Federal Republic of Nigeria
Country Programme Evaluation
Executive Summary

A. Background

1. This is the second country programme evaluation (CPE) of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in 2015. It covers the period 2009-2015 and has two main objectives: To (i) assess the results and performance of the IFAD-Government partnership to reduce rural poverty; and to (ii) generate findings and recommendations for the future partnership between IFAD and the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The CPE follows the IFAD IOE Evaluation Manual (1st edition). The CPE will inform the preparation of the new country strategic opportunities programme (COSOP) in 2016.

2. The main country mission took place in September 2015 and included extensive field visits in nine states in the Middle Belt and in the South (Oyo, Lagos, Edo, Rivers, Abia, Cross River, Benue, Nasarawa and Niger) as well as stakeholder meetings in Abuja, Ibadan, Lagos, Abia, and Port Harcourt. The project performance assessment of the Community-Based Agricultural and Rural Development Programme (CBARDP) had earlier covered four northern states through field visits (Sokoto, Katsina, Jigawa and Kebbi).

B. IFAD Country Strategic Opportunities Programme

3. **COSOP relevance.** The second IFAD COSOP (2010 – 2015) was broadly aligned with the Nigerian Government’s policy priorities under the last political dispensation in 2010. Under the second COSOP, the programme underwent a strategic shift towards IFAD’s core business, agriculture, while taking into consideration IFAD’s comparative advantage in tackling poverty and deprivation at community level through building community assets and capacities. This has meant a move away from community-driven development (CDD)-based, broad social and economic investments to themes around market-led, commodity-based value chains and rural finance.

4. The second COSOP had a coherent approach in terms of the choice of sectors, regions and target groups. In the North, IFAD promoted community institutions and services with an agricultural focus. As this is the area of the country with the least reach by Government services and infrastructure, investment in community empowerment and infrastructure was the right strategy. In the Niger Delta, population densities are high and market access is better, hence rural employment creation for the large youth population and the women remaining in rural areas, as well as the promotion of on- and off-farm enterprises was appropriate. In the Middle Belt, where there are large tracts of under-used land and access to markets is good, enhancing yields through technologies, inputs and credit also makes sense.

5. **COSOP effectiveness.** Over the COSOP period, the IFAD-supported programmes reached 9.2 million beneficiaries out of the 14.2 million targeted. This total roughly represents some 10 per cent of the estimated 98 million rural population, the majority of them residing in remote and resource-poor areas. The CPE shows that IFAD’s contribution has been effective in helping to support the overall trend in lowering poverty in the country, in particular in the poorer northern states, where IFAD’s operations were instrumental for supporting livelihoods in the communities assisted. While beneficiary outreach was less than targeted at appraisal, the policy of concentrating efforts in a limited number of villages meant that delivery in these locations was successful, efficient and often sustained. But the scale of the impact...
remains limited given the size of the country, and poverty statistics overall show an increasing divide between the urban and the rural and the wealthy and the poor.

C. Project portfolio performance

6. The ongoing IFAD portfolio includes four operations: the Community-based Natural Resource Management Programme – Niger Delta (CBNRMP); the Rural Finance Institutions Building Programme (RUFIN); the Value Chain Development Programme (VCDP), and the Climate Change Adaptation and Agribusiness Support Programme in the Savannah Belt (CASP).

Relevance

7. Programme design. The programmes are in one way or another characterized by overly-complex and overly-ambitious designs. These include wide geographical scope, multi-tiered implementation arrangements, engagement with a wide range of partners, or a challenging mix of investments and activities. While this ensures that the interventions are broad-based and able to address different needs and dimensions of poverty, it makes them difficult to implement, especially given the known capacities at state and local government area (LGA) level.

8. Redesign. IFAD’s programmes have had long timespans (around 10 years including extensions) necessitating multiple design adjustments as IFAD’s country strategy evolved or as supervision missions emphasized specific design adjustments. This has had a major influence on relevance, as the older programmes have all been substantially re-designed or retro-fitted to match the overall strategic direction. This re-design led to confusion in the field and to short implementation time frames. Already agreed community plans had to be changed at IFAD’s behest and this in turn weakened the sense of local ownership, while state staff had to adjust their technical guidance.

9. Poverty targeting. IFAD’s ambition in a large and economically diverse country like Nigeria is to reach the poorest communities and to avoid states or regions that are better off. This had led to a greater focus of IFAD support on the poorest regions of the North, while reducing investments into the better-off South. In the absence of credible poverty data at sub-state level, poverty targeting within states and within LGAs remained a challenge. The programmes used participatory methods to select the poorest locations and households, but from the available documentary evidence the actual process remains somewhat opaque. Direct targeting criteria singled out women and youth as beneficiaries.

10. Conflict and fragility. Although Nigeria is no longer regarded as a fragile state, there are serious areas of insecurity and insurgency in particular regions. Given the scale of IFAD’s engagement, its programmes have been vulnerable to various forms of conflict, insurgency or unrest, whether in the North East from Boko Haram, from pastoralist-farmer conflicts in the middle belt or violence and unrest in the Delta region. Most programmes do not include any conflict analysis or risk assessment of how changes introduced by IFAD would affect conflict or insecurity either in a positive or negative way, or mitigation measures. Where a mitigation strategy is put forward at design, it is largely to avoid working in known conflict zones by selecting LGAs or villages outside of known areas of disturbance, and by bringing staff and beneficiaries located in conflict zones to attend capacity-building or other sessions in safer programme locations.

Effectiveness

11. Delivery of results has been influenced by slow funding release, re-design turbulence and changes in loan disbursement rules. As a consequence, overall outreach has been disappointing for two of the programmes (the Roots and Tubers Expansion Programme and CBARDP), satisfactory for one (CBNRMP) and unclear because of questionable figures for the fourth (RUFIN). Notable achievements were recorded with regard to access to financial services, community capacity-building
and job creation. Within the locations, delivery of benefits in terms of building assets and spreading technology has been very good. Area targeting could have been stronger, but within the communities targeting of the poor, women and youth has been good.

12. **Delays.** The programmes experienced implementation delays due to loan agreement and effectiveness issues and then slow or no release of counterpart funds. The average effectiveness lag for the whole Nigeria portfolio is 32 months and 26 days for the programmes reviewed by this CPE, which is more than twice the IFAD average of around one year. The more recent programmes are taking as long as older ones in the portfolio. Reasons for these delays include delays in obtaining federal and state legislature agreement, in fulfilling loan conditions such as staff appointments and in opening necessary bank accounts. Delays in the early years of programme life then lead to non-release or slow replenishment from IFAD loan funds.

13. **Counterpart funding.** Varying and mostly poor level of state government commitments was a known lesson from earlier IFAD operations, yet some follow-on programmes retained a high dependency on such counterpart funding contributions. Underlying many states’ reluctance to provide agreed counterpart funding is the low priority given to agriculture as opposed to the social sectors or transport or manufacturing, especially in the southern states. Even after IFAD reduced the state funding percentage, slow and unpredictable flow of counterpart funding continued to undermine portfolio performance.

**Efficiency**

14. **Supervision.** While missions have been regularly conducted and findings thoroughly documented, the CPE has found that mission members were not always sufficiently experienced or consistently used, with significant variation in personnel and in areas of expertise. This affected the longer running programmes, all of which went through both major re-designs at mid-term but also a range of smaller technical adjustments according to the priorities raised by particular supervisions. This at times has led to inefficiency in terms of introducing unexpected changes to programme delivery that in turn led to wasted resources.

15. **Political changes.** A similar aspect of inefficiency surrounds the effects of frequent political changes in different levels of government because of elections and other disruptions or bureaucratic delays and obstructions. The turnover caused by the electoral cycle has led to a repeated need to justify and defend the programme approach to incoming leaders, many of whom have new agendas and an understandable desire to see their constituency benefit from donor projects.

16. **Management overheads.** The large number of states and LGAs involved in the programmes increased management overheads. Programme coordination units were stretched in working effectively across many states and LGA partners. This caused high overheads in terms of follow-up, supervision, and advocacy with leaders. For all programmes, management costs, as a proportion of the total programme costs, were over 20 per cent. The CDD programmes had management costs at almost 30 per cent because their funds were managed in a decentralized manner, with individual states processing a high number of withdrawal applications for relatively low eligible expenditures.

17. In terms of **value for money** the CDD programmes performed better. They used direct labour contribution and some local materials for assets. IFAD rarely used contractors but let the community manage investments directly, with the support of local government and programme staff, and this therefore avoided overheads and commissioning costs. Whether building schools, fish-farms or boreholes, the community also used local materials for building wherever possible. In terms of allocative efficiency, the community-led programmes in particular represent good value in the sense that funds were used on assets that were based on choices
expressed by the community, rather than being supplied by local government or by others without due consideration of local priorities.

D. Rural poverty impact

18. **Household income and assets.** There has been a marked increase in assets in the targeted villages especially in the area-based programmes (CBARDP and CBNRMP). The large number of social and economic investments that occurred over the past 10 years, and their concentration in a selected set of communities, led to a growth in assets and a rise in income for many direct beneficiaries. In many remoter locations, IFAD’s support was the main source of development activity and being community-led has been more relevant and shown greater beneficiary ownership. The impact could have been greater if re-design had not reduced the period for deeper and wider delivery.

19. **Human and social capital and empowerment.** Group formation, the transferring of planning and investment decisions to village committees, and the principle that the under-privileged have access to these assets and a voice in their use, have driven forward social capital and empowered the poorest in the selected communities. Under CBARDP a total of about 8,280 farmer groups representing different interests, trades and businesses have enabled communities to take responsibility for their development and increased the capacity for collective action. In CBNRMP, the focus on youth empowerment has been a significant achievement. Through increased incomes, these groups have grown in confidence and for some the impact has been life-changing. Important social benefits are also reported, as for example a reported reduction in youth migration as employment opportunities have risen, and less crime and vandalism.

20. **Food security and agricultural productivity.** Impact studies report marked increases in production and productivity in programme areas. To what extent these changes can be attributed to IFAD remains an open question. There are a range of other programmes supporting agriculture in the states where IFAD programmes have operated, and it is not easy to detect or separate their influence from IFAD’s support. The vast size of the sector and the fairly limited role that public expenditure (including both Government and foreign aid) plays in supporting such growth suggest that most of the rise in agricultural production has come as a result of investments from both large and small private investors.

21. **Institutions and policies.** IFAD’s programmes can claim significant impact on local institutions and through these, changes to a range of services benefiting the poor either in the form of social, production or credit support. The institutionalization of the community development associations (CDAs) as a 4th tier of government can be regarded as an important impact of CBARDP; while commodity apex development associations in CBNRMP, though more recently created, are widely accepted. To varying degrees this village-level form of community-based development architecture has been widely adopted within programme areas and beyond. Despite some level of political interference in the selection of localities and of leaders, they act as locally-owned organs that have channelled resources and brought forward the views and priorities of those living in often remote and disempowered communities. State legislation and funding have been introduced in Sokoto, Kebbi and Katsina States to support the replication of CDAs in LGAs not supported by IFAD, as well as in new villages within former IFAD-supported LGAs.

E. Other performance criteria

22. **Gender equality and women’s empowerment.** Overall the programmes have increasingly succeeded in mobilizing women to participate. Sustainable inclusion and empowerment of women is harder to ascertain. There is little evidence to show how women have used the opportunities provided by the programmes to improve
their economic and social status. Field assessments by the CPE suggest that while IFAD’s programmes have increased women’s participation in community development activities, their impact on decision-making empowerment and social change is not as great. Perhaps the most important shortcoming of the gender strategies has been the lack of consideration given to ethnic and religious differentiations. Nigeria’s religious and ethnic diversity and the role these play in shaping gender roles and in socio-economic processes (i.e. value chains, financial inclusion, etc.) place greater demands on understanding these roles and devising specific approaches.

23. **Innovation and scaling up.** The expansion of CDD must count as the most significant innovation arising from IFAD’s community-based programmes. These investments provided the structure and principles for how CDD would work at village level and in the case of CBARDP how local government would work with this newly formalized fourth tier. In addition, the demonstration of large scale production of quality certified seeds from producers in Yobe and Jigawa has been a notable achievement under CBARDP. Youth initiative ‘Youth in Agriculture’ was a deliberate strategy to address the problem of crime and unemployment amongst younger people in the Delta. On the other hand, IFAD’s success in promoting replication or scaling up of those innovations is rather limited. CBARDP seems to be the only programme that has achieved significant scaling up of the CDD approach.

24. **Natural resources, the environment and climate change** has not been a highlight of IFAD’s portfolio during the CPE period, and the proportion of community funds devoted to this domain has been very small. Creating rural employment through intensification of production in enterprises such as fish farming, rice, cassava, poultry and many others, has benefited the environment through reducing more destructive farm practices. At the same time, the shift in focus towards value chains, rural finance, processing and marketing has reduced the emphasis on more sustainable farming system. With regard to climate change, Northern Nigeria is particularly affected, and links with the increasing pressure on pastoralist and agrarian communities are becoming increasingly obvious. The new CASP is planning a detailed analysis of the implications of climate change in the Sahel zone and greater attention is now planned on this theme. The Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture (ASAP) grant funding will explicitly support climate-related measures for farmers. Given CASP’s multiple objectives (marketing, enterprises, governance); however, opportunities to address climate mitigation or adaptation within this competing agenda may be restricted.

F. **Non-lending activities**

25. **Policy engagement.** The establishment of the IFAD country office in 2008, created better and more cost-effective opportunities to engage in policy discussions on development strategies and programme operations. IFAD, through its country office, has also been active in the Agriculture Development Partner Working Group and since 2015 co-chairs the monthly meetings. This group allows donors to share good practices and knowledge, organize joint follow-up actions and division of work while discussing in a more harmonized manner policy concerns and priorities related to agriculture and rural development. Positive policy linkages occurred within the FMARD ATA reform framework through a grant, ‘Support to the design of the strategy and action plan for high impact commodity value chains in Nigeria’ in 2012. Other noteworthy IFAD contributions to policy dialogue are in microfinance, value chains and community development.

26. **Knowledge management.** There has been a marked increase in knowledge management activities instigated by the IFAD Country Office (ICO) team, underpinned by a strategy and efficient use of available resources. Attention has rightly been paid to CDD knowledge-sharing in order to enhance dialogue on
participatory approaches and to encourage local government to work with communities. Practical knowledge was shared with local communities to learn from experience and develop appropriate CDD procedures and these have also helped inform subsequent programmes such as CBNRMP and VCDP. However, considering IFAD’s long trajectory in implementing CDD approaches in the country, little documented evidence of these knowledge management activities from Nigeria is publicly available.

27. **Partnership-building.** With the out-posting of the country programme manager, increased efforts have been made to initiate partnerships with a wide array of stakeholders. But in the absence of a partnership strategy, engagement has been somewhat opportunistic and ad hoc and built around the needs of individual programmes rather than at a more strategic level. At local level, partnership between IFAD-assisted programmes themselves is very limited, and despite the long presence in certain states and LGAs, there is limited partnering in the sense of a joint, co-funding relationship. At national level, IFAD’s progress in developing partnerships has been hampered by a shortage of resources for this area and the need to devote a great deal of energy to overcoming delays in programme implementation. A missing partner, particularly in the earlier portfolio, has been the private sector, crucial given the move towards markets and processing across the portfolio. Co-funding of programmes by other donors has not been a feature of IFAD’s partnerships in Nigeria and is a significant gap, considering this was a key recommendation of the COSOP Mid-term Review. Instead, partnership-building with other development partners has achieved more around co-implementation and knowledge-sharing.

28. **Grants.** Under the CPE period, 20 grants received an overall amount of US$39.19 million amongst all types of IFAD grants. The grants revolve around key themes within the Nigeria portfolio, such as improved food crops and value chains to reduce rural poverty and vulnerability. While the research for development grants may have created some impact nationally, their capitalization, cross-fertilization and knowledge for immediate use and application through IFAD-supported country projects, either in terms of technological or processes innovation or scaling up, did not effectively materialize. Their effective use would depend on extension services delivering these technologies, yet there are capacity and budget constraints in this system following the decline in the Agricultural Development Programme and reduced Government funding. Only a few grants were used to build partnerships with non-governmental organizations, but they provide positive examples of learning and linkages with operations, such as the grants for Songhai-Benin for Rural Youth and Agricultural Business Development and for Creating Opportunities for Rural Youth.

G. **Conclusions**

29. **Geographic focus.** Under the second COSOP IFAD’s portfolio has improved geographic and poverty focus, but the broad multi-region coverage (of all but 9 out of 36 states) created gaps and prevented synergies between the programmes. Better geographical overlap in the states supported by different IFAD programmes would make efficient use of trained staff, build on capacitated local governments and sustain already existing community assets and cadres.

30. **The strengthening of the ICO** brought greater engagement in partnership and policy work, but given the size of the country and the complexities of the federal system, the level of capacity still seems inadequate to cover multiple roles of programme implementation support, policy dialogue and partnership-building. At state-level, little policy analysis or advisory activities were undertaken on contextual issues that affect portfolio performance, for example in the areas of governance and anti-corruption, social conflicts, or around state-level legislation to support enterprise growth or food security. Partnerships have mainly taken place at
programme level and along programme-specific themes, such as agricultural and microfinance research, farmer training and rural finance. The lack of strong partnerships with other influential players (World Bank, Department for International Development, United States Agency for International Development) through co-funded programmes has limited IFAD’s leverage at federal and state levels.

31. **Key issues noted by the last CPE (2008)** still remain to be addressed. Above all, IFAD’s operations continued to be hampered by the administrative complexity that led to funding delays and weak counterpart support and they struggled with issues of weak governance. Lending to state governments did not solve the issue of counterpart funding due to the lack of ownership and responsibility at state level. The issue of counterpart funding is fundamental and, unless a solution is found, will continue to seriously hamper the performance of the Nigeria portfolio. A related issue is the thin geographical spread across a large number of states, which limits the influence of IFAD’s financing.

32. **Capacity issues** and weak **coordination functions** continue to exist at federal level. Despite the proliferation of partners at federal level, limited progress has been made in expanding the implementation and coordination structure beyond FMARD, National Planning Commission, and the National Agricultural Seed Council. The absence of a well-structured policy coordination unit within FMARD is a major constraint for effective policy engagement as well as dissemination of results to Government systems and institutions. The lack of a strong coordinating function or office in either FMARD or NPC has also limited the development of strategic partnerships. At the level of individual programme staff, insufficient progress has been made in securing a mix of experiences and skills in line with the changed thematic focus. For example, a sufficient number of personnel with more private sector experience would be required to manage the rural finance and value chain operations.

33. **Greater synergies between loans and grants**, as recommended by the last CPE, are yet to be operationalized. Some grants were successfully used to support federal level policy implementation. The majority of grants continued to have a regional focus and therefore linkages between the main recipient of IFAD grants, the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture, and IFAD-supported operations were not systematically promoted. The use of matching grants to subsidize one-off investments is unsustainable and not aligned with IFAD’s technical guidance and good practices documented elsewhere.

34. **Effective knowledge management** is hampered by poorly performing monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems. IFAD has the potential to bring immense field experience into the policy discourse, based on the systematic collection of evidence from operations. Yet the observed data gaps and lack of sound empirical impact assessment, mean programme M&E data can only be used for policy discourse with caution. The baseline and impact studies produced by several programmes were disappointing and as such have not been widely used. The absence of thematic studies has also limited the understanding of the effectiveness and impact of IFAD-supported programmes.

35. The programme did not create sufficient opportunities for the **private sector** to participate. Involvement of the private sector in implementation is crucial given the move towards markets and processing across the portfolio. Even the ATA reports highlight the need to mobilize a range of public-private partnerships around fertilizer, seeds and processing. The private sector engagement has increased, particularly under RUFIN and VCDP. However, through their implementation structure these programmes continued to rely heavily on Government entities at federal and local level. Failure to include private investors as cofinanciers seems a
missed opportunity. Even in the policy work there has not been sufficient attention to providing support for private sector engagement in the agriculture sector.

36. The move towards larger programmes made it even more difficult to address issues of local governance, fragility and cultural diversity. Neither did it improve overall implementation efficiency as expected, because programme coordination and funds were spread over a larger number of states. This was compounded by the political and cultural diversity which made engagement with issues of local governance more challenging. Critical aspects of weak governance, including fragility and conflict, have been virtually ignored in portfolio design and execution. The inclusion of states into the programmes has been done without a deeper analysis of local governance issues. While the selection of states is done by the Federal Government, IFAD could have provided some clearly defined criteria that would have served as a proxy for the commitment and political will to support a joint programme, such as political stability, shared priorities (e.g. community development, smallholder agriculture), track record (e.g. public service reform, financial performance, accountability to development results). In addition, strong local ownership appears to be closely linked to smaller geographic units and more homogeneous programme areas, as has been the case in the earlier programmes in the North. With sufficient attention to governance-related issues IFAD could have developed a more adaptive approach at state level: an approach that involves nourishing partnerships, strengthening local ownership, sustaining commitment, and responding to crisis and disruptions in a proactive way.

H. Recommendations

37. Beyond what have been the recommendations of the last CPE, this CPE offers the following most critical recommendations.

38. **Recommendation 1. Increase geographic focus, transform state-level partnerships and identify realistic levels of counterpart funding.** The following possible options should be explored:

   (a) Develop a transparent mechanism for selection of states through adoption of clear selection criteria that consider poverty and governance-related indicators based on a robust analysis.

   (b) Conduct a proper assessment of the governance and public finances of the state as part of the institutional assessment during design, before drawing conclusions on the commitment and the ability to contribute ("know your client").

   (c) Adopt strategies to get the attention and commitment of state governors, such as (i) pressure from federal partners (ii) increasing the size of investment in fewer states (iii) have rewards for better performing states, (iv) increasing IFAD presence in key states, (v) keeping counterpart funding at feasible levels, e.g. % to minimum or zero, and making beneficiary contribution the trigger for release.

   (d) Develop strategies for strengthening local ownership, for example by creating programmes focussed on fewer states covering a smaller and more homogeneous geographic area.

   (e) Strengthen policy engagement at state level, to make sure that IFAD-supported programmes get on the top of the political agenda.

39. **Recommendation 2. Increase leverage and presence in operations.** There is scope for IFAD to gain traction on effectiveness and efficiency by changing the way it delivers implementation support.

   (a) There are opportunities to link programmes with each other and with non-lending activities in a more cohesive way for example linking rural finance
initiatives under RUFIN with value chain work under VCDP especially at local level. These linkages need to go along with a more integrated coordinating set-up at state level.

(b) Supervision missions should improve the consistency of recommendations and progressive understanding, for example by keeping a core team with changes in subject matter specialist as appropriate. Any recommendations for changes in approach should take due cognisance of their impact on existing programme commitments and community understanding.

(c) IFAD should dedicate technical capacities to strengthen engagement with key states. A suitable arrangement should be explored for decentralizing the posting of IFAD staff in key states/regions, whose role would be to focus on policy and strategic dialogue with state governments and LGAs.

(d) To strengthen ICO leverage, IFAD also needs high level engagement with incoming Government key people (e.g. new ministers) for dialogue on policy direction.

(e) IFAD should also use its performance-based allocation system (PBAS) discussions on rural sector performance and the portfolio performance as an opportunity for high-level policy engagement.

40. **Recommendation 3. Dedicate resources to cross-cutting issues that require further analysis and focus for sustainable programme results.**

Because of the complexity and difficulty of the context, the understanding of cross-cutting issues requires more and deeper analysis. The analysis should be built up through studies and lessons-learning within programmes and grants. It should aim at identifying opportunities for more effective engagement on cross-cutting issues outside day-to-day implementation. Important cross-cutting issues include:

(a) **Youth** - Valuable initiatives have been started, e.g. in CBNRMP, which should be built on. The initiatives themselves need to be sustained. Also the experiences should be documented and shared.

(b) **Gender** – Adopt culturally appropriate gender strategies: Address gender roles and issues within the local context (e.g. trafficking, social constraints on public roles, land ownership) and in a way that is tailored to existing capacities.

(c) **Conflict** – Integrate conflict analysis into the programme design and progress reporting, both at operational and COSOP levels.

(d) **Pastoralism** – Pastoralists are among the poorest and most vulnerable groups in Nigeria, and IFAD should explore ways to address farmer-pastoralist issues and integrate pastoralists into programme delivery.

(e) **NRM/environment** - bring more dedicated analysis and identify more substantial and explicit investments in this field through ASAP.

41. **Recommendation 4. Expand existing and develop new partnerships particularly outside of Government.**

(a) IFAD should link with civil society actors to widen opportunities for achieving on-the-ground sustainability and empowerment (e.g. young farmers in CBNRMP; rural finance associations in the North). Building more strategic partnerships with Civil society organizations rather than only for service provision would encourage sustainability and extend their engagement beyond a programme’s duration. IFAD grants should also explicitly support this endeavour. Where feasible such roles should be identified at design and written into the loan agreement or subsidiary memorandums of understandings.
(b) IFAD needs to facilitate the private sector in agriculture much more effectively. This requires measures such as hiring from the private sector as well as from Government for programme implementation, and using private sector advisors as mentors for existing Government staff. It also requires implementing tripartite agreements between private sector/farmers/IFAD in programmes such as VCDP and CASP, so that IFAD funds are used to crowd in private investors, as envisaged by IFAD’s technical guidance note on matching grants.

(c) IFAD needs to seek co-funding arrangements with its major partners (World Bank, United States Agency for International Development, United Kingdom Department for International Development, etc.) in order to improve leverage especially around policy dialogue, counterpart funding, and increasing levels of delivery in IFAD’s priority sectors.

42. **Recommendation 5. Continue to build on IFAD’s knowledge management strategy by improving the quality of evidence from the field.** This first requires improving evaluability during design - developing clear and logical theories of change, and designing practical M&E frameworks matching staff capacity, while minimizing Results and Impact Management System (RIMS) indicators. It then requires greater effort and rigour for evaluation. IFAD should support use of improved technology (such as computer-assisted personal interviewing, use of mobile phones and web tools), and also participatory methods. It should ensure rigorous survey design and analysis for major baseline or impact studies, and also follow up on the commissioning of thematic studies to ensure they are conducted in a way that reveals underlying factors as to how and why impact occurs, and how these affect particular vulnerable groups. To strengthen the country M&E system within the overall move to improved development effectiveness, IFAD should consider providing support to building institutional mechanisms and capacities within FMARD.