruption, rent-seeking behaviour and clientelism; fragile process of emergence from violent conflicts and war; localized and regional conflict; people's heightened vulnerability to personal violence and crime, particularly affecting women and girls; high numbers of displaced people; natural resource competition; incapacity of government to deliver basic functions and services to the majority of the people living within state borders; and weak public financial management.

Civil society has played a role in mobilizing social capital to hold the government accountable and make it more responsive to public needs, and civil society groups have delivered services to prevent and resolve conflicts, and have promoted democracy, human rights and the rule of law (Dzinesa and Laker, 2010). However, studies show the heterogeneity and weaknesses of civil society in the country, and the fighting and insecurity that continues in north-eastern DRC prevents government administration from applying laws effectively across the whole country.

Poor governance is a key constraining factor in socio-economic development; most development agencies fail to fully assess the dimensions of DRC's fragility, particularly the fragility of the state and the functional weaknesses of state institutions and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in re-engaging with DRC in 2002-2003. In addition to weak state institutions, civil society, farmers' organizations and customary institutions lack credibility as development intermediaries.

(iii) What types of structural and rural transformation have occurred and what attempts have been made to make these processes inclusive?

As illustrated by the figures and data in section 3, DRC is struggling with regard to all four elements of agricultural and rural transformation analysed. There is very little evidence of an inclusive structural transformation.

In order to promote a more equitable economic growth process, social cohesion and decent work for all segments of the population, the government has developed an operational plan for 2014-2016 to implement the National Support Programme for Social Protection. The plan aims to increase employment and encourage social transition across the agriculture, health, education and infrastructure sectors to improve well-being while eliminating all forms of discrimination between men and women in the labour market.

10. World Bank World Development Indicators, accessed 29 July 2015.

The Programme de Relance Agricole dans la Province de l'Equateur (PRAPE), launched in 2005, and the Programme de Réhabilitation de l'Agriculture dans la Province Orientale (PRAPO), launched in 2007, have attempted to address agricultural and rural development constraints and promote inclusive rural development. PRAPE succeeded in building the capacities of numerous rural organizations focused on agriculture and fisheries, and it boosted overall economic activity and agricultural production in the project area, improving household incomes and access to services. But these achievements were at risk when the project ended in 2014. Farmers' organizations remained weak, and the sustainability of service centres was not guaranteed in the face of continued political instability, weak local, regional and national government and weak local ownership of the programme.

PRAPO did not, according to the end of project report, adequately analyse and address weaknesses in state administration, organizational and project management capacities, transparency and accountability, nor did it sufficiently address gender, particularly the exposure of women and girls to various forms of violence. Efforts to support the capacity-building of farmers' organizations did not sufficiently focus on the organizations of the more vulnerable populations, and only 3 per cent of beneficiaries were actually considered as vulnerable populations (IFAD and IOE, 2015b).

The scale of investments required to address the enormous constraints to transformation is huge and needs to be maintained over time. The international community's support to DRC has involved only limited coordination between humanitarian agencies and development partners, and hence expenditures and investments often fail to make effective linkages between relief, longer-term development and building resilience.

With regard to gender equality, since the political settlements of 2009, in rural areas a positive redistribution of gender roles has been observed to some degree, with the division of work being less marked and women having access to more remunerative activities. But where this is taking place, men still manage to get hold of those jobs that generate more money, leaving those that are less lucrative to women. In addition, the jobs available to women generally tend to take more time, while those undertaken by men are often temporary, which leaves them with more free time (UNDP, 2014: 150).

There is some evidence of rural transformation occurring in DRC, although examples of truly *inclusive* rural transformation are rare. There are some examples of more effective farmers' organizations, contributing to the voice and economic empowerment of farmers, particularly rural women, at the local level. This is the case, for example, for the smallholder coffee producers' associations in eastern DRC, which seek to stabilize coffee prices and increase incomes of coffee producers in some of the most fragile areas by increasing the quality of coffee produced and linking smallholders to export markets.¹¹ Another encouraging example relates to urban and peri-urban horticulture in five cities and their regions. This is helping smallholders to grow 150,000 tons of vegetables a year, and supply fresh, nutritious produce to up to 11.5 million urban residents, contributing to more sustainable livelihoods for some 16,000 small-scale market gardeners. This will mean better incomes for 60,000 people in the horticulture value chain and more jobs while boosting the supply of vegetables for urban areas.¹²

However, problems related to infrastructure, illegal taxation, access to land and water disrupt activities. Lastly, much of the value-added and processing in agriculture in eastern DRC takes place in neighbouring countries such as Burundi and Uganda, thus often not directly

11. See, for example, <http://www.veco-ngo.org/blog/revival-eastern-congo%E2%80%99s-arabica-coffee-sector>.

12. See www.fao.org/docrep/013/i1901e/i1901e00.pdf.

benefiting or increasing the incomes of smallholders in DRC. To promote local processing of agricultural products and natural resources, the government, with the support of the World Bank, has decided to create growth poles, including agro-industry parks that will build on and be complementary to agricultural value chains (AfDB, OECD and UNDP, 2015: 15).

(iv) How inclusive has the transformation process been?

There is very little evidence to suggest that an inclusive rural transformation process is taking place in DRC. Fundamental political, economic and social factors related to fragility continue to undermine inclusive development and social cohesion in the country, whether these relate to cultural, gender, environmental or rural development issues. These constitute critical obstacles to an inclusive and sustainable process of structural and rural transformation. The basic building blocks required for equitable development in any society are not present in the DRC context.

Inclusive development remains elusive for women, girls and young people; gender equality and freedom from violence and sexual exploitation are far from being achieved in DRC (Dzineza and Laker, 2010). Collective efforts at achieving gender equality are undermined by the widely held perception that the gender aspects of projects can best be delivered by women and civil society. People aged between 15 and 24 constitute more than half of the unemployed (UNDP, 2014: 205). Congolese women are relatively well positioned in terms of social power, but suffer from very low levels of economic and political power. UNDP (2014) emphasizes the close linkages between national cohesion, poverty reduction, the equitable division of incomes, access to jobs, the intergenerational transmission of well-being opportunities, social expenditures and their effects on populations. While both women and men in urban and rural areas are affected by precarious jobs, women find it more difficult to work for themselves, given a relative lack of education and training, subordination, exclusion from decision-making processes, and the absence of independent access to productive capital.

Issues around land and natural resource management, use and access are major factors contributing to poor governance, undermining social cohesion and generating conflicts. There are often contradictions between formal land and natural resource use laws and customary land management practices, where land has both economic and cultural value and may be claimed by different groups who see themselves as possessing priority rights over land. However, land reform has not been a panacea for addressing fragility and unrest, and incomplete or partial land reforms have at times aggravated conflict, for example, in Colombia and Brazil (see paper on land and natural resources for this report for further analysis of this dimension). Furthermore, forestry and mining concessions and the creation of protected areas have forced an exodus of rural populations towards urban centres or marginal farming land. With little coordination between administrative and customary authorities over land management, contradictory and parallel land management regimes coexist and undermine land tenure security. These issues have led to the deterioration of the environment as well as the living conditions of populations with an impact on the availability of resources, labour allocation and agricultural production systems.

DRC is a multi-ethnic country with some 250 ethnic groups, including several indigenous pygmy groups. Indigenous Pygmies number over 650,000 people in the country and are generally recognized as the most ancient occupants of the current territory of DRC (IFAD and IWGIA, 2012). These indigenous people suffer discrimination when compared with other populations, including with regard to access to basic services (e.g. health and education), land tenure insecurity and exclusion from consultative processes.

National governance challenges, such as poorly staffed and financed decentralized authorities stretched over a very large country and illegal taxes levied on rural people, are an impediment to inclusive rural transformation.

The productive sectors (including agriculture, energy and rural development) are allocated less than 15 per cent of the national budget capital expenses, which explains the insufficient public investment in the agriculture sector and the small contribution of the state to the creation of employment opportunities that can reduce poverty (UNDP, 2014: 129).

(v) How has fragility affected the process of rural transformation and the degree of inclusivity?

DRC is a situation emerging from conflict, and faces challenges related to the continuing high numbers of displaced people and inadequate processes to support the demobilization and reintegration of combatants and ex-combatants. Coupled with the irregular payment of the salaries of military personnel and the police, this contributes to insecurity in the country. Cross-border issues, including the illegal export of minerals and natural resources, trafficking of children, light weapons, natural resources, and armed interventions by neighbouring countries exacerbate this sense of insecurity.

Competition over land and natural resources, weak rural institutions and organizations, and parallel formal legal and customary regulations prevent the effective and equitable governance of natural resources. The weakness of rural organizations (producer and civil society organizations) and lack of transparency of customary institutions also inhibit agricultural development initiatives from being effective.

Rural transformations take the form of rural migration and sprawling urbanization, accompanied by great regional inequalities. However, this cannot be considered an *inclusive* transformation process with no guarantee of secure land tenure, access to health and education, access to agricultural services and financial services, and decent employment. Poor socio-economic integration, with persistent gender inequalities and major obstacles faced by young people further contribute to a lack of national cohesion.

In regions where there might be more potential for transformation, such as the border areas of eastern DRC, the advances made by some households have often been wiped out by conflict. Other regions face many development challenges that will require huge investments over time to overcome – well in excess of the five-year project life cycle. Government investments in development corridors, to facilitate rural-urban linkages and access to markets, and roads and electrification, are intended to address these challenges. However, government efforts to develop appropriate policies and strategies that favour economic diversification, decentralization, job creation, and the reduction of inequalities in accessing basic services need to be strengthened significantly to address the scale of challenges and ensure the sustainability of benefits.

Finally, many observers note a lack of political will to address the needs of excluded groups, including women and girls and ex-combatants in rural development policies and programmes. This is compounded by a low level of institutional legitimacy given the weakness of government institutions at every level. In this context, a greater degree of conflict-sensitivity¹³ in development programming and coordination among political, security, development and humanitarian actors, linking relief, rehabilitation and development, are essential.

13. "Conflict sensitivity" here refers to: working to ensure that development programmes and interventions do not exacerbate tensions or conflict; identifying opportunities to support and reinforce peace initiatives, particularly local initiatives, as elements of rural development-related interventions, recognizing and promoting the roles of women in these interventions and in reconciliation, peacebuilding and confidence building; working to guarantee that members of vulnerable and marginalized groups are not at risk from insecurity; and all stakeholders taking steps to respect existing rights under international law of members of affected and at risk populations. (Adapted from CFS, 2015: 8-9, Principle 9)

Case study: Haiti¹⁴

(i) Development context

Haiti is situated close to major economies and markets with historic ties to countries such as the United States of America, Canada, and Latin America and the Caribbean, and has an important migrant community that regularly sends remittances to their families (some US\$1.8 billion in 2013, according to the World Bank's Development Indicators). However, economic growth rates are relatively low for the region, at 2.9 per cent in 2013 and 4.3 per cent in 2014. More than 72 per cent of the population of Haiti live on less than US\$2 a day, and 55 per cent live on under US\$1 a day. Many lack access to education and basic social services (IADB, 2010). The country is heavily dependent on aid and remittances.

According to the World Bank, in 2012, 59 per cent of Haiti's population was classified as poor, according to national poverty lines.¹⁵ Echévin (2011) reports that estimates show a small decline in extreme poverty over time nationally, from 60 per cent in 1986 to 54 per cent in 2001 (US\$1-a-day poverty line).¹⁶ The same study concludes that poor and vulnerable groups are mostly rural. Relative to their share in the population (60.2 per cent), rural households are over-represented among individuals who are poor (74.7 per cent) or extremely poor (93.0 per cent).

Haiti is the only country in Latin America and the Caribbean to be classified as fragile by international organizations. It regularly experiences drought, floods and hurricanes that particularly affect rural communities and the agricultural sector. Susceptibility to climate-related shocks and natural disasters, weak social organization coupled with governance problems, corrupt practices and widespread inequality and poverty undermine the capacity to address the broad development needs of its citizens (see Naudé and McGillivray, 2011: 2).

The most important sector of the economy is largely smallholder agriculture, which employs over 40 per cent of the labour force. Some agricultural commodities are exported, such as mangoes and coffee, but despite preferential trade agreements with the United States of America, Haiti has not succeeded in boosting trade given the lack of infrastructure and bureaucracy. Despite being a rice producer and having received support from development partners to install irrigation systems, Haiti's rice production has been stagnant for decades, irrigation systems are not maintained, and imported rice is cheaper.

The very rich segments of Haiti's population remain highly influential, despite being a small minority. They are largely disconnected from the poor, especially the rural poor, and the challenges they face, leading to a de facto segregation between wealthier and poorer parts of society. This impedes the ability of the government to put pro-poor policies in place that can stimulate an inclusive process of development and transformation. This long history of division and separation of communities, whether according to race, ethnicity or class, presents significant hurdles to development, the creation of national wealth and structural economic transformation. This, in turn, shapes the nature of rural transformation.

14. The section on Haiti draws on the analysis provided by Esther Kasalu-Coffin, IFAD Country Programme Manager for Haiti.

15. World Bank World Development Indicators, accessed 29 July 2015.

16. Estimates based on the US\$2-a-day poverty line show trends broadly similar to those for US\$1-a-day poverty rates (Echévin, 2011: 8).

(ii) Nature of fragility

Haiti's fragility is reflected in repeated climate-related shocks and natural disasters, compounded by governance and socio-political crises, entrenched inequalities, and a profound absence of social cohesion. The rural poor are often restricted by structural barriers that inhibit them from fully participating in economic activities. Many educated middle-class people have emigrated, leaving two predominant groups: the very rich and the poor who are separated economically, politically and even spatially. This is aggravated by rent-seeking behaviour by elites, weak governance and corrupt practices. The devastating earthquake that hit Haiti in 2010 further exacerbated the already fragile situation.

A recent evaluation has attributed the nature of fragility in Haiti to eroded governance, social violence, environmental degradation that exacerbates the impact of natural disasters (e.g. hurricanes, earthquakes, storms), and weak private sector; migration of educated women and men; and weak state capacity to define policies to provide public goods, provide public services and manage social risks (IFAD IOE, 2015b: 36-37). This report identifies four drivers of fragility: political instability; social fracture; high vulnerability to climate shocks and natural disasters; and an inadequate business climate. Importantly, weak capacity in government has made it difficult to address core drivers of fragility in development interventions. Other factors of fragility only compound these problems, such as the high levels of poverty and vulnerability; social discord and violence; weak social, civil society and governmental institutions; political instability; widespread corruption; and the high number of displaced people in camps since the 2010 earthquake.

The influx of humanitarian and development assistance into Haiti over the last 12 years, especially after several hurricanes, the 2010 earthquake that caused some 230,000 casualties, and the 2012 cyclone, has contributed to the high level of dependency on aid and social protection programmes (IFAD IOE, 2015b). This can be observed at the local level, particularly among the poorer populations.

(iii) What types of structural and rural transformation have occurred and what attempts have been made to make these processes inclusive?

As illustrated by the figures and data in section 3, Haiti is struggling with regard to achieving significant levels in relation to any of the four key aspects of agricultural and rural transformation analysed in this paper.

Since 2010, a consensus has emerged among the government and donors on the need to increase support to agriculture and rural development to address food insecurity and hunger in Haiti. The government has developed a number of policies and strategies that have developed explicit objectives of promoting poverty reduction and agricultural and rural development. These include the 2007 National Poverty Reduction Strategy, which recognized agriculture and rural development as one of four key drivers of growth, the Agricultural Development Policy (2010-2025), the National Plan for Food and Nutrition Security, and the Agricultural Recovery Plan 2013-2016, among others (IFAD, 2013). The National Agriculture Investment Plan 2011-2016 is a US\$772 million plan aimed at boosting productivity and competitiveness; increasing national food production by 25 per cent; cutting in half the number of people who suffer from food insecurity in the next five years; improving the health and nutrition of the poorest and most vulnerable groups; and increasing the income of at least 500,000 rural households (Shamshie, 2010: 2). Interventions have focused on smallholders that produce for the national market and for export, and on bringing those farmers into the market more effectively.

The government has regularly updated its agriculture and rural development policies and strategies, and supports rural development programmes that have prioritized addressing vulnerability, gender and natural resource management issues and empowerment. However, to date, these have not successfully addressed key constraints faced by smallholders and rural entrepreneurs, such as land tenure insecurity and lack of access to credit, nor have they successfully addressed key inclusion issues such as increasing the number of women in leadership positions. There is little evidence on their performance, rendering it difficult to analyse the impact of national policies or programmes that seek to promote rural transformation.

The government has not elaborated important policies such as the protection of local producers through import tax, and continues to adhere to full trade liberalization. For example, rice imported from the United States of America is cheaper than domestically produced rice. Haitian producers are not in the position to compete. Those who are in the import business and own the vast majority of businesses possess significant power and influence in the absence of such protection taxes. According to Shamshie (2010: 3), Haitian rural associations of small-scale producers have, on many occasions, lobbied for the protection of food staples from the subsidized commodities on world markets, but without success.

The high turnover of ministers and other public officials has had a negative impact on the implementation of development programmes and their capacity to foster inclusive development. For example, between 2013 and 2015, the ministers of the Ministries of Agriculture and of Economy and Finance changed three times.

The separation noted earlier between the rich and the influential, on the one hand, and the poor, particularly the rural poor, on the other hand, has led to societal practices and the implementation of policies in Haiti that are often skewed to benefit the wealthier and more powerful segments of society. This perpetuates a policy environment that does not tend to support inclusive socio-economic transformation in rural or urban areas.

A large proportion of development funds are spent on administration and management of programmes rather than investments. While on average it might be expected that only 10 to 15 per cent of development programme funds are allocated to project management, IFAD's experience in Haiti is that this proportion can reach over 30 per cent, thus diminishing resources available to improve the impacts of development interventions.

Nonetheless, the experience of the community councils (*conseils communautaires*), inspired by the "Animation Rurale" approach introduced in Haiti in the 1950s, is an example of a rural targeting strategy that has fostered a degree of inclusion in rural development strategies (Schwartz et al., 2015). These community councils were led by sector representatives of the community (religious, NGO and business) and elected officials, and they reflected the traditionally vertically stratified patron-client social structure that prevails in the country. They principally used food-for-work as a tool to support various dimensions of relief and development work: disaster relief, soil conservation, health, road rehabilitation, irrigation and agricultural extension services. Membership of a community council was a requirement for receiving assistance.

A United States Agency for International Development (USAID) evaluation in 1983 found that these community councils were effective channels for distributing assistance and targeting vulnerable people, and they were hailed as a success by many observers and activists in the 1960s and 1970s. However, they did not last for political reasons linked to the emergence

of the Duvalier Government and its assertion of control over the councils, and because they were criticized by NGOs and academics for being linked to urban and rural elite interests. Ultimately, they were replaced by smaller groups of up to a dozen farmers supported by a number of NGOs from the 1970s to the 1980s: *Gwoupman* groups that excluded government officials, local elites and large landowners. These in turn disappeared and were replaced by associations from the 1990s. These different institutions and democratic initiatives have not been successful in the longer term, as they failed to retain the connection between elites and vulnerable populations that existed in the community councils due to nepotism, unmitigated loyalty to extended family, and individual factions (White and Smucker, 1998).

(iv) How inclusive has the transformation process been?

Agriculture and the rural sector contribute significantly to national GDP (25 per cent) and overall employment (50 per cent). However, they also generate 75 per cent of employment of low-income households. Poverty and extreme poverty are more prevalent in rural areas, where 88 per cent still live below the poverty line and 59 per cent earn less than US\$1 a day (IADB, 2010).

The massive outmigration of rural elites from the 1980s, leaving the poor behind, the demise of the community councils and related social cleavages outlined above contributed to the stagnation of rural economies, a lack of economic transformation, and the rural population in Haiti remaining generally poor and excluded.

Evidence following the 2010 earthquake indicates that Haiti has not experienced elements of inclusive rural transformation since then. Oxfam (2012) indicates that programmes for rural agricultural development could have had a positive impact in Haiti given their emphasis on the long term rather than on unsustainable short-term interventions. USAID, the World Bank and IFAD have all published examples of how the lives of individuals or small groups in the rural areas of Haiti have been transformed with support from external interventions. Nevertheless, these studies do not demonstrate the achievement of sustained structural and inclusive rural transformation at a larger scale beyond individuals or small groups of programme beneficiaries.

As noted by Shamshie (2010), large numbers of agricultural labourers will continue to be part of Haiti's rural landscape and their conditions need to be addressed:

Unregulated (or under-regulated) rural labour markets ... allow employers and contractors to take advantage of casual rural labour by deducting commissions; holding back wages; imposing debt bondage; overcharging for transportation, housing, and food; among other strategies. Failure to improve the conditions of this vulnerable rural group lessens the poverty reducing quotient of any rural development strategy. One priority would be to help develop the organizational capacities of rural wagedworkers so that they can more ably defend their legal rights in labour markets.

Community organizations and women's associations continue to exist, but they tend not to undertake economic activities and are often established to attract resources and assistance from the aid community when disasters strike.

(v) How has fragility affected the process of rural transformation and the degree of inclusivity?

The key dimensions of fragility in Haiti outlined above have been critical impediments to moving towards inclusive rural transformation in the country. For many observers, these have blocked any meaningful rural transformation and led to development processes not being inclusive. According to many, the basic building blocks required for equitable development in any society are not present in the Haitian context.

Political instability, social fracture, a high vulnerability to climate-related shocks and natural disasters, and an inadequate business climate have been identified as primary drivers of fragility in Haiti (IFAD IOE, 2015b: 36-37). The same review identified land issues as an important driver of poverty and a source of conflict. In this context, it will take considerable effort and resources at different levels over time for Haiti to achieve a positive, sustainable structural and rural transformation. Many of the obstacles to this are related to entrenched social problems and inequalities that have deep historical roots.

Social relations and entrenched social divisions, the extremely unequal distribution of power and resources between the rich and poor, men and women and excluded groups, and the political economy are critical determinants of the failure to achieve an inclusive rural transformation. Weak institutions and governance frameworks render it very difficult to support inclusive rural transformation through classic rural development project and programme mechanisms where resources are channelled through existing mechanisms – innovative ways of supporting rural transformation are needed.

Private-sector service providers (international and domestic) are often contracted to implement investment activities and, in some instances, to manage development project accounts, especially with regard to bilaterally financed development investments, due to weak public institutional capacity. This raises administrative costs significantly, and diverts resources away from development programmes and their intended beneficiaries.

The significant control and influence that those who benefit from the existing policy environment continue to wield is a key obstacle to an inclusive rural transformation process that ensures economic, social and civic inclusion for rural people, specifically social groups that tend to be excluded or marginalized by broader structural socio-economic change.

Case study: Sudan¹⁷

(i) Development context

Following the independence of the Republic of South Sudan in 2011, Sudan is emerging from violent conflict. However, the country continues to face significant challenges that relate to different dimensions of fragility and subnational conflicts.

Sudan has made significant progress in reducing the proportion of the population living under the international poverty line and in reducing the prevalence of underweight children under five years of age – two of the targets for the MDG goal to halve human poverty. It was expected to meet the MDG targets on or before 2015 (UNDP, 2012).

By contrast, slow progress is being made on the under-five mortality and infant mortality feature. This underscores the deeply entrenched nature of poverty: from a total population

17. This section draws on consultations with Hani Abdelkader Elsadani, IFAD Country Programme Manager for Sudan.

of approximately 35 million (of which 67 per cent is rural).¹⁸ Poverty is largely rural and particularly affects farmers who practise rainfed agriculture.

The country faces major economic challenges since the independence of South Sudan in 2011 and the loss of resource-rich areas. Institutional capacities also tend to be weak in rural areas, and the legitimacy of formal institutions contested by some actors. Some peripheral areas continue to experience local insecurity, natural disasters and political tensions, which interrupt development processes.

(ii) Nature of fragility

In January 2005, the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement ending the civil war between the northern-based government and the southern rebels. For example, in 2007, flooding in Sudan affected 14 out of 26 states and some 140,000 people, and in 2008 and 2009 there were serious escalations of violence in Darfur and Khartoum.

Key aspects of fragility faced by Sudan include: climate change and climate variability induce recurrent erratic weather conditions (drought spells, floods, etc.), competition between users of increasingly scarce natural resources (particularly between nomadic and semi-nomadic herders and crop producers) and environmental degradation; fragile process of emergence from violent conflict in certain areas; continuing crises in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile States and associated disruption of basic services; social, economic and political disruption due to tribal conflicts; significant numbers of displaced people, including those coming to Sudan from South Sudan because of violent conflicts in South Sudan; and high levels of poverty and vulnerability.

A number of subnational conflict and humanitarian crises continue in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile States and along the borders with South Sudan – often related to conflicts with and between different tribal groups. The country regularly experiences weather shocks (e.g. variable rainfall, droughts, temperature anomalies and extreme temperature shocks) (Calderone, Maystadt and You, 2013; IFPRI, 2006), rendering smallholder farmers and rural people depending on agriculture vulnerable and contributing to conflicts over natural resources.

(iii) What types of structural and rural transformation have occurred and what attempts have been made to make these processes inclusive?

Sudan, despite being a country emerging from conflict where parts of the country are suffering from variable rainfall or drought and natural resource competition, has experienced economic growth, and registered a higher performance for labour productivity than the average for the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. This is closely linked with the oil production and income boom. On the other hand, as shown by the figures in section 3, land productivity and total factor productivity show disappointing trends in relation to the rest of sub-Saharan Africa.

The rapid urbanization process has been accompanied by a marked trend of outmigration from rural areas to provincial towns affecting agricultural productivity and rural transformation. Also, the emergence of artisanal gold-mining activities, often unregulated, attracts many young rural people, especially young men, which apart from health and other risks, reduces labour available to rural households and thus affecting their productivity.

18. Sudan's Central Bureau of Statistics, cited in IFAD (2013), Country Strategic Opportunities Programme.

Furthermore, smallholders and rural households rely heavily on remittances and periodic support from family members.

In Kordofan, IFAD has sought to bolster social cohesion, empower women, and build local capacities. It has supported local communities and their leaders to establish and manage local conflict resolution centres to manage conflicts over land and natural resources in a context of environmental degradation and intra-household issues. Nomadic and semi-nomadic herders have access to mobile teams of agricultural service providers, and project resources are available to mobile and settled communities. A reduction in conflicts between settled farmers and herders has been observed in this area and fewer cases of conflict are being reported to the conflict resolution centres. In Butana, it has also supported projects to enable rural women to increase their economic status through off-farm enterprises, such as dairy processing and small livestock production (IFAD, 2014). Flexibility in the management and implementation of programme subcomponents has proven important in this context.

The Gash Sustainable Livelihoods Regeneration Project in the Gash River area of Sudan, implemented between 2004 and 2012, aimed to regenerate the livelihoods of rural poor people in Eastern Sudan following the 2006 Peace Agreement based on equitable, secure and transparent access to land and water (IFAD IOE, 2014). Given this, the rehabilitation of the Gash Spate Irrigation Scheme was accompanied by land tenancy reform and institution-building – through which irrigation management was successfully transferred to water users' associations. This contributed to helping to improve access to safe water for some 20,000 rural households and to empower women in a highly conservative society through women's savings and credit groups and skills training. Land tenancy reform did not manage to achieve its declared objectives.

(iv) How inclusive has the transformation process been?

In Sudan, major challenges to inclusive rural transformation remain: (i) the need to mainstream gender and strengthen women's voice and empowerment; (ii) the need to build resilience to various climate-related and weather shocks; (iii) competition and related conflict over land, and the need to strengthen land tenure systems, especially where the interests of pastoralists, agropastoralists, settled farmers and large-scale mechanized farms are opposed; and (iv) the need to build the capacities of public institutions and strengthen the rule of law.

An empirical study by Calderone, Maystadt and You (2013: 17) concludes that coping strategies traditionally adopted in arid and semi-arid areas of the Horn of Africa are progressively breaking down. This is due to mutually reinforcing factors, such as population growth, limited mobility, spread of pests, and the fragmentation of grazing land. To improve the resilience of herders, a variety of measures are needed, including better access to natural resources, credit and agricultural services, but also efforts to support income diversification. Nevertheless, to foster an inclusive rural transformation process, such actions to support rural livelihoods need to be complemented by efforts to strengthen policies.

A number of development interventions have successfully supported marginalized tribal groups and migrants and also encouraged the financial inclusion of women (e.g. through access to group credit). Efforts that address power relations and political economy issues, such as land tenure reform, have often been unsuccessful given the strength of vested interests.

As in other parts of semi-arid Africa (see e.g. Hussein, 1998), competition between users over access to land, rangelands, water and other natural resources has led to local and regional conflicts. This competition over natural resources has been aggravated by the increasing settlement of farmers on stock routes historically used for seasonal migration of livestock for grazing and water from north to south, as most fertile grazing lands are in southern Sudan and in South Sudan. For herders, the situation was made more precarious following the secession of South Sudan, as use of historic transhumance routes became uncertain with increased tensions between populations on both sides of the border and areas planted with land mines. Within Sudan, large areas of land have been allocated to investors who have established very large mechanized farms (covering thousands of hectares) as part of a push by the authorities to modernize agriculture, sometimes making lands that had historically been seasonal grazing lands for transhumant herders inaccessible or cutting off stock routes. Together, these contribute to competition over natural resources and increased vulnerability of herders.

(v) How has fragility affected the process of rural transformation and the degree of inclusivity?

Competition between different natural resource users, particularly between nomadic herders and sedentary farmers, has increased as sedentary farming has expanded everywhere, absorbing traditional grazing lands. This has been compounded by the difficulties for herders to continue using traditional livestock transhumance routes crossing the border into South Sudan for grazing and water, and the emergence of very large mechanized farms over the past 30 years that often use converted rangelands.

The complex interaction between instability, sporadic violence and tribal issues in certain areas of the country undermines development programming that aims to address exclusion. As a consequence, the livelihood strategies pursued by the rural poor, and investments to support them, have been less effective.

Fragility and inclusive rural transformation: observations from the case studies

Overview

Drawing on the review of the three country case studies (DRC, Haiti and Sudan), this review has identified key characteristics of these fragile situations and ways in which fragility relates to the structural and rural transformation, and the degree to which these processes are inclusive. In fragile situations, this task is made more complicated as we can only truly speak of transformation processes, if and when transformation occurs. For Haiti, as we have seen, fragility relates to the absence of significant structural and rural transformation, and certainly an absence of inclusive rural transformation.

Nonetheless, this review has identified numerous issues that need to be considered in fostering inclusive rural transformation in these contexts; for example, political economy issues, equality, governance and institutions, social competition and conflict over natural resources, deepening inequalities and exclusion, particularly with regard to women, youth, migrants, landless and other excluded groups.

Clearly, structural and rural transformations are observed in fragile situations, but these transformations are more often neither inclusive nor do they contribute to a positive dynamic of structural transformation and rural transformation processes. Rather, the livelihoods of poor rural people are often disrupted, contributing to increased rural-urban migration, spurred by the need for security, employment opportunities and access to basic services.

Emerging issues

The issues that emerge from the three case studies and the analysis in this paper pertaining to inclusive rural transformation in fragile situations are organized below according to four headings: (a) situations emerging from conflict and violence; (b) economic inclusion; (c) capacities of institutions and organizations; and (d) capacity to prevent and adapt to shocks and disasters.

Situations emerging from conflict and violence

The three case studies illustrate the fact that fragile situations, although they may have some common factors of fragility (see Annex 1), are not homogenous and change over time. This implies a need to unpack this diversity of fragile situations in order to establish the most appropriate approaches that have proven to be more successful within a specific context.¹⁹ Nonetheless, the cases of Ethiopia, Uganda and Rwanda in the late 1990s and early 2000s suggest that post-conflict fragile contexts can offer unique opportunities for transformation where conflict has erased vested interests and political and institutional impediments to change.

19. This need to establish the diversity of situations that are considered fragile and to establish different types of fragility to inform action has been increasingly acknowledged. See, for example, CICID, 2007; Chandu, 2011; Grävingsholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum, 2012; OECD, 2015.

Development programmes to support inclusive rural transformation in countries such as Sudan and DRC can seek to build on such opportunities where they arise.

In countries emerging from conflict, such as DRC and Sudan, conflict-sensitive programming based on a more comprehensive understanding of the nature of the fragile situation and drivers of fragility (see IFAD IOE, 2015a) is of critical importance in efforts to contribute to inclusive rural transformation. This is because such situations are particularly vulnerable to a recurrence of violence that is likely to undermine any gains from efforts to support inclusive rural transformation, given that nearly a quarter of all comprehensive peace agreements fail in the face of a relapse of conflict, and even a higher proportion experience debilitating crises of governance and high levels of violence (especially against women) (UNDP, 2010: 4).

Conflict sensitivity in fragile situations should be in line with humanitarian law and requires paying special attention to addressing the impacts of conflict and violence on women and girls, such as the degree to which they are exposed to physical, sexual and domestic violence (see CFS, 2015). As shown in the case of DRC, gender inequalities at the national, local and organizational levels and specific challenges related to violence, exploitation and discrimination faced by women and girls in fragile situations need to be addressed to contribute to building social cohesion. Conflict resolution centres, which have been developed in Sudan, can be an effective tool to mitigate risks of competition and conflict between natural resource users. The degree to which the fragile situations described in this paragraph are linked to the furthering of structural transformation would be worthy of further exploration.

Insecurity, elite capture and weak institutions are severe impediments to the success of development programmes and their ability to foster inclusive rural transformation, particularly in countries emerging from long periods of violent conflict such as DRC and Sudan. The transformation of governance, with the objective of enabling more resilient, more responsive and more legitimate states, is critical for economic recovery and development (UNDP, 2010). More efficient central government and public financial management can free up resources to support the strengthening of decentralized authorities and ensure that public and private resources can be mobilized for rural development.

Areas that have lost agricultural potential owing to conflict need additional rural investments to support the recovery of household agricultural activities and provide livelihood opportunities to women, young people, displaced people and ex-combatants.

If structural transformations are inclusive and accompanied by inclusive governance and institutions, they are perhaps less likely to be undermined by conflict and fragility. Fragile situations are also more vulnerable to internal and external shocks (economic crises, climate-related shocks and natural disasters).

Economic inclusion

Fragility and instability can only be addressed with the integration of rural people and regions into the overall economy, and their inclusion in the benefits of wider national economic and social development. This requires the state to deliver core services, such as public safety, basic services, health and education to rural areas, and predictable, equitable access to vital resources such as land, water and other natural resources (see, for example, Nolting and Poeschke, 2006).

Fragility may impede the efficient flow of resources to industrial and urban-based economic activities: human capital (education, skills and labour); financial capital; and natural capital. This may prevent the achievement of the higher degrees of productivity and incomes hoped for in the process of development. This may also exacerbate rent-seeking behaviours that work against equitable and inclusive development processes.

Fragility is often a factor that raises households' vulnerability to poverty, natural hazards and economic shocks, as illustrated by Haiti after the 2010 earthquake (see Naudé and McGillivray, 2011).

Investments required to make a difference in FS, such as the cost of a project by a beneficiary, are usually higher in FS than in situations that are not fragile. At the same time, needs are often higher than the investment levels possible by country's themselves and resources available to development partners for investment in these countries.

Corrupt practices in public administration and business, often more prevalent in fragile situations, drain resources and inhibit inclusive rural transformation.

Special attention is needed to address gender inequalities at the national, local and organizational levels and to violence, exploitation and discrimination faced by women. The roles of rural women in agricultural value chains need to be acknowledged and strengthened in FS, given the compelling evidence on the significant contribution women make to rural development and transformation.

Furthermore, where there are a range of different ethnic, tribal and indigenous peoples (as is the case in DRC and Sudan), special efforts are required to ensure their economic, as well as social, inclusion in structural and rural transformation. Most development programmes and development partners do not make concerted and targeted efforts to reach indigenous peoples with basic services and programmes. Hence, tailor-made tools and approaches are needed to effectively address constraints to rural transformation, such as the eradication of discrimination, securing land tenure security and equal rights to access forest and other natural resources, and including them in consultative and participatory decision-making processes (see, for example, IFAD and IWGIA, 2012).

Capacities of local institutions and organizations

The World Bank's *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development* (World Bank, 2011b) underlined the importance for international development assistance to strengthen national institutions and governance which provide citizens with security, justice and jobs, and to alleviate the factors that undermine them in order to break repeated cycles of violent conflict and instability.

An appropriate government policy framework that supports poverty reduction and inclusive rural transformation is needed, but is not sufficient. Consequently, strengthening state institutions for rural transformation needs to be coupled with increased attention to addressing *drivers* of fragility such as vulnerability, weak local institutions or farmers' organizations, gender inequality and disempowerment of vulnerable groups – as has been observed in the PRAPE and PRAPO programmes in DRC.

Efforts to strengthen the capacities of NGOs are also critical to improve social cohesion. Private sector, farmers' organizations and civil society actors that are equitable, neutral, acceptable to

local populations and work more effectively than others in rural areas in FS need to be identified as partners and then supported to build their capacity and outreach.

The effects of fragility on social capital, including the ways it undermines the effective functioning of rural institutions and organizations, may well be a key determinant of the failure of inclusive transformation in fragile situations. The effects of state fragility may spill over borders, taking on regional or global dimensions, as can be seen in the Sahel and the Middle East. International support is often required to meet people's basic needs, including security, and to ensure access to basic services in these contexts.

Inclusive governance,²⁰ participation, gender equality, decentralization, transparency and accountability are essential to mitigate risks of conflict and build the capacities of rural organizations, to improve rangeland management and address land tenure. The participation of rural people and their organizations in decision-making and resource management is as important in fragile situations as it is in other stable settings, both to promote social cohesion and to strengthen institutions, and also to enhance the effectiveness of development processes. However, this must be accompanied by the institutional development of government administration at national and local levels. Local institutions for natural resource management need to be strengthened and local people represented in decision-making processes from the local through to regional and national levels. Capacity-building for national and local institutions (particularly farmers' organizations and women's organizations) is critical in such fragile contexts, but remains challenging with slow progress by farmers' organizations and insufficient capacity of state institutions at the local level.

Capacity to prevent and adapt to shocks and disasters

Natural disasters and threats related to climate change and climate events exist in all the fragile situations examined as case studies in this paper. Such threats can be addressed by: (i) raising awareness of issues related to climate change and its effects among all stakeholders; (ii) providing support for research, development of policy and local knowledge; (iii) mobilizing investments in adaptation to climate change and increasing resilience of vulnerable rural people to shocks; and (iv) building disaster preparedness and response into programmes, such as scaling down or relocating activities, or using alternative service providers to deliver services should conflicts or disasters occur.

Policy support and coordination among all development stakeholders, including ministries and local authorities, is needed to provide equitable access to vital natural resources.

Finally, synergies between relief, rehabilitation and development interventions, and effective sequencing among them, are needed from the outset to support the resilience of rural people and a more inclusive rural development process. For example, relief and development assistance remains fragmented in DRC, limiting opportunities for synergies and coordination among development actors. Development and relief actors need to operate in closer partnership to address this challenge.

20. UNDP definition of inclusive governance: "To be inclusive is a core value of democratic governance, in terms of equal participation, equal treatment and equal rights before the law. This implies that all people – including the poor, women, ethnic and religious minorities, indigenous peoples and other disadvantaged groups – have the right to participate meaningfully in governance processes and influence decisions that affect them. It also means that governance institutions and policies are accessible, accountable and responsive to disadvantaged groups, protecting their interests and providing diverse populations with equal opportunities for public services such as justice, health and education." (See: *Towards Inclusive Governance: Promoting the Participation of Disadvantaged Groups in Asia-Pacific*, UNDP Regional Centre in Bangkok, 2007: 1) (Available at http://hrbaportal.org/wp-content/files/Towards_inclusivegovernance_Asiapacific6.pdf)

Key messages on inclusive rural transformation and fragile situations

To conclude, this review highlights eight key messages on fostering inclusive rural transformation and fragile situations.

- (i) *Special attention is needed in policies and programmes to address gender inequalities at the national, local and organizational levels and to ensure the inclusion of the often excluded groups, such as rural youth, migrants, tribal and indigenous peoples, and landless people.* It is particularly important to address the vulnerabilities faced by rural women in fragile situations and to ensure their economic, as well as social, inclusion in structural and rural transformation.
- (ii) *The critical factors that characterize fragility identified in the three country case studies undermine the drivers of inclusive structural and rural transformation, yet fostering inclusive transformation can contribute to reducing the risk of countries and regions becoming fragile.* Rural transformations are observed in fragile situations, but these transformations are often not inclusive nor do they contribute to a positive and sustainable structural transformation. Inclusive structural and rural transformation addresses key drivers of fragility – such as poverty, inequalities, weak capacities in government and civil society. Fostering inclusive rural transformations and improving such conditions can therefore help strengthen states or prevent fragile situations from developing. This should include, for example, improving access to decent employment, increasing security of land tenure, building and strengthening inclusive rural organizations and representative local governance structures, ensuring equal access to basic services, including health and education, and access to agricultural and financial services.
- (iii) *Governance challenges and participation need to be addressed to foster inclusive rural transformation.* Where there are governance issues, weak institutions and civil societies, and questions about the legitimacy of government bodies, it is a challenge to ensure effective country ownership, which is also vital to achieving inclusive rural transformation.
- (iv) *Informed programming.* Rural development policies and programmes need to be tailored to the specific nature of the fragile situation based on adequate, and regularly updated, analysis of the nature, evolution and actors in the fragile context. Deepening situational analysis (including deepening the understanding of the implications of the political economy) in the design, implementation and review of interventions to support rural livelihoods is vital in fragile contexts (Seddon and Hussein, 2002; CFS, 2015). This is needed to better take into account the underlying factors of fragility, poverty and exclusions and to identify key risks.

- (v) *Natural resource competition and conflict. Where competition and conflict over access to, and the use of, vital natural resources exist between resource users, particular attention is needed to establish forums and/or strengthen customary institutions for equitable natural resource management and conflict resolution.* This is particularly important with regard to competition over resources between sedentary farmers and herders in semi-arid regions, and externally financed large mechanized farms and smallholders (see Hussein, 1998; Hussein, Sumberg and Seddon, 1999). Competition and conflict over natural resources have been key factors of fragility in many contexts.
- (vi) *Cross-border issues. There is a need to take cross-border and regional dimensions of fragile situations into account in policies, strategies and programmes to support inclusive rural transformation.* Regional dynamics have been shown to be critical in FS, for example, in the Middle East, Sudan, the Sahel and West Africa (see e.g. Hussein and Gnisci, 2004). Border areas are often the most socially and economically dynamic areas. However, in FS cross-border dynamics do not tend to foster an inclusive transformation process and can increase the vulnerability of rural people, particularly marginalized groups (see Grimm, Lemay-Hébert and Nay, 2015).
- (vii) *Government policies and programmes to promote rural development supported by governments and other stakeholders need to be informed by international best practice principles for engaging in fragile situations and protracted crises, and tailored to the characteristics of each fragile situation and the specificities of rural contexts to effectively support inclusive rural transformation, based on adequate and regularly updated, analysis of the nature, evolution and actors in the fragile context.* These include, for example, the policy advice from the Committee on World Food Security's *Framework for Action for Food Security and Nutrition in Protracted Crises* (CFS, 2015), and the OECD's *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations* (OECD, 2007). Flexibility in programming is needed to enhance the capacity to adapt programming tools, activities, outputs and planned outcomes, to adjust financing modalities, and to re-allocate project funds to foster inclusive rural transformation in rapidly evolving fragile situations.
- (viii) *Role of NGOs (including local organizations) as partners in development assistance to support inclusive rural transformation.* NGOs can be critical actors at the local level in providing support for inclusive rural transformation in fragile situations, particularly in remote areas or situations where state institutions are weak or unable to perform certain development functions (e.g. DRC, Yemen). Participatory and community-driven development approaches have proven effective in many fragile contexts, empowering communities so that they own development initiatives supported by international development partners.

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Annex 1:

Critical factors of fragility in case study countries

Country	Emerging from conflict?	Factors of fragility	Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index ranking*
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Yes	Insecurity, organized armed conflict, and military interventions in certain regions (e.g. north-eastern DRC), particularly border areas; widespread poverty and inequality; vulnerability to natural disasters; political disruption; weak government and civil society institutions and major governance challenges at national and local levels; widespread corruption and clientelism; fragile process of emergence from violent conflict and war; localized and regional conflict; people's heightened vulnerability to personal violence and crime, particularly affecting women and girls; high numbers of displaced people; natural resource competition and conflicts between different ethnic groups, indigenous peoples and other actors over access to resources; incapacity of government to deliver basic functions and services to the majority of the people living within state borders; weak public financial management.	154 th out of 175 countries
Haiti	No	High vulnerability to climate-related shocks and natural disasters (hurricanes, earthquakes, storms), exacerbated by environmental degradation; high levels of poverty and vulnerability; social discord and violence; weak social, civil society and governmental institutions; political instability; major governance challenges at national and local levels; widespread corruption; incapacity of government to deliver basic functions and services to the majority of the people living within state borders; high number of displaced people in camps since the 2010 earthquake.	161 st out of 175 countries

* Transparency International, 2014, *Corruption Perceptions Index*. Available at www.transparency.org/cpi2014/infographic/global (accessed 20 August 2015).

Country	Emerging from conflict?	Factors of fragility	Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index ranking*
Sudan	Yes	Competition between users of natural resources and environmental degradation; fragile process of emergence from violent conflict and the independence of South Sudan; continuing crises in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile States; social, economic and political disruption and contested governance; conflicts between different ethnic groups, indigenous peoples and other actors over access to resources; the disputed land allocation process; contested governance and weak civil society institutions; corruption; very high numbers of displaced people (over 2 million); high levels of poverty and vulnerability; drought and climate change risks; and disrupted provision of basic services. Affected by violent conflict in certain regions and border areas (e.g. Darfur; border with South Sudan).	173 rd out of 175 countries

* Transparency International, 2014, *Corruption Perceptions Index*. Available at www.transparency.org/cpi2014/infographic/global (accessed 20 August 2015).

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