

## Project Completion Report Validation

### Agricultural Commodity Chain Support Project (PROFIL)

Burkina Faso

Date of validation by IOE: July 2018

## I. Basic project data

			Approval (US\$ m)		Actual (US\$ m)	
Region	West and Central Africa	Total project costs	16,9		15,2	
Country	Burkina Faso	IFAD loan and percentage of total	13.8	82%	12.4	82%
Loan number	Loan 703 BF	Borrower	2.5	15%	2.5	16%
Type of project (subsector)	Agriculture	Cofinancier 1	-		-	
Financing type	Loan	Cofinancier 2	-		-	
Lending terms *	Highly Concessional	Cofinancier 3	-		-	
Date of approval	14 December 2006	Cofinancier 4	-		-	
Date of loan signature	15 March 2007	Beneficiaries	0.5	3%	0.3	2%
Date of effectiveness	06 December 2007	Other sources	-			
Loan amendments	-	Number of beneficiaries	20,000 households		34,711 direct beneficiaries 166,446 indirect beneficiaries	
Loan closure extensions	November 2013 September 2015	Completion date	31 December 2013		31 December 2016	
Country programme managers	Abdoul Barry (since 2015) <sup>1</sup>	Loan closing date	30 June 2014		30 June 2017	
Regional director(s)	Lisandro Martins (since 2018) <sup>2</sup>	Mid-term review			May 2013	
Project completion report reviewer	Hamdi Ahmedou	IFAD loan disbursement at project completion (%)			90	
Project completion report quality control panel	Max Kodjo Fumiko Nakai	Date of the project completion report			May 2017	

Source: Project Completion Report (PCR), President's Report, Oracle Business Intelligence.

\* This was a loan on highly concessional terms, free of interest but bearing a service charge of three fourths of one per cent (0.75%) per annum and having a maturity period of 40 years, including a grace period of 10 years.

<sup>1</sup> Norman Messer, Mohamed Tounessi (2010-2011), Cristiana Sparacino (2011-2015).

<sup>2</sup> Mohamed Béavogui, Perin Saint-Ange, Ides de Willebois.

## II. Project outline

1. **Project goal and objectives.** The Agricultural Commodity Chain Support Project (PROFIL) was approved by IFAD Executive Board in December 2006 and was completed in December 2016. The programme goal, as stated in the President's Report, was to reduce rural poverty by enhancing the access of the rural poor to profitable markets. This was expected to be achieved through three specific objectives: a) to develop the links between the target groups and other commodity chain stakeholders; b) to strengthen the capacities of the target groups and their institutions; and c) to improve the access of the rural poor to productive investments and marketing services.
2. **Country context.** Burkina Faso is a Sahelian country, landlocked, and exposed to severe climatic conditions. Its population, estimated at 18.6 million in 2016, is young and growing very fast, with around 65.2 percent of the population being 25 years old or younger. Politically, the country is emerging from a transition, following the ousting of former President in October 2014 but faces the critical challenge of national reconciliation and resisting to the international and regional terrorist threat, especially in the Northern regions. On the economic front, the country has reported a very good macro-economic performance over the last 15 years but failed to generate a structural transformation of the economy and its labour force. Almost 80 percent of the labour force is dependent on agriculture as prime activity, while women account for an estimated half of the labour force in rural areas and produce over two-thirds of food consumed in the country. Agriculture continues to suffer from low levels of productivity, with yields declining by 3 percent and crop production increasing by only 10 percent over the last decade. Diversification is also a challenge, as the overall structure of the sector has not changed in decades.
3. **Project area.** The project had a national scope in terms of policy and institutional dialogue but for field-level investment activities it was expected to cover four regions: North, Sahel, Boucle du Mouhoun, and Centre-North. Located mostly in the northern part of the country, these regions are characterized by a shorter growing season, higher rainfall variability, and less diversified agriculture, which expose them to food insecurity. The project area population was 4.6 million – around 600,000 households – at the time of project design, with Boucle du Mouhoun being the largest and Sahel the smallest, in terms of the number of inhabitants. The targeted regions are among the poorest of the countries, with poverty levels above 60 per cent, except for the Centre-North, where it is around 34 per cent.<sup>3</sup> The local economy is dominated by cereals crops, horticulture, and livestock activities. As a result, PROFIL targeted five commodity chains: cowpea, sesame, goats and sheep, poultry and onions.
4. **Target group.** The project targeted 1,000 Common Economic Interest Groups (CEIGs) of which 800 groups of farmers and 200 groups of traders and processors. In addition, it would strengthen 30 professional commodity chain organisations. In total, 20 000 households were expected to be reached by PROFIL. According to the President's report, target groups included: i) farmers, pastoralists, migrants, processors, marketers, local entrepreneurs, and others small-scale actors located up- and downstream in the five targeted commodity chains; ii) vulnerable (food insecure) groups, especially youths and women; and iii) farmer and professional organisations, women groups, and the private sector.
5. The project was to adopt a pro-poor targeting approach, using a self-targeting mechanisms which included: i) a selection of pro-poor commodity chains within which the poorest rural population groups participate or have the potential to do so; ii) support to collective local income-generating institutions (CEIGs) rather than

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<sup>3</sup> The Centre-North region was however selected for its potential in the development of the selected value chains.

to individual initiatives; and iii) the promotion of pro-poor technologies adapted to the specific needs of small producers, processors, and micro entrepreneurs.

6. **Programme components.** To reach its objective, the programme was structured around four components. **Component 1** aimed at promoting rural communication as a tool to enhance knowledge sharing among beneficiaries on selected themes such as market opportunities, technologies, prices and best practices. It was also planned to develop vertical links/relationships along the value chain between the targeted group and others chain stakeholders. **Component 2**, aimed at strengthening the capacities of commodity chains stakeholders and service providers. The project would also provide solutions to key issues identified by promoting research and development activities and developing adapted technologies and innovations. **Component 3** aimed at supporting financially CEIGs and apex organisations investments through a dedicated fund, the Commodity Chain Development Fund (FODEF). Finally, as part of **Component 4**, a programme management unit would be established and a monitoring and evaluation system was expected to be developed.
7. **Intervention logic.** The project focused on cowpea, sesame, goats and sheep, poultry and onions from production to processing activities. The supply and value chains of these commodities - with investment in the range of activities necessary to bring them from production to market - were considered to hold significant opportunities for poor rural people to boost their incomes. Farmers, pastoralists, local entrepreneurs and others would learn how to process these commodities into more marketable products that can be sold at a higher price.
8. The project aimed at increasing rural incomes and food security through increased production, reduction of post-harvest losses and increased storage at the level of farming households, allowing these households to benefit from strong seasonal price fluctuations. PROFIL would develop ways to support individuals and develop links between the people involved at various stages along each chain. It was also expected to improve access to rural financial services. For this goal, the project intended to support productive investments – micro projects – through a dedicated fund, called FODEF. A network of service providers would be set up to strengthen the capacities of the beneficiaries and support them in the design and implementation of micro projects. PROFIL would also strengthen organisations in the targeted commodity chains, which would lead to improvements in the structuring of these chains and increased impact of sub sector policies.
9. In order to attain its objectives, PROFIL needed to be implemented in a stable socio-political context. More importantly, it needed a competent and stable programme management unit for its implementation. The project also required availability, interest and quality of service providers in the project area.
10. **Financing.** The total estimated project cost, as approved by the Executive Board, was US\$16.9 million, of which IFAD was expected to provide a loan in the amount of US\$13.8 million (82 per cent), the Government would contribute with an amount of US\$5.1 million (15 per cent), and the beneficiaries US\$540,000 (3 per cent). Table 1 below gives the total planned, revised, and actual contribution of each financing source. Table 2 provides a breakdown of estimated and actual expenditures by component. Actual expenditures are presented in local currency as they are not available in USD in the PCR.

Table 1  
**Project costs**

<i>Funding sources</i>	<i>Estimated amount US\$ million)</i>	<i>Estimated amount (% of total)</i>	<i>Expenditure (US\$ million)</i>	<i>Expenditure (% of total)</i>	<i>Disbursement rate (%)</i>
IFAD	13.8	82	12.4	82	90
Government	2.5	15	2,5	16	99
Beneficiaries	0.5	3	0,3	2	68
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>16.9*</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>15,2</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>92</b>

Source: PCR 2017, OBI

\* This is not equal to the added amounts by different financiers above due to rounding.

Table 2  
**Component costs**

<i>Components</i>	<i>Estimated amount (m USD)</i>	<i>Estimated amount (% of total)</i>	<i>Expenditure ( XOF billion)</i>	<i>Expenditure (% of total)</i>	<i>Disbursement rate (%)</i>
Rural communication and stakeholders networking	1.2	8	0.4	5	36
Strengthening of capacities	6.4	44	2.5	31	103
Commodity chain development fund	4.7	33	2.5	31	39
Programme management and monitoring and evaluation	2.1	15	2.7	33	164
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>14.4<sup>4</sup></b>	<b>100</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>92</b>

Source: Design document 2006 (estimation), and PCR 2017 (effective).

11. **Project implementation.** PROFIL was implemented by the Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Fisheries<sup>5</sup>, which is the main Government partner for IFAD in the country. A programme management unit (PMU), based in Ouahigouya (North region), was established with administrative and financial autonomy and with overall responsibility for programme implementation and the use of programme funds. In 2009, following the approval of the Rural Business Development Services Programme (PASPRU), it was expected that both projects would be fully merged at operational level, with PASPRU relying on PROFIL regional offices (Nord, Centre-Nord, Boucle du Mouhoun). But this was abandoned as PROFIL experienced significant delays in implementing its institutional set up.
12. **Changes during project implementation.** PROFIL was approved by IFAD Executive Board in December 2006. The financial agreement was signed in March 2007 and became effective in December 2007. A mid-term review was undertaken in May 2013, few months before the project expected completion date. PROFIL was extended twice in November 2013 and in September 2015, respectively for two years and one year. As a result, the project duration was nine years instead of six and the project was completed in December 2016, with a loan closure in June 2017.
13. PROFIL introduced a number of changes following the mid-term review (MTR). The project logical framework was adjusted to address internal logic inconsistencies. As a consequence, the logical framework was reduced from 14 to 4 results in order to allow a better coherence, by outlining causal linkages in the project intervention, (i.e., its outputs, direct outcomes, 'intermediate states', and impact). The MTR recommended reorganizing the project around the groups of direct and indirect

<sup>4</sup> Auxquels s'ajoutent 2,1 USD millions d'imprévus physiques et financiers.

<sup>5</sup> Currently known as the Ministry of Agriculture and Water resources.

actors targeted by the project and not around components. Therefore, the recommendations of the MTR were organized according to the three institutional target levels of the project namely: i) Farmers' Organizations (CEIG), ii) apex organizations, including professional organizations and development support associations and, iii) regional chambers of agriculture. At operational level, the value chain approach reinforced the role of apex organizations and regional chambers of agriculture (RCAs), by giving priority to micro-projects carried by CEIGs belonging to unions and by giving a more prominent role to RCAs in the selection and monitoring of micro projects.

14. **Delivery of outputs.** Annex III indicates the delivery of outputs of the project per component based on the Project Completion Report (PCR) and RIMS data.

### III. Review of findings

15. The Project Completion Report Validation (PCRV) report presents findings based on review of the programme documents, including appraisal reports, project completion report, Mid-term Review, RIMS reports, supervision reports, and other relevant materials (e.g. Country Strategic Opportunities Paper [COSOP], policy documents). The PCRV also benefited from the Country Strategy and Programme Evaluation mission, carried out in April-May 2018.

#### A. Core criteria

##### Relevance

16. **Policy Relevance.** PROFIL was aligned with the country's development priorities, as laid out in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), adopted in 2000, which aimed at promoting good governance as well as guaranteeing access to basic social services and expanding employment opportunities and income-generating activities for the poor. The project remained coherent with the Strategy for Accelerated Growth and Sustainable Development (SCADD), adopted in 2011 and its emphasis on strengthening human capital and promoting social protection, with a cross-cutting attention to gender equality. Agriculture is cited as a priority sector, with a focus on the cereal and oilseeds sectors and a particular attention to the organization and connection to markets of rural producers.
17. At sectoral level, the programme was designed on the basis of the government's vision and priorities for the agriculture sector set in the 2003 Rural Development Strategy, which intends to boost agricultural productivity and production and increase incomes of rural poor. The strategy put emphasis on strengthening farmer's organizations capacities, enhancing access to markets and adopting a gender approach. PROFIL remained coherent with the government's priorities for the period 2011-2015, which are stated in the National Programme for the Rural Sector (PNSR). This strategy aimed at transforming the agriculture in Burkina Faso into a "modern, competitive, sustainable engine of growth, grounded on household farms and effective agricultural enterprises".
18. PROFIL was aligned with the COSOP 2007 first strategic objective to enhance and diversify sustainable livelihoods of rural poor and marginalized groups, especially women, through inclusive local private-sector development. As part of this objective, the aim was to develop rural microenterprises and improve commodity chain governance by enhancing access to information on markets and technologies. PROFIL was also aligned with the COSOP 2007 second strategic objective which was to emphasize institutional development and local partnership-building with rural communities as actors in their own right while strengthening village-level planning and management capacity.
19. **Relevance of design.** As stated in the PCR, the project suffered from a weak logical framework, which resulted in inconsistencies between the changes expected at the level of impact and the expected intermediate changes, outcomes and outputs. The project's value chain approach was insufficiently developed in the

design report. The latter did not provide any information related to the type of support to be provided to apex organizations, the type of activities that could be financed and the articulation between different stakeholders along the value chains (Apex organizations, CEIGs, RCAs, etc.).

20. The project's internal logic was also weakened by the expected synergies with other projects, which didn't happen. The feasibility of these synergies was not critically assessed at the design phase. PROFIL was designed as a complementary intervention to the World Bank supported Agricultural Diversification and Market Development Project (PAFASP), but the partnership was not successful as both projects targeted different categories of beneficiaries.<sup>6</sup> Another IFAD-financed project PASPRU (see paragraph 11) was designed to complement PROFIL interventions as the latter had financed many micro-projects in the production segments, and therefore PASPRU interventions could have allowed linkages between the production and the processing segments. Such approach was relevant and could have filled the gap created by lack of partnership with PAFASP, but this did not happen, given implementation and management issues faced by both projects.
21. **Relevance of targeting.** The selection of the five targeted commodity chains - cowpea, sesame, goats and sheep, poultry and onions - was relevant. Cowpeas sesame and onions are produced by a large number of poor producers, including women and young people. These crops play a dual role in satisfying the food needs of the population. First of all, they are easily marketed, and so bring in cash income to the farmers. Secondly, they often serve for local consumption, and to diversify household diets. As for the selected livestock activities, they require limited means to be developed and they represent a valuable source of income, as long as diseases are controlled.
22. The project adopted a pro-poor targeting approach, consisting of a mix of self-targeting mechanisms and the boosting of pro-poor commodity chain with a spatial development approach aimed at reaching out to the poorest local population groups. The project defined and applied criteria in the selection of micro-projects, such as 80% of funds allocated to the production chain, a segment with a large proportion of rural poor, and at least 50 per cent of women beneficiaries of micro projects financed by the FODEF.<sup>7</sup> However, these indicators evolved during project implementation, in order to spread the financing along different links (processing, storage, and marketing).<sup>8</sup> Also, from 2015, the priority was given to GEICs which are members of apex organizations, for a better structuring of the commodity chains. While these adjustments were relevant in order to integrate the project interventions into a commodity chain approach, they might also have diverted the project from its primary target group.
23. **Summary - relevance.** The PCR outlines the project's alignment with national and IFAD strategies, its internal logic and the relevance of the adjustments made during implementation. The project's objectives were broadly aligned to the Government priorities and PROFIL adopted a pro-poor targeting approach. However the project design showed inconsistencies in its internal logic. The value chain strategy was insufficiently detailed and the expected synergies with other projects were not adequately pre-assessed. The PCR rates the project's relevance as **moderately satisfactory (4)**, which is the same rating given by PMD.

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<sup>6</sup> PAFASP targeted rural entrepreneurs of a certain size, likely to create growth, which did not correspond to PROFIL targeting of the most vulnerable.

<sup>7</sup> This was achieved thanks to the implementation of positive discrimination criteria in the micro-project grading system (2 points for a women's GIE, 1 point for a mixed GIE and 0 points for a men's GIE).

<sup>8</sup> The lack of synergy and complementarity with PASPRU was the main reason behind this decision.

## **Effectiveness**

24. This section presents the effectiveness of the project in respect to its objectives, and considering the delivery of outputs presented in annex III. Since the MTR, the project's outputs are monitored and reported in the project documentation, including the PCR, by targeted stakeholders and not by components. However, the PCRv will assess the project achievements towards its specific objectives, as stated at design.

### **i) developing the links between the target groups and other commodity chain stakeholders**

25. As part of its efforts to create links between different stakeholders, PROFIL focused its support on the financing of fairs, promotional days, workshops and exchange trips. In this respect, PROFIL organized 31 information and consultation meetings (out of 40 expected), held on a quarterly basis, under the auspice of the RCAs. These meetings were opportunities for exchanges between apex organizations, RCAs and CEIGs on the implementation of micro projects. In addition, 14 trade relations workshops were organized in 2015 and 2016 for the cowpea (8 workshops) and small ruminant (6 workshops) chains. The networking resulted in 311 letters of intent for 4,550 tonnes of cowpea and 8,003 heads of small ruminants. The project also organized 18 exchange trips for knowledge sharing between apex organizations. Finally, PROFIL financed 30 fairs, as targeted, to support the stakeholders networking. These fairs were attended by over 15,000 participants in total, of which almost two thirds were women.

### **ii) strengthening the capacities of the target groups and their institutions**

26. PROFIL strengthened the capacities of CEIGs, relying on proximity support providers – called "accompagnateurs" and "rédacteurs locaux" – and decentralized technical services. The trainings aimed at improving internal governance within CEIGs and enhancing the services offered to their members. In total, 155 CEIGs were formalized and 5,429 members were trained in management. PROFIL also promoted CEIG's insertion into apex organizations. Thus, the socio-economic survey of 2015, showed that 68 per cent of members of CEIGs supported by PROFIL are members of an apex organization, against 42 per cent in 2010. The project's good results in strengthening the capacities of different stakeholders along the chain were used as a basis for the design of another IFAD funded project, the Participatory Natural Resource Management and Rural Development Project in the North, Centre-North and East Regions - Neer Tamba, approved in 2012.
27. PROFIL also aimed at strengthening the capacities of apex organizations to enable them to play their role in integrating their members into the value chains. Trainings were provided in various themes, such as organizational management and procurement. In addition, 61 farmer field schools were set up by apex organizations with project support, and served as a training ground for sesame producers in the four project regions.
28. In parallel, PROFIL initiated an institutional structuring process, which resulted in the creation of 85 new apex organizations, out of which 61 are compliant with the uniform acts of the OHADA (Organization for Harmonization in Africa of Business Law). These results were favored by the project's decision, in 2014, to set CEIGs belonging to an apex organization as a condition to receive financing. However, only 9 apex organizations are categorized at level three, which is the highest level of maturity defined by the project. These better-off apex organizations were allowed to introduce funding request for structuring investments and 22 requests were funded by PROFIL (infrastructure, equipment, working capital).

### **iii) improving the access of the rural poor to productive investments and marketing services**

29. PROFIL financed 100 per cent of the revised target of 2,018 micro-projects. These micro projects were mostly in the onion chain<sup>9</sup>, followed by small ruminants and cowpeas chains. These chains were selected considering the predominance of women, which represented 75 per cent of beneficiaries in the cowpea chain, and 64 per cent in the small ruminant's chain, according to the PCR. In total, 19,715 beneficiaries were reached through micro projects, out of which 63.5 per cent of women and 10.2 per cent of youth. The total funding was over the target by 26 per cent reaching around US\$3.3 million, with the project providing 90 per cent of the funding through its FODEF and the beneficiaries contributing the remaining 10 per cent. According to the micro projects assessment carried out by the project in 2015, the success rate of funded micro projects was 89 per cent and the proportion of beneficiaries who have reinvested in their chain was 93 per cent.<sup>10</sup> But these reported data can be questioned as discussed in the following paragraph.
30. Indeed, the PCR notes that the vast majority of micro projects were approved in the production chain, and to a lesser extent, for the storage of onion. Only 4 per cent of the approved micro projects were located in the processing or marketing chains. The weak organization of these chains around CEIGs and a lack of flexibility in the financing mechanisms are cited as the main reasons. Therefore, the absence of synergies with PASPRU limited the effectiveness of the interventions, which barely covered downstream activities. On another note, the PCR provides limited analysis of the FODEF results in enhancing access to sustainable financial services. It appears, according to supervision reports<sup>11</sup>, that the financing mechanism showed weaknesses in its approach as CEIGs remained highly dependent to project subventions, with limited entrepreneurship capacities, and were unable to generate enough profits from micro projects to reconstitute a working capital. The latter was essential to expand the number of beneficiaries within CEIGs.
31. **Summary - effectiveness.** The project, also with the help of three-year extension, achieved most of its revised physical targets. PROFIL was successful in structuring the production chain and organizing producers within CEIGs and apex organizations. However, the project's ambitions to adopt a holistic approach, involving upstream and downstream activities were hampered by the failure of partnerships planned with other projects. In addition, the CEIGs remain highly dependent to the project's subventions and the FODEF was not successful in enhancing access to sustainable financial services and promoting entrepreneurship among its beneficiaries. As a result, effectiveness is rated as **moderately satisfactory (4)**, which is the same rating given by PMD.

### Efficiency

32. The time lapse between the project's approval and its entry into duty was one year and it took the project 14 months to start its activities. The programme's first disbursement was 19 months after its approval, below the national average of 2 years and above the regional average of 14 months for IFAD supported projects.<sup>12</sup> A mid-term review was carried out late, in 2013, and introduced important changes and evolutions in the project.
33. **Disbursement performance.** At project closure, disbursement of funds reached 92 per cent of project total cost. The PCR highlights two different periods during the project implementation. Up to 2010, PROFIL made no expense on productive investment and the discrepancies between investment and management expenditures hampered the project's efficiency until 2013. Since the MTR, and following the loan extension in 2013 and 2015, PROFIL focused its interventions on investments expenditures, notably micro projects, and improved significantly the

<sup>9</sup> The high number of onion micro projects is linked to the project dissemination of a local innovation called "tilgr-baoré", an onion storage hut.

<sup>10</sup> PROFIL, Rapport de l'étude des effets des micro-projets sur les bénéficiaires du PROFIL, Mars 2015.

<sup>11</sup> PROFIL, Supervision report, July 2016, p. 8.

<sup>12</sup> IFAD – WCA 2018, Portfolio Stocktake.



management expense ratio. Component 1, rural communication and stakeholders networking, had the lowest disbursement rate with only 36 per cent. At the opposite, programme management expenditures exceeded the target by 67 per cent, mainly due to the project's three year extension.

34. **Project coordination and management.** PROFIL experienced important issues regarding human resources management, with high staff turnover and low performance of some key project staff which hampered the implementation of some components. The project had four directors, three financial and administrative managers and three monitoring and evaluation managers, in a period of nine years. Only PASPRU have similar figures among other IFAD funded projects in the country. The delays in firming up the management set up, was one of the main reasons behind the failure to create synergies with PASPRU. On another note, the monitoring and evaluation system was only operationalized in 2013 and was impeded by the weak human resources at its disposal. The PCR notes that the data were collected in an inconsistent and irregular manner, and exclusively at the level of output, preventing thus the M&E system to play its role.
35. **Financial management.** PROFIL did not have an adequate administrative, accounting and financial system despite the introduction in 2008 of procedures and financial tools to improve the quality of fiduciary management (financial management software and the Manual of Procedures, re-actualized in January 2012). Supervision reports highlighted problems related to eligibility of expenditures, adequacy of supporting documents, rigor and timeliness of accounting by regional offices, internal control, and contract management. While some progresses were made in the last implementation years, overall the quality of financial reporting was poor with weakness on internal control and recurrent ineligible expenditures.
36. **Financial and economic analysis.** The economic internal rate of return of the project was estimated, by the PCR, at 21 per cent, above the 17 per cent expected at design, and with a net present value of around US\$2.9 million. The economic and financial analysis is insufficiently developed in the PCR Appendix, and there are limited information about the models, the source of data and, if need be, the assumptions behind the models.
37. **Summary - efficiency.** PROFIL efficiency was affected by issues of disbursement during its first years of implementation and high management costs. The project also faced management issues, with high staff turnover and weak financial management. In addition, given the weak M&E system, the economic and financial analysis carried out by the PCR was not adequate to assess this criterion in depth. For this reason, the PCR rates efficiency as **moderately unsatisfactory (3)**, which is the same rating given by PMD.

### **Rural poverty impact**

38. Given the weak M&E system which did not provide second and third-level data (outcomes, impact), it is difficult to assess rural poverty impact. The project carried out a study in 2015 to assess the micro projects<sup>13</sup> as well as baseline and final socio-economic studies. Nonetheless, the PCR questions the validity and the quality of data collected by the project. The baseline was carried out jointly with PASPRU and included areas which are not covered by PROFIL. Moreover, as most interventions only started from 2015, notably the financial support to CEIGs, it was challenging to assess the project impact at its completion. Taking these limits into consideration, the programme's main impact were as follows:
39. **Household income and assets.** PROFIL aimed at increasing incomes by improving the access of the rural poor to productive investments and marketing services. The data derived from various studies carried out by the project shows an

<sup>13</sup> PROFIL, Rapport de l'étude des effets des micro-projets sur les bénéficiaires du PROFIL, Mars 2015.

increase in the income of micro projects beneficiaries. The final socio-economic survey shows an overall average annual income of surveyed beneficiary households of 756,295 XOF<sup>14</sup>, almost twice more than non-beneficiaries households. According to the 2015 assessment of micro projects, 93 per cent of beneficiaries noted an increase in their income, which was even more important among onion and sesame producers. Other surveys related to the FODEF confirmed these results with 56 per cent of beneficiaries surveyed reporting an increase of more than 100 per cent in their income. Nonetheless, it should be noted that 65 per cent of micro projects were funded in the last three years of PROFIL, whereas most of the above-mentioned studies were carried out between 2013 and 2015, on a limited sample of micro projects. It is therefore difficult to assess the impact of recently funded micro-projects on household income. Besides, it should be noted that supervision reports (2015-2016), raised questions about the profitability of funded micro projects and the ability of CEIGs to expand the number of beneficiaries. Overall, it appears that the increase in income generated by micro projects was limited and was used primarily to meet basic needs (health, clothing, education, food), without enabling to make investments in the short term.<sup>15</sup>

40. **Human and social capital and empowerment.** By promoting a value chain approach, PROFIL strengthened the capacities of stakeholders at different level. The project provided trainings to beneficiaries in processing techniques and processes, hygiene and quality control, marketing, financial and organizational management. The technologies promoted in the cowpea chain have led to a significant reduction in drudgery and working time. The programme also provided training and technical support to CEIGs which led to an improvement in their internal governance and in their ability to provide services to their members. PROFIL also promoted CEIGs insertion within apex organizations and supported the creation and funding of 68 development plans. As a result of the project's interventions, apex organizations improved their categorization, with seven moving from category 1 to 2 and one moving from category 2 to 3.
41. **Food security and agricultural productivity.** PROFIL support in terms of equipment, inputs and, most importantly, training on improved techniques (e.g. farmer field schools) had a positive influence on agricultural production and productivity. For instance, according to the PCR, the farmer field schools resulted in an increase in yields and a reduction in production costs. The project's socio economic studies suggest an increase in the production among benefiting CEIGs, since the MTR, of cowpea (from 1,080 to 3,331 tons, 55 per cent more than the target), onion (from 4 200 to 8 957 tons, 97 per cent of the target) and sesame (from 1 170 to 1 783 tons, 69 per cent of the target).<sup>16</sup> These production volumes do not necessarily mean an increase in productivity as the results didn't include an analysis of the unit surface area necessary for the production. It is therefore impossible to know if the increase in production volume is a result of intensive or extensive farming techniques. Considering the nature of the supported chains, mainly subsistence crops, it is possible to affirm that part of the production have been used to meet food needs of beneficiaries. The PCR suggests that the project enhanced food security in the project area, basing its analysis on the RIMS final survey, which reports that the percentage of households suffering from food scarcity dropped by 13 per cent, but these results are questionable.
42. **Policy and institutions.** PROFIL was designed with a national scope in terms of policy and institutional objectives, with the project expected to be an integral part of a wider, national programme for fostering value chain development. The PCR did

<sup>14</sup> Around 1500 USD.

<sup>15</sup> PROFIL, Project Completion Report, p. 16, paragraph 77.

<sup>16</sup> The results of this study can be questioned as it was carried out in 2014, three years before the end of the project on a sample of 371 benefiting CEIGs in the targeted area. The evolution of the production corresponds to rough estimates by beneficiaries who benefitted from micro projects. The results were collected through monitoring sheets and were compared with baseline data collected through a socio-economic study in 2010.

not provide analysis of the leading role PROFIL was expected to play in value chain development, especially for the cowpea and sesame chains. Burkina Faso adopted an action plan for the sesame chain in 2009, but it is not possible, from the project documentation, to assess a potential contribution of the project to its formulation. As for the Cowpea Action Plan, it has not been updated since 2002. These two commodity chains, receive few resources from the national budget.<sup>17</sup> Therefore, the project didn't obtain significant results at policy level.

43. At institutional level, PROFIL is the first IFAD funded project in Burkina Faso to provide a substantial support in strengthening the capacities of RCAs. The project consolidated their role as the main interlocutor for agriculture and rural development in the regions. They were involved in approving micro projects and raising awareness among beneficiaries.
44. **Rural poverty impact.** PROFIL main impact was in structuring and strengthening the capacities of rural institutions along the value chains and enabling RCAs to play a vital role in local development. It is likely that the project has contributed to an increase in household incomes through the financing of micro projects and that it has enhanced food security. These results are however nuanced by the project's late start up and a lack of evidence and reliable data in project documents. In light of the above, the PCR rates rural poverty impact as **moderately satisfactory (4)**, which is the same rating as PMD.

### **Sustainability of benefits**

45. **Institutional sustainability.** PROFIL strengthened the role of RCAs in piloting development interventions and in monitoring micro projects. The project also contributed to implement a sustainable network of service providers with: i) local editors, providing support to CEIGs in formulating and building their micro projects; ii) field extension assistants ("vulgarisateurs volontaires villageois"), providing technical support and vaccination to local poultry producers; iii) agrochemical brigadiers ("brigadiers phytosanitaires"); as well as iv) craftsmen (welders and woodworkers), with expertise on building and disseminating the onion storage hut. However, as the project intensified its interventions in the last three years, it has negatively affected the capacity of the service providers to support micro-projects in an efficient manner. For instance, it resulted in local writers following many more micro projects than expected, which was beyond their capacities.
46. **Economic sustainability.** The PCR notes that 65 per cent of the micro projects were funded in the last three years of the project, which raises questions about their support and follow up after project completion. The sustainability of livestock projects will depend on the beneficiaries' capacities to apply hygiene norms and control diseases. Overall, the micro projects funded by PROFIL were not market oriented which limited their insertion in the value chains and hence their sustainability. The CEIGs also remain highly dependent on the project subventions, as noted in supervision reports, and the project was not successful in developing a sustainable financing mechanism.
47. **Technical sustainability.** PROFIL developed cost-effective local innovations, such as the onion storage hut, which sustainability is favored by the network of 53 craftsmen set up by the project. However, only one welder, in Centre North, was trained in building and maintaining the manual cowpea thresher and the project could not finance, due to lack of time, the training of local craftsmen to maintain the motorized cowpea thresher.
48. **Summary – sustainability of benefits.** The project approach to strengthen the capacities of rural institutions, notably RCAs, and to develop a network of service

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<sup>17</sup> According to FAO, cowpea and sesame received only 1 per cent of agricultural national expenditures, compared to 32 per cent and 52 per cent respectively for rice and cotton.

providers is in favour of its sustainability. Moreover, the sustainability will be further strengthened by the ongoing Neer Tamba project, which implementation relies on RCAs in the same areas. However, there are some issues regarding the sustainability of micro projects and the maintenance of some equipment. As a result, the overall project sustainability is rated as **moderately satisfactory (4)**, which is the same as the PMD rating.

### **Innovation**

49. One of the project's main strength was to disseminate innovations applied and promoted by local populations. The onion storage hut, called "tilgr baoré" and created by an apex organisation of onion producers, is a good example. The hut has a capacity of 10 tons and enables to store the production up to 10 months with a loss rate of only 3 per cent, if the producer applies appropriated techniques for onion storage. PROFIL disseminated 448 hut in the project area, developed a technical-economic sheet (translated into local languages), and trained 53 local craftsmen (welders and carpenters). On another note, PROFIL also established a partnership with IRSAT to build and operationalize 81 manual cowpea threshers and four motorized multi-purpose threshers with a production capacity of 800 kg/hour, used for threshing and cleaning cowpeas, maize, sorghum and rice. This equipment contributed to significantly reducing workload and drudgery among beneficiaries.
50. As part of the institutional innovations, PROFIL introduced support providers, called "local writers" in the project area. This support mechanism showed encouraging results but there are doubts about its institutional sustainability, in the light of the development, by PASPRU, of business development providers, called resource centres for rural entrepreneurship (CREER). On another note, the project's innovations were limited by the poor performance of the rural communication sub-component which intended to use innovative methods and practices to integrate different stakeholders in information exchange process from bottom up and vice versa.
51. In light of the above, the PCR rates innovation as **satisfactory (5)**, which is the same rating given by PMD.

### **Scaling up**

52. The PCR provides no specific analysis regarding scaling up. PROFIL is expected to upscale activities through the network of service providers for increasing outreach and village animal health workers, and for preparing micro-projects. The project also rely on unions, federations and other associations of commodity chain actors including CEIGs and chambers of agriculture active at provincial, regional and national levels. A number of the innovations introduced by the project will be scaled up by the ongoing Neer Tamba and the recently approved Agricultural Value Chains Promotion Project – PAPFA, which design draw on lessons learned from PROFIL. But there is no evidence of scaling up by other actors, including the Government. As a consequence, the PCR rates scaling up moderately **satisfactory (4)**, one point below PMD rating.

### **Gender equality and women's empowerment**

53. **Economic empowerment.** PROFIL, through its targeting approach and the selection of women-dominated chains, reached directly more than 20,600 women, about 60 per cent of project direct beneficiaries (34,711). The project approach was to support women's groups' micro projects and at least 50 per cent of beneficiaries and 60 per cent of CEIGs members needed to be women for a micro project to be positively considered by the FODEF. In addition, the project developed "positive discrimination" criteria for women's CEIGs funding requests by granting them 2 points, against 1 point for a mixed CEIG and 0 point for a men's CEIG. According to the PCR, women represented 75 per cent of beneficiaries for

cowpea micro projects and more than 60 per cent for livestock micro projects. The PCR suggests that the support received have contributed to economic empowerment of women as they are able to contribute to household expenses. However, women still face structural challenges such as access to inputs (land) and financial services.

54. **Presence and influence in rural institutions and organizations.** PROFIL also aimed at increasing women's presence and decision making within rural institutions. In order to strengthen their skills, women were trained on financial and organizational management and beneficiaries were also sensitized about the importance of women participation. PROFIL did not achieve its objectives in terms of percentage of women member of apex organization's board. In addition, women still face high illiteracy rates and traditional hurdles which limit their participation and influence in mixed rural organizations. Finally, women only represented 27 per cent of trained services providers, such as local writers, field extension assistant, or agrochemical brigadiers.
55. **Balance in workloads and in the sharing of economic and social benefits.** The equipment introduced by the project significantly reduced workload and drudgery as it facilitated the threshing of cowpea and improved the quality of production. However, the project could not train local craftsmen to the maintenance of the cowpea motorized thresher, which limits its outreach.
56. PROFIL did contribute to increase women incomes through micro projects and reduce drudgery of work but the project was not successful in addressing structural challenges limiting their presence in mixed rural organizations and their access to inputs and sustainable financial services. In light of the above, the PCR rates this criterion as **moderately satisfactory (4)**, one point below PMD rating.

### **Environment and natural resources management**

57. The project documents, mainly the PCR and supervision reports, did not cover this criterion.<sup>18</sup> According to the project design, the project's planned activities and potential impacts were not expected to have a significant negative impact on the environment, allowing the project to be classified as "category B". It is mentioned in the PCR, that all micro projects, prior to their approval, were assessed regarding their environmental impacts by specialized services from the Ministry of the Environment. The PCR adds that any micro project with major negative environmental effects, and without mitigation measures, was systematically rejected.
58. One of the main challenges was the reduction in chemical fertilizer and pesticide use, which would improve the overall environment as well as the health of smallholder producers. PROFIL trained 256 "agrochemical brigadiers" to ensure a use of pesticides which is compliant with the norms. The project supported the production of organic sesame and peasant school fields promoted the production of organic pesticides. Also, promoting the production of small ruminants and local poultry has generated organic manure that has helped restore soil fertility.
59. The project documents do not include additional analysis about natural resources management. For instance, the storage onion hut promoted by the project is wood-consuming and its impact on natural resources could have been further assessed.
60. Overall, the project activities in the field of agriculture and livestock can be considered as having positive effects on the environment. However, there is limited analysis and data (e.g. micro projects environmental impacts) in the project documents to demonstrate it. Considering the above, the PCR rates this criterion as **moderately satisfactory (4)**, the same as PMD rating.

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<sup>18</sup> Appendix 13 of the PCR is related to the project's environmental impact but provide limited analysis.

## **Adaptation to climate change**

61. The PCR did not cover this criterion in its analysis stating that the project was designed in 2006, before these aspects became integrated in IFAD funded projects. Yet, the climate change is a key issue in the country's northern regions covered by PROFIL, which suffer from severe water stress and extreme climatic variations. It appears that the project design didn't take into account climatic risks in this Sahelian area in which floods, droughts and pests invasions might have impacted the results of micro-projects and the chains targeted by the project, notably the sesame. But given the lack of analysis and data in the project documentation, and the absence of rating from PMD, the PCR/V prefer not to assess this criterion.

## **B. Overall project achievement**

62. PROFIL is likely to have achieved positive impacts on the livelihoods of the beneficiaries through the financing of micro projects within the value chains of five commodities. The programme was successful in introducing new value chain development dynamics in Burkina Faso and effectively targeted women. The adjustments made at the MTR were highly relevant and enabled the project to focus its interventions at different levels of the value chains. PROFIL contributed to structure and organize the farmers around apex organizations and to strengthen the ownership of RCAs in local development. The programme also introduced and disseminated several innovations that have a potential for replication and sustainability.
63. The programme results were, however, affected by significant implementation delays, mainly relating to human resources issues. As a result, the complementarity approach with PASPRU could not be implemented, limiting thus the micro project's insertion into value chains. The late implementation of the micro projects raise questions about their sustainability. In addition, the impact of the project is difficult to assess because the M&E system was not operational until 2013 and the quality of the impact surveys is questionable.
64. In view of the above, the PCR/V rates the overall project achievement as **moderately satisfactory (4)**, which is the same rating given by the PMD.

## **C. Performance of partners**

65. **IFAD.** IFAD was responsible for supervision of the project. PROFIL was indeed the first project in Burkina Faso to be directly supervised by IFAD from its starting date. The PCR highlights two distinct periods in the project's lifetime. Up until 2011, IFAD lacked proactivity in addressing the project's issues. In 2011, four years after its entry into force, PROFIL had disbursed just 14 per cent of its resources and the audit of the 2008 accounts, sent to IFAD in July 2009, highlighted many malfunctions. IFAD and the Government should have raised the alarm much earlier and sent a midterm review mission as early as 2011, according to the PCR. The revision of the logical framework should have occurred much earlier in the life of the project since it was not until 2013 that these changes were made, one year from the project's original date of completion. The PCR partially explained these difficulties by the high turn-over of IFAD country programme managers (CPMs) – three between 2006 and 2011 – which made it difficult to take decisions for drastic changes in the project implementation.
66. Since the establishment of a country office in 2010, considerable efforts were made by IFAD to put the project back on track. PROFIL was categorized a *project at risk* in July 2011 and the supervision missions included more consultants (five against two before), providing the project with the required expertise. A priority plan was set up in 2011 and was crucial in reviving the project. On another note, the rotation of CPM became more stable, with one CPM staying over four years between 2011 and 2015. The mid-term review could not be organized before 2013, as the project was yet to carry out its interventions, but it provided the requested

changes, with adjustments made to the logical framework and interventions focusing on value chain stakeholders. There were also more proactivity in changing underperforming management staff. Finally, IFAD decision to grant two extensions for a total period of three years was inevitable considering the significant delays in project implementation.

67. Considering the above, most notably the important efforts to rescue a project that was on the brink of early closure in 2012, the PCR rates IFAD performance as **moderately satisfactory (4)**, which is the same rating given by PMD.
68. **Government.** At operational level, the Government lacked proactivity during the project's first years. The project implementation was hampered by internal conflicts within the programme management unit until 2011 and the Government was not prompt to address the situation by replacing key positions among project management staff. There was also no close monitoring of the project interventions by the Ministry of Agriculture. In addition, the Government shares with IFAD the responsibility of the weak M&E system.
69. However, the PCR notes that the Government performance was satisfactory with regard to the mobilization of counterpart funding, despite few delays. The Government also pre-financed with its own resources the development fund – FODEF – which allowed to financially supporting the micro projects. The decentralized services, supported by the project, provided valuable proximity technical support and contributed to the implementation of the micro projects. The Government also joined hands with IFAD to agree to an emergency action plan in 2011 to put the project back on track and to remove two project directors and other relevant staff which were underperforming. These decisions were crucial to prevent an early closure of the project in 2012 with no results.
70. As a result, the PCR rates the Government performance as **moderately satisfactory (4)**, which is the same rating given by PMD.

## IV. Assessment of PCR quality

### Scope

71. The PCR covers the key questions and follows broadly the PCR guidelines. However, some criteria, such as environment and natural resource management, adaptation to climate change are missing and others such as relevance, scaling up Government performance and gender and women's empowerment could have been further analyzed. In addition, the effectiveness analysis is not structured around the project's specific objectives, which was necessary, but by type of stakeholders, as recommended by the MTR. Overall, following the adjustments made at MTR and the revision of the logical framework, the project's results were not reported by components but as per the three expected outputs. These changes made it difficult to measure the project's achievements as they were expected at design. Therefore, the PCR rates PCR scope as **moderately unsatisfactory (3)**.

### Quality

72. The PCR methodology is well detailed in the report. However. The project impact section was limited by the available data, questioned by the PCR itself (project studies). The financial and economic analysis gives little detail about the methodology, namely a description of the models and the data source. As a result, the PCR quality is rated as **moderately satisfactory (4)**.

### Lessons

73. The PCR identified a number of relevant key lessons learned from PROFIL, almost exclusively at operational level, based on the available evidence. Additional lessons at strategic level could have been added. The PCR's lessons are rated **moderately satisfactory (4)**.

## **Candour**

74. The analysis produced by the PCR was objective, acknowledging the limits of the available evidence and outlining both positive and negative aspects of the project throughout the document. However, the project's achievements were analyzed with regard to the revised indicators, with no mention to the initial targets in the main text. In addition, the ratings seemed sometimes to reflect the project performance after the MTR, without taking into account the difficulties in the first years of implementation. Therefore, the PCR's candour is rated as **moderately satisfactory (4)**.

## **V. Lessons learned**

75. Key lessons to be learned from PROFIL, drawn from the PCR and the PCRV conclusions, are as follows:
76. **Programme management.** PROFIL implementation was hampered by the low performance of its programme management unit, which led to frequent changes in management staff. It is therefore important to carefully recruit project staff on the basis of their skills, without other considerations. The M&E system should be also strengthened to provide reliable data about the project performance and impact as well as lessons learned.
77. **Support to productive investments.** PROFIL experience shows that micro projects are more successful when they are market-oriented and fully integrated in the value chains. CEIGs need better access to market information as well as business events in order to advertise their products and expand their outreach. In addition, it requires extensive human resources to ensure the monitoring and assessment of thousands of micro projects. Finally, the development of value chains such as poultry farming, cowpea, and onion matches the gender targeting of IFAD projects in Burkina Faso.
78. **Strengthening local capacities.** PROFIL approach to develop a network of service providers is an important feature to ensure the project's sustainability. In addition, the project's strategy, which consisted in strengthening the capacities of RCAs and gradually transferring the micro projects monitoring contributed to reinforce their role as a leading actor in local development. Finally, the involvement of the Government's decentralized services appears to be crucial in ensuring a follow up of activities and developing the technical support services.



## Definition and rating of the evaluation criteria used by IOE

Criteria	Definition *	Mandatory	To be rated
<b>Rural poverty impact</b>	Impact is defined as the changes that have occurred or are expected to occur in the lives of the rural poor (whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended) as a result of development interventions. <i>Four impact domains</i>	X	Yes
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Household income and net assets: Household income provides a means of assessing the flow of economic benefits accruing to an individual or group, whereas assets relate to a stock of accumulated items of economic value. The analysis must include an assessment of trends in equality over time.</li> </ul>		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Human and social capital and empowerment: Human and social capital and empowerment include an assessment of the changes that have occurred in the empowerment of individuals, the quality of grass-roots organizations and institutions, the poor's individual and collective capacity, and in particular, the extent to which specific groups such as youth are included or excluded from the development process.</li> </ul>		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Food security and agricultural productivity: Changes in food security relate to availability, stability, affordability and access to food and stability of access, whereas changes in agricultural productivity are measured in terms of yields; nutrition relates to the nutritional value of food and child malnutrition.</li> </ul>		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Institutions and policies: The criterion relating to institutions and policies is designed to assess changes in the quality and performance of institutions, policies and the regulatory framework that influence the lives of the poor.</li> </ul>		No
<b>Project performance</b>	Project performance is an average of the ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.	X	Yes
Relevance	The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, institutional priorities and partner and donor policies. It also entails an assessment of project design and coherence in achieving its objectives. An assessment should also be made of whether objectives and design address inequality, for example, by assessing the relevance of targeting strategies adopted.	X	Yes
Effectiveness	The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.	X	Yes
Efficiency	A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results.	X	Yes
Sustainability of benefits	The likely continuation of net benefits from a development intervention beyond the phase of external funding support. It also includes an assessment of the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the project's life.	X	Yes
<b>Other performance criteria</b>			
Gender equality and women's empowerment	The extent to which IFAD interventions have contributed to better gender equality and women's empowerment, for example, in terms of women's access to and ownership of assets, resources and services; participation in decision making; work load balance and impact on women's incomes, nutrition and livelihoods.	X	Yes
Innovation	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have introduced innovative approaches to rural poverty reduction.	X	Yes
Scaling up	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have been (or are likely to be) scaled up by government authorities, donor organizations, the private sector and others agencies.	X	Yes
Environment and natural resources management	The extent to which IFAD development interventions contribute to resilient livelihoods and ecosystems. The focus is on the use and management of the natural environment, including natural resources defined as raw materials used for socio-economic and cultural purposes, and ecosystems and biodiversity - with the goods and services they provide.	X	Yes
Adaptation to climate change	The contribution of the project to reducing the negative impacts of climate change through dedicated adaptation or risk reduction measures.	X	Yes

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Definition</i> *	<i>Mandatory</i>	<i>To be rated</i>
<b>Overall project achievement</b>	This provides an overarching assessment of the intervention, drawing upon the analysis and ratings for rural poverty impact, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, gender equality and women's empowerment, innovation, scaling up, as well as environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change.	X	Yes
<b>Performance of partners</b>			
• IFAD	This criterion assesses the contribution of partners to project design, execution, monitoring and reporting, supervision and implementation support, and evaluation. The performance of each partner will be assessed on an individual basis with a view to the partner's expected role and responsibility in the project life cycle.	X	Yes
• Government		X	Yes

\* These definitions build on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management; the Methodological Framework for Project Evaluation agreed with the Evaluation Committee in September 2003; the first edition of the Evaluation Manual discussed with the Evaluation Committee in December 2008; and further discussions with the Evaluation Committee in November 2010 on IOE's evaluation criteria and key questions.

## Rating comparison<sup>a</sup>

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Programme Management Department (PMD) rating</i>	<i>IOE Project Completion Report Validation (PCRVR) rating</i>	<i>Net rating disconnect (PCRVR-PMD)</i>
<b>Rural poverty impact</b>	4	4	0
<b>Project performance</b>			
Relevance	4	4	0
Effectiveness	4	4	0
Efficiency	3	3	0
Sustainability of benefits	4	4	0
<b>Project performance<sup>b</sup></b>	3,75	3,75	0
<b>Other performance criteria</b>			
Gender equality and women's empowerment	5	4	-1
Innovation	5	5	0
Scaling up	5	4	-1
Environment and natural resources management	4	4	0
Adaptation to climate change	NA	NA	-
<b>Overall project achievement<sup>c</sup></b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Performance of partners<sup>d</sup></b>			
IFAD	4	4	0
Government	4	4	0
<b>Average net disconnect</b>			<b>-0.18</b>

<sup>a</sup> Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable.

<sup>b</sup> Arithmetic average of ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.

<sup>c</sup> This is not an average of ratings of individual evaluation criteria but an overarching assessment of the project, drawing upon the rating for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, rural poverty impact, gender, innovation, scaling up, environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change.

<sup>d</sup> The rating for partners' performance is not a component of the overall project achievement rating.

### Ratings of the project completion report quality

	<i>PMD rating</i>	<i>IOE PCRVR rating</i>	<i>Net disconnect</i>
Candour	-	4	
Lessons	-	4	
Quality (methods, data, participatory process)	-	4	
Scope	-	3	
Overall rating of the project completion report			

Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable

## Review of outputs

Indicateurs				
Libellé	Situation de référence Unité de mesure	Cible révisée 2016	Réal/Niveau 31/12/2016	%
Nombre de ménages (vulnérables, dont le chef est une femme, jeunes) insérés durablement et équitablement dans les filières	Nombre	10 000	20 612	206,12%
Volume de la production issue de l'agriculture familiale (par produit)				
Niébé	Tonne	2 175	3 381	155,45%
Sésame	Tonne	2 585	1 783	68,97%
Oignon	Tonne	9 200	8 957	97,36%
Nombre moyen de poulets vendus par éleveur/an	Nombre	87	71	81,61%
Nombre moyen de petits ruminants embouchés par éleveur/an	Nombre	13	11	84,62%
<b>Taux d'accroissement des productions végétales</b>				
Niébé	Pourcentage	101	81	80,20%
Sésame	Pourcentage	120	28	23,33%
Oignon	Pourcentage	119	164	137,82%
Taux de succès des microprojets financés (filière, maillon, région)	Pourcentage	100	89,4	89,40%
Proportion des bénéficiaires ayant réinvesti dans leur filière	Pourcentage	100	92,8	92,80%
Microprojets financés (filière, maillon, région)	Nombre	2 018	2 018	100,00%
<b>Personnes ayant accès au fonds destinés au développement*</b>	Nombre	20 000	34 711	173,56%
<b>Institutions financières participant au projet *</b>	Nombre	0	174	
Proportion des GIE membres d'OF de référence	Pourcentage	100	68	68,00%
Nombre de groupements formalisés	Nombre	155	115	74,19%
Nombre de groupements accompagnés pour l'élaboration des plans d'affaires	Nombre	1 861	2 831	152,12%
Membres des GIE formés en gestion	Nombre	5 583	5 429	97,24%
Nombre de groupements encadrés lors de la mise en œuvre de leur microprojet	Nombre	1 861	1 430	76,84%
Nombre de GIE ayant échangé avec les IMF	Nombre	1 861	1 699	91,30%
Groupes ayant bénéficié des services du projet*	Nombre	2 016	2 003	99,36%
Ménages ayant bénéficié des services du projet SYGRI*	Nombre	20 000	34 711	173,56%
Groupes de commercialisation formés/consolidés*	Nombre	52	74	142,31%
Membres des groupes de commercialisation formés/consolidés*	Nombre	770	544	70,65%
Groupes de commercialisation comptant des femmes dans leurs instances de direction*	Nombre	52	22	42,31%
Personnel des prestataires de services formé*	Nombre	336	188	55,95%
Personnes ayant accès aux services de conseil mis en place*	Nombre	100 000	173 646	173,65%
Ménages ayant accès aux services zoosanitaires*	Nombre	4 560	6 946	152,32%
OF créées/renforcées*	Nombre	50	84	168,00%
Nombre d'OF constituées/formalisées avec l'appui du projet	Nombre	78	80	102,56%
Nombre d'OF de niveau 1 dotés d'un PDF	Nombre	47	43	91,49%
Nombre d'OF de niveau 2 dotés d'un PDF	Nombre	17	17	100,00%
Nombre d'OF de niveau 3 dotés d'un PDF	Nombre	8	8	100,00%
Nombre de PDF mis à jour	Nombre	38	37	97,37%
Nombre d'actions des OF financées	Nombre	136	126	92,65%

Indicateurs				
Nombre d'actions intégrées financées	Nombre	24	22	91,67%
Nombre d'ateliers bilan-concertation par filière	Nombre	30	26	86,67%
Nombre de réunions d'information et de concertation avec les GIE	Nombre	40	31	77,50%
Nombre de foires/journées promotionnelles appuyées	Nombre	30	33	110,00%
Nombre de sessions CPP tenues	Nombre	51	51	100,00%
Nombre de sessions CAP tenues	Nombre	20	20	100,00%
Nombre de microprojets approuvés par les CAP	Nombre	2 018	2018	100,00%
Nombre de PDT des filières élaborés	Nombre	4	4	100,00%
Nombre de PDT des filières mis en œuvre	Nombre	5	5	100,00%
Nombre de sessions d'approbation des plans d'action des OF (CTAA)	Nombre	12	12	100,00%
Existence de RTE des filières d'appui	Nombre	7	7	100,00%
Nombre de demandes d'appuis des OF examinées par les CRA	Nombre	129	125	96,90%
Nombre de protocoles signés par la CRA avec les STD	Nombre	39	36	92,31%
Nombre de protocoles signés par la CRA avec les OF	Nombre	116	123	106,03%
Base de données des MP et appuis aux OF fonctionnelle	Nombre	1	1	100,00%
Disponibilité de répertoire des GIE et OF	Nombre	4	4	100,00%
Disponibilité de répertoire des corps d'appui	Nombre	4	4	100,00%

Source: PCR, 2017.

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## List of acronyms

BOAD	Banque Ouest-Africaine de Développement
CEIG	Common Economic Interest Group
COSOP	Programme d'Options Stratégiques par Pays
CPM	Country Programme Manager
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
FODEF	Commodity Chain Development Fund
IOE	Independent Office of Evaluation
IRSAT	Institut de recherche en sciences appliquées et technologies
MTR	Mid-Term Review
PASPRU	Programme d'appui et de promotion du secteur privé en milieu rural
PCR	Project Completion Report
PCRV	Project Completion Report Validation
PNSR	Programme National du Secteur Rural
PMD	Programme Management Department
PMU	Programme Management Unit
PROFIL	Projet d'appui aux filières agricoles
RCA	Regional chamber of agriculture
RIMS	Results and Impact Management System
SCADD	Stratégie de croissance accélérée et de développement durable
USD	Dollars des États-Unis
WCA	Division Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre – FIDA
XOF	Franc de Communauté Financière Africaine (XOF)