

Project Completion Report Validation

District Livelihoods Support Programme (DLSP)

Republic of Uganda

Date of validation by IOE: March 2017

I. Basic project data

			Approval (US\$ m)		Actual (US\$ m)	
Region	Eastern and Southern Africa	Total project costs	50.9		50.6	
Country	Uganda	IFAD loans and percentage of total	45.44	89.4%	45.1	89.1%
		IFAD grants and percentage of total	2.4	4.7%	2.4	4.7%
Loan/grant numbers	Initial loan: LI-707 Initial grant: GIC-895 Suppl. loan: LI-783 Suppl. grant: GIC-1164	Borrower contribution and percentage of total	2.4	4.7%	2.4	4.7%
Type of project (subsector)	Rural development	Cofinancier 1 (BSF)	0			
Financing type	Loans and grants	Cofinancier 2				
Lending terms*	Highly concessional	Cofinancier 3				
Date of approval	December 2006	Cofinancier 4				
Date of loan signature	August 2007	Beneficiaries' contribution and percentage of total	0.6	1.2%	0.6	1.2%
Date of effectiveness	October 2007	Other sources				
Loan amendments	1	Number of beneficiaries	200 000 households		329 000 households	
Loan closure extensions	One, for two months					
Country programme managers	Marian Bradley Alessandro Marini	Loan closing date	June 2015		26 October 2016	
Regional director(s)		Mid-term reviews			June 2012	
Project completion report reviewer	Ernst Schaltegger	Overall IFAD financing disbursement at project completion (%)			99.55	
Project completion report quality control panel	Michael Michel Carbon Fabrizio Felloni	Date of the project completion report			December 2015	

Source: Presidents' Report, Project Completion Report (PCR).

* There are four types of lending terms: (i) special loans on highly concessional terms, free of interest but bearing a service charge of three fourths of one per cent (0.75%) per annum and having a maturity period of 40 years, including a grace period of 10 years; (ii) loans on hardened terms, bearing a service charge of three fourths of one per cent (0.75%) per annum and having a maturity period of 20 years, including a grace period of 10 years; (iii) loans on intermediate terms, with a rate of interest per annum equivalent to 50 per cent of the variable reference interest rate and a maturity period of 20 years, including a grace period of five years; (iv) loans on ordinary terms, with a rate of interest per annum equivalent to one hundred per cent (100%) of the variable reference interest rate, and a maturity period of 15-18 years, including a grace period of three years.

II. Project outline

1. The District Livelihoods Support Programme (DLSP) was approved by the IFAD Board in December 2006 for a planned duration of seven years. Total programme cost amounted to US\$38.98 million, with an estimated IFAD loan of US\$27.4 million and an IFAD grant of US\$280,000. At the outset, the Belgian Survival Fund (BSF) was expected to cofinance the equivalent of US\$4.95 million. This financier withdrew by 2009 without any disbursement. No reasons are given that justified the withdrawal of BSF, either in the President's Report of 2009 or in the Project Completion Report (PCR). A cross-check of the mid-term Review (MTR)¹ and the 2012 supervision report² did not provide any answer in this respect. A possible reason could be that in 2006 the Human Development Index for Uganda surpassed 0.50, which is the cut-off point for eligibility for BSF financing (see also Paragraph 16). Building on a precursor operation, the District Development Support Programme (DDSP), whose impact in five districts of Uganda has been undeniable but somewhat difficult to prove for a lack of systematic statistical data, resulting in an overall impact rating of moderately satisfactory³, the DLSP was to scale up the approach to 13 districts. According to this evaluation, the impact of the provision of water sources, rural access roads and health centres was excellent and that of rural finance activities far exceeded measurable objectives. DLSP, based on the DDSP model, was to be executed through the local governance and financing system of Uganda and was expected to directly improve the livelihoods of 100,000 small farmers and poorer community members⁴.
2. In 2009, IFAD extended a supplementary loan and grant to DLSP⁵. The allocation defined for Uganda under the performance-based allocation system was US\$53 million over the 2007-2009 allocation cycle. The proposed supplementary loan and grant for DLSP was to support the successful activities of the Ministry of Local Government (MOLG) and to use part of the remaining balance of the allocation. With these supplements, total programme cost increased to US\$51.17 million, with a supplementary IFAD loan of US\$18 million and a supplementary IFAD grant of US\$2 million. In the basic programme data table above, the cumulative figures of the original loans and grants plus the supplementary financing are given, in accordance to the PCR.
3. The programme goal was to achieve a significant improvement in the standard and sustainability of livelihoods of rural poor households. Subordinated to this goal, two complementary objectives were formulated in the 2009 President's Report: (i) empowering rural households to increase their food security and incomes; and (ii) empowering local governments to deliver decentralized services to rural communities. The logical framework of the President's Report of 2009 defined the following programme components: (i) community access roads and infrastructure; (ii) agriculture and land management, including pilot land tenure activities; (iii) community development; (iv) district and subcounty execution; and (v) programme coordination including monitoring and evaluation. It is noteworthy that the denomination and resource allocation of these components was changed in comparison with the programme layout of 2006. The figures displayed in the table on basic project data follow the 2009 arrangement, against which the PCR⁶ is reporting. The most visible trait is that the first component related to community

¹ IFAD, Republic of Uganda, Ministry of Local Government. Mid-term review of the District Livelihood Programme (DLSP), Kampala, 30 June 2012.

² IFAD, Uganda. District Livelihood Support Programme (DLSP), Supervision Report, July 2012.

³ IFAD, Republic of Uganda, District Development Support Project, Completion Evaluation, Rome, 2005.

⁴ IFAD, President's Report, Proposed loan and grant to the Republic of Uganda, District Livelihood Support Programme, Rome, December, 2006.

⁵ IFAD, President's Report, Proposed supplementary loan and grant to the Republic of Uganda and modification to the financing agreement, District Livelihood Support Programme, Rome, December, 2009.

⁶ IFAD, Republic of Uganda, Ministry of Local Government. District Livelihood Support Programme (DLSP), Project Completion Report, Kampala, December 2015.

infrastructure gained in resource allocation with the supplementary loan and grant, up from 30 per cent of base cost to 48 per cent. Paragraph 47 revisits this significant shift of emphasis.

4. According to the 2009 President's Report for the supplementary loan and grant, the programme's resources were targeted towards the 30 per cent poorest subcounties in each district (approximately three to four subcounties per district or about 40 subcounties overall). DLSP also piloted a "household mentoring" methodology in which poorer households with potential were encouraged to examine their own problems and to develop solutions. As part of the household mentoring approach, household members joined clusters in order to build confidence and to gain access linked to mainstream development activities.
5. On the basis of the information provided by the PCR (Basic Information, Page 2), it is attempted to draw a table displaying the revised budget allocations based on the supplementary loan and grant per component, and the effective costs incurred by component. The currency is assumed to be thousands of US\$. It is possible that the physical and price contingencies have not been correctly factored in at project completion. In any case, the totals displayed in the PCR, and consequently in Table 1 below, do not correspond, either with the figures given in the table on basic project data or with the data in Table 1 below that shows the financing status at programme completion. It is, however, evident that overall disbursement, by all financiers, has been close to complete. Moreover, output delivery of DLSP (Paragraphs 8-10) suggests that most targets were achieved for all components. Table 2 displays a general comparison of final disbursements of the IFAD loan and grant, and of the borrower's and beneficiaries' contributions.

Table 1

Budgets and effective costs per component

<i>Component</i>	<i>IFAD</i>		<i>Beneficiaries</i>		<i>Government</i>		<i>Total</i>
	<i>Appraisal</i>	<i>Actual</i>	<i>Appraisal</i>	<i>Actual</i>	<i>Appraisal</i>	<i>Actual</i>	
Agricultural development	9,880	8,743	620	620	520	520	9,938
Community infrastructure	2,820	2,519	0	0	320	320	2,839
Community development	25,440	18,889	0	0	200	200	19,009
District and sub-county execution	4,800	3,585	0	0	690	690	4,275
Programme management	4,910	4,064	0	0	680	680	4,744
Contingencies	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	47,850	37,810	620	620	2,410	2,410	40,895

Source: PCR, Page 2.

Table 2

Financing (in USD '000)

<i>Source of funds</i>	<i>Estimates after loan amendment</i>	<i>Actual</i>	<i>Percentage of appraisal</i>
IFAD (loans)	45.4	45.1	99.3
IFAD (grants)	2.4	2.4	99.9
Government	2.4	2.4	100
Beneficiaries	0.6	0.6	100
TOTAL	50.9	50.6	99.4

Source: PCR, 2015, Paragraph 57, IFAD Oracle Business Intelligence database.

7. As mentioned in Paragraph 1, the intervention logic of DLSP built on a precursor project, the DDSP, which infers that the basic intervention model was already

tested, e.g. the use of the financial control, operational oversight and auditing arrangements put in place under DDSP, which have proven to be fully effective according to the President's Report of DLSP⁷. Effectiveness was however rated as only moderately satisfactory by the DDSP Project Completion Evaluation because the programme effectively did not sufficiently include the very poor⁸. The Uganda Country Programme Evaluation (CPE)⁹ noted that DDSP and DLSP applied a broader integrated rural development approach while another programme tandem had more narrow focus on rural infrastructure (roads and electricity) and processing/marketing equipment and structures. Thus, DLSP built on the anticipated synergy between upgrading community infrastructure, community and agricultural development as well as land management, including activities in land tenure, district and subcounty execution and programme coordination. This was to serve two complementary objectives: (i) to empower rural households to increase their food security and incomes; and (ii) to empower local government to deliver decentralized services (2009 President's Report). This is evident from the structure of the 2009 logical framework (Paragraph 3). The appraisal report (Paragraph 45) explicitly included lessons learnt, mainly from DDSP, into the design of DLSP, such as: (i) the strengthening of local government implementation capacity; (ii) targeting the active and motivated poor while devising specific instruments for equitable distribution of benefits; (iii) the fostering of rewarded development agents versus the reliance on voluntarism; (iv) the involvement of lower level agencies; (v) the adoption of a longer-term perspective; and (vi) taking note of financial constraints of local government entities. The 2009 President's Report contains assumptions on potential risks, the main risk identified being the non-participation of the poorest groups in mainstream development activities. The principal mitigation measure against this risk was household mentoring, whereby the poorest individual households were to be coached by community mentors to make them eligible and users of mainstream development activities and services. Another risk perceived was inadequate fiscal allocation by central government to assure sustainability at the level of local government entities. In this area, a structured dialogue between MOLG and IFAD was anticipated as an appropriate risk mitigation approach.

8. **Delivery of outputs.** Output delivery of DLSP is amply documented by the PCR in its Annex V. Against a target of 2,400 km of access roads rehabilitated, 2,087 km or 87 per cent are on record, and, out of 300 road committees to be formed, 270 are reported to be set-up at programme completion. All physical targets in terms of water supply infrastructure were met, benefitting close to 40,000 people and 8,000 cattle. Related to the road rehabilitation target, it is to be noted that the 2,400 km target was revised downwards to 1,700 km as a result of the supervision mission of June 2012¹⁰. However, the practically simultaneous programme MTR¹¹ maintained the target at 2,400 km, and so does the PCR.
9. Outputs in agricultural development and land management were relatively more constrained in terms of farmer trainings (around 70 per cent of the targets), but were compensated by the above-target provision of enterprise development and food security grants. Over 20,000 poor households benefitted from the household mentoring scheme. Similarly, all organizational and training activities under the land tenure subcomponent were realized, but with very modest tangible results (Paragraph 21).

⁷ IFAD. IFAD. President's Report, Proposed loan and grant to the Republic of Uganda, District Livelihood Support Programme, Rome, December, 2006.

⁸ IFAD. Republic of Uganda, District Development Support Project, Completion Evaluation, Rome, 2005.

⁹ IFAD. Republic of Uganda, Country Programme Evaluation, Rome, April 2013.

¹⁰ IFAD. Uganda. District Livelihood Support Programme (DLSP), Supervision Report, July 2012.

¹¹ IFAD, Republic of Uganda, Ministry of Local Government. Mid-term review of the District Livelihood Programme (DLSP), Kampala, 30 June 2012.

10. In terms of community development and local government execution, DLSP overwhelmingly overcomplicated targets in the training and coaching of local government officials, household mentors and functional adult literacy (FAL) trainers. The programme fully covered the 13 districts and 52 selected poorer subcounties identified for this purpose.

III. Review of findings

11. Chapter III hereafter proceeds to the assessment of DLSP, based on the evaluation criteria contained in the IFAD Evaluation Manual¹² and on a detailed review of all relevant project documents, foremost of the PCR.

A. Core criteria

Relevance

12. **Policy relevance.** DLSP was well aligned to the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (1997-2008) of Uganda, and the Plan for the Modernization of Agriculture (PMA). The main thrust of the PMA was to integrate small farmers in the market and commercialize and modernize their operations, based on the market and with the state having mainly a facilitating role. However, following the multi-party elections in 2006, the Government departed from some of the PMA strategies, and the views of partners started to diverge, in particular on how to develop rural financial services and agricultural advisory services, both key elements of the IFAD-supported portfolio¹³. The PCR confirms that DLSP had to modify its rural finance strategy with the abolition of the Microfinance Outreach Plan (MOP) of 2003. In 2006, the Government of Uganda decided to replace the MOP with a new Rural Financial Services Strategy, which changed the focus towards exclusively using Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs) as the vehicle for delivering rural financial services. Government's new ambition was to have one SACCO operating in each sub-county¹⁴. As a consequence, and according to the PCR, the community savings under DLSP were to be handed over to another IFAD operation, the Rural Finance Support Programme. These government policy changes caused disruptions in the policy relevance of DLSP, which was coped with the transfer of the original community savings component to the Rural Finance Support Programme.
13. DLSP was also consistent with the Local Government Sector Investment Plan (LGSIP 2006-2012), which did not fundamentally change when a follow-up plan was devised, the Local Government Sector Strategic Plan (LGSSP 2013-2023). The first strategy document is mentioned in the 2007 Appraisal Report while the PCR makes the case that DLSP, in this context, remained solidly grounded in a local government policy framework. Despite the setbacks due to policy changes, Uganda remained committed to investments in local governments (LGSSP 2013-2023).
14. Related to relevance, the PCR does not refer to the then valid 2004 Country Strategic Opportunities Paper (COSOP)¹⁵, but the 2006 and 2009 President's Reports and the 2013 CPE do. The cited President's Report confirms that empowering the rural poor to enhance their food security, incomes and assets was consistent with the 2004 COSOP. It was also in line with the IFAD Strategic Framework 2007-2010 by promoting the organizational capacity of poor people, developing human and social assets, and supporting economic activities. The CPE confirms the consistency of DLSP with the 2004 COSOP, but cautions against the handing out of free or heavily subsidized assets. In the case of DLSP, this has been the case to the tune of 5 per cent of total disbursements (enterprise grants). Indeed, such grants may not be consistent with "smart subsidies"¹⁶ as they were

¹² IFAD, Independent Office of Evaluation (IOE). Evaluation Manual, Second Edition, Rome, 2015.

¹³ IFAD. Republic of Uganda, Country Programme Evaluation, Rome, April 2013.

¹⁴ Ibidem, Paragraph 135.

¹⁵ IFAD (2004), Republic of Uganda - Country Strategic Opportunities Paper, Rome, 2003.

¹⁶ IFAD: Matching grants: a smarter way to subsidize rural finance? Insights, Issue #19 – 2012.

not systematically matched by beneficiary contributions and as they seemed to encourage elite capturing¹⁷.

15. **Relevance to local needs.** The 2009 President's Report indicates that DLSP, after having given supplementary financing, served two complementary objectives: (i) to empower rural households to increase their food security and incomes, and (ii) to empower local government to deliver decentralized services. Regarding food security, the PCR concurs by saying that stunting of children under five was, in accordance with the Uganda Demographic and Household Survey 2011, still at 33 per cent while the same cohort was underweight to the extent of 14 per cent. Addressing the local government weakness to deliver services was also badly needed, because even with DLSP, many poor subcounties in the 13 attended districts remained underserved. The explicit targeting strategy to select the poorest 30 per cent of subcounties per district, as declared by the 2009 President's Report, obviously had its understandable limits. The subcounty selection was done by applying 14 poverty-related criteria, among these gender-related criteria.
16. **Design relevance.** DLSP design was relatively solid because it built on proven features of the precursor programme DDSP, which were highlighted in the 2005 Project Completion Evaluation (Paragraph 1). The diversity of the five programme components made DLSP architecture however complex. With regard to the extension of the supplementary loan in 2009, only the respective President's Report is on record, but not a comprehensive redesign document. The key criteria in the selection of districts were the poverty levels and existence of other development interventions. Within the 13 selected districts, the poorest subcounties (about one-third of each district) were selected. Hence, these selected subcounties were not necessarily the poorest in the country, but were among them. The 13 selected districts were scattered over the national territory, of which only six formed a somewhat contiguous and sizeable cluster in Central Uganda. This must have increased transition costs, but the appreciation of efficiency reveals a low portion of management costs against total costs (Paragraph 25). According to the PCR, the major emphasis on community infrastructure (mainly roads and water supply schemes) was justified as these represented the major weaknesses, and because rehabilitated roads did indeed benefit a big number of people. The Project Completion Report Validation (PCRv) concurs and refers to Paragraph 47.
17. **Qualification of relevance.** DLSP was able to remain focused on its core mission, i.e. improving the livelihoods of rural poor people via a decentralized delivery system. According to the PCR, the LGSSP 2013-2023 mentioned in Paragraph 13 focused on local economic development, by harnessing the relationship between local governments, communities and private sector and thus contributing to economic growth and wellbeing at household level. This is consistent with DLSP's design. However, the policy changes mentioned in Paragraphs 12, 34 and 35 depressed programme relevance. Weighing the mentioned positive and limiting traits, the PCRv rates relevance as *moderately satisfactory (4)*, one point below the Programme Management Department (PMD) rating.

Effectiveness

18. The most significant measure of effectiveness is derived from the comparison of planned against achieved magnitudes of the defined programme objectives, building on objectively verifiable indicators of the results framework. For this purpose, the logical frameworks of the 2009 President's Report, of the MTR and comparative matrix in the PCR have been compared. They are mutually consistent whereby it is to be noted that the water supply targets, which are not present in the 2009 President's Report, have been retaken in the MTR and the PCR. Consequently, Annex V of the PCR is taken as the main source for the assessment of effectiveness. When calculation standard cost ratios per beneficiary, some

¹⁷ IFAD. Republic of Uganda, Country Programme Evaluation, Rome, April 2013, Paragraph 130.

doubts remain about their plausibility as the possibility of double counting road and other beneficiaries is real. As the assessment of PCR quality notes, the PCR is hardly citing the various programme-internal sources that provided the data (Paragraph 55). This made the use of triangulation points by the PCRV very difficult. The double programme objective, first of empowering rural households to increase food security and incomes, and second of empowering local governments to deliver services (Paragraph 3) were given seven indicators of which only three were measured at programme completion and documented in the PCR.

19. At the outset, the PCR mentions that the number of 1.587 million beneficiaries of community access roads was reached, against an appraisal estimate of 1.200 million. 45 per cent of surveyed beneficiaries mentioned roads as one of the benefits of the programme, against a target of 90 per cent satisfaction. In reality, the PCR cites some examples of transport cost reduction that appear to be substantial (by more than 60 per cent), correlated with an increase of producer prices for agricultural produce, in average of more than 50 per cent, thanks to the improved road links. The above figures do have a bearing on programme objective indicators, e.g. on the satisfaction of road users and on the cash income thanks to better market linkages (Paragraphs 28 and 30 in the section on impact assessment).
20. The PCR also mentions key figures related to FAL. Instead of 80 per cent of certified FAL attendees, only 60 per cent made the proficiency test, apparently also due to shortcomings in implementing these tests with the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development. Another ambitious objective, i.e. having 100,000 households with land certificates in the land tenure pilot subcounties, did only materialize to the extent of 1,882 certified parcels. This was a disappointment because the land tenure pilot activities simply intended to implement the dispositions of the 1998 Land Act, which was assumed to be straightforward at appraisal. As it turned out, this was a killer assumption that led to the dismal performance in issuing land certificates. The PCR gives plausible explanations for this underperformance, among these the resistance of land lords, and operational and administrative shortcomings in the Ministry of Lands and Urban Development, which halted the issuing of land certificates because the process was not standardized.
21. **Effectiveness rating.** Many other achievements are reported by the PCR, which will be referred to under the various impact domains. In terms of mere effectiveness, the achievements in providing access to safe water contrast with lower than expected success in attendees of FAL, and especially with the issuing of land certificates. In addition, the policy changes mentioned in Paragraphs 12, 13 and 17 must have affected programme effectiveness. Taking into account the above, the PCRV rating of effectiveness is *moderately satisfactory (4)*, in line with the PMD rating.

Efficiency

22. The approval-effectiveness lag of DLSP was ten months, thus about two months below the IFAD average of 12.3 months. DLSP's completion date was December 2014, identical to the appraisal estimate. As Table 1 in Paragraph 5 shows, 99.4 per cent of all funds were disbursed by that date.
23. The economic internal rate of return (EIRR) of DLSP was estimated at appraisal at 16.3 per cent, mainly based on the assumption that average family incomes would increase provided that all programme recommendations would be adopted. The PCR attempted to roughly estimate the final benefits of DLSP, in its Paragraph 66 and Appendix VI, concluding that the EIRR at programme completion must have been above 30 per cent. It is, however, not clear whether this conclusion is comparable with the benefit-cost calculation method applied at appraisal. Moreover, the end-of-programme estimate assumed that financial and economic

return was identical, which is improbable considering the prevailing overt and hidden subsidies built into the programme (Paragraph 14).

24. The PCR also determined the total programme cost per beneficiary, i.e. US\$26, including the beneficiaries of the community access roads. A summary calculation of total effective costs divided by the total beneficiaries of 1.587 however arrives at a per beneficiary cost of US\$32. The PCR calculated the average per km costs of road rehabilitation, a commended practice in a programme with such a high incidence of infrastructure cost (48 per cent of base cost). The result was that DLSP was in the range of 2008 World Bank estimates for Uganda and within the norms of the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority. Again, in a summary calculation based on Tables 1 and 2 in this PCR, the per beneficiary cost excluding community access roads, and using the 329,000 households or 1.2 million individual beneficiaries (Annex V of the PCR), this ratio would come down to US\$20.
25. The fourth efficiency indicator is independent from the number of covered households. The PCR reveals that the portion of programme management cost to total cost was 12 per cent at programme completion. This is well within the range of IFAD operations and slightly lower than the final programme management cost ratio of DSSP (14 per cent) according to its Project Completion Evaluation.
26. **Efficiency rating.** The above indicators of efficiency are in the positive range. Given the doubts about the soundness of the estimated EIRR at completion, and about the soundness of the figures in Annex V of the PCR, the rating of efficiency is *moderately satisfactory* (4), by PMD and the PCRV alike.

Rural poverty impact

27. The PCR devotes an extensive chapter (Paragraphs 102-121) to impact. It builds on data from the DLSP impact survey 2015¹⁸ and the Results and Impact Management System (RIMS) survey 2014.¹⁹ Both have been reviewed for this PCR. Regarding the 2014 RIMS data, the caveat about possible double counting of beneficiaries (Paragraph 18) is reiterated.
28. **Household income and assets.** Against a target of 200,000 households, a total of 329,000 increased household assets, with an average increase of 8.1 per cent across all districts (Annex V of the PCR). The highest increase concerned radios, and the lowest television sets. The ownership of mobile phones grew from 29.7 per cent at MTR to 63.5 per cent of the surveyed households at completion. While total household land holdings decreased in three districts, they grew in all remaining districts, with a noticeable increase of cultivated land, from 2.23 to 2.91 acres, or 21.8 per cent over programme life. Similar trends were visible with regards to livestock, with a remarkable increase in cattle ownership of 33 per cent. Housing conditions also improved in all districts, from mud to brick walls, and from soil to concrete floors. As the impact surveys infer, these improvements were clearly due to DLSP. At goal level, only household asset indicators were set in the 2009 logframe, except for the fifth indicator for the two programme objectives (number of farmer groups with increased yield and cash income), which was not measured at the end. Thus, this impact domain is incompletely documented in the PCR.
29. **Human and social capital and empowerment.** According to the PCR, the most notable changes of human capital occurred thanks to household mentoring, highlighting that not only the mentored households, but also the trained mentors presented valuable human assets at the end. The FAL classes, despite the lower than expected number of certified trainees, were also a vehicle for enhancing human capital. In this respect, the PCR also mentions radio talk shows and the

¹⁸ Republic of Uganda, IFAD, Ministry of Local Government, Impact Assessment of the District Livelihoods Support Programme, Final Report, Kampala, December 2015.

¹⁹ IFAD. DLSP RIMS Survey 2014.

amount of entrepreneurship training given by DLSP, with over 14,000 trainees, and of formal training of over 400 local government officials. Functional literacy had spill-over effects to social capital: trained producers tended to opt for group farming, thus more rationally using assets in common, realizing economies of scale, and hiring veterinary services, for instance. The training of elected and remunerated staff in local government entities went into the same sense of increased social capital.

30. **Food security and agricultural productivity.** 20 per cent of the surveyed households reported an increase in food security and 10 per cent a reduction of child malnutrition up to five years of age. These figures are derived from informal DLSP surveys and the 2014 impact survey, based on the compilation of the number of meals per day and the number of food-insecure months. The PCR infers a linear correlation between these positive trends and the prevalence of mentored households. The RIMS figures on child malnutrition however still report high levels of chronic malnutrition (37 per cent) and 18 per cent of children being underweight. These figures are conspicuously higher than the ones referred to at programme appraisal, i.e. 33 and 14 per cent, respectively (Paragraph 15). With the exception of cotton and rice, all other crops report yield increases, the most prominent being bananas with an average increase of banana yields of more than 100 per cent, 70 per cent for sunflower and 60 per cent for coffee. These impacts, however, cannot be clearly ascribed to DLSP, due to the absence of reference to control groups. Interestingly, the PCR states that these increases were not only due to better cropping techniques but also boosted by the increased market opportunities in the wake of access road rehabilitation, thus acknowledging the importance of market pull effects, for which the DLSP Impact assessment of 2015 presents some evidence²⁰. This last effect can reasonably be attributed to the programme as DLSP devoted 48 per cent of its outlay to road rehabilitation.
31. **Institutions and policies.** An entire component of DLSP, denominated district and subcounty execution, was devoted to empowering local government entities to improve their service delivery. More than 600 officials were trained in planning and management, and DLSP contributions disbursed based on annual work plans and budgets. Despite these efforts, weaknesses remained: without IFAD funding, districts and subcounties had little resources to implement their own projects²¹. The land tenure subcomponent, typically an undertaking at district and subcounty level, was seriously hampered by obstacles at central government level and, in a few districts also by the resistance of big land lords²², according to the PCR. The failure to achieve meaningful results in this subcomponent means that DLSP had very limited impact in addressing inequalities in land ownership.
32. **Rating of rural poverty impact.** Based on the findings above, and building on the partly incomplete data provided by the PCR, the baseline surveys and impact study of 2015, the PCRV suggests a *moderately satisfactory (4)* rating of impact for DLSP, the same as the PMD rating.

Sustainability of benefits

33. The PCR is overwhelmingly positive in its assessment of sustainability. The fact that DLSP activities built on participatory planning, and that distinct efforts to bring marginal groups into the mainstream of service delivery, thanks to household mentoring, are perceived as factors of sustainability. FAL can also be mentioned to be a factor of sustainability (Paragraph 29) because it enhances human and social capital. However, the 2012 supervision mission report raises a caveat by noting

²⁰ Republic of Uganda, IFAD, Ministry of Local Government, Impact Assessment of the District Livelihoods Support Programme, Final Report, Kampala, December 2015.

²¹ IFAD's Regional Division for Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) has commented that local governments received far much more funds for key government priorities like health, primary education and feeder roads.

²² According to ESA, this resistance was relevant in only two out of 13 districts, because of a unique land tenure system.

that the transition from FAL I classes (literacy learning) to FAL II classes (business management) was not vigorous enough. The training of local government officials in the local execution component was certainly a necessary investment for sustainability. Whether it was also sufficient may be more doubtful. First, there is a natural rotation with such elected and contracted officials and, second, the financial sustainability of local governments is more than questionable. On the other hand, the PCR infers that the maintenance of community access roads was facilitated thanks to the Uganda Road Fund created by the central government and apparently accessible for local governments. The MTR, in its Paragraphs 118-123, notes that road and water supply maintenance committees were set up and trained.

34. In fact, the CPE²³ reports with some concern that in 2002, there were 56 districts, by 2008 this had risen to 80, and by 2011, the number was reported to be some 120. First, this created administrative confusion, weakened the authorities in the affected districts, increased public administration expenditure and reduced quality of services. Second, in 2007, the Graduated Tax was abolished, hitherto the main source of revenue for local governments. This significantly reduced district revenue, the capacity to deliver services and, of course, district autonomy. Third, in 2007, the appointment of the districts' Chief Administrative Officers was „decentralised“, thereby reducing the districts' authority. All these moves compromised the sustainability of a comprehensive decentralization agenda as it prevailed in early 2006.
35. It is not surprising, then, that the continuation of the programme in the same districts was an issue at the final programme completion workshop²⁴. The message was conveyed at this event that this was not possible because IFAD had a rolling deployment strategy, with a similar programme in pipeline in Northern Uganda. Another issue raised was that DLSP was relatively weak in integrating value addition, marketing and marketing information services, and the promotion of business development services and marketing facilities. The above factors – insufficient residence time in the identified 13 districts and a lack of value chain approaches – were perceived as detrimental to sustainability.
36. **Appreciation of sustainability.** While the PCR itself (which does not contain ratings) is mentioning foremost positive building blocks of sustainability, the PCRV is more cautious, on the basis of the above-mentioned facts. PMD, without further substantiating, must also have had some reservation on programme sustainability, by rating this criterion as *moderately unsatisfactory (3)*. The PCRV concurs.

B. Other performance criteria

Gender equality and women's empowerment

37. By design, gender equality and women's empowerment were made visible in DLSP. The mentoring methodology consciously targeted female and widow-headed poor households. Household mentors were two per subcounty, a man and a woman to present a choice to the households to be mentored. Programme documentation, including the PCR, present fairly good gender disaggregated data to allow an assessment of gender issues. At global level, 56 per cent of the programme beneficiaries were women. Both the PCR and the 2012 supervision mission report confirm that more women were attracted to FAL classes. DLSP also made explicit efforts to determine minimum thresholds of female representation. Thus, in all infrastructure management committees, at least 30 per cent of women had to be present in membership and governing bodies. The PCR, or the cited supervision for that matter, do not present solid evidence that this membership to a genuine empowerment of women. But the fact remains that DLSP displays innovative

²³ IFAD. Republic of Uganda, Country Programme Evaluation, Rome, April 2013, Paragraph 20.

²⁴ IFAD. Republic of Uganda, Ministry of Local Government. District Livelihood Support Programme (DLSP), Project Completion Report, Kampala, December 2015, Annex VII.

methods for bringing women into the mainstream of economic development and community management (Paragraph 39).

38. **Rating.** On the basis of the above, gender equality and women's empowerment of DLSP is rated as *satisfactory (5)*, by both PMD and the PCRV.

Innovation and scaling up

39. First and foremost, the PCR identifies the household mentoring method as a key innovation. Whether it was a genuine innovation from scratch or a replication of a precursor developed in DDSF is not overly relevant. The fact is that household mentoring was recognized as being innovative by the CPE already in 2011, and that the method received awards within IFAD for being a particularly gender-sensitive approach. The PCR infers that DLSP was able to adapt also other gender related methodologies, such as the Gender Diamond and the Gender Challenge Tree, from an approach known as Gender Action Learning System. The introduction of novel crops and of animal traction was novel in many subcounties, albeit not innovations as such, but that did make significant differences in area productivity and crop production. The PCR and the CPE agree that especially the household mentoring approach had the potential for scaling up. However, no such upscaling IFAD operations is on record. It is true that an explicit DLSP successor programme co-funded by IFAD, the Project for the Restoration of Livelihoods in the Northern Region (PRELNOR)²⁵, has replicated household mentoring. This however falls short of the definition of scaling up, which implies that other operations take the innovation and scale it up on a wider scale.
40. **Rating of innovation and scaling up.** Innovation is rated *satisfactory (5)* and scaling up *moderately satisfactory (4)*, while PMD had rated the two criteria inversely, i.e. 4 and 5, respectively.

Environment and natural resources management

41. Environment and natural resources management were not directly addressed by DLSP. Whether the increased adoption of animal traction really reduces soil degradation, as the PCR infers, may be matter of debate. The use of manure, on the other hand, can be perceived as positive for the environment as it recycles nutrients. DLSP made it compulsory for the road contractors to rehabilitate gravel borrow pits and to install appropriate drainage on all rehabilitated community access roads.
42. **Rating.** The PCR also reports that trees planted along the access roads were cut again by the neighboring farmers. The relatively distinct disregard for the environment and natural resources management may have induced PMD to rate it as *moderately satisfactory (4)*. On the basis of the scant evidence regarding this criterion, the PCRV has no major reason to deviate from this appreciation.

Adaptation to climate change

43. The PCR mentions adaptation to climate change only once. It notes that DLSP trained farmers, through demonstration plots, to practice climate-smart agriculture, but that these themes did not pick up significantly. On practical grounds, this is a missed opportunity. Several studies have confirmed that Ugandan agriculture is vulnerable to climate change and variability²⁶. Climate change is expected to result in more extreme and frequent periods of intense rainfall, erratic onset and cessation of the rainy season, as well as more frequent episodes of drought. These changes are likely to have significant implications for agriculture, food security, and soil and water resources. The respective national support programme "Adaptation to climate change in Uganda" had the general

²⁵ IFAD, Republic of Uganda. Project for the Restoration of Livelihoods in the Northern Region (PRELNOR), Supervision Report, 21 December 2016.

²⁶ European Commission. Global Climate Change Alliance, Adaptation to climate change in Uganda, <http://www.gcca.eu/national-programmes/africa/gcca-uganda>

objective to contribute to the sustainable improvement of livelihoods and food security of the rural populations in Uganda.

44. More interestingly, the specific objectives were: (i) to strengthen the resilience of rural populations and agricultural production systems in the central part of the cattle corridor (more specifically, the districts of Nakasongola, Nakaseke, Luwero, Kiboga, Mubende and Sembabule, which are particularly vulnerable to drought and climate variability); and (ii) build the capacities of communities, commercial farmers and the Government of Uganda to cope with climate change. These specific objectives are close to the ones of DLSP. Two districts were also attended by DLSP, and this project was designed around the time of the DLSP MTR in 2012.
45. **Rating.** In its comments to the rating table, PMD makes the case that the standards of the access roads were upgraded to "all-weather" to mitigate the risk of making them difficult to pass. It also acknowledges the above-mentioned demonstration plots of climate-smart farming, which results in a PMD rating of moderately satisfactory (4). In view of Paragraphs 43 and 44 above, the PCRV is of the opinion that adaptation to climate change should have had a more prominent, transversal, function in DLSP. The proposed appreciation is *moderately unsatisfactory* (3), one point below the PMD rating.

C. Overall project achievement

46. DLSP was a carefully conceived programme building on a former experience in local government-led interventions in infrastructure, access roads and water supply installations, coupled with the promotion of agricultural development. It included innovative methods such as household mentoring that reached many marginalized poor people, including women. DLSP was indeed gender-sensitive and benefitted to more women than men in the end.
47. DLSP had also the courage to venture into sensitive areas, e.g. the certification of land holdings in its land tenure subcomponent. In this realm, the interventions were clearly inconclusive, with less than 2 per cent of the targets met. DLSP, in its conception, appeared to still be founded on a more comprehensive concept of local government and governance, with more decentralized resources available to cater for the ambitious programme agenda. The changes that came in 2007 and undermined the autonomy of local governments turned into less favourable conditions for DLSP (Paragraph 34). With the supplementary loan and grant funding of IFAD in 2009, financial resources doubled, and the infrastructure-lead intervention mode was reinforced, reaching 48 per cent of base cost. In hindsight, it may have been a bold move to regain part of the lost initiative, which it did to some extent due to the more substantial resource endowment. However, this did not allow the completion of the access road network, which only reached 87 per cent of the target. It also suffered from fundamental weaknesses in local government and in the demand-driven provision of rural finance, e.g. by the abandon of MOP and the introduction of the SACCO coverage, which was supply-driven with an administrative logic of territorial coverage (Paragraph 12).
48. **Rating of overall project achievement.** The strong conceptual characteristics of DLSP, on one hand, and the impossibility to transform these strengths into lasting achievements due to a less favourable political environment, on the other hand, are determining the rating of overall programme achievement. Both PMD and the PCRV rate it as *moderately satisfactory* (4).

D. Performance of partners

49. **IFAD.** It goes to the credit of IFAD to have devised DLSP as a comprehensive, intervention combining key elements of economic and social development with decentralized governance principles. DLSP had the advantage to rely on the assets of DSSP, which were assessed as solid by a Project Completion Evaluation. The PCRV displays the frequency and nature of the supervision and implementation support

missions in its Annex II. IFAD fielded 13 missions in seven years, not included the MTR, which however came relatively late, in June 2012. This intense supervision and implementation support activities were nonetheless unable to completely mitigate the effects of policy changes of the Ugandan government, which went largely beyond DLSP and IFAD, and which caused a prolonged period of disagreement between the government and the donor community.

50. The PCR specifically commends the timeliness of non-objections to annual workplans and budgets, expenditures, procurements and withdrawal applications. The PCR suggests that this was also a consequence of the set-up of a country presence office while the country programme manager remained in Rome. The swift functioning of the Country Programme Management Team is also mentioned, which was coordinated by the country presence office.
51. **Rating.** PMD and the PCRV concur that the above performance warrants a rating of IFAD performance of *satisfactory* (5).
52. **Government.** As highlighted in Paragraphs 12 and 34, various generic government policy changes around 2007 presented significant challenges to donor-funded projects involving local governments, not only DLSP. As the PCR relates, the Permanent Secretary of MOLG provided guidance and support throughout the programme and served as a liaison to other ministries. The government honored its commitments in terms of counterpart funds, responded well to IFAD recommendations and caused the special account to be well managed. However, government performance must also be assessed here with regards to the cited policy changes, which affected the autonomy and credibility of local governments, and thus the performance and impacts of DLSP.
53. **Rating.** In view of the above, the PCRV rates government performance as moderately *satisfactory* (4), against a PMD rating of satisfactory (5).

IV. Assessment of PCR quality

Scope

54. With 54 pages of text plus annexes, the PCR is clearly above the number of pages recommended by IFAD guidelines (19-25 pages). On the other hand, it includes all the mandatory sections of a PCR and provides supporting information in the annexes. Besides a copy of the logical framework, a table comparing indicators and effectively achieved magnitudes is very useful. Scope is thus rated as *satisfactory* (5).

Quality

55. The PCR was prepared by a staff member of the Uganda Management Institute and sets good standards of quality. It is evidence-based that it refers to footnotes, but is not systematic when it comes to citing programme internal sources. In particular, the assessment of the number of programme beneficiaries leaves some doubts. The PCR would have further gained with a cumulative bibliography. The chapters on effectiveness and impact in particular build on facts and exemplary cases that are well illustrated. The inclusion of the proceedings of the final stakeholder workshop is indeed commendable. Some of the lessons were derived from this event (Paragraph 57). Weighing both the strengths and weaknesses, PCR quality is rated as *moderately satisfactory* (4).

Candour

56. The author displayed a sufficiently critical distance towards the subject matter and programme management. However, the government policy changes of 2007 are presented with less outlook on the consequences on local governments and their effect on authority and resource availability to assure sustainability. There, a certain discrepancy is visible between the narrative of the PCR and the PMD rating

of sustainability of moderately unsatisfactory. Candour is therefore rated as *moderately satisfactory* (4).

Lessons

57. The chapter on lessons learned in the PCR is remarkable. It includes section headings with pertinent questions, such as.
 - If this programme was to be done again, what would be done differently?
 - What was overlooked in the design?
 - What alternative strategies could have been adopted?
 - Which programme activities had the most significant and positive impact on the beneficiaries?
58. The displayed answers can indeed be taken as lessons. For instance, if community committees are established that take over monitoring functions, there must be rules that allow the voice of such committees to be heard instead of being simply overridden by technicians. Another lesson drawn by the PCR is that land tenure issues, as important they may be for rural development, are simply outside the authority of MOLG. Preliminary institutional analyses, followed by inter-institutional agreements, would have been a must in such a sensitive area.
59. According to the PCR, programme design overlooked that a comprehensive, interdisciplinary, team would have been needed from the start at the Programme Coordination Unit, and that a value chain approach would have provided more demand-pull from markets. The PCR also perceives FAL and household mentoring as key inputs when a programme intends to be inclusive of poor and marginalized population segments. "Development relies on self-esteem". The PCR rates PCR lessons as *satisfactory* (5).

V. Lessons learned

Lessons learned

60. Continuity over various project or programme cycles pays off. Over and above its logical relation with a programmatic approach – which is one of the essential foundations of a result-based COSOP – it provides reiterated learning opportunities and tangible evidence for adjustments if needed. The complexity of DLSP as a community infrastructure and agricultural improvement programme, combined with a clear drive towards local governance, social inclusion and the resolution of land tenure inequalities, needed such insertion into longer term visions. It still may have been too complex to successfully manage externalities, such as the issues related to land certification. Thus, especially comprehensive programmes need to check early in the design process whether a key premise – simplicity – is complied with. An additional risk was that DLSP did not incorporate lessons learnt from other IFAD projects in matters of land tenure. This would have been particularly relevant with a sensitive issue such as land tenure.
61. Trusted partnership with MOLG was a factor of relative success. The weight of the infrastructure dimension and the explicit local execution at district and subcounty level would have made any alternative less pertinent, e.g. leadership by the Ministry of Agriculture. On the other hand, the programme heavily relied on a favorable policy framework, which may not have progressed into the right direction after some policy changes against local government autonomy, political and fiscal. There, a coordinated donor-initiated policy dialogue could have helped. According to the CPE, the critical years from 2007 to 2011, however, absorbed attention and resources of IFAD because of the introduction of direct supervision and the set-up of the country presence office. A possible lesson is that partnerships with entities of local government - which are by nature multisectorial and multifunctional – require

robust mechanisms of policy dialogue that accompany programme design and implementation.

62. Key programme surveys came relatively late, e.g. the RIMS baseline survey in 2010²⁷, which however allowed to give it a layout following the extension of the supplementary loan and grant. On the downside, the time lapse between baseline and impact surveys, on one hand, and the absence of control groups, weaken the opportunity to demonstrate tangible progress and to infer the attribution of impact to the programme. Similarly, the MTR was fielded in June 2012. Late MTRs – if they propose major adjustments – give little opportunities to a project or programme to implement such adjustments. These were limited in the case of DLSP²⁸.

²⁷ IFAD/MoLG. Final Baseline Survey Report for Results and Impact Management System [RIMS] in DLSP Districts. October 2010.

²⁸ ESA remarked that direct supervision of the project partly compensated for the belatedness of the PCR, as key issues were identified in time and addressed early enough, e.g. the need for re-design and the supplementary funding.

Definition and rating of the evaluation criteria used by IOE

Criteria	Definition *	Mandatory	To be rated
Rural poverty impact	Impact is defined as the changes that have occurred or are expected to occur in the lives of the rural poor (whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended) as a result of development interventions.	X	Yes
	<i>Four impact domains</i>		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Household income and net assets: Household income provides a means of assessing the flow of economic benefits accruing to an individual or group, whereas assets relate to a stock of accumulated items of economic value. The analysis must include an assessment of trends in equality over time. 		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Human and social capital and empowerment: Human and social capital and empowerment include an assessment of the changes that have occurred in the empowerment of individuals, the quality of grass-roots organizations and institutions, the poor's individual and collective capacity, and in particular, the extent to which specific groups such as youth are included or excluded from the development process. 		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Food security and agricultural productivity: Changes in food security relate to availability, stability, affordability and access to food and stability of access, whereas changes in agricultural productivity are measured in terms of yields; nutrition relates to the nutritional value of food and child malnutrition. 		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Institutions and policies: The criterion relating to institutions and policies is designed to assess changes in the quality and performance of institutions, policies and the regulatory framework that influence the lives of the poor. 		No
Project performance	Project performance is an average of the ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.	X	Yes
Relevance	The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, institutional priorities and partner and donor policies. It also entails an assessment of project design and coherence in achieving its objectives. An assessment should also be made of whether objectives and design address inequality, for example, by assessing the relevance of targeting strategies adopted.	X	Yes
Effectiveness	The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.	X	Yes
Efficiency	A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results.	X	Yes
Sustainability of benefits	The likely continuation of net benefits from a development intervention beyond the phase of external funding support. It also includes an assessment of the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the project's life.	X	Yes
Other performance criteria			
Gender equality and women's empowerment	The extent to which IFAD interventions have contributed to better gender equality and women's empowerment, for example, in terms of women's access to and ownership of assets, resources and services; participation in decision making; work load balance and impact on women's incomes, nutrition and livelihoods.	X	Yes
Innovation and scaling up	The extent to which IFAD development interventions: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) have introduced innovative approaches to rural poverty reduction; and (ii) have been (or are likely to be) scaled up by government authorities, donor organizations, the private sector and others agencies. 	X	Yes
Environment and natural resources management	The extent to which IFAD development interventions contribute to resilient livelihoods and ecosystems. The focus is on the use and management of the natural environment, including natural resources defined as raw materials used for socio-economic and cultural purposes, and ecosystems and biodiversity - with the goods and services they provide.	X	Yes
Adaptation to climate change	The contribution of the project to reducing the negative impacts of climate change through dedicated adaptation or risk reduction measures	X	Yes

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Definition</i> *	<i>Mandatory</i>	<i>To be rated</i>
Overall project achievement	This provides an overarching assessment of the intervention, drawing upon the analysis and ratings for rural poverty impact, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, gender equality and women's empowerment, innovation and scaling up, as well as environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change.	X	Yes
Performance of partners			
• IFAD	This criterion assesses the contribution of partners to project design, execution, monitoring and reporting, supervision and implementation support, and evaluation. The performance of each partner will be assessed on an individual basis with a view to the partner's expected role and responsibility in the project life cycle.	X	Yes
• Government		X	Yes

* These definitions build on the OECD/DAC Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management; the Methodological Framework for Project Evaluation agreed with the Evaluation Committee in September 2003; the first edition of the Evaluation Manual discussed with the Evaluation Committee in December 2008; and further discussions with the Evaluation Committee in November 2010 on IOE's evaluation criteria and key questions.

Rating comparison

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>IFAD-PMD rating^a</i>	<i>PCRV rating^a</i>	<i>Rating disconnect</i>
Rural poverty impact	4	4	0
Project performance			
Relevance	5	4	-1
Effectiveness	4	4	0
Efficiency	4	4	0
Sustainability of benefits	3	3	0
Project performance^b	4	4	0
Other performance criteria			
Gender equality and women's empowerment	5	5	0
Innovation	4	5	+1
Scaling up	5	4	-1
Environment and natural resources management	4	4	0
Adaptation to climate change	4	3	-1
Overall project achievement^c	4	4	0
Performance of partners^d			
IFAD	5	5	0
Government	5	4	-1
Average net disconnect			-0.27

^a Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable.

^b Arithmetic average of ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.

^c This is not an average of ratings of individual evaluation criteria but an overarching assessment of the project, drawing upon the rating for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, rural poverty impact, gender, innovation and scaling up, environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change.

^d The rating for partners' performance is not a component of the overall project achievement rating.

Ratings of the project completion report quality

	<i>PMD rating</i>	<i>IOE PCRV rating</i>	<i>Net disconnect</i>
Candour	n.r.	4	
Lessons	n.r.	5	
Quality (methods, data, participatory process)	n.r.	4	
Scope	n.r.	5	

Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.a. = not applicable

Bibliography

- IFAD. Republic of Uganda, District Development Support Project, Completion Evaluation, Rome, 2005.
- IFAD. Republic of Uganda, District Livelihoods Support Programme, Appraisal Report, Volume 1, Rome, May 2007.
- IFAD. President's Report, Proposed loan and grant to the Republic of Uganda, District Livelihoods Support Programme, Rome, December, 2006.
- IFAD. President's Report, Proposed supplementary loan and grant to the Republic of Uganda and modification to the financing agreement, District Livelihoods Support Programme, Rome, December, 2009.
- IFAD, Republic of Uganda, Ministry of Local Government. District Livelihoods Support Programme (DLSP), Project Completion Report, Kampala, December 2015.
- IFAD. Republic of Uganda, Country Programme Evaluation, Rome, April 2013.
- IFAD. Uganda. District Livelihoods Support Programme (DLSP), Supervision Report, July 2012.
- IFAD, Republic of Uganda, Ministry of Local Government. Mid-term review of the District Livelihoods Programme (DLSP), Kampala, 30 June 2012.
- IFAD: Matching grants: a smarter way to subsidize rural finance? Insights, Issue #19 – 2012.
- IFAD, Independent Office of Evaluation (IOE). Evaluation Manual, Second Edition, Rome, 2015.
- IFAD (2004), Republic of Uganda - Country Strategic Opportunities Paper, Rome, 2003.
- European Commission. Global Climate Change Alliance, Adaptation to climate change in Uganda, <http://www.gcca.eu/national-programmes/africa/gcca-uganda>
- IFAD/MoLG. Final Baseline Survey Report for Results and Impact Management System [RIMS] in DLSP Districts. October 2010.
- Republic of Uganda, IFAD, Ministry of Local Government, Impact Assessment of the District Livelihoods Support Programme, Final Report, Kampala, December 2015.
- IFAD. DLSP RIMS Survey 2014

List of acronyms

CPE	Country Programme Evaluation
DDSP	District Development Support Project
DLSP	District Livelihood Support Project
EIRR	Economic Internal Return Rate
FAL	Functional Adult Literacy
LGSSP	Local Government Sector Strategic Plan
MOLG	Ministry of Local Government
MOP	Microfinance Outreach Plan
MTR	Mid-term Review
PCR	Project Completion Report
PCRv	Project Completion Report Validation
PMA	Plan for the Modernization of Agriculture
PMD	Project Management Department
SACCO	Savings and Credit Cooperative