Approach Paper

Evaluation Synthesis on IFAD’s Country-Level Policy Dialogue
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Abbreviations and acronyms

ARRI  Annual Report on Results and Impact of IFAD Operations
AUSAID  Australian Aid
COSOP  Country Strategic Opportunity Programme
CLE  Corporate-level Evaluation
CLPD  Country Level Policy Dialogue

CPE  Country Programme Evaluation
CPM  Country Programme Manager
ECU  Evaluation Communication Unit of IOE, IFAD
ESPOD  Evaluation Synthesis of Policy Dialogue
GIZ  Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
IEG  Independent Evaluation Group, World Bank
IOE  Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD
NGO  Non-Governmental Organization
ODI  Overseas Development Institute
PD  Policy Dialogue
RIDE  Report on IFAD Development Effectiveness
PPA/PPE  Project Performance Assessment/Evaluation
PMD  Programme Management Department of IFAD
PRM  Office of Partnership and Resource Mobilization of IFAD
PTA  Policy and Technical Advisory Division of IFAD
SKD  Strategy and Knowledge Department of IFAD
UNEG  United Nations Evaluation Group
Evaluation Synthesis on IFAD’s country-level policy dialogue- Approach paper

I. Introduction

1. Evaluation Syntheses were introduced by the Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD (IOE) after the 2010 Peer Review of IFAD’s Office of Evaluation and Evaluation Function. The Peer review had recommended this new product as a way to further strengthen the use of evaluation findings, learning and feedback loop. Evaluation Syntheses are now considered in the Evaluation Policy (2011)\(^1\) and Evaluation Manual of IFAD (2015, second edition)\(^2\).

2. Evaluation syntheses are different from other IOE products, as they are prepared to primarily promote learning, collective reflection and improve IFAD’s development effectiveness. Taking stock of findings from previous independent IOE evaluations, they aim to bring together lessons from IFAD evaluations while also capturing evaluation-based lessons from other organizations. It is important to note that evaluation syntheses are synthesis of evaluations rather than evaluations.

3. **Rationale for conducting this Evaluation Synthesis.** This Evaluation Synthesis was approved by the Executive Board of IFAD in its 116th session of December 2015, jointly with three other synthesis, to address “systemic issues and knowledge gaps in IFAD”.\(^3\) In choosing this theme, IOE applied its selectivity framework considering the following factors: (i) availability of adequate evaluative evidence; (ii) contribution to filling a critical knowledge gap; (iii) strategic priority for IFAD; (iv) timeliness with respect to corporate processes; and (v) serving as a building block for other IOE evaluations. It is worthwhile to note that in a 2015 survey conducted by PTA amongst CPMs, when asked what would be most helpful to improve policy engagement and its effectiveness, the top highest ranked answer was “relevant examples of policy engagement from IFAD and non IFAD projects”, which would be one of the outputs of this Evaluation Synthesis (the critical knowledge gap is also discussed below, in para. 22).

4. This approach paper presents the objective, scope, key questions, methodology, the outline of the process, and the timeline, team composition and dissemination for this evaluation synthesis.

5. **Definition.** The latest definition of what **country level policy dialogue** means for IFAD is the one provided by the information paper *A Plan for Country-level Policy Dialogue*, endorsed by the EMC at its 137\(^{th}\) meeting and presented during the 108\(^{th}\) Session of the Executive Board (March 2013):\(^4\) “For IFAD, country-level policy dialogue can be considered as a process to engage, directly and indirectly, with its partner governments and other country level stakeholders, to influence policy priorities or the design, implementation and assessment of formal institutions (e.g., laws, administrative rules), policies and programmes that shape the economic opportunities for large numbers of rural people to move out of poverty”.

6. As indicated below in para. 13, currently at IFAD use is made of the broader concept of country-level policy engagement, which adds to the original definition of policy dialogue presented at the EB in 2013 the notion of collaboration and the

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\(^1\) According to the 2011 Evaluation Policy of IFAD, “evaluation syntheses […] will identify and capture evaluative knowledge and lessons learned on a certain topic from a variety of evaluations produced by IFAD and the evaluation units of other organizations. These syntheses will be supplemented by lessons from academic literature and targeted interviews to promote learning and the use of evaluation findings”:\http://www.ifad.org/evaluation/policy/new_policy.html

\(^2\) See the second edition of the IFAD Evaluation Manual:


acknowledgement of the range of approaches that IFAD adopts to engage in the policy process.\(^5\)

7. The evolution of thinking on country-level policy dialogue at IFAD is presented in Table 1. Although the notion of policy dialogue has always been present in different corporate documents,\(^6\) a fully-fledged definition of policy dialogue have been formulated only in recent years. This might have been related to the fact that the Fund was established primarily as an institution to provide financing for projects designed by other institutions. Indeed, the Agreement Establishing IFAD, as well as the Lending Policies and Criteria, did not allow the Fund to undertake direct supervision, nor to have country presence and, consequently, did not consider any involvement of IFAD in policy dialogue.\(^7\) The increasing interest towards policy dialogue may be associated to IFAD's fundamental shift in its operating model, which in recent years established the Fund as a full-fledged development agency that finances investments projects and programmes, conducts its own supervision\(^8\), is involved in policy processes\(^9\), and has presence in numerous Member States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key corporate documents</th>
<th>Key messages</th>
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| 2002-2006 Strategic Framework                          | "The Fund is well placed to facilitate policy dialogue between grassroots organizations and national-level decision-makers".
| 2003 Field Presence Pilot Programme 2004-2007 – Initiative briefs | "A more permanent field presence would allow IFAD to increase the effectiveness of existing measures and leverage them more successfully in favour of the rural poor". |
| 2006 Supervision and implementation support policy     | "Supervision and implementation support [...] facilitate evidence-based policy dialogue". |
| 2007 Strategic Framework 2007-2010                      | "IFAD has a comparative advantage in. Capturing the lessons of experience from the projects it finances and using the knowledge as a basis for engagement in dialogue with its member governments" |
| 2009 Results Measurement Framework for the Eighth Replenishment period 2010-2012 | Despite its increasing importance, "policy dialogue continues to remain relatively under-resourced". |
| 2010 ARRI 2010                                         | "Policy dialogue is still limited to the project context and in most countries IFAD still do not manage to engage..." |

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\(^5\) As clarified in the 2016 PMD-wide review "Country-level policy engagement: a review of experience", the term policy dialogue "has frequently been used to describe IFAD's role in country-level policy processes. However, the term dialogue suggests a particular approach: one based on a bilateral relationship between IFAD and the national government, focused on discussing policies and approaches. While such an approach is not excluded, the range of policy-related activities that IFAD either conducts or facilitates is far broader than policy dialogue alone. The term "country-level policy engagement" is thus used to describe the range of approaches that IFAD adopts to collaborate, directly and indirectly, with partner governments and other stakeholders in order to influence the priorities, design, implementation and assessment of national policies that shape the opportunities for large numbers of rural people to move out of poverty" (p. 3).

\(^6\) As an example, the Annual report 1999 besides recognizing that other international agencies were better positioned to influence macroeconomic policy and national poverty-alleviation strategies, it also acknowledged IFAD's increasing participation in policy dialogue to influence policy in the interests of small-scale producers and the rural poor. (p. 14)

\(^7\) Since IFAD's basic documents did not provide for a permanent field presence through country offices or representations, during its early years, the Fund fulfilled its mandate working solely from its Headquarters (HQ) through cooperating institutions (CIs), and through staff and consultant missions to borrowing Member States.

\(^8\) An amendment to article 7, section 2(g) of the Agreement Establishing IFAD was adopted by the Governing Council at its twenty-ninth session in 2006 to allow IFAD to appoint national, regional or other institutions or entities to undertake supervision, in addition to international cooperating institutions. The Governing Council in the same resolution also amended paragraph 43 of the Lending Policies and Criteria to allow IFAD to, with the authorization of the Executive Board, occasionally supervise project implementation directly.

\(^9\) "As IFAD shifts its focus from exclusively project-specific goals to making a broader contribution to rural poverty reduction, engaging in country-level policy processes is becoming an increasingly important activity within country programmes, supported by dedicated services and products, and an important mechanism through which to scale up proven approaches and lessons learned at the project level." PMD-wide review "Country-level policy engagement: a review of experience". Introduction, page 2.
### 2011-15 Strategic Framework
Explicitly linked effective policy dialogue to IFAD’s core objective of scaling up.

### 2012 Report of the Consultation on the Ninth Replenishment of IFAD’s resources
"More rigorous policy analysis and active engagement in national policy dialogue on agriculture and rural development".

### 2012 ARRI 2012
"With an average rating of 3.6, policy dialogue is the lowest-rated aspect of the country programmes".

### 2013 The Brookings Institution’s Institutional review of IFAD’s Scaling up programs for the rural poor
Pointed out the over-ambitious policy agendas defined in the COSOPs.

### 2013 A plan for country-level policy dialogue
For the first time, it provides an institutional definition of what policy dialogue means for IFAD.

### 2015 Report of the Consultation on the Tenth Replenishment of IFAD’s Resources
"100 per cent of COSOPs define a specific approach for country-level policy engagement appropriate to IFAD’s programme in each country".

### 2016 Country-level policy engagement in IFAD, a review of experience
"In the absence of systematic documentation of these experiences, there has been a gap in knowledge about the scope, successes and limitations of IFAD’s country-level policy engagement".

### 2016-2025 Strategic Framework
Policy dialogue is one of the four pillars of IFAD’s results delivery.

**Source:** Compiled by IOE

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8. At the beginning of the past decade, the attention was on IFAD’s catalytic role and comparative advantage. IFAD’s Rural Finance Policy recognized that “as an advocate of the poor, IFAD will participate in policy dialogues aimed at promoting a conducive environment”. As well, the Consultation of the 24th Session of the Governing Council urged IFAD "to build on the Fund’s comparative advantage by enhancing its policy dialogue and analysis in relevant areas and by sharpening its focus on areas that can act as a catalyst for wider application". Also, the **2002-2006 Strategic Framework**, besides recognizing policy dialogue as an important part of the Organization’s work, insisted on IFAD’s catalytic role as the Fund “is well placed to facilitate policy dialogue between grass-roots organizations and national-level decision-makers”.

9. The year 2003 represented a turning point in the evolution of thinking on policy dialogue. Over the years, donors’ increasing interest in national policy dialogue and partnership activities had led to a gradual shift in the focus of IFAD’s involvement in policy dialogue: from a *project-based context* (with a focus on project design instead of supervision and implementation due to the constraints derived from the Agreement Establishing IFAD), to a more active engagement *outside* the project context, in order to bring the necessary policy changes and to create a conducive environment to rural poverty reduction and rural development. But how to enhance IFAD’s engagement in policy dialogue considering the lack of institutional presence in borrowing countries? Discussions on this issue, started during the consultation on the Fifth Replenishment and continued during the Consultation on the Sixth Replenishment, brought to the approval of the **Field presence pilot programme 2004-2007** in the belief that "a more permanent field presence..."
would allow IFAD to increase the effectiveness of existing measures and leverage them more successfully in favour of the rural poor."  

10. In December 2006 the adoption of the corporate policy on Supervision and Implementation Support\textsuperscript{17}, intertwined with the nearly simultaneous decision to establish an IFAD country presence, represented the most far-reaching change to IFAD’s operating model and its history. Additionally, the IOE corporate-level evaluation on IFAD’s field presence pilot programme stated that policy dialogue was considered "one of the areas in which the Field Presence Pilot Initiatives have a significant role in helping IFAD influence policies in favour of the rural poor".\textsuperscript{18} In this way, both documents strongly linked the ability of the Fund to effectively engage in policy dialogue with in-country stakeholders to the issue of its presence on the field and direct supervision and implementation.  

11. In 2009 the Results Measurement Framework related to the Eighth Replenishment period (2010-2012), besides acknowledging that the impact of IFAD’s non-lending instruments such as policy dialogue and knowledge-sharing was increasing, "they continue to remain relatively under-resourced".\textsuperscript{19} It also pointed out the difficulties that IFAD was facing in measuring outputs in policy dialogue and in establishing the linkages among diverse levels of results. Similarly, the ARRI 2010, along with recognizing non-lending activities as integral components of country programmes supported by IFAD, noted that policy dialogue was still limited to the project context and in most countries IFAD still did not manage to engage systematically and successfully at the national policy level.\textsuperscript{20} In consideration of these weaknesses, the Fund started working with other IFIs to share experiences and strengthen collaboration and mutual learning throughout the Eighth Replenishment period.  

12. From that moment onwards, the relevance of policy dialogue has echoed also at corporate level: the Strategic Framework 2011-2015 recognized policy dialogue as "part of IFAD's core business"\textsuperscript{21}, and an enabling institutional and policy environment for poor rural people as "one of IFAD’s five strategic objectives".\textsuperscript{22} It also stated that improved policy and regulatory frameworks at the local, national and international levels and strengthened in-country institutional capacities for pro-poor agricultural and rural development were among the key outcomes IFAD’s expected to achieve through policy dialogue and advocacy initiatives. At the same time, the Report of the Consultation for IFAD9, IFAD committed to "more rigorous policy analysis, and active engagement in national policy dialogue on agriculture and rural development".\textsuperscript{23} Supporting policy dialogue was also the learning theme covered in the ARRI 2012.\textsuperscript{24}  

13. The year 2013 represented another turning point in the evolution of thinking on policy dialogue. The critiques raised by the ARRI 2012 and by the Brookings Institute Institutional Review of IFAD,\textsuperscript{25} (both pointing out the over-ambitious policy agendas defined in the COSOPs due to the narrow focus on project results and to the lack of staff capacity and budget resources in IFAD’s operational divisions), and the suggestions they made to enable the Fund to intensify its...
engagement in policy dialogue (which included: (a) the need for IFAD to build technical capacity in PTA to deploy in support of specific policy engagements in individual countries; (b) the need to partner more systematically with other donor agencies; (c) the introduction of policy notes\(^{26}\) as an analytical entry point to an engagement process), pushed the Fund to take a step forward in shaping its new approach towards policy dialogue. Thus, in late 2012, a position of policy advisor was created, and an **Action Plan for Strengthening and Mainstreaming IFAD’s Engagement in Country-level Policy Dialogue** was developed and approved by the EMC at the beginning of 2013. The Action Plan for country-level policy dialogue\(^{27}\) provided a framework for IFAD-wide involvement in policy dialogue and it represented a milestone for three main reasons: i) it provided an institutional definition of what policy dialogue means for IFAD; ii) it urged policy dialogue to be recognized as a distinct activity within the country programme and supported with a dedicated budget and delivery products; iii) it stated that policy engagement must be led by the CPMs, as they are in position to engage directly with governments on policy issues affecting poor rural people.

**The current Operational Framework**

14. After three years from its endorsement, the Action Plan for Country-level Policy Dialogue still represents the reference document for IFAD’s engagement in country-level policy dialogue and, along with additional provisions provided by the Report of the Consultation on the Tenth Replenishment of IFAD’s Resources, it shapes what can be considered as the current Operational Framework for IFAD’s engagement in country-level policy dialogue. It should be mentioned that the RSP process in the PBAS contributes to country-level policy dialogue, and this process is fundamental to the organization’s “current operational framework” for country level policy dialogue (as shown in the 2016 CLE on PBAS).

15. Before analyzing it more in depth, a preliminary clarification is necessary. The term **country-level policy dialogue** is giving way to a broader term, which is **country-level policy engagement**, which is possibly more appropriate to describe the more recent involvement of IFAD in country-level policy process. This shift can be explained as the effect of the combined action of new interests arising from an increasing number of IFAD’s Member States that are gaining the status of middle-income country (and, as they do so, their interest in what IFAD can offer them is changing),\(^{28}\) and new opportunities for IFAD to be more involved in country-level policy processes as never before associated to the growing number of IFAD country offices.\(^{29}\)

16. Thus, the range of policy-related activities that IFAD either conducts or facilitates, today is broader than the term policy dialogue alone (a term that suggests a particular approach based on a bilateral relationship between IFAD and the national government, focused on discussing policies and approaches\(^{30}\)); it also includes policy analysis, strengthening government capacity and operationalizing policy. This is why to describe IFAD’s role in country level policy processes the terminology “country-level policy engagement” is used, since it includes, but it is not limited to,

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\(^{26}\) The introduction of the policy notes were one of the key elements of the Action Plan. However, they are not systematically used as they are supported on a demand-driven basis, with CPMs apply for funding.

\(^{27}\) See EB 2013/108/INF.3

\(^{28}\) Indeed, governments are less interested in IFAD’s loans and more interested in drawing on IFAD’s experience and expertise in rural poverty reduction to develop new approaches that can be integrated into their national programmes: in this regard, support for policy processes is an important service that IFAD can offer them.

\(^{29}\) See GC38/L.4/Rev.1 IFAD10 committed IFAD to “Establish 10 new country offices to bring the total number to 50, and as required, strategically strengthen staffing, including out-posting of country programme managers, through a budget-neutral approach, in order to support better project design and implementation, policy engagement and impact” (p. 28).

\(^{30}\) 2015 PMD-wide review “Country-level policy engagement: a review of experience”,
policy dialogue activities. However, it is worthwhile to mention that in IFAD’s website “policy dialogue” features a prominent role under “who we are”.31

17. The Action Plan is based on five key features that serve to underpin IFAD’s approach towards country-level policy engagement.32 First, effective integration of country-level policy engagement in country programmes, from design to completion, as the project is not considered as an end in itself, but as a starting point for policy engagement and other scaling-up approaches. A strong input in this direction derives from IFAD10 that committed IFAD to ensure that 100 per cent of COSOPs define a specific approach for country-level policy engagement appropriate to IFAD’s programme in each country.33

18. Second, making resources available for new products, such as country and issue-specific policy analysis that may be useful at any stage of the country programme or project cycle to bring evidence to bear on a policy process. To this end, in 2013 and 2014 PTA was able to access the resources of the Innovation Mainstreaming Initiative (IMI) supported by the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) to carry out policy analysis needed to establish an evidence base for larger processes of policy dialogue, or to support national policy processes.34 In other cases, PTA conducted country level policy studies by using its regular budget.35

19. Third, monitoring and measuring results, since they are both essential for accountability and learning, as well as to understand IFAD’s contribution to overall development impact. In this regard, the Results Measurement Framework for IFAD10 includes engagement in national policy dialogue as one of the indicators to assess the operational effectiveness of IFAD-supported country programmes and projects. Client surveys remain the main source of information for assessing IFAD’s contribution to national policy dialogue and for its support to enable the participation of civil society in policy dialogue.

20. Fourth, developing partnerships for influence, analysis and learning. The importance of partnership-building is underlined by the 2016-2025 Strategic Framework that recognizes partnerships as “crucial for IFAD to promote synergies among its own and other sources of finance, knowledge and expertise and create more enabling environments for poor people in rural areas to build their pathways out of poverty”. Additionally, IFAD10 commits IFAD to strengthen its existing partnerships and expand private sector participation in the projects it supports through value chain financing and 4Ps mechanism (public-private-producer partnerships).36

21. Fifth, building in-house capacity through the organization of training, workshops and knowledge-sharing products. In this regard, since 2013 a number of workshops and learning events has been organized aimed at sharing concepts and exchanging experiences and lessons learnt.37

31 See https://www.ifad.org/what/policy_dialogue/overview.
32 See also Country-level policy engagement: opportunity and necessity, 2013 (p. 5).
33 See GC38/L.4/Rev.1 (p. 27).
34 During 2015, thanks to the resources made available by the IMI, PTA carried out six case studies on activities in the East African Community, Cote d’Ivoire, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Mexico and Tajikistan. They illustrate that by utilizing innovative mechanism for policy engagement, large impacts are achievable with few resources.
35 By using its regular budget, PTA also carried out two studies reviewing the policy framework for the dairy sector prior to design missions in Tanzania and Rwanda; it gave its support for a study on pricing policy for key food products in Ecuador and training for the Ecuadorian government on estimating the costs and benefits of pricing policies; it carried out a review highlighting ways to mainstream policy engagement into the Bangladesh country portfolio, and a review of the policy and regulatory framework for artisanal fisheries development in Mozambique.
36 The 2016-2025 Strategic Framework (p. 20).
37 An example was the workshop “Mainstreaming policy dialogue: from vision to action”, held in October 2013: it was the first event of its kind in IFAD and it was intended to make a substantive contribution to IFAD’s evolving agenda for
22. The table below summarizes the key features of the Action Plan:

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key features of the Action Plan for Country-level Policy Dialogue</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Effective integration of country-level policy engagement in COSOPs</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Making resources available for new products</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Monitoring and measuring results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Developing partnerships</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Building in-house capacity</td>
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Source: Compiled by IOE

23. In addition to the Action Plan, the Report of the Consultation on the Tenth Replenishment of IFAD’s Resources, under Section IV – Operational effectiveness and efficiency states that country-level policy engagement will focus on four broad objectives, which are: (a) creating an enabling policy environment for implementing IFAD-supported projects and achieving development impact; (b) drawing out lessons learned under projects and scaling up successes through integration into national policies, institutions and strategies, thus having an impact which goes far beyond what a single project can do; (c) strengthening and enhancing the pro-poor focus of public policies for rural development and their implementation, and the responsible institutions; and (d) strengthening the capacity of national stakeholders (in particular those who directly represent poor rural people) to participate effectively in policy processes and shape national policies. Under the same section, the report also mentions some specific activities that IFAD will undertake to strengthen its country-level policy engagement, such as policy analysis; supporting local institutions – both government and those of rural civil society; creating policy space and supporting policy processes; and promoting regional and South-South learning and exchange.

24. To fulfil the above mentioned objectives, the Action Plan identified three main instruments (or entry points) which are linked and overlapped: i) IFAD-financed investment projects; ii) country-level and regional-level grants programme; iii) analysis and related engagement provided by the CPMs and the CPOs in the country offices. Although most policy-related activities originate from, and are implemented within investment projects or grants programme, also CPMs and CPOs undertake activities related to policy engagement that may or may not be mentioned explicitly in COSOPs. In addition to these three main instruments, in response to government requests, IFAD can also conduct policy and analysis work itself, financed through administrative budget.

25. In 2013, a country-level policy desk was established within PTA. The desk supports CPMs and regional divisions to engage more effectively in in-country policy processes. The PTA policy desk elaborated a number of policy case studies and organized learning events, which complement other country-level knowledge management products. It also published in 2016 a review of IFAD experience in Policy Engagement; this review tried to fill a knowledge gap concerning the scope, successes and limitations of IFAD’s country-level policy engagement, but it

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country-level policy engagement. Another example was the learning event “Assessing the impact of policy engagement”, co-hosted by IFAD and RIMISP in June 2015. The event was designed to present IFAD's recent work on policy engagement and learn from partners how to best monitor and evaluate policy engagement.

38 See GC38/1.4/Rev.1, p. 12.

39 The activities that IFAD finances through its investment projects include: strengthening the capacity of government agencies to formulate, implement and lead national policies and programmes, as well as enhancing the capacity of Farmers’ Organizations (FOs) to participate effectively in them; creating and promoting policy dialogue between different national stakeholders, such as governments, FOs and private sector; supporting policy analysis as part of national-led policy process; operationalizing a national policy, strategy or programme at a local level.

40 Both regional and country-specific grants contain objectives related to policy engagement: most grants focused on policy are aimed at fostering dialogue, producing research/analysis on policy, and assisting rural organizations in advocating for policies.

did not considered the evidence contained in IOE’s evaluations, which is the focus of this Evaluation Synthesis on Policy Dialogue (thus complementing the 2016 review). The PTA Policy desk is currently working on a Toolkit on Country Level Policy Engagement, which could use the evidence that will be provided by the Evaluation Synthesis.

26. **Highlights from other organizations.** The Evaluation Synthesis will take into account lessons learned by other organizations concerning country-level policy dialogue, searching for the lessons in the evaluations conducted by those institutions. The organizations to be considered will be a purposive sample of international financial institutions, bilateral agencies, think tanks and foundations. Of course, any lessons from other organisations would be contextualised to IFAD’s reality.

II. **Objective, scope, key questions and methodology**

27. This evaluation synthesis will aim at addressing the knowledge gap with respect to evaluative evidence on country-level policy dialogue drawing lessons from evaluations that may feed into IFAD’s future work on country level policy dialogue.

28. **Objective.** The objectives of this evaluation synthesis are to draw: (i) lessons, highlight good practices, factors of success and identify risks and potential limitations in IFAD’s engagement in country-level policy dialogue; and (ii) recommendations that can further strengthen the design and implementation of IFAD policies, strategies and operations in connection to country-level policy dialogue in IFAD. Recommendations will be formulated at a strategic level.

29. The main audience of this evaluation synthesis will be IFAD Management and operational staff and the Governing Bodies of IFAD. The report may be of interest for international development evaluators and development practitioners as well.

**Scope of the evaluation synthesis**

30. **Time Frame.** The time frame proposed would cover the period 2010-2015, with particular emphasis after 2013. The Strategic Framework 2011-2015 recognized policy dialogue for the first time as “part of IFAD’s core business”, and an enabling institutional and policy environment for poor rural people as “one of IFAD’s five strategic objectives”. The special emphasis after 2103 is related to the presentation to the EB in 2013 for information of an Action Plan for country-level policy dialogue which provided a framework for IFAD-wide involvement in policy dialogue, including an institutional definition.

31. **What the evaluation synthesis on policy dialogue will not do.** This synthesis will not address IFAD’s engagement in regional or global fora. Its focus is on country-level policy dialogue. Furthermore, it will not be an evaluation but an evaluation synthesis.

32. **The criteria.** According to the second edition of the Evaluation Manual (2015), evaluation synthesis focus on summarizing lessons learned, and good or less good practices. The analysis in a synthesis report is expected to use four evaluation criteria: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability, without rating these criteria.

33. The Manual also indicates that other criteria could be considered. Although it may seem appropriate to include “rural poverty impact”, given the way in which policy changes induced by policy dialogue could generate impact, this would not be practical because during the preparatory stage of this synthesis no evaluation was found that provides evidence concerning rural poverty impacts of country-level policy dialogue.

34. As mentioned in the introduction, the evaluation synthesis is not an evaluation so it should not apply the criteria to evaluate the interventions. It should synthesize the evaluative evidence rather than generate new evaluative evidence. In the future,
when IFAD evaluations applying the Manual’s 2nd edition questions for non-lending activities (including country-level policy dialogue) will be available, a richer evaluation synthesis could be prepared.

35. **Key questions.** With the caveats indicated in the previous paragraph, a set of key questions guiding the evaluation can be linked to the criteria and to the theory of change, which stripped to its essentials is presented in Figure 1.42.

Figure 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Level Policy Dialogue</th>
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<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>From IFAD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grants/Loans → CL Policy Dialogue → Policy Change → Pro-Poor Results</td>
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36. The full-fledged theory of change (Figure 2) shows the results chain and makes explicit the role of IFAD knowledge management and partnerships, which are crucial to generate outputs, intermediate outcomes and outcomes in synergy with country level policy dialogue (as indicated in paras. 15 and 17).

Figure 2. Country-Level Policy Dialogue Theory of Change

Source: IOE

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42 “Policy change” could include changes to the manner in which policies are implemented, or changes to the types of evidence utilized when undertaking policy making, or changes to the ways that policy results are achieved, for instance by building the capacity of and creating the space for local stakeholder organizations themselves (through IFAD loans or grants) to engage in policy processes. For the broad concept of policy change, see Corduneanu-Huci et.al. (2013)
37. For the sake of clarity, Fig. 2 is not comprehensive. As pointed out by Management in comments to an earlier version of this AP, in the box titled “processes”, direct participation of IFAD staff is not limited to sector working groups. With regards to "outputs", other aspects which could be included (to the extent that they led to outputs) could be cross-cutting work on institutional strengthening, M&E / knowledge sharing, and policy implementation. Along those lines, the "intermediate outcomes" section could also include better implementation and better M&E of policies.

Core questions:

A) On Relevance

1. Why is CLPD relevant for IFAD. Why is it important?
2. Which were the expected results of PD? (e.g. policy change? changes in the “rules of the game”? scaling-up?) → linked to the relevance of the design
3. What has been the theory of change for PD? (if there has been one, or more than one?) How was PD supposed to generate changes? Which were the key assumptions? → linked to the relevance of the design

B) On Effectiveness

4. Which were actual results (outputs, outcomes) of PD? → linked to effectiveness
   4.1 What is the evidence on PD results?
   4.2 What worked in which contexts and why? Examples
5. Are there lessons learned from IFAD’s country engagement in PD?

C) On Efficiency

5.1 Lessons on modalities of PD that were cost-efficient → linked to efficiency

D) On Sustainability

5.2 Lessons on PD with sustainable results → linked to sustainability
5.3 Other lessons learned that may be useful for IFAD’s future CLPD

Heuristic questions:

6. How was PD defined in IFAD evaluations? How is PD currently understood at IFAD?
7. Which indicators, if any, were used for PD? For inputs, processes, outputs, outcomes?
8. Which are key IFAD documents addressing policy dialogue? Do these documents make reference(s) to evaluation?
9. Who participated in PD? Who were the PD actors?
10. Which were the issues on which the policy dialogue took place? In which areas (e.g. agriculture, rural finance, pro-poor policies)?
11. Were there any tools used for PD?
12. Were resources earmarked for PD?

38. Methodology. The methodology for this evaluation synthesis will combine different methods consistent with those indicated in IFAD’s Evaluation Manual and
within a realist evaluation framework based on the triad context, interventions and results.\(^{43}\) The methods will be:

(i) a review of the literature on the evaluation of country level policy dialogue (CLPD), to identify relevant examples of interventions in different contexts; the questions in Annex 1 and the theory of change (fig.1 and fig.2) are used as a guide for this review and also for the set of methodological activities described in this paragraph. Furthermore, the literature review will also include some recent work that focuses on relevant political economy issues that are crucial for PD;

(ii) a review of IOE’s CPEs and CLEs, focusing on all CPEs (27), ARRIIs (6) and CLEs (10) published since 2010 (to include 3 years before the critical change on country-level policy dialogue, as per table 1); a Boolean table (annex 3) will be used to indicate the availability of evidence, or lack of it, for the different components of the theory of change;

(iii) comparative analysis of CLPD interventions or practices;

(iv) dyadic interviews\(^{44}\) with IFAD management and staff, complementing the information from interviews on CLPD conducted in 2015 (an initial interview with IFAD’s PTA focal points for CLPD, including PD, took place before preparing this approach paper); and

(v) synthesize findings/lessons learned taking into account different contexts (by region, type of country, and other categories to be developed during the synthesis), using the theory of change presented in annex 3, so as to maximize the learning value added of the evaluation synthesis.

39. The CPEs and CLEs since 2010 will be reviewed using the template included as Annex 1. Although it is unlikely that project evaluations will provide significant information on CLPD (as the limited information captured under “institutions and policies” does not allow to disentangle policy dialogue from other elements), the Evaluation Synthesis will also consider all PPAs and PCRVs whose rating for “institutions and policies” is 4 or more, and which correspond to CPEs since 2010 with a rating for PD of 4 or more (10 PPAs and 5 PCRVs) and/or for which there is evidence of scaling-up.

III. The Evaluation Synthesis process

40. The main steps in the Evaluation Synthesis process include: (i) the peer review, discussion and finalization of this approach paper; (ii) the desk review of all relevant documentation; (iii) interviews with managers and relevant staff and with external key informants; (iv) analysis of data and information, using the Boolean table (annex 3) and non-parametric distribution-free statistics triangulation of findings; (v) preparation of the report, including quality review; (vi) feedback from IFAD Management and staff during a workshop dedicated to emerging findings.

41. The present approach paper will be subjected to a peer review in IOE. It will be submitted to IFAD’s Management for comments and finalised taking those comments into account.

42. The desk review will be one of the key sources of data and information and will be conducted along the main guiding lines explained above and in annexes. Interviews will also be held, individually and in groups, with IFAD staff. In addition, interviews will also be held with representatives from other international development organizations on a selective basis. The exact institutions and persons to be interviewed will be identified through the desk review and in the course of the interviews (snow-ball iteration).

\(^{43}\) See Better Evaluation (2014)
\(^{44}\) See Morgan et.al. (2016)
43. At this stage, it is expected that the persons to be interviewed at IFAD will include: (i) Associate Vice Presidents of the Programme Management Department (PMD) and Strategy Knowledge Department (SKD), respectively; Associate Vice-President and Chief of Staff, Office of the President (ii) front office of the Programme Management Department; (iii) Director and/or selected lead technical advisors in the Policy and Technical Advisory Division (PTA); (iv) one representative from each of the five PMD Regional divisions (to be nominated by their respective Directors) as well as selected country programme managers; (v) Director of Global Engagement, Knowledge and Strategy Division within SKD; (vi) Director, Office of Partnership and Resource Mobilization (PRM); (vi) Director, Deputy Director and selected staff in IOE. Additional persons to be interviewed may be identified in the course of the exercise. Furthermore, during his participation at the Asian Evaluation Week, which will be attended by evaluators and policy makers from all regions, the senior consultant (who was invited by IEG/World Bank) will try to use the opportunity to interview IFI and UN evaluators as well as policy makers, to expand the range of views concerning effective and efficient policy dialogue modalities so as to increase the value added of the synthesis.

44. Based on the evidence captured through the desk review, data analysis and interviews and following the methodology outlined in the previous sections, IOE shall prepare a draft final report. This will be subjected to a peer review process within IOE (entailing an ad hoc meeting).

45. Based on the comments received, IOE will revise the draft and share it with IFAD’s management for comments. A workshop dedicated to emerging findings will be organised in-house at IFAD before sharing the draft report with the core learning partnership so that some of the feedback can be already integrated in the revised draft (see further below under “dissemination”). After receiving comments from Management, IOE shall finalise the report and produce an audit trail illustrating how these were considered. The final report and audit trail will be shared with IFAD Management for information. Thereafter, IFAD Management will prepare a written response (2-3 pages) on the final evaluation synthesis report, which will be included in the final report.

46. **Discussion at the Evaluation Committee.** All final evaluation synthesis reports, together with the written IFAD Management’s response, are discussed in the Evaluation Committee. Upon request of the Evaluation Committee, the reports may also be discussed in the Executive Board. This Evaluation Synthesis will be presented to the Evaluation Committee in the course of 2017, based on a calendar that will be established at the last Committee’s session of 2016.

47. **Risks and Limitations.** The main risk is that there may be a misunderstanding concerning what the evaluation synthesis attempts to do, which can lead to unfulfilled expectations. To mitigate this risk the present approach paper has explicitly stated that an evaluation synthesis is not an evaluation (nor an evaluation with more limited resources) and focuses on harvesting and synthesizing evidence that has already been gathered rather than to generate new evidence. Other limitations are the limited evidence from IOE evaluations as CLPD has not been central in the design and implementation of IFAD interventions and has not been addressed in detail in CPEs nor in project or grant evaluations, with few exceptions, which the synthesis will try to identify. Another risk is that these exceptions are not fully identified and what will be done to cope with this risk is to search in the data and text bases, taking into account ratings whenever available to identify cases of good practice (a preliminary analysis shows that Argentina and Madagascar are two such cases). Interviews will also be held to further identify relevant cases and to assess the quality of evidence, triangulating documentation review with key informants’ views.

48. Last but not least, time and resources for an evaluation synthesis are more limited than for an evaluation, and because of this the synthesis will be focused on
evaluation documents that are more likely to provide valuable insights for the ESPOD, mainly CPEs and CLEs, leaving aside project evaluations (with perhaps a few exceptions, mainly related to cases of good practice, to enrich the description of the good practice examples).

IV. Proposed timeline, team and dissemination

49. **Evaluation Team**: The synthesis will be undertaken by a team including: Mr Miguel Torralba, IOE Lead Evaluation Officer and lead evaluator; Mr Osvaldo Feinstein (senior consultant); Ms Luna Montozzi (desk review). Ms Chabana Bagas, IOE Evaluation Assistant, will provide research and administrative support.

50. **Timeline**:

<table>
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<th>Table 3. Proposed Timeline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation of the approach paper and peer review</td>
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<tr>
<td>Desk Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>Revised Approach Paper sent to Management for Comments</td>
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<td>Comments due by Management</td>
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<td>Approach Paper Finalised</td>
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<td>Annotated table of comments for the report</td>
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<td>Writing of the draft report</td>
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<td>Senior consultant in Rome</td>
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<td>Discussion on emerging key issues with Core Learning Partnership</td>
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<td>IOE Internal peer review</td>
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<td>Learning Event with Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>Revised draft sent to Management</td>
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<td>Comments from Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>Final report</td>
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<td>Publication</td>
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51. **Dissemination**. Evaluation synthesis reports are prepared in English only. The final evaluation synthesis report should include the written IFAD Management’s response. The lead evaluator will prepare an Evaluation Profile and Insights. The Evaluation Communication Unit (ECU) of IOE will also prepare an infographic note.

52. An in-house workshop shall be organized to discuss the main findings from all evaluation synthesis reports to share lessons and promote dialogue around the main emerging themes. It will be held at IFAD headquarters and will be attended by IFAD Management and staff, IOE staff and others concerned. The main background document – the draft evaluation synthesis report – should be shared with all participants ahead of the session. The comments made at the workshop will be taken into account in revising the report.

53. Once finalized, the evaluation synthesis report will be submitted to the ECU for editorial quality assurance, web publishing and dissemination. The ECU will post the report on the IFAD intranet (log-on screen), the video wall in the IFAD lobby, the independent evaluation section of the IFAD website, IFAD’s Facebook page and Twitter and Yammer accounts. The link to the report is also included in the UNEG database of evaluation reports, available at [http://www.uneval.org/evaluation/reports](http://www.uneval.org/evaluation/reports).

54. The ECU shall share the final report electronically with internal and external audiences, including IFAD Management and staff, IOE staff, consultants, members
of the Executive Board, UNEG, ECG, all IFAD regional networks, evaluation associations and other networks according to the thematic area discussed in the report. A limited number of hard copies are printed and placed in IOE’s display case for IFAD staff and visitors. Printed copies will also be available upon request.

55. **Tentative Outline of the ESPOD**

   a) Background  
   b) Evaluation Synthesis objectives, methodology and scope  
   c) IFAD’s support to country-level policy dialogue  
   d) Main findings from IFAD’s experience with CLPD  
   e) Lessons from other agencies  
   f) Conclusions and recommendations

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45 Based on Box 15 of the Evaluation Manual.
Annexes

1. Questions for Comparative Analysis
2. Selected References
3. CPEs Evidence on the Theory of Change
Annex 1. Questions for Comparative Analysis

- Year
- Country
- Type of evaluation
- Were policy dialogue objectives explicitly recognized/described in COSOP?
- Were budget figures included?
- Type/categories of policy dialogue activities
  - Through COSOP and project preparation
  - Included as specific project component
  - Ongoing dialogue through implementation/supervision
- Which partners are mentioned as having a role in policy dialogue?
  A. Government entities
  B. Other national entities
  C. Private sector
  D. IFIs
  E. UNs
  F. NGOs, Universities, Research institutes, think tank, individual advisors, other international institutions
- Source of funding
  G. Project component
  H. Grants (specify type)
- Outputs
  I. Contribution of the CPM/CPO to in-sector working groups
  J. Policy analysis work and TA notes for policy formulation; supporting preparation of new national policies and strategies
  K. Informing design of new national programmes (through projects)
  L. Specific workshops, seminars, trainings, national/regional
  M. Space for policy dialogue between national stakeholders, focal groups, platforms for dialogue
- Intermediate outcomes
  N. Enhanced capacity of national stakeholders to participate in national policy processes
  O. Strengthened capacity of Government agencies to formulate national policies and programmes
• **Outcomes**

  **P.** Influence/change/adjustment on policies (national, regional, local), sectorial, legislation, procedures (draft, proposed, approved)

  **Q.** Scaling-up and/or adoption by government of successful models and initiatives

  **R.** Operationalization of a national policy or programme at the local level

  o Is policy dialogue supporting programme objectives? Are there synergies with the strategy and IFAD programme?

  o Strengths/good practices/successful factors

  o Challenges/shortcomings

  o Any other issues/lessons

  o Recommendations related to policy dialogue

• **Ratings for non-lending activities**

  **S.** Policy dialogue

  **T.** Knowledge management

  **U.** Partnership building

  **V.** Overall rating for non-lending activities
## Comparative Analysis of CPEs (panel A)

<p>| No. | Country | Year | Which partners are mentioned as having a role in the project? | Input | Output | Source of funding | Types of CPEs (as described in COP25) | Categories of NO activities | Project goals | Project strategies |
|-----|---------|------|-------------------------------------------------------------|-------|--------|------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------|-----------------|------------------|
| 1   | Mexico  | 2020 | Yes                                                         | NO    | NO     | United           | Through COP25                        | Work with multilateral            | Private sector | Through COP25   | Local platforms for dialogue |
| 2   | Argentina| 2020 | Yes                                                         | NO    | NO     | United           | Through COP25                        | Work with multilateral            | Private sector | Through COP25   | Local platforms for dialogue |
| 3   | Brazil  | 2020 | Yes                                                         | NO    | NO     | United           | Through COP25                        | Work with multilateral            | Private sector | Through COP25   | Local platforms for dialogue |
| 4   | India   | 2020 | Yes                                                         | NO    | NO     | United           | Through COP25                        | Work with multilateral            | Private sector | Through COP25   | Local platforms for dialogue |
| 5   | China   | 2020 | Yes                                                         | NO    | NO     | United           | Through COP25                        | Work with multilateral            | Private sector | Through COP25   | Local platforms for dialogue |
| 6   | Indonesia| 2020 | Yes                                                         | NO    | NO     | United           | Through COP25                        | Work with multilateral            | Private sector | Through COP25   | Local platforms for dialogue |
| 7   | Vietnam | 2020 | Yes                                                         | NO    | NO     | United           | Through COP25                        | Work with multilateral            | Private sector | Through COP25   | Local platforms for dialogue |
| 8   | Philippines | 2020 | Yes                                                         | NO    | NO     | United           | Through COP25                        | Work with multilateral            | Private sector | Through COP25   | Local platforms for dialogue |
| 9   | Pakistan | 2020 | Yes                                                         | NO    | NO     | United           | Through COP25                        | Work with multilateral            | Private sector | Through COP25   | Local platforms for dialogue |
| 10  | Turkey  | 2020 | Yes                                                         | NO    | NO     | United           | Through COP25                        | Work with multilateral            | Private sector | Through COP25   | Local platforms for dialogue |
| 11  | Egypt   | 2020 | Yes                                                         | NO    | NO     | United           | Through COP25                        | Work with multilateral            | Private sector | Through COP25   | Local platforms for dialogue |
| 12  | Morocco | 2020 | Yes                                                         | NO    | NO     | United           | Through COP25                        | Work with multilateral            | Private sector | Through COP25   | Local platforms for dialogue |
| 13  | Tunisia | 2020 | Yes                                                         | NO    | NO     | United           | Through COP25                        | Work with multilateral            | Private sector | Through COP25   | Local platforms for dialogue |
| 14  | Algeria | 2020 | Yes                                                         | NO    | NO     | United           | Through COP25                        | Work with multilateral            | Private sector | Through COP25   | Local platforms for dialogue |
| 15  | Senegal | 2020 | Yes                                                         | NO    | NO     | United           | Through COP25                        | Work with multilateral            | Private sector | Through COP25   | Local platforms for dialogue |
| 16  | Côte d'Ivoire | 2020 | Yes                                                         | NO    | NO     | United           | Through COP25                        | Work with multilateral            | Private sector | Through COP25   | Local platforms for dialogue |
| 17  | Mali     | 2020 | Yes                                                         | NO    | NO     | United           | Through COP25                        | Work with multilateral            | Private sector | Through COP25   | Local platforms for dialogue |
| 18  | Burkina Faso | 2020 | Yes                                                         | NO    | NO     | United           | Through COP25                        | Work with multilateral            | Private sector | Through COP25   | Local platforms for dialogue |
| 19  | Senegal | 2020 | Yes                                                         | NO    | NO     | United           | Through COP25                        | Work with multilateral            | Private sector | Through COP25   | Local platforms for dialogue |
| 20  | Mauritania | 2020 | Yes                                                         | NO    | NO     | United           | Through COP25                        | Work with multilateral            | Private sector | Through COP25   | Local platforms for dialogue |
| 21  | Morocco | 2020 | Yes                                                         | NO    | NO     | United           | Through COP25                        | Work with multilateral            | Private sector | Through COP25   | Local platforms for dialogue |
| 22  | Senegal | 2020 | Yes                                                         | NO    | NO     | United           | Through COP25                        | Work with multilateral            | Private sector | Through COP25   | Local platforms for dialogue |
| 23  | Côte d'Ivoire | 2020 | Yes                                                         | NO    | NO     | United           | Through COP25                        | Work with multilateral            | Private sector | Through COP25   | Local platforms for dialogue |
| 24  | Senegal | 2020 | Yes                                                         | NO    | NO     | United           | Through COP25                        | Work with multilateral            | Private sector | Through COP25   | Local platforms for dialogue |
| 25  | Benin    | 2020 | Yes                                                         | NO    | NO     | United           | Through COP25                        | Work with multilateral            | Private sector | Through COP25   | Local platforms for dialogue |
| 26  | Mauritania | 2020 | Yes                                                         | NO    | NO     | United           | Through COP25                        | Work with multilateral            | Private sector | Through COP25   | Local platforms for dialogue |
| 27  | Senegal | 2020 | Yes                                                         | NO    | NO     | United           | Through COP25                        | Work with multilateral            | Private sector | Through COP25   | Local platforms for dialogue |</p>
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Annex 2. Selected References

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Annex 3. CPEs Evidence on the Theory of Change