

## Project Completion Report Validation

### Market-oriented Smallholder Agriculture Project(MOSAP)

Republic of Angola

Date of validation by IOE November 2017

## I. Basic project data

			Approval (US\$ m)		Actual (US\$ m)	
Region	ESA	Total project costs	49.48		33.24	
Country	Angola	IFAD loan and percentage of total	8.20	16%	7.10	21.63%
Loan number	L-I--736-	Borrower: MINAGRI	4.12	9%	2.14	12.03%
Type of project (subsector)	Agricultural Development	Cofinancier 1: WB/IDA	30.10	63%	20.00	60.17%
Financing type	Loan	Cofinancier 2: Japan	4.02	8%	4.00	6.44%
Lending terms *	Highly Concessional	Beneficiaries	3.04	6%	0.00*	0%
Date of approval	13 Dec 2007	*Not measured				
Date of loan signature	16 Apr 2008					
Date of effectiveness	05 Nov 2009					
Loan amendments	1	Number of beneficiaries	126 000 50,000 (revised)		52 982	
Loan closure extensions	Three extensions, for a total of eighteen months					
Country programme managers	Abla Benhammouche, Carla Ferreira	Loan closing date	30 Sep 2014		31 Mar 2016	
Regional director(s)	Sana Jatta	Mid-term review (WB)			25 Feb 2013	
Project completion report reviewer	Jorge Carballo	IFAD loan disbursement at project completion (%)			85.2%	
Project completion report quality control panel	Tullia Aiazzi Simona Somma	Date of the project completion report (WB ICR)			20 Sep 2016	

Source: World Bank. Implementation Completion and Results Report; IFAD. Financial Management Dashboard.

\* The loan has a term of 40 years, including a grace period of 10 years, with a service charge of three fourths of one per cent (0.75 per cent) per annum.

## II. Project outline

1. **Introduction.** The Market Oriented Smallholder Agriculture Project (MOSAP) was approved by IFAD's board in December 2007 under the framework of IFAD 2005 Country Strategic Opportunities Programme (COSOP) and Angola's Poverty Reduction Strategy (2004-2008). The project was implemented through a partnership between IFAD, the World Bank and the Japanese government, and its rationale was based on the recognition that economic diversification in Angola requires massive investments in the agricultural sector. Therefore, the MOSAP project aimed to spur investments in this sector, and translate them into improved agriculture production through the provision of better services and investment support to rural farm households.
2. **Project area.** The project area consisted of 25 *Comunas* (municipalities) in 12 *Municípios* (districts) in the Provinces of Bié, Huambo and Malanje. The three provinces had been heavily affected by the civil war, which had caused smallholders to revert their production from markets to subsistence. The selection of the project area was guided by the following criteria: high agricultural potential, based on favourable ecological and climatic conditions; high population density; market access; existence of some supporting infrastructure; and potential synergies with other operations.
3. At the time of project design, the numbers of vulnerable rural people in the Central Highlands were very high. A 2005 World Food Programme survey in the Central Highlands identified high levels of vulnerable groups, most of whom depended on agriculture as their main source of livelihood. The survey found that 19 per cent of households were chronically food deficient, 30 per cent were considered to be highly vulnerable households, consuming just one insufficiently balanced meal per day, they had low asset ownership and were often female headed households. Another 19 per cent were moderately vulnerable, with more than one source of income, but still consuming just one meal a day.<sup>1</sup>
4. **Project goal, objectives and components.** The project's development objective was to increase the agricultural production of rural smallholders in selected *comunas* and *municípios* in the provinces of Bié, Huambo and Malanje through enhanced agricultural productivity and more efficient agricultural markets.
5. The specific objectives were:
  - a) improve capacity of farmers to access markets through market oriented training and technology adoption to increase farmer's long-term capacity to engage in markets;
  - b) improve productive infrastructure and assets for rural smallholder farmers through the financing of sub-projects in the form of matching grants for production, processing and marketing related assets ; and
  - c) increase agricultural production of participating smallholder farmers
6. Based on the Project strategic framework and design Matrix, activities were structured in three components: (i) capacity building, (ii) agricultural investment support; and (iii) project management.
7. **Target group.** The primary project target group for MOSAP were smallholder farmers who cultivated between 1 and 2 hectares of land under rain-fed conditions with the potential for expanding the size of their holdings to 2.5 hectares. This group would benefit from technical assistance to form or strengthen smallholder groups and associations, manage productive agricultural investments funded through the second components, and improve agricultural and marketing skills. The Project was also designed to indirectly benefit government institutions and service

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<sup>1</sup> MOSAP, appraisal report, 2008.

providers, particularly at the decentralized level. These included staff from the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAGRI) and its Agricultural Development Institute (ADI) at central, provincial and district level, who received training in, among others, extension methodology, participatory processes, agricultural techniques, to support project implementation.

8. **Financing.** The total project cost foreseen at the design stage was US\$49.48 million over six years of which US\$8 million were going to be financed by IFAD, 16.5 per cent; the World Bank US\$30.1 million, 60.8 per cent; Japan US\$4.0 million, 8.1 per cent; Angola Government US\$4.1 million, 8.3 per cent; beneficiaries US\$3.0 million, 6.1 per cent, in cash or kind). IFAD has contributed with a loan on highly concessional terms to help finance the Market-oriented Smallholder Agriculture Project, of which only 86.6 per cent (US\$7.18) was disbursed at the time of closure.

Table 1  
**Project costs: approved and disbursed amounts**

Financier	Appraisal (in 000' US\$)	Percentage of appraisal costs	Actual (in 000' US\$)	Percentage of actual cost	Percentage Disbursed
IFAD	8,200	16.57%	7,100	21.63%	86.59%
IDA/WB	30,099	60.83%	20,000	60.17%	66.45%
Japan	4,022	8.12%	4,000	12.03%	99.45%
Government	4,122	8.33%	2,140	6.44%	51.92%
Beneficiaries	3,036	6.13%	0	0.00%	0.00%
Total	49,479		33,240		

Source: IFAD, Historic Transaction Analysis Dashboard – Business Intelligence Unit.

Table 2  
**Component costs**

Component	Appraisal (in 000' US\$)	Percentage of appraisal costs	Actual (in 000' US\$)	Percentage of actual cost	Percentage Disbursed
1: Capacity Building	23,204.9	46.89%	13,844	42%	59.66%
2: Agricultural Investment Support	17,925.6	36.22%	10,704	32%	59.71%
3: Project Management	8,348.4	16.88%	8,692	26%	104.12%
Total	49,478.9		33,240		

Source: IFAD Investment Project Portfolio Dashboard – Business Intelligence Unit.

9. **Project implementation.** The MINAGRI was responsible for project implementation and delegated ADI for the management and oversight of the project. At the specific request of MINAGRI, a Project Implementation Unit (PIU) was established in ADI, including a Project Coordinator, a financial manager, a procurement specialist, communication specialist and an accountant (ADI staff), as well as a monitoring and evaluation officer. At the provincial level, MINAGRI was to establish three Provincial Project Implementation Units (PPIUs)<sup>2</sup> reporting to the ADI-based PIU, for the operational management of the project. The Ministry worked in collaboration with contracted service providers, including NGOs. The project implementation began 26 months after the Board's approval due to delays in the approval of the financing agreement within the Council of Ministers, in the provision of the legal opinion, in the finalization of the project's operations manual, and in hiring key fiduciary staff. Lack of implementation capacity in MINAGRI,

<sup>2</sup> Composed by a team of three technical staff, including an agronomist, an agribusiness specialist and a rural infrastructure specialist, was to be based at provincial level (one based in each province).

compounded by weak PIU leadership for the first 2 years contributed to slow progress.

10. **Changes and developments during implementation.** The main changes in the project design during project implementation were a result of the reduction of funds by the World Bank and an unexpected rise in operational costs in the country, due to increasingly unfavourable exchange rates for the Angolan Kwanza. The reduction in scale in component 2 resulted in more than halving the number of targeted beneficiaries, which went from 126,000 farmers to 50,000 farmers. Outcome indicators were also revised accordingly. The closing date was postponed by a total of 18 months beyond the original closing date. Overall, the project went through 4 main restructurings:
  - (i) The first restructuring took place in February 2013 when the IDA Credit was partially cancel for a total amount of US\$10 million in order to match the project's implementation capacity more realistically with the time available;
  - (ii) The second restructuring took place in September 2014 and the main objective to extend the project closing date for a period of 15 months, from September 30, 2014 to December 31, 2015;
  - (iii) A third restructuring was processed in December 2015 to extend the project closing date for a period of three months, from December 31, 2015 to March 31, 2016;
  - (iv) In March 2016 the project was restructured to advance the closing date of IFAD co-financing Loan Agreement from June 30, 2016 to March 31, 2016 and to match the IDA and the Policy and Human Resources Development Co-financing closing dates.
11. **Intervention logic.** The World Bank involvement was intended to help facilitate a harmonized framework among donors for supporting smallholder agriculture in Angola. IFAD agreed to support MOSAP and work within the same framework to reduce possible duplication and improve the impact of development assistance. Also, IFAD's support offered the opportunity to access a considerable global experience and knowledge in supporting pro-poor agricultural development programs targeting smallholders through income generating activities. The co-financing arrangement with IFAD also aimed at strengthening potential for policy dialogue.
12. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)<sup>3</sup> played an important role by assisting ADI and its municipal offices for agricultural developments (EDAs) in establishing, through project component 1, an innovative participatory agricultural extension method known as Farmer Field School (FFS). Through the FFS, smallholder farmers could strengthen their technical and managerial skills, establish and strengthen their associations and cooperatives as well as of services providers<sup>4</sup> and other stakeholders involved in agricultural production. Component 1 aimed at developing the capacities of all stakeholders, to more effectively operate in a market-driven environment and to prepare for the agricultural investment support opportunities under component 2, Agricultural Investment Support.
13. Component 2 provided demand-based support, in the form of matching grants for sub-projects, addressed to rural communities and smallholder groups, to develop small-scale agricultural infrastructures, production, processing and marketing sub-projects.<sup>5</sup> The sub-projects were to be initiated upon the request of communities and smallholder farmer groups and should be prepared with the assistance of

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<sup>3</sup> FAO also were identified as service providers during the CSPE main mission.

<sup>4</sup> These were NGOs operating in the project's intervention area such as ADRA, CODESPA, AFRICARE and ADPP. They provided training and support to associations and cooperatives in three areas: i) community organization and leadership, production organization, technology and agro technology of some culture and literacy; (ii) elaboration of subprojects; and (iii) support in the marketing processes.

<sup>5</sup> Project appraisal document-MOSAP-2008.

service providers that were to be trained and equipped for this task through component 1. The sub-projects would then be screened for technical, financial, social and environmental feasibility, before approval for funding.

14. **Delivery of outputs.** Overall, the delivery of outputs was effective despite some initial delays. Under component 1, 54,982 smallholder farmers (110 per cent of the revised target) benefited from trainings on community organization and leadership, organization of production and agricultural techniques for maize, beans and Irish potatoes, and cassava; and 22,000 farmers among these were members of the Farmer Field Schools. The percentage of participating smallholder farmers in the project areas who belonged to farm organizations was overachieved by 100 percent (250 per cent of target). The ratio of smallholder farmer's organization to an extension officer was 12 (100 per cent of target).
15. Under component 2, the project financed 14,439 smallholder farmers (144 per cent of the revised target). 257 sub-project were financed (97 per cent of target) of which 46 per cent of sub-project were animal traction, 42 per cent were mechanization and seeds, and 12 percent were mills.

### III. Review of findings

16. This chapter focuses on the assessment of MOSAP, based on the evaluation criteria contained in the IFAD Evaluation Manual and on a detailed review of all relevant project documents, foremost on the implementation completion and results report (ICR) drafted by the World Bank. This project completion report validation (PCRVR) also benefited from the field visits conducted in Malanje, Huambo and Bié during the main mission in October-November 2017 for the Country Strategy and Programme Evaluation (CSPE) for Angola.

#### A. Core criteria

##### Relevance

17. **Relevance of objectives.** The project was aligned with the 2005 IFAD COSOP, the 2007 World Bank's Interim Strategy, and the 2003 Government's Poverty Reduction Strategy. These three strategies converged in focusing on the need to ensure food security and increase incomes, particularly among the most vulnerable groups in the food insecure areas of the Central Highlands. The strategies also created opportunities to strengthen public sector management and institutional capacity, to rebuild critical infrastructures and support delivery of public services for poverty reduction, and to promote growth of the agricultural sector.
18. The project development objective was maintained throughout the entire implementation period. Low national agricultural production and the need to import large quantities of food at a time when the national revenue from oil exports was dropping made it relevant for the project to focus on the improvement of food security and the revitalization of the rural economy in Angola. The project objective was aligned with the basic principles outlined in the food security and rural development section of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (2003) of the Government.
19. This PCRVR found that IFAD's strategies were highly relevant to the project's objectives. However, in areas such as gender, the CSPE mission identified that MOSAP lacked of a design revision to include gender-focused targets and objectives such as "enabling women and men to have equal voice and influence in rural institutions and organizations"<sup>6</sup> (this issue will be further explained in the section on gender).
20. **Relevance of design.** The project design focused on addressing the need to re-capitalize smallholder producers and re-activate market linkages to support broad-scale and sustainable agricultural production among smallholder farmers. The main

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<sup>6</sup> IFAD gender policy 2012

project components offer opportunities to address key challenges experienced by the target group in the project areas. The activities under component 1 were meant to create a foundation for component 2 through the strengthening of technical, institutional, managerial and marketing skills of smallholder farmers and their organizations. Relevant activities under the second component would contribute towards achieving the stated objective through the provision of demand-based support to rural communities and smallholder groups in the form of matching grants for small-scale agricultural infrastructure, production, processing and marketing sub-projects.

21. IFAD's contribution to the design document was mainly to targeting and the Fund insisted on including a targeting strategy as well as annexes about rural poverty and social inclusion. This targeting strategy firmly focused on the rural poor and on supporting smallholder agriculture. IFAD also encouraged the inclusion of specific activities targeted to women (e.g. functional literacy and access to water).
22. However, the design did not include critical arrangements to address input constraints. Seed and fertilizers were provided in limited quantities. Also, the design lacked maintenance arrangements for the equipment provided to producers such as grinding mills and consideration for veterinary services for farmers who received draught animals for facilitating ploughing, in areas where smallholders had little familiarity with cattle.
23. **Relevance of local needs.** The community demand-driven (CDD) approach adopted by MOSAP was seen as an important mechanism to support agricultural development for smallholders, and target income and employment generating activities for rural households in a way that empowered associations and possibly communities. The adoption of a CDD approach for the selection and implementation of the subprojects ensured that project beneficiaries had a say in determining the project activities that best meet their needs and that they would be willing to sustain.
24. **Overall,** IFAD's and WB's strategies and objectives were aligned with the Government's by targeting crucial issues in the most vulnerable areas in the central highlands, affected by the internal conflicts, such as the need to re-capitalize smallholder producers and re-activate market linkages. The structure and elements of the project design were coherent with the project's objectives. The CDD approach was relevant to empower communities and target their needs. Yet, the design did not make adequate provisions for some key issues such as sustainability of investments. Overall, balancing between areas of strength and gaps, this PCR rates relevance as **satisfactory (5)**, one point higher than the Programme Management Department of IFAD (PMD).

### **Effectiveness**

25. The analysis of the MOSAP effectiveness consists of measuring the extent to which project's objectives were achieved, compared to what was planned at the design stage. As previously mentioned in paragraph 10, the project conducted a revision of outcome targets after the partial cancellation of the WB's funds and indicators directly related to market access activities (i.e. smallholder farmers/smallholder vulnerable groups with contractual arrangements with agro businesses) were dropped from the project's results framework. Therefore, the analysis of effectiveness will be only based on the project's revised targets.
26. **Objective 1: improve capacity of farmers to access markets through market oriented training and technology.** The capacity development provided to farmers was driven by a market orientation and the opportunities to increase marketable surplus. The project trained 52,982 smallholder farmers (110 per cent of target). The introduction of farmer field schools (FFS) was a key project achievement. This methodology was developed by FAO and aimed at developing farmers' capacity, based on the principles of 'learning by doing' and comparing the

results obtained by applying the improved cropping techniques and those traditionally used by farmers. A total of 726 FFS were created in three provinces, comprising of 22,432 farmers' members (42 per cent of total beneficiaries), 66 trained extensions facilitators and 307 trained farmers' facilitators; 1,497 graduated as facilitators and 96 as community leadership, and about 2,252 benefitted from literacy and agribusiness.<sup>7</sup>

27. FFS were formed either from existing farmer's groups/associations or through new community mobilization activities. FFS should comprise about 25-30 farmers, who elect their leaders; as reported by the final impact assessment, group members considered that the FFS contributed to creating strong farmers' associations in their communities. FFS also contributed to develop farmers' capacity to understand why and how cropping techniques affected crop development. Extension workers, in turn, considered that FFS had enabled them to reach more farmers, and contributed to building up a close working relationship with the farmers.
28. The revised target of 50 per cent of participating smallholder farmers in the project areas who belong to farm organisations was overachieved, with 100 per cent membership of smallholders. In addition to the targets evaluated in the ICR, the final impact assessment highlights that the project's target was set to reach 20,000 beneficiaries adopting improved agricultural technology. At completion, the objective was overachieved in quantitative terms, reaching 161.5 per cent of target (32,300 beneficiaries), of which 42.7 per cent were women.
29. **Objective 2: improve productive infrastructure and assets for rural smallholder farmers.** The initial target of 7,200 farmers receiving support through the agricultural investment component was outnumbered by the final number of smallholders reached, that the ICR stated was to 12,344 (target overachieved by 71 per cent).
30. The project financed 257 sub-projects (investment based activities) of which 46 per cent (118) were animal traction; 42 per cent (109) were mechanization and seeds; and 12 per cent (30) were mills. These activities involved (a) provision of seeds for potatoes; maize, beans and fertilizers; (b) support in provision of assistance for mechanized land preparation covering over 1,500 ha and (c) provision of animal traction. At project completion, 90 per cent of the sub-projects were operational.
31. **Objective 3: increase agricultural production of participating smallholder farmers.** At design, the project targeted a 25 per cent increase in the crop production index (CPI). This target was revised in 2013, lowering it to a 10 per cent increase. At project completion, the project achieved a CPI of 166 or an increase of 66 percent, exceeding the overall revised target (changes in agricultural productivity will be further analysed under the impact section).
32. **Overall,** most of the revised project outcome targets were achieved and overachieved (in some cases). The improvement of farmers' production capacity and the adoption of new technologies were achieved through the implementation of FFS. Productive infrastructure and assets were provided through sub-projects under the agricultural investment component. 90 per cent of the sub-projects targeted at design were delivered and executed. Beneficiaries increased their crop production index by 66 per cent compared to the overall revised target. This PCRV nevertheless believes that revised targets with more challenging estimations were necessary to reach more beneficiaries and generate more outcomes, closer to what it was intended at design. This PCRV agrees with PMD and rates Effectiveness as **moderately satisfactory (4)**.

## Efficiency

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<sup>7</sup> The number of FFS implemented was not measured as a specific outcome indicator. However, this information is provided to better understand the extent of FFS coverage through the project.

33. The project was only declared effective on November 05, 2009 about 23 months after Board approval due to specific country requirements, including the need for the Loan Agreement to be approved by the Cabinet and the requirement that the approval be published in the Country's official bulletin. The completion of the baseline survey study was a disbursement condition for Component 2; however, it was only completed in January 2013 – two years after the project entered in force. For this reason, the implementation of activities under Component 2 were delayed and only started in 2013 leaving limited time for implementation.
34. Although the start-up was slow, eventually the PIU was able to significantly improve the pace of implementation from 2013 onward. The Project was restructured in February 2013 and was extended for an additional 18 months to make up for the delay at start-up. The main implementation challenges were the following: field technical team not in place in timely manner; lack of supply chain service providers (including high cost of doing business in Angola); lack of experience in engagement with local producers' organizations; limited availability of government programs to complement project activities.
35. At the time of project closure, the project only disbursed US\$7.18 million (86.5 per cent of total IFAD funds). In this regard, the project experienced slow disbursement rates reaching as much as 62 per cent of total IFAD funds one year before closure. Implementation under the second component was affected by delays in meeting disbursements conditions. This included establishing baseline values for key performance indicators and finalizing the data collection needed to guide sub-project investments. During the last year of implementation, the project managed to disburse 17 per cent of IFAD total funds thanks to an intensive implementation of Farmer Field Schools. The project saw significant reallocation of funds to components 1 and 3, with actual costs reaching 143 per cent and 154 per cent of appraisal estimates, respectively.
36. At design, project management cost (component 3) was estimated to be 18.8 per cent of the total project cost. At completion, project management costs absorbed 26 per cent of the total funds. This was mainly due to the higher costs of service provision than planned; and the project extension that demanded higher project coordination and management costs.
37. The Economic Internal Rate of Return (EEIR) was estimated at 21.1 per cent, but according to the ICR it was estimated at 13 per cent after the completion of the project. The lower estimation compared to the initial appraisal was due to the calculation of the former based on a shorter implementation time, as well as on lower costs for provision of services and goods, as well as wider beneficiary coverage. Nevertheless, with the opportunity cost of capital in Angola, at 12 per cent per year, the EEIR was still higher than the discount rate.
38. The main cause of implementation delays, that caused the loans extension for both WB and IFAD; the unbalanced disbursement rates; and the WB partial cancelation of US\$10 million of total funds; was the poor management capacity of the PIU in the first two years of project implementation. During this period, the project had difficulties to comply with disbursements requirements and implementation progress. Project performance and disbursement rates only improved with the third Project Coordinator, who was recruited during the second year of project life. Also, the implementation of FFS helped to boost disbursements during the third year.
39. **Overall**, MOSAP's efficiency lag was significantly long due to Government's internal procedures which took about 26 months. Initial implementation was slow and required a project restructuring in 2013 that helped to accelerate implementation. During the first three years, disbursement rates were low due to a lack of implementation of activities and understanding of disbursements processes. Project performance improved thank to the recruitment of a third project coordinator and



the full-scale implementation of FFS. Management costs at completion were almost two times (35.1) the estimates calculated at project design. This PCRV agrees with PMD and rates efficiency as **moderately unsatisfactory (3)**.

## **Rural poverty impact**

40. The ICR mentions that poverty impact was not analyzed in depth, due to the lack of quantitative data. This was the case for impact domains such as household income and assets. The ICR assesses poverty impact of MOSAP as positive; however, some of the statements do not seem to be based on strong evidence. The project conducted an "End of project impact evaluation survey" which provided relevant data, based on an analysis between the baseline and after completion data. This information was useful to assess some impact domains covered by this section.
41. **Household income and assets.** Neither the ICR nor the End of project Impact assessment reported data about impacts on household incomes. However, taking into consideration the agricultural productivity data available (see paragraph 47), it can be surmised that the project may have had a positive impact on farmers' incomes. Also, anecdotal information gathered from FFS members during the field visits of the CSPE, confirmed that part of the additional production obtained through the new cropping techniques, was sold in the local markets.
42. The investment on productive assets was one of the main pillars to achieve greater value addition and commercialization. Investment on productive assets such as grinding mills, mechanization, animal traction and small scale irrigation pumps were capable to improve the production capacity of 12,354 smallholder beneficiaries. By the time of the ICR mission, 90 per cent of sub-projects had been completed and were fully operational. With regards to the impacts of productive investments on farmers' incomes, the CSPE main mission only found recurrent evidence of positive impacts on incomes in FFS groups thanks to the availability of mechanized ploughing services that enabled the cultivation of larger group common fields; and the establishment of seed multiplication plots. Typically, part of the income from the sale of the produce from the common fields would be re-invested in the group's activity, and part would be distributed among members.
43. **Human and social capital and empowerment.** The MOSAP end of project impact evaluation survey reported an improvement of 212 per cent increase in the percentage of farmers who had become members of a local association; this against a control of 89 per cent. FFS have proved to be an effective platform for farmer organization and empowerment. The FFS methodology helped smallholder farmers with a common interest to gain increased production and productivity.
44. According to the final impact assessment, the proportion of farmers with association membership grew significantly, going from 27 per cent in 2012 to 87.1 per cent in 2015 in the target areas. Huambo and Bie reported the highest rates of growth going from 18.8 per cent and 26.4 per cent in 2012 to 92.0 per cent and 90.5 per cent in 2015, respectively. Malanje had the lowest difference in change going from 55.3 per cent in 2012 to 78.8 per cent in 2015. However, it has been taken into consideration that farmers in Malanje have had a longer tradition of association through cooperatives. In comparison, from 2012 to 2015, the percentage of farmers who are members of local association in targeted areas was 112 per cent higher than control areas.
45. FFS offer an opportunity to members to learn technical issues, to discuss community issues and to develop social capital. The membership of a respected group in the community is in itself, a first step towards empowerment, of particular importance for women members. Furthermore, as already mentioned, some farmers were trained to become Master trainers, or Master facilitators; both are key roles in the FFS extension approach that open-up opportunities for employment, in addition to strengthening the incumbents' profiles in the respective communities. Most importantly, in those FFS that benefitted of functional literacy courses, all participants went through a significant empowerment process. At the same time, the FFS methodology should progressively develop to make

membership attractive for young people, and to strengthen the participation of women in leadership roles as well.

46. **Food security and agricultural productivity.** The ICR states that, even though detailed analysis of impacts on poverty was not undertaken as part of the project, the baseline level of production captured in project surveys indicated that many beneficiaries were operating at basic levels of subsistence production. As already mentioned, the evidence provided by the ICR showed that the crop productivity index (an aggregated measure of the increase in crop production across four commodities supported by the projects) had a positive trend in real terms.
47. The results reflected in the final impact assessment showed that yields among farmers increased among both, beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, though the increase in non-beneficiaries was very low. A difference-in-difference analysis<sup>8</sup> was also conducted to capture the actual improvement in crop yields of targeted areas compared to control areas. The results showed that the highest net increase in yield was in maize with net increase of 0.14 t/ha (33 per cent higher than baseline yield values), followed by potato with a net increase of 1.27 t/ha (32 per cent higher than baseline), beans at 0.06 t/ha (20 per cent higher than baseline) and cassava 2.19 t/ha (13 per cent higher than baseline). These results are all above target levels. Even though project gains in production exceeded targets, the low levels of production during baseline mean that absolute gains were small in some cases.
48. The CSPE mission found almost systematic evidence during its interactions with FFS members that their food security has improved. However, this evidence needs to be taken with caution given that it cannot be attributed to the project alone. The increases in production provided more food for the households and generated incomes useful for household improvements, medicines, school for children. Improvements in production however were far from being uniform across all project areas; with FFS in some districts struggling to achieve improved yields due to drought and to the gradual deterioration of soils and seeds.
49. **Institutions and policies.** The main impact of MOSAP I at this level, was the official adoption of the FFS approach as the national agricultural extension methodology. FFS had already been introduced by FAO in Angola thorough the Special Programme for Food Security in the early 2000s, and possibly even earlier. However, it was only with MOSAP that the approach was scaled up to a level that tangibly showed its strengths in developing farmers' capacities for increased food security and agricultural production, and in supporting the establishment and strengthening of local producers' associations. These being all key objectives of the Government of Angola, the ADI's decision to adopt FFS nationwide appeared very relevant and coherent. Furthermore, the rigour in the application of the FFS approach through MOSAP is noteworthy.<sup>9</sup>
50. Within the FFS approach, the project aimed at improving the quality of support and technical assistance farmers would receive from the relevant Government organizations. The spear-head of the system were to be the Agricultural Development Offices at the municipal level (district) (ADI/EDAs), which would see an increase in the front level staff, i.e. extension supervisors and agents who would interact directly with farmers.
51. A total of 88 government extension agents attended trainings on improved production techniques, FFS methodology, management, etc. In turn, the extension officer working with FFS groups, supported farmers in developing their own

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<sup>8</sup> Both, targeted and control areas' differences were calculated by subtracting the yields (t/ha) of the baseline from end line.

<sup>9</sup> For example, the adoption of the three cycles approach to graduation of FFS, as envisaged in the original design of FFS, is undoubtedly costly but is also a basic feature ensuring the long-term benefits and sustainability of the methodology.

knowledge and capacity. The FFS approach enabled the establishment of a solid relationship between the extension systems and farmers' groups. Reportedly, extension agents stated that their role had gradually changed from teaching to facilitation.

52. **Overall**, members of FFS benefitted of an increase in their household income and assets, mainly through the increase in crop productivity and production and some of the sub-projects. However, changes in incomes were not assessed by the ICR or by the impact assessment, thus only qualitative and anecdotal information is available. Association membership grew exponentially during project implementation, and members developed their skills and capacities on a number of themes. However, MOSAP FFS approach lacked to some extent in the outreach capacity to include young people in the farmers' associations, and in the efforts required to raise women's profiles in the groups. Further, MOSAP over performed the productivity targets set at design for the four selected crops. However, the impact results showed that the low levels of productivity at baseline meant that absolute gains were small in some cases. The implementation of FFS improved the institutional capacity at the municipal level. This PCRV agrees with PMD and rates rural poverty impact as **moderately satisfactory (4)**.

### **Sustainability of benefits**

53. The adoption by ADI of the FFS as the national extension system is a strong evidence that the MOSAP approach in this regard was sustainable. The CSPE found evidence that farmer field schools established by MOSAP I continued to function, supported by the local extension officer, when MOSAP I came to a close in March 2016 and before MOSAP II was launched in early 2017. The CSPE was also told of FFS that were established in provinces outside the project area, by extension officer who had been trained by MOSAP I and had been transferred since. It remains to be seen to what extent ADI itself will be able to upscale the approach to the rest of the country, also without financial support from partners.
54. The long-term sustainability of project achievements on productivity and production will largely rely on the opportunities that farmers will have to access markets for their production, raw or transformed, and whether this will generate sufficient profits to justify the additional efforts required to produce a surplus. This will largely depend on the extent to which national policies will contribute to making agriculture an attractive sector of employment. This will range from the availability of inputs, infrastructures and services in rural areas, to the actual urban-rural terms of trade, to the national discourse on agriculture and smallholder agriculture. At the time of project completion, the country's weak supply chains and high margins at the retail level still favoured cheap agricultural imports and resulted in low prices for smallholder farmers. In such an environment, yield and production increases by smallholder farmers may not always result in improved incomes.
55. With regards to the technical sustainability of the innovation introduced through the FFS, sustainability appeared to be strong. The final impact assessment showed positive adoption rates of improved farming practices in the last three years of the project, which lead to the adoption of the method as the national agricultural extension methodology. One clear example was the seed selection practices, adopted by almost 100 per cent of the farmers. The CSPE found that several of the practices and techniques learned through the FFS were being used in the common fields that belonged to the groups, but much less so in the individual fields. More analysis would be necessary to understand the constraints that farmer face in the latter, which could range from labour availability to risk-aversion at the individual level, and identify ways to overcome these.
56. Finally, at project completion, MOSAP had financed a total of 257 sub-projects of which 227 (88 per cent) were still operational. The ICR stated that out of these,

132 (51 per cent) were operating normally and 95 (37 per cent) with some deficiencies. There were 24 sub-projects (9 per cent) still under execution and 6 (2 per cent) were non-operational or abandoned. Evidence available to the CSPE main mission was that whereas the mechanization and seeds subprojects were generating sufficient returns to the groups to be sustainable if the group decided to continue, sustainability for the other categories of subprojects was highly variable. Both animal traction and mills subprojects suffered from poor design, including under-estimation of technical and organizational challenges, and lack of adequate support and follow-up.

57. In light of the above, this PCRV rates the sustainability of benefits **moderately satisfactory (4)**, one point higher than PMD.

## **B. Other performance criteria**

### **Innovation**

58. According to the MOSAP President's Report, innovations in the context of Angola would include the establishment of community-driven participatory processes to identify local needs for small-scale agricultural investments, to be funded through matching grants; capacity-building of private-sector service providers and improved linkages with other development interventions, particularly those supporting decentralization.
59. The ICR concluded that smallholder farmers, who benefited from the project, had shown a potential to adapt, adopt, and innovate. According to the Decision Tree Analysis (DTA) presented in the ICR, the training provider is a strong determinant of adoption and productive innovation. It was found that farmers who received training in FFS, in association with the local Agricultural Development Stations (EDA) extension officers, were highly likely to adopt the technology and to innovate their productive processes. Also previous knowledge of the new technologies introduced plays an important role in spurring adoption.
60. FFS are undoubtedly the most important innovation introduced by the project, as a participatory agricultural extension method. In the view of ADI, also the technical improvements conveyed to farmers through the FFS on the four selected crops, represented a significant innovation for Angolan farmers. And, as inferred by the final impact assessment, farmers found that the improved farming practices were actually beneficial, which was the key reason for their adoption. The PCRV agrees with PMD and rates innovation as **moderately satisfactory (4)**.

### **Scaling up**

61. As in the Project Appraisal Document from the World Bank, the scaling-up approach conceived at the design stage consisted of promoting a participatory approach to small-scale agricultural investments.
62. However, the IFAD's Operational Framework for Scaling Up focuses on how successful local initiatives can sustainably leverage policy changes, additional resources and learning to bring the results to scale; under this interpretation of scaling up, the project facilitated a harmonized framework among donors for supporting smallholder agriculture in Angola. As stated in the ICR, the project offered a framework to attract and work with other development agencies active in smallholder agriculture in Angola.
63. Furthermore, MOSAP I supported the adoption of the FFS as the national extension system, and this is being replicated through a number of on-going projects by the World Bank (MOSAP II) and FAO, and will be replicated through the recently approved IFAD's projects Smallholder Agriculture Development and Commercialization Project in Cuanza Sul and Huila Provinces (SAMAP) and the Agricultural Rehabilitation project (ARP) in the southern provinces of the country. As already mentioned, at the time of writing this report, the capacity and

willingness of ADI and MINAGRI to systematically upscale the FFS approach with its own resources to the entire country, was not yet assured.

64. This PCRV rates scaling up as **moderately unsatisfactory (3)**, one point lower than PMD.

### **Gender equality and women's empowerment**

65. Project completion data indicate that 56 per cent of FFS members were women, and that 43 percent of the farmers who "adopted an improved agricultural technology promoted by project" were also women. The high levels of membership of women in FFS partly originated in the methodology itself; nevertheless the main reason was that in the traditional gender division of labour in rural Angola, women have a strong responsibility in agricultural production.
66. Although MOSAP I stated quite firmly at design stage the need for a gender-sensitive approach to capacity development, and that gender-training and awareness raising would be part of the curriculum at institutional and community levels, the project did not develop a different approach or activities to address the specific challenges or problems faced by women farmers and members of FFS. The only activity that addressed a characteristic women's practical need were the cereal mills sub-projects that have a direct positive impact on women's time. However, as already mentioned, the feasibility and sustainability of some subprojects (mills and animal traction) were quite weak, and supply did not match demand.
67. The planned functional literacy and numeracy trainings would have been another positive step in this direction, as women tend to have lower levels of literacy than men; still, this also was planned as a 'gender-neutral' activity and in any case, only few FFS groups benefitted of it under MOSAP I. Interestingly, in all the FFS met by the CSPE main mission, the associations' treasurers were always women, even when they defined themselves as 'unable to write and read'.
68. The limited attention to gender issues led to gender imbalances in the leadership of farmer associations; on average across the three provinces, 10.5 per cent of associations' leaders were women, despite their majority presence as members. The female leaders tended to be heads-of-households; final impact assessment interestingly noted that "the spouses, or women in conventional marriages, may have little chance of ascribing to leadership positions". A positive step in this regard was that women took seats in the subprojects selection and approval committees; the CSPE main mission nevertheless found mixed evidence in terms of the capacity of FFS female members to make their voices heard in the groups; and this was likely to be the same at the level of said committees.
69. A possible reason for the project shortcomings in this important area of work, was the lack of a gender specialist in the project PIU and PPIUs. The presence of community development specialists in the Units, typically a man, was not enough to ensure that more attention would be given to gender equality issues, and the simple majority of female members in the groups were taken as good enough.
70. **Overall**, the majority of farmers participating in the project's activities were women. However, the project did not address women's specific needs, nor promoted the participation and inclusion of women in leadership position within their farmers associations. The addition of a gender specialist in the project team would have been necessary to identify these issues and to promote activities to address women's needs and gender inequalities. This PCRV rates gender equality and women's empowerment as **moderately unsatisfactory (3)**, one point lower than PMD.

## **Environment and natural resources management**

71. An Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) was prepared in 2008 as part of the design of MOSAP and was updated in July 2012 to include several mitigation measures that had not been included in 2008. Approvals of subprojects generally followed established procedures and were based on the verification that the subproject had no environmental impact, or in the case of adverse and significant impact, contained measures or actions to mitigate or prevent these impacts.
72. Moreover, projects that had a positive impact on the environment, such as erosion control and reforestation were considered as having high public value and were granted a funding ratio set at 90 per cent project contribution and 10 per cent beneficiary contribution. However, environmental management suffered from the lack of human capital and technical capacity. The project had only one environmental assistant at the provincial level. The CSPE main mission noticed that issues related to sustainable environmental management were not well incorporated in the activities of MOSAP and there was no evidence of awareness or knowledge developed on these issues among the farmers. Nevertheless, farmers typically raised concerns about dwindling water resources, erratic rainfalls, and decreasing soil fertility.
73. **Overall**, at project completion, environmental risks were considered low given the cropping techniques proposed, as well as the investment subproject, were all small scale and would not have created cumulative negative impacts. However, it can be argued that the increased use of mechanisation and fertilisers might induce soil degradation even on a small scale. Also, the project had limited staff to cover environmental issues as well as limited technical capacity. There were significant issues that were not properly addressed by the project such as water scarcity, soil fertility and types of fertilizers proposed. This PCRV rates environment and natural resources management as **moderately unsatisfactory (3)**, one point lower than PMD.

## **Adaptation to climate change**

74. Adaptation to climate change was not directly addressed by MOSAP. Since the time of project approval however, climate change started to affect rainfall patterns also in the Central Highlands of Angola, with a direct impact on agricultural production. For this reason, the SAMAP project funded by IFAD, which represents the MOSAP II in new provinces, aims to mainstream environmental considerations and climate smart agriculture (CSA) practices into the project implementation through investments in more efficient use of water resources, promotion of soil conservation techniques, and integrated natural resource management.
75. This PCRV agrees with PMD and rates adaptation to climate change as **moderately unsatisfactory (3)**.

## **C. Overall project achievement**

76. The project's design focused on technical training, producer organizational development and community driven development modalities in order to achieve increased productivity and production. It also focused on the need to re-capitalize smallholder producers and re-activate market linkages to support broad-scale and sustainable agricultural production among smallholder farmers who comprised the majority of the rural population.
77. The project was able to strengthen the technical, institutional and managerial skills of smallholders and their organizations. Through the implementation of the Farmer Field Schools, MOSAP enhanced smallholder farmer's capacity to generate and use new knowledge and improve agricultural practices and technologies. Through the FFS, MOSAP contributed to improve the productivity and production levels of

smallholder farmers engaged in four different crops: maize, cassava, beans, and potato. The FFS also allowed farmers to enhance their organizational capacity.

78. At the institutional and policy level, MOSAP I led to the adoption of the FFS approach as the national agricultural extension system, based on a rigorous application of the model that ensures its long-term sustainability. The institutional capacity of ADI, in terms of transport means, infrastructures and above all, human resources, was also greatly enhanced.
79. This PCRV agrees with PMD and rates the overall project achievement as **moderately satisfactory (4)**.

#### **D. Performance of partners**

80. **IFAD.** During the major part of the project's life, IFAD operated under the business model whereby implementation support and supervision was often undertaken as joint WB-IFAD missions. In addition, one of IFAD's main operational engagement was to approve proposals on reallocations between expenditure categories. The implementation support/supervision of MOSAP allowed for course corrections and adjustments to design. According to the ICR, the joint team displayed flexibility and was proactive addressing implementation bottlenecks.
81. IFAD was active in MOSAP since the project's initial design, thanks to the active contribution of a national agriculture expert, who 'represented' the organization in Angola starting in 2005, who was recruited by IFAD as a consultant 'when actually employed', with an annual contract that came to an end in 2013, based on mutual agreement. The expert represented IFAD in all WB's supervision missions and provided technical and strategic support to the PIU, as and when requested. The collaboration, which was assessed as highly positive by stakeholders, enabled IFAD to bring to bear its development view and focus on poverty, into MOSAP.
82. IFAD's participation in MOSAP was somewhat less intense from headquarters. Between 2008 and 2016, IFAD assigned at least five Country Programme Managers (CPM) to Angola. This relatively high turn-over, and the 'minority partner status' of IFAD in MOSAP did not facilitate a close engagement of CPMs in the project. In more recent times, however, the current CPM did engage in organizing IFAD's contribution to the MOSAP/ICR, where the Fund's main operational role was to approve proposals on reallocations between expenditure categories.
83. This PCRV agrees with PMD and rates IFAD's performance as **moderately satisfactory (4)**.
84. **Government.** According to the ICR, the government at the municipal and provincial level demonstrated high level of ownership. On the other hand, project performance was affected by the 26-months delay for effectiveness. The lack of familiarity with the bank modalities caused delays in implementation which impacted directly on project results. At project completion, only US\$2.1 million (47 per cent) from government's counterpart had been delivered. Some institutional and policy issues at government level had repercussions on the project performance, namely: the low accuracy and timeliness of government statistics to allow for more informed decision making and the limited ability of senior staff to address structural constraints through promoting agricultural sector policy dialogue.
85. Some of the delays experienced at the initial stages of implementation were partly due to the lack of qualified procurement staff, as well as weakness in project coordination. Overall, during the first years of project's implementation, the attention of the Government to the project was limited. However, project performance improved when key senior staff with the right level of skills and competences were recruited and took over the project management.



86. This PCRV rates Government performance as **moderately unsatisfactory (3)**, one point lower than PMD.

#### **IV. Assessment of PCR quality<sup>10</sup>**

##### **Scope**

87. The ICR covers most of the key aspects of the project. Annexes and tables were clear and presented relevant data to have a wider picture of the whole project. However, some parts such as the “assessment of outcomes” were not very well structured. Some sections of the report (i.e. efficiency) did not provide sufficient data to better understand some of the key issues during project implementation. This PCRV rates the ICR scope as **moderately satisfactory (4)**.

##### **Quality**

88. Overall, the ICR is well written and provides an overview of project main achievements and deficiencies. The report provides a good description of the project and its different activities. Some of the financial data presented in the completion report are not accurate and inconsistent with other data in different sections and annexes. The impact section provides extensive data on productivity, however, quantitative data on income and food security was limited. The ICR was WB oriented and misses the opportunity to analyse some of the most relevant issues that are covered by IFAD’s strategy (i.e. gender and innovation). In some cases the report does not present quantitative data related to targets and results. This PCRV rates the quality of the ICR as **moderately unsatisfactory (3)**.

##### **Lessons**

89. The report provides an important compilation of lessons learned from all key partners (IFAD, WB, MINAGRI, and the PIU), which covers various areas such as design, implementation, sustainability, environment and natural resource management, and efficiency. This PCRV rates the ICR’s lessons learned as **satisfactory (5)**.

##### **Candour**

90. The ICR narrative provides a fair balance between the project’s positive and negative results in most of the sections. However, sections such as Gender and Government’s performance could have been analyzed more in depth. This PCRV rates the ICR’s candour as **moderately satisfactory (4)**.

#### **V. Lessons learned**

##### **Lessons learned**

91. The Farmer Field Schools (FFS) approach to agricultural extension was successful in raising the productivity of some important crops for smallholder farmers, and the latter’s capacity to increase production. Participation in the FFS enabled smallholder households to produce more, and generate a surplus that can be marketed. In addition, the FFS approach has significantly contributed to establish and strengthen farmers’ associations. Several farmers also were trained to become master trainers or master facilitators, which opened up opportunities for employment and additional income.
92. The absence of an exit strategy at design and during implementation could have negatively affected the sustainability of some project’s results, as the delays in project implementation and the decision to abolish the marketing component had affected the possibility to develop the capacity of farmers’ and their associations with regards in particular with regards to transform and sell the surplus production in a more profitable manner. The World Bank’s decision to engage in a second

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<sup>10</sup> The completion report was written by the World Bank and will be referred as Implementation Completion Report (ICR).

phase of MOSAP filled this major gap and opened the way to strengthening associations and farmers' capacities alike.

93. Even though MOSAP was successful in involving large numbers of women to participate in the FFS, this mainly originated in the traditional gender division of labour in rural Angola, whereby women have a strong responsibility in agricultural production. Little, if any, efforts were made towards empowering women and accessing leadership positions in the associations. The few positive cases in this sense should be publicized and promoted as examples across FFS. The inclusion of a gender specialist in the PIU, in addition to the community development expert, would be necessary to identify specific issues and provide effective solutions to improve gender equality and women's empowerment.

## Definition and rating of the evaluation criteria used by IOE

Criteria	Definition *	Mandatory	To be rated
<b>Rural poverty impact</b>	Impact is defined as the changes that have occurred or are expected to occur in the lives of the rural poor (whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended) as a result of development interventions.	X	Yes
	<i>Four impact domains</i>		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Household income and net assets: Household income provides a means of assessing the flow of economic benefits accruing to an individual or group, whereas assets relate to a stock of accumulated items of economic value. The analysis must include an assessment of trends in equality over time.</li> </ul>		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Human and social capital and empowerment: Human and social capital and empowerment include an assessment of the changes that have occurred in the empowerment of individuals, the quality of grass-roots organizations and institutions, the poor's individual and collective capacity, and in particular, the extent to which specific groups such as youth are included or excluded from the development process.</li> </ul>		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Food security and agricultural productivity: Changes in food security relate to availability, stability, affordability and access to food and stability of access, whereas changes in agricultural productivity are measured in terms of yields; nutrition relates to the nutritional value of food and child malnutrition.</li> </ul>		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Institutions and policies: The criterion relating to institutions and policies is designed to assess changes in the quality and performance of institutions, policies and the regulatory framework that influence the lives of the poor.</li> </ul>		No
<b>Project performance</b>	Project performance is an average of the ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.	X	Yes
Relevance	The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, institutional priorities and partner and donor policies. It also entails an assessment of project design and coherence in achieving its objectives. An assessment should also be made of whether objectives and design address inequality, for example, by assessing the relevance of targeting strategies adopted.	X	Yes
Effectiveness	The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.	X	Yes
Efficiency	A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results.	X	Yes
Sustainability of benefits	The likely continuation of net benefits from a development intervention beyond the phase of external funding support. It also includes an assessment of the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the project's life.	X	Yes
<b>Other performance criteria</b>			
Gender equality and women's empowerment	The extent to which IFAD interventions have contributed to better gender equality and women's empowerment, for example, in terms of women's access to and ownership of assets, resources and services; participation in decision making; work load balance and impact on women's incomes, nutrition and livelihoods.	X	Yes
Innovation	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have introduced innovative approaches to rural poverty reduction.	X	Yes
Scaling up	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have been (or are likely to be) scaled up by government authorities, donor organizations, the private sector and others agencies.	X	Yes
Environment and natural resources management	The extent to which IFAD development interventions contribute to resilient livelihoods and ecosystems. The focus is on the use and management of the natural environment, including natural resources defined as raw materials used for socio-economic and cultural purposes, and ecosystems and biodiversity - with the goods and services they provide.	X	Yes
Adaptation to climate	The contribution of the project to reducing the negative impacts of climate	X	Yes

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Definition</i> *	<i>Mandatory</i>	<i>To be rated</i>
change	change through dedicated adaptation or risk reduction measures.		

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Definition</i> *	<i>Mandatory</i>	<i>To be rated</i>
<b>Overall project achievement</b>	This provides an overarching assessment of the intervention, drawing upon the analysis and ratings for rural poverty impact, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, gender equality and women's empowerment, innovation, scaling up, as well as environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change.	X	Yes
<b>Performance of partners</b>			
• IFAD	This criterion assesses the contribution of partners to project design, execution, monitoring and reporting, supervision and implementation	X	Yes
• Government	support, and evaluation. The performance of each partner will be assessed on an individual basis with a view to the partner's expected role and responsibility in the project life cycle.	X	Yes

\* These definitions build on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management; the Methodological Framework for Project Evaluation agreed with the Evaluation Committee in September 2003; the first edition of the Evaluation Manual discussed with the Evaluation Committee in December 2008; and further discussions with the Evaluation Committee in November 2010 on IOE's evaluation criteria and key questions.

## Rating comparison<sup>a</sup>

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Programme Management Department (PMD) rating</i>	<i>IOE Project Completion Report Validation (PCRVR) rating</i>	<i>Net rating disconnect (PCRVR-PMD)</i>
<b>Rural poverty impact</b>	4	4	0
<b>Project performance</b>			
Relevance	4	5	1
Effectiveness	4	4	0
Efficiency	3	3	0
Sustainability of benefits	3	4	1
<b>Project performance<sup>b</sup></b>	3.50	4	
<b>Other performance criteria</b>			
Gender equality and women's empowerment	4	3	-1
Innovation	4	4	0
Scaling up	4	3	-1
Environment and natural resources management	4	3	-1
Adaptation to climate change	3	3	0
<b>Overall project achievement<sup>c</sup></b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>0</b>

<b>Performance of partners<sup>d</sup></b>			
IFAD	4	4	0
Government	4	3	-1
<b>Average net disconnect</b>			<b>-2/12: -0.16</b>

<sup>a</sup> Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable.

<sup>b</sup> Arithmetic average of ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.

<sup>c</sup> This is not an average of ratings of individual evaluation criteria but an overarching assessment of the project, drawing upon the rating for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, rural poverty impact, gender, innovation, scaling up, environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change.

<sup>d</sup> The rating for partners' performance is not a component of the overall project achievement rating.

### Ratings of the project completion report quality

	<i>PMD rating</i>	<i>IOE PCRVR rating</i>	<i>Net disconnect</i>
Candour	n/a	4	n/a
Lessons	n/a	3	n/a
Quality (methods, data, participatory process)	n/a	5	n/a
Scope	n/a	4	n/a

Overall rating of the project completion report

Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable.

## Abbreviations

ADI	Agricultural Development Institute
CDD	community demand-driven
COSOP	country strategic opportunities programme
CPI	crop production index
EDA	Agricultural Development Stations at Municipal Level
ESA	East and Southern Africa Division
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
ICR	Implementation Completion and Results Report
IDA/WB	International Development Association/World Bank
IOE	Independent Office of Evaluation
MINAGRI	Ministry of Agriculture
MOSAP	The Market Oriented Smallholder Agriculture Project
PCR	project completion report
PCRV	project completion report validation
PIU	Project Implementation Unit
PMD	Programme Management Department of IFAD

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