

Project Completion Report Validation

Rural Development Programme (RDP)

Solomon Islands

Date of validation by IOE: 31 October 2016

I. Basic project data*

			Approval (US\$ m)		Actual (US\$ m)	
Region	Asia and the Pacific Division	Total project costs	21.83		37.40***	
Country	Solomon Islands	IFAD grant and percentage of total	3.99****	-	3.99	10.7%
Grant number	G-I-DSF-8070	Borrower	0.89	4.1%	5.00	13.4%
Type of project (subsector)	Rural development	AusAID	6.61	30.3%	8.6	23.0%
Financing type	IFAD Grant	European Union	10.06	46.1%	7.65	20.4%
Lending terms**	DSF Grants	World Bank	3.20	14.6%	9.40	25.1%
Date of IFAD approval	15 December 2010	Global Food Crisis Response Programme	-	-	3.00	8.0%
Date of IFAD loan signature	11 November 2011	Beneficiaries	1.07	4.9%	2.50	6.7%
Date of IFAD effectiveness	11 November 2011	Appraising/Cooperating institution	World Bank		World Bank	
Loan amendments	2	Number of beneficiaries	300,000 direct		198,340 direct	
Loan closure extensions	1	IFAD Loan completion date	-		30 November 2013	
Country programme managers	Ronald Hartman (previous & current) Chase Palmeri (previous)	IFAD Loan closing date	30 June 2014		29 August 2014	
Regional director(s)	Thomas Elhaut (previous) Hoonae Kim (current)	Mid-term review	30 September 2009		28 February 2010	
Project completion report reviewer	Renate Roels	IFAD grant disbursement at project completion (%)			100%	
Project completion report quality control panel	Simona Somma Michael Carbon	Date of the project completion report			19 December 2015	

NB: Figures are from IFAD's financial database and may show differences with the figures from the World Bank.

Source: Project Completion Report, IFAD's financial database.

* Data provided concerns the IFAD grant and not the overall project. A more complete overview is provided in the report.

** Grants allocated through IFAD's Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF) govern the allocation of assistance to countries eligible for highly concessional assistance and with high to moderate debt-distress risk. Solomon Islands is classified as being at high risk of debt vulnerability under IFAD's DSF. This entitles the country to 100 per cent grant financing from IFAD.

*** Project Completion Report reports a total programme cost of US\$ 37.40, while the total reported contributions of the various sources of funding add up to US\$40.05. The latter most probably includes price contingencies. For this reason, the percentages of the last column exceed 100 per cent.

**** Contribution after mid-term review. No contribution from IFAD was foreseen at project appraisal.

II. Programme outline

1. **Introduction.** The Rural Development Programme (RDP) was led by the International Development Association (IDA) through the World Bank. It was approved in September 2007 and became effective in December 2007. Implementation was officially launched in February 2008.
2. The mid-term review (MTR) of March 2010 highlighted the need for additional financing to expand the programme to the more remote areas. In April 2010 the Government of the Solomon Islands formally requested IFAD to re-engage as a development partner and help to improve the under-performing programme after MTR. Before RDP, IFAD had not been involved in any project in the country for almost two decades due to non-payment of debts. This suspension was lifted in 2008. Furthermore, the Solomon Islands suffered a serious internal conflict that was only resolved in 2003.
3. IFAD contributed to RDP with a grant of US\$3.99 million, allocated across all project activities and administered by the World Bank. This grant was approved in December 2010 and became effective in November 2011, making RDP the third programme financed by IFAD in the Solomon Islands. Since IFAD's programme objectives are the same as the objectives set by the WB at design, and since IFAD stepped in at a later stage of the programme, this Project Completion Report Validation (PCRV) will look at the programme performance as a whole, and zoom into IFAD's specific engagement where possible.
4. In addition to the WB's design report (2007), IFAD produced two design documents (2010): one President's report, and one supplementary design report. The latter contains more details on IFAD's engagement and the programme arrangements. At the end of the programme, only one programme completion report (PCR) was produced in World Bank format, which provided the basis for this PCRV.
5. **Programme area.** The RDP had a phased approach to implementation. Up to MTR, the programme covered four provinces (Choiseul, Malaita, Temotu and Western), which were selected based on the "economic potential, need, willingness and readiness to participate" in the programme. After MTR, the project was extended nationally to cover all nine provinces¹. IFAD's additional financing and expertise, allowed the inclusion of remote rural areas. No target was set for the number of villages to be covered.
6. **Programme development goal, objective and components at design.** The original programme development goal of both IFAD and the WB design documents was to "raise the living standards of rural households by establishing improved mechanisms for the delivery of priority economic and social infrastructure and services" through the following objectives: (i) increased, cost-effective and sustained provision of local services and basic infrastructure determined through participatory planning prioritized by villagers (covered under component 1 "*local infrastructure and service delivery*"); (ii) increased capacity of agriculture institutions to provide demand-driven agriculture services at the local level (covered under component 2 "*improved agricultural services*"); and (iii) support for rural business development (covered under component 3 "*rural business development*"). RDP had a fourth component dedicated to programme management.
7. **Target group.** The primary beneficiaries, as described in both WB's and IFAD's design report, were estimated to entail approximately 300,000 people or 60,000 rural households and expected to benefit from improved access to infrastructure and services, agricultural support services and rural business development, including financial services. The WB design document also refers to secondary

¹ Adding (i) Central, (ii) Guadalcanal, (iii) Isabel, (iv) Makira-Ulawa, and (v) Rennel and Bellona (Renbel) to the aforementioned four pilot provinces.

beneficiaries, which included civil servants at provincial and central level, through training and capacity building as well as improved conditions of service; and service providers and contractors in the private and NGO sectors. No target was set for the secondary beneficiaries.

8. **Financing.** The total programme cost at design was estimated at US\$21.57 million without contingencies, and at US\$21.83 million with contingencies. This was composed of a US\$19.86 million grant (European Union (EU) US\$10.06 million; Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) US\$6.61 million; and World Bank/IDA US\$3.20 million), a contribution of US\$0.89 million by the borrower and a US\$1.08 million contribution by the beneficiaries.
9. The actual programme cost amounts to a total of US\$37.40 million, including a US\$32.64 million grant (EU US\$7.65; AusAID US\$8.60 million; World Bank/IDA US\$9.40 million; IFAD US\$3.99 and Global Food Crisis Response Programme US\$3.00), a contribution of US\$5.00 million by the borrower and a US\$2.50 million contribution by the beneficiaries.
10. **Programme implementation and supervision.** The overall implementation responsibility laid with the Ministry of Development Planning and Aid Coordination (MDPAC) supported by a Steering Committee and technical working group. The latter was composed of members from the Ministry of Infrastructure Development, MDPAC, the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAL), the Ministry of Provincial Government and Rural Development, the Ministry of Finance and Treasury as well as provincial secretaries representing the participating provinces. The programme coordination unit (PCU) was located within the MDPAC.
11. The programme was directly supervised by the World Bank with active contributions and participation from the partners (including IFAD) and stakeholders involved. The responsibility for the loan and grants financial management lay with the World Bank.
12. **Key programme dates.** The RDP was approved on 9 September 2007 by the World Bank and became effective three months later on 21 December 2007. The expected closing date was 30 November 2012 while the actual closing date was on 28 February 2015, some 2.5 years after the original date. This made a total of 7.3 years actual programme duration. IFAD's grant was approved on 15 December 2010 and became effective on 11 November 2011. The grant was completed on 30 November 2013 and closed on 29 August 2014.
13. **Significant changes/developments during project implementation.** During programme implementation a number of modifications have been made, among which two important restructurings. The first one was a follow-up of MTR recommendations in 2010 and involved an additional financing to: (i) fill the gap created by exchange rate fluctuations and inflation; and (ii) enable the foreseen expansion of the programme at the national level. The MTR also recommended a one year extension of the closing date, to be able to: (i) implement activities in programme areas which would be covered after MTR; and (ii) implement the World Bank's Pest Management safeguards policy.
14. The second restructuring was made in 2013 and involved another financing from the World Bank to mainly cover inflation and the cancellation of part of the European Commission's contribution. It also entailed an amendment of the programme development goal, a revision of some indicators and a change in the third programme objective from "rural business development" to "increased access to financial services"². Table 1 on the next page illustrates the difference in the original and the revised programme development goal.

² They proved either too broad and difficult to measure or difficult to attribute to the programme investments. Changes were made in order to optimize M&E, the relevance of the design and the effectiveness of the objectives.

Table 1

Revision in programme development goal

<i>Original</i>	<i>Revised</i>
To raise the living standards of rural households by establishing improved mechanisms for the delivery of priority economic and social infrastructure and services by the public and the private sector.	To increase access of rural households to high priority, small-scale economic and social infrastructure, agriculture and financial services.

Source: Project's original and revised Results Framework

III. Review of findings

A. Core criteria

Relevance

15. **Relevance of the objectives.** The programme objectives are well aligned to the rural sector needs of the Solomon Islands and remained aligned to the Government goals throughout programme duration. Following a period of civil conflict (1998-2003) the country required a restoration of infrastructure and basic services as well as rural business development to stimulate social and economic growth. The government furthermore recognized the need to invest in the sustained development of the rural areas as well as the need to improve aid effectiveness and donor harmonization in the rural sector.
16. In response to these priorities, the MDPAC developed the Agricultural and Rural Development Strategy for which some of its key priorities (i.e. the programme objectives) were implemented through the RDP, such as: (i) infrastructure development; (ii) social services sector; (iii) economic and productive sector; and (iv) the establishment of partnerships with key sector actors.
17. The RDP is in line with IFAD's strategic niche and proposed thrusts as defined in the Sub-Regional Strategic Opportunities Paper³ and with the needs of the poor as recognized in IFAD's supplementary design report and later on in the results of the household survey. As mentioned, the additional financing and expertise of IFAD enabled the programme to expand and target communities in remote areas, which is also in line with IFAD's strategic approach in the Pacific Islands.
18. Moreover, it enabled IFAD to rebuild its network and knowledge base in the Solomon Islands and provide an opportunity to apply lessons learned in similar Pacific Island countries where IFAD is already active through its sub-regional programme for the Pacific Islands, or other small islands where the Fund is planning to become active.
19. **Relevance of design.** The design of RDP was relevant to national policies and the needs of the target beneficiaries. It was informed by the analysis and recommendations of the Agricultural and Rural Development Strategy, which in return drew on the Solomon Islands Smallholder Agriculture Study completed by AusAID in 2006, as well as analytical studies from the World Bank.
20. Even though many challenges and risks had been acknowledged⁴, the design was affected by efficiency issues, among which a significant underestimation of the required cost for the various programme components (especially for component 1

³ In particular, the programme aimed to provide for: (i) strengthening the capacity of the rural poor and their organizations, particularly strengthening local governance systems and increasing the capacity of rural communities in particular; (ii) improving equitable access to productive natural resources and technology, particularly increasing local food security including for disadvantaged communities; and (iii) increasing access to financial services, especially focussed on small and medium-sized enterprises and on public-private partnerships through investment equity schemes.

⁴ Among others: (i) weak capacity of national and provincial institutions; (ii) remoteness and difficult conditions after period of conflict; (iii) weak private sector and NGO service provision; and (iv) amount of time and effort to set up a community-driven development approach; etc.

and 4). Moreover, "the programme design did not sufficiently assess the availability of private sector providers nor did it put in place any activities for their involvement during implementation, leaving the burden for service delivery during implementation on an already under-capacitated MAL"⁵.

21. As detailed in the introduction section of this PCR, the overall programme goal and several key indicators needed revision at various points in time, as they proved either too broad and difficult to measure or difficult to attribute to the programme investments. With a delayed baseline study and set up of a functioning monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) system, these flaws were picked up very late in the implementation of the programme. Yet, the various restructurings contributed to improving the relevance of design to the extent possible. Finally, the design report clearly describes the RDP as a two-phased programme, yet the design did not cover a clear scaling up strategy, thus constraining greater impacts.
22. **Rating.** The PCR assigns a moderately satisfactory (4) rating to the programme relevance, one rating below the Programme Management Department (PMD).

Effectiveness

23. The following paragraphs assess achievements against the three project objectives of the most recent log frame which was revised during the second restructuring in 2013. The rationale for this choice is based on three main factors: (i) the speed of implementation which only picked up towards the final years of the programme; (ii) M&E issues that persisted until 2013; and (iii) the revision of the overall programme goal, objective 3 and several indicators as a result of the restructuring. Where relevant, comparison is made between formally revised target values and original target values (at design).
24. **Objective 1: Increased, cost-effective and sustained provision of local services and basic infrastructure determined through participatory planning prioritized by villagers.** The first objective was covered under component 1 "*local infrastructure and service delivery*" and sought to increase the access to and use of rural infrastructures and services through a community-driven development approach, which included participatory planning, budgeting and the provision of execution mechanisms at provincial and community level. The beneficiaries would select the sub-projects to be implemented in their village based on their priorities and needs. This ensured ownership of project results and capacity building of the community.
25. The PCR describes that the total number of sub-projects and people reached fell short of their targets (the latter will be discussed under outreach). A total of 283 sub-projects have been completed, which is 76 per cent of the revised target and 57 per cent of the original target⁶. This was due to implementation and fund flow delays.
26. For this objective, the programme sought to measure the satisfaction of the community. The PCR states that 94 per cent of the surveyed households felt that the project investments reflected their needs (compared to the target of 80 per cent), and that 92 per cent of the beneficiaries were satisfied with their infrastructure or service (compared to the original target of 65 per cent and the extremely low revised target of 10 per cent).
27. The percentage of people in target planning units participating in sub-project decision making remained below target at 48 per cent compared to the expected 80 per cent. According to the PCR this is a more reasonable achievement than 80 per cent⁷, given the amount of outside responsibilities of the community members.

⁵ PCR, page 21.

⁶ The target was revised down during the second restructuring.

⁷ Or the original target of 70 per cent.

All in all, this objective fell mostly short of its targets, while community satisfaction is reported by the survey as high.

28. **Objective 2: Increased capacity of agriculture institutions to provide demand-driven agriculture services at the local level.** Through the component "*improved agricultural services*" the programme aimed to improve the access of rural smallholder households to quality agricultural services to improve their livelihoods and agricultural practises. This was done through village level dissemination of agricultural advice and information through the improved capacity of MAL officers and provincial service providers.
29. With the assistance from RDP, the MAL has significantly rebuilt its capacity to support farmers through staff training, activity-based planning and improved budget processes. At the end of the programme, 49 per cent of the villages in the programme area received agricultural services, against a revised target of 50 per cent. Yet, the original target was set at 60 per cent. The service activities, which were based on community needs, covered 56 different technologies in the areas of food crops, cash crops, livestock, resource management and biosecurity – six more than envisaged at design. At the same time, the percentage of wards to whom agricultural services have been provided remained underachieved at 79 per cent against a target of 90 per cent. This was due to a limitation in available funds. In sum, objective 2 has been generally reached, even though most indicators remained just beneath the target.
30. **Objective 3: Increased access to financial services.** This objective was covered under the third component and aimed to facilitate rural enterprise development through the provision of an equity financing facility and associated training and technical assistance. Investments by beneficiary grant recipients were expected to expand business activity in rural areas through increased purchase of agricultural raw materials, associated rural expenditure (e.g. transport) as well as job creation.
31. The target for the establishment of small and medium sized enterprises involved in rural business was revised during the second restructuring from 100 to 50 due to budget reduction and low uptake. At completion 65 businesses were established (130 per cent of the revised target, yet only 65 per cent of the original target) and an average of 5.8 new jobs had been created against a target of 5. No additional data or information is available on the nature, scope, equity or income/profitability of these businesses, partly due to the unavailability of comparable and reliable data from the grant recipients. For this reason, the PCRV concurs with IEG's validation which questioned the reliability of the finding that only one business out of the established 65 defaulted. Furthermore, the evaluation that was conducted to assess the business development component mentions that "the impact of the project on the rural poor is difficult to assess"⁸. In conclusion, for this objective, the PCRV finds that the main two targets for this objective have been achieved, yet only due to some necessary revisions in the indicators and target values. There is however insufficient evidence to determine the scale and scope of achievement for the established businesses.
32. **Effectiveness in outreach.** At the time of closure, the programme had reached a total of 198,340 beneficiaries equal to 66 per cent of the target. This is mainly due to the fact that the programme did not manage to complete the implementation of all subprojects (approximately 20 per cent of subprojects remained incomplete at the time of the project closing date).
33. **Rating.** On balance, with many of the indicators below (yet close) to target, and considering the lack of reliable and comparable evidence, the effectiveness of RDP is considered borderline between moderately unsatisfactory and moderately

⁸ Evaluation of Business Development Component, page 17.

satisfactory. It is rated moderately satisfactory (4) which is the same as PMD's self-rating.

Efficiency

34. **Cost structure and financial delivery.** As mentioned earlier, the programme experienced several efficiency issues causing implementation delays and requiring two loan extensions. In addition, financial gaps due to increased costs and inflation, required a substantive change in the cost structure. Table 2 reports a financial gap of approximately US\$8 million between appraisal and MTR. The actual costs (at completion) increased even more to 171 per cent of the estimated appraisal cost, illustrating a significant underestimation of the required cost.

Table 2

Project cost by component

<i>Components</i>	<i>Total cost at appraisal (US\$ million)</i>	<i>Revised cost after MTR (US\$ million)</i>	<i>Total cost at completion (US\$ million)</i>	<i>IFAD's contribution (US\$)</i>
<u>Component 1:</u> Local infrastructure and services delivery	9.08	15.36	19.67	2,065,685
<u>Component 2:</u> Improved agricultural services	6.42	7.82	9.09	1,051,670
<u>Component 3:</u> Rural business development	2.37	0.86	1.15	115,657
<u>Component 4:</u> Programme management	3.70	5.67	7.49	762,528
Total	21.57 (21.83 incl. price contingencies)	29.71 (30.40 incl. price contingencies)	37.40	3,995,540

Source: IEG Implementation Completion Report Review (2016).

35. Up to mid-point, programme expenditures were behind schedule. About 43 per cent of the funds were committed or spent, out of which the largest share covered programme management related costs, instead of being allocated to local infrastructures and improved agricultural services (as planned at design).
36. Under the programme management component there was need to expand the number of Provincial Support Units, adapt implementation methodologies and provide greater levels of support. These amendments influenced and changed the cost structure and the implementation sequence and speed of all RDP components significantly. With an increase up to 20 per cent of the total programme cost at completion⁹, it can be concluded that the financial requirements and implementation schedule for the programme management component have been highly underestimated.
37. In addition, while component 1 was supposed to start from the beginning of programme implementation, no investment had been made in community sub-projects till MTR. Activities under this component only commenced in 2010, three years after effectiveness. For this reason, the real operational costs of this component were not yet known at MTR stage. As a result, the budget prepared for the first financial restructuring and allocated to component 1 was insufficient for the planned expansion to the remaining provinces.

⁹ Out of the IFAD grant, 19 per cent was allocated to programme management.

38. For the aforementioned reason, and also due to inflation and the cancellation of EU funds¹⁰, additional funds were leveraged from the World Bank, AusAID, the beneficiaries and the government. Two additional donors joined the programme: IFAD and the global Food Crisis Response Programme. Nonetheless, there were severe delays in disbursements until the end of the programme which constrained the programme's capacity to reach its targets under component 1. In fact, 77 subprojects could not be finalized by programme completion. With specific regard to the disbursement of the US\$3.99 million IFAD grant, the financial database of IFAD indicates that it was 100 per cent disbursed within one year between July 2012 and July 2013. Even though the first disbursement was eight months after the effectiveness date, it is still in line with IFAD's global average of 12.4 months.
39. **Economic and financial analysis.** The programme did not include an economic analysis to produce the net present value or economic internal rate of return either for the overall programme or for the individual components. This was due to the lack of information or rigorous assessment of past activities as well as the absence of basic agricultural data on yields and farm systems. The economic internal rate of return for selected subproject categories (water supply and sanitation, education and health) ranged between 12 and 39 per cent, which is within the range of returns for comparable projects¹¹.
40. **Rating.** Based on the above, the efficiency of the programme is rated moderately unsatisfactory (3) in line with the assessment by PMD.

Rural poverty impact

41. **Household income and net assets.** The PCR indicates that the activities under Component 2 could have led to an increase of smallholder incomes by three-fold over ten years in the case of cocoa production and two-fold in the case of pig production, which were two major activities in the programme area. Yet this is not substantiated by any evaluative evidence. Moreover, the indicator to measure the increase in income or employment arising to rural people from businesses established by the programme was dropped during the first project restructuring as it was considered too difficult to measure.
42. An independent impact evaluation of the programme was able to provide some proxy indicators. The evaluation found that 350 jobs have been created under the programme¹², and states that the additional income from these created jobs are to be directly related to the increase in employment. The evaluation assumes that a typical unskilled wage is SBD500 for a period of 14 consecutive days, which would entail additional annual wage payments of SBD4.55 million for 350 new jobs. This amount should even be higher for semi-skilled and skilled workers.
43. All in all, as no specific data has been collected on income or assets, it is difficult to rigorously assess this impact domain and attribute the assumed additional wage to the jobs created under the programme. The same applies to assets. The PCR mentions that the Subproject Implementation Committees (SICs) have played an important role in enabling community ownership of their assets and attributes, but no further data is available.
44. **Human and social capital and empowerment.** The impact evaluation found that there is a high level of satisfaction amongst beneficiaries related to RDP's processes to engage the community, which is commendable for a post conflict environment. Furthermore, compared to the baseline significant improvements were found in access to roads, markets, water, sanitation and electricity, ranging from 11.3 per cent (markets) to 1,250 per cent (electricity). Yet, at the same time, a decline was recorded in the access to health centres and primary schools as

¹⁰ The funds from the EU were only available till 2010, and could therefore not be used (up to 76 per cent).

¹¹ A World Bank study reported that an economic internal rate of return of 18-53 per cent for community-drive development infrastructure projects is relatively efficient.

¹² No target was set for this indicator.

compared to the baseline (-6.5 per cent for both criteria). This negative result could be attributed to the fact that some villages choose to focus on non-education related projects (e.g., water, etc.), and that in some cases, the improvement in access to health centres and primary schools only counted for people who already had prior access. However in general, RDP villages had a positive impact in improving or providing stability in the access of basic services compared to non-RDP villages.

45. **Food security and agricultural productivity.** This criterion has been covered under component 2, which aimed to promote improved farming practises for better livelihood and development. The main instrument that was developed to achieve impact was village level dissemination of agricultural advice/information and related services through the MAL. The rationale was that improved access to better information would lead to improved agricultural practices.
46. Collected survey data reveals that the majority of the households that received advice from MAL is satisfied with the information provided and has changed farming practises accordingly. Although these results led to a higher proportion of households reporting increased crop or livestock production, the intensity of this process was relatively low and mainly during the initial stage of implementation. In contrast to previous results, follow up survey results revealed that three quarters of the households did not receive advice from the MAL and when they did about half of them (48 per cent) changed practices in 2013.
47. Despite these results, of those households surveyed at baseline¹³ 57 per cent reported selling food compared to 71 per cent during the follow up survey. Study results furthermore showed that the majority (65 per cent) of the households that received advice from MAL are more likely to sell crops. It is nevertheless a regret that no attempt was made to measure changes in farmer productivity or production. Suggestions for improvements under RDP II will be discussed under scaling-up.
48. **Institutions and policies.** As already highlighted under effectiveness, the capacity of agricultural institutions in providing demand-driven services improved substantially. The PCR describes that the new community driven development approach fostered by the project allowed MDPAC to refine its practises over time and establish a mechanism that can be continued into the future as one of the government's primary investments in rural development. The programme also enabled MAL to rebuild its delivery of nationwide extension services.
49. Even if the capacity of MAL has significantly improved, several lessons have been noted down: (i) overreliance on public sector service delivery has deprived the private sector of opportunities to deliver similar services; (ii) public sector financing cannot sustain the levels of operational funding for extension services provided under the first phase; (iii) participatory community consultation approach leads to services which are too diffuse to have a significant impact on commercial production of any one crop; and (iv) there has been a lack of attention to commercial development of the agriculture sector, focusing mainly on farming techniques rather than marketing. These lessons have been incorporated in a new corporate strategy which is supposed to enhance the focus on private sector partnership and agribusiness under RDP II.
50. The provincial governments have also developed their roles over time and integrated the new community driven development approach into their operations, though the PCR recognizes that there is scope to expand the impact of community driven processes at provincial level. There is still a lack of institutional integration, horizontally and vertically, of national and provincial plans and priorities. Even

¹³ The impact evaluation surveyed a total of 80 villages, out of which 63 overlapped with the baseline survey.

though this was not an objective of RDP, it remains crucial for the successful delivery of a nationwide community driven development approach.

51. **Overall rural poverty impact rating.** In summary, the programme managed to yield positive impacts in several areas such as human and social capital and empowerment and institutions and policies in a challenging post conflict environment. Yet, the limitations in the availability of data constricted attribution to the programme. On balance, the overall rural poverty impact of RDP is rated as moderately satisfactory (4), one rating below PMD.

Sustainability of benefits

52. With respect to institutional sustainability, the PCR highlights that there has been a good commitment towards making MAL more efficient and effective in implementing its mandate through identification of capacity gaps, improved staff capacity, performance-based Human Resources management and reporting mechanisms, and knowledge and information management. However, the programme's desired achievement of having MAL progressively taking over from RDP and allocating adequate recurrent and development budget to service provision as long as the programme phased out, seemed to have happened only to a limited extent. Furthermore, as already mentioned under institutions and policies, the lack of institutional integration could be a threat to sustainability. It was recorded that the various types of funds flowing through a combination of mechanisms remain uncoordinated and overlapping.
53. With regard to the sustainability of RDP activities, the last supervision mission report of 2015 revealed that MAL's service delivery to the beneficiaries has been scaled down in line with the decline in available programme budget. It is uncertain if MAL will be able to cover all the necessary costs of service delivery supported by RDP. It is therefore plausible that the recurrent issues faced by MAL in service provision –extension staff mobility and accommodation, activity costs, etc.– could emerge again. Attention should be devoted to this matter under RDP II, as with less funding available, and the expected shift from public sector extension to private sector partnerships¹⁴, there is a risk that the outreach to farmers could diminish.
54. Finally, the extension of the programme to all nine provinces during RDP and the rolling out of the programme into RDP II allowed for the capitalization on the relatively high investment made during the first phase and guarantee a better sustainability of benefits.
55. **Operations and Maintenance (O&M).** The PCR reveals that cultural perceptions of O&M have undermined the efforts taken in the establishment of O&M committees and SIC trainings. This is demonstrated by the lack of functional O&M plans and the beneficiaries' confusion when asked about future management, especially regarding financial arrangements. O&M planning is particularly important, as even well maintained subprojects are at risk to natural disasters (e.g. flooding). It is however expected that RDP II will continue to provide Community Helpers to assist communities to operate and maintain their infrastructure investments.
56. **Rating.** Taking in consideration the above stated positive and negative factors to the sustainability of benefits, and the fact that RDP is followed up by a second phase, this criterion is rated moderately satisfactory (4), same as PMD.

¹⁴ The shift to private sector provision should ensure that private sector services are provided for the most commercially-oriented agricultural production, while government maintains support to subsistence farmers (PCR, page 39).

B. Other performance criteria

Innovation and scaling up

57. **Innovation.** The RDP entailed a number of innovations that were new to the context of application. Even though these innovations do not always derive from the completion report, the MTR reports specifically observed that the pioneering of an approach to community development and improved service delivery in agriculture constituted an innovation to the Solomon Islands.
58. Furthermore, both the WB appraisal report and IFAD's President's report highlight the following institutional innovations: (i) working through government systems and a focus on linkages between government and rural communities; (ii) decision-making processes at ward and provincial level that associate elected representative and community representatives; (iii) accountability processes, including through increased control by communities on resources allocation and subproject implementation; and (iv) demand-driven provision of rural services and infrastructure.
59. **Scaling up.** While the programme design report clearly described the RDP as a two-phased programme, the second phase has not been a certainty in the programme cycle. In fact, a clear scaling up strategy was not foreseen at design. Moreover, as mentioned under relevance, the design did not cover a longer intervention following a programmatic approach with clear objectives and milestones.
60. Nevertheless, the second phase started after MTR¹⁵ and RDP II started in 2015 as a follow-up programme continuing the completion of unfinished activities under RDP I and further consolidating and institutionalizing the results¹⁶. Table 3 here below illustrates how the follow-up programme leveraged more resources from the Government and the various donors involved, compared to the design stage of phase I, which is an element of successful scaling up of results according to the IOE definition of scaling-up.

Table 3
Overview of contributions phase I and phase II

<i>Financier</i>	<i>Design</i>	<i>RDP I Actual</i>	<i>RDP II at design</i>
IFAD	-	3.99	4.6
WB	3.2	9.4	9.0
AusAID	6.61	8.6	13.3
Government	0.89	5.0	20.0

Source: design documents of RDP I and RDP II.

61. Furthermore, as mentioned in paragraph 50, the integration of the new community driven development approach into the operations of the provincial governments is another example of scaling up.
62. **Rating.** Based on the above information, the PCRV assigns a rating of 5 for innovation and scaling up, which is the same as PMD's self-rating.

Gender equality and women's empowerment

63. The PCRV noticed that no reference is made to the IFAD gender policy in the IFAD's President's Report or IFAD's supplementary design report. Even though the latter contains a section on gender mainstreaming and the importance of women's involvement, gender disaggregation in data collection was only added with the

¹⁵ Which entailed a geographic expansion.

¹⁶ Additional objectives can be found in the design document of RDP II.

second additional financing in 2013. The gender specific indicators and their results are illustrated in the table below.

Table 4
Overview of gender specific indicators and their results

<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Target</i>	<i>Achieved</i>	<i>% of target</i>
Nr. of female beneficiaries of completed community development sub-projects	150,000	73,385	49%
Nr. of women in consultation activities during project implementation	12,000	9,936	83%
Percentage of women attending participatory needs identification	40%	43%	108%
Percentage of female representatives in community based decision making structures, specifically in Subproject Implementation Committees (SICs)	30%	29%	97%
Percentage of women that participated in provincial agriculture activities	40%	47%	118%
Percentage of female beneficiaries benefitting from improved access to infrastructure	50%	33%	66%

Source: Programme Completion Report (2015).

64. The table shows that women were overall less reached, and according to the impact evaluation, also more passively engaged compared to men. According to the PCR these results partially derive from poor data collection, underreporting by the beneficiary community, and the fact that the completion of subprojects only reached 76 per cent of its target. The deficit in data collection and analysis, as well as the lack of specific actions taken to address gender inequalities in the project design, was of specific concern to the AusAID¹⁷.
65. Even though most surveyed households appreciated RDP's efforts in involving women in community activities and decision-making (especially related to their role in a SIC), additional programme documentation¹⁸ revealed the limited impact of the programme, in particular in the recruitment of female staff for PCU, Provincial Support Units and community helper positions.
66. **Rating.** Notwithstanding the fact that RDP managed to engage women, the programme did not have a clear gender mainstreaming strategy. Targets have not been met and available gender disaggregated data are of poor quality. For these reasons, the PCRV rates gender equality and women's empowerment as moderately unsatisfactory (3), one rating below PMD.

Environment and natural resources management

67. The Solomon Islands are rich in terms of ecosystems and biodiversity, with many endemic endangered species. The recognition of the importance of these fragile ecosystems resulted in the setting up of an environmental assessment/environment and social management framework (the EA/ESMF). The EA/ESMF was jointly prepared by the Government and programme stakeholders and provided a mechanism to ensure that the activities funded under RDP would not have detrimental effects on the environment.
68. The assessment predicted that negative environmental impacts were to be expected but that they would be temporary and limited to the construction phase. In order to keep this threat under control, RDP envisaged feedback mechanisms and community monitoring of programme implementation, including the collection of social and environmental information (e.g. during special environmental

¹⁷ PCR, page 71.

¹⁸ IEG PCRV (2016) and IFAD Aide Memoire for phase II (2015).

safeguard missions), as well as training and screening processes. Facilitators have been trained on the programme's environmental and social guidelines.

69. An important bottleneck was the ESMF certification of every subproject, which constrained the implementation flow. Among the causes were the large geographical coverage, an insufficient number of environmental specialists and resource constrains. The ESMF has therefore been revised and the screening process simplified, which from that moment forward, would include spot checks only.
70. **Rating.** This criterion is assessed by the PCRV as moderately satisfactory, 4, same as PMD.

Adaptation to climate change

71. While there is limited information available regarding the adaptation to climate change or the impact of the programme on climate change, and it is not mentioned at all in the PCR, the EA/ESMF has been intended as the main instrument to adapt to the negative effects of climate change, next to its efforts to provide environmental guidelines.
72. The EA/ESMF mentions that donor aid policies have been taken into consideration in the preparation of this EA/ESMF. In fact, the EU Action Plan on Climate Change in the context of development cooperation would be central in the community's support and the strategies and objectives of two relevant AusAID policy papers¹⁹ would be considered when implementing the programme. Furthermore, important lessons will be registered for the design of RDP II.
73. **Rating.** Even though the joint review mission of 2014 states that the safeguard procedures set out in the RDP design have been satisfactorily followed, the PCRV regrets that the above mentioned aid policies, or impact on climate change in general, is not discussed in the PCR. This hampers a full validation of the utility of the implemented climate change measures. Nevertheless, given that some measures had been put in place, the PCRV rates this criteria as moderately satisfactory, 4, same rating assigned by PMD.

C. Overall programme achievement

74. The RDP has been an ambitious programme that provided a direct contribution in three priority areas of the Solomon Islands Government. Despite the many constraints it faced, RDP made a moderate contribution in trying to rebuild remote rural communities, empowering them, ensuring that they receive better public and private services, and building livelihood opportunities in a post-conflict environment. With the exception of efficiency and gender equality and women's empowerment, the programme achieved moderately satisfactory or better ratings.
75. The continuous adjustments during the course of the programme improved the relevance of the design and the effectiveness of the objectives to the greatest extent possible. Despite the fact that many programme targets could not be reached, the satisfaction rate among the community is good. Other successes were the inclusion of various innovations and the scaling up to RDP II as well as the attention given to the management of the environment and natural resources.
76. However, the assessment has been constrained due to a rather weak M&E system, which retarded the reporting of results in full. For the same reason, the effectiveness of objective 3 could not be fully determined.
77. **Rating.** Thus, the overall programme achievement is rated moderately satisfactory (4), same rating PMD assigned.

¹⁹ The 2006 White Paper on Australian Aid and the 2007 Draft Strategy for Australian Aid.

D. Performance of partners

IFAD

78. **Involvement in the project design and implementation.** When IFAD joined RDP, the programme had just undergone the MTR. As IFAD joined at a later stage, it had limited scope for influencing changes in design. Yet IFAD played a key role in improving the key programme activities on agriculture and finance/business after MTR. The availability of an IFAD president's report and supplementary more detailed design document have been useful to get a better understanding of IFAD's view of and its own strategic objectives towards the RDP, especially since these do not derive from the PCR.
79. Even though IFAD's influence on RDP is hardly reflected in the PCR, it has been recorded in other programme documentation and correspondence that IFAD significantly contributed in ensuring the programme recovered from a disappointing performance at MTR to a programme worthy of scaling up for a second phase. It also played an important role in improving the supervision process. These are important contributions, as at mid-point, the programme was still at its tipping point due to delays in implementation and financial issues. Furthermore, with IFAD's specific expertise, it has been possible to expand the programme to the more remote areas.
80. **Quality of IFAD's self-evaluation system.** It is regrettable that IFAD has not produced a separate PCR including lessons learned based on its implementation experience at the completion of the first phase, and reflecting areas of importance for IFAD.
81. A separate completion report, together with the project status reports or RIMS reports, could have contributed in ensuring a completion process that would have been useful for IFAD in terms of focus (e.g. treatment of different evaluation criteria), specific IFAD priorities and strategies as well as knowledge generation which could be valuable for future operations in the Pacific islands as well as other small islands developing states, but also to be able to influence the second phase and capitalize on the partnerships with key actors in the region and relevant sectors.
82. Furthermore, it would have allowed an assessment of the achievement of the specific strategic objectives mentioned in the IFAD design report²⁰. This has been acknowledged during PMD PCR discussions and the preparation of phase II, for which during the quality enhancement and quality assurance rounds, the main lessons of phase I have been discussed.
83. **Supervision.** Although the expertise and number of mission members varied throughout the various joint review missions, IFAD actively participated in all of them between 2011 and 2015. The IFAD Country Programme Manager participated in the joint review missions in 2010 and 2011, and the IFAD Sub-Regional Coordinator for the Pacific Islands participated in the joint review mission of 2011 and 2012.
84. **Rating.** All, in all, the performance of IFAD as a partner is rated moderately satisfactory (4), same as that provided by PMD.

Government

85. **Programme management.** The Government of the Solomon Islands has shown commitment to the RDP and its activities remained aligned to the government goals. The latter was partly ensured through the involvement of many relevant ministries in the programme's Steering Committee and technical working group.

²⁰ (i) re-engaging in Solomon islands after an absence of almost two decades; (ii) influencing the development of the second phase of the programme; and (iii) partnering with key sector actors.

Furthermore, the government's support to RDP II materialized in a significant augmentation in its funding.

86. The Ministry and PCU were evaluated as an effective coordinator that collaborated well with the co-financiers. The only significant impediment was the serious delay in establishing a functional M&E unit and effective management information system.
87. **M&E.** The set-up of a very much delayed management information system resulted in a delayed baseline survey and functional M&E programme, thus reducing the comparability with final results. Subsequent inconsistencies in the collection of data and the programme design required several rounds of adjustments in the system and design, hampering effective programme monitoring and the availability of data. Notwithstanding these impediments, the M&E is said to have been sufficiently useful to contribute to decision-making. To overcome data unreliability, alignment issues across data sources, and the unavailability of data outside the PCU (issues that persisted until 2013²¹) during RDP II, a so-called open source web-based management information system platform system was installed around 2014. Yet an insufficient amount of data and information has been collected for objective 3 as well on income and assets.
88. **Financial management.** The financial counterpart in the Government of the Solomon Islands, the Financial and Economic Development Unit, has been overall supportive to the programme, yet not as proactive in the financial management or in supervision as desired. Issues regarding the provision of funds have been particularly problematic towards the end of the programme, when delayed disbursements caused significant under achievements, contributing to the shortfall in effectiveness at programme completion.
89. With respect to the fiduciary aspects, the PCR indicates that programme procurement has had a poor record till MTR. Among the issues were the difficulty in finding qualified staff for decentralized government positions (e.g. PCU, MAL, etc.), as well as an insufficient quality of technical capacity and record-keeping. Post-MTR it appeared more stable, though continuous and strong oversight remained required. The procurement for sub-projects also suffered from serious delays and cost overruns, however these have been largely addressed by the Provincial Support Units in due course. The annual programme audits are said to have been consistently submitted late by the Auditor General's office. They were only submitted on time in the last two years due to the contracting of an independent auditor.
90. **Rating.** Based on the above described commitment in programme management and flaws in the financial management, the performance of the Government as a partner is rated moderately satisfactory (4), equal to PMD's rating.

IV. Assessment of PCR quality

Scope

91. The PCR was prepared by an IFAD consultant following the World Bank format and is informative. IFAD concurred with this World Bank version and did not produce a separate IFAD PCR for this programme. It only prepared a separate overview of IFAD ratings for all the evaluation criteria. The PCR is well structured according to the World Bank format, however for this reason not all IOE evaluation criteria are fully covered. Even though the scope is good for World Bank assessments, there is need to consult other IFAD and World Bank documents (e.g. mission reports, MTR, IFAD design reports, etc.) in order to be able to fully validate performance against the IOE evaluation criteria. This particularly counts for the different impact domains, for which the separate impact evaluation report had to be consulted in

²¹ Twelfth Joint Donor Review and Implementation Support Mission Report (2013).

order to fully cover the validation. For the full assessment of IFAD as a partner, separate IFAD documents and correspondence had to be collected as the performance of IFAD and donors other than the World Bank is only scarcely discussed. As mentioned in the efficiency section, information on disbursement rate and flow is missing and would have been useful in the assessment. The information provided on component 3 could also have been amplified in the PCR, especially since an evaluation of this component was prepared by IFAD. The scope of the PCR is rated as moderately satisfactory (4).

Quality

92. Overall the completion report is detailed and informative. Attempts have been made to include information about impact where possible. Yet, more explanation to certain achievements as well as data from the impact evaluations would have been desirable. The programme is known for holding regular beneficiaries assessments at regular intervals and a stakeholder workshop was organized towards the completion of the programme. A number of inconsistencies have been noticed between data included in the Results Framework Analysis and the rest of the report. In these cases, the PCRV used the data from the framework. Overall, the PCRV assigns a quality rating of moderately satisfactory (4) to the PCR.

Lessons

93. The PCR of the RDP presents many useful lessons by highlighting areas/results which did not work well, and by explaining how and why these elements were revised (or not). Additionally, the PCRV finds that it provides value adding lessons and recommendations for the follow up programme RDP II. The PCRV rates the lessons of the PCR as satisfactory (5).

Candour

94. The PCR is candid, even though the PCRV finds that in some sections it is somewhat over emphasizing the positive contributions without mentioning the caveats – for example in the case of food security and agricultural productivity and gender. A part from this element, programme issues are treated transparently and candidly, and lessons illustrated. Overall, the PCRV assigns a candour rating of moderately satisfactory (4) to the PCR.
95. Taking all four domains into consideration, the overall rating for PCR quality is moderately satisfactory (4). Since 2016, PMD has discontinued the ratings on PMD quality; therefore no rating comparison can be made.

V. Final remarks

96. The PCR identifies a number of lessons. The most prominent ones are summarized below.

Lessons learned

97. The PCRV concurs with the following main lessons identified by IEG²² which have been discussed or referred to in the implementation completion report as follows:
- Community procurement can increase community ownership and reduce costs for a village small-scale infrastructure programme, but needs practical accompanying features. RDP's community-driven development procurement system (PCR page 24) was in the end broadly successful, and was preferred by communities, but it had delays and cost-over-runs initially, requiring modifications during implementation to make it effective. In RDP's case (community procurement implementation features are likely to need tailoring to each project's circumstances) adjustments included: the PCU drawing up price lists of potential suppliers for distributing to communities; compilation of community choices of equipment or infrastructure to exploit reduced prices

²² IEG (2016) Implementation Completion Report Review, page 11.

from bulk buying; and, increased technical assistance through Community Helpers;

- Agricultural development needs improvements in commercialization as well as in agricultural technology. RDP focused agricultural extension on enhancing agricultural productivity. Better results would have come from also promoting agricultural marketing and processing (PCR page 43);
 - The public sector's role in service delivery may best be restricted to guidance and monitoring of services, rather than actual delivery of services, which could be provided through private channels. Overreliance on the public sector under RDP reduced opportunities for entry of the private sector. Agricultural extension costs financed from Government's operational budget may also become unsustainable over the longer term (PCR page 43); and
 - Community Driven Development Projects should have a longer term strategic vision that is matched to the capacity and expectation of the Bank's partner. Where phased projects build on an awareness of commitment over time, the project is more realistic in its ambition and focus.
98. Furthermore, both the PCR and the impact study suggest that for RDP II, there is an important need to improve both the scope of dissemination of agricultural advice as well as the take up rate upon receiving advice. The reason provided is a statistically significant relationship between receiving advice on agricultural practises and food security²³. According to the study, an increase in the information dissemination rate will lead to an increase in food security in the programme area and should therefore become a core priority for the second phase. The PCR further underlines the need for improvements in the commercialization of agricultural development and agricultural technology, as well as the promotion of marketing and processing – factors that prevented further results for food security and agricultural productivity during phase I.
99. The PCR would like to add the additional lesson that more implementation time, resources and flexibility to adapt to the local context should be allocated to Community Driven Development Projects, especially in cases where: (i) early in the programme it is recognized that design requires adaptation to obvious realities on the ground; (ii) the capacity of national and provincial institutions is weak (and therefore more investment is needed in programme management); (iii) remoteness and difficult conditions after period of conflict are an impediment; (iv) there is a weak private sector and NGO service provision.

²³ The impact study indicates that "1 percent increase in advice received is correlated with a 6 per cent decrease in the probability of being food insecure".

Definition and rating of the evaluation criteria used by IOE

Criteria	Definition *	Mandatory	To be rated
Rural poverty impact	Impact is defined as the changes that have occurred or are expected to occur in the lives of the rural poor (whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended) as a result of development interventions. <i>Four impact domains</i>	X	Yes
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Household income and net assets: Household income provides a means of assessing the flow of economic benefits accruing to an individual or group, whereas assets relate to a stock of accumulated items of economic value. The analysis must include an assessment of trends in equality over time. 		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Human and social capital and empowerment: Human and social capital and empowerment include an assessment of the changes that have occurred in the empowerment of individuals, the quality of grass-roots organizations and institutions, the poor's individual and collective capacity, and in particular, the extent to which specific groups such as youth are included or excluded from the development process. 		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Food security and agricultural productivity: Changes in food security relate to availability, stability, affordability and access to food and stability of access, whereas changes in agricultural productivity are measured in terms of yields; nutrition relates to the nutritional value of food and child malnutrition. 		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Institutions and policies: The criterion relating to institutions and policies is designed to assess changes in the quality and performance of institutions, policies and the regulatory framework that influence the lives of the poor. 		No
Project performance	Project performance is an average of the ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.	X	Yes
Relevance	The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, institutional priorities and partner and donor policies. It also entails an assessment of project design and coherence in achieving its objectives. An assessment should also be made of whether objectives and design address inequality, for example, by assessing the relevance of targeting strategies adopted.	X	Yes
Effectiveness	The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.	X	Yes
Efficiency	A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results.	X	Yes
Sustainability of benefits	The likely continuation of net benefits from a development intervention beyond the phase of external funding support. It also includes an assessment of the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the project's life.	X	Yes
Other performance criteria			
Gender equality and women's empowerment	The extent to which IFAD interventions have contributed to better gender equality and women's empowerment, for example, in terms of women's access to and ownership of assets, resources and services; participation in decision making; work load balance and impact on women's incomes, nutrition and livelihoods.	X	Yes
Innovation and scaling up	The extent to which IFAD development interventions: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) have introduced innovative approaches to rural poverty reduction; and (ii) have been (or are likely to be) scaled up by government authorities, donor organizations, the private sector and others agencies. 	X	Yes
Environment and natural resources management	The extent to which IFAD development interventions contribute to resilient livelihoods and ecosystems. The focus is on the use and management of the natural environment, including natural resources defined as raw materials used for socio-economic and cultural purposes, and ecosystems and biodiversity - with the goods and services they provide.	X	Yes
Adaptation to climate change	The contribution of the project to reducing the negative impacts of climate change through dedicated adaptation or risk reduction measures	X	Yes

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Definition</i> *	<i>Mandatory</i>	<i>To be rated</i>
Overall project achievement	This provides an overarching assessment of the intervention, drawing upon the analysis and ratings for rural poverty impact, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, gender equality and women's empowerment, innovation and scaling up, as well as environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change.	X	Yes
Performance of partners			
• IFAD	This criterion assesses the contribution of partners to project design, execution, monitoring and reporting, supervision and implementation support, and evaluation. The performance of each partner will be assessed on an individual basis with a view to the partner's expected role and responsibility in the project life cycle.	X	Yes
• Government		X	Yes

* These definitions build on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management; the Methodological Framework for Project Evaluation agreed with the Evaluation Committee in September 2003; the first edition of the Evaluation Manual discussed with the Evaluation Committee in December 2008; and further discussions with the Evaluation Committee in November 2010 on IOE's evaluation criteria and key questions.

Rating comparison^a

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Programme Management Department (PMD) rating</i>	<i>IOE Project Completion Report Validation (PCR) rating</i>	<i>Net rating disconnect (PCR-PMD)</i>
Rural poverty impact	5	4	-1
Project performance	4	4	0
Relevance	5	4	-1
Effectiveness	4	4	0
Efficiency	3	3	0
Sustainability of benefits	4	4	0
Project performance^b			
Other performance criteria			
Gender equality and women's empowerment	4	3	-1
Innovation and scaling up	5	5	0
Environment and natural resources management	4	4	0
Adaptation to climate change	4	4	0
Overall project achievement^c	4	4	0
Performance of partners^d			
IFAD	4	4	0
Government	4	4	0
Average net disconnect			-0.27

^a Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable.

^b Arithmetic average of ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.

^c This is not an average of ratings of individual evaluation criteria but an overarching assessment of the project, drawing upon the rating for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, rural poverty impact, gender, innovation and scaling up, environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change.

^d The rating for partners' performance is not a component of the overall project achievement rating.

Ratings of the project completion report quality

	<i>PMD rating</i>	<i>IOE PCR rating</i>	<i>Net disconnect</i>
Candour	n.p.	4	n.a.
Lessons	n.p.	5	n.a.
Quality (methods, data, participatory process)	n.p.	4	n.a.
Scope	n.p.	4	n.a.
Overall rating of the project completion report	n.p.	4	n.a.

Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable.

Abbreviations and acronyms

AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development
EA/ESMF	Environmental assessment/environment and social management framework
EU	European Union
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IDA	International Development Association
IOE	Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD
MAL	Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock
MDPAC	Ministry of Development Planning and Aid Coordination
MTR	Mid-term Review
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
O&M	Operation and Maintenance
PCR	Project Completion Report
PCR/V	Project Completion Report Validation
PCU	Project Coordination Unit
PMD	Programme Management Department of IFAD
RDP	Rural Development Programme
RIMS	Results and Impact Management System of IFAD
SBD	Solomon Islands Dollar
SIC	Subproject Implementation Committees

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