

Project Completion Report Validation

Kidal Integrated Rural Development Programme

Republic of Mali

Date of validation by IOE: February 2016

I. Basic project data

			Approval (US\$ M)		Actual (US\$ M)	
Region	West and Central Africa	Total project costs	22.83			
Country	Mali	IFAD loan and percentage of total	11.34	49.7%		
Loan number	ML1356	Borrower	2.7	11.9%		
Type of project (subsector)	Rural development	Cofinancier 1: West African Development Bank	5.03	22%		
Financing type	HC	Cofinancier 2: Belgian Fund for Food Security	3.5	15.3%		
Lending terms *						
Date of approval	14/12/2006					
Date of loan signature	16/02/2007	Beneficiaries	0.26	1.1%		
Date of effectiveness	20/07/2007	Other sources				
Loan amendments		Number of beneficiaries	Direct: 37,100 Households: 6,791			
Loan closure extensions						
Country programme manager	Philippe Remy	Loan closing date	31/03/2015			
Regional director	Ides De Willebois	Midterm review	November 2011			
Project completion report reviewer	Mohamed Tounessi	IFAD loan disbursement at project completion (%)			59.34%	
Project completion report quality control panel	Ashwani Muthoo Mona Bishay	Date of the project completion report	30/09/2014			

Source: President's report, Project Status Report and Project Completion Report.

* There are four types of lending terms:

- (i) special loans on highly concessional terms, free of interest but bearing a service charge of three fourths of one per cent (0.75 per cent) per annum and having a maturity period of 40 years, including a grace period of 10 years;
- (ii) loans on hardened terms, bearing a service charge of three fourths of one per cent (0.75 per cent) per annum and having a maturity period of 20 years, including a grace period of 10 years;
- (iii) loans on intermediate terms, with a rate of interest per annum equivalent to 50 per cent of the variable reference interest rate and a maturity period of 20 years, including a grace period of five years;
- (iv) loans on ordinary terms, with a rate of interest per annum equivalent to one hundred per cent (100 per cent) of the variable reference interest rate, and a maturity period of 15-18 years, including a grace period of three years.

II. Programme outline

1. Mali is a landlocked country in West Africa with an estimated population of 11.4 million, growing at the rate of 2.2 per cent per year. Over 80 per cent of its population is rural and 46 per cent is under 15 years old. Almost 60 per cent of Mali's land area, corresponding to the three northern regions of Tombouctou, Gao and Kidal, is semi-arid or arid. Mali's economy is based heavily on agriculture, which accounts for 40 per cent of GDP, 75 per cent of export earnings and 80 per cent of employment. Its main crops are the traditional staple foods rice, millet and sorghum, with cotton as the main cash crop in the south. Crop production is dominated by smallholder subsistence farmers who sell only between 15 to 20 per cent of their output. Production varies considerably with rainfall, and returns from cotton are dominated by fluctuations in world prices. Kidal is situated in northern Mali and is among the poorest regions in the country. It is characterized by its extreme geographic isolation, low road density, dominant but weak nomadic livestock husbandry, poor infrastructure, and limited capacity of local institutions. There have been intermittent conflicts in the northern part of the country since independence, and the situation has deteriorated over the past decade. It has recently descended into armed conflict and a security crisis which severely affects the livelihoods of the rural population.
2. **Development objectives and components.** The overall goal of the Kidal Integrated Rural Development Programme (PIDRK) was to help reduce poverty and food insecurity in the Kidal Region. Its specific objectives were to: (i) increase and diversify local residents' incomes by stabilizing returns from nomadic livestock husbandry and promoting agropastoral activities; and (ii) improve their living conditions, notably those of women, by facilitating access to basic socio-economic services and infrastructure.¹ The programme had five components: (1) development of agropastoral potential; (2) income generation and diversification; (3) improved access to basic social services; (4) capacity-building; and (5) programme management and monitoring and evaluation (M&E). From the standpoint of internal consistency, the PIDRK intervention strategy was to establish a strong link between the two specific objectives of the programme and its components. Indeed, components 1 and 2 were to contribute to the improvement and diversification of production and income, while component 3 was to improve the living conditions of the beneficiaries. The implementation of these first three components required skills at local and regional levels and justified the relevance of the capacity-building component.
3. **Programme area, target group and total costs.** The programme planned to reach 20,000 persons in three categories: (i) extremely vulnerable households with an average of 4 goats; (ii) highly vulnerable households with a mixed flock of about 10 small ruminants; and (iii) vulnerable households with a flock of approximately 30 small ruminants. Within each category, special attention was given to women through specific activities and inclusive measures. The priority area of the programme included six of the 11 communes of the Kidal region, which are more densely populated. The Kidal region is characterized by its isolation (1,600 km from Bamako), low road density, difficulty of crossing wadis in the rainy season, and in particular, the intermittent recurrent political and security crises, which have deteriorated since 2007.
4. The total approved budget of PIDRK was US\$22.83 million, including: (i) IFAD loan of US\$11.34; (ii) West African Development Bank loan of US\$5.03 million; (iii) Belgian Fund for Food Security US\$3.50 million, Government, US\$2.7 million and beneficiaries US\$0.26.
5. **Implementation arrangements.** Implementation took place within the government decentralization framework. A programme management unit (PMU) was set up to ensure the technical and financial management of activities, including

¹ President's report, December 2006, para. 12 and logframe, annex 2.

M&E and policy dialogue. Local governments were involved as part of their legal mandate under Mali's decentralization law. Beneficiaries were involved in the management of programme activities through their elected representatives and grass-roots organizations. Private service providers were contracted to support the implementation of activities under the responsibility of the PMU.

6. **Major changes during implementation.** Structural changes were made to the programme in the difficult context of armed conflicts since 2007. The presence of fighters linked to Al-Qaida and the return of soldiers and mercenaries from Libya have exacerbated tension in the region. The worsening political and military situation in 2011-2012² pushed the programme to transfer the PMU to Bamako. During implementation, the programme showed flexibility in responding to the implementation challenge in the context of the political and military crises, which reached a peak in 2012.³ To better fit the local context and the strategic shift in programme priorities, modifications proposed by the midterm review (MTR) were undertaken in November 2011.⁴

III. Review of findings

7. The Project Completion Report Validation (PCR/V) presents findings based on review of the programme documents, the Project Completion report (PCR), supervision reports, programme status reports and other relevant material.

A. Programme performance

Relevance

8. The programme's objectives are assessed by the PCR as being fully aligned with the Government and IFAD strategies and with beneficiaries' needs. The programme was also relevant and in line with Government policies and strategies, including the Strategic framework for growth and poverty reduction (CSCR/P) 2002-2006, CSCR/P 2007-2011, and the updated 2012 Rural Development Master Plan. In particular, the design of PIDRK was aligned with the three strategic axes of the 2002-2006 CSCR/P relating to: (i) institutional development and improvement of governance and participation; (ii) human development and strengthening access to basic social services; and (iii) the development of infrastructure and support to productive sectors. Its various activities were also incorporated in the 2007-2011 CSCR/P whose main objectives were to: (i) accelerate economic growth in the agricultural sector; and (ii) improve the well-being of people by continuing efforts in social sectors. Similarly, PIDRK activities were aligned with the agricultural development policy adopted in 2003, whose main objectives were to increase production and food security in a sustainable manner, improve basic social services and protect the environment.
9. Furthermore, the intended purpose of the programme through the enhancement and sustainable development of agricultural and pastoral areas was coherent with the orientations of the national food security strategy with regard to varietal improvement, supply of inputs, improving producers' revenues, capacity-building and professionalization of actors. The activities carried out by the PIDRK contributed to achieving the objectives of the social and health development programme.
10. The PIDRK was also aligned with the 1997 and 2007 country strategic opportunities papers (COSOPs), as well as with various IFAD's policy strategic framework documents, including the Policy on Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (2012), Policy on Targeting (2006), and the innovation strategy (2007).⁵ In particular, the design was aligned with the major thrusts of the 1997 COSOP, relating to: (i) strengthening capacity of the rural poor; (ii) equitable and secure access to natural resources and technology; (iii) access to financial services and

² For security reasons, the MTR and PCR missions did not carry out field work in PIDRK zones.

³ PCR, para. 48.

⁴ MTR work not completed, field work not carried out and therefore, coherence of changes not clear to PCR/V.

⁵ Ibid, para. 22.

markets; and (iv) reducing vulnerability and prevention/conflict management.⁶ Its various activities were also coherent with the 2007-2011 COSOP, whose main objectives were to: (i) increase and diversify agricultural production to improve household food security and the accumulation of property; (ii) improve the quality of basic social services and household access to these services; and (iii) create and strengthen the capacity of farmer's organizations to provide technical and economic services to producers.

11. PIDRK was designed to meet the priority needs of the populations of Kidal region, which, at the time of design, were among the poorest of Mali. In particular, it was highlighted that all activities proposed under the different programme components were requested by the communities through the formulation of their community development plans. It responded well to the needs of the beneficiaries by combining rural development with natural resource management. However, the unstable political and social situation impacted heavily on implementation. The risks linked to conflicts were underestimated – a more thorough analysis would have helped to plan mitigation measures. By contrast, the PCR considers that it was pertinent to continue programme implementation after the 2012 crisis.
12. Based on the above analysis, the PCRV rates the relevance of the PIDRK as satisfactory (5), same as the IFAD Programme management department (PMD) rating.

Effectiveness

13. The PCR section on programme effectiveness⁷ reporting extensively (11 pages) on targets and achievements by specific objectives and components. Regarding support to the promotion of pastoral potential, certain activities such as water points, rangelands and strengthening the animal health system were performed satisfactorily, while the accompanying infrastructure (vaccination parks and livestock markets) showed weak achievement (less than 40 per cent).⁸
14. Regarding support to improving and diversifying income target groups, despite conditions of insecurity, global achievement reached 61 per cent of the planned targets.⁹ Twenty-six garden wells were rehabilitated, against a planned target of 20, and 33 were constructed against a target of 30. The availability of water helped increase vegetable acreage.
15. The programme distributed 3,750 vitro date palms, against the planned target of 3,500. A total of 5,127 fruit trees were distributed as compared to the expected distribution of 8,000 (64 per cent). This activity was preceded by advisory support regarding various growing techniques conducted by the regional directorates for agriculture and water & forests, and the Chamber of Agriculture in 2010. A total of 104 market gardeners, 29 of which were women, were trained in farming techniques.¹⁰
16. To address the problems that followed the outbreak of the crisis and adapt to new working conditions, the PIDRK set up new delivery mechanisms with local NGOs to ensure continued support. Some unplanned infrastructure, which emerged as priority needs for the population, were carried out, including protection of the banks of the Oued district Aliou, a micro-dam rehabilitated in Agharous Kayone, repairs to the connecting dike of Tessalit bridge, rehabilitation of nine pastoral wells and the provision of three drilling equipment sets for Tineze and Tessalit.¹¹ A total of 76 marketing groups were formed or consolidated, and 152 members of these groups were trained in project management and processing of agropastoral products. The programme also contributed to the mitigation of the pastoral crisis of 2009-2011 through: the rehabilitation of nine pastoral wells and drilling

⁶ Ibid, para.20.

⁷ Ibid, page 24 to 35.

⁸ Ibid, para. 56.

⁹ Ibid, para.70.

¹⁰ Ibid, para. 76.

¹¹ Ibid, para. 78, and table 1, page 30.

equipment; the establishment of an animal feed plant infrastructure; support for water transport tanks for the people in the town of Kidal and livestock. In addition, 14 small ruminant marketing units were financed from the crisis mitigation fund.¹² With regard to improved access to basic social services, the programme performance overall seems moderately satisfactory.¹³ However, activities related to the rehabilitation of classrooms, literacy centers, early childhood development centers, training of agents for animal and human health, nurses, midwives and development of small businesses were judged only satisfactory by the PCR.¹⁴

17. Regarding capacity-building, two phases were noted: (i) the pre-crisis phase, characterized by the establishment of four service providers for implementing municipal development plans, strengthening technical services, information and sensitization of beneficiaries over the programme approach; and (ii) the crisis phase, marked by a significant slowdown of activities. This is also reflected in the fact that only 59.3 per cent of the IFAD loan was disbursed at the end of the operation.
18. Taking into consideration the continuous crisis context, and despite the efforts made to reach the output targets, PCRV rates the effectiveness of PIDRK as moderately unsatisfactory (3), the same as the PMD rating. This is because that in spite of the outputs realized, insufficient inroads were made toward meeting project objectives, as outlined in paragraph 2 above.

Efficiency

19. Planned for a duration of seven years, the PIDRK was approved in December 2006, and was effective in July 2007. However, effective implementation started two years later, in July 2009, with the establishment of the special account. Therefore, it began after two years of initial delays, with different major perturbations linked to the resurgence of social and political crises in 2007, including: (i) the theft of three PIDRK vehicles, with loss of life; (ii) the defection of the Administrative and Financial Officer in March 2008; the resumption of the socio-political crisis in January 2012 with the consequent relocation of the PMU to Bamako; (iii) the coup d'état of 22 March 2012 which suspended the work of the Fourth Session of the Programme Steering Committee; and (iv) the looting of programme headquarters in Kidal.¹⁵ Such initial delays had a substantial negative effect on efficiency.
20. In addition, important delays were encountered in the implementation of socio-economic infrastructure works, mainly due to the political and security context, slow procurement procedures, weak performance of the National Investment Agency for Local Authorities (ANICT) and the cancellation of major civil work contracts.¹⁶ According to the PCR,¹⁷ the programme reached a total disbursement rate of 51.56 per cent, broken down as follows: IFAD loan, 59.34 per cent; West African Development Bank loan, 29.70 per cent; and the Belgian Fund for Food Security grant, 55.79 per cent.
21. With regard to component performance,¹⁸ unbalanced disbursement rates are noted. Development of agropastoral potential only reached disbursements of 32 per cent; income generation and diversification, 65 per cent; improved access to basic social services, 52 per cent; capacity-building, 23 per cent; and programme management and monitoring and evaluation, 93 per cent. By the end of the programme, a high expenditure level for programme management and coordination were also recorded. Management costs reached 32 per cent¹⁹ of total costs (compared to initial projected costs of 21 per cent). On this basis, the ratio, investment/recurrent costs is 2.15.

¹² Ibid, para. 83.

¹³ Ibid, para. 85.

¹⁴ Ibid, para. 85.

¹⁵ PCR, para. 50 and 51.

¹⁶ Ibid, para. 127.

¹⁷ PCR, para. 117

¹⁸ Ibid, para.123.

¹⁹ Ibid, para. 130.

22. Based on the number of direct beneficiaries estimated at 37,100 persons, corresponding to 6,791 households, the total cost of all financing is estimated at US\$291 per beneficiary and US\$1,594 per household. A comparison with the PIDRN, which is a similar programme in Mali, shows that these costs are higher than those of PIDRN. According to the PCR, the explanation lies primarily in the difference in the population densities of the two programme intervention areas and the most difficult working conditions are in the Kidal region.²⁰ A cost-benefit analysis was not given in the PCR report, however annex 9 of the report shows information gathered on productive initiatives, which suggest relatively good returns. However, it is difficult to analyze the cost-benefit analysis, and caution should be considered in interpreting the data presented, as many factors are not considered in the calculation and assumptions appear unrealistic.²¹
23. Overall, and taking into consideration the specific context of PIDRK since 2012, the PCR rating for efficiency is moderately unsatisfactory (3), the same as the PMD rating.

B. Rural poverty impact

24. The PIDRK did not carry out a baseline survey that would have allowed for the comparison of the initial situation and the situation after programme completion. During programme implementation, Results and Impact Management System (RIMS) surveys were conducted as reference data in 2010, and again in 2014 for programme completion. However, they should be treated with caution as they refer to a limited period of time, are not based on actual M&E data²² but on beneficiary opinions, and do not show the change of household incomes before and after the programme. In the context of the preparation of the PCR, a stakeholder workshop was organized in Bamako,²³ which served as a venue for the qualitative assessment of beneficiaries by using business models prepared by the PCR mission for different crops and livestock productions. The PCR states that data for the assessment of impact are mostly taken from the RIMS surveys and the PCR workshop. Weak M&E data were not used for rural impact analysis. Therefore, this section on impact describes possible impacts based on information given in the PCR and other relevant documents.
25. **Household income and assets.** According to the PCR, despite the difficult security context, the programme helped to increase and diversify the income of people through nomadic livestock and agropastoral development. The diversification of agricultural activities and the revival of small livestock were the flagship of the programme. The rehabilitation of water infrastructure and rangeland development allowed sheep, cattle and camels to prolong their grazing for over a month in these areas that initially did not have water resources.²⁴ The programme also made investments to access water for gardening, and downstream production resources were strengthened with the endowment of plants and improved seeds. Micro-projects submitted to the Fund for Income-generating Initiatives, flexible and responsive in nature (e.g. goat loans), allowed for direct contact with the most vulnerable groups, including women – up to approximately 49 per cent for the entire region. Through the establishment of the Fund for Income-generating Initiatives, the programme made available financial resources, technical support and management as a strategy to support the improvement and diversification of income.²⁵
26. The programme's contribution to improving local incomes was also favored by the transfer of resources to local businesses, which developed outsourcing and job creation. The report provided by the General Secretary of the regional office of the

²⁰ Ibid, table 2, page 39.

²¹ In addition, the PCR, for security reasons did not carry out field work to check the assumptions used for cost-benefit analysis.

²² PCR, para. 157.

²³ Due to the security situation, the PCR mission did not carry out field work and visits.

²⁴ PCR, para.

²⁵ Ibid, para. 163.

Employers' Association of Construction Contractors reported the creation of 160 permanent jobs and 600 temporary jobs for 40 companies mobilized as part of PIDRK activities. In general, the programme benefited 6,792 households through farming, income-generating activities and livestock loans, allowing households to achieve a certain level of accumulation of goods.²⁶

27. In light of the above, the PCRV rates household income and assets as moderately satisfactory (4), the same as PMD rating.
28. **Human and social capital and empowerment.** This section is not assessed in the PCR. In the opinion of the PCRV, the comprehensive capacity-building and training provided to communities, producer organizations benefiting from productive investments, and decentralized technical structures, may have resulted in impact on human and social capital and empowerment. However, due to insufficient evidence, the PCRV has not rated this impact domain.
29. **Food security and agricultural productivity.** According to the PCR, RIMS surveys undertaken in 2010 and 2014 and outputs from the PCR consultation workshop showed that food security has improved. The percentage of people experiencing two seasons of hunger was reduced from 38 per cent in 2010 to 4 per cent in 2014,²⁷ despite the crisis context. This enhanced food security was driven by the increased productivity of agropastoral systems.²⁸ With regard to children's nutrition from birth to five years of age, chronic malnutrition was reduced from 38 per cent in 2010 to 28 per cent in 2014. However, severe malnutrition increased from 13 per cent in 2010 to 28 per cent in 2014. The most plausible explanation for the increase in severe malnutrition lies with the increased violence and subsequent war following the occupation of the region by armed groups, with the corollary failure of the basic food supply chains.
30. The PCRV rates food security and agricultural productivity, as moderately satisfactory (4), same as the PMD rating.
31. **Natural resources, the environment and climate change.** According to the PCR, through various supports, the PIDRK contributed – in a limited extent – to better management of natural resources and integration of adaptation to climate change. The promotion of crops using improved varieties that are more drought-resistant and resilient to invasive species was a key element in the field of agriculture. With regard to small-scale irrigation, the programme supported beneficiaries in the efficient management of soil and water.
32. The achievements focused on three aspects: recovery of degraded land, management of soil fertility and water management.²⁹ Overall, the information available is not conclusive on environmental impact and climate change, therefore, the PCRV does not rate this impact domain.
33. **Institutions and policies.** This section is not assessed in the PCR. However, based on the review of the PCR stakeholder workshop report, the comprehensive capacity-building and training provided to communities, producers and decentralized technical structures appear to have resulted in impact on institutions and policies. However, due to insufficient evidence, also this impact domain was not rated by the PCRV.

²⁶ Ibid, para.166 and table page 44.

²⁷ PCR, table page 42.

²⁸ PCR and other documents did not provide basic information for PCRV's analysis.

²⁹ PCR did not provide basic information for PCRV's analysis.

C. Other performance criteria

Sustainability

34. Given the political and security context of Mali in general and the Kidal region in particular, the sustainability of programme achievements was seriously undermined. According to the Country programme evaluation (CPE), despite some encouraging results, the assessment is pessimistic for productive activities.
35. According to the CPE, many productive micro-initiatives (including non-agricultural initiatives) continued to depend on external (project) support for technical support and the purchase of spare parts.
36. The situation appears somewhat more favorable for local institutions and basic services. The agreements with the decentralized services, as well as the training given to municipal services are relevant steps to ensure sustainability of social services. However, their financial autonomy after programme closure has not been addressed.³⁰ Regarding new irrigated perimeters, trails and social infrastructure, related investments remain unfinished or partially completed. The situation of conflict and insecurity undermined sustainability.³¹
37. In contrast, the PCR presents a more optimistic situation with regard to sustainability, based on qualitative assessment. The PCR articulates its assessment around political, social, institutional, economical and environmental sustainability. In particular, the PCR underlines the high beneficiary ownership of programme achievements due to the participatory approach adopted by the programme, in combination with relevant training and capacity-building efforts. According to the PCR, the chances of sustainability of the investments made by the programme are considered good, for the following reasons: (i) the satisfactory level of profitability of production activities; (ii) the quality and adaptation of plant material supplied (date palms, fruit trees, seeds for market gardening, stone barriers as part of the restoration of pastoral rangelands); (iii) support for the organization of actors to better value the achievements and ensure their sustainable use; (iv) support for the development of small businesses (pump repairers, masons, tapestry weavers, catering, etc.); and (v) support for access to markets and services. The weaknesses related to the overall sustainability of the programme beyond the crisis context are: status of land for private investments and the direct intervention of the programme in the distribution of inputs without providing an internal mechanism to ensure supply in the long term.³²
38. It is worth mentioning that the last supervision mission undertaken in March 2014 did not include a project exit strategy and the mandatory section on sustainability is not included in the supervision mission report.
39. In short, although the programme contributed to some positive achievements, there are major risks to sustainability, which is therefore rated as moderately unsatisfactory (3) – the same as the PMD rating.

Innovation and scaling up

40. As reported in the CPE and the PCR, good practices/innovations with potential for scaling up were introduced in four major areas: (i) promotion of a goat rearing scheme for vulnerable households; (ii) promotion of vaccination parks for cattle and camels; (iii) promotion of concrete borders for pump wells; and (iv) development of salt lands in Tessalit. While the programme introduced several innovations, no specific measures were taken to ensure that successful innovations would be scaled up in wider policies or programmes funded by the Government or other development partners.
41. On the basis of the above, the PCR rates innovation and scaling up as moderately satisfactory (4), same as PMD ratings.

³⁰ Ibid, para. 140.

³¹ Ibid, para. 143.

³² PCR, para. 195.

Gender equality and women's empowerment

42. This section is not dealt with in the PCR. However, the support in technical training, literacy, women's leadership and support to investments that benefit women (gardening, irrigation, water, nutrition and health) have probably led to a gradual change in terms of income and increased decision-making capacities of women within their communities. However, due to a lack of evidence, the PCRV refrains from rating this domain.

D. Performance of partners

43. **IFAD.** According to the PCR, IFAD support increased greatly starting in 2010 when IFAD supervision of the PIDRK began. Direct supervision by IFAD has greatly improved the efficiency of programme implementation and reduced processing time of withdrawal applications, and other IFAD requests for non-objection, which in turn helped improve programme performance. IFAD supervision was considered instrumental because it focused on support to programme field staff.
44. According to the CPE, direct supervision by IFAD seemed to present a series of advantages: (i) a solid technical foundation and better coverage of the thematic aspects of projects; (ii) a systematic involvement of the Country Programme Manager; and (iii) greater clarity and coherence in the formulation and monitoring system of the supervision missions' recommendations.³³ In addition, the IFAD Country Office established in January 2012 has been supportive to PIDRK for knowledge management, partnerships and contribution to the policy dialogue. The flexibility that IFAD has shown towards change in the context of programme execution, whereby, accepting the continuation of activities in crisis while most others suspended their funding, was appreciated by the Government and beneficiaries.
45. Overall, the performance of IFAD is rated by the PCRV as satisfactory (5), same as the PMD rating.
46. **Government.** The contribution of government agencies involved was appreciated by the PCR and the CPE. There were three government structures involved in programme implementation: (i) the Commissariat for Food Security which was a structure attached to the Prime Minister, and was responsible for the supervision of PIDRK. The office had no ministerial rank and worked with departments through the Prime Minister. Such an institutional set-up led to a lengthy decision-making chain; (ii) the National Coordination of Projects and Programmes was established in April 2004, with a mandate to monitor and report the implementation of projects to the Ministry of Agriculture; establish a project database; capitalize on the experiences of different projects and programmes; establish a formal framework for exchange and cooperation between the projects and programmes; and facilitate contacts between donors. The National Coordination of Projects and Programmes provided an accountability framework with programme monitoring and a mechanism for linking PIDRK and PTFs programmes.
47. Finally, the third governmental structure involved in programme implementation was ANICT. This agency was to control the budgetary resources for project investments within the jurisdiction of municipalities. The ANICT established financing agreements for the benefit of municipalities, which played the role of "delegate project master" (in French: maître d'ouvrage délégué). They are responsible for the bidding process, selection, contracting of suppliers, supervision and final handover of the programme. However, ANICT is jointly responsible for quality control work since funding requests had not performed adequately and therefore PIDRK mobilized its technical officers to monitor the performance of contracts carried out at the communal level.³⁴

³³ CPE, para.171.

³⁴ CPE, para. 187.

48. Based on the mixed record, the performance of Government is rated moderately satisfactory (4), one point below the PMD rating (5).

E. Overall programme achievements

49. The PCR does not include an overall assessment of the programme, however, based on the PCR and other reviewed documents, the PCRV's assessment is fairly positive, taking into consideration the complex political and security context in which the PIDRK operated. The programme was relevant in that it addressed multidisciplinary causes of poverty through a concerted pro-poor approach involving the Government, producers and civil society. In general terms, the PIDRK contributed to attaining the development objectives of improving food security, increasing household incomes and preserving land capital. However, at completion there were some limitations in relation to sustainability that should be taken into account in the design and implementation of future development interventions in the programme areas.
50. The PCRV rates the overall programme achievements as moderately satisfactory (4), the same rating as given by PMD.

IV. Assessment of PCR quality

51. **Scope.** The PCR covered all the key aspects of the programme, however several mandatory sections were not provided in the report, such as human and social capital and empowerment, institutions and policies, gender equality and women's empowerment, and overall programme achievements. This can be explained by the difficulties the programme had when putting in place an adequate M&E system. The PIDRK did not carry out a baseline survey, which would have allowed for comparison of the situation before with the situation after the programme. The impact assessment was mostly taken from the RIMS surveys undertaken in 2010 and 2014 and PCR workshop discussions with stakeholders. Furthermore, the PCR did not analyze the reason for the two-year gap between programme approval and effective start-up. On this basis, the PCRV assesses the PCR scope as moderately unsatisfactory (3).
52. **Quality.** On the whole the PCR is well written, although it is devoid of a bibliography and footnotes on impact. Analysis and conclusions are in most cases clearly connected. However, quantitative evidence provided in support of the statements made about effectiveness and impact is quite limited and not always persuasive. The report analysis is more output-oriented than outcome-oriented. The PCR has a strong focus on relevance and physical outputs, however, given the absence of data, this validation considers the quality of the PCR as moderately satisfactory (4).
53. **Lessons.** Lessons learned focus mainly on the operational issues, however more could have been included about programme weaknesses, in particular why the programme failed to set up a simple M&E system. Given the absence of strategic lessons learned, and in particular, lessons related to the specific country context, this validation rates the lessons learned as moderately satisfactory (4).
54. **Candour.** In several sections of the report, the PCR tends to over-emphasize the project's achievements, despite its major shortcomings. It relies, however, on professionally credible opinions and judgments, and the rating disconnect with the PCRV is only -0.1. The PCRV assesses PCR candour as moderately satisfactory (4).
55. Overall, the PCR quality is rated as moderately satisfactory (4).

Rating comparison

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>PMD rating^a</i>	<i>IOE rating^a</i>	<i>Net rating disconnect (IOE PCRVR – PMD)</i>
Programme performance			
Relevance	5	5	0
Effectiveness	3	3	0
Efficiency	3	3	0
Programme performance^b	3.7	3.7	0
Rural poverty impact			
Household income and assets	4	4	0
Human and social capital and empowerment	3	N/A	N/A
Food security and agricultural productivity	4	4	0
Natural resources, environment and climate change	4	N/A	N/A
Institutions and policies	4	N/A	N/A
Rural poverty impact^c	4	4	0
Other performance criteria			
Sustainability	3	3	0
Innovation and scaling up	4	4	0
Gender equality and women's empowerment	4	N/A	N/A
Overall programme achievement^d	4	4	0
Performance of partners^e			
IFAD	5	5	0
Government	5	4	-1
Average net disconnect			-0.1

Ratings of the PCR quality

	<i>PMD rating</i>	<i>IOE PCRVR rating</i>	<i>Net disconnect</i>
Scope		3	
Quality (methods, data, participatory process)		4	
Lessons		4	
Candour		4	
Overall rating of PCR		4	

^a Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable.

^b Arithmetic average of ratings for relevance, effectiveness and efficiency.

^c This is not an average of ratings of individual impact domains.

^d This is not an average of ratings of individual evaluation criteria, but an overarching assessment of the project, drawing upon the rating for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, rural poverty impact, sustainability, innovation and scaling up, and gender.

^e The rating for partners' performance is not a component of the overall assessment ratings.

Definition of the evaluation criteria used by IOE

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Definition^a</i>
Project performance	
Relevance	The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, institutional priorities and partner and donor policies. It also entails an assessment of project design in achieving its objectives.
Effectiveness	The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.
Efficiency	A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results.
Rural poverty impact^b	Impact is defined as the changes that have occurred or are expected to occur in the lives of the rural poor (whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended) as a result of development interventions.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Household income and assets 	Household income provides a means of assessing the flow of economic benefits accruing to an individual or group, whereas assets relate to a stock of accumulated items of economic value.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Human and social capital and empowerment 	Human and social capital and empowerment include an assessment of the changes that have occurred in the empowerment of individuals, the quality of grassroots organizations and institutions, and the poor's individual and collective capacity.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Food security and agricultural productivity 	Changes in food security relate to availability, access to food and stability of access, whereas changes in agricultural productivity are measured in terms of yields.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Natural resources, environment and climate change 	The focus on natural resources and the environment involves assessing the extent to which a project contributes to changes in the protection, rehabilitation or depletion of natural resources and the environment as well as in mitigating the negative impact of climate change or promoting adaptation measures.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Institutions and policies 	The criterion relating to institutions and policies is designed to assess changes in the quality and performance of institutions, policies and the regulatory framework that influence the lives of the poor.
Other performance criteria	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sustainability 	The likely continuation of net benefits from a development intervention beyond the phase of external funding support. It also includes an assessment of the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the project's life.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Innovation and scaling up 	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have: (i) introduced innovative approaches to rural poverty reduction; and (ii) the extent to which these interventions have been (or are likely to be) replicated and scaled up by government authorities, donor organizations, the private sector and others agencies.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Gender equality and women's empowerment 	The criterion assesses the efforts made to promote gender equality and women's empowerment in the design, implementation, supervision and implementation support, and evaluation of IFAD-assisted projects.
Overall project achievement	This provides an overarching assessment of the project, drawing upon the analysis made under the various evaluation criteria cited above.
Performance of partners	This criterion assesses the contribution of partners to project design, execution, monitoring and reporting, supervision and implementation support, and evaluation. It also assesses the performance of individual partners against their expected role and responsibilities in the project life cycle.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> IFAD Government 	

^a These definitions have been taken from the OECD/DAC *Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management* and from the IFAD Evaluation Manual (2009).

^b The IFAD Evaluation Manual also deals with the 'lack of intervention', that is, no specific intervention may have been foreseen or intended with respect to one or more of the five impact domains. In spite of this, if positive or negative changes are detected and can be attributed in whole or in part to the project, a rating should be assigned to the particular impact domain. On the other hand, if no changes are detected and no intervention was foreseen or intended, then no rating (or the mention 'not applicable') is assigned.

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