



Enabling poor rural people
to overcome poverty

COUNTRY PROGRAMME EVALUATION



Federal Republic of Nigeria

September 2009



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**Federal Republic of Nigeria
Country Programme Evaluation**

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Photo on cover page:
Nunu (milk) seller, North Nigeria
Painting by Abubakar K. Akobi

¹ Deep appreciation is due to the late Mr Jim Semple, who passed away in January 2009. The Nigeria CPE was his last assignment for IFAD, and it benefited from his vast experience and knowledge of agriculture and rural development as well as his outstanding collaboration as the consultants' team leader.

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(*) Annexes are available from IFAD's Office of Evaluation (evaluation@ifad.org).

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

Local Currency – Naira (NGN)

US\$1 = NGN120

NGN1 = US\$0.0083

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

Standard metric system unless specified in text; most crop yields are in tons.

FISCAL YEAR

1 January to 31 December


ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADP	Agricultural Development Project
ACP	Agreement at Completion Point
AfDB	African Development Bank
AVA	agriculture value added
AWPB	annual work programme and budget
BCR	benefit-cost ratio
CBARDP	Community-based Agricultural and Rural Development Programme
CBN	Central Bank of Nigeria
CBNRMP	Community-based Natural Resource Management Programme
CDA	Community Development Association
CDD	community-driven development
CDPA	community-driven participatory approach
CI	cooperating institution
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CMP	Cassava Multiplication Programme
COSOP	country strategic opportunities paper/programme
CPE	country programme evaluation
CPM	country programme manager
CPS	Country Partnership Strategy
CPR	country portfolio review
DfID	Department for International Development (of UK Government)
EB	Executive Board
EC	European Commission
EoPSD	Employment-oriented Private Sector Development Programme
FADPEC	Federal Agricultural Development Programme Executive Committee
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FCT	Federal Capital Territory
FGD	focus group discussions
FMAWR	Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources
FMoF	Federal Ministry of Finance
FGN	Federal Government of Nigeria
FPO	field presence office
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GTZ	German Agency for Technical Cooperation
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
HQCF	high quality cassava flour
IITA	International Institute of Tropical Agriculture
KSACDP	Katsina State Agricultural and Community Development Project

LEEDS	Local Government Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy
LGAs	Local Government Areas
LGCs	Local Government Councils
MARKETS	USAID Agribusiness Development Program
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MEO	monitoring and evaluation officer
MSADP-CMP	Multi-State Agricultural Development Programme-Cassava Multiplication Programme
MSME	micro, small and medium enterprises
NACRDB	Nigerian Agricultural, Cooperative and Rural Development Bank
NBS	National Bureau of Statistics
NDDC	Niger Delta Development Commission
NEEDS	National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy
NFRA	National Food Reserve Agency
NGO	non-governmental organization
NISER	Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research
NLAs	non-lending activities
NPC	National Planning Commission
ODA	official development assistance
OE	Office of Evaluation
PA	West and Central Africa Division of IFAD
PBAS	performance-based allocation system
PCU	project coordinating unit
PSO	Programme Support Office
RIMS	Results and Impact Management System
RTEP	Roots and Tuber Expansion Programme
RUFIN	Rural Finance Institution Building Programme
RUMEDP	Rural Micro-enterprise Development Programme
SA	self assessment
SEEDS	State Economic Empowerment Development Strategy
SMEDAN	Small and Medium Enterprise Development Agency of Nigeria
SPSO	State Programme Support Offices
SSACDP	Sokoto State Agricultural and Community Development Project
SSO	State Support Office
TAGs	technical assistance grants
T&V	training & visit
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank

Nigeria

IFAD-funded Project and Programme Areas



The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IFAD concerning the delimitation of the frontiers or boundaries, or the authorities thereof.

Map compiled by IFAD

FOREWORD

Since the start of its activities in Nigeria in 1985, IFAD has contributed to financing nine projects/programmes in the country. The total cost of these interventions amounts to approximately US\$642 million (inclusive of counterpart funding and cofinancing), of which IFAD loans account for US\$187.4 million. In addition, since 1979, IFAD has provided 31 technical assistance grants that were mostly of regional or sub-regional nature but which also covered some of the Fund's operations in Nigeria.

The most recent country strategic opportunities paper (COSOP) for Nigeria, prepared in 2001, reflected Government and IFAD strategic priorities for reducing poverty and ensuring the sustainable economic and social development of the country's rural poor. Key elements of the COSOP were as follows: (i) policy advocacy for pro-poor reforms and improved local governance; (ii) development of rural institutions; and (iii) productivity and natural resources management.

The first country programme evaluation (CPE) of Nigeria, undertaken by the Office of Evaluation in 2007-2008, found that the overall strategy set out in the COSOP provided a useful framework for the partnership between IFAD and the Government, and that the aforementioned key elements were relevant not only at the time of COSOP preparation but also in terms of the present development context.

The CPE found, however, that a number of areas should have received greater attention in the COSOP, including: (i) assessment of the depth of Nigeria's rural poverty in order to facilitate selection of strategic priorities; (ii) analysis of institutional constraints in need of remedial action so as to ensure more effective support to agriculture and natural resources management; and (iii) lessons learned from the limited results of previous microfinance activities and enterprise development, and from implementation difficulties experienced by earlier projects. Moreover, involvement of the private sector was not adequately covered in the COSOP.

Overall, the performance of the project portfolio in Nigeria was found to be only moderately satisfactory. However, the CPE noted that positive achievements had been made with regard to improving physical and financial assets, social capital and empowerment, and food security. IFAD was also instrumental in promoting the community-driven development (CDD) approach in agriculture and rural development programmes in Nigeria, which the Government and other donors are following under their own programmes. In this regard, the CPE found that unit costs for development of infrastructure, such as rural roads, were lower and of the same quality under the CDD approach as they were when the work was carried out by line departments or private contractors. Moreover, support to agricultural research for the development of pest-resistant and high-yielding cassava varieties contributed to improving livelihoods and incomes.

Apart from the foregoing successes, however, less impressive results were discernable in agricultural productivity and natural resources management. Likewise, efforts to promote access to input/output markets were limited, partly because this was not an explicit objective of the COSOP. Another implementation constraint had to do with delays in the provision of counterpart funds, which, in some cases, held up project implementation.

The report includes the Agreement at Completion Point summarizing the main findings of the evaluation and setting out the recommendations that were discussed and agreed by the Federal Government of Nigeria and IFAD, together with proposals as to how and by whom the recommendations will be implemented.



Luciano Lavizzari
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Federal Republic of Nigeria
Country Programme Evaluation

Executive Summary

A. Introduction and Background

1. **Evaluation objectives, methodology and process.** The objectives of the country programme evaluation (CPE) are to assess the performance and impact of the IFAD country programme in Nigeria and develop findings and recommendations to serve as building blocks for preparation of the new country strategic opportunities programme (COSOP) by the Fund's Western and Central Africa Division (PA) and the Federal Government of Nigeria. This represents the first full evaluation of the Nigerian portfolio since project funding commenced in 1985. The CPE covers the ten-year period 1998-2008, and analyses the seven loan projects (of a total of nine) that were still ongoing at the time of the COSOP in 2000, or whose implementation is about to start. The findings of the CPE are based on: (i) a desk review of existing documentation; (ii) self-assessments by PA and three of the programme management teams including the Roots and Tuber Expansion Programme (RTEP), Community-based Agricultural and Rural Development Programme (CBARDP), and the Community-based Natural Resource Management Programme (CBNRMP); (iii) a country portfolio review undertaken by PA in 2007, and a performance assessment study of two of the projects commissioned as part of the CPE; and (iv) four weeks of work by seven mission members in the country including key informant and focus group discussions with stakeholders and partners.

2. A preparatory mission fielded in October 2007 was followed by the main mission in November/December 2007. Comments from the Government, programme managers and PA were taken into account in preparing this report. A round-table workshop was held in Nigeria in November 2008, the outputs of which inform the preparation of the Agreement at Completion Point between the Government and IFAD.

3. **Country perspective.** Nigeria is the world's twelfth largest producer of oil. Its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has increased fivefold since 1990 and stands in 2007 at US\$140 billion, giving a GDP per capita of over US\$1,000 and expected, consistent current-account surpluses of ten per cent of GDP per year. However, the country's 140 million people are still among the poorest in the world: the country is ranked 158 out of 177 nations in the Human Development Index of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and 80 out of 108 in the Poverty Index. Income disparity and widespread poverty persist despite burgeoning foreign revenues. Until the return of democratic government in 1999, Nigeria was characterized by a series of military dictatorships, economic mismanagement and blatant corruption; some of these issues remain as challenges to this day.

4. Apart from the oil sector, the economy is agrarian-based and the bias of poverty is to the rural areas; the incidence of poverty reaches as much as 80 per cent in some northern States compared with the 64 per cent national average. Agriculture is the mainstay of rural livelihoods and social fabric and still accounts for about 45 per cent of GDP and 60-70 per cent of employment, but its importance is declining in the face of growth of other sectors and diminishing farm returns. Government and donor efforts to stimulate expansion and commercialization, in line with the prioritization of agriculture as a main plank in the poverty reduction and economic growth strategy, have yet to yield the desired change. The sector is dominated by smallholders: small farms, ranging in size from one to five ha, account for over 90 per cent of output; over half of all farmers produce only food crops in the production, processing and marketing of which women play the major role. Nigeria is Africa's largest producer of yam and cowpea, and the world's leading producer of cassava¹, and a major fish producer with annual outputs of over 300,000 tons.

¹ Partly as a consequence of an earlier support of IFAD, working in conjunction with the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture and the Federal and State Governments.

5. Government policy for rural and regional development is set out in the National Empowerment and Economic Development Strategy (NEEDS) and complementary state and local strategies. The goals of NEEDS include: poverty reduction, wealth creation, and employment generation, to be achieved through: (i) empowering people and improving the delivery of social services; (ii) fostering private-sector-led growth in an appropriate enabling environment; and (iii) enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of government.

6. In Nigeria's 2008 budget, NGN121 billion (US\$1bn) is to be devoted to agriculture, more than trebling the previous allocation. The budget does not specify poverty funding separately, but the implied allotment for NEEDS in 2007 was NGN1,391 billion (US\$11.6bn). Total official development assistance (ODA) in 2006 reached US\$280 million, equivalent to US\$2 per capita, compared with the average of US\$28 per capita for Africa. ODA plays a minimal role in Nigeria. Principal donors are the European Union, World Bank, UNDP, Department for International Development (DfID) of the United Kingdom and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The current annual IFAD allocation of US\$51.85m places it as one relatively minor donor and IFAD expenditures are also minimal compared with state and Local Government Area (LGA) budgets. By general consent, IFAD funding - and experience and expertise - are valued mainly for their catalytic effect.

B. The Country Strategy and IFAD-funded Operations

7. The 2001-2007 COSOP, the first formal strategic planning document on Nigeria to be submitted to the Executive Board, was the result of a two-year consultative process, much of it carried out in-country among a broad group of stakeholders and including a number of workshops and studies. The document reflected IFAD's sound project track record and both government and IFAD strategic priorities, as well as those of other donors and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Key elements of the COSOP strategy are: (i) policy advocacy for pro-poor reforms and improved local governance; (ii) development of effective rural institutions; and (iii) productivity and natural resources management. Major strategic thrusts are: empowerment of core target groups and community-based organizations (CBOs) to generate higher on- and off-farm incomes; supporting expansion of access to information, communication, infrastructure and technologies; and improving access of the poor to financial and social services.

8. The COSOP strategy has proved to be a workable framework for the IFAD/Government partnership and for identification of development themes. The areas in which the strategy might have been stronger and more detailed were in the analysis and deduction of findings on: poverty and targeting; emphasis on agriculture; IFAD's comparative advantage; lessons of failure in credit, enterprise development and income-generating activities; implementation difficulties; the importance of partnerships; and donor collaboration. Of the key elements, development of effective rural institutions has had the greatest effect; policy advocacy has been problematic without an IFAD country presence, which was not established until 2006. Agricultural productivity and natural resources management initiatives have been relegated in importance in project funding and have proved difficult to implement owing to constraints of poverty and affordability and to households having alternative sources of income. Overall, the value of the IFAD input and the quality of the strategy output are rated as moderately satisfactory, a score of 4.2 on the IFAD evaluation scale.

9. The CPE covers two completed projects: Katsina State Agricultural and Community Development Project (KSACDP) and Sokoto State Agricultural and Community Development Project (SSACDP), which closed in 2001; and the three ongoing programmes: the Community-Based Agricultural and Rural Development Programme (CBARDP); Roots and Tubers Expansion Programme (RTEP); and the Community-Based Natural Resource Management Programme-Niger Delta (CBNRMP), which form the core of the CPE. The two projects not yet effective – the Rural Finance Institutions-Building Programme (RUFIN) and the Rural Microenterprise Development Programme (RUMEDP) – are assessed only in terms of quality of design and strategic consistency. The geographical spread of IFAD assistance encompasses all except a few central and eastern States.

10. The CPE also covers 11 technical assistance (TA) and eight grants dating from 1997/1999. The value of IFAD programme loans has been US\$187.2 million out of a total cost of US\$641.9 million, with IFAD contributing 29 per cent; while for the grants included in the CPE, the IFAD amounts allocated have been US\$9.4 million for technical assistance grants and US\$0.85 million for early implementation support grants. The World Bank was the only cooperating institution involved until 2007 in the supervision of IFAD supported projects, but the RTEP, RUFIN and RUMED programmes are to be supervised directly by IFAD.

C. Performance and Impact of IFAD-funded Operations

11. The evolution of the portfolio up to 2006 followed a logical pattern of synergy of coverage and content, building on and expanding successful aspects of previous projects. This is best seen in the community-driven development (CDD) modality and LGA involvement; in capability-building from the Katsina and Sokoto Projects being incorporated in the CBARDP and CBNRMP; and the latter drawing lessons also from the Cassava Multiplication and Artisanal Fisheries Development Projects. Synergy in the portfolio also contributes to performance, coinciding on strong themes of enhancing social facilities and services and improving food security and incomes of poor rural households. The new RUFIN and RUMED programmes take IFAD into a different spectrum of development as to content, institutional framework for implementation and some new States.

12. The prevailing pattern of funding of earlier projects was planned as: IFAD contribution, 40–60 per cent; Federal Government, 12–15 per cent; and state and local governments, three or four per cent. The remaining funding relates to participating local institutions, cofinancing, and beneficiaries. Actual out-turns were of the order of: IFAD, 60–70 per cent; Federal Government, five per cent; and state and local governments 15–16 per cent. In recent programmes, LGAs have increased their contribution, with a norm of: IFAD, about 40 per cent; and all levels of government, 60 per cent. In many instances, cofinancing did not materialize as planned. Of the TA grants, all except two have been devoted to supporting regional research and development associated mainly with cassava. The exceptions were grants to NGOs for assistance in community development and benefit assessment. The early implementation support grants range from almost US\$20,000 up to the US\$400,000 now scheduled for RUMEDP, typical of the larger amounts now available through the IFAD grant window.

13. The first measure of relevance is comparison of project content with the key elements of the COSOP; on this count, there is a large degree of consonance. On other factors of relevance, including orientation to poverty, livelihood, and implementation, most of the interventions record positive results; the major exception is the second phase of RTEP, which is promoting an approach to cassava processing that is of questionable viability. The CPE observed a considerable range of implementation progress across the portfolio. Effectiveness is just one of a number of exemplary results, for instance under the CDD approach; and less impressive results, as in agricultural and natural resources conservation. The CPE has particular concerns about the prospective performance of RTEP, phase-2, RUFIN and RUMEDP. The determination of efficiency is more complex, but in Nigeria the crucial constraints of the long duration of project preparation and the prevalent delays and denials of funding militate against efficient performance. Despite these factors, individual projects have reported marked economies in construction of social infrastructure and reasonable costs per beneficiary.

14. The rural poverty impact of the country programme is assessed primarily on the results of KSACDP, SSACDP and the first phase of RTEP; for CBARDP and RTEP Phase-2, the discernible likely impact is also taken into account. The CPE finds that outreach to the targeted population has been less than planned. Nevertheless, there has been positive change in the predicament of direct and indirect beneficiaries across all of the projects in terms of enhanced household food sufficiency, as well as modest increases in family incomes; better accessibility of health, education and transport services; and a marked change in community and women's confidence and self-reliance. Notable impacts have been attained in the enhancement of physical and financial assets, social capital and empowerment, and food security. Less impressive impacts have been recorded in agricultural productivity, environment and common resources, and market access.

15. The sustainability of impact is mainly determined by project design and implementation effectiveness, but also by the Government emphasis on, and funding for, agriculture. Thus the political, economic and social facets of sustainability are reasonably assured, while institutional sustainability is less certain. IFAD interventions have clearly been innovative, as demonstrated by the replication and scaling up to 26 States of the cassava productivity activities during the first phase of RTEP; and by adoption of the CDD approach in African Development Bank (AfDB) projects and in other States, LGAs and communities, often without external funding. The RUFIN and RUMED programmes have been designed to be replicated and scaled up, but the CPE has concerns that the environment in which they are to be implemented - and the less than certain commitment of potential partners - may make this difficult to occur.

16. The performance of partners in delivery of the country programme has been overshadowed by the inordinate time taken for project preparation and implementation, the problems of inconsistent fund flows and the lack of urgency and decisiveness in taking action to resolve problems and improve progress. These factors impinge on the performance of all parties. IFAD's performance has been constrained by lack of an in-country presence and the complexities of dealing with government without field presence and relying on cooperating institutions for supervision. The performance of federal government agencies has been variable. It is unclear whether the present arrangement with the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources (FMAWR) and the National Food Reserve Agency (NFRA) will be sufficient for the developing of more diverse programmes. The performance of States and LGAs has been reasonable, but not always as strong as it could have been. Where it has been lacking, the performance of programme managements has been mostly due to deficient project design and is not a reflection on the calibre or dedication of the staff cadre. The performance of the cooperating institution is judged as proficient in supervision and moderately satisfactory. The performance of partners is assessed as moderately satisfactory.

17. The aggregate achievement of the portfolio is rated as 4.4, moderately satisfactory, with individual ratings lying between 4.0 and 4.5, except for efficiency, which is 3.5, between moderately satisfactory and moderately unsatisfactory. Innovation, replication and scaling up is rated 4.8, satisfactory.

Overall Performance and Impact of IFAD-funded Operations in Nigeria

Evaluation Criteria	KSACDP	SSACDP	RTEP	CBARDP	CPE Assessment
Core performance criteria					
Relevance	5	5	3	5	4.5
Effectiveness	4	4	3	5	4
Efficiency	3	4	3	4	3.5
Project performance	4	4.3	3	4.7	4
Rural poverty impact	4	4	4	5	4.3
Physical assets	5	5	5	5	5
Social capital and empowerment	5	5	4	6	5
Food security and agricultural productivity	4	4	5	5	4.5
Environment and common resource	2	2	2	4	3
Financial assets and market access	3	3	2	4	3
Institutions and services	5	5	5	6	5.3
Other performance criteria					
Sustainability	5	5	3	4	4.3
Innovation, replication and scaling up	5	5	4	5	4.8
Overall project portfolio achievement	4.5	4.5	3.5	4.7	4.4
Partner performance					
IFAD	3	3	4	5	3.8
Government	3	3	3	5	3.5
Cooperating institution	4	4	4	4	4

Rating scale: 6-Highly satisfactory; 5-Satisfactory; 4-Moderately satisfactory; 3-Moderately unsatisfactory; 2-Unsatisfactory; and 1-Highly unsatisfactory.

^a Overall project achievement reflects the combined assessment of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, rural poverty impact, sustainability and innovation. As per the evaluation guidelines of IFAD's Office of Evaluation, the performance of partners is not included in the aforementioned calculation. The overall portfolio achievement is calculated in a similar way.

D. Conclusions

18. The pro-poor development environment in Nigeria presents an unusual set of circumstances and conditions compared with those of most IFAD borrower countries in Africa owing to its vast oil and gas reserves that provide it with high volumes of hard currency export earnings. The country therefore has adequate financial resources to promote economic and social welfare, including agricultural and rural development activities that are crucial to reducing poverty. In fact, Nigeria allocated about four per cent of its federal public expenditure to agriculture in 2007; this figure has risen to seven per cent in 2008. It is, however, still less than the ten per cent target established by African governments at the African Union Summit on Food Security, held in Abuja in December 2006.

19. Despite this, Nigeria has not yet managed to resolve its rural poverty problems. The per capita gross national income was around US\$620, based on 2005 data (World Bank, 2008). More recent statistics² put the GDP purchasing power parity at US\$1,256 for 2007. The challenge of poverty is illustrated by the fact that around 25 per cent of all the rural poor in sub-Saharan countries live in Nigeria. The population living below the poverty line in 2006³ is 64 per cent, down from 71 per cent in 2003. Poverty incidence has a rural bias, with an overall rural prevalence in excess of 67 per cent for all households and 77 per cent for woman-headed households. The rural population has extremely limited access to infrastructure and services such as education and health.

² From the Central Bank of Nigeria.

³ As estimated by the Government Core Welfare Indicator Survey.

20. The ODA that Nigeria receives is extremely limited compared with the federal budget. It comprises only around 0.5 per cent of GDP, which is significantly lower than the eight per cent for developing countries as a whole and is equivalent to only US\$2 per capita compared with the average of US\$28 per capita for Africa. ODA figures make up around one per cent of overall public spending, which is US\$14.1 billion. In such a context, therefore, the resources that IFAD provides for rural poverty reduction are minimal in terms of volume when compared with total government revenues and with the contributions of some other donors, such as the European Union and the World Bank.

21. In spite of this, IFAD is seen by Nigeria as an important development partner because of: its focus on sustainable agriculture and rural development as a means of reducing rural poverty; the comparative advantage of the flexibility and quality of its interventions; and its experience in participatory and bottom-up approaches and in innovative solutions to poverty alleviation that can be replicated and scaled up by the Government, the private sector, donors and others. Nigeria is entitled to more than 40 per cent of the Fund's overall financial allocations to the PA region. This high level of allocation has significant implications for the resources required and for the way IFAD manages its strategy and operations in the country.

22. Agriculture and rural development are crucial to Nigeria's rural economy and social fabric. Around 45 per cent of GDP is generated from agriculture and almost 70 per cent of the poor live in rural areas and derive their livelihoods primarily from small-scale agriculture and rural activities. Small farmers account for about 90 per cent of the country's food production. Limited accessibility to inputs, equipment, new technology, and markets has kept agricultural productivity low. Small farmers are also more acutely affected by exogenous factors such as climate change and rising commodity prices. Thus, given its mandate, IFAD is a natural choice as development partner, and the Government has clearly indicated its commitment to the sector in the NEEDS, the National Policy on Integrated Rural Development and the New Agricultural Policy Thrust.

23. On the question of the importance of agriculture, the CPE findings indicate that, with programmes devoted to rural finance and rural enterprise development in recent years, the Fund has not devoted adequate levels of attention to agricultural activities in its Nigerian operations, which would have been commensurate with the centrality of agriculture in the overall economy and as the main means of income and food security of the rural poor. In spite of its modest financial contributions, IFAD has a distinct and catalytic role, in collaboration with Government and other donors, in supporting achievement of the MDGs relating to the elimination of poverty and hunger. In sum, with its focus on enhancing the productivity of small and landless farmers, IFAD is well positioned to support the Government in improving the livelihoods of small farmers, including women, artisanal fisher folk, pastoralists and other disadvantaged communities.

24. **Promotion of replicable innovations.** The Fund has been fairly successful in promoting pro-poor innovations in its operations. The grant-funded support to the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture for research on developing new cassava varieties and for promoting CDD in projects in Katsina and Sokoto States and ongoing community-based programmes, are examples of successful innovations. The CPE finds that a number of successfully tested innovations in IFAD operations have been replicated and scaled up by local governments and others. A more systematic and organized effort by IFAD might have ensured a wider replication and scaling up of successfully promoted innovations in IFAD operations.

25. Related to the above, the evaluation found that insufficient human and financial resources and time were devoted to IFAD engagement in policy dialogue, knowledge management and the development and nurturing of strategic partnerships with key players in agriculture. These are important ingredients for replication and scaling up, which is in fact the ultimate test of IFAD's capacity to promote innovations. Even though there are some improvements in such activities as a result of the recent establishment of the country presence office, IFAD's performance in non-lending activities was only moderately satisfactory.

26. The CPE concludes that the innovation promotion process was not systematic, and that the synergies between grant- and loan-funded activities could have been greater. Moreover, the

innovations promoted were not sufficiently integrated into broader project activities that would have allowed them to contribute more effectively to achieving project objectives. For instance, while the demand-driven CDD approach was appreciated by the rural poor and their organizations, little attention was devoted to positioning CDD within the broader local governance framework with linkages to the private sector, such as banks that could have provided credit for enterprises and income-generating activities.

27. **Local governance.** IFAD interventions have contributed to changing the mind-set of the local governments and community leaders towards local governance through an inclusive process of decision making. Positive results include, in particular, under the community-driven development (CDD) approach: (i) pioneering of participatory processes to empower beneficiaries, and foster group and community cohesion and self-reliance for development actions; (ii) involvement of LGAs in development planning and execution and the consequential support of improved local governance; and (iii) contribution to construction, cost-effective completion, timely achievement and organization for operation, maintenance and management of social infrastructure.

28. Furthermore, the approach and content of IFAD supported programmes have lent themselves to rapid and sound expansion and replication at both National, State and LGA level, as demonstrated by the broad support of the CDD model by both State and Federal government and other donors as best practice for local development.

29. However, while the demand-driven CDD approach was appreciated by the rural poor and their organizations, little attention was devoted to positioning this approach within the broader local governance framework with linkages to the private sector, such as rural banks that could have provided credit for enterprises and income-generating activities. The strengthening of the capacity of other key players at the local level such as local government and local elected bodies at the state and LGA level could have been pursued most strongly.

30. **Country strategy issues.** The CPE found the analysis of opportunities and constraints in the agriculture and rural sectors, as well as of rural poverty in the 2001 COSOP, to be limited. This may reflect inadequate capacity and skills on the part of the Fund to undertake thorough analytic work while preparing COSOPs. However, the COSOP provided a useful framework for cooperation with the country. Its attention to policy advocacy in agriculture and rural development, to promoting effective rural institutions and to productivity and natural resources management were, and remain, relevant and important in today's aid architecture in Nigeria.

31. The strategy did not, however, pay adequate attention to smallholder agriculture activities. The vast geographic coverage of IFAD's activities in Nigeria, with near national coverage of some operations, also raises concerns related, inter alia, to synergies within and across projects and programmes, as well as to the sustainability of benefits. With regard to the latter, for example, a wide geographic spread of activities would cause greater challenges to the Government in providing the technical assistance and follow-up, needed by the rural poor after project completion.

32. The CPE underlines three specific issues related to partnerships that call for reflection. Firstly, the recent development of operations outside the purely agricultural sector has created new challenges in terms of defining the respective institutional roles and responsibilities within federal agencies, for which a clear solution is yet to be found. Secondly, while the evaluation recognizes the importance of working with federal and state governments it has found that the various administrative layers introduce complexity in operations, for example, in terms of delays and denials of funds flows, arising from difficulties in securing counterpart funding, as well as implementation, coordination, monitoring and communication issues. Thirdly, there has been only limited cofinancing of IFAD interventions, so that opportunities for replication, scaling up and joint pro-poor policy dialogue have not been maximized.

33. Finally, the evaluation acknowledges that the sound move towards direct supervision and implementation support in recent operations should contribute to better development effectiveness on the ground. Similarly, the evaluation commends IFAD for strengthening its presence by establishing

an office in such a large and important country as Nigeria. However, its view is that the current human resources arrangements, level of delegation of authority and resources deployed for the country presence are not of a calibre that would ensure that the country office can play an appropriate role in improving IFAD assistance.

E. Recommendations

34. The CPE includes three overarching recommendations that would contribute towards improving IFAD's development effectiveness in Nigeria. These are: (i) renewing the focus on agricultural development for rural poverty reduction; (ii) promoting pro-poor innovative solutions; and (iii) adapting IFAD's operating model to changing circumstances.

35. **Renewing the focus on agricultural development for rural poverty reduction.** The evaluation recommends that IFAD's future strategy and activities in Nigeria should pay critical attention to addressing the main challenges related to the low productivity of smallholder farmers. This would serve as the main vehicle for improving small farmers' competitiveness, including enhancing their incomes and promoting better livelihoods. Among other issues, this entails ensuring more systematic access to markets by adopting a value-chain approach, as well as linkages with the private sector, for example, for the provision of sustainable rural financial services and agro processing. Moreover, the heterogeneity of small farmers requires different approaches that cater to the needs of both subsistence and market-oriented individuals and groups.

36. In addition, the renewed focus should be accompanied by a more narrowly defined geographic concentration of IFAD operations in Nigeria. This would facilitate project implementation and coordination, as well as ensure wider synergies within and across projects. The levels of rural poverty and gender inequality could be amongst two of the main criteria for choosing the states and LGAs upon which to focus. The CPE also recommends that IFAD should reflect upon the pros and cons of working with the Federal Government on the one hand and with the state governments on the other hand. Opportunities for direct lending to State authorities could be explored, as this is likely to contribute to building more ownership and to facilitate the flow of funds and allocation of counterpart financing by the States themselves, which has in fact been a constraint in the past.

37. Finally, IFAD needs to ensure that the federal partner agencies selected have the required skills, experience and competencies to ensure effective implementation and support to IFAD-financed activities. In this regard, it is important to expeditiously develop a mutually satisfactory understanding on pending institutional issues, in terms of coordination, division of labour and implementation, especially as they relate to RUMEDP, which is not yet effective; and around future project activities that may demand different competences. In the absence of such an understanding, IFAD management may consider a cancellation of the corresponding loan in the near future, thereby allowing IFAD to devote its limited resources to other pressing country strategy, programme development and implementation issues.

38. **Promoting pro-poor innovative solutions.** The total volume of ODA to Nigeria is small in relation to the government budget, and IFAD's financial contribution corresponds to a very small portion of total ODA. Therefore, the CPE recommends that IFAD should focus its future country strategy and programme on promoting pro-poor innovative solutions to rural poverty, which can be replicated and scaled up by the Government, donors, private sector and others. This requires a more systematic approach to finding and piloting innovations, and greater attention to policy dialogue, knowledge management and development of strategic partnerships, which are important factors in achieving the replication and scaling up of successful innovations.

39. Similarly, proactive efforts are required to link grants to loan-funded investment projects. Grants may be used for testing innovative solutions, which can then be applied more broadly through loan operations. Among other areas, innovations could be centred on the objective of improving smallholder farmer productivity, taking account of the challenges currently facing farmers, including those caused by rising commodity prices. This should also include due consideration being given to

adaptive research oriented to the needs of small farmers. Likewise, innovative solutions that would assist farmers to limit the effects of climate change should be explored.

40. **Strengthening local governance.** It is recommended to devote more attention to positioning CDD within the broader local governance framework and strengthening local governance, including all actors at the local level such as States and LGAs, elected local bodies, the private sector, local NGOs, and other actors involved at the local level together with CBOs. In particular, at the State and LGA level, there is a need to reinforce grass roots and local government capabilities in development planning, delivery and improvement of service provision.

41. Empowerment and consolidation for progressive devolution of governance to the local level should be supported through policy dialogue and improved knowledge management⁴. The CDD paradigm needs to be adopted wherever relevant as the basis for development action.

42. The development of robust farmer associations as part of a stronger local governance framework that can lead to better empowerment of the poor would be another area of innovation for IFAD and the Government to pursue in the future. In this regard, IFAD's positive experience of promoting farmer associations in both Western and Central Africa and in other regions might prove valuable.

43. **Adapting IFAD's operating model.** Nigeria is a large country of importance to IFAD. Given the vast number of rural poor, the increasing financial allocations under the performance-based allocation system (PBAS) and the proposed re-emphasis on promotion of replicable innovations, it is recommended that IFAD should seek ways and means of strengthening its country presence. In this regard, the option of out-posting the country portfolio manager should be explored. Such a country presence might also have a sub regional dimension. A stronger country presence would allow IFAD to be more fully engaged in policy dialogue, further its commitment to meeting the provisions of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, improve its knowledge management, and ensure even better implementation support.

44. The introduction of the PBAS has important implications for the projects funded by IFAD in Nigeria. Increasing the total volume of resources allocated to the country under the PBAS calls for serious thought as to the number of projects to be developed and the corresponding volumes of loans. Given the current levels of IFAD human resources allocated to Nigeria, financing fewer projects with larger loan amounts would appear to be the most plausible option.

⁴ As advocated by the recent thematic evaluation on IFAD's Performance and Impact in Decentralizing Environments, Office of Evaluation, July 2005.

Federal Republic of Nigeria
Country Programme Evaluation

Agreement at Completion Point

A. Background

1. In 2007/2008, the Office of Evaluation (OE) of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) conducted a country programme evaluation (CPE) in Nigeria. The main objectives of the CPE were to: (i) assess the performance and impact of IFAD's strategy and operations in the country; and (ii) develop a series of findings and recommendations that will serve as building blocks for the preparation of the new results-based country strategy and opportunities programme (COSOP) for Nigeria. The COSOP will be formulated by the West and Central Africa Division (PA) of IFAD and the Federal Government of Nigeria.

2. This Agreement at Completion Point (ACP) presents the key findings and recommendations contained in the CPE. It also benefits from the main discussion points that emerged at the CPE National Roundtable Workshop (NRTW), organized in Abuja on 27-28 November 2008. The ACP captures the understanding between IFAD management, represented by the Programme Management Department, and Government of Nigeria, represented by the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources (FMAWR) on the core CPE findings and on their commitment to adopt and implement the evaluation recommendations contained herein within specified timeframe.

B. Main Findings

3. **Development setting.** The pro-poor development environment in Nigeria is unusual in that its vast oil and gas exports provide the country with high volumes of hard currency earnings, adequate financial resources to promote economic and social welfare and reduce rural poverty. Despite its relatively high income, Nigeria has not yet managed to resolve its income disparity and rural poverty problems. The per capita gross national income was around US\$620, based on 2005 data (World Bank, 2008). The poverty challenge is illustrated by the fact that Nigeria accounts for around 25 per cent of the rural poor in sub-Saharan Africa, and still has 64 per cent of the population living below the poverty line in 2006, with around 80 per cent incidence among woman-headed households.

4. During the period under review, and in 2007, only about four per cent of the federal public expenditure was allocated to agriculture. In 2008, the present Government raised this figure to seven per cent with plans to increase it to more than the ten per cent target agreed at the Conference of the Ministers of Agriculture of the African Union in Maputo in 2003. Overseas development assistance to Nigeria is extremely limited comprising only 0.5 per cent of GDP and the IFAD contribution is minimal compared to total Government revenues or the contributions of donors such as the European Union and the World Bank.

5. Agriculture and rural development are crucial to the Nigerian economy. Around 45 per cent of GDP is generated from agriculture and almost 70 per cent of the poor live in rural areas and derive their livelihoods primarily from small-scale agriculture and rural activities. Small farmers account for 90 per cent of national food production. Limited accessibility to inputs, equipment, new technology, and markets has kept agricultural productivity low. Small farmers are also more acutely affected by climate change and commodity price volatility.

6. Government is committed to the sector as indicated in the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy, the National Policy on Integrated Rural Development and the New Agricultural Policy Thrust. IFAD is considered by the Government as an important development partner because of: (i) its focus on agriculture and rural development for rural poverty reduction; (ii) its flexibility as a development organization and the quality of its interventions; and (iii) its

experience in participatory approaches and in promoting innovative solutions to rural poverty reduction that can be replicated and scaled up by the Government, donors, the private sector and others. Also, according to the IFAD Performance Based Allocation System, Nigeria is entitled to over 40 per cent of the Fund's overall financial allocations to the West and Central Africa Region.

Performance and Impact of IFAD's Strategy and Operations

7. **IFAD country strategy issues.** The CPE found the analysis of opportunities and constraints in the agriculture and rural sectors, as well as of rural poverty in the 2001 COSOP, to be limited in depth. However, the COSOP provided a useful framework for cooperation with the country. Its attention to policy and advocacy in agriculture and rural development, to promoting effective rural institutions and to productivity and natural resources management were, and remain, relevant and important in the aid architecture of today.

8. The vast geographic coverage of IFAD's activities, with near national coverage of some operations also raises concerns related, *inter alia*, to synergies within and across projects as well as to the sustainability of benefits. Nevertheless, the approach and content of IFAD supported community driven development (CDD) concept projects have lent themselves to rapid and sound expansion and replication at National, State and Local Government Area (LGA) levels, with broad support by Government and donors and considered as best practice for local development. However, insufficient attention was devoted to smallholder agriculture activities and the limited positioning of CDD within the broader local governance framework, where linkages to the private sector, such as rural banks, could have provided credit for enterprises and income-generating activities. With regard to the latter, for example, a wide geographic spread of activities would cause greater challenges to the Government in providing the technical assistance and follow-up needed by the rural poor after project completion.

9. IFAD Operational Issues

(a) **Centrality of agriculture.** Despite its modest financial contribution, IFAD has a distinct and catalytic role in improving the livelihoods of small farmers, including women, artisanal fisher folk, pastoralists and other disadvantaged communities. However, recent operations financed by IFAD have not devoted adequate levels of attention to agricultural activities.

(b) **Local governance.** IFAD interventions have contributed to a change in mind-sets in the LGAs and community leaders, who have adopted a more inclusive approach to decision making and resource allocation for rural poverty reduction activities. Positive results are visible especially under the CDD approach. These include: (i) pioneering of participatory processes, beneficiary empowerment and fostering of group and community cohesion and self-reliance for development; (ii) involvement of LGAs in development planning and execution, leading to better local governance; and (iii) contribution to construction, cost-effective completion, timely achievement and organization for operations and maintenance and management of social infrastructure.

(c) **Institutional framework and partnership.** The CPE underlines three specific issues related to institutional arrangements and partnerships for project planning and implementation. Firstly, the recent development of operations outside the purely agricultural sector has created new challenges and very strong reservations by the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources in terms of institutional roles and responsibilities among federal agencies, for project implementation. Secondly, while the CPE recognizes the importance of working with Federal and State Governments, it finds the various administrative layers introduce complexity in operations, for example, in terms of delays and denials in funds flows, arising from difficulties in securing counterpart funding, as well as implementation, coordination, monitoring and communication. Thirdly, there has been only limited cofinancing of IFAD interventions, so that opportunities for replication, up-scaling and joint pro-poor policy dialogue have not been maximized.

(d) **Promotion of pro-poor replicable innovations.** IFAD has been successful in promoting pro-poor innovations in its operations in Nigeria. However, a more systematic and organized effort by IFAD might have ensured even wider replication and scaling up and insufficient human and financial resources, and time, were devoted for IFAD's engagement in policy dialogue, knowledge management and the fostering of strategic partnerships with key players in agriculture activities. Although the grant-funded support to the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture to develop new cassava varieties, and the promotion of community-driven development in projects in the Katsina and Sokoto States and other community-based programmes are examples of successful innovations that have been replicated and scaled up by local governments and others. IFAD's performance in non-lending activities was only moderately satisfactory. Also, the CPE found that insufficient synergies were developed between IFAD grant-funded and loan-funded activities, thus limiting the benefits of grant-funded initiatives. Grants have been used, *inter-alia*, for developing and piloting new technologies, which have not always found their way into wider loan-funded activities.

(e) **IFAD country presence.** Operational activities and participation in in-country meetings and working groups' activities have improved with the recent establishment of the country presence office (CPO). The CPE acknowledges that the sound move towards direct supervision and implementation support in recent operations should further contribute to better development effectiveness on the ground. As such, the evaluation commends IFAD for strengthening its presence by establishing an office in such a large and important country as Nigeria. However, its view is that the current human resources arrangements, level of delegation of authority and resources deployed for the country presence should be of a calibre that would allow it to play a greater role in improving IFAD's assistance to Nigeria.

C. Recommendations

Recommendation 1: Renewal of Focus on Small-scale Agriculture for Poverty Alleviation

10. The evaluation recommends that the future IFAD strategy and activities in Nigeria should pay critical attention to addressing the main challenges related to the low productivity of smallholder farmers. This would serve as the main vehicle for improving small farmer competitiveness, including enhancing their incomes and promoting better livelihoods. The heterogeneity of small farmers would require different approaches that cater to the needs of both subsistence and market-oriented individuals and groups. The prime importance of a value chain-based and commercialized approach to enhancing small farm livelihoods is acknowledged. As such, particular attention should be given to ensuring more systematic access to markets by adopting a value-chain approach, as well as linkages with the private sector, for example, for the provision of sustainable rural financial services and agro-processing. It is also recognized that, where required, rural finance and micro-enterprise development, adaptive research and extension, environmental management, and improvement of livestock production and marketing are key elements of small farm development.

11. In addition, it is recommended that the renewed focus should be accompanied by a reduced geographic coverage of IFAD-supported operations, including those that have a national coverage as well as those that take an area-based development approach. This would, *inter-alia*, contribute to better development effectiveness in general, and at the same time facilitate supervision and implementation support, the promotion of innovations, monitoring, evaluation and co-ordination, as well as ensure wider synergies within and across projects. The criteria for selection from the reduced areas to target in the future will be further discussed during the formulation of the next Nigeria COSOP. For instance, the levels of rural poverty and gender inequality are examples of two important criteria for choosing the intensity of support to States and LGAs upon which to focus.

Recommendation 2: Adaptation of the Institutional Framework and Partnerships

12. The CPE also recommends that the current operational arrangements whereby the roles and responsibilities of the Federal Government and State and Local Governments are adequately stratified be further deepened to emphasize intensity of action at the local levels. Lending to State Governments under the Subsidiary Loan Agreements with the Federal Ministry of Finance is an effective way of increasing ownership and giving greater direct responsibility to facilitate the flow of funds and allocation of counterpart financing by the States authorities. Also, allocation of grant resources to national agricultural research institutions will contribute to development of appropriate technologies and identify innovative approaches to sustainable agricultural development.

13. The CPE recommends that IFAD needs to ensure that the federal partner agencies selected have the required skills, experience and competencies to ensure effective implementation and support to IFAD-financed activities. In this regard, it was recommended to expeditiously develop a mutually satisfactory understanding on pending institutional issues, in terms of coordination, division of labour and implementation, especially as they relate to RUMEDP, which has not yet been negotiated. In the absence of such an understanding, IFAD management may consider a cancellation of the corresponding loan in the near future, thereby allowing IFAD to devote its limited resources to other pressing country strategy, programme development and implementation issues.

Recommendation 3: Promoting Pro-poor Innovative Solutions

14. The total volume of official development assistance (ODA) to Nigeria is minimal and the IFAD financial contribution is a very small proportion of total ODA. Therefore, the CPE recommends that IFAD should focus its future country strategy and programme on promoting pro-poor innovative solutions to rural poverty, which can be replicated and scaled up by the Government, donors, private sector and others. It is proposed that a more systematic approach be taken to finding and piloting innovations, and greater attention be paid to policy dialogue, knowledge management and development of strategic partnerships, which are important factors in replication and scaling up of successful innovations. Similarly, proactive efforts are required to link grants to loan-funded investment projects. Grants may be used for testing innovative solutions, which can then be applied more broadly through loans. Among other areas, innovations should be centred on the objective of improving smallholder farmer productivity, taking account of the challenges currently facing farmers, including those of rising commodity prices. This should also include due consideration of adaptive research oriented to the needs of small farmers. Likewise, innovative solutions that would assist farmers to limit the effects of climate change should be explored. The CPE advocates that more attention be given to private/public sector partnerships, donor coordination and policy dialogue. The Federal Government of Nigeria has developed a National Food Security Programme with emphasis on commercial agriculture, food security and sustainable land management, amongst others. In this regard, IFAD will consider to partner on all aspects consistent with its mandate.

Recommendation 4: Strengthening Local Governance

15. The CPE recommends that more attention be devoted to positioning CDD within the broader local governance framework, strengthening the capability of all actors at the local level such as States and LGAs, elected local bodies, the private sector, local NGOs, and CBOs. In particular, at the State and LGA level, there is a need to reinforce grass roots and local government capabilities in development planning, delivery and improvement of service provision. Empowerment and consolidation for progressive devolution of governance to the local level should be supported through policy dialogue and improved knowledge management. The CDD approach should in fact be adopted even more widely as an instrument for participatory agriculture and rural development activities in Nigeria.

16. The development of robust farmer associations as part of a stronger local governance framework that can lead to better empowerment of the poor would be another area of innovation for IFAD and Government to pursue in the future. In this regard, IFAD's positive experience of promoting farmer associations in both Western and Central Africa and in other regions might prove valuable. IFAD can

play a role in supporting the broader participation of all tiers of government and research institutions and grass roots organizations in development, principally through sensitization, capability building, counselling and mentoring.

Recommendation 5: Adaptation of the IFAD Operating Model

17. Nigeria is a large country of strategic importance to IFAD. Given the vast number of rural poor, the increasing financial allocations under the performance-based allocation system (PBAS) and the proposed re-emphasis on promotion of replicable innovations, it was recommended that IFAD should seek ways and means of strengthening its country presence, for example in terms of human and financial resources, infrastructure, roles and responsibility. In this regard, the option of out-posting the country programme manager (CPM) should be explored. Such an IFAD country presence could eventually have a sub-regional dimension, which would entail the CPM covering and based in Nigeria also assuming responsibilities for IFAD operations in selected neighbouring countries. A stronger country presence would allow IFAD to be more fully engaged in policy dialogue, further its commitment to meeting the provisions of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, improve its knowledge management, and ensure even better implementation support.

18. The introduction of the PBAS has important implications for the projects funded by IFAD in Nigeria. Increasing the total volume of resources allocated to the country under the PBAS calls for serious thought as to the number of projects to be developed and the corresponding volumes of loans. Given the current levels of IFAD human resources allocated to Nigeria, it was suggested that financing fewer projects with larger loan amounts would appear to be the most plausible option.

Proposed Timeframe to Implement the Recommendations

19. All of these recommendations will be taken into account in formulating the new results-based COSOP, which is expected to be finalized and discussed by the IFAD Executive Board before the end of 2009.

Key Partners to Be Involved

20. The West and Central Africa Division will be the main IFAD Division responsible for ensuring the implementation of the recommendations in this Agreement at Completion Point. In fact, within the framework of the IFAD President's Report on the Implementation Status and Management Actions, prepared annually and submitted to the Board for consideration, the PA Division will provide an account of how the recommendations were incorporated in the new Nigeria COSOP. The main partner in the Government of Nigeria responsible for ensuring the implementation of the recommendations will be the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources.

Signed by:

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 Date 08-04-09

Mr. Kevin Cleaver

Assistant President, IFAD Programme Management Department, Rome

 Date April 8, 2009



Federal Republic of Nigeria
Country Programme Evaluation

Main Report

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Overview of IFAD Assistance

1. As a major oil producer, Nigeria was a founding member of IFAD in 1977 and since then has been a consistent participant in the financing, administration and management of the Fund. The first IFAD loan to Nigeria was approved in 1985; nine loans, amounting to a total of US\$187 million and funding 29 per cent of total project costs of US\$642 million, have since been disbursed or are in the process of being approved (see Appendix 1). In addition, since 1979, IFAD has provided 31 technical assistance grants (TAGs) amounting to over US\$23 million, for regional, national and international application, to the Nigeria-based International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) and principally related to work on cassava and other root and tuber crops. A further TAG was awarded to the International Fertilizer Development Centre for trials on millet and sorghum. Two additional TAGs worth US\$0.29 million were made available to NGOs for assistance in community and farming development. Nigeria also received eight early implementation support grants worth US\$0.8 million related to the start-up and implementation of project and programme activities.

2. Cofinancing of projects was planned with development organizations such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and with the European Union (EU), the Ford Foundation and other institutions. However, only limited cofinancing materialized, although some parallel financing was undertaken.

3. Counterpart funding has been provided by the Federal and State Governments, local government areas (LGAs), the Niger Delta Development Commission and Nigerian banks. The overall contribution of government institutions ranges from 15 to 38 per cent for closed projects, 36 to 55 per cent for ongoing programmes and 25 to 27 per cent for new programmes. The contribution from beneficiaries ranges from 1 to 5.8 per cent. All, but one, of the IFAD-assisted projects and programmes have had the World Bank as cooperating institution. As of November 2007, however, IFAD has been directly supervising the Roots and Tubers Expansion Programme (RTEP), supported by the Field Presence Office established in early 2006.

4. Official development assistance (ODA) plays a minor role in the economy and is estimated at 0.5 per cent of GDP, which is significantly lower than the eight per cent for developing countries as a whole (Development Assistance Committee, 2007). The IFAD contribution is minimal in terms of share of overall funding (around 18 per cent of the ODA contribution). It is also small in comparison with federal, state and LGA budgets and can only be expected to have a catalytic role.

5. For the two decades preceding Nigeria's return to civilian government in 1999, agricultural and rural development was based on the Multi-State Agricultural Development Project (ADP) model. ADPs adopted a top-down, prescriptive approach that had limited impact on the prevalence of poverty for small farming households and rural society in general. The resulting stagnation in rural development was compounded by the economic mismanagement of the former military regimes and by the increasing importance of the oil industry and its huge export earnings.

6. In 1993, the IFAD-funded projects in Katsina and Sokoto States were among the first to move away from the ADP approach. They shifted responsibility for development planning and implementation down to the potential beneficiary communities and their LGAs and set out to avoid the bureaucracy, politicization and rigidities of the state project management systems. Both projects adopted the community-driven development (CDD) approach, which has since been widely used elsewhere in

Nigeria and West Africa. A range of community and social development initiatives, with a strong emphasis on the empowerment of community groups, were also implemented under the projects, alongside their core interventions in conservation-oriented agricultural productivity improvement. The CDD approach was adopted in subsequent IFAD-assisted programmes and has been replicated and expanded across an increasing number of other government, state and donor-funded development projects.

B. Evaluation Objectives, Methodology and Process

7. **Objectives.** The main objectives of the evaluation are to assess the performance and impact of the overall IFAD country programme in Nigeria and develop a series of findings and recommendations that will serve as building blocks for the country strategic opportunities programme (COSOP) to be prepared by the Western and Central Africa Division (PA) of IFAD and the Federal Government of Nigeria following completion of the evaluation. This represents the first full evaluation of the Nigerian portfolio since project funding commenced in 1985.

8. **Methodology.** The CPE applies the methodology used by IFAD's Office of Evaluation (OE), which addresses three overarching questions: (i) Did IFAD pursue the right country strategy to ensure the highest possible rural poverty reduction impacts? (ii) To what extent was the country strategy effectively implemented through projects and non-lending activities, such as policy dialogue, partnerships and knowledge-sharing, and how did they perform? (iii) What was the impact of IFAD's country strategy and operations? The evaluation applies the current IFAD standards and policies, which conform to good practice in the evaluation of international development programmes, taking into account any changes that may have been introduced during the period covered by the evaluation. It also draws on information collected from several sources, including: (i) focus group discussions undertaken in the field and interaction with key respondents; (ii) surveys and studies conducted specifically for this evaluation by IFAD or other donor projects; and (iii) national data, which are used as reference points.

9. Portfolio performance is assessed against internationally recognized evaluation criteria, such as: (i) **relevance**, or how closely the programme and non-lending objectives match the needs of the rural poor and IFAD and government poverty reduction policies and strategies; (ii) **effectiveness**, or the degree to which the immediate objectives of interventions have been attained; (iii) **efficiency**, which is a measure of how resources have been translated into results. Indicators considered include the cost per beneficiary, resource use in relation to the results achieved, profitability analysis (based on marginal returns, level of variable costs, benefit-cost ratio and break-even point) and internal rate of return; (iv) **impact** of the strategy and interventions targeting poverty and the livelihoods and well-being of the target group, determined as far as possible using the nine recognized impact domains of physical assets, financial assets, food security, environment and common resource base, human assets, social capital and empowerment, agricultural productivity, institutions and services, and access to markets; (v) **innovation**, or the identification of new approaches to development and opportunities for replication and scaling up; (vi) **sustainability**, measured as the extent or likelihood of continuation of project benefits following programme closure; (vii) **performance of partners**, i.e. of IFAD, the Government and the cooperating institution. The results for each of the evaluation criteria listed are rated on a six-point scale where six is the highest score and one the lowest.

10. The country programme evaluation (CPE) covers projects and programmes approved and activities undertaken in the period 1998-2008. It assesses two closed projects, the Katsina State Agricultural and Community Development Project (KSACDP) and the Sokoto State Agricultural and Community Development Project (SSACDP), both of which closed in 2001, and three ongoing programmes, the Community-based Agricultural and Rural Development Programme (CBARDP), the Community-based Natural Resource Management Programme (CBNRMP) and the RTEP mentioned earlier. These three programmes form the principal source of data on progress, performance and rating of the key evaluation factors. The CPE also considers two further programmes that are not yet fully effective, the Rural Finance Institutions-building Programme (RUFIN), approved in September 2006, and the Rural Microenterprise Development Programme (RUMEDP), approved in December 2007. Both programmes are considered only in terms of their quality of design and consistency with the emerging framework of government and IFAD policies and strategies. Twelve TAGs and eight Special Operation

Facility grants awarded between 1997 and 1999 are also covered by the evaluation. Appendix 1 lists the projects, programmes and grants reviewed.

11. The geographical spread of IFAD-assisted interventions can be summarized as follows: the original Katsina and Sokoto projects covered these two states in the extreme north of Nigeria and the latter was subsequently extended to take in Zamfara and Kebbi States. The CBARDP then extended the coverage of the semi-arid dryland region to bring in Borno, Jigawa and Yobe States in the north-east. Earlier coverage by the Cassava Multiplication Programme (CMP) of the nine southern States of Akwa Ibom, Anambra, Benue, Delta, Ebonyi, Edo, Enugu, Imo and Ogun was extended by the RTEP to include almost the entire central and southern part of the country, bringing the total number of states covered to 26, of which most are in the south. The CBNRMP covers the nine States of Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers. The RUFIN will cover 12 states, seven of which are in the south (Akwa Ibom, Anambra, Benue, Edo, Imo, Lagos and Oyo) and five in the centre, east and north (Adamawa, Bauchi, Katsina, Nasarawa and Zamfara). RUMEDP coverage is expected to extend to eight states, yet to be determined in consultation with the Government of Nigeria. Table 1 lists the projects and programmes covered by the CPE.

Table 1. List of Projects and Programmes covered by the CPE (millions of US\$)

Title	Total Cost	IFAD Loan	Date			Cooperating Institution
			Approved	Effective	Closing	
KSACDP	28.8	12.1	12/12/90	08/07/93	30/06/01	World Bank
SSACDP	17.2	9.6	08/09/92	04/11/94	30/06/01	World Bank
RTEP	36.0	23.0	09/12/99	31/06/02	31/03/10	IFAD direct supervision as of December 2007, under the direct supervision pilot programme
CBARDP	101.6	29.9	12/09/01	31/01/03	31/09/10	World Bank
CBNRMP	82.2	15.0	11/12/02	06/07/05	31/03/14	World Bank
RUFIN	40.0	27.6	14/09/06	Not yet	Not available	IFAD direct supervision
RUMEDP	57.9	42.8	13/12/07	Not yet	Not available	IFAD direct supervision
Total	363.7	160.0				

12. **Process.** The principal in-country inputs were the one-week preparatory mission, attended by the lead evaluator and the mission leader, and the one-month fieldwork mission of the six-person core CPE team, culminating in an informal debriefing meeting. The last input was the formal wrap-up meeting, which included intensive consultations on the preliminary findings of the mission with the Government, and with PA and other IFAD headquarters legal and financial staff. The CPE also benefited from the outputs of an internal IFAD desk review; the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) records of the programmes; the PA/Government Country Portfolio Review (CPR) undertaken in October and November 2007; and the self-assessments conducted by the CBARDP, RTEP and CBNRMP programme managements and by PA and IFAD projects/programmes staff. Additional information was provided by the performance assessment study conducted between November 2007 and January 2008 by the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research, which examined the impact of the original KSACDP and the RTEP activities in Nasarawa and Kwara States.

13. Most of the fieldwork took place between 19 November and 20 December 2007. Three sub-teams of up to three consultants made separate visits to various programme activity sites, including the project or programme management offices and many of the state offices involved in each of the ongoing interventions; they also met local officials and participants. In all, the mission visited 14 states and met staff from 16 states across the country, ranging from Akwa Ibom in the south-east to Sokoto in the north-west; 22 LGAs were visited and interaction took place with 36 participating villages and communities and with representatives of NGOs, community banks, and group and private sector enterprises. The mission also met more than 300 farmers and village inhabitants – many of whom were women – either in groups, at local committee meetings or in one-to-one discussions. Meetings were also held in Abuja during the first and last weeks with government agencies, the cooperating institutions and key bilateral and multilateral agencies operating in Nigeria. The details of visit locations and respondents are included in Appendix 7.

14. The work of the mission continued after the wrap-up meeting through the analysis of information and synthesis of conclusions and recommendations. This first draft of the main CPE report takes account of the feedback received from government officials, including the project and programme managements, and from IFAD and other stakeholders. The draft report is being distributed to the major partners; adequate time will be allowed for consideration of its content and for further comments to be submitted.

15. Once any necessary modifications have been made, an issues paper will be produced and will form the basis of the agenda for a CPE national round-table workshop, organized by OE in collaboration with PA and the Federal Government towards the end of the evaluation process. The draft report will be made available at the workshop. The workshop will focus on learning and give stakeholders an opportunity to exchange views on key evaluation issues. It will also provide input for the preparation of the Agreement at Completion Point (ACP) which articulates the recommendations and specific actions deriving from the CPE that IFAD and the Government both agree to implement. The published final CPE report, inclusive of an executive summary and the ACP, will then be widely circulated and posted on the IFAD website.

16. An evaluation profile and insight¹ will also be prepared and distributed together with the final report. The CPE report, profile and insight will also be disseminated through selected electronic networks such as UNEVAL and FIDAFRIQUE. Written comments submitted by the Government and PA on key CPE deliverables will be carefully examined by OE, in line with the provisions of the IFAD Evaluation Policy. Under this policy, OE is required to rectify factual inaccuracies and give due consideration to the comments of partners on substantive issues to decide whether or not they should be incorporated into the report. Finally, OE will prepare and share an audit trail of how it has dealt with the comments of the Government and PA in finalizing the CPE report.

Key Points

- IFAD lending operations in Nigeria date from 1985 and comprise nine loans amounting to US\$187 million, financing 29 per cent of total project costs of US\$642 million.
- ODA is minimal and equivalent to only 0.5 per cent of GDP; the IFAD share is negligible in the context of the national economy and can only be expected to have a catalytic role.
- IFAD loans are cofinanced by development organizations, such as UNDP, and by the European Union and other institutions.
- Until 2007, the World Bank was the sole cooperating institution for IFAD programmes. Direct supervision and implementation support by IFAD has now been introduced in new operations, starting with the RTEP.
- The IFAD Katsina and Sokoto projects were among the first to phase out the top-down ADP approach in 1993 and to pioneer CDD.
- The CPE covers the seven projects or programmes that were ongoing under IFAD funding when the last COSOP was prepared in 2000, including two that are now closed, three current programmes and two soon to be launched, in addition to the grant programme for the decade 1998-2008.
- The evaluation methodology and process follow OE guidelines; key objectives are to assess the performance and impact of IFAD operations and provide building blocks for the proposed new COSOP.

¹ A profile is an easy-to-read summary of the evaluation report focusing on three or four of the report's key recommendations. An insight, on the other hand, focuses exclusively on one key learning issue arising from the evaluation. It provides a new angle on the issue and poses new questions. Insights are intended to form the basis of discussion among development professionals and policymakers.

II. COUNTRY CONTEXT

A. The Economy, Agriculture Sector and Rural Development

17. Nigeria lies on the coast of West Africa and occupies a land area of 924,000 km². According to the provisional results of the 2006 census, it has a population of 140 million,² making it one of the largest and politically most important nations in Africa. The country has a decentralized federal system of government comprising a federal capital territory (FCT), 36 states and 774 LGAs. All three tiers of government -- federal, state and LGA -- are democratically elected. The federal capital is Abuja. Nigeria is divided into six ecological zones, ranging from the semi-arid north-west to the savannah of the centre and south-west, and the high rainfall/rainforest areas of the south-south and south-east regions. The dominant ethnic groups are the Hausa/Fulani in the north, the Yoruba in the west and the Igbos in the east.

18. Given that agriculture is a major source of Nigeria's economic growth, accounting for about 45 per cent of the increase in GDP during the period 1990-2005, the country is classified as agriculture-based by the World Bank. Seventy-eight per cent of Nigeria's poor -- those living below the poverty line on less than a dollar a day -- live in rural areas and derive their livelihoods primarily from agriculture and rural development³. However, since 1973, the economy has become highly dependent on the oil sector, in which Nigeria is the twelfth largest world producer. By 2006, depending on international oil prices, oil and gas accounted for 70 to 80 per cent of government revenue, over 90 per cent of export earnings and 25 per cent of GDP. The non-oil sector -- particularly communications, construction, manufacturing and services -- is becoming increasingly significant, currently accounting for a further 42 per cent of GDP and growing by nearly ten per cent each year. GDP increased fivefold from US\$28 billion in 1990 to an estimated US\$140 billion in 2007 and is expected to continue to grow at a rate of five to seven per cent per year, yielding current account surpluses of ten per cent of GDP. GDP per capita at purchasing power parity was calculated at about US\$1,000 at the end of 2003 and is estimated to have risen to US\$1,256 in 2007 (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2008).

19. However, higher revenues from oil and gas have not led to a reduction in poverty. The Government is committed to a liberal economy, with a market-determined exchange rate, fiscal prudence, decentralization, privatization and progressive reform of the financial sector. Inflation is on a downward trend and was estimated at 7.2 per cent at the end of 2007. The Government received debt relief in 2005/2006 and by May 2007 had paid off its accumulated debt in full. Agriculture contributes to development in several ways. For instance, as an economic activity, agriculture is a source of growth for the national economy, a provider of investment opportunities for the private sector and a prime driver of agriculture-related activities and industries and the rural non-farm economy. Agricultural production is important for food security because it is a source of income for most of the rural poor. Between 1990 and 2005, agricultural value added rose by an average of four per cent each year; for the period from 2003 to 2005, agriculture value added (AVA) represents US\$16.46 billion and accounts for 22.1 per cent of GDP. Agriculture is the source of livelihood for the majority of rural people, providing jobs for smallholders and landless laborers and a foundation for viable rural communities.

20. The agricultural sector is typified by the predominance of smallholders: 90 per cent of the country's food is produced by small-scale farmers on small plots of land. More than half of all farmers grow only food crops and women play a greater role in processing and marketing than men. Around 44 per cent of male farmers and 72 per cent of female farmers cultivate less than one hectare per household. The sector comprises an arable land area of over 70 million hectares, of which only 50 per cent is under cultivation; an inland water body area of just over 12 million hectares, which is important for both farming and fishing; and low-lying, seasonally flooded areas that are used increasingly for rice. In the northern zone, sorghum, millet, sesame, groundnuts and cotton are grown. This is also the main livestock-raising area, where over 75 per cent of small ruminants and cattle, camels and donkeys are bred. In the central belt and south-west, root and tuber crops, maize, plantain and

² Provisional results of the 2006 census in Nigeria (April 2007).


³ World Development Report, 2008.

sorghum are most commonly cultivated. Cash and export crops are produced mainly in the south-west and south-east: cocoa, oil palm, rubber and citrus fruits, and fisheries is also a major activity. Nigeria is the largest producer of yam and cowpea in Africa, the world’s leading producer of cassava and a major fish producer, with annual outputs of over 300,000 tons.

21. Although agriculture remains a mainstay of livelihoods and the social fabric of the country, its importance has been declining and those for whom it is a way of life have seen the value of its rewards being steadily eroded as more investment and resources are channeled into the oil and gas and related sectors. At the time of independence in 1960, Nigeria was a major exporter of primary produce; now it is a massive importer of even basic foods. Government and donor efforts to stimulate the expansion, commercialization and prioritization of agriculture as a cornerstone of the national poverty reduction and economic growth and empowerment strategy so far have not yielded the desired transformation.


22. Rural development, particularly in remote areas, is constrained by the inadequacy of the social infrastructure and services; roads are limited in coverage and many are in poor condition; schools, clinics and hospitals are lacking in number and capacity; supply of water, sanitation and electricity is often inadequate and unreliable. Social and financial service provision is rudimentary at best. Apart from its impact on human welfare, the poor infrastructure creates serious difficulties for marketing and enterprise development generally.

23. **Past trends and current situation in food prices.** In previous years, food price rise in Nigeria was associated with supply gap during the planting and near harvesting periods, mostly aggravated by poor infrastructure including inadequacy of roads, power supply and functional cold stores. This was made worse by the incidence and activities of food speculators and the absence of market information which often created panic among consumers and tended to push food prices momentarily upward.



24. The diverse ecological features of the country that support different food crops and different planting and harvesting seasons provide several options to consumers and often create a balancing force that makes the effect of natural disasters – such as flooding and drought – on food availability and prices relatively insignificant. The country’s high reliance on some major staples -like rice, and wheat- and the ability of the economy to cope with the public preference for foreign products have also kept price changes at near equilibrium. But in the second quarter of 2008, these contentious variables broke down. The exogenous forces of climate change, higher economic growth of countries such as China and China, development of biofuels technologies by the developed world in answer to the upsurge in prices of fossil fuels, and the unprecedented drought and flood in 2007 in most parts of the world including Nigeria, among other factors, have caused major distortions in the supply and demand of food crops, leading to price rising across commodities and an unexpected shift in the entire food price equation.

25. There emerged an increased international demand for bio-fuel raw materials, such as wheat, soy, maize and palm oil, and increased competition for cropland, despite the fact that biofuels, though less costly, generate a greater greenhouse effect. The dramatic surge in food price hit Nigeria as well as other developing countries from the first quarter of 2008, as seen in Figure 1. The price movements for rice, beans, maize, and sorghum from 2006 to 2008 in Nigeria (Figure 2) indicate a sharp rise for these crops. An increase of more than 60 per cent in price was recorded for all the crops, against one of less than five per cent in the previous years.



Source: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2007) & Extension Research and Liaison services, 2008

26. Present market indices⁴ in Nigeria indicate that, even though the price increase remained relatively stable in the last two quarters, and has dropped, the trend may not have reverted to its normal curve, which suggests that the upward movement in the second quarter was not a temporary phenomenon. For instance, as at October 2008, one metric ton of paddy rice was sold at N53,000 against N43,000 during the same period in 2007⁵.

27. International forecasts from other major organizations⁶ are broadly consistent with these projections. Predictions of high food prices in the long run are further strengthened by weaknesses in some factors such as business climate, infrastructure, and the capacity of the economy to withstand shocks due to uncertainty from natural disasters and social problems. In addition, there are other local factors like the traditional supply-led approach, and the high tendencies for embracing a procurement model associated with an insufficient participation of the private sector, population increases, changes in corporate food system and preference, poverty and migration trends.

28. Besides, there is a need for an effective fertilizer distribution system that avails farmers especially small holders, the opportunity to access fertilizers at affordable prices, and help them remain competitive. More so, most Nigerian farmers do not have a credible credit profile that can easily leverage financial assistance for them from financial institutions. Existing situations in the crops - rice, sorghum and sesame-, and aquaculture sub-sectors, have also revealed that farmers are faced with insufficient high yielding seeds and fast growing fingerlings to meet industrial and market demand. The seeds and fingerling industries are underdeveloped as input delivery is limited. The key actors in the seed industry often inadvertently supply grains or low yielding fingerlings to farmers who are devastated few months after planting, stocking or during harvest; and such supply is usually development project-driven.

B. Demography and Poverty

29. Nigeria's rural population is about 72.7 million, equivalent to 52.7 per cent of the total population for the period 2003 to 2005, and is increasing by an average of 1.2 per cent each year. Women account for 49.6 per cent of the country's total population. Life expectancy is 47 years. The dependency ratio is high, with an estimated 42 per cent of the population under the age of 15. Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) incidence in 2005 was estimated at about four per cent.

⁴ The prices for 2008 in Figure 2 were obtained from FEWSNET monthly report on prices of food crops while 2007 and 2006 prices were sourced from USAID/MARKETS reports.

⁵ CPE Field survey (October 2008).

⁶ FAO, OECD, and USDA.

30. Paradoxically, despite its rich endowment of resources and human capacity, Nigeria continues to experience severe and worsening income disparity and widespread poverty. Rural poverty increased from 28 per cent in 1980 to 51 per cent in 1985, and although it showed signs of decline between 1985 and 1992, between 1992 and 1996 it was again on the increase. The 2008 World Development Report indicates that 70.8 per cent of Nigeria's population lives below the poverty line, while 92.4 per cent exist on less than two dollars a day. The core welfare indicator survey conducted by the Government in 2006 indicates that about 64 per cent of Nigerians – nearly 90 million people – are poor, living on an income equivalent to or less than one dollar per person per day and account for over 25 per cent of all the poor in sub-Saharan Africa. While Nigeria was seen as one of the world's 50 richest countries in the early 1970s, basic indicators place it among the 20 poorest countries at the start of the new millennium. The States of Bauchi, Gombe, Kebbi, Sokoto and Zamfara recorded the highest incidence of poverty, with about 80 per cent of their population classified as poor.

C. Key Challenges to Rural Poverty Reduction

31. Nigeria was ranked 158th out of 177 countries on the 2007/2008 UNDP human development index and 80th out of 108 countries on the poverty index, with an incidence of poverty and level of progress towards poverty eradication similar to those of Burundi and Malawi. Poverty has a rural bias, affecting in excess of 67 per cent of all households and 77 per cent of households headed by women. The key challenges to be faced in reducing rural poverty include rapid population growth, lack of technological innovation, misallocation of resources, low rate of investment, slow growth of AVA per capita, poor distribution of social services and limited infrastructure, low agricultural productivity and food insecurity. Major manifestations of poverty include high infant and maternal mortality rates, acute disease and illiteracy, low school enrolment rates, and hunger and malnutrition. Underlying these aspects and factors of poverty is poor governance, with a lack of accountability at all levels of administration and mismanagement of resources.

D. Government Strategies for Poverty Reduction

32. The guiding instrument of the Government's policy and strategy for rural and regional development to promote economic growth and combat poverty and income disparity are predicated the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) of 2005, the second phase of which is soon to be launched, and the complementary State and Local Empowerment and Economic Development Strategies (SEEDS and LEEDS). NEEDS was the strategic blueprint developed by the Government to address the country's development challenges. It was anchored in the belief that people constitute the beginning and the end of any credible and legitimate public policy or process. By focusing on people, it represented a paradigm shift and was a comprehensive initiative that adopted a holistic approach towards addressing the country's widespread development challenges (Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation, 2004).

33. The policy thrust was to improve significantly the quality of life of Nigerians, create social safety nets for the vulnerable segments of the populace and cater for those displaced by the dynamics of the reform process. Given that overall economic growth alone may not necessarily ensure poverty reduction at the desired pace, the need for direct and specific steps to facilitate individual economic empowerment, particularly among the poor and other vulnerable groups, was considered imperative. The first phase of NEEDS, NEEDS 1, therefore identified four goals or priority action areas: (i) wealth creation; (ii) employment generation; (iii) poverty alleviation; and (iv) value reorientation, especially elimination of corruption.

34. The three pillars underpinning NEEDS 1 were: (i) reforming government institutions; (ii) promoting private enterprise; and (iii) empowering people. Assessments of the performance of NEEDS 1 indicate that targets have been exceeded in many areas, evident in the stable macroeconomic environment, civil service reforms, due process, banking consolidation, privatization and liberalization. However, weaknesses have also been shown to exist in a number of areas, such as M&E, coordination, poverty reduction, employment generation and power supply (International Monetary Fund, 2007).

35. A new version of the strategy – NEEDS 2 – is being prepared by the current Government, based on the experience in implementing NEEDS 1. All states have also drawn up SEEDS that link in with NEEDS 1 and adopt its priority action areas, although the emphasis of each strategy varies from state to state. For example, the Akwa Ibom SEEDS lists the following long-term goals: (i) poverty reduction/elimination; (ii) employment generation; and (iii) wealth creation.

36. The NEEDS initiative complements two other policies: the New Agricultural Policy (2001) (FMAWRD, 2001a) and the National Policy on Integrated Rural Development (2002) (FMAWRD, 2001b). The new Government has adopted a seven-point agenda,⁷ the elements of which will be incorporated into NEEDS 2. The target areas of the agenda are: (i) real sector development including agriculture/land reform, manufacturing/small and medium-sized enterprises, solid minerals, housing, oil and gas; (ii) physical infrastructure; (iii) human capital development; (iv) security, law and electoral reform; (v) combating corruption/improving governance; (vi) regional development (Niger delta, city development, erosion management/control, desertification, environment); and (vii) cross-cutting issues (poverty, gender, employment, youth development, sports development, HIV/AIDS).

37. The new NEEDS, like its predecessor, and the seven-point agenda, are based partly on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The Government has made specific funding allocations within its medium-term expenditure framework and from the virtual poverty fund set up as part of its 2005 debt relief agreement to address the MDG priorities. However, the most recent assessment of progress towards the eight MDGs, conducted in November 2007, indicates that targets are likely to be met only for universal primary education; gender equality and empowerment of women; and combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other infectious diseases. Insufficient data are available to allow progress to be measured for the other five MDGs, including eradication of poverty and hunger, environmental sustainability and building partnerships for development.

38. **Other government policies.** NEEDS incorporated and built on previous agricultural and rural development policies and strategies. The New Agricultural Policy was aimed at both achieving self-sustaining growth in all subsectors of agriculture and the structural transformation necessary for the overall socio-economic development of the country, and improving the quality of life of Nigerians. Critically, the National Policy on Integrated Rural Development sought to empower rural dwellers through the development of productive employment and enhancement of income, protecting the environment, promoting gender responsiveness and ensuring adequate care for vulnerable groups. It advocated taking a community-driven participatory approach (CDPA) in project identification, design, implementation and M&E, in addition to collaborative efforts between the Government and other stakeholders in the delivery of inputs and marketing of agricultural and other rural products.

39. Important for IFAD's new RUMED programme is the Government's National Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) Policy. The vision of the policy is an MSME subsector in Nigeria that delivers optimal benefits in the form of sustainable growth, employment generation, wealth creation, poverty reduction in the domestic economy, while maintaining international competitiveness (Small and Medium Enterprises Development Agency of Nigeria [SMEDAN] and UNDP, 2007).

40. The policy statement outlines key objectives, strategies and programmes to promote the development of MSMEs and delineates several programmatic areas, including legal and regulatory services, human resource development, technology, research and development, extension and support services, infrastructure, marketing and finance. Special target enterprise categories are identified and elaborated. An institutional framework is also proposed, in which SMEDAN is assigned primary responsibility for the policy's implementation and monitoring.

41. The RUFIN programme was developed within the Microfinance Policy Framework launched by the Central Bank of Nigeria in 2005, which recognizes that microfinance services, particularly those sponsored by the Government, have adopted a traditional supply-led, subsidized credit approach and target mainly the agricultural sector and such non-farm activities as trading, tailoring, weaving, blacksmithing, agro-processing and transportation. The framework also acknowledges that although the

⁷ Outlined by Nigeria's current President during his campaign for office.

services have resulted in an increased level of credit disbursement and gains in agricultural production and other activities, the effects have been short-lived as a result of the unsustainable nature of the programmes implemented.

42. The specific objectives of this microfinance policy include making financial services accessible to a large segment of the potentially productive Nigerian population, promoting synergy and mainstreaming the informal subsector into the national financial system. One of the primary targets is to increase the share of microcredit (i) as a percentage of total credit in the economy from 0.9 per cent in 2005 to at least 20 per cent in 2020; and (ii) as a percentage of GDP from 0.2 per cent in 2005 to at least five per cent in 2020.

43. In line with this policy, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) is promoting the establishment of microfinance banks that are adequately capitalized, and appropriately regulated and supervised to address the need for financing at the micro levels of the economy. There are two categories of microfinance banks: (i) those licensed to operate as unit banks (also known as community banks), with an increase in the minimum paid-up capital from the previous amount of NGN5 million (US\$38,500) to NGN20 million (US\$154,000); and (ii) those licensed to operate in a given state with a minimum paid-up capital of NGN1 billion (US\$7.7 million).

44. Government development policies seek to address the plight of vulnerable groups, particularly women and young people, by calling for equitable representation for women in all spheres of development and that affirmative action should be taken to guarantee that women make up at least 30 per cent of the work force. Rigorous attention has also been focused on ensuring that the disadvantaged have access to microfinance, social services and opportunities for training and employment. Specific instruments have been identified within NEEDS to address the problems of vulnerable groups, while the National Poverty Eradication Programme is designed to address poverty-related issues, including poverty monitoring.

E. Other Donor Strategies

45. The World Bank Group and the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DfID) have devised a joint Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) for Nigeria (World Bank, 2005). The strategy aims to step up financial and technical assistance in order to signal strong support for the Government's reform efforts and help finance the investment needed to remove obstacles to growth and development. The CPS proposes specific activities to support the Federal Government and selected states that are performing well ("lead states"), and targeted MDG-related action elsewhere. Work with the Federal Government will be in four areas: (i) financing investments in infrastructure (especially power supply, gas and transport); (ii) financial and technical support to improve accountability and transparency and to fight corruption; (iii) technical assistance and advisory services for investment and policies to stimulate private-sector-led growth; and (iv) sustaining national initiatives for human development, particularly those aimed at fighting HIV/AIDS, strengthening the health system and supporting the knowledge economy.

46. In the lead states, it is expected that operations taking a sector-wide approach will predominate. Financial and technical assistance will seek to leverage state resources to boost economic activity and improve social service delivery. Interventions will be designed to support state development strategies and will help create a model of growth and development that can be scaled up. Initially, the World Bank and DfID propose working in up to six lead states, selected on the basis of their governments' commitment to reforms, especially in the areas of budget and financial management, transparency and fighting corruption.

47. In the remaining states, support will be directed at the livelihoods of poor people by means of nationally designed CDD projects in the social and productive sectors and MDG-related programming, particularly through the United Nations, civil society and the private sector. The aim is to have a more direct impact on the lives of poor people and their access to social and productive infrastructure, goods and services. Targeted programmes will work with a range of stakeholders on specific MDG-related issues, such as girls' education, maternal health, routine immunization or access to safe water. An

important aspect of work in these states will be that of strengthening the voice of service users and communities and supporting their demand for change.

48. The CPS is serving as a major platform for donor coordination in Nigeria: it is understood that the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has fully aligned its strategy with the CPS and that other donors such as the African Development Bank (AfDB) and UNDP also plan to follow suit.

49. The main programmes in the USAID Country Strategic Plan for the years 2004 to 2009 are: (i) Strengthened Foundations for Democratic Governance; (ii) Improved Livelihoods in Selected Areas; (iii) Increased Use of Social Sector Services; and (iv) Reduced Impact of HIV/AIDS in Selected States. The states in which one or more of the above programmes are to be implemented are Abia, Anambra, Bauchi, Cross River, Delta, FCT Abuja, Kano, Lagos, Nasarawa, Plateau and Rivers. Cross-cutting themes include food security, conflict resolution, HIV/AIDS, gender, the environment and public/private partnerships.

50. In order to support the Government in its efforts to reduce poverty and to contribute to the achievement of the MDGs, the AfDB Group's Country Strategy Paper 2005-2009 proposes two strategic pillars: (i) developing human capital through improved service delivery in education and health; and (ii) stimulating non-oil growth through enhanced infrastructure and agricultural/rural development. The strategy paper will support the Government's reform agenda through a selective approach that focuses on two pillars of NEEDS: (i) empowering people and (ii) promoting private enterprise to foster growth of the non-oil sector, which is aimed at rapidly developing a competitive non-oil private sector through the establishment of appropriate economic infrastructure and agricultural/rural development. AfDB also plans to align its strategy with the World Bank/DfID CPS.

51. The United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for Nigeria has three broad themes: (i) promoting good governance and human rights; (ii) reducing poverty; and (iii) reducing the incidence and impact of HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis and other infectious diseases. In reducing poverty – the theme most directly related to the IFAD COSOP – the UNDAF aims to increase by at least 30 per cent the participation of women, youth and other vulnerable groups in economic and social development processes; promote agricultural production and practices, food security and effective use and management of the environment; increase access, utilization and quality of basic social services by 20 per cent, support government efforts to address population issues in development; promote the use of information technology; promote synergy among all United Nations agencies in poverty reduction programmes; and promote employment preservation and generation initiatives, which contribute to poverty reduction, through the strengthening of the private sector, and its supporting institutions and mechanisms.

52. The development interventions currently implemented by GTZ⁸ span health, business promotion, vocational training and natural resources management. In a desire for sharper focus, the Nigerian and German Governments agreed in 2002 to concentrate technical cooperation on sustainable economic development. This gave rise to the Employment-oriented Private Sector Development Programme (EoPSD), which is designed to improve the performance of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises in Nasarawa and Niger States in order to create income opportunities and employment. EoPSD is similar in design to IFAD's RUMEDP.

53. According to the Cotonou Agreement, the central objective of cooperation between the African-Caribbean and Pacific countries and the European Commission (EC) is "poverty reduction and ultimately its eradication; sustainable development; and progressive integration of [these] countries into the world economy". Within this framework, the European Commission's stated policy is to support Nigeria's own development processes of: (i) consolidating democracy and respect for human rights; (ii) reducing poverty and achieving sustainable institutional reform, social and economic development; and (iii) enhancing its capacity to contribute to regional integration, peace, security and development.

⁸ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit GmbH.

54. The EC strategy for cooperation is a state-based approach (targeting one state in each of six geopolitical zones, Abia, Cross River, Gombe, Kebbi, Osun and Plateau). There are two focal sectors: (i) water and sanitation, and (ii) state and local institutions and economic reform.

F. Government Budget and External Assistance

55. **Government budget.** The allocation of funding to agriculture and rural development proposed in the official papers of the Federal Government Budget for 2006 was set at NGN30.8 billion (US\$240 million), equivalent to two per cent of the total government recurrent and capital budget allocations. In 2007, the corresponding allocation was reported to be NGN38 billion (US\$304 million), representing four per cent of the total. However, despite the increase in allocation, there was considerable disquiet in the farming community about the actual expenditures and their effectiveness. The new Government that came to power in May 2007 has recognized that the performance of the 2007 agriculture budget was mixed at best; it has now placed agriculture at the forefront of funding priorities for 2008, with a reported NGN121 billion (US\$1 billion) being devoted to the sector. However the overall budget is framed, this would signify a quantum leap in support for the agricultural and natural resources sectors. The budget does not normally identify specific allocations for poverty reduction, but the aggregate investment projections for NEEDS support put the government contribution at NGN378 billion (US\$3.2 billion) in 2003, increasing to NGN 1,391 billion (US\$11.6 billion) in 2007.

56. **External assistance.** Total ODA to Nigeria in 2006 reached US\$280 million, down from US\$573 million in 2004 and equivalent to only US\$2 per capita, compared with the average for Africa of US\$28 per capita. Figures compiled recently by the World Bank indicate that total donor support in terms of overall current allocations or commitments to agriculture, food security, land tenure and water was of the order of US\$1.69 billion, comprising US\$645 million by the EU; US\$585 by the World Bank; US\$175 million by UNDP; US\$165 million by DfID; US\$56.5 million by USAID; and about US\$13.5 million by the Canadian International Development Agency. The current total IFAD allocation of US\$51.85 million makes it one of the less important financial donors to the sector.

57. However, ODA plays a minor role in Nigeria. In 2004 it was estimated that Nigeria faced a negative net transfer of US\$1.3 billion annually, given the levels of debt servicing, as reported by the World Bank in 2005. ODA is estimated to be about 0.5 per cent of GDP, significantly lower than the eight per cent for developing countries as a whole (Government of Nigeria, 2007), with IFAD's contribution being rather limited. Commitments of ODA are significantly higher than actual disbursement, indicating that absorptive capacity is low. For example, total commitments were estimated at about US\$1.3 billion in 2004, rising to about US\$6.5 billion in 2005 (OECD, 2005).

58. Furthermore, IFAD-funded project budgets are small compared with total local government council (LGC) budgets in target LGAs. For example, the IFAD budget for the CBARDP in Katsina State in 2005 averaged about NGN7 million (US\$58,000), while LGC budgets ranged from NGN 326 million (US\$ 2.7 million) to NGN1,208 million (US\$10.1 million). With such a small contribution to ODA, IFAD and its partners need to weigh critically the benefits of their contribution. By general consent, IFAD funding and its experience and expertise can best be utilized for their catalytic effect.

Key Points

- Nigeria is a vast and politically significant country, the twelfth largest oil producer in the world; GDP has increased fivefold since 1990 to US\$140 billion, giving a GDP per capita of over US\$1,000. Future expectations are for freedom from external debt and consistent current account surpluses of ten per cent of GDP per year.
- Nigeria is ranked 158th out of 177 countries on the UNDP Human Development Index and 80th out of 108 on the Poverty Index.
- Income disparity and widespread poverty persist; the bias of poverty is rural, with incidences as high as 80 per cent in some northern states, compared with the 64 per cent national figure.
- Agriculture is a major source of growth in Nigeria, accounting for about 45 per cent of GDP growth between 1990 and 2005; 70.8 per cent of the poor live in rural areas. Agriculture, mainly small-scale food crop production, contributes to development as an economic activity and as a keystone of rural livelihoods and the social fabric of the country.
- Efforts to stimulate expansion and commercialization of agriculture in line with its priority in the national poverty reduction and economic growth strategy so far have not yielded the desired transformation.
- NEEDS sets out the national policy for rural development, poverty reduction, wealth creation, employment generation and value reorientation. Its central themes are empowering people, improving social service delivery, fostering private sector-led growth, and enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of government.

III. THE COUNTRY PROGRAMME STRATEGY

A. Description of the Strategy

59. The current IFAD strategy for collaboration with the Federal Government in rural development and poverty reduction was laid out in the 2001-2007 COSOP. This was the first such formal planning document for IFAD in Nigeria. It was also the first to involve the necessary detailed preparation for submission to the Executive Board of IFAD under the new arrangements for discussion. The COSOP was the result of teamwork over a period of two years by a group comprising representatives of the then equivalent of the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources (FMAWR), the Federal Ministry of Finance and the coordinators of the four ongoing IFAD-funded projects. Preparation entailed extensive discussions with other donors, NGOs, the private sector, smallholders and rural poor communities. The process was also informed by the outputs of a Country Programme Review (CPR) conducted in April 1998, a CPR workshop in May 1999, a preliminary-phase COSOP mission in November 1999 and a series of sectoral studies undertaken by the World Bank in partnership with IFAD and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations. The COSOP was discussed at the validation workshop of May 2000, attended by delegates from states, LGAs, rural communities, NGOs, and private-sector and development partners such as Dfid, FAO, UNDP, USAID and the World Bank.

60. Prior to the COSOP, IFAD had adopted three different approaches: (i) a food security and commodity approach, exemplified by the Multi-State Agricultural Development Project–Cassava Multiplication Programme (MSADP-CMP); (ii) a subsectoral approach, such as that taken in the Artisanal Fisheries Development Project (AFDP); and (iii) a community-based integrated development approach, represented by the original Katsina and Sokoto project.

61. The COSOP drew heavily on the lessons of previous IFAD interventions and the cumulative guidance deriving from foregoing consultation activities. It placed emphasis on the strengthening of alliances with other development partners, notably AfDB, Dfid, FAO, IITA, USAID and the World Bank, in addition to NGOs, community-based organizations and the private sector. It also envisaged closer and more explicit links between loans and grants in the formulation and implementation of IFAD-funded projects and an intensification of policy dialogue. The particular topics for dialogue included rural economic and social development, governance, accountability and local government devolution, financial system liberalization and environmental degradation. The IFAD niche was defined as the empowerment of poor rural communities and especially women, enhanced access to and management of productive resources, and support for rural infrastructure and service provision. A gender and development approach was advocated, so that the roles of men and women would be systematically analyzed and their optimal involvement set out in the design and applied in the implementation of new projects and programmes.

62. The key elements of the COSOP strategy were stated as: (i) policy advocacy in support of pro-poor reforms and improvement of local governance; (ii) development of effective rural institutions; and (iii) productivity and natural resources management.

63. The major strategic thrusts were characterized as:

- (i) Empowerment of core target groups and their civil society organizations to generate raised incomes from on- and off-farm activities;
- (ii) Supporting expansion of access to information, communication, infrastructure and technologies; and
- (iii) Improving access of the poor to financial and social services.

64. Important priorities for implementation of the strategy were described as:

- (i) Focusing on multisectoral, community-based and demand-driven interventions;

- (ii) Ensuring outreach to the poor and securing their access to sustainable financial services determined by demand and by the market;
 - (iii) Promoting reversal of the alarming degradation process affecting soil, land and the riverine and coastal environments;
 - (iv) Strengthening of the decentralized planning process; and
 - (v) Aiming for national coverage through joint donor and multi-agency initiatives, embracing the private and NGO sectors and potentially extending to regional collaboration in common interest subject matters.
65. The COSOP envisaged three interventions that would put the strategy into operation:
- (i) A community-based rural development and demand-driven support services programme;
 - (ii) A rural financial services development programme; and
 - (iii) A community land, water and common property resources management scheme.

B. Analysis of the Country Strategy Design

66. As far as the appropriateness of the thrusts of IFAD strategy is concerned, the first of the key elements, policy advocacy for pro-poor reforms and improved local governance, was important at the time of COSOP preparation. However, the prospects for its activation in the early years of the return of democratic government and without a consistent IFAD presence in-country were limited. This activity is even more important now, given that the way forward in development for Nigeria is already taking IFAD out of its principal domain of agriculture and into financial services and microenterprise development. In these areas, IFAD is likely to become less and less comfortable to be operating on its own and without clear government policy signals and backing. Since the inception of the Field Presence Office, IFAD has been able to make a significant contribution at the operational level to the development of partnership and dialogue with the Government.

67. The second key element, development of effective rural institutions, brings into play the substantive successes IFAD has achieved, using the CDD approach, in the inculcation and support of grass-roots farmer and community organizations and in the fostering, mentoring and support of LGCs in dealing with community issues. It also impinges on the wider issue of progressing from decentralization to real devolution, where the responsibility and authority for local development planning and implementation are attributed to the level at which commitment and accountability can best be achieved. This implies substantial strengthening of the capacities and capabilities of LGCs, village and community bodies, and a degree of reform of state – and possibly federal – sectoral support agencies.

68. The third key element of the strategy, productivity and natural resources management covers the area of intervention that has been, and probably will continue to be, the most difficult in which to achieve meaningful impact for IFAD and for other donor interventions. However, it is also acknowledged to be the principal driver of sustainable economic growth for the rural areas, not to mention of sustainable individual farming family livelihoods. The constraints on impact vary from region to region. In the north and centre, prudent utilization and conservation of the soil, land and water resources are crucial and are not yet properly practiced. In the south, small farm size, the reliance for income on a range of alternative sources and the opportunity for alternative and more amenable employment often conspire to restrain interest and progress in farming. In all regions, the low productivity and profitability of crop and livestock enterprises and the absolute poverty of the farming household are serious obstacles to adoption.



Water pump: positive example

Source: IFAD Evaluation Mission



Water pump: negative example

Source: IFAD Evaluation Mission

69. The strategy was relevant to IFAD and government interests at the time, although the COSOP itself lacked a precise analysis and illustrative matching of the key concerns and priorities of the Fund and the Government. It continues to be relevant at present, having covered reasonably well the main aspects of concern in project and programme effectiveness encountered during the CPE.

70. The strategy presented in the COSOP has proved to be a workable framework for the partnership between IFAD and the Federal Government and for the identification of development themes and thrusts. The rationale for optimal use of IFAD funding and expertise derives principally from the analysis of the successful aspects of the Katsina, Sokoto and the cassava multiplication interventions of the MSADP-CMP and was appropriately described in the document. Both the ethos and the specific elements of the strategy put forward for IFAD were in consonance with government strategies and priorities for poverty reduction, empowerment of people, growth of the rural economy and achievement of the MDGs, and consistent with and complementary to those of most other donors. The strategy has satisfactorily underscored the importance of policy dialogue and set the agenda for it, albeit somewhat short of detail on how the responsibility for dialogue would be allocated and the process handled. It also correctly identified the innovations in the earlier projects and the potential, if not the process, for replication, expansion and dissemination of the new approaches that had been introduced.

71. While the COSOP demonstrated a fair grasp of the challenges to poverty reduction and livelihoods improvement for the rural poor, the strategy would have been enhanced by a deeper and more comprehensive analysis of certain of the major issues and topics affecting IFAD interests. It would also have benefited from a clearer deduction of findings and postulating of recommendations for future programme design. Above all, the goal, objectives and potential activities under the strategy were not presented in sufficient detail in either the text or the logical framework.

72. Other areas where the treatment could have been more rigorous include:

- (i) The analysis of the status and issues of rural poverty was reasonable but rather broad and general; although the emphasis of IFAD on targeting was less strong at the time of the COSOP, a more precise differentiation and description of key target groups, such as single women, youth, the landless and disadvantaged, would have been useful in predicating possible locations and subject matters for intervention;
- (ii) Similarly, the analysis of the current scenario and scope for improvement of the agricultural sector might have been more explicit in elaborating not only on the natural resource and technical limitations but also on the policy, political and institutional constraints to more effective sector support;
- (iii) The comparative advantages of IFAD as a donor and the scope and means for complementarity and joint operation with other development partners could have been better spelled out;

- (iv) The shortcomings of some IFAD-financed activities, for example the difficulty of credit provision and issues related to sustainability of microenterprises and income-generating activities within KSACDP and SSACDP, could have been underlined more clearly. Moreover, the way in which lessons from previous projects were used to inform the design of new operations was not documented;
- (v) In dealing with the problems of project implementation, notably in trying to find ways to avoid the inordinate delays in start-up and the complications of delays and denials of funds flows; and
- (vi) While the desirability, or it might be said, need for a national and strongly government-backed approach to intervention in fields such as rural microfinance provision was acknowledged, no mention was made of the conditions and implications likely to be associated with IFAD participation.

73. The analysis of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) confined itself to the development environment, as determined by government policies and the practical institutional and operational constraints for IFAD intervention, but neglected to take properly into account the role of other development partners. At the time of COSOP formulation, the importance of communication, information and knowledge-sharing were only beginning to be recognized and utilized in project design; their absence from the strategy was therefore to be expected. In practice, IFAD has been working on these activities only since the establishment of the Field Presence Office in 2006.

74. The COSOP provided some guidance for future operations, in terms of specifying priorities and then outlining goals, objectives and possible activities, together with implementation modalities and targets for outreach and impact for prospective interventions. The strategy recounted the existing level and terms of relationships with other development partners. However, it did not clearly foresee the emergence of more formal agreements for collaboration, such as the World Bank/DfID CPS; nor did it presage the possible use of sector-wide approaches, although opportunities for these or for simpler multidonor basket funding modalities might have been anticipated, given the Nigerian context. For instance, rural finance has been one of the main themes of the IFAD country programme and the COSOP even envisages a national rural finance programme. Yet, on the issue of partnerships, it was silent about linkage with the Central Bank – which actually should have been foreseen as a key institutional partner – and about the implications and opportunities for inter-donor cooperation and complementary interventions of nationwide coverage.

C. IFAD Capacity for Strategy Development

75. The efforts and resources deployed by IFAD in developing the COSOP extended over two years, 1999 and 2000, and involved inputs from the former and current country programme managers (CPMs), the divisional director and regional economist and several other senior staff members of IFAD for the technical review and operational strategy assessments of the draft document, which were favourable. It also involved substantive inputs from various in-country agencies, including those in the CPRs and stakeholder workshops described above, and numerous individual and group consultations with government and development partner personnel. This approach was successful in promoting ownership of the COSOP within the FMAWR and in other government agencies. However, although the consultations included the Federal Ministry of Finance and the National Planning Commission (NPC), the senior staff of these agencies expressed concern that the scope and depth of the dialogue during COSOP preparation had not been sufficient. The senior staff of these agencies expressed strong interest in being associated with the preparation of the future COSOP. It has to be mentioned that the turnover of staff from these agencies has been higher since the preparation of the COSOP.

76. Most of the analytical work was undertaken by the CPM and the regional economist, but the principal burden of analysis had already been dealt with in the course of the CPR preparation, the mid-term reviews and routine reports of the ongoing projects, and the various survey and study documents of other development partners. IFAD clearly has the capacity to undertake preparation of COSOPs, but the quality of the documents produced and the strategies put forward in them is constrained by the quantum

of inputs and costs budgeted for the process. Thus, in the case of Nigeria, there is clear evidence of a thorough process of consultation and participation, unusually including interaction with beneficiary individuals and communities of the existing projects, and with potential participants in the next generation of interventions. If there was a weakness in the preparation process, it was the limited involvement of the private sector. This was partly because at the time attention was devoted to capacity-building of local government and to social, rather than productive, commercial investments.

D. Assessment of Strategy Quality

77. The quality of the country strategy is rated against key criteria in the following Table 2. The causes of poverty and poor performance of the agricultural and rural development sectors have been identified and addressed in a manner that can best be characterized as adequate, and the direction, instruments and potential investments for future collaboration were appropriate and were agreed upon with/by the Government. Since the COSOP did not include a detailed analysis and interpretation of findings on the institutional environment, the issue of effectiveness of implementation and the scope for improvement therein remains to be resolved. Apart from this, as alluded to above, more intensive and deeper analysis of certain aspects of the quandaries of poverty reduction and agricultural and natural resource utilization and conservation would have added value to the strategy. Now, seven years after the COSOP, these issues are still being explored in the context of implementation of the current programme and in the finalization of relevant sections of the NEEDS 2 document, in which IFAD has taken an active part. The overall rating of the IFAD strategy is 4, moderately satisfactory.

Table 2. Quality of the Country Strategy

Assessment Criteria	Rating	Discussion of Rating
Understanding key challenges to rural poverty reduction	Satisfactory (5)	Main causes and manifestations of rural poverty described, but others -- corruption, ineffectual local governance, politicization and dependency -- not well accounted for. No problem tree.
Analysis of IFAD target groups and their needs	Moderately unsatisfactory (3)	Target group definition general/descriptive, not explicitly differentiated, for instance for gender aspects; no guidance on targeting issues or means; no reference to any survey on the poor, their characteristics and expectations.
Relevance and clarity of goal and objectives	Moderately satisfactory (4)	The rudimentary nature of the logframe left the reader searching for an understanding of the explicit intent of these objectives, although this tool was not required as it is today. The rating is justified in line with the CPR in the way in which the goal, purpose, and objectives of the strategy were articulated, that is, in a general way that does not lend assistance to the design and implementation of IFAD interventions.
Structure of strategy and sequence of assistance	Moderately satisfactory (4)	Structure of the strategy was reasonable, but sequence or prioritization of interventions or activities not mentioned.
Identification of partners and partnership opportunities and plan for building partnerships	Moderately satisfactory (4)	Existing donor agencies and arrangements noted and proposed for continuation and extension of cooperation; but no clear picture of the how and when of joint working opportunities, or sector or national approaches.
Innovation, replicability and scaling up	Moderately satisfactory (4)	Innovation and scope for replication and scaling up reasonably well described, albeit without specifics.
Agenda for policy dialogue	Satisfactory (5)	Issues for and approach to policy dialogue stated in clear terms; these included specific focus on pro-poor economic and social policies; local governance and accountability; financial system liberalization; the environment; the progressive replication of the CDD approach demonstrates the relevance and effectiveness of these aspects; however, more on process, responsibility would have been helpful.
Overall Assessment	Moderately satisfactory (4.2)	The COSOP 2001 can serve as a broad basis for preparation of the future/next COSOP.

Note: Ratings from 1 to 6, where 1 is the lowest score and 6 the highest.

78. **Conclusion.** The analysis of the COSOP and strategy design make clear the challenging institutional landscape for agricultural and rural development in Nigeria, especially in light of the evolution in governance within the country. While the CPE is not mandated to undertake a comprehensive institutional analysis, it does assess the performance of the key institutions involved in IFAD operations and endeavours to identify key opportunities and challenges that deserve further analysis and attention in the COSOP development process. The present COSOP can provide a reasonable starting point for the new COSOP, which will be based on the revised IFAD results-based country strategic opportunities programme approach, as approved by the IFAD Executive Board of September 2006.

Key Points

- The COSOP 2001-2007, the result of an intensive two-year process, was the first formal planning exercise both between IFAD and Government and for submission to the Executive Board.
- The COSOP strategy built on the sound IFAD-supported project experience and that of other government and donor projects, in consonance with IFAD and government strategic priorities.
- The key elements were: policy advocacy for pro-poor reform and improved local governance; development of effective rural institutions; and productivity and natural resources management.
- Major strategic thrusts were: empowerment of target groups and organizations to raise on/off-farm incomes; access to information, infrastructure, technologies and financial and social services.
- The strategy has proven to be a workable framework for the partnership of IFAD and the Federal Government and for the identification of development themes and initiatives.
- Of the key elements, development of effective rural institutions has had the greatest effect; policy advocacy was problematical until the IFAD country presence was established in 2006; and the agriculture and natural resource element has had limited funding and been difficult to implement. This would have been especially important for poverty reduction.
- The strategy presented some limitations, including insufficient focus on target groups and their needs; weak emphasis on agriculture and IFAD's comparative advantage. Lessons in the failure of credit, enterprises and income-generating activities and implementation problems were not drawn out strongly enough.

IV. PERFORMANCE AND IMPACTS OF THE LENDING PROGRAMME


A. Programme Description

79. The projects and programmes that comprise the core subject of evaluation are listed and described, including their geographical coverage, in section I. B above; and the Technical Assistance and Early Implementation Support Grants that were considered are listed in Appendix 1. Except for the KSACDP and SSACDP, all other IFAD interventions are located at Federal level and executed at State level. The evolution of the portfolio up to 2006 has followed a logical pattern of synergy between existing and new interventions, in terms of coverage and content of new projects and programme, building on and expanding the successful aspects of those that were nearing completion.

80. This is particularly clear in the emphasis on the CDD modality from Katsina and Sokoto being incorporated in both the CBARDP and the CBNRMP. The latter took cognizance of the best features of the MSADP-CMP and the previous Artisanal Fisheries Project, and the RTEP expansion to its present twenty-six State coverage. To a degree, the new RUFIN Programme continues this trend, covering five of the existing IFAD-assisted States. However both RUFIN and RUMEDP take IFAD into an essentially different and wider spectrum of development activity, as to content and institutional framework for implementation, as well as new States.

81. There is further synergy within the portfolio in as much as the goals, purposes and objectives of the different projects and programmes coincide on strong common themes of enhancing social facilities and services and improving productivity, food security and incomes of poor, rural households as the principal means of uplifting their livelihoods. Supporting objectives revolve around: (i) enhanced agricultural production, natural resource utilization and conservation; (ii) community involvement, empowerment and self-reliance; (iii) support of LGA and local governance performance; and (iv) promotion of more effective service provision.

82. Although the RTEP started out as a purely single commodity, agricultural production intervention, it has been transformed to a degree towards the community-based approach that is a key feature of the other ongoing programmes. In all projects and programmes and in the more recent loans in particular, designs and/or subsequent implementation directions and activities have ensured the incorporation of specific provision to address the issues of gender inequality, disease, and vulnerability. Figure 3 below illustrates the pattern of IFAD programme in Nigeria by components.



83. The prevailing pattern of funding of earlier projects was planned as: IFAD contribution, 40 to 60 per cent; Federal Government, 12 to 15 per cent, cofinancing with development organizations (UNDP, EU, Ford Foundation), 23 to 28 per cent (including UNDP, 4.4 to 13 per cent, the European Union, 13 per cent; and Ford Foundation, 1.3 per cent); State and Local Governments, three or four per cent; participating institutions, 1 to 18.3 per cent; and beneficiaries, 1 to 5.8 per cent. Actual out-turns were of the order of: IFAD, 60 to 70 per cent; the Federal Government, five per cent and State and Local Governments 15 to 16 per cent. The rest of funding was provided by cofinanciers, national institutions such as the NDDC, Banks, and beneficiaries.

84. The pattern of funding for more recent Programmes has seen a significant change as LGAs have been able to increase their contribution, with a norm of an IFAD share of about 40 per cent and all levels of Government putting up 60 per cent. In the case of the CBNRMP, the substantial contribution being made by the Niger Delta Development Commission has reduced the IFAD financing requirement to only 18 per cent. There is a need for agreement among the Government stakeholders and with IFAD prior to, or during future project design about the optimal and realistic pattern of sharing of costs and acceptance of responsibility for meeting targets for funds delivery.

85. Of the twelve TAGs awarded since 1997, all except two have been devoted to the support of research and development work associated with cassava and the other root and tuber crops, the complementary crops of the predominant farming systems and the farmer field school method of extension. The two exceptions were grants to the NGOs, the Nigerian Integrated Accelerated Development Organization and Food Basket Foundation International for specialist assistance in community development and benefit assessment methodologies. The Grants ranged from nearly US\$20,000 to US\$270,000, the latter scheduled to assist start-up of the RUFIN Programme. One other large grant, of US\$220,000, was devoted to the Sokoto State ACDP. Except for these two examples, advantage had not been taken of the grant window for IFAD financing, but there is now a provision in the design of the RUFIN and RUMEDP for a grant of US\$400,000 for each programme, typical of the larger amounts that are being accessed by other borrowers in support of specific studies and enabling actions for IFAD Programme support.

B. Portfolio Performance: Relevance, Effectiveness and Efficiency

86. **Relevance.** The relatively consistent features of IFAD Programme design have served to build a credible overall series of initiatives that are aiming at resolving the problems of rural poverty and economic growth. More important, the portfolio is attuned to Government policy priorities of uplifting the livelihoods of the rural poor, empowering individuals, groups and communities to raise incomes and standards of living and supporting local authorities to improve their performance.

87. Given the huge size of the country and its population, and the limitations of funds availability, both the ongoing and new interventions have a geographic focus that is reasonably well-aligned to greatest need and prospective benefit. This has proved to be a moderately effective mode of operation. However, it may not be the optimum means in the future of dealing with issues that require a national approach, as foreseen for rural financial service provision in the COSOP; and probably multi-donor participation, especially in view of the desirability of better aid coordination and harmonization of UN interventions under the Paris Declaration.

88. Given that the analysis and conclusions of the COSOP are logical and valid and accurately reflect the strategic aims of the Government and IFAD, then a first measure of relevance may be obtained by a comparison of the actual content and coverage of projects and Programmes with the key elements and major thrusts of the COSOP. The results of this comparison made by the CPE are set out in Table 3.

89. The results from the comparison on access to financial and social services are favorable but may be rather misleading. The fact is that in the case of the community-based programmes and the current phase of the RTEP, a large share of the development funds are provided on a grant or quasi-grant basis or require limited beneficiary contribution. In the former, the major allocation of funds is to the social, rather than the productive, cash generating investments, which are needed to sustain social infrastructure

and services. It would have been desirable to have a clearer separation of the financial services from the social.

90. Since the rural finance components of all previous projects and programmes also aimed to form credit linkages to banks, much of the groundwork for what the RUFIN Programme aims to achieve has already been laid in the CBARDP and CBNRMP locations. However, since the RUFIN LGAs overlap with other Programme areas only in a few cases, the opportunity has been missed for a more efficient design. The fact that the RUFIN Programme has come so late and has no efficient linkages between it and other IFAD rural finance components has reduced its relevance for prior IFAD Programmes. Nevertheless, it is relevant for future interventions.

91. In addition to consistency with COSOP strategy elements and thrusts, assessment of relevance needs to embrace the wider context of certain national concerns and circumstances, such as the worsening incidence, and in some cases, severity of poverty; the fragility of rural livelihoods, particularly in the drier or more densely populated States and the constraints of the traditional cultural and institutional environment in which projects and programmes must be implemented. The relevance of interventions in this regard is related to how well the overall design is conceived to ensure that the plight of the poorest and the need for their positive inclusion is mainstreamed in management thinking and carried through to execution.

Table 3. Programme Design Related to Key Elements and Thrusts of COSOP Strategy

Category Key Elements	CBARDP	RTEP	CBNRMP	RUFIN	RUMEDP
Policy Advocacy					
- Inclusion in design	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
- Estimated per cent of project cost	<10	0	2	>25	>10
Rural Institutions Development					
- Inclusion in design	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
- Estimated per cent of project cost	~50	6	~23	~20	30+
Productivity, Natural Resources Management					
- Inclusion in design	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
- Estimated per cent of project cost	<17	55	22	0	>30
Major Thrusts					
Target Group Empowerment (and strengthen local organizations)					
- Inclusion in project design	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
- Estimated per cent of project cost	<14	5	~18	>20	~30
Pro-poor Reform Support (and improve local governance)					
- Inclusion in project design	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
- Estimated per cent of project cost	<30	0	~30	~20	<5
Access Financial/Social Services					
-Inclusion in project design	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
-Estimated per cent of project cost	~3	~40	51	>50	>30

Notes: Designs of original Katsina and Sokoto projects and, to a degree, RTEP are pre-COSOP. Estimates of share of programme costs are based on original appraisal cost tables.

92. Relevance also relates to the practicability of implementation using the existing Government framework or through autonomous management systems. The current portfolio portrays a range of approaches: the RTEP is coordinated by a Programme Management Unit but is implemented by State ADPs. The community-based programmes have autonomous Programme Support Offices (PSOs) but at State level some have independent State Support Offices (SSOs) while others are embedded in the ADP system. The exact configuration for the two new Programmes, with their specific sector requirements, is still under discussion. All of the IFAD interventions are coordinated at the Federal level by the Project Coordinating Unit (PCU), which is now part of the National Food Reserve Agency (NFRA) of the FMAWR; and the NFRA itself, is understood to be in the process of review and reorganization.

93. The assessment for relevance is not a process that is amenable to a completely objective and quantitative analysis for each of the contributory aspects to the rating. For example, the community-based programmes, and particularly the original Katsina and Sokoto projects and the community-based programmes (CBARDP and CBNRMP) were relevant with respect to their pioneering of beneficiary involvement and empowerment, and LGA strengthening in the CDD paradigm. The community infrastructure interventions were also relevant and have brought substantial livelihoods and welfare improvements to the IFAD target groups and in particular the poorest and vulnerable, women, youth and children. The most requested projects included hand-dug wells and boreholes with hand pumps, school buildings and health centres.

94. The CDD approach empowered communities not only to identify and prioritize infrastructure such as potable water supplies, health facilities, rural/village roads, inter- and in-community roads, primary schools and training centres, but to establish them in a cost-effective manner, thus providing an example of relevance beyond the sphere of projects and Programmes alone. Also, for their proposed simple yield enhancing technologies and the introduction of best cultural, husbandry and soil and water conservation practices, the sustainable agricultural and conservation subcomponents of the earlier interventions were highly relevant.

95. However, the assessment also needs to recognize that the relevance of these projects and programmes was weak with respect to: (i) the communal aspects of natural resource management; (ii) the critical elements of profitability and marketability for increasing agricultural income and household wealth; (iii) omission of due consideration of the commodity value chain approach; (iv) the viability and sustainability of enterprise and income generating activities; and (v) the practicability of microcredit provision through the commercial or community banks.

96. In the case of the RTEP, the first phase of the Programme carried forward the MSADP-CMP achievements in the productivity and output of the cassava crop and attempted to widen the range of crops promoted and further develop the resolution of their disease⁹, pest and productivity problems. This intervention to consolidate the progress made with respect to assuring the supply of the basic food crop of the southern States was highly relevant; but, as explained further below, it failed to address the already emerging problem of the danger of over-supply and undermining of the market.

97. The rationale for the second phase of the RTEP, emphasizing the processing and marketing of cassava, including as more sophisticated products, also appeared, at first glance, to be highly relevant. However, the underlying analysis of the viability of investment in processing; the competitiveness of the trade; the limitations of market and product demand; and of the ability of civil servants to mount and sustain the necessary processing and marketing initiatives under the Programme, does not appear to have been sufficiently rigorous and sound. In addition, the proposed design did not include the degree of participation by the financial services institutions and the private sector that might have better ensured its success. The rating for relevance of the Programme overall needs to reflect these shortcomings.

98. The objectives of the RUFIN and RUMEDP fit with the country and IFAD strategy objectives, especially in terms of their aspiration towards national coverage; and their focus on the themes of rural finance and micro-enterprise development that are seen as essential components of the commercialization of small scale agriculture and of rural development more generally. The objectives of these two Programmes are also consistent with the need to address key challenges to poverty reduction and to that extent are clearly relevant. However, if the rationale is to be relevant for future interventions, the components need to be properly linked with the wider rural finance activities of other IFAD-financed projects, other donor and Government programmes; and preferably to be backed up by multi-donor funding commitment and participation, rather than just promises of possible future collaboration.

99. Taking all of these factors into account, the CPE concludes that the individual programme activities were generally in line with the country strategy and has assessed the relevance of individual

⁹ Principally the Cassava Mosaic Disease.

projects and programmes and the overall portfolio as portrayed in Table 4, below. The portfolio rating is 4.3, moderately satisfactory.

Table 4. Ratings of Projects and Programmes for Relevance

KSACDP/ SSACDP	CBARDP	RTEP	CBNRMP	RUFIN	RUMEDP	Portfolio
Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory
5	5	3	5	4	4	4.3

100. **Effectiveness.** Despite the difficult environment in which the projects and programmes were, or are being, implemented and the ambitious nature of their geographical and subject matter coverage, many exemplary results have been achieved. In particular, the IFAD interventions have: (i) helped rural people to uplift their social status, confidence and self reliance; (ii) pioneered participatory processes to forge and foster group and community development actions; (iii) assisted in resolving the disease and pest susceptibility and productivity problems of the staple food crop, cassava; and (iv) empowered communities to plan and prioritize their community infrastructure needs and then to contribute to cost effective and timely construction and subsequent organization of their operation and maintenance.

101. The assessment of effectiveness is based only for the KSACDP and SSACDP. For the CBARDP and for the RTEP, the assessment findings are based on progress to date against targets, as recorded by interim reviews and/or recent supervision reports, as well as indicators provided by discussion with Programme Managements during fieldwork. In the case of the RTEP, the targets have been amended following the 2005 Tri-term Review. For the CBNRMP, implementation is at an early stage which does not allow a realistic scoring to be determined, while the RUFIN and RUMEDP have yet to commence implementation.

102. The CPE observed a considerable variation in the achievement of progress towards targets across the country portfolio. For the two closed projects, selections of examples of figures for achievement against target serve to illustrate the general effectiveness scenario. For the KSACDP, the relevant figures are: number of farmers reached by extension, 68 per cent; volume of outgrower production of improved seeds, 173 per cent; number of community development associations (CDAs) formed, 144 per cent; number of boreholes rehabilitated/constructed, 96 per cent; kilometers of roads rehabilitation, 94 per cent; and kilometers of new roads built, 167 per cent. These are clearly effective results.

103. Conversely, the achievement in other activities was rather less impressive. For instance, the figures for representative activities are: number of women groups registered, 50 per cent, and with loans 46 per cent; number of upland conservation groups formed, 13 per cent; acreage of degraded arable and grazing land rehabilitated, three per cent; kilometers of conservation grass hedging planted, less than one per cent; and number of hand-dug wells rehabilitated, 16 per cent. The data show that there are social activities that have performed well (community associations formed) and others that performed less well (gender). The environment activities consistently performed less than average, mainly because of the lack of interest by farmers. Hence, there is disparity in completion between social and community investments and those of a more productive nature in agriculture and natural resources management.

104. In the SSACDP, a similar variation in achievements was found. For example, key figures which indicate positive effectiveness include: number of development and women groups formed, 120 per cent and 109 per cent respectively; number of community group projects assisted, 392 per cent; number of farmers benefiting from improved extension, 125 per cent; number of paravet clinics established, 112 per cent; and volume of improved seeds produced by outgrowers, 286 per cent. Lesser achievements were recorded for other indicators, viz: number of on-farm testing sites, 16 per cent; volume of improved seeds produced by project, 35 per cent; acreage of degraded land rehabilitated, 10 per cent; acreage of Fadama land developed and irrigated, 13 per cent and 23 per cent respectively; and kilometers of grass hedging, 28 per cent.

105. In particular, there were considerable disparities in the community infrastructure achievements. Here, representative key figures of achievement include: number of hand dug wells rehabilitated, 36 per cent; kilometers of roads construction, 35 per cent; kilometers of rural roads rehabilitated, 280 per cent; number of village/cottage industries established, 40 per cent; and number of hand pumps rehabilitated, 170 per cent. On balance, the performances of the KSACDP and the SSACDP were not dissimilar in terms of effectiveness, the Sokoto project being judged to have had a slightly stronger agricultural and conservation effect.

106. Under the RTEP, the main indicators of performance emerge from the first phase of the programme and refer to the improvement of production. The key figures include: numbers of farmers reached through field days, 74 per cent, and with access to improved planting materials, 81 per cent; quantity of improved cassava planting materials multiplied and distributed, 79 per cent; number of on-farm adaptive research trials, 77 per cent; and estimated typical increase in yield of cassava, 45 to 50 per cent. These are clearly impressive achievements, some of which can probably be attributed to the impact that had already been made by the MSADP-CMP. In terms of the processing and marketing activities, the second phase of the programme is at an early stage of implementation; the figures to date relative to target are: number of processing groups formed and trained, 69 per cent; number of farm families engaged in processing, 66 per cent; and number of processing centres established, 15 per cent.

107. The CPE has found that the effectiveness of the RTEP is being affected by the changes in programme design since the Tri-term Review. The original programme design was premised on lessons learned from the CMP review, namely that: (i) it was confined to cassava and only to production; (ii) its resources were spread too thinly; (iii) processing and marketing were largely missing; and (iv) demonstration, training and promotion were the best tools for root and tuber promotion - and therefore further assistance to groups should be provided on a grant basis.

108. The evidence from field work suggests that other, more important lessons that should have been taken into account were that:

- (i) The CMP increased production, only to result in frequent and substantive market gluts, rendering fresh tubers uneconomic or impossible to sell;
- (ii) There is a strictly limited demand and price for cassava for both local consumption and for processing - and limited interest among farmers and consumers in other root and tuber crops;
- (iii) Processing of cassava, other than for simple domestic use, and marketing of more sophisticated cassava products, are specialist, competitive, cost intensive and not notably profitable activities, with established private sector interests and structures; and
- (iv) Small farmer groups and small scale processing facilities, whether grant-aided or not, are likely to have great difficulty competing in the market unless operating in close collaboration with flexible financial services providers and private sector players in trading and processing.

109. It is of particular concern, in the view of the CPE, that these crucial feasibility and marketing factors were not given appropriate weight despite the intensive consultation between Government and IFAD in formulating the RTEP second phase; and despite the clear signals that were contained in the Tri-term Review Report itself.

110. In broader terms, effectiveness of the RTEP has been negatively influenced in terms of its agricultural development activities, by the lack of a strong market-led approach and entrepreneurial element in programme design. Farmers were not provided with viable economic options, or even any original thinking, on diversification of production and marketing; nor is there sufficient involvement of commercial interests that might have assisted in resolving the problems of market access at both local and national levels. In the RTEP funding activities, design and management of the US\$12 million

Stakeholder Support Fund for promotion of cassava processing, the financial services institutions, which are an essential adjunct to commercial operation, have virtually no involvement.

111. In the CBARDP, while most programme activities are determined by Community Action Plans rather than the appraisal, the following physical results are indicative: number of Community Action Plans completed, 75 per cent; numbers for construction or rehabilitation of wells, boreholes and pumps, 67 per cent; health centre construction or rehabilitation, 20 per cent; and road construction or rehabilitation, nine per cent; the latter low achievement is due to higher than planned costs per sub-project. The CBARDP has achieved a typical level of outreach to its target villages and communities and the overall financial performance in CBARDP in community infrastructure is around 20 per cent of the allocated funds. Achievements against allocated amounts to States varied between three per cent and 44 per cent. Despite this variation, 40 per cent of CBARDP community infrastructure projects have been completed, as described under Efficiency, below.

112. As for the RTEP, the design of the agricultural and natural resources subcomponents of both CBARDP and CBNRMP is not market-oriented. No deliberate efforts were made to hinge intervention on business principles or sales increase along the market/commodities chains which are strong elements in rural livelihoods improvement. The associated lack of understanding and creativity among programme facilitators is deemed a major obstacle to effectiveness. In addition, in the opinion of the CPE, the bias in share of funding towards community and social infrastructure at the expense of the more productive and remunerative investments in agriculture and natural resource utilization and the approach of allocating part of the responsibility for these investments to the Gender and Income Generation Component is tending to limit both effectiveness and sustainability.

113. Although it is considered too early to draw sound conclusions about effectiveness and efficiency in the case of the CBNRMP, it should be noted that the CPE has found that significant capacity building has already been achieved, as required by the programme design. The management team has been innovative in adding a pilot community infrastructure and natural resource management sub-project within the first two year, awareness creation and capacity building phase of implementation, in order to sustain stakeholder interests, thus compensating for an acknowledged shortcoming in design. Community infrastructure projects implemented under the pilot phase have been effective in meeting the initial goal in building confidence between the programmes and participating communities.

114. In the case of the RUFIN programme, it is again considered too early to make judgments on effectiveness, but the CPE has discerned a number of factors that give concern. While the focus on capacity building of the microfinance institutions is appropriate, the current design and spread of activities need refinements to guarantee the best results. The principal reasons for this observation can be summarized as follows:

- (i) If large volumes of commercial funds are not readily available alongside capacity building, then the RUFIN supported financial institutions can get heavily dependent on Government grants and heavily subsidized loans which are available in several States, thus undermining the results of the Programme. RUFIN does not indicate how it will tackle the supply of and access to grants from different State Governments without diluting the sustainability of the rural financial institutions;
- (ii) The assumption is implied in the design that after capacity building, the necessary funds will flow to the improved institutions: this is a high risk strategy and one that is counter-indicated by all IFAD in-country experience to date;
- (iii) It is believed that agencies such as the World Bank, DfID, and other institutions¹⁰, which provided inputs during RUFIN's formulation, will automatically oblige with future funding support to the programme. This expectation of substantive funds commitments to rural microfinance development from other donors should preferably have been formalized into firm commitments to a national programme in concert with Government, before the IFAD intervention goes forward; and

¹⁰ Such as GTZ, UNDP, FAO, USAID, and CIDA.

- (iv) The contribution and involvement of the commercial banking and private sectors is not as well-defined as it should be.

115. Effectiveness of the RUFIN Programme as part of a nationwide exercise is also likely to be eroded by: (i) the limited outreach within the States and inadequate supply of loan funds from formal sources; (ii) insufficient training and understanding of microfinance at the community and programme levels; (iii) the poor repayment culture, and weak savings propensity and performance.

116. Notwithstanding these challenges to effectiveness, the CPE enquiries clearly demonstrate that the IFAD portfolio has delivered a commendable performance in terms of impact at the household and community level, as discussed below and of the track record of acceptance and adoption of the approaches and pattern of activities that it has promulgated.

117. Conversely, effectiveness has been influenced by a number of weaknesses or shortfalls in project conception, design and management that have general implications for future interventions. Principal among these are:

- (i) The prevalence of out-dated practices in both Government and civil society, including institutional rigidities and politicization - with resultant dependence - in development affairs;
- (ii) Inadequate definition and delegation of executive decision making and action taking responsibility and accountability; delays and denials of funds flows for IFAD programme implementation;
- (iii) The limited attention to promotion of improved small farm productivity in general and to sustainable, conservation-based farming in particular; the lack of experience, understanding or application of the principles of commercialization - finance, business and markets - to small farm sector improvement; and
- (iv) Over ambitious and unrefined design with respect to the resources available, as evidenced in the RTEP phase II and the RUFIN programme.

118. The ratings for effectiveness of the individual projects and programmes and for the portfolio are assessed on the basis of the foregoing discussion and are presented in Table 5, below. It should be borne in mind that these ratings are based only for the KSACDP and SSACDP. The assessments for the CBARDP and the RTEP are findings based on progress to date against targets. In the latter case, the targets have been amended following the 2005 Tri-term Review. The overall rating for the portfolio is classified as 4, which is moderately satisfactory.

Table 5. Ratings of Projects and Programmes for Effectiveness

KSACDP	SSACDP	RTEP	CBARDP	Portfolio
Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory
4	4	3	5	4

119. **Efficiency.** The determination of efficiency is a rather more complex exercise than the assessment of the other performance factors, in as much as the particular conditions of implementation of individual projects or programmes are not necessarily comparable with those of others. In addition, the acquisition of sufficiently robust results and expenditure data for comparisons, for instance with the projects of Government or other donors, requires inputs of time and cost that are beyond the scope of the CPE.

120. In the case of Nigeria, two factors impinge on efficiency across the board of the IFAD portfolio: the first is the prevalent, inordinate delay between loan approval and effectiveness and launch on the ground. Typically, it takes two to three years for IFAD-assisted projects and programmes to achieve start-up. In one case, the delay extended to 40 months. It cannot be construed as efficient under any

circumstances to have funding available and yet to have unmet needs. The second crucial factor is that of certainty and timely delivery of provision of funds from all sources for IFAD operations when they are underway. Here again, as alluded above, the track record for the portfolio is one of protracted bureaucratic processes for the drawdown of funds and frequent delay and often denial of funding, despite all parties having been involved in, or at least informed about the demands of the annual work programme and budgets (AWPBs).

121. Investments having been made, staff appointed and being in place, and other resources committed only for the progress of work to be held up, or rendered ineffective because of funding unavailability, is the epitome of poor management and inadequate institutional and regulatory arrangements for implementation. A further issue concerning funding has been the perception by project managements that fund allocations by activity have been prescriptive, according to the appraisal design. In future it should be made clear that fund allocations are flexible and that there should be scope for retro-fitting of funding to meet the pattern of interest and uptake of different project activities, according to AWPBs.

122. The allocation of funds to project or programme management for the Katsina, Sokoto and RTEP interventions has been of the order of 15 to 22 per cent, depending on the exact content of the Sub-component. This level of allocation is in excess of the typical levels of operating and overhead costs found in other projects and countries. However, in the case of RTEP, it can be partly accounted for by the complexity of the multi-State coverage, encompassing 26 States, and the need to have a management presence, albeit not full-time, in each State. The RTEP financial activities were always split from the ADP accounts at the State level. RTEP financial activities were recorded using ADP documents. The financial management documentation is centralized at the RTEP-MU but only one financial statement is prepared for RTEP¹¹.

123. For the CBARDP and CBNRMP, programme management was not defined as a separate sub-component, although given the need for both PSO and several SSOs; it would not be surprising to find that management costs were rather high. The overall assessment from the CPE field work with respect to programme operations is one of top-heavy staffing, but adequate provision of vehicles and equipment.

124. An area where there has been marked efficiency of programme operations is with respect to the execution of the social investments within the CDD approach of the CBARDP. Where communities control both planning and implementation and monitoring, they have demonstrated that by use of own labor, local materials supply and direct contracting of local artisans, community infrastructures have been implemented with the same degree of quality and timeliness, at much lower cost, than had they been done by the more formal service providers and contractors predicted in the COSOP and appraisal reports (private and NGO sector).

125. An important factor of the efficiency of social and community infrastructure projects has been community contributions, especially in the form of labor and local construction materials. Under the CBARDP, these vary from ten per cent for most infrastructure schemes such as roads and school buildings, up to 30 per cent in Fadama irrigation packages and they have led to substantial savings in total costs. Despite these cost economies, which have contained expenditures so far to 20 per cent of budget, the community infrastructure programme has actually achieved 40 per cent of its projected output, with a good record of quality of construction and timeliness of completion.

126. For instance, a survey conducted by the CBARDP Kebbi SSO, compared the costs of CBARDP infrastructure projects with similar schemes implemented by the World Bank-funded Community Based Poverty Reduction Program, as well as with other State and LGA projects in the State. The results for typical selected interventions are presented in Table 6, below. They illustrate high cost efficiency: CBARDP projects cost on average less than half of the expenditure projected in the appraisal; 30 per cent less than comparable projects under the World Bank program; 40 per cent less than the State Government projects; and 60 per cent less than the LGA projects. Apart from immediate cost saving, there is additional efficiency in reducing contract inflation.

¹¹ Financial Management Project Implementation Support Mission Report, October 2007.

Table 6. Comparative Costs of Typical Community Infrastructure Projects in Kebbi State (NGN '000)

Description of Projects	IFAD-CBARDP	Kebbi State Government	World Bank-CPRP	Local Government
Block of 2-classroom office and store	1,540	4,500	2,200	5,200
Dispensary 2-ward, 6-bed capacity including furniture and drugs	2,465	4,500	5,000	10,500
Hand pump (below 50m depth sedimentary formation)	540	750	800	950
Open dug well, concrete lined	80	150	200	350

Source: CBARDP, Kebbi State (2008).

127. Table 7 sets out the comparison of appraisal estimates and actual average costs for typical projects, illustrating the significant savings realized, despite the constraints of delayed funding for many schemes and the knock-on effects of adverse weather conditions for work completion and unforeseen cost increases for inputs, such as cement.

Table 7. Comparison of Projected and Actual Costs of Typical Community Infrastructure Projects (NGN '000)

Description of Projects	Appraisal Cost Estimate	Average Actual Cost	Divergence/Saving (per cent)
Access road construction	12,120	1,500	88
Dispensary	2,570	1,622	37
Borehole and hand pump	1,630	720	56
Open dug well, concrete lined	775	100	87

Source: CBARDP, Appraisal Report and recent Progress Reports, 2001-2007.

128. A further indicator of efficiency, assuming that the benefits have been achieved to a reasonable degree, is cost per beneficiary family of the project or programme operations. For the KSACDP and SSACDP the final figures are available. The overall costs per principal beneficiary family, assuming an average household size of five, are US\$391 and US\$243, respectively. These figures are within the normal range of expectation for such interventions and indicate an acceptable level of efficiency. The figures available for the RTEP and CBARDP are for interventions in progress and for the IFAD disbursement only; and must therefore be considered as tentative and indicative. For the RTEP, the current level of expenditure is taken as US\$10.5 million and the number of benefiting households as 35,000, giving a cost per main beneficiary family of US\$300. For the CBARDP, the claimed counts of beneficiaries are much higher, but taking present expenditure as US\$10.97 million and benefiting households as 265,000, the indicative cost per family is US\$41; this is an exceptionally low value for such an intervention.

129. The key factors underpinning efficiency of the IFAD programme at the farmer level are high costs of operations, poor gross margin, low net returns, poor benefit-cost ratios (BCRs) and high break-even point. In typical examples, the variable costs account for over 70 per cent of the total cost which indicates that most operations were done by manual labor and could not have been efficient. Although BCRs may be positive, the break-even factor of yield is often of the order of 15 tons/ha, yet not all farmers were able to achieve up to 10 tons/ha. The gross margin by farm model for cassava enterprises

set out in Table 8 shows an average cost per hectare of NGN35,000 (US\$290) and an average gross margin of about NGN3,320 (US\$27) per ton.

Table 8. Gross Margin by Farm Model for Cassava Enterprises

Farm Model	Average Yield (ton)	Average Farm Size (ha)	Gross Output (ton)	Average Price (NGN/ton)	Gross Output Value (NGN/ha)	Gross Margin (NGN/ha)	Gross Margin (NGN/ton)
Small	12.4	3.2	39.68	6,000	74,400	39,400	3,177.41
Medium	12.8	7.5	96.00	6,000	76,800	41,800	3,265.62
Large	14.2	12.5	177.50	6,000	84,960	49,960	3,518.30

Source: Field Survey in Kwara State, 2007.

130. The value added through cottage level processing is also most often discouraging from the economic point of view, as recounted above from the RTEP Tri-term Review data and from the typical example seen in Box 1 below. The BCR of 1.1 for the processing enterprise ordinarily represents about ten per cent profit margin; such a return is wholly inadequate to withstand any shock and is not sustainable for such an enterprise.

131. The CPE observed that the kind of financial results portrayed in the two scenarios (Table 8 and Box 1) accounted for the huge cassava glut and the numerous abandoned cassava farms found in the sub-sector. Many farmers complained that lack of markets and inability to break even at the prevailing market price had forced them to abandon their farms. However, there was a relatively better performance for these indicators in the case of yam mini-set enterprises, which are an alternative to cassava. These enterprises recorded a net return of over NGN 475,000 (US\$3,654) per hectare and a BCR of 2.5. Unfortunately, the RTEP has not yet been able to seize the opportunity presented by the positive economic indicators of the yam enterprise.

Box 1. Cottage Level Cassava Processing Abia State, Nigeria, 2007 (Naira)	
Total Variable Cost	154,500
Total Fixed Cost	87,665
Total Cost	241,165
Sale/Revenue	270,000
Gross Margin : TR – TVC	116,000
Net return : TR – TC in Naira	28,835
Benefit-cost Ratio	1.1:1
Break-even point	4.6 tons

132. Feasibility budgets for cassava and yam production are given for six farm models in various States¹²; in only two of these models does the with-project case show any advantage over the without-project case and then the incremental benefit-cost ratios are only seven per cent and 18 per cent higher, hardly sufficient to justify additional investment for these basic root and tuber crops. Of even more concern are the results given for six models of cassava processing. In this case, the various results quoted are as follows:

¹² Annex 5 of the Tri-term Review Report on Enterprise Analysis, 2006.

	With-project BCR	BCR Increase %
• Gari production in Plateau State	1.07	+2
• Fermented flour (custom services) Niger State	1.05	+5
• Gari production (cottage level) Abia State	2.33	+120
• Fermented flour production Abia State	1.06	+5
• Gari production (cottage level) Delta State	1.12	+4
• Fermented odorless foofoo Ogun State	1.07	+5



Training on water pump utilization in Edo State

Source: RTEP, 2008

133. It is clear from these results that the examples of cassava processing that are portrayed, which are representative of the range of possible investments being promoted by the RTEP second phase, are highly unlikely to be viable and sustainable. BCRs for such investments in virtually any type of primary agricultural product processing such as this need to be in the order of 2:1 or higher for the enterprise to offer a worthwhile and acceptably low-risk proposition. In the only example above which meets this criterion, the BCR cottage level gari production in Abia State, the BCR quoted of 2.33:1 appears to be based on the assumption of more than half of the enterprise revenue coming from the provision of custom grating and pressing services for cassava producers other than the business owners. Given the state of the cassava market, this is not considered to be a credible assumption; the BCR without this assumption would be 1.06.

134. Thus, the shift, since the Tri-term Review, to the encouragement of processing by grower groups appears to be based on assumptions of technical and financial feasibility and end-product marketability that are not borne out by market demand or present industry performance. The CPE noted in nearly all visits to small and medium cassava processing mills associated with the CMP/RTEP that they were not functioning at anywhere near capacity, if at all; and that new ones were not taking off for lack of markets and/or were operating in a position of marginal profitability or outright loss. In the view of the CPE there is a danger that the damage that may be done by injudicious processing investments will undermine the effectiveness to date of the RTEP.

135. Overall, the CPE observed that many, but not all of the objectives of the project and programme activities were attained with unit costs either less than or similar to those of other donor interventions. Putting together the main variations in results and related expenditures and economic scenarios set out above, the ratings for efficiency were scored as presented in Table 9, below. The overall portfolio rating is 3.5, on the borderline between moderately unsatisfactory and moderately satisfactory.

Table 9. Ratings of Projects and Programmes for Efficiency

KSACDP	SSACDP	CBARDP	RTEP	Portfolio
Moderately unsatisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory
3	4	4	3	3.5

C. Rural Poverty Reduction Impacts

136. The domains of rural poverty reduction impact analyzed by the CPE relate to physical assets, social capital and empowerment, food security and agricultural productivity, environment and common resources, financial assets, market access, and institutions and services. The CPE assessment is based primarily on analysis of the impact of the closed projects, KSACDP and SSACDP; and of the RTEP, taking account of the fact that the latter is an extension of the previous cassava improvement and production upgrading activities of the MSADP-CMP. The evidence of progress to date in poverty impact of the CBARDP and its prospective continuation allow it to be included in the assessment. Conversely, the CBNRMP and the RUFIN and RUMEDP are not yet at a stage where their actual or potential impact on poverty reduction and beneficiary livelihoods can be properly assessed and they are therefore excluded.

137. The CPE field enquiries show positive effects and benefits at several levels of livelihood of participating households, in reasonable self-sufficiency of food, better accessibility to social services and facilities and endowment of communities and women with the ability to participate in and influence development. The field enquiry findings are supplemented by the outputs of the Performance Assessment Studies carried out in parallel under the aegis of the CPE by the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research (NISER). These detailed studies focused on the KSACDP and the RTEP activities in Nasarawa and Kwara States.

138. Although the CBARDP and RTEP phase-2 are still ongoing and their poverty impact cannot be determined conclusively, it is possible to discern a number of trends that indicate likely positive impact. These include, in particular:

- (i) the establishment and highly effective operation of the CDD system of demand-led intervention and especially the empowerment and capability building of the local people and the provision of important social infrastructure and services;
- (ii) the inculcation of these principles of development planning and execution in the LGA administration, so strengthening capacity for - and changing attitudes to - service provision;
- (iii) the imparting of a wide range of technical, entrepreneurial and managerial training to programme and partnership agency staff and beneficiaries; and
- (iv) the extensive outreach of the CBARDP across the States and the consequently high numbers of participants potentially and actually benefiting.

139. In terms of broad estimates of the size of beneficiary populations, the KSACDP records the number of families reached by improved extension as nearly 48,000 compared to the target of 69,700, including over 1,000 women in groups accessing loans. Around 300, and up to 800 recipients benefited from direct assistance in livestock supply, machinery provision and demonstrations respectively. Those benefiting from the RTEP included 18,750 families that produced or received improved planting materials and 285,000 farmers who were trained on new production technologies. The coverage and potential impact across the 69 participating LGAs of the CBARDP is even greater, with estimates of beneficiary numbers to date of 300,000 families from agricultural productivity improvements, nearly 41,000 persons trained in CDD; and some 14,880 community groups formed.

140. The CPE enquiries show that there has been positive change in the predicament of both direct and indirect beneficiaries across all of the projects and programmes, albeit that their numbers fall below expectations for some interventions and in some States. Confirmation was obtained from group

discussions and individual interviews of enhanced household food sufficiency, as well as modest increases in family incomes; better accessibility of health, education and transport services and a marked change in community and women's confidence and self-reliance.

141. The data available on impact are not sufficiently detailed or disaggregated to identify the distribution of benefits across the hierarchy of poverty or to confirm the effectiveness of targeting. However, the nature of the social and community investments, the intensive sensitization and awareness building activities and the careful village selection processes serve to supplement the CPE field findings that the poorer and less advantaged echelons of the community were reasonably well represented in the beneficiary profile of the current programmes. The actual and potential results for the various domains of poverty impact are summarized in the following paragraphs. Where data are available, including those from the NISER studies, figures are quoted that compare beneficiaries with a non-beneficiary control group. The ratings for poverty impact are recorded in Table 10 at the end of the chapter.

142. **Physical assets.** The original Katsina and Sokoto projects and the community-based programmes have included significant expenditures in communal and social assets as well as an element of assistance for group or individual household or enterprise assets. The RTEP has increased the availability of equipment. The main manifestations of improvements in physical assets are in ownership of land, household appliances and farm equipment and livestock, in means of transport and in size and quality of houses. The typical figures of benefit are that 72 per cent of beneficiaries report advancement in physical asset accumulation as against 38 per cent of non-beneficiaries - that is a near doubling of advantage for project participants, principally in land and livestock ownership, housing and transport.

143. It is expected from current programme progress that the CBARDP and CBNRMP will record similar increases in asset ownership related to agricultural productivity and income generation. For KSACDP, most of the beneficiaries (75 per cent) indicated improvement in all aspects of physical assets in contrast to 38 per cent of non-beneficiaries. The non-beneficiaries only made progress in ownership of sheep and goats.

144. **Social capital and empowerment.** This is a key domain of impact because it impinges on both sustainability and the capacity of targeted communities to plan for and attract further development. The major parameters of social capital and empowerment are involvement in decision making and management of communal facilities and services, as well as the improvement of relationships both within the community, for instance in caring for the disadvantaged or destitute poor; and between the community and Government, NGO and private sector agencies. The results recorded for the KSACDP impact study indicate that 86 per cent of the beneficiaries report progress in social capital and empowerment whereas 39 per cent of non-beneficiaries do. This represents a more than doubling of impact for the project. The only shortfall in this aspect was in relations between project communities and the private sector, where the difference was insignificant. Under the RTEP, 53 per cent of respondents reported an advance in empowerment.



Cassava processing in progress

Source: RTEP, 2008

145. IFAD community infrastructure interventions were successful in directly impacting rural poverty by providing: (i) access to potable water through the construction of wells and boreholes which reduced water borne diseases within the communities; (ii) access to basic health care by establishing rural clinics; and (iii) improved access roads to farming communities. Social development activities also had significant benefits in increased literacy, numeracy and vocational skills for women and children by establishing and rehabilitating primary and secondary schools; and in the provision and rehabilitation of markets.

146. With respect to gender, the KSACDP impact study investigated the opinions of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries as to the achievement of gender equality in a range of potential project benefits. These included improved input supply, human capital development, provision of fertilizers and credit, extension delivery and improved processing. The results indicate that the project had achieved appreciable degrees of gender equality in most of these measures, with an aggregate rating recorded by beneficiaries of 38 per cent, as against that stated by the control group of 26 per cent.

147. Among the non-beneficiaries, the occurrence of bias towards male participants in various development activities was in the range of 66 per cent to 81 per cent, indicating the prevalence of considerable gender inequality. Given the cultural constraints on participation by women in communal and development activities, a particular achievement of the CBARDP was to engage the religious authorities in facilitating women's involvement, as outlined in Box 2.

Box 2. Increasing Participation by Women in the North through Local Teachings

In Northern Nigeria, IFAD community-based programmes experienced an initial reluctance for Muslim women to participate in development activities. Women were not accustomed to taking part openly in community affairs, especially alongside men; also men disapproved of their wives' active participation. This is due to the traditional beliefs that a virtuous woman should not be outgoing or outspoken. IFAD PSO used a culturally acceptable method of peer education to encourage women's participation in the CDD approach, where women were grouped together and addressed by women and separated from men during community meetings.

However, women were still uncomfortable with airing their views in public. At this point the IFAD PSO used an innovative approach by inviting local village religious leaders and *Imams* from 207 participating villages in Northern Nigeria, to encourage women to participate and men to allow their wives to participate in CDD. The *Imams* used Islamic teachings, which state that "*Islam recognizes the equality of men and women in spirituality and doing good works*" (*Quran 33:35*); and "*the search for knowledge is obligatory for every Muslim (both men and women); (Hadith)*."

As a result IFAD programmes in northern Nigeria have overcome the initial natural reticence of women to participate in community development and increased their representation and involvement. At the IFAD-CBARDP presentation at the Self Assessment Workshop held in Abuja on 12 – 14 November 2007 it was reported that 4,662 women now participate in the CDD approach; and at the community level, several women are now in leadership and decision making positions.

148. **Food security and agricultural productivity.** The parameters of assessment for food security are based on production - and adequacy of supply - of the main food crops and livestock products, including cereals and pulses, roots and tubers, fruit and vegetables and dairy products. Productivity does not necessarily determine food security; seasonality and local availability are other important parameters. In the KSACDP, 87 per cent of beneficiary respondents claimed a positive impact, compared to 53 per cent for non-beneficiaries, indicating that there has been a marked increase in food availability and sufficiency generally, but with a 60 per cent increment with-project. The actual difference recorded for food consumption between the two groups was less, namely 20 per cent higher for the beneficiaries.

149. The RTEP enquiry did not incorporate food security as a separate item but included production and better nutrition as indicators of food supply. Overall, 87 per cent of beneficiaries claimed production increases and 71 per cent stated that they had experienced better nutrition. For the main crops, the responses on better nutrition were mixed, namely: 60 per cent of respondents for cassava, 49 per cent for yam and 46 per cent for sweet potato believed that levels of nutrition were improved and improving. The

CPE noted that yield has shown a marked increase for most crops. However, the limited emphasis on value addition through promoting new products and increased shelf life - and lack of a deliberate and determined effort by interventions to increase the sales and income of the farmers - have militated against achievement of the level of food security that was expected from intervention.

150. The key measures used to assess the agricultural productivity impact include area cultivated, yields and outputs, incidence of cash cropping, use of improved inputs and machinery, general intensity of production and adoption of technology, including, in the case of the RTEP, processing equipment. The KSACDP results demonstrate that 69 per cent of beneficiaries report advancement as against 36 per cent of non-beneficiaries, a 90 per cent increase from participation. The key differences were in area cultivated and output; the aspect of least difference was in rate of technology adoption, where both categories of respondents reported less than 30 per cent uptake. In the case of the RTEP, technology adoption was higher, at 54 per cent, this being principally attributable to improved planting material and farm practices.

151. Information from the self-assessment exercise indicates that average cassava yields have been increased from ten tons per hectare in 1997 to 15 tons per hectare in 2006 through the impacts of the MSADP-CMP and RTEP. Conversely, information from field interviews suggest that most small farmers are achieving yields of only eight to ten tons per hectare, partly, it is thought, because the problem of marketing larger outputs in periods of glut is a disincentive to produce more. The CBARDP also recorded over 100 per cent increase in productivity for most cereal crops.

152. **Rising food price and agricultural development.** The soaring prices of food crops in 2008 have triggered several responses in the economy. One of the implications is that food price increase in Nigeria has sent inflation rates up from 5.4 percent to 5.8 percent. The level of the composite food index was higher than the corresponding level a year ago by 12.4 percent (National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), 2008). The NBS attributed the rise to the sharp increase in the prices of rice and other staple foods and vegetables. Reactions from various farm families indicate that the percentage share of income spent on food crops has tripled over the last three months, as the poverty gap seems to be widening in other sectors of the economy.

153. The hoarding and storage of farm produce have also been adopted by some farmers who still anticipate increases in price thereby causing further scarcity of food crops and price escalation. Speculators and consumers are responding to the development through bulk purchases and conservative rationing of their food needs. But, some producers are benefiting from the situation since their local economy is transforming into a money-making enterprise¹³. For instance, recent reports from service providers¹⁴, indicates that the age bracket in agriculture has improved as many of those under 30-years old have gone back to farming. The increase in food prices appears to be a positive development for small rice farmers. The development has prompted Nigeria to realize that it has the potential to meet the rice needs of the West African region. Many farmers are already responding to higher prices by burning and plowing huge areas of forest and grassland to convert them to cropland and high value crops like rice, millet, and sorghum, while some other farmers are taking advantage of high yielding technologies to improve productivity. There are also distortions in the cropping cycle, as most farmers are clearing land previously meant for soybean or leguminous crops in favor of rice, maize, sesame and other cereals.

154. Most countries are no longer preoccupied with exporting their food surplus because of the additional demand for bio-fuels. This will leave a significant supply demand gap in the nation's food requirement. For instance, as at 2007, Nigeria consumes about 6.4 million metric tons of rice. Only 56 per cent of this quantity is locally produced. The remaining 44 per cent is imported and its absence in the rice market in 2009 will exert undue pressure on the prices of close substitutes. Even though production

¹³ For instance, in the rice sub-sector, a majority of the farmers under the OLAM/MARKETS supported out-growers scheme made a net income of over NGN2 million (price of high quality rice paddy rose from NGN46 000/ton to NGN80 000/ton while that of Faro variety rose from NGN85 000/ton to NGN150 000/ton).

¹⁴ USAID/MARKETS, 2008.

will increase significantly through various intervention programmes,¹⁵ productivity is still very low. The currently available processing technologies are rudimentary and may not be able to provide wide range of options in high quality processed products to meet increasing local demand - or compensate for gaps to be created by absence of high quality imported brands.

155. Although the Government of Nigeria is sensitive to this development and has decided to spend over NGN10 billion for importation of processing and tractor equipment to add value along the chain. The market-led, demand-driven approach has direct positive bearing on the indices for economic growth and may benefit the poor and small farmers in a more sustainable way. But, existing projects have also revealed that Nigeria lacked enough post-harvest and marketing management technologies and most importantly technical know-how to make agriculture competitive and self reliant. The inclusion of the private sector in the decision-making process and improvement of the business climate in terms of research/extension services, capacity building, and infrastructure are still partial.

156. **Environment and common resources.** The main criteria for assessment of the environmental impact encompassed tree cover and forest, grazing land, watershed management, soil quality and productivity, and availability and quality of water. Except for watershed management, the KSACDP beneficiaries reported a 91 per cent response on positive progress in the state of these indicators, compared with a 33 per cent positive response by the control group, a near trebling of impact. The non-beneficiaries recorded advancement only in water resources and supply, while beneficiaries reported progress across all of the criteria. The lack of willingness of the communities to invest in natural resource management projects is attributed to the long period of payback for such projects and the lack of a tradition of communal systems of utilization and management.

157. Nigeria is endowed with a good number of rivers, pockets of annual streams and natural dams which usually overflow their banks at the peak period of the rains to recharge the lowland plains and also serve as natural drainage for several watersheds. These watersheds provide good opportunities for communities, especially those with short rainfall duration, to harvest and conserve rainwater for their agricultural use. In the area of watershed management, the CPE mission noted that apart from one micro earth dam in Katsina State, little was done by IFAD programme interventions on the conservation and management of water supply. No specific activities were proposed or undertaken to rehabilitate dilapidated earth dams or to control storm water runoff and groundwater utilization. These types of action could have reduced the incidence of water erosion to either improve water quality or reclaim lost lands, and thus have improved water availability for crops and livestock production.

158. **Financial assets and market access.** The key variables of financial impact at household level include income, savings, ownership of valuables such as jewellery and access to credit and business assets. Under the KSACDP, 22 per cent of the non-beneficiary groups reported a decline in financial assets over recent years, while only four per cent of the beneficiary group reported such a decline. In terms of growth in financial assets, 84 per cent of beneficiaries reported positively as against 32 per cent of the control group, that is a two and a half times incremental impact for the project. In the RTEP assessment, 70 per cent of respondents reported enhanced income. But, interestingly, when questioned further about the specific impacts of improved cassava production, 55 per cent of responses indicated that incomes were now decreasing.

¹⁵ IFAD supported programmes (RTEP, CBNRMP, and CBARDP), the upcoming World Bank funded Commercial Agricultural Development Programme (CADP), and USAID/MARKETS programme.



Access to markets

Source: Evaluation Mission, 2008

159. The key factors of assessment for market access include availability and quality of infrastructure and facilities for handling, storage and selling, means of transportation, marketing information and rural/urban linkages, food prices and percentage of produce marketed. The NISER study on the performance of KSACDP shows that 81 per cent of beneficiaries reported incremental impact from the project, as against 57 per cent of the control group who also reported positive impacts without-project, indicating only 40 per cent uplift attributable to the KSACDP. The results from the RTEP survey suggest that only 17 per cent of respondents considered that enhanced access to markets had been achieved; and, specifically for cassava, 60 per cent were of the opinion that market access was worsening, while 15 per cent believed that it was improving. Interestingly, among yam producers, the opinions on whether market access was improving or getting worse were equally balanced; 65 per cent of the beneficiaries mentioned the lack of market as a major constraining factor on the impact of the RTEP intervention.

160. In this context inadequate market linkages were mentioned as the most constraining factor, followed by deficiencies in roads and transport conditions, in storage, access to credits, and market information. The linkages between crop producers and processors were rather rudimentary and weak; while interviews with RTEP officials revealed that many processors were not aware of the potential existing opportunities in the international market.

161. The market orientation of the RTEP interventions in the first phase of the programme was low, as reflected by the limited funds initially allocated to market-led activities. Funds were increased from 19 per cent to 55 per cent of the resources for the second phase of the programme. The implementation of the Diversification of Processing and Marketing Component was entrusted to the Nigerian Centre for Agricultural Mechanization. This move allowed the RTEP to become technically reasonably effective in processing, in the upgrading of new products such as high quality cassava flour (HQCF) and odorless *fufu*; and in drying and peeling equipment.

162. However, the dilemma of market access - and hence financial benefit for farmers - for the cassava processed products sector goes much deeper than technical efficiency. In the course of field work, the CPE did not find a single HQCF plant, which was able to market its flour on a consistent and profitable basis. Calculations made subsequently by the CPE team for a typical HQCF plant, indicated a clear lack of profitability, with a negative net return for a one year operation of NGN5.23 million (US\$44,000), as presented in Appendix 4. Demand for HQCF dropped severely because wheat is much cheaper. Similar indications of the lack of profitability of processing activities were obtained as part of the NISER performance assessments, which concluded that enterprises producing gari, cassava chips and HQCF were highly unlikely to achieve positive net margins.

163. While Nigeria has substantial comparative advantage in processing technology as compared to other West African countries where IFAD-funded roots and tubers projects are implemented, such as Ghana, Cameroon and Benin, the marketing and value chain investigations have shown serious shortcomings. These include absent or inadequate linkages to industrial processors, exporters and supermarkets; lack of support for improvements in contracting, group marketing, quality control and packaging; and limited market information services. Given these circumstances, the CPE has reservations about the reported level of marketing impact, because it is clear that the implementation of IFAD programmes was conducted under the traditional supply-led and activity-driven model; and as such no emphasis was placed on strategies to capture consumer preference and improve market access for the farmers. Some of these aspects were addressed in the second phase of RTEP but a more holistic and comprehensive approach is needed.

164. **Institutions and services.** The marked success and the wider adoption of the CDD approach has been based on the empowerment, support and upgrading of capability of local institutions at community and LGA level. In most circumstances, this has been followed by improved service provision, whether in social affairs or for productive purposes. One of the main and still prevalent weaknesses in this scenario is that of the accessibility of financial and business development services. Their absence or inadequacy is one reason for the limited sustainability of many of the local enterprises established by the projects and programmes.

165. Another weakness, highlighted by the impact assessment of the KSACDP, is that of the effectiveness of the local governance structure in support of grass roots development. In the study, questioned on the response of Government to the needs of the community and the poor, and on gender issues, only 13 per cent of beneficiaries thought that there was increasing impact in the without-project situation, partly because of illiteracy, lack of responsiveness and bad governance. The corresponding figure for the with-project case was 70 per cent, indicating that governance issues are probably a major factor in development impact and poverty mitigation.

166. The impact assessment exercise for the KSACDP and RTEP questioned beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries on the constraints to impact for the projects. There was a considerable coincidence of views that a lack of awareness and the prevalent low level of education restrained impact from the outset; while inadequate input supply and poor road conditions hampered the full realization of benefits.

167. There were contrasting views on other topics. Of the non-beneficiaries, 42 per cent thought that bad governance and 12 per cent, compared to the beneficiaries, thought that scarcity of organizations such as cooperatives was a constraint. Of the beneficiaries, only three per cent, compared to nine per cent for the non-beneficiaries, felt that marketing problems were important. Interestingly, neither group was of the opinion that there was any serious inability of women to access extension services. Other factors of more assured sustainability mentioned were dedication and discipline on the part of participants, timely repayment of loans, and higher levels of funding all round.

168. In summary, intervention has to a large extent created positive impact in changing the mind-set of the Government cadre and community leaders towards governance through an inclusive process of decision making; and in trying to resolve the disease, pest and profitability problems in agriculture. However, pronounced impact is yet to be recorded in sustainable agriculture and food security, if the parameters of sustainable use of land and water resources, value addition to farm produce, seasonality of agricultural products and income level of farmers are considered.

169. The ratings for rural poverty impacts are set out by project and programme for the relevant interventions and for the portfolio in Table 10. The overall score is 4.3, moderately satisfactory.

Table 10. Ratings of Projects and Programmes for Rural Poverty Impact

KSACDP	SSACDP	CBARDP	RTEP	Portfolio
Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory*	Moderately Satisfactory
4	4	5	4	4.3

*Note: The rating for the RTEP refers only to the production aspects of the programme.

D. Other Performance Criteria

170. **Sustainability.** To a considerable degree, the potential sustainability of the IFAD programme has already been demonstrated by the continuity and dissemination of the approach and activities of the original Cassava Multiplication, Katsina, and Sokoto projects and their extension into the RTEP, CBARDP, and CBNRMP. Clearly, sustainability has been assured to an extent by additional donor funding, but it also represents a substantive Federal, State and Local Government commitment. It presages **political sustainability** of IFAD-assisted interventions as long as they expound development ideas, mechanisms and means that correspond to real community needs - and to the capacity of authorities to deliver - and that then go on to achieve the planned-for outputs.

171. Funding from IFAD comprises only a minimal share of budget provisions even at the LGA level and the primacy of agriculture as the driver of rural economic growth, as evidenced by the trebling of the allocation in the 2008 Federal Budget, is now well founded. In these circumstances, and considering the alignment of IFAD strategy and Government aspirations vis-à-vis poverty reduction, it can fairly be assumed that the types of intervention financed with IFAD assistance will continue to be promoted and supported. This conclusion is reinforced by the proven **economic sustainability** of most of the current interventions, which will be complemented by the financial sustainability from the incremental budget provision. The exception, in the view of the CPE, is the case of the promotion of the more advanced technologies for cassava processing that is being implemented under the RTEP-phase-2, where the feasibility of the proposition for most small farmer and women groups is highly uncertain.

172. Certain specific aspects and activities of the IFAD programme have shown resilience to date, have been adopted by other projects, donors, States and LGAs, and are most likely to be sustained. These include the bottom-up, CDD approach and the community groups and organizations that have been established and that have so far shown proficiency in the execution and subsequent operation, management and maintenance of local infrastructure and services. The achievements under this category of interventions, emerging, as they do, from the intensive participatory processes of beneficiary consultation and empowerment, indicate a level of responsibility and understanding of the obligations and benefits of ownership that promise to ensure **social sustainability**. In the particular case of the CBNRMP, the likelihood of social sustainability is less certain, given the recent and, to an extent, continuing, insecurity in the region as a result of communal militancy and prevalent criminality.

173. Thus, the CPE observed that the CDD approach encourages and fosters the sustainability of infrastructure projects, but the ability of the communities to maintain the facilities after programme funding will depend to some extent on their level of income and sustainability of the agricultural enterprises that are the main-stay of the local economy. Little has happened in the area of natural resource management and therefore the sustainability of the natural resources may be in doubt.

174. Other community level aspects of the programme have been less successful. In the case of Katsina and Sokoto - and prospectively for the more recent programmes - efforts to establish credit provision, enterprise development and income generating services and activities have proven to be of questionable sustainability. This is partly due to the financial non-viability of many of the enterprises and activities; but is mostly attributable to the fact that the modalities, conditions and arrangements for financial services provision across the IFAD portfolio are unrealistic and highly unlikely to be sustainable.

175. The favorable impact of the programme on the capacity, orientation and effectiveness of the lower strata of Government has been described above. The activation or improvement of relations between

strong community groups and organizations and their LGA counterparts has been a feature of the community-based programmes. Conversely, the tendency for the RTEP to work from State and ADP level directly with communities, by-passing LGA structures, detracts somewhat from this advantage. The community-based programmes have also shown that even where State operations are autonomous, in the majority of cases liaison has been established and working relations set up with the ADPs or Agricultural and Rural Development Authorities. Thus the signs of institutional sustainability at the LGA level are good, although they may be constrained by the experience, competencies and limited rewards and prospects for local personnel - and the consequent tendency for high staff turnover.

176. At the State and Federal levels, the assurance of sustainability is less certain. In the case of States, it is clear that dedicated implementation structures comprise a highly effective and efficient mode of implementation, but this approach is not innovative and may not be sustainable. However, they may be justified where they have a catalytic role for change in ADP effectiveness in planning and development and are eventually incorporated into the formal structure, as part of programme objectives.

177. Until now, constraints of implementation have been experienced in some cases within the ADP system. These include: (i) bureaucratic rigidities and the overloading of staff with multiple responsibilities; (ii) adherence to traditional, top-down training and visit (T&V) system of agricultural extension, which is now widely seen as inappropriate and ineffective in the context of the small farm sector in Africa. This is mostly because of the lack of accountability, and the prescription of technological practices, instead of building capacity among the rural poor (especially smallholders) to identify and take advantage of available opportunities¹⁶; and (iii) bypassing LGAs in the development process.

178. At the federal level, sustainability of programme operations and benefits will be determined mainly by the dedication and effectiveness of the PCU within the NFRA. At present, in addition to its IFAD commitments, the PCU handles five other projects for the World Bank, AfDB and the Federal Government, as well as undertaking routine statistical, reporting and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) tasks for line departments of the FMAWR. This is a complex and demanding remit.

179. In its initial analysis, the CPE concluded that a detailed functional and organizational analysis of the NFRA/PCU was required, given: (i) its observations and dealings with the PCU cadre; (ii) the new direction of subject matter coverage of the RUFIN and RUMEDP interventions and possible future projects, which are likely to require inputs to implementation from a broader range of Government, private sector and NGO agencies; (iii) the wide remit of the NFRA, which, as its name suggests, will entail the management of demanding activities that are not essentially development in nature; and (iv) the proposed establishment of a strengthened, formal IFAD in-country presence, with practical responsibility for the conduct and progress of projects and programmes, and for improved Government and donor liaison.

180. This analysis would determine the capacity and capability of the NFRA/PCU to handle the current and future IFAD-assisted programme. It is clear that this task will necessitate not just the ability to coordinate, but clear definition of the authority and accountability for executive decisions to be taken at the appropriate levels of project or programme management - and/or within the State ADP or the PCU. In particular, implementation agencies will need to be conscious of the limitations for IFAD in the funding of social infrastructure and services, as opposed to its investments in productive natural resource based activities. In subsequent consultations with the NFRA/PCU, it was agreed that the necessary functional and organizational study of the IFAD counterpart agencies would be made; and, in addition, it was proposed by the FMAWR, that the IFAD focus point would be strengthened with additional staff and improved training and IT facilities, including the updating and streamlining of the M&E system and procedures.

¹⁶ This empowerment model is opposed to the T&V model of organizing extension, promoted by the WB from 1975 to 1995. The T&V model was designed to "improve performance of extension systems by strengthening their management and formulating specific regular extension messages".

181. The technical content of the projects and programmes has so far been innovative in concept and reasonably accomplished in delivery and it has not been so complicated or sophisticated that it would pose problems for **technical sustainability**. Community infrastructure projects are based on well-known technologies and standards of construction and their operating and maintenance demands are known and not onerous. Sustainability could be increased with improvements in implementation; enhanced training and mobility for better supervision; and more, and gradually increasing, community responsibility and capacity for maintenance.

182. Community services interventions, likewise, are straightforward in design and in their delivery and upkeep systems. The agricultural aspects of the Cassava Multiplication Programmed (CMP) and the production components of the RTEP were well-executed by the research agencies and the elements of best practice are now standard. Moreover, the crop and livestock production and land and water conservation activities of the community-based programmes utilize - to a large degree - established and even simple knowledge and technologies, which do not pose any threat to environmental sustainability. The exception, as alluded above, is the promotion of sophisticated cassava processing under the RTEP Phase-2, where technical complexity could exacerbate other feasibility aspects of marketing and marginal profitability and thus threaten sustainability.

183. The impact assessment exercise for the KSACDP and RTEP questioned beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries on the constraints to sustainability for the programmes at the practical level of implementation and community and farming support. There was a reasonable coincidence of views that the critical factors in ensuring sustainability include: (i) raising levels of credit; (ii) eradicating illiteracy, raising standards of education; and creating greater awareness; (iii) providing farm inputs; and (iv) providing good roads. There were disparate views on three other topics that could impinge on sustainability: the non-beneficiaries mentioned the need for good, presumably better, governance and more cooperative groups; whereas the beneficiaries felt that the provision of more farm machinery was important.

184. In summary, the CPE noted that many of the supporting factors for sustainability are in place but that certain additional efforts will be required to ensure the continuity and longevity of development activities and benefits. In particular, social, economic and environmental sustainability will depend on the standard of project and programme design, the performance of non-lending activities (NLAs) and the quality of country-level decision making, especially as these relate to agricultural and livelihoods improvement in the areas of watershed management and the agribusiness/value chain approach. The sustainability ratings are given in Table 11; the portfolio rating is 4.3, moderately satisfactory.

Table 11. Ratings of Projects and Programmes for Sustainability

KSACDP	SSACDP	CBARDP	RTEP	Portfolio
Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory
5	5	4	3	4.3

185. **Innovation, replication and scaling up.** In the same way as for sustainability, the achievement of innovation and the propensity for replication and scaling-up of the IFAD programme approach, components and activities is already well-proven. The original Katsina and Sokoto projects have pioneered the participatory CDD approach and the empowerment and enhanced involvement of the LGAs in development planning and implementation, despite the efforts of the Federal agencies at the time to modify the approach so that it was better aligned with the prevailing ADP systems of the time. They also attempted to introduce new methods of combining conservation practices with dry-land farming techniques and of involving the regional commercial banks in credit supply, approaches that have not met with success.

186. The CDD approach has been: (i) expanded within the two original States and now multiplied across the further five States covered by the CBARDP, including extension into non-participating LGAs in Yobe, Zamfara and Kebbi States, with budgets in the latter two of the order of NGN150 million

(US\$1.25m) and NGN500 million (US\$4.2m) respectively; (ii) adopted by Kano State with funding only from local resources; (iii) incorporated by the AfDB in its own version of CBARDP in the five central and eastern States of Adamawa, Bauchi, Kaduna, Gombe and Niger; and to a degree in its Community-based Poverty Reduction project in the four States of Edo, Zamfara, Osun and Gombe; (iv) copied as the basis of design of the CBNRMP in the Niger Delta; and (v) now widely advocated by both State and Federal authorities and other donors as best practice for local rural and natural resources development planning and, through the strengthening of LGA capability, upgrading the quality of local governance.

187. In line with IFAD policy and strategies, the TAG programme is intended to be a major contributor to innovation, replication and scaling-up of Country Programme activities. Prior to and during the MSADP-CMP, and to a degree under the first phase of the RTEP, an innovative aspect of the interventions was the forging of a strong research/extension link, whereby the outputs of research in the productivity improvement and pest and disease resistance of new cassava cultivars were quickly put into the field, multiplied up and made available to the farmer. Although it was not the first case in which this type of improvement was done, it was a notable example of the synergy between IFAD assistance in TA Grants and an IFAD-funded programme. The original effectiveness and impact in scaling up the availability of improved planting material, and the application of cultivation practices, was exemplary, not only for Nigeria, but for several other regional countries.

188. To an extent the RTEP has been able to replicate this success for yam and sweet potato, but uptake for cassava has so far not been so impressive. In the case of the other main root crop, coco-yam, the evidence suggests that production is not profitable, at least as a mono-crop. Also the achievement of the true potential for cassava production continues to be limited by the scarcity and cost of inputs and the constraints of market demand, especially in the recent context of rising food prices.

189. Further, it has been found that in the administration and management of the TAG programme, neither IFAD nor the IITA or other grantees had put in place the personnel, systems or documentation to monitor the use, performance and impact of the grants. It has also emerged that there has been virtually no follow-up or communication between IFAD and the grantees during the life of the award. Additionally the relationship between the IITA and the State ADPs that were co-beneficiaries was informal and loose, making it difficult to gauge the outputs of the research collaboration. In these circumstances, there is reason to question the rationale for a continuation of the TAG programme along broadly the same subject matter lines that have been followed since 1979. It may be time to find a new direction more attuned to the diversification of root and tuber farming systems, such as the yam mini-set enterprise which commands better acceptability in terms of sales and income.

190. In similar vein to its efforts in crop productivity, the RTEP is seeking to innovate in the area of cassava processing, working with processors and the fabricators of processing machinery to improve equipment, processing efficiency and hence enterprise economics. As discussed above, the CPE finds that this is a problematic area and one in which the pursuit of the current RTEP phase-2 strategy is considered highly unlikely to lead to sound and sustainable development. The RUFIN and RUMEDP are designed to be innovative in the capacity building of participating institutions, including savings and credit groups at the community level, in training and systems development and in influencing the framing and application of policy, legislation and regulatory control and support of sector development. They are also explicitly geared to replication and scaling-up, with the expectation of significant complementary future involvement by major donors and increasing support from the Government. In theory, this is an appropriate approach. However, as described earlier, the CPE has found that there is uncertainty among other donors and Government as to whether the environment for development of the financial services and micro and small enterprise interventions is sufficiently favorable; and about the practicability of the modalities for their implementation. Moreover, in the absence of prior formal commitments to support RUFIN, future donor microfinance programmes are not obliged to align with RUFIN and their model and geographical locations may not overlap with the IFAD interventions.

191. The CDD approach proved to be an innovative and effective tool for HIV prevention. IFAD programmes have successfully integrated prevention activities such as HIV/AIDS awareness creation and Voluntary Counselling and Testing within its interventions. In the community-based programmes,

HIV/AIDS prevention activities were carried out under the gender and CDD components and were also integrated in their community infrastructure projects such as village dispensaries - where health workers carry out the HIV rapid test and make referrals. The RTEP incorporated HIV/AIDS prevention messages within extension services and Women in Agriculture Activities to provide comprehensive livelihood services. IFAD programmes have also successfully partnered with the USAID “Heart to Heart” centres i.e. Voluntary Counselling and Testing centres, and have made referrals of HIV positive community members to National and State Control of AIDS Agencies to receive HIV/AIDS information and education communication materials, such as posters and t-shirts.

192. Based on the above analysis, the CPE concludes that the IFAD programme included several innovations in implementation that have already been widely replicated and up-scaled. However, for the agricultural and natural resource management components, the ideas have a low potential for replication and scaling up unless there are significant actionable and effective marketing strategies to stimulate supply on a continuous basis. The ratings for innovation, replication and scaling-up are set out in Table 12; the overall rating for the portfolio is 4.8, considered as satisfactory.

Table 12. Ratings of IFAD Programmes for Innovation, Replication and Scaling Up

KSACDP	SSACDP	CBARDP	RTEP	Portfolio
Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Satisfactory
5	5	5	4	4.8

E. Performance of Partners

193. **Overview.** Overlying any assessment of the performance of the Partners in the conception, design and implementation of the portfolio are those factors limiting the effectiveness and efficiency of the execution and delivery of benefits that have been identified and discussed above. They are: (i) the inordinate time taken, first, to have interventions designed and approved but second and more important, to bring them to effectiveness and start-up after loan agreement; (ii) the delays and denials of funding that impact directly and severely on operational progress; and (iii) the obfuscation and complication of obtaining timely and thorough analysis, and actions to rectify weaknesses and problems in implementation.

194. The CPE finds that all of the Partners are implicated to one degree or other in the shortfall of performance that derives from these factors, if only in the lack of urgency and the tendency to divert responsibility that seem to prevail in addressing the problems and issues involved. The effect is to discourage and disillusion the intended beneficiaries, particularly those at the community and LGA level, where most harm can be done. The fact that these weaknesses persist suggests that both Partners and their staff do not have a clear appreciation of their implications, or they feel that matters are out of their control.

195. **IFAD.** For the pre-COSOP projects in Katsina and Sokoto and the MSADP-CMP, IFAD took the lead role in design and preparation. In the case of the former projects, there was active participation by the State authorities and several of the prospective LGA partners, but, as earlier discussed, Federal Agencies intervened to try to adapt the design to the ADP model; and the proposed co-funding by the UNDP and the European Union failed to materialize. Apart from delaying implementation by nearly three years, in this process IFAD had only a limited impact in resolving the issues involved, but eventually the key elements of bottom-up, participatory and demand-led local development were preserved.

196. The subsequent assessment of IFAD performance in implementation concluded that in the case of the Katsina project, IFAD was unable to follow-up sufficiently frequently and effectively. In the case of the Sokoto project, although there was a measure of liaison with the project and with the CI, IFAD representatives did not visit field operations in a systematic manner nor did they play a pro-active role in the resolution of differences between the State Government and the Federal agencies in the early stages

of implementation. For the MSADP-CMP, given the long-established nature of the project and its supporting systems and the active inputs of the Cooperating Institution (CI), fewer and less intensive IFAD inputs were required and the Fund put in a satisfactory performance.

197. In preparing the 2001 COSOP, IFAD undertook a wide and intensive schedule of work involving consultation with many potentially concerned agencies, as well as studies and workshops in the run-up to actually producing the strategy document. This was clearly a ground-breaking effort, a fact clearly indicated by the cost incurred of some US\$80,000, four times the normal COSOP budget allocation of the time. Despite the devotion of these resources, only few of the respondents to the CPE considered that the scope and depth of consultation had not been sufficient. For the post-COSOP projects and programmes between 2001 and 2006, the World Bank has been the CI; and since it has assumed a similar degree of responsibility and control to that which it applies to its own projects, the demands on IFAD for direct involvement in supervision and oversight of implementation have not been onerous.

198. Since the COSOP, IFAD has continued to play the major role in the conception and design of projects and programmes and this appears always to have been done in close consultation with the immediate Partner agencies, including the FMAWR and Federal Ministry of Finance (FMoF), related central agencies and the relevant State organs, as well as the CI and other donors. In so far as its sporadic field visits allowed, and notwithstanding the dissatisfaction about consultation expressed by the National Planning Commission and the FMoF, this particular aspect of IFAD performance has been handled reasonably well. The major problems that have been encountered have arisen from the quandary of how best to attribute responsibility and arrange implementation for the RUFIN and RUMEDP.

199. Apart from the suggestion that the Fund should have taken a more frequent and active part in supervision missions; and that its non-resident status precluded proper participation in donor group and Government forums, the consensus of in-country opinion on its performance in the years from 2002 onwards is that it has been quite satisfactory. Since 2006, with the introduction of the Field Presence Office (FPO), this situation has improved further; and if the Office is strengthened, it appears likely that this improvement will continue. In mid-2007, it was decided that the RTEP would henceforth be supervised directly by IFAD, as would the two new RUFIN and RUMED programmes. The work involved in these additional responsibilities would vindicate the decision to strengthen the FPO.

200. The view of other partners on the IFAD role is that the World Bank receives considerable kudos from the performance of IFAD-assisted projects and programmes, much of which should be attributed to IFAD; but, on the other hand, the Fund does not have sufficient human resources for direct supervision and implementation support.

201. In addition to consideration of its Divisional and operational role, account should also be taken of the part played by IFAD Headquarters. The opinion of the Government Partners and the CI is that the Fund has shown flexibility and understanding when dealing with matters of consistency of flow of funds, but it is clear that this has not necessarily led to timely resolution of the problems outlined above.

202. Since 2000, the IFAD average annual commitment to approved loans has been US\$12 to 15 million, while average annual disbursements over the last three years have been only SDR 4.3 million, equivalent to some US\$6.5 million. Under the IFAD Performance Based Allocation System the guideline allocation has recently been significantly increased to some US\$15 million per year on the basis of the poverty prevalence, low GDP per capita and the large and steadily expanding population in Nigeria.

203. A deeper enquiry, involving all parties, including the IFAD Loan Management and Financial Control and PA Divisions, and the concerned Government agencies - and convened on the ground in Nigeria - is called for, prior to the next COSOP, to thrash out a more workable and responsive arrangement for avoiding funding delays and denials.

204. Although evidence of the relevance and impact of the grants in Nigeria was demonstrated by the ADPs through various successful farmer participatory trials and multiplication and distribution of the improved planting materials, no M&E system was put in place to track their performance. The CPE

mission observed that neither IFAD nor the grantee put in place an arrangement to monitor grant performance. The relationship between IITA and the ADPs was loose. There was no memorandum of understanding to firm up roles and responsibilities between the agencies, thus making the grants less result-oriented. In addition there is frequent and high turnover of CPMs for the Nigeria programmes.

205. The critique of the CPE regarding the rationale of the RTEP, RUFIN and RUMEDP design and implementation modalities poses questions as to the depth of in-house procedures for technical and strategic operational assessments of programme proposals. Overall, IFAD performance is judged close to moderately satisfactory with a rating of 3.8.

Government

206. **The FMAWR and PCU.** The Government input into the country programme is intensive, due to the involvement of different states and LGAs and the complexities of programme scope and operating modalities. The main organ at Federal level has been the national PCU-IFAD Coordination Office under the FMAWR. The RTEP is coordinated under the Federal Department of Agriculture, a separate arm of the Ministry, managed by a PMU and operated within State ADPs by personnel that also have responsibilities for other projects and routine public service tasks. The community-based programmes are coordinated from their specific, region-based PCU-PSOs, the Coordinators of which report directly to the PCU. These Programmes are operated by State Programme Support Offices (SPSOs) most of which are separate from, but generally in frequent liaison with, the State ADPs; and whose programme management reports to the State Commissioner of Agriculture. Programme organization charts are presented in Appendices.

207. The PCU, now part of the NFRA, has a demanding mandate of responsibility for IFAD alone, leaving aside its other tasks, and one that is likely to intensify in future with the diversification of subject matter of the IFAD programme. The PCU and the FMAWR have played a crucial role in the performance of the portfolio to date, but increasingly the demands of implementation management are not just for coordination but for clearer attribution and definition of the authority and accountability for executive decisions to be taken at the appropriate levels of Programme management - and/or within the State ADP or the PCU, on a more frequent basis than is the case under present Federal Agricultural Development Programmed Executive Committee¹⁷ oversight arrangements. As presently constituted, it is not obvious that the FMAWR and PCU are fitted, or can readily be adapted for management of rural finance services and micro and small enterprises development and non-agricultural activities, due to lack of previous experience and competence. A partnership and coordination with specialized agencies is to be developed in this regard.

208. The PCU currently has about 315 staff members, with 97 senior and technical staff. Prior to the opening of the IFAD FPO the PCU served as the focal point for IFAD in Nigeria, carrying out all IFAD related activities and also following up on activities such as timely loan and replenishment repayment.

209. **Monitoring and evaluation.** M&E has been an integral part of the participatory planning process for community activities and is therefore both a key feature of the Awareness and Capacity Building phase of the CDD approach; and a continuous process through the programme life in each community. The performance of the M&E system is satisfactory in most CBARDP States and has facilitated the taking-on of full ownership of programme activities by communities. However, there are some questions on how, and to what extent, members of the M&E committees are to be compensated for time spent. This is an as yet unresolved issue since it has implications for the cost and sustainability of community operations.

210. The M&E system is still weak, and of low quality. The reporting on the Results and Impact Management System (RIMS) is limited to the project and programmes activities and inputs. Information on outputs and RIMS second-level results, related to project results, beneficiaries perception and sustainability as well as the third-level results (project impacts), are lacking. Thus, no systematic, proper and timely actions are taken by the management at different decision-making levels to tackle arising

¹⁷ Federal Agricultural Development Projects Executive Committee.

constraints in the programme. There is a need to improve capacity for the provision of explicit feedback to Programme Managers and for periodic assessment of progress and evaluation of projects and programmes. In this regard, the staffing and operational remit of the M&E section in the PCU may need to be re-examined and the recording and reporting systems updated and streamlined.

211. The M&E reports formats, schedule and dissemination are not standardized. There is weak documentation of good practices in M&E. The Financial Monitoring Report is rarely prepared at the State level. No single state involved in RTEP prepared the Financial Monitoring Report. Baseline information is often lacking. However, as it is the case of RTEP, the baseline study has been undertaken in some States but was not analyzed in others, limiting the performance of the M&E system. Moreover, the M&E officers are generally not well trained for the implementation of the M&E system.

212. The Federal Government is a principal co-financier of the IFAD portfolio and although it is understood that it has in due course remitted its full share of agreed expenditures, it has periodically been the source of delayed or deficient counterpart funding which has, often seriously, limited programme performance. It is understood that measures are being taken to address the problems of uncertainty of funds flows from both Federal and State levels, involving agreements for budgeted amounts to be secured by ex-ante deductions from budget allocations. This may solve the future problems, but does not erase the implications for past Government performance. In addition the staffing of implementation agencies has experienced a high level of turn-over due mainly to political decision; this is a serious concern for programme management.

213. **State Governments, LGAs and programme managements.** As for the Federal Government, a number of State Governments also should accept responsibility for the uncertainty of funding which has affected their performance as development Partners. The institutional arrangements for the community-based programmes at the State and LGA levels have been sound; and the capability, competence and performance of the staff cadres, and particularly the programme managements, are considered to be of a good calibre. Notwithstanding, there is scope for some additional training and exposure to best practice for those of the senior and middle management that have demonstrated dedication to programme objectives and operations. Those States and LGAs that have come to the programme with conviction, commitment and a cooperative attitude have turned in a sound performance and in many cases have benefited hugely from programme activities and support. Those that have been reluctant and sometimes difficult collaborators have not performed and are unsuitable Partners. In considering the next COSOP, it may be that a more rigorous entitlement or pre-selection process should be included in design.

214. The position and performance of the staff cadres of the RTEP operating through the ADPs are complicated by their involvement in multiple duties and by the deficiencies of the design that they are being asked to implement in the second phase. The CPE is of the view that the competence and application to duty of the personnel met is not in question and that the results of the recent RTEP activities should not be allowed to reflect on their ability or performance. The programmes have equipped the relevant State and LGA agencies with a reasonable complement of vehicles, computers, office equipment and operating funds and these have been well-used. However, it was noted on some visits that care and upkeep of these facilities is not of the requisite standard, partly because of the neglected state of the premises in which they are housed.

215. **The Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC).** The NDDC is a distinct parastatal institution with the specific regional mandate to address the socio-economic development of the nine oil producing States of the Niger Delta Area, namely: Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers. The Commission remit includes formulating policies and guidelines for development and planning and implementing socio-economic projects for sustainable development of the region. The Commission receives funding mainly from the Federal Government and oil and gas processing companies. In the CBNRMP, the NDDC is financing infrastructure such as schools, health facilities, rural electricity supply and water points, as well as community development funds and has performed positively, not least by timely delivery of its counterpart 18 per cent share of programme funding. The rating of Government performance in all aspects is put at 3.5, which is between moderately unsatisfactory to moderately satisfactory.

216. **Cooperating institution.** In accord with the 1978 Cooperation Agreement, the World Bank has been given the responsibility for the loan administration and supervision of the IFAD-assisted projects and programmes being reviewed by the CPE. In applying the provisions of the financing agreement, the Bank utilizes the methods, standards and procedures applied by the Bank in the administration of its own loans or grants. The World Bank Nigeria Office has mounted supervision missions twice per year for each ongoing project or programme, except during 2007 when the political situation necessitated a delay so that only one mission was undertaken for the RTEP. The Office has experienced difficulties in getting IFAD to participate fully in the missions and has expressed a wish to have more structured participation and more IFAD staff on supervision missions. There have also been delays in getting responses to mission recommendations from IFAD. The Bank acknowledges that the human resources available to IFAD for such missions have been inadequate.

217. A review of supervision reports by the CPE revealed that they were usually quite succinct, addressing issues of concern with regard to the implementation of the relevant interventions and making recommendations for improvement. The rating of the frequency and quality of supervision, standard of reporting and reports and overall impact on project implementation by the CPE is in reasonable accord with that of the CPM - that is that they were of sound quality and commensurate with the funding provided. The only aspects of criticism that were encountered were that: (i) the size of the supervision missions was often too large - as many as eight or ten members; (ii) the composition of supervision teams was not always of the caliber and subject matter expertise that were required; (iii) and the feedback of actionable recommendations for change in project or programme operations to Management and to the PCU and IFAD was not always as urgent and forceful as was desirable.

218. In terms of the administration of supervision, the performance of the Bank was sound. However, the opinion was expressed to the CPE by several respondents that in the execution of its fiduciary responsibility, the Bank was constrained by the complexity of its financial management systems and a seeming lack of urgency or recalcitrance on the part of its responsible Pretoria office to play its part in assuring a consistent flow of funds. The overall rating for performance of the CI is moderately satisfactory, 4.

219. The ratings for performance of Partners are summarized in Table 13. The performance of the relatively recent programme (CBARDP) for IFAD and the Government is better than that of older projects and RTEP, and is provided relatively higher rating.

Table 13. Ratings of Performance of Partners

Partner Performance	KSACDP	SSACDP	RTEP	CBARDP	Portfolio
IFAD	3	3	4	5	3.8
Government	3	3	3	5	3.5
Cooperating Institution	4	4	4	4	4
	10	10	11	14	3.8

F. Overall Assessment of the Lending Programme

220. Table 14 presents an overview of the ratings of the projects and programmes, as well as the CPE assessment of the whole portfolio. The rating for the overall performance of IFAD interventions is 4.4. The analysis for relevance is done for all closed and on-going IFAD-assisted projects and programmes, which include RTEP, CBARDP, CBNRMP, RUFIN, and RUMEDP. However, for the rating only four closed and on-going projects and programmes have been rated. The Self-assessment (SA) by PA Division was done for two programmes, which is the RTEP and the CBARDP, and is similar to that of the CPE rating for relevance, and efficiency. The SA put its ratings 1.5 points higher for effectiveness; 0.7 points higher for rural poverty impact; 1.2 points higher for sustainability; and 1 point higher for the performance of the Cooperating Institution. The overall rating by PA of projects and programmes achievement is higher by 0.8 point; even it is done for only two programmes.

221. Comparing the performance of Nigerian agriculture by development zones since 1999 to the situation of 2003, a recent USAID study rated the performance of the sector - on a five point scale - as slightly better for six criteria, namely: food security; poverty status of farming households; agricultural exports; rate of return to agricultural enterprises; and economic climate for investment in agriculture. The study considered employment in agriculture as about the same between 1999 and 2003. The rating was undertaken for six development zones in Nigeria¹⁸.

Table 14. Overall Performance and Impact of IFAD-funded Operations

Evaluation Criteria	KSACDP	SSACDP	RTEP	CBARDP	CPE Assessment
Core performance criteria					
Relevance	5	5	3	5	4.5
Effectiveness	4	4	3	5	4
Efficiency	3	4	3	4	3.5
Project performance	4	4.3	3	4.7	4
Rural poverty impact	4	4	4	5	4.3
Physical assets	5	5	5	5	5
Social capital and empowerment	5	5	4	6	5
Food security & agricultural productivity	4	4	5	5	4.5
Environment and common resource	2	2	2	4	3
Financial assets and market access	3	3	2	4	3
Institutions and services	5	5	5	6	5.3
Other performance criteria					
Sustainability	5	5	3	4	4.3
Innovation, replication and scaling up	5	5	4	5	4.8
Overall project portfolio achievement	4.5	4.5	3.5	4.7	4.4
Partner performance					
IFAD	3	3	4	5	3.8
Government	3	3	3	5	3.5
Cooperating Institution	4	4	4	4	4

Rating scale: 6-Highly satisfactory; 5-Satisfactory; 4-Moderately satisfactory; 3-Moderately unsatisfactory; 2-Unsatisfactory; and 1- Highly unsatisfactory.

^a Overall project achievement reflects the combined assessment of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, rural poverty impact, sustainability and innovation. As per OE evaluation guidelines, the performance of partners is not included in the aforementioned calculation. The overall portfolio achievement is calculated in a similar way.

¹⁸ North central, Northeast, Northwest, Southeast, South-South, and Southwest.

Key Points

- The CPE rating of the programme performance is based on two closed projects (KSACDP and SSACDP) and two on-going programmes (CBARDP and RTEP).
- It is too early to judge the performance of the CBNRMP, and the RUFIN and RUMEDP are yet to commence implementation; these three were assessed only for relevance. The overall performance of the portfolio is rated as moderately satisfactory.
- The design of programmes has been consistent with the elements and thrusts of the COSOP strategy, but actual effectiveness of access to financial services is questionable; and an over-emphasis on social interventions and infrastructure at the expense of productivity has been noted.
- On performance rating, the best scores are for relevance and effectiveness of the original Katsina and Sokoto projects and the CBARDP; the worst are for the RTEP, for all performance factors.
- In the analyses of market access and financial asset impact, calculations, secondary data and the impact assessment study reinforce the CPE findings on the weak profitability of cassava processing and the constraints of the market-led approach. The outstanding successes of the programme are the exceptional cost-effectiveness of community infrastructure investments; the social capital and empowerment aspect of poverty impact; and the proven propensity for replication and scaling-up of IFAD initiatives and interventions.
- Principal constraints on performance have been: institutional, in adherence to out-dated structures and practices; administrative, in protracted durations for project effectiveness and delays and denials of funding flows; and design-related, with imbalances in component emphasis, lack of innovation and commercial/marketing focus; and failure to optimize partnership and collaboration.
- Except for CBARDP which had a satisfactory poverty impact, other core projects and programmes have had a moderately satisfactory poverty impact. The highest ratings for sustainability and for innovation, replication and scaling-up were for the KSACDP and SSACDP, with the CBARDP scoring similarly for the latter factors. Compared to the CPE, the PA self-assessment (SA) put higher scores for effectiveness, poverty impacts, sustainability, and the performance of the Cooperating Institution, and the overall programme achievement ratings. But these ratings are similar to that of the CPE for relevance and efficiency. Some caution should be observed since the SA rated only two programmes; RTEP and CBARDP.
- The CPE rating of partners' performance for the Cooperating Institution and IFAD was moderately satisfactory and moderately unsatisfactory for Government agencies.

V. ASSESSMENT OF NON-LENDING ACTIVITIES

A. Policy Dialogue

222. The non-lending activities (NLAs) relate to policy dialogue, partnership, and knowledge management. Active policy dialogue has been possible during the periodic in-country visits of the CPM and other staff, particularly since 2000 and the intensive process of consultation that underpinned preparation of the original COSOP. To the extent that dialogue has been possible, it has been relevant and apparently reasonably influential at an operational and strategy level, if not at the higher reaches of framing of policy. In those times, dialogue was focused on the rationale and process for evolution of the project pipeline. In this context, the main contributions of IFAD were in promotion of the wider application of the CDD approach in interventions by IFAD and by other donors, an endeavor that was clearly relevant in the wider context of rural development and quite effective.

223. IFAD was associated in the early 2000, in some strategic activities such the National Stakeholders' Workshop to Review the Country Gender Assessment Strategy, and the Donor group on agriculture and rural development. This group includes the main multilateral and bilateral donor agencies active in the sector (WB, AfDB, IFAD, CIDA, and DfID). It was active since 2002 to share information on assisted programmes and implementation strategies in Nigeria, collaborate in cofinancing programmes such as the CBARDP between IFAD and AfDB, and in the preparation of the RUFIN programme. More visibility for policy dialogue was made with the visit of the IFAD president to Nigeria in December 2001 to launch the rural development sector strategy¹⁹. Furthermore, during his address to IFAD's Governing council, the former President of Nigeria called for further expansion of the Fund's involvement in the country. The lack of follow up due mainly to the turnover of staff from both the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) and IFAD, the focus of IFAD interventions in remote and poor communities, and the absence of a country presence of IFAD in Nigeria has limited the role of IFAD in building on opportunities offered to a fruitful policy dialogue with all partners in the country, including the involvement in the strategic donor collaborative efforts in the country. Nevertheless, IFAD played a worthwhile role in policy dialogue, especially with the partnership with the FGN for sustainable rural poverty reduction and development.

224. With the establishment of the IFAD Field Presence Office in 2006, the capacity for participation in policy dialogue, and associated Government consultations on development strategies and operations, across a range of development interest, has been greatly enhanced. Probably the most relevant and effective inputs by the CPM and the FPO team have been in the areas of rural financial services and rural micro-enterprise promotion, the subject matter of the most recent programmes. Prior to the stage of identification and inception for the RUFIN and the RUMEDP, the IFAD CPM and FPO was involved, in conjunction with the FMAWR, the FMoF, the Central Bank, the Federal Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the UN Group, and the multi-donor Rural Microfinance Group in framing and refinement of the National Policies on Microfinance and on Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise Development. The associated process of consultation continued throughout the formulation and appraisal process of the programmes.

225. The IFAD FPO, under the guidance of the CPM, has also had an active part to play in a range of policy formulation and related implementation matters, as: (i) the secretary of the Food Security Thematic Group, which generated the agriculture inputs for the NEEDS 2 in collaboration with FAO; (ii) a member of the FAO/USAID food early warning system network group which highlighted the lack of reliable agricultural data as an obstacle to policy making and brought in the National Bureau of Statistics to work with the FMAWR to resolve the data problem; (iii) adviser to the Central Bank on aspects of implementation of the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Fund; (iv) participant in the World Bank portfolio review and member of the donor Rural Microfinance and Rural Investment Climate Groups, with the WB, IMF, DfID, USAID and the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ); (v) collaborator with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the IITA for formulation of the proposed Regional Common Agricultural Policy; and (vi) founder member of

¹⁹ Following the IFAD President's visit, 11 December was declared "rural development day" in Nigeria.

UNDAF, main proponent, with FAO, of its agricultural development for poverty reduction platform; and secretary of the UN Communicate Group.

226. In the exercise of these policy dialogue activities, the IFAD FPO has frequently been faced with considerable constraints of funding, availability of suitably qualified personnel and back-up and of sufficient time to undertake the tasks involved. These difficulties have been found to be related not least to ensuring the attendance at meetings and the contributions of other stakeholders; and dealing with the bureaucratic procedures and attitudes of the Federal and State Governments and other development agencies.

227. Notwithstanding these obstacles, the pursuit of other non-lending issues included in the COSOP has fallen short of planned intentions. This refers specifically to the proposed dialogues on: (i) decentralization and budgetary reforms; (ii) governance and accountability; (iii) support of regional partnership and networking; and (iv) partnership with the wider donor group and the organized private sector agencies and NGOs. IFAD has good relations with several development partners but these appear rarely to result in substantive arrangements for cooperation or collaboration.

228. It can also be seen that the policy dialogue interventions have not been particularly innovative in seeking new strategic directions for more commercial approaches to agricultural development. These could have involved a much more active contribution from the private sector, such as through public-private partnership to create a supply response in the upstream agricultural sector. Evidence from other countries, including some in West Africa, suggests intervention could have incorporated ideas that link agriculture and allied income generating activities more directly and effectively to poverty alleviation, wealth creation, and sustainable natural resource management.

B. Partnership

229. In addition to the relations with partners involved in the policy dialogue efforts, the participation of IFAD in the building and support of partnership with donors and other stakeholders has been relevant, but difficult to sustain and make as effective as it should be. For instance, despite their close working relations on other matters, IFAD is still not party to the Country Partnership Strategy of the World Bank, DfID and prospectively USAID and AfDB and possibly several other major donors; and this may restrain the effectiveness of the Fund in its influence at the higher levels of government. Other than those mentioned above, the most active cooperation with other donors is with: (i) the Canadian International Development Agency in environment, sustainable agriculture and agricultural policy matters; (ii) the AfDB and European Union; and (iii) the UN agencies, UNDP, FAO and UNIDO.

230. The IFAD FPO and the individual programmes have formed strong links between themselves and with many Government and non-government agencies. Principal among these are relations with the FMAWR, the FMoF and NPC, the National and State Aids Control Agencies, the National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control, the Agricultural and Rural Development Training Institute, the Standard Organization of Nigeria, the Agricultural Extension and Research Liaison Station of Zaria University and the IITA. The interaction with these agencies and between programmes, States and neighboring LGAs in particular, has provided a strong element of synergy within the IFAD portfolio.

231. However, despite the collaboration on policy dialogue and the interaction between several partners, it cannot yet be said that the degree of donor harmonization and coordination in the rural development sector in Nigeria has reached the level that is presaged by the Paris Declaration and that is clearly desirable. This is an especially important consideration in the context of the type of sectoral or national development interventions that are likely to be required in future for donor assistance to match Government aspirations under the NEEDS 2. The CPE considers it unlikely that IFAD will attain the requisite level of understanding and collaboration unless, and until, the Field Presence Office is properly set up and supported. Even then, it will be necessary for Government take a more pro-active stance in rationalizing assistance and encouraging cooperation.

232. Although partnerships and collaboration with research institutes and the International Fertiliser Development Centre have provided sound results for the programme and its beneficiaries, especially on

set targets, the CPE takes the view that the trials process adopted during implementation should have been down-sized to allow intervention to focus on on-farm demonstrations of tested and proven technologies. In this way, more farmers would have been reached and interventions would have produced more results and a larger impact per time period, so strengthening the agricultural natural resource management subcomponents, particularly in soil-water conservation, watershed management and/or ground water utilization to support the farming environment.

C. Knowledge Management

233. In terms of knowledge management, the IFAD intent and effort have been relevant and increasingly effective, within the limitations of the funding provided. Among the initiatives that have been launched and carried through are those of the programmes, notably the CBARDP and RTEP, in the preparation and publication of information on both technical and community development subjects. These have been produced in cooperation with the IITA, academic institutions and other Government and non-government agencies. In particular, the production and quality of technical publications under the RTEP is commendable for promotion of learning and knowledge-sharing. Similar messages have been put out in radio programmes and recently IFAD programme items have been included in the news broadcasts of African Independent Television, as well as on Government stations.

234. These positive developments are counterbalanced by the recognition that the acquisition and dissemination of useful information from the Nigeria programme, as well as from relevant IFAD initiatives in the region and in countries with similar ecologies elsewhere, has the potential for substantial expansion and added value. This is another aspect of IFAD activity that can be made more effective by a stronger in-country presence.

235. **Overall non-lending activities.** The relevance and effectiveness of NLAs can be assessed reasonably fairly. Assessment of efficiency is less straightforward, since many of the major elements, such as policy improvements and partnerships do not lend themselves to immediately tangible end results or accurate calculations of benefits against costs. For instance, partnerships with the IITA and the related grant assistance have had an international, regional, as well as a Nigerian application. The above partnership have also had a follow-up on the performance and evaluation of the collaboration programme and the disposition, use and impact of funds have not been scrutinized by either the IITA nor, apparently, by IFAD. Given this situation and taking account of the foregoing commentary, the ratings for performance of the NLAs is moderately satisfactory for policy dialogue and partnership, and moderately unsatisfactory for knowledge management.

<p style="text-align: center;">Key Points</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• The content and objectives of NLAs are consistent with those of the loan and grant programmes.• IFAD inputs into partnership and policy dialogue and the performance of these activities prior to establishment of the Field Presence Office has been as sound and effective as time and resources allowed; they have been markedly more meaningful while the FPO was functioning, at least at the operational level, if not at the top level of Government.• In knowledge management, some progress has been made, but without a clearer definition of purpose, targets, responsibilities and an action plan, and sufficient allocation of resources, information compilation and dissemination will be less effective than it should be.• Particular success has been registered with the promotion of the CDD approach to project design. Efforts in microfinance and micro-enterprise activities have been intensive, and there are good prospects for successes in these areas as well.• The NLAs are assessed as moderately satisfactory in terms of policy dialogue and partnership, and moderately unsatisfactory for knowledge management. The overall performance for the NLAs is rated as moderately satisfactory.• A key factor in future NLA performance has been the consistent presence or otherwise of an IFAD Country Office FPO, with a proficient support cadre and adequate resources.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Conclusions

236. The pro-poor development environment in Nigeria presents an unusual set of circumstances and conditions compared with those of most IFAD borrower countries in Africa owing to its vast oil and gas reserves that provide it with high volumes of hard currency export earnings. The country therefore has adequate financial resources to promote economic and social welfare, including agricultural and rural development activities that are crucial to reducing poverty. In fact, Nigeria allocated about four per cent of its federal public expenditure to agriculture in 2007; this figure has risen to seven per cent (of a greatly increased GDP) in 2008. It is, however, still less than the ten per cent target established by African governments at the African Union Summit on Food Security, held in Abuja in December 2006.

237. Despite this, Nigeria has not yet managed to resolve its rural poverty problems. The per capita gross national income was around US\$620, based on 2005 data, as quoted in the 2008 World Bank Development Indicators database. More recent statistics from the Central Bank of Nigeria put the GDP purchasing power parity at US\$1,256 for 2007. The challenge of poverty is illustrated by the fact that around 25 per cent of all the rural poor in sub-Saharan countries live in Nigeria. The population living below the poverty line in 2006, as estimated by the Government Core Welfare Indicator Survey, is 64 per cent, down from 71 per cent in 2003. Poverty incidence has a rural bias, with an overall rural prevalence in excess of 67 per cent for all households and 77 per cent for woman-headed households. The rural population has extremely limited access to infrastructure and services such as education and health.

238. The ODA that Nigeria receives is extremely limited compared with the federal budget. It comprises only around 0.5 per cent of GDP, which is significantly lower than the eight per cent for developing countries as a whole and is equivalent to only US\$2 per capita compared with the average of US\$28 per capita for Africa. ODA figures make up around one per cent of overall public spending, which is US\$14.1 billion. In such a context, therefore, the resources that IFAD provides for rural poverty reduction are minimal in terms of volume when compared with total government revenues.

239. In spite of this, IFAD is seen by Nigeria as an important development partner because of: its focus on sustainable agriculture and rural development as a means of reducing rural poverty; the comparative advantage of the flexibility and quality of its interventions; and its experience in participatory and bottom-up approaches and in innovative solutions to poverty alleviation that can be replicated and scaled up by the Government, the private sector, donors and others. Nigeria is entitled to more than 40 per cent of the Fund's overall financial allocations to the PA region. This high level of allocation has significant implications for the resources required and for the way IFAD manages its strategy and operations in the country.

240. Agriculture and rural development are crucial to Nigeria's rural economy and social fabric. Around 45 per cent of GDP is generated from agriculture and almost 70 per cent of the poor live in rural areas and derive their livelihoods primarily from small-scale agriculture and rural occupations. Small farmers constitute the major echelon of producers, accounting for about 90 per cent of the country's food production from small parcels - most of less than one ha - of land. Women play a major role in the production, processing and marketing of food crops. Limited accessibility to markets, inputs, equipment and new technology have kept agricultural productivity low. Small farmers are also more acutely affected by exogenous factors such as climate change and rising commodity prices. Thus, given its mandate, IFAD is a natural choice of development partner, and the Government has clearly indicated its commitment to the sector in the NEEDS, the National Policy on Integrated Rural Development and the New Agricultural Policy Thrust.

241. On the question of the importance of agriculture, the CPE findings indicate that, with programmes devoted to rural finance and rural enterprise development, in recent years the Fund has not devoted adequate levels of attention to agricultural activities in its Nigerian operations, which would have been commensurate with the centrality of agriculture in the overall economy and as the main means of income and food security of the rural poor. In spite of its modest financial contributions, IFAD has a

distinct and catalytic role, in collaboration with Government and other donors, in supporting achievement of the MDGs relating to the elimination of poverty and hunger. In sum, with its focus on enhancing the productivity of small and landless farmers, IFAD is well positioned to support the Government in improving the livelihoods of small farmers, including women, artisanal fisher folk, pastoralists and other disadvantaged communities.

242. **Promotion of replicable innovations.** The Fund has been fairly successful in promoting pro-poor innovations in its operations. The grant-funded support to the IITA for research on developing new pest – and disease-resistant cassava varieties and for promoting CDD in projects in Katsina and Sokoto States and ongoing community-based programmes, are examples of successful innovations. The evaluation also observed that a number of successfully tested innovations in IFAD operations have been replicated and scaled up by local governments and others, although no evidence were found of IFAD playing an instrumental role in this process. The CPE finds that a more systematic and organized effort by IFAD might have ensured a wider replication and scaling up of successfully promoted innovations in IFAD operations.

243. Related to the above, the evaluation found that insufficient human and financial resources and time were devoted to IFAD engagement in policy dialogue, knowledge management and the development and nurturing of strategic partnerships with key players in agriculture. These are important ingredients for replication and scaling up, which is in fact the ultimate test of IFAD's capacity to promote innovations. Even though there are some improvements in such (non-lending) activities as a result of the recent establishment of the country presence office, IFAD's performance in non-lending activities was only moderately satisfactory.

244. The CPE concludes that the innovation promotion process was not systematic, and that the synergies between grant- and loan-funded activities could have been greater. Moreover, the innovations promoted were not sufficiently integrated into broader project activities that would have allowed them to contribute more effectively to achieving project objectives.

245. **Local governance.** IFAD interventions have contributed to changing the mind-set of the local governments and community leaders towards local governance through an inclusive process of decision making. Positive results include, in particular, under the community-driven development (CDD) approach: (i) pioneering of participatory processes to empower beneficiaries, and foster group and community cohesion and self-reliance for development actions; (ii) involvement of LGAs in development planning and execution and the consequential support of improved local governance; and (iii) contribution to construction, cost-effective completion, timely achievement and organization for operation, maintenance and management of social infrastructure.

246. Furthermore, the approach and content of IFAD supported programme have lent themselves to rapid and sound expansion and replication at both National, State and LGA level, as demonstrated by the broad support of the CDD model by both State and Federal government and other donors as best practice for local development.

247. However, while the demand-driven CDD approach was appreciated by the rural poor and their organizations, little attention was devoted to positioning this approach within the broader local governance framework with linkages to the private sector, such as rural banks that could have provided credit for enterprises and income-generating activities. The strengthening of the capacity of other key players at the local level such as local government and local elected bodies at the state and LGA level could have been pursued most strongly.

248. **Country strategy issues.** The CPE found the analysis of opportunities and constraints in the agriculture and rural sectors, as well as of rural poverty in the 2001 COSOP, to be limited. This may reflect inadequate capacity and skills on the part of the Fund to undertake thorough analytic work while preparing COSOPs. However, the COSOP provided a useful framework for cooperation with the country. Its attention to policy advocacy in agriculture and rural development, to promoting effective rural institutions and to productivity and natural resource management were, and remain, relevant and important in today's aid architecture in Nigeria.

249. The strategy did not, however, pay adequate attention to smallholder agriculture activities. The vast geographic coverage of IFAD's activities in Nigeria, with near national coverage of some operations, also raises concerns related, inter alia, to synergies within and across projects and programmes, as well as to the sustainability of benefits. With regard to the latter, for example, a wide geographic spread of activities would cause greater challenges to the Government in providing the technical assistance and follow-up, for instance by extension, needed by the rural poor after project completion.

250. The CPE underlines three specific issues related to partnerships that call for reflection. Firstly, the recent development of operations outside the purely agricultural sector has created new challenges in terms of defining the respective institutional roles and responsibilities within federal agencies, for which a clear solution is yet to be found. Secondly, while the evaluation recognizes the importance of working with federal and state governments it has found that the various administrative layers introduce complexity in operations, for example, in terms of delays and denials of funds flows, arising from difficulties in securing counterpart funding, as well as implementation, coordination, monitoring and communication issues. Thirdly, there has been only limited cofinancing of IFAD interventions, so that opportunities for replication, scaling up and joint pro-poor policy dialogue have not been maximized.

251. Finally, the evaluation acknowledges that the sound move towards direct supervision and implementation support in recent operations should contribute to better development effectiveness on the ground. Similarly, the evaluation commends IFAD for strengthening its presence by establishing an office in such a large and important country as Nigeria. However, its view is that the current human resources arrangements, level of delegation of authority and resources deployed for the country presence are not of a calibre that would ensure that the country office can play an appropriate role in improving IFAD assistance.

B. Recommendations

252. The CPE includes three overarching recommendations that would contribute towards improving IFAD's development effectiveness in Nigeria. These are: (i) renewing the focus on agricultural development for rural poverty reduction; (ii) promoting pro-poor innovative solutions; and (iii) adapting IFAD's operating model to changing circumstances.

253. **Renewing the focus on agricultural development for rural poverty reduction.** The evaluation recommends that IFAD's future strategy and activities in Nigeria should pay critical attention to addressing the main challenges related to the low productivity of smallholder farmers. This would serve as the main vehicle for improving small farmers' competitiveness, including enhancing their incomes and promoting better livelihoods. Among other issues, this entails ensuring more systematic access to input and output markets by adopting a value-chain approach, as well as linkages with the private sector, for example, for the provision of sustainable rural financial services and agro-processing. Moreover, the heterogeneity of small farmers requires different approaches that cater to the needs of both subsistence and market-oriented individuals and groups.

254. In addition, the renewed focus should be accompanied by a more narrowly defined geographic concentration of IFAD operations in Nigeria. This would facilitate project implementation and coordination, as well as ensure wider synergies within and across projects. The levels of rural poverty and gender inequality could be amongst two of the main criteria for choosing the states and LGAs upon which to focus. The CPE also recommends that IFAD should reflect upon the pros and cons of working with the Federal Government on the one hand and with the state governments on the other hand. Opportunities for direct lending to State authorities could be explored, as this is likely to contribute to building more ownership and to facilitate the flow of funds and allocation of counterpart financing by the States themselves, which has in fact been a constraint in the past.

255. Finally, IFAD needs to ensure that the federal partner agencies selected have the required skills, experience and competencies to ensure effective implementation and support to IFAD-financed activities. In this regard, it is important to expeditiously develop a mutually satisfactory understanding

on pending institutional issues, in terms of coordination, division of labour and implementation, especially as they relate to RUMEDP, which is not yet effective. In the absence of such an understanding, IFAD management may consider a cancellation of the corresponding loan in the near future, thereby allowing IFAD to devote its limited resources to other pressing country strategy, programme development and implementation issues.

256. Promoting pro-poor innovative solutions. The total volume of ODA to Nigeria is small in relation to the government budget, and IFAD's financial contribution corresponds to a very small portion of total ODA. Therefore, the CPE recommends that IFAD should focus its future country strategy and programme on promoting pro-poor innovative solutions to rural poverty, which can be replicated and scaled up by the Government, donors, private sector and others. This requires a more systematic approach to finding and piloting innovations, and greater attention to policy dialogue, knowledge management and development of strategic partnerships, which are important processes in achieving the replication and scaling up of successful innovations. Similarly, proactive efforts are required to link grants to loan-funded investment projects. Grants may be used for testing innovative solutions, which can then be applied more broadly through loan operations. Among other areas, innovations could be centred on the objective of improving smallholder farmer productivity, taking account of the challenges currently facing farmers, including those caused by rising commodity prices. This should also include due consideration being given to adaptive research oriented to the needs of small farmers.

257. Strengthening local governance. It is recommended to devote more attention to positioning CDD within the broader local governance framework and strengthening local governance, including all actors at the local level such as States and LGAs, elected local bodies, the private sector, local NGOs, and other actors involved at the local level together with CBOs. In particular, at the State and LGA level, there is a need to reinforce grass roots and local government capabilities in development planning, delivery and improvement of service provision.

258. Empowerment and consolidation for progressive devolution of governance to the local level should be supported through policy dialogue and improved knowledge management²⁰. The CDD paradigm needs to be adopted wherever relevant as the basis for development action.

259. The development of robust farmer associations as part of a stronger local governance framework that can lead to better empowerment of the poor would be another area of innovation for IFAD and Government to pursue in the future. In this regard, IFAD's positive experience of promoting farmer associations in both Western and Central Africa and in other regions might prove valuable.

260. Adapting IFAD's operating model. Nigeria is a large country of importance to IFAD. Given the vast number of rural poor, the increasing financial allocations under the PBAS and the proposed re-emphasis on promotion of replicable innovations, it is recommended that IFAD should seek ways and means of strengthening its country presence. In this regard, the option of out-posting the country portfolio manager should be explored. Such a country presence might also have a sub regional dimension. A stronger country presence would allow IFAD to be more fully engaged in policy dialogue, further its commitment to meeting the provisions of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, improve its knowledge management, and ensure even better implementation support. In this regard, the option of out posting the Nigeria CPM should also be explored.

261. The introduction of the PBAS has important implications for the projects funded by IFAD in Nigeria. Increasing the total volume of resources allocated to the country under the PBAS calls for serious thought as to the number of projects to be developed and the corresponding volumes of loans. For example, IFAD could finance a larger number of projects with small loan amounts or fewer projects with larger loans. Given the current levels of IFAD human resources allocated to Nigeria, financing fewer projects with larger loan amounts would appear to be the most plausible option.

²⁰ As advocated by the recent IFAD Thematic Study on Decentralization.

Loan and Grant Portfolio Data

Appendix 1-Table 1. List of all IFAD Projects and Programmes (US\$ million)

Title	Total Cost	IFAD Loan	Date			Cooperating Institution
			Approved	Effective	Closing	
Multi-State Agricultural Development – Cassava Multiplication Project (MSADP-CMP)	256.4	12.0	5/12/85	25/09/87	30/06/97	World Bank
Artisanal Fisheries Development Project	19.7	15.0	30/11/88	05/04/91	30/09/97	UNOPS
Katsina State Agric and Community Development Project (ACDP)	28.8	12.1	12/12/90	08/07/93	30/06/01	World Bank
Sokoto State ACDP	17.2	9.6	08/09/92	04/11/94	30/06/01	World Bank
Roots and Tubers Expansion Programme (RTEP)	36.0	23.0	09/12/99	31/07/01	31/03/10	World Bank
Community-based Agricultural and Rural Development Programme (CBARDP)	101.6	29.9	12/09/01	31/01/03	31/09/10	World Bank
Community-based Natural Resource Management Programme (CBNRMP)	82.2	15.0	11/12/02	06/07/05	31/03/14	World Bank
Rural Finance Institution-building Programme (RUFIN)	40.0	27.6	14/09/06	not yet	na	na
Rural Micro-enterprise Development Programme (RUMEDP)	57.9	42.8	na	na	na	Na
Total US\$ million	641.9	187.2	(IFAD 29 per cent)			

Appendix 1-Table 2. IFAD Project/Programme Loans covered by the CPE (US\$ million)

Title	Total Cost	IFAD Loan	Cooperating Institution/Supervision
1- Katsina State Agricultural and Community Development Project (KSACDP)	28.8	12.1	World Bank
2- Sokoto Agricultural and Community Development Project (SACDP)	17.2	9.6	World Bank
3- Roots and Tubers Expansion Programme (RTEP)	36.0	23.05	World Bank (IFAD direct 2007)
4- Community-based Agricultural and Rural Development Programme (CBARDP)	101.6	29.9	World Bank
5- Community-based Natural Resource Management Project (CBNRMP)	82.2	15.0	World Bank
6- Rural Finance Institutions Building Programme (RUFIN)	40.0	27.6	IFAD Direct
7- Rural Micro-enterprise Development Programme (RUMEDP)	57.9	42.8	IFAD Direct
Total US\$m	365.8	160.3	(IFAD 44 per cent)

Appendix 1-Table 3. IFAD Technical Assistance Grants to Nigeria-based Institutions since 1997

Grant Number and Recipient	Title	Amount US\$m	Dates: Approved	Effective	Closed
412-IITA	Biological control of cassava green mite	1.5	10/09/98	30/03/99	31/07/03
457-IITA	Improved yam technology	1.25	18/09/99	03/12/99	12/04/06
487-IITA	Cowpea adaptive research	1.6	03/05/00	26/05/00	15/11/05
189-FBFI	Info data systems development in community-based food and nutrition	0.0725	15/12/00	02/05/01	30/09/03
204- NIRADO	Community sensitization, and mobilization under community-based rural development	0.059	20/11/01	11/12/01	31/05/03
633-IITA	Integrated pest management for cassava	1.0	11/12/02	16/12/04	ongoing
649-IITA	Farmer field school (FFS) systems dynamics - I	0.07	na	21/01/03	16/02/06
661-IITA	Cowpea development, diffusion and adoption	1.0	11/09/03	29/03/05	ongoing
704-IITA	Productive and competitive yam systems	1.5	09/09/04	19/05/05	ongoing
769-IITA	Farmer field school systems dynamics - II	0.03	na	31/12/05	ongoing
874-IITA	Cassava emerging pests and diseases	1.3	14/09/06	21/03/07	ongoing
Total Grant Value US\$m		9.3815			

Appendix 1-Table 4. List of IFAD Special Operating Facility (SOF) Grants (US\$)

Grant Number	Project/Programme Link	Grant Amount	Date of Effectiveness	Closing Date	Amount Disbursed	Percentage Disbursed
IFAD E 33	Artisanal Fisheries Development Project	98,868	27-Jun-96	25-Feb-02	98 868	100
IFAD R 528 E	Katsina State Agricultural and Community Development Project	19,695	4-Apr-01	30-Jun-02	19 695	100
IFAD R 528 F	Sokoto State Agricultural and Community Development Project	220,000	4-Apr-01	30-Jun-02	220 000	100
IFAD S 22	Roots and Tubers Expansion Programme	50,000	8-Aug-00	31-Jan-03	50 000	100
IFAD S 22 A	Roots and Tubers Expansion Programme	24,893	8-Aug-00	31-Jan-03	24 893	100
IFAD S 126	Community-based Agricultural and Rural Development Programme	99,997	11-Nov-01	30-Jun-03	99 997	100
IFAD S 148	Community-based Natural Resource Management Programme-Niger Delta	70,000	6-Nov-03	31-Dec-05	70 000	100
IFAD C 870	Rural Finance Institution Building Programme	270,000				
	Total US\$	853,453				

Appendix 1-Table 5. Summary of Loans and Grants Portfolio (US\$ million and percent)

Category	Total Cost	IFAD Contribution	IFAD Share per cent
Loans: All 9 IFAD Loans 1985 to 2008	641.9	187.2	29
Loans (7, active in 2000) covered by CPE	365.8	160.3	44
Grants: All technical assistance (TA) grants (since 1979)	na	23.423	100
TA grants (11, since 1997) covered in CPE	na	9.382	100
SOF grants (8, since 1996) covered in CPE	na	0.853	100
Total Value – all Grants	na	24.276	

Approach Paper Nigeria Country Programme Evaluation

I. Background and Rationale

1. The Office of Evaluation of IFAD will undertake a country programme evaluation (CPE) of IFAD's programme in Nigeria in 2007. The CPE will be conducted under the overall provisions of the IFAD Evaluation Policy¹ following the standard methodology for CPEs of the Office of Evaluation (OE), and looking at country-specific key issues. Moreover, for purposes of learning, the CPE process would include a number of interactions, both within IFAD and with key stakeholders in Nigeria. These have also been anticipated in the Approach Paper to the extent possible.

2. IFAD's Central and West Africa Division (PA) is planning to prepare a country strategic opportunities programme (COSOP) by mid 2008. The last COSOP for Nigeria was finalized in 2001, prior to which the only guiding framework for the IFAD programme in Nigeria was a General Identification Mission Report. The CPE is expected to contribute to the design of the new COSOP, in particular, by synthesizing lessons from IFAD's experience in Nigeria, and from some of the profound changes (democratization) that have taken place in the country context since then and have a bearing on IFAD operations. As is the practice in all evaluations, the CPE would also provide a basis for accountability, which is defined in the international principles for evaluation as the assessment of development results².

3. Important changes that have taken place in recent years in the way IFAD works would provide some additional points of departure for the CPE. Thus, the CPE will look at compliance with the corporate policies of IFAD on various subjects, including policies on rural finance, rural enterprises, governance, private sector, sector-wide approaches, and targeting. It will also look at the implications of the performance-based allocation system (PBAS). And it would seek to relate IFAD's experiences in Nigeria to a number of important corporate level evaluations, including the evaluations of field presence, direct supervision, innovation, rural finance and experiences in decentralized environments.

4. The purpose of this Approach Paper outlines the country context, objectives, approach, methodology, and evaluation framework for the CPE.

II. Country Context

5. **Economy and rural development issues.** Nigeria is located in West Africa and it is the most populous country in Africa contributing a quarter of West Africa's population³. Its geographical area is about 924,000 km² and in 2006, its population was estimated at 134.4 million inhabitants⁴. Nigeria's population growth reaches 2.2 per cent per year, with a life expectancy at birth of 44 years, and with 53 per cent of its population living in the rural areas⁵, mainly depending on agricultural activities.

¹ Approved by the Fund's Executive Board in April 2003, see document EB2003/78/R.17/Rev. 1. Also available from the IFAD internet site: <http://www.ifad.org/evaluation/policy/index.htm>.

² According to the IFAD Evaluation Policy, "Accountability in this context refers to the assessment of developmental results, the impact of development assistance and the performance of the parties involved. This is different from accountability for the use of public funds in financial and legal terms, usually the responsibility of auditors and legal specialists."

³ The Economist Intelligence Unit indicated that the exact size of the population has long been a contentious issue due to its implications on ethnic balance, electoral competition and resource allocation (Nigeria Country profile 2007).

⁴ Nigeria's census history is controversial and the last census was 1991. The figures used here are estimates from different organizations.

⁵ The World Bank: World Development Indicators, 2006.

6. Nigeria's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has grown from US\$28 billion in 1990 to US\$72 billion in 2004 at a rate ranging between six and ten percent per annum. Real GDP growth rate averaged six per cent during the period 2002-06, with a growth slowing to 5.3 per cent in 2006, due to the disruptions in oil production in the Niger Delta.

7. Nigeria is the world's twelfth largest producer of petroleum. The oil sector contributes 25 percent of GDP, 70-80 percent of Federal Government revenue and 90 per cent of export earnings. In the 1960s, agriculture was the mainstay of the economy but over time, its importance has been replaced by the rapidly developing oil sector. The performance of the Nigerian economy in recent years has benefited both from the high world price of oil and the efficiency gains resulting from economic reforms (OECD, 2007).

8. Yet, agriculture still employs 60 per cent of the population and constitutes 40 percent of GDP⁶. The main drivers of growth in the non-oil sector were telecommunications, general commerce, manufacturing, agriculture, and services. Despite "the improvement of macroeconomic policies, strengthened financial institutions, and more business-friendly context, the Nigerian economy is still confronted with many serious challenges such as poverty, inefficient delivery of social services, high youth unemployment, poor infrastructure facilities, and widespread insecurity and crime (OECD, 2007).

9. Poverty is widespread in Nigeria despite the fast rate of growth of the country's economy and its oil rich resource base. As such, in 2004 its income per capita and Human Development Index were US\$1,154 and 0.448, respectively. In addition, Nigeria ranked 159th out of 177 countries⁷ according to the UNDP Human Development Indicators. Furthermore, the World Bank estimates 34 per cent of Nigeria's population to be poor⁸. The proportion of people living below the poverty line is estimated at 54.4 per cent in 2006. Poverty is largely a rural phenomenon and its rate is in excess of 63 per cent; nevertheless, income inequality is higher in urban areas than in rural areas. In fact, the Gini coefficients for urban and rural areas are 0.554 and 0.529, respectively. "About the third of households in Nigeria perceived their economic situation as being worse in 2006 than in the previous year, whilst over 39 per cent felt that their economic situation had improved. A slightly higher proportion of rural households (41.7 per cent) than households in urban areas (34.5 per cent) perceived their economic situation in 2006 as being better than in the preceding year⁹.

10. The key challenges to rural poverty reduction include rapid population growth, the prevalence of inappropriate technology and resource allocation, low rate of investment, low rate of growth of the value added per capita in agriculture¹⁰, poor distribution of social services and limited infrastructure, low agricultural productivity and food insecurity. Furthermore, as in other sub-Saharan countries, Nigeria faces a potential health crisis as in 2005 an estimated four per cent of its sexually active population was living with HIV/AIDS.¹¹

11. **Government strategies.** Since 1999, Nigerian Government has planned to create a market-oriented economy driven by the private sector while attempting to alleviate poverty and promoting local production. In 2004 the Government launched the National Economic Empowerment Strategy and Development (NEEDS), which is largely similar to other Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) in sub-Saharan Africa. The NEEDS has four goals: poverty reduction, wealth creation, employment generation, value re-orientation. The framework for actualizing the goals of NEEDS is "anchored on three pillars: i) empowering people and improving social delivery; ii) fostering private

⁶ Economist Intelligence Unit limited, 2007.

⁷ UNDP: Human development Indicators, 2006.

⁸ World Bank: 2006 little data book.

⁹ Government core welfare indicator survey, 2006.

¹⁰ Less than one per cent from 1985-2000 (COSOP, 2000).

¹¹ The Economist Intelligence Unit: Nigeria Country Profile, 2007.

sector led growth through creating the appropriate enabling environment, and; iii) enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of government”¹².

12. States and local governments in Nigeria also produced their own versions of the above plan called State Economic Empowerment Development Strategies (SEEDS) and Local Economic Empowerment Development Strategies (LEEDS), respectively. In the recent past, Government has tried to revitalize agricultural development suffering from neglect after the discovery of oil. NEEDS also highlighted the improvement of agricultural exports (cassava, rubber) as one of the priorities. NEEDS has been implemented in the past three years and is at its terminal year of implementation. NEEDS II is in a state of formulation and IFAD contributed to it through comments.

III. IFAD’s Strategy and Operations in Nigeria

13. **Strategy.** IFAD assistance to Nigeria dates back to 1985. The 2001 COSOP draws lessons from IFAD’s 15 year of project implementation in different agro-ecological zones of Nigeria. The COSOP builds on experiences and lessons that have emerged from IFAD’s previous lending operations, non-lending operations and dialogue with the various stakeholders in Nigeria. It started with a Strategic Portfolio Review, (April 1998), a Country Portfolio Review Workshop (May 1999), a preliminary phase of COSOP mission (November 1999), and a series of sectoral studies, undertaken by the World Bank in partnership with IFAD¹³.

14. IFAD’s lending operations in Nigeria have adopted three different approaches before the 2001 COSOP: i) a food security and commodity approach, directed towards promoting the production of a particular commodity across the wide agro-ecological region in which its production has a comparative advantage. This is the case of the Multi States Agricultural Development Project (MSADP)¹⁴ and Cassava Multiplication Programme (CMP), a first phase of the currently implemented Roots and Tuber Expansion Programme (RTEP); ii) a sub-sectoral approach, as it is the case of the Artisanal Fisheries Development Project (AFDP); and iii) a community based integrated development approach represented by projects in Katsina and Sokoto states¹⁵. These latter projects are targeted at strengthening Government's capacity to develop the infrastructure of a particular area through community-based demand driven approach.

15. The IFAD’s strategy (2001 COSOP) identified five main elements:

- i) a focus on programmes that are multi-sectoral, community-based and demand driven rather than commodity based or sub-sectorally led, and the deployment of the instruments of Flexible Lending to support such programmes over a longer time-horizon rather than the classical short-term project lending instruments;
- ii) a more decentralized planning process towards states, local government and communities and an acceleration of reforms of the fiscal system;
- iii) support of national efforts to reverse the alarming ongoing degradation process and enhance the sustainability of the resource base of the rural poor;
- iv) a shift from the traditional supply-led approach to the provision of credit, to a market determined financial services that are efficient, cost-effective and of expanded outreach; and

¹² The International Monetary Fund. Nigeria: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper- Progress Report, August 2007.

¹³ “...these include, the preparation of a community based rural development strategy, a natural resource management study, including an Environmental Impact Assessment of the natural resources in the Niger Delta Region, and a review of the rural financial system including small and medium-scale enterprise development” (COSOP, 2001).

¹⁴ The Cassava Multiplication Programme focused on improved cassava varieties.

¹⁵ The Katsina State Agricultural and Community Development Project (KSACDP) and the Sokoto State Agricultural and Community Development Project (SSACDP).

- v) a national coverage of IFAD's interventions instead of narrow enclave-based projects, with a phased approach for effective implementation to adjust programme targets according to some criteria¹⁶. Partnership is central to expand such coverage and to increase the amount of resources mobilized.


16. IFAD partners in Nigeria include, inter-alia, the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, the Federal Ministry of Finance, and State Ministries of Agriculture, IFIs such as the WB and the AfDB, bilateral and multi-lateral institutions (DfID, GTZ, USAID, FAO, UNDP, EU), the private sector, NGOs and CBOs.

17. **Operations.** IFAD's portfolio in Nigeria has involved eight loans approved between 1985 and 2006 for a total amount of US\$144.2 million (Table 2), with an average loan size of US\$18.03 million per project. The loan size is higher for the recently approved projects from 1999 to 2006, with an average loan size of 23.9 million per project. The most recent IFAD-funded programme under development is the Rural Micro-Enterprise Development Programme (RUMEDP) is aiming at a higher funding level of US\$43 million.

18. The four closed projects are the MSADP, the AFDP, the KSACDP and the SSACDP. Three projects are ongoing and are the Roots and Tuber Expansion Programme (RTEP), the Community-based Agricultural and Rural Development Programme (CBARDP), and the Community-based Natural Resource Management Project (CBNRMP) and are expected to be completed by in 2010 or 2014. The Rural Finance Institutions Building Programme (RUFIN) was approved in 2006 and is planned to start by end of 2007 or early 2008. The Rural Micro-Enterprise Development Programme (RUMEDP) is at the appraisal phase (September 2007). The expected project cost is US\$58 million, with about 74 per cent. IFAD financing. Other co-financing in parallel is sought from AfDB.

19. Figure 1 below shows the distribution of project costs throughout the history of IFAD involvement in Nigeria. Generally, there has been a mixture of interventions including large components of agricultural and community development in the first six projects. Research was an important component of the Root and Tubers Expansion Programme and it was a small part of the initial programme of the Multi-State Agricultural Development Programme. Irrigation has only been part of the KSADP (18 per cent). Institutional development and strengthening are important components of the CBNRMP (45 per cent), RUFIN (38 per cent), and CBARDP (42 per cent).

¹⁶ Criteria such as performance, impact on beneficiaries, local capacities and the commitment of the states, and stakeholders, to the investment made.



20. Community development and empowerment became more important after the current COSOP, representing 58 per cent for the CBARDP and 55 per cent for the CBNRMP total base costs. Rural Finance has also become very important as there is a whole Programme devoted to this component. A total of nine grants have been approved for Nigeria since 1985. The grants were mainly for implementation support for on going and closed projects (Table 3).

IV. CPE Objectives, Approach and Methodology

21. **Methodology.** The main objectives of the CPE will be to assess the performance and impact of IFAD's overall country programme in Nigeria, and develop a set of findings and recommendations that will be used as building blocks for the preparation of the new COSOP for Nigeria that the Western and Central Africa Division (PA) of IFAD will prepare following the conclusions of the evaluation. The evaluation will follow the standard CPE methodology currently used by OE. The methodology is premised on answering three key questions:

- i) Did IFAD pursue the right country strategy, i.e., was it designed to ensure highest possible rural poverty reduction impacts for the given resources;
- ii) Was the strategy rightly/properly implemented through projects (loans and TAGs) and non-project activities (policy dialogue, partnerships, knowledge sharing, and innovation's promotion) and how did the strategy perform; and
- iii) What was the impact of IFAD's country strategy and operations?

22. These three key questions are the key building blocks of the evaluation as illustrated in Table 4 of the Approach Paper. The CPE Framework (Table 4) further elaborates the questions that the evaluation inquiry aims to answer.

23. In dealing with the three key questions, the Nigeria CPE should address what would have happened in the absence of IFAD and what alternative strategy IFAD could have followed in Nigeria. These counterfactual questions are useful in identifying and highlighting more clearly IFAD's impact. For this purpose, it is useful to benchmark, to the extent possible, with what other donors have done in Nigeria during the same (or almost similar) period and what results it would have been achieved by them. In the case of the Nigeria CPE, this could be done using the available country programme evaluations from the World Bank and the African Development Bank.

24. The analysis would include an assessment not only of the COSOP, as it was written and approved, but also of the strategy that was actually followed. This distinction is important because several key aspects of IFAD interventions such as policy dialogue, field presence arrangements, compliance with corporate policies, resource allocation and approaches to targeting and gender equality may not have been spelled out in the COSOP but may be inferred in view of their presence (or otherwise) in actual operations.

25. The assessment of the country strategy and the programme portfolio will be carried out applying current standards. Changes in standards of performance over the last decade, flexibility of the development instruments, and management discretion -which allow performance to be adjusted- support this approach. In turn, this permits the current performance gap of programmes and projects to be readily established.

26. The internationally-recognized evaluation criteria the CPE will use are the following:

- (i) *relevance* of the strategy and of the interventions, project and non-project activities, taking into account the core objectives.
- (ii) *effectiveness* will be assessed against the stated objectives¹⁷ of the strategy, and against the objectives of the project and non-project activities.
- (iii) *efficiency* would be considered in terms of an assessment of costs in relation to the results achieved, for the different types of activities, benchmarking with the IFIs operating in Nigeria. Efficiency would compare the costs of projects and non-project activities with the results they yielded. As efficiency measures, ex-post financial and economic internal rates of return, net present values, cost-benefit ratios, and unit least cost analysis would be carried out.
- (iv) *impact* of the strategy and interventions should be assessed taking into account the nine “impact domains”¹⁸, and their corresponding indicators, with emphasis on those contributing to the MDGs, and related directly to the key challenges to rural poverty reduction in Nigeria.
- (v) *sustainability* should be considered in terms of its different dimensions¹⁹, assessing the extent to which the COSOP addressed sustainability and the continuation of benefits corresponding to IFAD interventions in Nigeria after their completion. The evaluation will also address how were the functions of the project management/coordination units mainstreamed following the closure of IFAD-funded projects.

27. The CPE will also address whether the country strategy has chosen the right mix of instruments, particularly the combination of projects and non-project activities (including grants), assess synergies and analyze linkages between projects. Special attention will be paid towards identifying specific approaches promoted by IFAD in Nigeria, particularly in comparison with those of other international organizations and NGOs working in agriculture and rural development, as well as potential synergies with other donors, particularly WB, AfDB, and FAO, DfID, GTZ, USAID. The joint effort of IFAD with these donors in coordinating and harmonizing activities will apply the poverty reduction strategies in Nigeria.

28. **Ratings.** A range of criteria will be covered in the CPE that include the analysis of Rural Poverty Reduction, the analysis of IFAD Target Groups, the relevance of Goal and Objectives and strategy,

¹⁷ Alternatively the restated objectives (CPE should go along the stated objectives of the 2001 COSOP) in those cases where project reviews have led to agreed changes in the objectives.

¹⁸ The “impact domains” are mentioned in the CPE Guidelines and presented in some detail in IFAD’s “First Principles” Evaluation Methodologies. They include: physical assets, food security, environment and common resource base, human assets, social capital and empowerment, agriculture productivity, institutions and services, financial assets, and markets.

¹⁹ Policy, social, institutional, economic and financial, technical, environmental, and ownership. (IFAD not much impact on political process in Nigeria, in view of the “size” of its funding, much lower than the WB).

effectiveness, efficiency, impacts of interventions, partnership, innovation, scaling-up, and policy dialogue. The key evaluation criteria will be rated on a scale from 1 (low) to 6 (high) as provided by the CPE guidelines. Separate ratings against each criterion will be combined into an overall assessment of the quality of IFAD's strategy and operations. When relevant, aggregate evaluation is to be benchmarked with evaluations made by other development agencies operating in the rural sector in Nigeria, mainly WB, FAO, and UNDP (there is need to expand the scope of rural intervention of other partners to GTZ, DfID, USAID – see the most recent appraisal documents: either RUFIN or RUMEDP).

29. **Sources of data.** The main sources of data will be used : i) the analysis of documentation through desk review of the background information, Nigeria policy and strategy reports including the Nigeria COSOP, project design and implementation documents, M&E and supervision reports, mid-term reviews, completion reports, evaluation reports, studies and researches on Nigeria; ii) a self-evaluation of the Nigeria country programme to be carried out by PA, in close consultation with the GON; iii) interviews with different IFAD partners, government officials, project staffs, and beneficiaries²⁰; iv) field visits to IFAD projects by the evaluation mission.

30. The evaluation team will have to combine and cross-check different sources of evidence, including an analysis of the reliability of the data. The CPE will also review the COSOP for Nigeria (2001), the President's Report and Recommendation (PRR) of all the selected projects, PA's Annual Portfolio Reviews, the Project Status Reports (PSRs) of all the ongoing projects in Nigeria, and available mid-term reviews of the CBARDP (2007), RTEP (2005 & 2006), the SSACDP (1997), the completion reports (SSACDP and KSACDP), and PA country programme reviews. Evaluation reports considered relevant for the CPE include, in particular the corporate level evaluations of direct supervision, innovation, rural finance and experiences in decentralized environments.

31. The evaluation will maximize the time dedicated to obtaining inputs directly from the beneficiaries in order to reach fair and balanced conclusions about the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and impact of the programme.

32. Among national and international sources that may be particularly useful, the CPE is expected to benefit from the Nigerian National Economic Empowerment Strategy (NEEDS-2004), the Poverty Assessment and Alleviation Study²¹, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper –IMF (2007), the World Bank Country Assistance Strategy in Nigeria (2005-2009), the UNDP CPE for Nigeria (2003), and the WB and AfDB rural and agricultural development strategies for Nigeria. A comprehensive scoping analysis of information that may be useful for the CPE is given in Table 5 of the Approach Paper.

33. **Coverage.** Following the general provisions of the CPE methodology, the evaluation will span a period of ten years from 1997 to 2007. Two factors for the selection of projects and grants are to be considered in the CPE. First, the necessity of at least three-year period from the project start up to conduct a full assessment of results and impacts. Second, for closed projects, it is often difficult to track former projects staff and sometimes even access the former project archives, as it is the case for the MSADP and the AFDP project.

34. Moreover, considering the fact that OE has not conducted a field-based evaluation in Nigeria, the significance of IFAD's portfolio in Nigeria, and the geographical dimension of the projects loans and grants all over the country, it is suggested to include in the CPE projects (Table 1): i) the KSACDP and SSACDP, two site-specific projects closed and designed before the COSOP; ii) three recent and still ongoing projects: RTEP, CBARDP, and CBNRMP. The RTEP is conceived as a follow-up phase of the CMP that extends support to other roots and tubers (including yam and potatoes) and places additional emphasis on processing and marketing. The long-term objective of the programme is to

²⁰ Two-days brainstorming workshop will be held with the CPU officers, projects managers, and the field presence officer on the rating of some IFAD projects.

²¹ Central Bank of Nigeria, 1999.

improve the living conditions, income and food security of poor smallholder households in the programme area.

35. These two categories of projects will be assessed for the quality of IFAD strategy, a fully fledged performance and impact assessment and ratings. The assessment and rating of RUFIN will be confined to its relevance, and managerial and supervision arrangements as well as RUMEDP that is in its appraisal phase.

36. The above criteria mean that all projects funded by IFAD after the approval of the 2001 COSOP will be scrutinized. In addition, the two ante-COSOP projects will help understand the evolution of IFAD strategy and operations in Nigeria. It will be important for the CPE to capitalize on the results of mid-term reviews, completion reports, and country programme reviews conducted by PA in Nigeria. The rating system should take into account different phases of these projects as stipulated by the evaluation methodology.

37. In addition, TAGs and non-project activities such as policy dialogue, partnership strengthening and knowledge management, will be assessed in the CPE period. The TAGs to be included in the CPE will cover a variety of topics and geographical diversity. The number of these TAGs will be decided after the preparatory mission.

38. The total costs for projects under consideration amounts to US\$365.8 million, with US\$160.3 million, or 43.8 per cent of IFAD current financing.

V. Evaluation Team

39. The evaluation will be supervised by a Senior Evaluation Officer from OE under the overall guidance of the Director of OE. The composition of the CPE mission depends mainly on the country context, the sectoral emphasis of the projects mentioned above, and the methodology and issues outlined in the Approach Paper and the OE methodology guidelines. The evaluation team will consist of: i) a Team leader with a wide experience in rural development particularly in West Africa. He will be responsible for coordinating the team and assessing cross cutting issues like policy dialogue, knowledge management, sustainability, and innovation. He will be in charge of the writing of the main report; ii) a natural resource and agricultural development specialist to deal with issues related to agriculture and, applied research; iii) an institutional development and policy analyst specialist; iv) a community development and gender mainstreaming specialist; v) a rural credit and financial services development specialist; and vi) project management specialist. Beside the international consultants, the team should include local consultants and resource persons to be determined in the preparatory mission. The cross-cutting issues should be addressed by each consultant under each theme. Mission composition will be finalized with the preparatory mission that will take place in late October 2007.

VI. Core Learning Partnership

40. The core learning partnership (CLP) consists of the main users of the evaluation²². As per the Evaluation Policy, it is mandated to provide guidance to OE at critical stages in the evaluation process. Furthermore, by ensuring that the evaluation asks relevant questions, and by becoming involved in it from an early stage in the process, the CLP also plays a role in developing ownership of the evaluation and in facilitating the utilization of evaluation recommendations and learning. The CLP will be involved, in particular, in reviewing and commenting the Approach Paper, the CPE, the Issues Paper, participating in the National Round Table Workshop, and Agreement at Completion Point that serves mainly for the next COSOP. It is suggested that the CLP may consist of:

- (a) Dr. Yaya O. Olaniran, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the UN Food and Agriculture Agencies in Rome;

²² See IFAD's Evaluation Policy, p. 10.

- (b) Representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources;
- (c) Representatives of the Federal Ministry of Finance;
- (d) Representatives of IFAD, including the Director of PA, the Director of OE, the CPM, and the OE's lead Evaluator;
- (e) Representative of multilateral donors in Nigeria, and the cooperating institution (the World Bank); and
- (f) The Team Leader for the CPE.

41. Other members of the CLP will be determined during the preparatory mission.

VII. Evaluation Schedule

42. The following provisional timetable for the CPE takes into account the fact that PA Division is planning to prepare the COSOP following the completion of the CPE, and to submit it to the IFAD board's approval in September 2008.

Tentative CPE Evaluation Schedule

Tasks	Date
Share first Draft of approach paper (AP) within OE	2 October
Desk review	22-31 October
Share AP with PA	4 October
Draft TORs and Select Mission Members	19 September
Comment from PA on draft AP	10 September
CPE preparatory mission to Nigeria	13-21 October
Debriefing SEO and ML to OE	21-22 October
Circulate AP to CLP members	7 October
Self-evaluation	25 Oct. – 4 November
CPE field mission in Nigeria	10 Nov-9 December
Wrap up meeting to discuss the Aide Mémoire	10 December
Zero Draft of the CPE (Team leader to OE)	30 Jan. 2008
Comments on the draft CPE report by OE	11 February
Distribute the draft CPE report to PA	18 February
Comments on the draft CPE report by PA	3 March
OE review of draft CPE report	10 March
OE share draft CPE with CLP and PA for comments	14 March
CLP provides comments to OE	24 March
OE to finalize report as per IFAD Evaluation Policy.	4-21 April
Preparation of CPE Issues Paper & arrangements for Nigeria CPE National Roundtable Workshop	22-30 April
CPE National Roundtable Workshop in Nigeria	26- 30 May
Finalize the Agreement at Completion Point	1-4 June
Print and disseminate final evaluation report	20 June
Preparation of evaluation Profile and Insight	24 June

Note: it will be late to rely solely on the outcome of the CPE that will end in June 2008. PA is proceeding with its internal review (CPR) to allow it start preparing for the next COSOP in early 2008. The results of the CPE will be taken into account to improve the design of the COSP for submission to the September 2008 Board.

VIII. Communication and Dissemination

43. In order to facilitate the use of the Nigeria CPE, and in line with IFAD's Evaluation Policy, there will be a first stage in the evaluation process. A draft evaluation approach paper will be communicated to key stakeholders at IFAD and Nigeria, inviting their comments. OE will organize a CPE preparatory mission to Nigeria in the second week of October 2007 to discuss the draft approach paper. In addition, the mission will brief partners about the Evaluation Policy and the CPE guidelines and overall process.

44. As per usual practice, a wrap up meeting will be held in Abuja at the end of the CPE field mission (December 2007), and on that occasion the evaluation team will present and discuss with key partners its preliminary findings. Partners will also be provided adequate time and opportunities to review and comment upon the draft CPE report and Issues Paper.

45. Moreover, a CPE national roundtable workshop will be organized in Abuja by OE in close collaboration with the federal Government of Nigeria and PA towards the end of the evaluation process (in early May 2008). This workshop, which will focus on learning, allowing multiple stakeholders to exchange views on key evaluation issues. The workshop will also provide inputs for the preparation of the evaluation's Agreement at Completion Point, which articulates the recommendations and specific actions that both IFAD and the Government of Nigeria agree to implement from the CPE.

46. The published final CPE report (inclusive of an Executive Summary and the Agreement at Completion Point) will thereafter be widely distributed in hard copies and posted on IFAD's website. An evaluation Profile and Insight will also be prepared on the Nigeria CPE, and distributed together with the final evaluation report. The CPE report, Profile and Insight will also be disseminated through selected electronic networks such as UNEVAL and FIDAFRIQUE. The main text of the CPE report should not exceed 40 pages, written in English.

47. It is important to note that written comments of the GON and PA on key CPE deliverables will be treated with utmost consideration by OE, in line with the provisions contained in the IFAD Evaluation Policy. This requires OE to: (i) rectify any factual inaccuracies that may be present in the CPE report; and (ii) carefully assess the comments of partners on substantive issues, and decide whether or not they should be included in the report. Comments of a substantive nature that, according to OE, would not lead to changes in the evaluation's overall findings may be flagged in the main CPE report as dissenting views in the form of footnotes clearly indicating the issue at hand and source of comment. Finally, OE will prepare and share an "audit trail" of how it has treated the comments of the GON and PA in finalizing the CPE report.

**Approach Paper-Appendix 1. IFAD-funded Project Loans in Nigeria
(USD million)**

Project Title	Total Cost	IFAD Approved Financing	Cooperating Institution
1- Katsina State Agricultural and Community Development Project (KACDP)	28.8	12.1	World Bank
2- Sokoto Agricultural and Community Development Project (SSACDP)	17.2	9.6	World Bank
3- Roots and Tubers Expansion Programme (RTEP)	36.0	23.05	World Bank and IFAD from 1 November 2007
4- Community –Based Agricultural and Rural Development Programme (CBARDP)	101.6	29.9	World Bank
5- Community Based Natural Resource Management Project (CBNRMP)	82.2	15.0	World Bank
6- Rural Finance Institutions Building Programme (RUFIN)	40.0	27.6	World Bank
7- Rural Micro-Enterprise Development Programme (RUMEDP)	60.0*	43.0*	World Bank

* Estimated amount

Approach Paper-Appendix 2. List of IFAD Projects in Nigeria

Name	Total Cost (US\$ m)	IFAD loan (US\$ m)	Date			Cooperating Institution
			Approved	Effective	Closing	
1. Multi State Agriculture Development	256.4	12.0	5/12/85	25/09/87	30/06/97	World Bank
2. Artisanal Fisheries Development	19.7	15.0	30/11/88	05/04/91	30/09/97	UNOPS
3. Katsina State Agricultural Development	28.8	12.1	12/12/90	08/07/93	30/06/01	World Bank
4. Sokoto State Project	17.2	9.6	08/09/92	04/11/94	30/06/01	World Bank
5. Roots and Tubers Expansion	36.0	23.0	09/12/99	31/07/01	31/03/10	World Bank
6. CBARDP	101.6	29.9	12/09/01	31/01/03	31/09/10	World Bank
7. CBNRMP	82.2	15.0	11/12/02	06/07/05	31/03/14	World Bank
8. RUFIN	40.0	27.6	14/09/06	Not yet	N/A	N/A
9. RUMEDP	60.0*	43.0*				
Total	641.9	187.2				

* Estimated costs

Approach Paper-Appendix 3. List of IFAD Grants in Nigeria

Grant Number	Project/Programme Link	Grant Amount	Date of Effectiveness	Closing Date	Amount Disbursed	% Disbursed
IFAD C 870	Rural Finance Institutions Building Projects	270,000				
IFAD E 33	Artisanal Fisheries Development Project	98,867.61	27-Jun-96	25-Feb-02	98,867.61	100
IFAD R 528 E	Katsina State Agricultural and Community Development Project	19 695	4-Apr-01	30-Jun-02	19,695	100
IFAD R 528 F	Sokoto State Agricultural and Community Development Project	220,000.00	4-Apr-01	30-Jun-02	220,000.00	100
IFAD S 22	Roots and Tubers Expansion Programme	50,000	8-Aug-00	31-Jan-03	50,000	100
IFAD S 22 A	Roots and Tubers Expansion Programme	24,892.85	8-Aug-00	31-Jan-03	24,892.85	100
IFAD S 126	Community-based Agricultural and Rural Development Programme	99,996.99	11-Nov-01	30-Jun-03	99,996.99	100
IFAD S 148	Community-based Natural Resource Management Programme-Niger Delta	70,000	6-Nov-03	31-Dec-05	70,000	100

Approach Paper-Appendix 4. Nigeria CPE Framework

Purpose	Key Questions ²³
Assess the quality/relevance of the IFAD country strategy	<p>Did IFAD country strategy address the main challenges to rural poverty alleviation?</p> <p>Did the impact contribute to the achievement of IFAD's strategic objectives and to the MDGs?</p> <p>Is the COSOP consistent with IFAD's strategic framework and regional strategy?</p> <p>Did the COSOP allow sufficient guidance to IFAD interventions to follow?</p> <p>How effective are the targeting mechanisms proposed in the COSOP?</p> <p>What resources were allocated to the COSOP? Were they resources made available by IFAD to complete the main objectives of the Country Strategy?</p> <p>Was IFAD country strategy coherent with national strategies, and how did it adjust with the evolving context? How relevant the COSOP today?</p> <p>How was IFAD strategies/activities coordinated and harmonized with MDGs and other donors for poverty alleviation?</p>
Evaluate IFAD's country strategy implementation	<p>How did IFAD's interventions fit in the logical framework designed/reconstructed?</p> <p>Was the COSOP put into practice through IFAD interventions?</p> <p>Was the design and implementation of projects relevant to IFAD target groups and poverty alleviation?</p> <p>How is IFAD projects spatial distribution justified?</p> <p>Did the issues identified for policy dialogue relevant for poverty alleviation and harmonized with other policies?</p>
Effectiveness	<p>Were the immediate objectives of IFAD interventions reached? How did they contribute to accomplishment of the country strategy objectives, and how did they address the rural poverty reduction challenges?</p> <p>Did the projects follow the IFAD targeting policy?</p>
Efficiency	<p>Was the maximum outcome achieved for the given inputs costs for IFAD's interventions? Could the same outcome have been achieved with fewer inputs?</p> <p>Did the comparison of costs of IFAD's activities with their benefits and results yield any worthiness?</p>
Sustainability	<p>In what extent did the IFAD's projects and non projects activities ensure technical, financial, economic, environmental and institutional sustainability and ownership over time?</p>
Innovative approaches	<p>Did the country strategy identify opportunities for innovation and partnerships through which innovation could be pursued? Did it develop an actual strategy for building innovation systematically into IFAD's interventions?</p> <p>In what areas did projects and non-project activities complement or conflict each other?</p> <p>Are there any innovative ways identified to address rural poverty reduction challenges? Are they sustainable?</p> <p>How well were innovation objectives articulated? What were the challenges of introducing innovation in these interventions? What can be learned from the experience in terms of design and implementation for innovation?</p> <p>Has innovation contributed to learning, reducing rural poverty, replication, and scaling up?</p>

²³ In addition to these key questions, the CPE will refer to specific guiding questions for each section provided in the CPE guidelines.

Nigeria CPE Framework (continued)

Purpose	Key Questions
Partnerships	<p>Did IFAD and each partner have specific roles and responsibilities, and did IFAD and each partner fulfill its role?</p> <p>Did partners react to the need for changes, and if so how speedily?</p> <p>Did partners build ownership among the communities and local authorities that should have taken over the responsibility for operating and maintaining facilities after the implementation phase of the project is completed?</p> <p>What were the criteria used to identify opportunities for outreach and working with NGOs, community groups, local agents of research and innovation? What roles and types of partnerships did the strategy foresee for working with these groups?</p>
Impact domains:	Guiding questions
Physical assets	<p>Did IFAD programme improve equitable access to productive resources and technologies?</p> <p>To what extent did IFAD interventions secure access for the rural poor to income generating assets</p>
Environment and common resource base	<p>Were the community-base resources influenced by the actions of the poor in different IFAD interventions?</p> <p>To what extent did IFAD’s interventions contribute to the protection or rehabilitation of natural resources and the environment (with a focus on water resources and rangeland)?</p>
Agriculture productivity	<p>What are the trends, among IFAD target groups, in terms of the Changes in cropping patterns (additional crop types and additional growing seasons); what is the evolution of crop and animal productivity? How these changes are seen across all farming households.</p>
Social capital and empowerment	<p>To what extent did IFAD empowering the poor to make their voices heard, influence policymaking and gain access to social services?</p> <p>How well did IFAD interventions help building the poor’s collective capacity in order to increase their capacities and their negotiation skills?</p>
Institutions and services	<p>Did the existing institutions, policies and regulatory frameworks significantly influence the lives of the rural poor?</p> <p>To what extent did IFAD interventions contribute to increasing the degree of decentralization?</p>
Financial assets	<p>To what extent did IFAD interventions contribute to increasing the financial resource base of rural poor households and individuals?</p> <p>What impact did IFAD interventions have on securing financial services for the rural poor? What were the improvements made by IFAD’s operations on the institutional financial frameworks?</p>
Markets	<p>To what extent did IFAD interventions improve the marketing of goods and services, and the reduction of transaction costs to achieve favourable market prices?</p> <p>What are the main incentives/constraints faced by the target groups in accessing the markets for agricultural inputs/outputs?</p> <p>What is the evidence of effectively greater inclusion of target groups as a result of IFAD interventions?</p> <p>Are there any marketing practices that connect target groups to different markets?</p> <p>What are the key factors in terms of policies, business models, and collective action that explain these practices?</p> <p>To what extent did the added-value of on-farm transformation of agricultural and animal husbandry products increase?</p>

Approach Paper-Appendix 5. Scoping Analysis for the Nigeria CPE

Data Required (As per Report Outline)	Data Available Data Source	Data to be collected or verified by the evaluation team
Country Strategy Analysis		
(i) IFAD Role and Value Added (ii) Target Groups (iii) Partnerships (iv) Guidance for Operations (v) Policy Dialogue (vi) Innovation	National Economic Empowerment Strategy (NEEDS/SEEDS-2004) IFAD's Western and Central Africa Strategy. 2001 COSOP. NEEDS. Poverty Assessment and Alleviation Study (Central Bank of Nigeria, 1999) Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper – IMF (2007). CAS 2005-2009 (WB, 2005) 2003 UNDP Nigeria CPE Other Papers on rural poverty.	Desk review, Interviews with government officials, IFAD management/staff, and others (first week of the evaluation mission). Analysis of different strategy papers and individual project proposals.
IFAD Capacity for Strategy Development		
(i) Analytical Work (ii) Consultations & Partnerships (iii) Ownership (iv) Flexibility & Continued Relevance (v) Learning from experience (vi) Underlying all of these aspects is the question whether IFAD has adequate resources for this type of work.	World Bank and AfDB rural and agricultural development strategies for Nigeria.	Interviews with former and actual Nigeria CPM about the IFAD's portfolio in Nigeria. Obtain the relevant documentation from PA and the CPM on supervision reports, mid-term reviews, CPR, in-country workshops, TAGs. Interviews with Government officials related with IFAD's interventions. Assessment of the 2001 COSOP relevance.
Operational Performance Data		
(i) Relevance to country strategy and the needs of the rural poor. (ii) Effectiveness in terms of attaining country strategy objectives and projects objectives (use design documents and "reconstructed" logical frameworks and effectiveness indicators of the OE guidelines to determine data requirements (iii) Efficiency of projects and the combination of project and non- project activities (unit costs, rates of return, delays, synergy effects)	Project design documents, supervision reports, Mid-term reviews Country portfolio reviews PA Division Portfolio Performance Review. PA Division records. Nigeria Field presence reports. Self-evaluation report.	Interviews with beneficiaries. Interviews with government officials, donors NGOs, and CBOs. Loan and grant portfolio desk review.

Scoping Analysis for the Nigeria CPE (continued)

Operational Performance of IFAD and its Partners		
<p>(i) Analyze the performance criteria given below and identify source documents that define performance requirements of each partner (e.g., loan agreements, contracts, or cooperation agreement) to determine relevant data requirements.</p>	<p>Loan agreements with government and agreements with cofinancing and cooperating institutions. Contracts with specialized partners.</p>	<p>Desk reviews and Interviews with key government officers, IFAD project managers/staff, CI, NGOs, research institutions, IFIs/UN/Bilat. organizations</p> <p>Self-evaluation by IFAD management/staff</p> <p>Triangulation of different sources of information</p>
Impacts, Sustainability & Innovation/Replicability		
<p>(i) Impacts country strategy goals and projects goals (use design documents and “reconstructed” logical frameworks and impact indicators of the OE guidelines to determine data requirements)</p> <p>(ii) Sustainability (use sustainability factors given in the annotated outline below and determine which are the most relevant and important to the strategy and to operations and identify corresponding data needs)</p> <p>(iii) Innovation/Replication/Up-Scaling (use guidance in the annotated report outline and information on the country strategy and programme to determine which aspects of innovation and replication need to be assessed and what data is needed for doing so)</p>	<p>Poverty-Environment Linkages in the Natural Resource (WB, 2003).</p> <p>Other special working papers, reports and studies</p> <p>Field presence.</p> <p>M&E records.</p> <p>Mid term reviews.</p>	<p>Interviews with beneficiaries, project officials on implementation issues, M&E findings, special studies, etc.</p> <p>Desk review of impact studies</p>

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Nigeria CPE cover page painting by Abubakar K. Akobi, (E-mail: abuartsproduction@yahoo.com)

Outline Costing of Plant for High Quality Cassava Flour

(Output of 1 ton/ day; costs in '000 NGN)	Unit	Unit Costs	Number	Costs/ Day	Costs/Year (200 days)
Investment costs: Equipment incl. Flash dryer, graters, presses, building		8,000			
Variable costs					
Transport: 2 t cassava mash/ day (pick-up)				2	400
Raw material: cassava mash cake	Ton	23	2	46	9,200
Labour	Person	1	2	2	400
Plant Operator	Person		1		180
Manager	Person		1		222
Energy : Electricity 2000 NGN/ month					24
Black oil: 200 l/t HQCF (45 NGN/l; 9,000 NGN/ t HQCF)	Liter	0,045/l	200/ d	9	1,800
Total Variable Costs					12,226
Total Fixed costs					8,000
Total Revenue of HQCF				75	15,000
Gross Margin (TR – TVC)					2,774
Net Return (TR – TC)					-5,226
Benefit-Cost Ratio					1.2:1
Production costs HQCF / ton					61.13
Wholesale Price of Wheat / ton in Nigeria*					35

Source: Calculation based on interviews with processors and RTEP feasibility studies.

* Information provided by RTEP staff.

Performance Assessment Study of NISER Executive Summary

I. STUDY BACKGROUND

1. International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) Central and West Africa Division is planning to prepare a COSOP by the end of 2008. The last COSOP for Nigeria was finalized in 2001, prior to which the only guiding framework for IFAD programme in Nigeria was a general Identification Mission Report. The Country Programme Evaluation (CPE) is expected to contribute to the design of the new COSOP, in particular by synthesizing lessons from IFAD's experience in Nigeria, and from some of the operations. As in the practice in all evaluations, the CPE is also expected to provide a basis for accountability, which is defined in the international principles for evaluation as the assessment of development results, the impact of development assistance and the performance of the parties involved. Thus, as a way of generating required information to achieve the above processes, IFAD commissioned NISER to undertake a study on the impact assessment of Katsina State Agricultural and Community Development Project (KSACDP) a completed project and the Root and Tuber Expansion Programme (RTEP) which is one of the on-going IFAD projects in the country.

A. Sampling Procedure

2. The KSACDP study was conducted in four Local Government Areas (LGAs) out of which two each were selected from the beneficiaries and non-beneficiary LGAs in Katsina state. The procedure followed in selecting respondents for this study took into cognizance the fact that the survey covered both beneficiary and the control groups, the sampling technique thus followed a multi-stage random sampling. The first stage is the selection of one LGA for each group making a total of two LGAs in the state. From each LGA, two villages were selected for each group. From each village, an average of 25 households was randomly selected to make a total of 200 households in the state. Efforts were also made to ensure that the sample covered both male and female-headed households. In the case of RTEP, however, Kwara and Nasarawa States were selected. These states were selected based on the extensive discussion with officials of IFAD and RTEP-MU. Nasarawa State is one of the leading producers of RTEP crops and it performed relatively very well during the first tri-term of RTEP. The choice of Kwara State is based on its high level of preparedness and the commitment of all stakeholders (especially the Kwara State Government and beneficiary communities) to the implementation of the Second tri-term of RTEP. In each State, at least four beneficiary communities were purposively selected, but the questionnaires were randomly administered to respondents in each community. In all, a total 200 beneficiary questionnaires were administered with an average of 100 per state. Both male and female headed households were covered.

B. Method of Data Collection and Analysis

3. The studies adopted an integrated approach for the collection and analysis of data. For data collection, a combination of sample survey and rapid appraisal was adopted. The sample survey was targeted at the beneficiaries of the projects for the purpose of assessing the performance and various impacts of the projects while rapid appraisal focused mainly on the project institutions, self-help groups and other key stakeholders in the project areas. Three sets of survey instruments were engaged in collecting the data for the study. For the sample survey, well structured questionnaires targeted at both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries were used while in the rapid appraisal, a combination of Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and In-depth interviews (IDI) was adopted. A total of eight FGDs and seven IDIs were conducted for KSACDP in Katsina state while for RTEP, eight FGDs and four IDIs were conducted respectively in Kwara and Nasarawa states to make a total of 16 FGDs and eight IDIs for RTEP in the two states.

4. Basically, two methods were adopted in analyzing the data for the study. Qualitative method was used in analyzing information collected from the FGD and the IDI. This method was used to examine stakeholder and institutional analyses. The second method is descriptive statistics which was

used in analyzing the beneficiary assessment of the performance and impact of the project. The beneficiary assessment is a participatory assessment method and monitoring tool that incorporates direct consultation of those affected by or influenced by the development programme or projects.

II. SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS

A. General Basic Information

5. Majority (54 per cent) of the KSACDP beneficiaries had no formal education as against 21 per cent recorded for the non-beneficiaries. In other words, the non-beneficiaries seem to have higher education than the beneficiaries. Also, virtually all the beneficiaries (98 per cent) are still living in mud houses while their main source of lighting is still kerosene lamp as reported by 64 per cent of the beneficiaries. Similar trend is observed for the non-beneficiaries. The main source of cooking fuel for the two groups is firewood as reported by 100 and 84 per cent for beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries respectively. None of the beneficiaries had access to pipe borne water but about 77 per cent of them depend on well and borehole as their main source of drinking water while 66 per cent of the non-beneficiaries had access to pipe borne water.

6. Majority of the beneficiaries (73 per cent) were living within a range of one kilometre to all season road as against 62 per cent recorded for the non-beneficiaries. Similarly, 93 per cent of the beneficiaries now live within a distance of 1 km to the nearest health facilities compared to 61 per cent recorded for the non-beneficiaries. The same trend was observed for primary school where 93 per cent of the beneficiaries are living within a distance of one kilometre to the nearest primary school as against 57 per cent reported by non-beneficiaries. As a result of diversification, it was observed that only 20 per cent of the respondents now depend on agriculture as their main source of income. This is very encouraging when compare with 38 per cent recorded for the non-beneficiaries. Consequently, 10, 8 and 12 per cent of the beneficiaries now derived their income from trade, salaries/wages and craft/artisan activities respectively. Another seven per cent derived income from other sources.

7. A sizeable proportion of RTEP participants are within the active age and majority of them are females. Most of them had no formal education and are accommodated in houses built of mud. The main source of water is dug out well while the nearest all season road to most of them is within a range of ten km from home. The nearest health facility is less than five km while the nearest primary school is within a range of one km from home. Most of the respondents have access to less than ten hectares of cultivable land and majority of them derived three-quarters of their incomes mainly from agricultural activities.

III. PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT OF PROJECTS

A. Overall Assessment

8. The performance of KSACDP can be described as mixed. While the project performed satisfactorily particularly in the development of village infrastructure such as boreholes, rural feeder roads, multi purpose skills centres and reaching women through small scale informal credit and skill acquisition, it was less satisfactory in the area of land rehabilitation schemes due to high cost of input particularly labour. The performance was, also, very unsatisfactory in the implementation of commercial credit operated through participating banks (PBs) due to faulty design at appraisal.

9. Field investigation revealed that RTEP has proved to be a potent vehicle for the diffusion of productivity, income and livelihood-enhancing interventions among root and tuber farming population. Project interventions had been largely responsible for increased productivity; scale expansion; improved food security and enhancement in general socio-economic welfare of participating farmers. However, there are still many generic, systemic and specific constraints, which is currently undermining the operational efficiency, benefits and sustainability of the project.

B. Relevance of Projects

10. The relevance of KSACDP could best be examined from the **point of view of the beneficiaries** in terms of benefit derived from the project. Thus, the FGD sessions held in some of the beneficiary communities revealed how much the communities benefited from the project in terms of physical and other socio-economic assets. For instance, during FGD held with a selected men group in Ya'riga community in Katsina state, some of the benefits derived from the project were stated to include cash loan for farming, training on new farming methods, and skills acquisition in soap, pomade and yoghurt making. With respect to RTEP, there is a wide gap between the benefits expected by the beneficiaries and the accrued benefits from the RTEP. Areas where the expectations of participants were not met include market expansion, loan facility, and technology transfer. In spite of these, respondents claimed they benefited from the programme, improved input supply, provision of fertilizer/credits, extension delivery, human capital development/training, and provision of processing facilities.

C. Effectiveness of the Projects

11. In terms of effectiveness, KSACDP has been very effective in meeting the various objectives. According to the project completion report, the loan draw down amounted to US\$10.5 million, which represented 80 per cent of the target. The differential was attributable to low release of counterpart fund by the participating State. The details of the effectiveness of the project in terms of meeting the targets under the various subcomponents were illustrated in the body of the report. The level of effectiveness of RTEP in meeting the objectives can be said to be substantial. For instance, in Nasarawa State achievement rate of out grower's scheme was more than 100 per cent; that of adaptive research scheme was 100 per cent while in Kwara State, achievement rate for cassava farm and the agro-processing component was also 100 per cent. For other components, achievement rates in both states were above 50 per cent. In spite of this, objectives and targets of RTEP have not been fully achieved because implementation strategies were strong in the aspect of production but weak in the aspects of processing, marketing and industrial linkages. Other constraining factors include inadequate funding, lack of market for output, slow delivery of services, political interference and communal conflicts.

D. Efficiency of Projects

12. For KSACDP, there was no deliberate attempt empirically to investigate the degree of efficiency of some of the participants under the various sub-components of the project during the survey. However, various reports by the planning, monitoring and evaluation unit and project completion report confirmed various degree of efficiency of some of the major components of the project.

13. For example, the crop and farm management sub-component adopted the On Farm Adaptive Research (OFAR) strategy which guarantees farmer involvement in the identification, testing and evaluation of promising indigenous and improved technologies. The adoption rate was, however, noted to be low as very few farmers have been very successful in adopting different technologies and adaptability of different techniques for the particular situation has been very slow. As such, the impact in terms of improved food security and income has very low.

14. The land conservation sub-component showed some moderate degree of efficiency. This sub-component adopted conservation measures like the tassa, half moon moisture retention techniques and the introduction of hedges and vetiver to check soil erosion as a result of wind and water. Under this scheme, about two million slips of vetiver were planted by farmers in the project area while 125,000 tree seedlings were also planted. The survival rate has been estimated to be 50 per cent. In area of communal grazing land rehabilitation, leguminous crops (such as lab-lab) and grasses that check soil degradation like (such as Andropogan) were planted. FGD conducted for farmers in Jana-Doka grazing area of the state revealed that crop production have witnessed noticeable increase in both upland and Fadama farming system in the last few years. The efficiency of the rural infrastructure sub-component was assessed from the volume of traffic flow in areas where roads were not originally in existence before the project but have now been served with motorable roads linking various villages.

An FGD conducted in Kanda to assess their perceptions showed that the project has contributed in making their lives better.

15. Under the village community development, a total of 268 community development projects were financed and implemented in nine LGAs. It was found that the project has been very proactive in the hand-over process to the communities with the preparation of memoranda of understanding signed between the communities, the LGAs and the project. Funding profile for the operational activities of RTEP derive from tripartite arrangement involving the Nigerian Federal government, the state governments and IFAD. The efficiency of RTEP was constraints by under-funding, late release of funds, slow and inefficient responses from the States. With respect to profitability of root and tuber crop production, yam and sweet potato appeared to be the most profitable enterprises followed by cassava and cocoyam. On the other hand, cassava processing enterprises find it difficult making profit. Some of the cassava enterprises even operated at a loss. The impact of diversification of cassava products has not been felt by the participants as the profit margin is still low.

IV. ANALYSIS OF TREND IN STUDY AREAS OF KSACDP

16. This analysis was only carried out for KSACDP since is a completed project and the time of completion is matured enough for a detail impact analysis. The assessment of RTEP was more detailed in area of the performance of the project while impact analysis of the project was limited to the intermediate outcomes of the first tri-term.

A. Signs of Distress and Inequality

17. In terms of physical assets, only two per cent of the project beneficiaries reported decline in land ownership as compared with 34 per cent recorded for the control group (non-beneficiaries). For the remaining three indicators under this domain the corresponding figures are lower for the beneficiaries. For social capital and empowerment, only one per cent of the beneficiaries reported decline in their involvement in decision making and management of village schemes as compared with 46 and five per cent respectively for the control group. Similarly, only two per cent complained of decline in their involvement in the management of water and grazing land and system of agricultural input supply compare with 9 and 12 per cent respectively for the control group. In the domain of agricultural productivity, two per cent of the beneficiaries reported decline in cultivated land area while three per cent complained of decline in growing of cash crops and use of improved input/seeds. Only one per cent reported decline in rate of technology adoption as compared with 21 per cent reported by non-beneficiaries. Environment and communal resources conditions in the project areas have been impressive as none of the beneficiaries recorded decline in the quality of water and only one per cent reported decline in availability of water. This is in contrast to three and eight per cent respectively recorded by the control group. Similarly, only six per cent of the beneficiaries complained of decline in tree/forest and productivity/quality of soil as compared with 54 and 31 per cent respectively recorded by the control group. About five per cent of the beneficiaries recorded decline in grazing land as against 47 per cent of the control group. Household and financial assets have witnessed significant improvement in the project area as only one per cent of the beneficiaries reported decline in household income in contrast to 20 per cent reported by the control group. In the same vein, three per cent of the beneficiaries reported decline in household saving as against 51 per cent of the control group. Decline in access to credit was reported by four per cent of the beneficiaries, while five and nine per cent reported decline in business assets and jewellery.

B. Signs of Stagnation

18. This section highlights indicators of well-being in which at least 40 per cent of the respondents reported no change in conditions during the last five to six years. Given this threshold therefore, it is only in the control group where respondents reported stagnation in the ownership of all the four major physical assets except in the ownership of sheep and goats. Similar situation holds for social capital and empowerment where less than ten per cent of the beneficiaries reported stagnation for all the six indicators. For the control group, respondents reported stagnation in all other indicators except in their involvement in decision making and management of water and grazing land. Agricultural productivity

witnessed stagnation among the control group in six of the eight indicators. These include; the growing of cash crops, use of improved input, use of farm inputs, double cropping, the use of farm machinery and rate of technology adoption. The percentage of beneficiaries that reported stagnation for all the eight indicators is very negligible. The environment and communal resources showed significant improvement as the percentage of beneficiaries that reported stagnation for all the five indicators fell below 40 per cent threshold. For the control group, however, respondents reported stagnation for two out of the five indicators (grazing land and availability of water).

19. In the accumulation of household/financial assets, the beneficiaries reported stagnation for one out of the five indicators (jewellery). For the control group, stagnation was reported for household savings, access to credit, business assets as well as jewellery. No stagnation was reported for all the five indicators of household food security among the project beneficiaries. The same situation was observed for the control group except in the production of dairy products. For market access, stagnation was reported for three of the six indicators by the control group while no stagnation was reported for the beneficiaries. Areas of stagnation among the control group included market infrastructure, access to modern storage facilities and market stalls.

C. Signs of Progress

20. In contrast to the two preceding sections, this section acknowledges progress in the conditions faced by the respondents during the last five to six years. Progress is acknowledged if at least 50 per cent of either the beneficiaries or the control group in the sample rated increasing or improving conditions. As a result, the following profile of progress was found. All the beneficiaries reported progress in all the four indicators for physical assets. The situation was, however, different for the control group where respondents only indicated progress in ownership of sheep and goats. Similar situation holds for social capital and empowerment where beneficiaries witnessed significant progress in all the six indicators as compared with the control group where progress was only reported for management of village scheme and management of water and grazing land. In the area of agricultural productivity, progress was made in the practice of mixed farming by the control group. The beneficiaries could not made progress in the use of machinery and technology adoption.

21. Environment and communal resources only witnessed progress in terms of quality of water among the control group. All other indicators could not reflect any significant progress. The situation was, however, different for the beneficiaries where all respondents reported progress for all the five indicators. Household and financial assets only witnessed progress in household income among the control group in contrast to the beneficiaries where all respondents recorded progress for all the five indicators though progress for jewelleries is low (51 per cent). Household food security witnessed significant progress among the control group in terms of production of cereals, production of fruits and vegetables and in food consumption. All the beneficiaries reported progress for all the five indicators in this domain.

V. IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF KSACDP

22. A detail and critical analysis of the impact of KSACDP was carried for the selected seven impact domains including market access, financial assets, physical assets, agricultural productivity, environment and communal resources, food security and household/ financial assets. A critical look at the impact analysis revealed a common trend. The results showed without the intervention, the level of development was generally higher in the beneficiary communities than the non-beneficiary communities. This further buttressed the fact that the project was targeted at very poor communities in the state. However, the implementation of the projects in the respective communities brought about a significant change in favour of the beneficiaries.

23. **Physical assets and social capital and empowerment.** Most of the beneficiaries indicated increases in all aspects of physical assets, especially quality of dwelling units (90 per cent), agricultural land (87 per cent), sheep and goats (87 per cent), size of dwelling unit (82 per cent), means of transport (81 per cent). What is yet unclear, however, is whether this impact could be sustained in view of some of the constraints mentioned by both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.

With respect to social capital and empowerment, except for linkage between community and private sector (33 per cent), the project appeared to have significantly enhanced all the components of social capital and empowerment of beneficiaries.

24. **Market access.** The variables captured in this impact domain include market infrastructure, modern storage facilities, market stalls, transportation, market information, rural-urban market linkage and food prices. The analysis revealed that except food prices, in all these variables did the non-beneficiary communities have up to half of the total percentages that the beneficiary communities had. This situation, however, changed drastically during the project period whereby the percentage of those that reported increment was consistently higher or close to two thirds. For instance, as high as 96 per cent of the respondents said there was improvement in transportation as a result of the project and another 91 per cent said there was improvement in rural-urban linkage.

25. **Financial assets.** The major variables captured in this domain include impacts on household income, savings, access to credit and business assets. As it is common to the entire impacts domain, the findings here revealed that the beneficiary communities fared well on all the impact variables used to capture financial assets without the project. However when considered the impact of the project period, there was a significant change in the financial assets variables. The percentage of those that said their financial assets increased was as high as 98 per cent for household income, 91 per cent for access to credit, etc. The analysis revealed further that even, jewellery which is often considered as a luxury item increased as a result of the project impact.

26. **Agricultural productivity.** The impact of KSACDP on agricultural productivity is examined using different variables which include the amount of cultivable land now available, growing of cash crops, use of improved seeds/inputs, use of machinery and farm output among others. With respect to cultivable land, it is interesting to note that in both the beneficiary and the non-beneficiary communities, less than one-third of the respondents believed that there was any increase in the amount of cultivable land without the project. However, with the coming of the project the situation changed drastically especially with respect to the amount of cultivable land, growing of cash crops, use of improved seeds/inputs, and the practice of double and mixed cropping. In all these variables, the percentage of respondents indicating increment ranged from 79 per cent for use of improved seeds to as high as 93 per cent for increment in amount of cultivable land.

27. **Environment and communal resources.** The major variables used in capturing this impact domain include the changes in the number of trees and size of forest areas, amount of grazing land, productivity and quality of soil, availability and quality of water. The results of the analysis revealed that the proportion of respondents that believed that there was appreciable increase in environment and communal resource base without the project was very low among the beneficiary communities. About two-thirds of beneficiaries reported significant increase in impact of the project on environment and communal resources. For instance as high as 96 per cent of the respondents believed that there was increase in the availability of water as a result of the project. Another 94 per cent believed that the quality of water in the communities improved during the project period.

28. **Food security.** For all the variables used in capturing impact on food security, there was mixed responses among the respondents in both the beneficiary and the non-beneficiary communities. As with all the results discussed so far, proportion of those that believed that there was increase in all the impact variables was generally higher in the non-beneficiary communities without the project. With the implementation of the project, there was significant improvement in the food and nutrition situation in the project beneficiary communities. As revealed in the analysis, except in the purchase of foods where less than two-thirds (63 per cent) of the respondents said there was increase as a result of the project, other variables showed that more than two-third of the respondents said there was increase during the project. The values ranged from 76 per cent for increase in production of roots and tubers to as high as 97 per cent for increase in the production of cereals.

VI. IMPACT OF THE RTEP

29. The RTEP is still an on-going project as such; the analysis of the impact of the programme was limited to the intermediate outcomes of the first tri-term which focused mainly on cassava production and multiplication. The result of the various analyses showed that, in the case of cassava, the positive impact of the programme has been felt in the areas of increased production, better nutrition, better health and enhanced income. The reverse is the case in the areas of market and marketing, the state of access to farm inputs and agricultural income which initially witnessed improvement but later started decreasing as a result of inadequate demand for increased output. With respect to yam, there has been improvement in the areas of access to information, access to training and empowerment and area of land cultivated and yield.

30. The state of farm input is not different from that of cassava. With respect to agricultural income, the situation is better than that of cassava. For potato production, there has been improvement in the areas of yield, access to information, training and empowerment and access to improved seedlings. However, potato farmers are also facing problem of decreasing income. On poverty reduction, it is revealed that the programme has had some remarkable impact on the quality of life of the beneficiaries, in spite of the shortcomings.

VII. PROJECT IMPACTS AND BENEFITS: GENDER PERCEPTION

31. The results indicate that, whereas the IFAD programme appears to have achieved appreciable degree of gender equality in the beneficiary's communities, in non-beneficiary communities, a high level of gender inequality still existed. The figures show high inequality in the provision of fertilizer, provision of processing facilities, provision of input supply, etc. This problem could be attributed to lack of awareness, low level of education, and poor governance among other functions.

A. Sustainability of Project Impacts and Benefits

32. Investigation revealed that KSACDP adopted sustainability measures to keep the project going without external fund. These measures include: i) funds in the escrow accounts for revolving loan; ii) security funds in the fixed deposit account; iii) registered participating groups, that may have access to facilities; iv) mobilized savings of the farmers with the bank; v) adequate linkage between the project, farmers and the participating bank; and, vi) signing of Memorandum of Understanding between Local Governments and project by liaison the credit office to relevant institutions to enhance credit resources.

33. With respect to sustainability of RTEP, almost all the participants agreed that the services provided through the programme are sustainable. Measures suggested for enhancing the sustainability of the programme include, in order of importance, increased funding of the programme, dedication and discipline on the part of the participants, timely repayment of loan by participants, unhindered flow of information between RTEP officials and participants and among participants, better monitoring on the part of RTEP officials, adoption of farming and processing technology, ownership of the programme by beneficiaries and, provision of marketing facilities.

B. Factors Limiting Impact of Projects

34. One of the most limiting factors affecting the impact of KSACDP is insufficient capital as reported by 45 per cent of the respondents. This was followed by lack of awareness, low level of education, inadequate farm inputs and poor road conditions as reported by 39, 35, 28 and 14 per cent of the beneficiaries, respectively. Major constraints limiting impact of RTEP are inadequate funding, lack of market for output, slow delivery of services, political interference and communal conflicts. Analysis of beneficiary perception showed that 82 per cent of the selected respondents mentioned inadequate funding, 65 per cent mentioned lack of market for output, 31 per cent indicated slow delivery of services, 28 per cent mentioned political interference while 17 per cent mentioned communal conflicts.


C. Suggested Ways of Addressing Project Constraints

35. The followings have been suggested by both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of KSACDP as ways by which project constraints can be addressed. These include the provision of capital, eradication of illiteracy, need for good governance, ensuring women's access to extension services, creation of awareness and the provision of good roads. Towards improving the performance, effectiveness, efficiency and impact RTEP, the following measures must be taken: prompt release of funds; increased funding and reduction in Community/Group counterpart fund; enhanced market linkage; improved access to farm inputs; access to improved technology and storage facilities; assistance in the area of land provision, and improved welfare of RTEP officials, among others.

VIII. CONCLUSION

36. A number of inferences can be drawn from the results of the analyses of the two projects discussed above. Firstly, the projects could be seen to have impacted positively on some aspects of the socio-economic lives of the participants. Secondly, the projects were able to achieve the important objective of targeting the very poor. Thirdly and very importantly, the fact that people still relish in the good memory of a project completed over five years ago (KSACDP) is very instructive of the wide scale impact of such project. This buttresses the fact that the communities were fully aware and participated in the choice and implementation of projects executed in their respective communities. However, in the case of RTEP, it is important to lay more emphasis on the downstream activities in this current phase in order to achieve much expanded impact.

Typical Agribusiness/Market-led Model



Source: Adapted from USAID/MARKETS Project (2005)

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