

Project Completion Report Validation

Rural Business Development Services Programme (PASPRU)

Burkina Faso

Date of validation by IOE: July 2018

I. Basic project data

			Approval (US\$ m)		Actual (US\$ m)	
Region	WCA	Total project costs	25.2		9.9	
Country	Burkina Faso	IFAD financing and percentage of total	8.1 (loan) 8.1 (grant)	64%	4.59 (loan) 4.59 (grant)	93%
Loan and grant number	DSF Grant 8030 BF Loan 775 BF	Government	3.9	15.3%	0.6	6%
Type of project (subsector)	Credit and Financial Services	West African Development Bank	5.1	20.3%	-	-
Financing type	Loan and grant on 50:50 ratio	Cofinancier 2	-			
Lending terms	Highly Concessional	Cofinancier 3	-			
Date of approval	30 April 2009	Cofinancier 4	-			
Date of loan signature	23 September 2009	Beneficiaries	0.1	0.4%	0.2	1%
Date of effectiveness	08 December 2010	Other sources	-			
Financing agreement amendments	21 April 2011	Number of beneficiaries	12,000 microenterprises 60,000 beneficiaries		4,959 microenterprises 15,193 beneficiaries	
Loan closure extensions	-	Completion date	31 December 2016		31 December 2016	
Country programme managers	Abdoul Barry (since 2015) ¹	Financing closing date	30 June 2017		30 June 2017	
Regional director(s)	Lisandro Martins (since 2018) ²	Mid-term review			July 2014	
Project completion report reviewer	Hamdi Ahmedou	IFAD loan disbursement at project completion (%)			57	
Project completion report quality control panel	Max Kodjo Ernst Schaltegger Fumiko Nakai	Date of the project completion report			June 2017	

Source: Project Completion Report (PCR), President's Report, Oracle Business Intelligence.

* Under the debt sustainability framework, the IFAD financing was 50 per cent a loan on a highly concessional terms and 50 per cent grant. A highly concessional loan is free of interest but bearing a service charge of three fourths of one per cent (0.75%) per annum and having a maturity period of 40 years, including a grace period of 10 years.

¹ Norman Messer, Mohamed Tounessi (2010-2011), Cristiana Sparacino (2011-2015).

² Mohamed Béavogui, Perin Saint-Ange, Ides de Willebois.

II. Project outline

1. **Introduction.** The Rural Business Development Services Programme (PASPRU) was approved by the IFAD Executive Board in April 2009 and completed in December 2016. The programme built on the achievements of the Rural Development Services Program (PAMER), closed in 2008, and was designed as a complementary intervention to the Agricultural Commodity Chain Support Project (PROFIL), which was approved in December 2006.
2. **Country context.** Burkina Faso is a Sahelian country, landlocked, and exposed to severe climatic conditions. Its population, estimated at 18.6 million at the end 2016, is young and growing very fast, with around 65.2 percent of the population being 25 years old or younger. Politically, the country is emerging from a transition, following the ousting of the former President in October 2014, but faces the critical challenge of national reconciliation and regional terrorist threats. On the economic front, the country has reported a very good macro-economic performance over the last 15 years but failed to generate a structural transformation of the economy and its labour force. Almost 80 percent of the labour force depends on agriculture as the prime activity, while women account for an estimated half of the labour force in rural areas and produce over two-thirds of food consumed in the country.³ Agriculture continues to suffer from low levels of productivity, with yields declining by 3 per cent and crop production increasing by only 10 per cent over the last decade. Diversification is also a challenge, as the overall structure of the sector has not changed since decades.⁴
3. **Project area.** PASPRU targeted eight of the country's eleven regions: Boucle du Mouhoun, Cascades, Centre Est, Est, Hauts Bassins, Boucle du Mouhoun, Nord, Centre Nord. These regions represent different agro ecological zones and face different levels of poverty (from 60% in Boucle du Mouhoun to 34% in Hauts-Bassins). The project area corresponds to the intervention areas covered by the Support to Rural Micro-Enterprises Project (PAMER) completed in 2008. The Agricultural Commodity Chain Support Project (PROFIL), completed in 2017, was identified to ensure complementarity with PASPRU in terms of value chain development. Nonetheless, PASPRU ambitions were significantly reduced following the withdrawal of the West African Development Bank (BOAD) financing, and the project was restructured, which led to the reduction of the interventions areas to four regions (Est, Boucle du Mouhoun, Cascades, Hauts-Bassins).
4. **Programme goal and objectives.** The programme goal, as stated in the President's Report, was to contribute to rural poverty reduction by developing the local private sector. This was expected to be achieved through two specific objectives: i) increasing the sustainable access of target groups to business development services, vocational training and technology; and ii) enhancing an enabling environment for the development of the local rural private sector.
5. **Programme components.** To reach its objective, the programme was initially structured around four components. **Component 1** aimed at promoting a viable and sustainable non-financial business development services market for rural entrepreneurs. **Component 2** that aimed at improving the enabling environment for microenterprise development, through collaboration with MFIs and banks to improve access to medium-term credit and develop new financial products for RMEs. The programme would, in addition, provide practical and methodological support to trainees and rural microenterprises (RMEs) for jobs creation and value addition. **Component 3** "Programme management" and **Component 4** "Support to the country programme", were expected to carry out financial and administrative management of the project and building synergies with other IFAD supported programmes in the country. A monitoring and evaluation system was

³ World Bank, Systematic Country Diagnosis, April 2016.

⁴ Ibid.

also supposed to be developed. In 2012, following a supervision mission, Component 4 was significantly reduced and merged into Component 3, reducing thus the number of programme components to three.

6. **Intervention logic.** By fostering an adequate enabling environment for RMEs and introducing new microfinance products and greater accessibility of business information, PASPRU aimed at creating sustainable employment opportunities. PASPRU built on the Rural Development Services Program (PAMER), closed in 2008. The main difference between both projects is the shift of strategy from a supply-driven support of Business Development Services (BDS) provision in PAMER to a more demand-driven approach to the provision of these services in PASPRU. The rationale of the latter was to move beyond income-generating micro-enterprises per se, to stimulating and structuring an adequate enabling environment for rural microenterprises (RMEs), allowing these to emerge and be sustained, especially in terms of their affordable access to private and public goods and services (including marketing expertise, small infrastructure, utilities).
7. For this purpose, the programme intended to set up 60 business development support (BDS) providers, called rural enterprise resource centres (CREERs), which would act as the main contact point for the direct target group and would facilitate their access to programme resources. Five CREERs were already set up under PAMER and were already operating at project design. The CREERs would receive support from the project to strengthen their network and deepen outreach over time. They would provide support to RMEs to improve service provision to their members as well as to strengthen their capacity for lobbying and policy dialogue.
8. In parallel, PASPRU would facilitate the access of microenterprises to financial services tailored to their needs. To implement its rural finance strategy, PASPRU would support partner financial institutions to develop and pilot new products and facilitate linkages between banks and microfinance institutions operating in the project area. PASPRU, among other interventions, would establish a guarantee mechanism to encourage financial institutions to lend mid-term funds to RMEs. In addition, a medium-term credit risk fund – “*Fonds d'Incitation*” – would be established and co-financed for at least fifty percent by MFIs. PASPRU also included a matching grant facility for innovation. The matching grant facility was expected to be a tool for RMEs to experiment and adopt new technologies to enhance their efficiency and profitability, without interfering with the provision of other financial services of banks and MFIs, but rather complementing them. Finally, it was also planned to establish a Community investment fund, financed by BOAD which would channel financing of community economic infrastructure through the communes. Through improved agro-processing and marketing infrastructure promoted by PASPRU, farm-gate prices for agricultural commodities were expected to increase together with demand.
9. In order to attain its objectives, PASPRU needed to be implemented in a stable socio-political context. The Government was supposed to establish a regulatory and legal framework in favour of business activities at national level. In addition, the presence of well-performing microfinance institutions and specialized service providers in the programme area was a pre-requisite. As the programme was relying on the institutional set up of PROFIL, at regional level, it was assumed that PROFIL would already be at a satisfactory level of progress and maturity, and its staff would give adequate attention to PASPRU's activities.
10. **Synergies with PROFIL.** PROFIL specific objectives were: a) to develop the links between its target groups and other commodity chain stakeholders; b) to strengthen the capacities of its target groups and their institutions; and c) to improve the access of the rural poor to productive investments and marketing services. Since rural producers often combine agricultural and non-agricultural activities, there was a potential overlap between PROFIL and PASPRU target groups

for income-generating activities and food processing activities. PROFIL was to benefit from PASPRU expertise in non-financial services to RMEs to strengthen production units, as part of its value chain approach. PROFIL beneficiaries would also be eligible for trainings organized by PASPRU. On another hand, PASPRU would benefit from PROFIL expertise in structuring and strengthening farmers' organizations as well as its activities to enhance access to market prices information.

11. **Target group.** The initial target group consisted of 12,000 rural microenterprises. These covered a large diversity of RMEs, from income-generating activities, to microenterprises. Indirect target groups consisted of small and medium-sized enterprises that had a demonstrable positive impact on the direct target group, including proportionate economic benefits.
12. According to the Design Report, PASPRU was to adopt an inclusive targeting approach, based on positive discrimination of IFAD target groups (including a minimum quota for women) and activity targeting (by selecting small-scale, pro-poor activities and technologies). To this end, a set of pre-conditions were introduced such as including targeting objectives in performance-based contracts with service providers so that their financial compensation depends on their contribution towards reaching these objectives. In addition, the programme would select economic sectors that require low investment and are easily accessible to women and young people. To further enhance women's targeting, a specific percentage - 50 per cent - of the innovation fund would be reserved for them.
13. **Financing.** The total estimated project cost, approved by the Executive Board, was US\$25. 2 million, of which IFAD was expected to provide a loan in the amount of US\$8.1 million and a grant under the Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF) in the amount of US\$8.1 million (64 per cent, for IFAD total financing), the West African Development Bank (BOAD) would contribute with an amount of US\$5.1 million (20.3 per cent), and the government US\$3. 9 million (15.3 per cent). A modest contribution of US\$0.1 million (0.4 per cent) would be provided by beneficiaries Table 1 below gives the total planned, revised, and actual contribution of each donor in US\$ and in percentage.
14. The total project cost was reduced to US\$20.1 million following the withdrawal of BOAD funding. While the reasons are not clearly specified in the project documents, it appears that the development bank withdrew its financing following instructions from the Government to reallocate the funds to another project.

Table 1
Project costs

<i>Funding sources</i>	<i>Estimated amount (m USD)</i>	<i>Estimated amount (% of total)</i>	<i>Expenditure (m USD)</i>	<i>Expenditure (% of total)</i>	<i>Disbursement rate (%)</i>
IFAD	16,2	64	9,2	93	57
BOAD	5,1	20,3	-	-	-
Government	3,8	15,3	0,6	6	16
Beneficiaries	0,96	0,4	0,1	0	106
TOTAL	25,2	100	9,9	100	49⁵

Source: PCR 2017, OBI.

15. Table 2 provides a breakdown of estimated and actual expenditures by component. The figures show a significant increase in programme management costs proportion which represented more than a third of project total costs at completion (against 14 per cent expected at design).

⁵ In relation to the revised project total cost, excluding BOAD expected contribution.

Table 2
Component costs

<i>Components</i>	<i>Estimated amount (m USD)</i>	<i>Estimated amount (% of total)</i>	<i>Expenditure (m USD)</i>	<i>Expenditure (% of total)</i>	<i>Disbursement rate^v</i>
Access of microenterprises to non-financial services	14,1	56	5,2	53	57%
Improving the enabling environment for microenterprise development	5,9	23	1	10	31%
IFAD country support programme	1,8	7	-	-	
Programme management	3,4	14	3,7	37	97%
TOTAL	25,2	100	9.9	100	49%

Source: Design document 2009 (estimation), and PCR 2017 (effective).

16. **Project implementation.** PASPRU was implemented by the Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Fisheries⁷, which is the main Government partner for IFAD in the country. The programme implementation was expected to be fully merged with PROFIL. Both projects were supposed to share their steering committee. A programme management unit (PMU), was based in Ouahigouya (Nord), within the same offices as PROFIL. In the regions where PROFIL was present (Nord, Centre-Nord, Boucle du Mouhoun), PASPRU was to rely on the PROFIL project staff.⁸ In 2013, the PMU was transferred to Ouagadougou to enhance the project efficiency and move it closer to its operations.
17. In addition, PASPRU was expected to build partnerships with the Ministry of Commerce, Enterprise Promotion and Handicrafts; the Burkina Faso Business Bureau (MEBF), which is a private operator; six microfinance institutions identified in the programme area; the Vocational Training and Apprenticeship Fund, which is a public operator for vocational training. IFAD was expected to provide national and international technical assistance; the latter being destined in particular for microfinance-related activities.
18. **Changes during project implementation.** PASPRU was approved by IFAD Executive Board in April 2009. The financial agreement was signed in September 2009 but only became effective in December 2010. The project's first disbursement came more than two years after its approval, in July 2011. A mid-term review was undertaken in July 2014 and the project was completed, in December 2016. The loan was closed in June 2017. There was no change in the project duration, which lasted six years.
19. PASPRU introduced a number of changes following the reduction of its funds and important delays in its implementation. The search for complementarity with PROFIL hampered the project's institutional set up. PASPRU could not rely on PROFIL regional offices as the latter experienced significant delays. As a consequence, only two regional offices⁹ were effectively established, which led the project to focus on four regions instead of seven. As part of the interventions, literacy was introduced to make it possible for RMEs to assimilate knowledge during trainings. Furthermore, a Rural Microenterprise Development Fund (FODEMER) was established as a replacement to the innovation fund and the "Fonds d'Incitation".

⁶ In relation to the revised project total cost, excluding BOAD expected contribution.

⁷ Currently known as the Ministry of Agriculture and Water resources.

⁸ The programme was expected to open two other regional offices (Fada, Bobo) to cover the remaining regions in which PROFIL had no presence. Fada N'Gourma covering Est and Centre-Est regions and Bobo Dioulasso covering Hauts-Bassins and Cascades.

20. Despite the withdrawal of BOAD funds, which were allocated to the infrastructure component, there was almost no change made in the project logical framework. The latter was slightly adjusted in March 2013 to take into account the reorganization of the components and the literacy activities pending the mid-term review, which was to revise it, but this revision did not take place.
21. **Delivery of outputs.** Most of the programme's achievements have been made during the last two years (2015 and 2016) and the execution rates reached respectively 65.5 per cent and 61 per cent for the physical and financial components. PASPRU reached 4,959 enterprises (mostly RMEs and farmer's organizations) out of 12,000 targeted, of which only 326 were effectively financed (in 2015 and 2016) by FODEMER (out of 2,400 planned, 13 per cent). The training activities implementation rates varied between 11 and 36 per cent depending on the themes (e.g. 1,629 entrepreneurship and simplified management training over 9,000, 18 per cent, 3,233 technical and vocational training courses out of 9,000, or 36 per cent). Annex III indicates the delivery of outputs of the project per component based on the Project Completion Report (PCR) and RIMS data.

III. Review of findings

22. The Project Completion Report Validation (PCR) report presents findings based on the review of the programme documents, including appraisal reports, project completion review, the Mid-term Review, RIMS reports, supervision reports, and other relevant materials (e.g. Country Strategic Opportunities Paper [COSOP], and policy documents). The PCR also benefited from the Country Strategy and Programme Evaluation mission, carried out in April-May 2018.

A. Core criteria

Relevance

23. **Policy Relevance.** PASPRU was well-aligned with the country's development priorities, as laid out in the Strategy for Accelerated Growth and Sustainable Development (SCADD), and its emphasis on economic growth and reduced vulnerability (first pillar), with a cross-cutting attention to gender equality (fourth pillar). At sectoral level, the programme was aligned with the government's vision and priorities for the agriculture sector for the periods 2011-2015, which are stated in the National Programme for the Rural Sector (PNSR). The national strategy aims at transforming the agriculture in Burkina Faso into a "modern, competitive, sustainable engine of growth, grounded on household farms and effective agricultural enterprises". PASPRU contributed to the «growth pole» approach which is being pursued by the strategy through creating and promoting RMEs.
24. As stated in the PCR, PASPRU was designed in accordance with IFAD corporate strategies with regard to targeting, gender equality and women's empowerment, and the private sector. The programme was coherent with the COSOP 2007 first strategic objective to enhance and diversify sustainable livelihoods of rural poor and marginalized groups, especially women, through inclusive local private-sector development. As part of this objective, the aim was to develop rural microenterprises and enhancing access to information on markets and technologies.
25. **Relevance of design.** The project documents carefully lay out lessons learnt under PAMER and take them into account for the design¹⁰. PASPRU was based on a demand-driven approach aimed at strengthening the capacity of local service providers to respond to the needs of RMEs, which in turn would be supported in their ability to articulate their service demand. The approach to assist RMEs to access to credit through existing financial intermediaries was relevant. Nonetheless, given the weak overall track record with guarantee funds, the design

¹⁰ PASPRU, Design Report, paragraphs 94-106.

could have elaborated further on the MFIs interest in such a mechanism, and thoroughly assessed the relevance of the guarantee mechanism as well as further explored alternative mechanisms for facilitating access to mid-term credit (matching grant, low interest capital, equity fund). Furthermore, PASPRU included a matching grant facility for innovation while funds were also provided under PROFIL for action or adaptive research which could prove confusing at field level for potential recipients.

26. On another hand, synergies between a commodity development project, such as PROFIL, focused on the rural poor, and a BDS programme such as PASPRU, focused less directly on the rural poor, should have been further developed. The programme was supposed to implement the same strategy adopted by PROFIL for pro-poor targeting in value chain development, but a more detailed description of such a strategy was lacking in the design document, which doesn't clarify how PASPRU would include agricultural enterprises targeted under PROFIL.
27. **Relevance of targeting.** The aim to support 12,000 RMEs was ambitious compared to the 2,700 RMEs strengthened by the previous PAMER project. It was justified by the shift to a demand driven approach and it included direct as well as indirect target groups through a value chain approach that allowed for economies of scale. Nevertheless, the numbers were over ambitious and there was a risk that the "push for numbers" could compromise the quality of services and efforts to reach IFAD target groups. On another hand, the geographical targeting was too wide with seven regions targeted. While these regions were selected to build on the achievements of PAMER and PROFIL, there was a big risk that interventions would be dispersed.
28. The programme design made efforts to reach the most vulnerable, as detailed in paragraph 12. However, it is important to note that a broadened approach, which did not set pre-defined value chains was likely to attract better-off RMEs. Besides, further clarity was required as to how the project would reach poorer RMEs without penalizing service providers, as cost recovery would be more difficult from poor clients.¹¹ Finally, there was no guarantee, from the programme design, that the established Funds would benefit the poorest. Key issues such as operational aspects of the Funds, including decision-making procedures, eligibility criteria and composition of the committee responsible for selecting eligible recipients were not addressed at the design phase.
29. **Summary - relevance.** The PCR outlines the programme's alignment with national and IFAD strategies, its internal logic and the relevance of the adjustments made during implementation. The programme's objectives were broadly aligned to the Government priorities, as outlined in the appraisal report and in various policy documents. The design documents show that PASPRU has appropriately incorporated successful PAMER project lessons, in many priority institutional and implementation aspects. However additional analysis on the design shows that the targets were over ambitious and there is question on how the project would effectively reach the poorest. The PCR rates the project's relevance as **moderately satisfactory (4)**, which is the same rating given by PMD.

Effectiveness

30. This section presents the effectiveness of the project with respect to its objectives and considering the delivery of outputs presented in annex III.

i) Access of microenterprises to non-financial services

31. One of the programme main achievements was to set up 56 CREER (out of 60 expected, 93 per cent), which provide proximity support and advisory services to RMEs. The CREER have benefited from capacities strengthening by the Burkina

¹¹ PASPRU proposes to use Performance based contracts including specific indicators to avoid the risk that service providers will focus on better off and less remote RMEs because they are more likely to be successful at lower cost.

Faso Business House (MEBF), a private partner, which proceeded to their selection, recruitment, training and certification. Nonetheless, their level of maturity and development was very variable. The most dynamic CREERs were those operating in the areas where the project was effectively implemented (East, Cascades, Hauts-Bassins). According to the PCR, RMEs were willing and capable to pay for their "affordable" services. This is however in contradiction with other evidence from project documentation which underlines their limited capacities and issues related to cost recovery. As a consequence, there is a risk that the CREER offered their services only to better off RMEs.

32. The PCR notes that RMEs benefitted from around 7,740 services, in the form of advisory support on various themes. In addition, 6,116 service contracts were agreed between RMEs and the CREERs, which is a sign of the relevance and effectiveness of the BDS system. The RMEs were strengthened in key aspects such as processing techniques and processes, hygiene and quality control, marketing, financial and organizational management, gender equality and women's empowerment. According to the PCR, these trainings have resulted in systematic accounting/book keeping, better workload distribution among members, enhanced quality of products, technical control of processing processes and compliance with hygiene standards as well as improved access to markets.

ii) Improving the enabling environment for microenterprise development

33. In the absence of partnerships with microfinance institutions (MFIs), PASPRU implemented the FODEMER.¹² A total of 326 RMEs (out of 2,400 expected) including 254 women benefitted from its funding, following a selection process supervised by the Regional Chambers for Agriculture. The beneficiaries contributed to 9% of the overall costs of micro-enterprises funded. The fund has enabled RMEs to build infrastructure, acquire equipment, and ensure working capital, to increase the quantity and quality of products. However, according to the PCR, the Fund implementation experienced some difficulties including: (i) long delays between the approval of micro-projects and the provision of resources to the benefiting RME; and (ii) insufficient support provided by the CREER for RMEs. In addition, the FODEMER was implemented only in 2015, which limited its operational duration to two years. It was also noted that the financing mechanism was not adapted as the Government had to pre-finance it.
34. The CREERs supported the creation / strengthening of 36 RMEs organizations and six departmental unions in different value chains. In addition, the CREER facilitated the organization of four knowledge exchange meetings between RMEs, experts and operators which led to business opportunities for RMEs. The programme's efforts to structure RMEs were more successful for rice and cassava chains in which it could link them to existing apex organizations (National Union of Rice Steamers, Regional Unions of Cassava Processors, etc.).
35. **Summary - effectiveness.** PASPRU achieved encouraging results in terms of enhancing the access of microenterprises to non-financial services. The programme set up a network of CREER which provided valuable services to RMEs. There are however concerns about their ability to meet the demand and ensure a pro-poor targeting. In addition, the programme was not successful in improving access to financial services. The FODEMER was implemented only two years before the end of the project and reached limited RMEs. As a result, effectiveness is rated as **moderately unsatisfactory (3)**, same as the PMD rating.

¹² FODEMER was a cost-shared funding instrument, in which beneficiaries contributed to 9% of the total micro-projects costs. It included two funding windows: an incentive window and an innovation window. The selection of beneficiaries was supervised by the Regional Chambers of Agriculture.

Efficiency

36. If compared with other IFAD-funded projects in the country, PASPRU was the programme with longest delays. The time lapse between the project's approval and its ratification was 5 months (against an average of 2 months for other projects) and it took for the project 20 months to start its activities (compared to 12 months for PROFIL). The programme's first disbursement was 27 months after its approval, above the national average of 2 years and the regional average of 14 months for IFAD supported projects.¹³
37. **Disbursement performance.** At project closure, disbursement of funds reached 49 per cent of project revised total cost (excluding BOAD contribution). The mismatch between investments and operating expenditures has had an impact on efficiency until 2013. During the period 2011-2013, PASPRU spent around US\$0.5 million in management costs without any satisfactory physical achievement. As stated in the PCR, 61 per cent of the overall expenditures were made over the 2015/2017 period. Component 2, improving the enabling environment for microenterprise development, showed the lowest disbursement rate with only 31 per cent.
38. **Project coordination and management.** PASPRU experienced important issues regarding human resources management, with high staff turnover and low performance of some key project staff, which hampered the implementation of some components. Over the implementation period, significant delays in obtaining "no objections" on annual work plan and budgets (due to requests for clarification on the consistency of activities and costs), resulted in a reduction in the implementation period of the annual work plan from 7 to 9 months. The PCR also notes that the programme was implemented without a technical implementation manual. Nonetheless, the recruitment of a technical assistance between July 2012 and September 2013 contributed to improve the programme management. In addition, PASPRU could control its operating costs after canceling the implementation of 3 regional offices and the rationalization of expenses from 2015. The programme management costs were still high and represented 37 per cent of total costs, because of higher costs than expected at design (additional budget lines, staff) according to the PCR.
39. **Financial management.** PASPRU started with substantial financial management risk but managed to control and reduce it to medium due to the improvement made by the internal controller on the eligibility of expenditures and the acceptability of supporting documents. The programme did not have an adequate administrative, accounting and financial system despite the introduction in 2008 of procedures and financial tools to improve the quality of financial management.
40. **Economic internal rate of return.** The PCR provides a credible analysis of the internal rate of economic return (EIRR), on the basis of rather conservative assumptions of calculation. The EIRR of the project was estimated at 8.67 per cent, below the 12 per cent expected at design, and with an economic net present value of around US\$600,000. The PCR notes that, while the EIRR can be considered as low, it should be nuanced by the good results of the financial analysis which shows that activities such as: honey processing, meat processing, rice, juice, cassava have contributed significantly to the overall EIRR.
41. **Summary - efficiency.** The PCR provides an objective analysis of the project efficiency, underlining its major difficulties. PASPRU faced programme management issues which hampered the project implementation and effectiveness. The programme's efficiency indicators are the weakest among other IFAD funded projects in the country implemented during the past decade. For this reason, the PCR rates efficiency as **unsatisfactory (2)**, one point below PMD rating.

¹³ IFAD – WCA 2018, Portfolio Stocktake.

Rural poverty impact

42. The project's impact is difficult to measure given its weak monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system and late start-up. The project carried out baseline and final socio-economic studies, but these could not inform on the poverty level. The PCR therefore used figures from the 2014 continuous multi-sectoral study, led by the National Institute for Statistics. In addition, several baseline data were not available for indicators related to programme objectives. Moreover, as most interventions only started from 2015, notably the financial support to RMEs, it was challenging to assess the project impact at its completion. Taking these limits into consideration, the programme's main impacts were as follows.
43. **Household income and assets.** Based on the final RIMS survey, the PCR conclude to an increase in household incomes as a result of the project activities. The level of increase in household incomes differed according to the value chain. Thus, it appears that RMEs processing cassava, honey and meat (kilichi) were the most profitable. The PCR speculates that this increase in income might have led households out of poverty and increased their assets. As a result of improved quality of processed products RMEs were able to position themselves in more profitable markets and to retain customers (e.g. kilichi, parboiled rice, fruit juice), which allows them to get more regular and predictable income and makes it easier for them to make investments. However, there is no data on the number of beneficiaries whose income has increased, and it is not clear how such an increase can be attributed to the project. The rather low number of RMEs which benefited from financing (326) raises questions about the PCR findings.
44. **Human and social capital and empowerment.** The impact on social and human capital was one of the project's strongest points as it implemented a vast training and capacity building program for 4,959 rural micro-enterprises, which included literacy, training in processing techniques and processes, hygiene and quality control, marketing, financial and organizational management. The technologies promoted have led to a significant reduction in drudgery and working time. According to the PCR, some RMEs owners built on it to occupy important positions at the level of local and regional authorities. The programme also provided training and advisory support to farmer's organizations, which led to an improvement in their internal governance (minutes of meetings, presence of management tools and periodic updating, etc.) and the workload distribution within them.
45. **Food security and agricultural productivity.** The PCR underlines that PASPRU didn't aim at enhancing food security and that the project's interventions were not at the level of the production chain. As a consequence, the potential effect of the development of processing units and the improvement in marketing conditions on agricultural production were not monitored or measured. However, increased incomes (see paragraph 44) could potentially have contributed to food security. In addition, according to the PCR, the programme did contribute to improved product storage and the reduction of post-harvest losses. The PCR also notes an increase in RMEs average production, between 2014 and 2016, for selected chains such as parboiled rice (from 11,935 kg to 15,195 kg), soumbala (from 1,978 kg to 3,069 kg), and honey (from 556 liters to 633 liters). It is however not clear how these data were collected.
46. **Institutions and policies.** The programme's policy objectives were ambitious as it intended to contribute to policy dialogue on the sustainability of a pro-poor countrywide system of BDS provision, and on the role of the public sector and of public-private partnerships in microenterprise development. The programme didn't provide support to CREER as well as microenterprise organizations to engage in policy dialogue on issues that they would identify as relevant. However, the implementation of a network of CREER, although still fragile, is one of the project main achievements at institutional level. The PCR notes that the Government is

effectively supporting the scaling up and the strengthening of the network but doesn't specify by which means.

47. **Summary – rural poverty impact.** PASPRU main impact was in strengthening the RMEs in various skills. The programme has implemented a network of BDS providers which created an enabling environment for RMEs development at local and institutional level. However, the programme impact on rural poverty is difficult to measure considering available data and late start-up. It is also limited by its weak performance in enhancing access to financial services. As a result, the PCRV rates rural poverty impact as **moderately unsatisfactory (3)**, which is the same rating given by the PCR.

Sustainability of benefits

48. **Institutional sustainability.** One of the programme's objectives was to contribute to the building of a viable and sustainable BDS system. The organization of CREERs around Economic Interest Grouping (GIE) is in favour of their sustainability. However, some of the CREERs have no operational existence (i.e. they exist "on paper" but without means to undertake any activities) and they face significant challenges in terms of mobilizing internal and external resources. One of the central issues of PASPRU will be the sustainability of pro-poor rural business services provision, which is directly related to cost recovery of such services, and questions such as the critical size of service providers for outreach are yet to be answered.
49. The programme approach for sustainability also relied on public-sector institutions to play a key role, in such areas as vocational training provision and monitoring. Thus, at the end of the project, post-closure monitoring was planned to be carried out by central-state structures, based in Ouagadougou, without any involvement of decentralized institutions. But as the extension of the project was not accepted, it ended without setting up an exit strategy and allocating resources to the institutions in charge of monitoring. For instance, it was envisaged that the General Directorate for the Promotion of Rural Economy (DGPER) would ensure the supervision of CREER set up by PASPRU. But this did not happen as there was no funding available.
50. **Economic sustainability.** The RMEs are better equipped since they have benefited from intangible assets (capacity building, notably through training on various themes) and, to a lesser extent, from material support (processing equipment). There is limited information in the PCR about the survival rate of RMEs supported by the programme. The programme's approach to work with existing RMEs, some of those already supported under PAMER, contribute to their consolidation. The PCR mention a "dynamic of growth" and "very high survival rates" after the programme driven by RMEs ownership of innovations and improved techniques introduced by the programme, which led to enhanced quality and quantity of products, income increase and jobs creation. However, there are no concrete examples in the PCR of RMEs which have succeeded in expanding their activities and investing in the acquisition of new production tools, or just replacing those that no longer work. In addition, access to financing remains difficult, if not impossible, for RMEs.
51. **Technical sustainability.** Capacity building programmes have enabled MERs to acquire a certain level of technical competence to increase their productivity using appropriate technologies disseminated by the research institute in applied sciences and technologies (IRSAT) and CEAS. However, some equipment provided was defective and the maintenance, including accessibility of spare parts, is challenging for some RMEs. The programme has contributed to strengthening the network of equipment manufacturers capable of maintaining the technical equipment available to RMEs and craft units. The PCR states that CEAS has committed to follow-up activities after project completion, but this support has not been provided. A

protocol was signed for maintaining the equipment provided for 2 years, but the CEAS had to provide this support with its own resources, which appeared to be unrealistic.

52. **Summary – sustainability of benefits.** PASPRU sustainability is favoured by the established network of CREER and the partnership with equipment manufacturers to introduce innovations and technologies. However, the project ended at its peak and with no exit strategy. There are doubts about the government and private sector capacities to ensure a close follow-up of the project's achievement. Also, the RMEs development is limited by the weak access to financial services. As a result, the overall project sustainability is rated as **moderately unsatisfactory (3)**, which is the same as the PMD rating.

Innovation

53. The PCR mentions a number of technological innovations introduced or disseminated by PASPRU such as: i) the development of equipment in the processing chain of cassava, rice, milk, and meat drying; ii) the introduction of a néré grain husker which should enhance the production process of soumbala; and iii) the distribution of Kenyan hives, and the amelioration of honey production and processing methods. There is however limited information about the effectiveness or the outreach of these innovations. For instance, the néré grain husker was not fully functional. Overall, it appears that most of these innovations were limited by the lack of follow up due the short time between their introduction and the end of the project, as no means were allocated to the implementing partner, CEAS, to assure a technical support, following the project completion. At institutional level, the rural enterprise resource centres – CREER – are considered as the programme main innovation but there are questions around their ability to meet the growing and more diverse demand among RMEs.
54. On another hand, there are a number of missed opportunities in terms of innovation. The programme was expected to promote technological, technical, commercial and organizational innovations through a demand-driven innovation fund, but the latter was merged into a development fund, with limited results. PASPRU was also supposed to develop new financial products for RMEs, by upscaling and promoting the most successful financial instruments developed under the PROFINDER grant, which implementation had started in 2008.¹⁴ There was an ambitious target to develop up to two new products per microfinance institution.¹⁵ In addition, the programme proposed the funding of a small fund for refinancing, the *Fonds d'Incitation*, but this was not implemented as expected. Fonds d'Incitation was meant to be an innovation among IFAD projects and an answer to major bottlenecks, namely, the difficulties of RMEs and MFIs to provide their own financial contribution to access medium-term credit.
55. In light of the above, the PCR rates innovation as **moderately unsatisfactory (3)**, which is the same rating given by the PCR.

Scaling up

56. The PCR provides limited analysis regarding scaling up. It is mentioned that upscaling PASPRU innovations would depend on: i) their effectiveness and their level of ownership by beneficiaries; ii) technical support from qualified service providers; and iii) access to funding, from the Government or sustainable financial services, for RMEs to purchase new equipment. While it is not stated in the PCR, it is possible to affirm, from the project documentation, that these conditions were

¹⁴Following the weak performance of PAMER microfinance activities, a grant was approved to test new financial instruments for microenterprise development and to monitor and evaluate these pilot activities to collect information and data for knowledge management and policy dialogue, whilst informing the design of new interventions and the fine-tuning of existing ones. Coordinated by a national technical centre for supporting the microfinance sector (CTMP-B), the PROFINDER project was worth 1,5 USD million.

¹⁵ PASPRU, Design Report, paragraph 190.

not met at the end of the project, jeopardizing the scaling up of technological innovations. At the institutional level, the promotion of business development support providers, through CREER, is at the core of the programme's scaling-up approach. But the likelihood of CREER scaling up the project's interventions is weak as they are facing challenges on their side. As a consequence, the PCRV rates scaling up **moderately unsatisfactory (3)**, which is the same as PMD rating.

Gender equality and women's empowerment

57. **Economic empowerment.** Women were priority target group of PASPRU, and 83 per cent of the project's beneficiaries were women, well above the 35 per cent targeted at design phase. In addition, 82 per cent of the RMEs are exclusively managed by women. These impressive figures were reached based on the project focus on processing activities in which women are dominant. PASPRU supported 4,067 RMEs managed by women by strengthening their capacities to enhance their entrepreneurship skills and their production process. A limited number of women-managed RMEs, 254 more precisely, also benefitted from funding from the development fund, FODEMER. While there is no data to confirm it, the PCR assumes that the support received have contributed to economic empowerment of women as they are able to pay for basic expenses such as food, health and school fees.
58. **Presence and influence in rural institutions and organizations.** PASPRU provided training in literacy for 985 RMEs and additional training on women empowerment and leadership skills which might have contributed to enhance woman participation in rural institutions and organizations. An interesting feature was that men were also invited to attend trainings on women empowerment to raise awareness within the households on gender equality issues. Having said that, women still suffer from a persistent bias and discrimination, which limit their presence and influence in rural organizations. It is also important to note that only 12 out of 120 employees in the CREER are women.
59. **Balance in workloads and in the sharing of economic and social benefits.** The PCR shows no evidence that PASPRU contributed to achieve a more equitable balance in workloads and in the sharing of economic and social benefits between women and men. However, the project did contribute to improved processing efficiency by strengthening the skills on improved techniques and through the introduction and dissemination of processing facilities for *néré* and fonio. Thus, the *néré* grain husker, despite malfunctions (see paragraph 54), significantly reduced drudgery of work related to the production of *soumbala*.
60. In light of the above, the PCRV rates this criterion as **moderately satisfactory (4)**, one point lower than the PMD rating.

Environment and natural resources management

61. The PCR underlines that some technological innovations introduced, notably by the CEAS and the IRSAT (e.g. the use of improved stoves and solar kits in small processing units) had positive effects in terms of environmental impact. There are however limited details in the PCR on the environmental impact produced by the processing units. Because of their location in residential areas, certain activities (cassava processing) may have caused significant nuisance in the absence of wastewater pits (cassava) and an overall weak waste management. Constructing latrines around processing units could have contributed to improved hygiene but this did not happen at all.
62. In terms of natural resource management, it was noted that some beneficiary communities were beginning to use good practices (e.g. associations of beekeepers and operators of the shea butter and *néré* value chains) in order to preserve the woody resources. (shea, *néré*) and fight against bush fires (e.g. beekeepers by the use of smokers). Improved technologies have the potential to reduce the quantities

of agricultural and other natural resource-based products necessary for processing and also reduce post-harvest losses, thus leading to a positive impact on environment.

63. Considering the above and given the only indirect impact the project had on agricultural and natural resources, the PCRV rates this criterion as **moderately satisfactory (4)**, one point above PMD rating.

Adaptation to climate change

64. The PCR doesn't cover this criterion in its analysis by merely stating that it is not a key issue in the programme. Nonetheless, some project interventions might have contributed to climate change adaptation such as: (i) promoting the use of improved stoves; (ii) promoting the use of solar energy and gas in small processing units; and (iii) considering the management of environmental impacts as a criterion in the selection of micro-projects eligible for funding from FODEMER. But given the lack of analysis and data in the project documentation, and the absence of rating from PMD, the PCRV prefers not to rate this criterion.

B. Overall project achievement

65. PASPRU was highly relevant to beneficiaries needs and coherent with national and IFAD strategies. The approach of the project presented two solid features, namely the proximity of services to be provided and the commitment to the establishment of a sustainable and pro-poor BDS delivery system, without choosing a specific value chain as a pre-requisite. The development approach linking the demand and the offer of advisory services has proven to be relevant, accepted and beneficial for RMEs and BDS providers. The programme obtained encouraging results in strengthening RMEs capacities and contributed to introduce and disseminate innovations and technologies. The specific focus on gender was also one of PASPRU's main achievements.
66. The programme results were, however, affected by significant implementation delays, mainly relating to human resources issues. PASPRU had the lowest efficiency indicators among IFAD funded projects in the country during the past decade. As a result, the complementarity approach with PROFIL could not be implemented, limiting thus the project's relevance and effectiveness. In addition, the M&E system was particularly weak, providing limited data to assess the project rural poverty impact. The latter was however limited as access to financial services remained a key issue for RMEs, limiting their development and viability. There are also concerns about the sustainability of the BDS system and its ability to cover the needs of RMEs and to provide adequate services to the most vulnerable RMEs.
67. In view of the above, and taking into consideration the challenging country context, the PCRV rates the overall project achievement as **moderately unsatisfactory (3)**, which is the same rating given by the PMD.

C. Performance of partners

68. **IFAD.** IFAD was responsible for supervision and implementation support. The PCR laments the irregularity of supervision missions as only 5 were carried out of twelve expected in a period of six years. But it is not clear how it could have been feasible to undertake two supervision missions per year in Burkina Faso, a portfolio with up to five ongoing projects at the time of PASPRU. On another note, there is also mention in the PCR of the frequent rotation of IFAD country programme managers (CPMs, 4 in a period of six years) which could have caused some difficulties among project staff. However, this should be nuanced as one CPM stayed over four years between 2011 and 2015.
69. The PCR also questions the quality of the support provided by supervision missions with some key expertise missing among team members. The document also mentions the inadequacy of recommendations with the project's needs. The

supervision mission and the mid-term review (MTR) failed to adjust the project internal logic and its implementation manuals to better reflect the changes occurred since the project starting date (withdrawal of BOAD...). There were also too many recommendations made – over a hundred at MTR- following supervision missions. But according to a former CPM¹⁶, the important number of recommendations, notably at MTR, was justified to highlight the amount of activities yet to be done and to demonstrate the project director's incapability to manage.

70. Since the establishment of a country office in 2010, considerable efforts were made by IFAD to put the project back on track. PASPRU was categorized a *project at risk* and IFAD explicitly considered closing the project in its correspondence with the Government. IFAD convinced the Government to hire, through project funds, an international technical assistant to manage the programme for over 1 year, between 2012 and 2013. This technical assistant managed to put the programme back on its track until a new director was hired. However, the PCR notes that the issuance of "no objections" was slow until the last two years of project implementation important delays (from 79 days in 2011 to 27 in 2016).
71. Considering the above, most notably the shortcomings in terms of supervision, the PCR rates IFAD performance as **moderately unsatisfactory (3)**, which is the same rating given by PMD.
72. **Government.** The PCR notes that the Government performance was satisfactory with regard to the mobilization of counterpart funding. It also provided funding to the implementation of the programme management unit and pre-funded, on its own resources, the development fund – FODEMER – which allowed to financially support the RMEs. Nonetheless, 89 per cent of Government funds were allocated to management costs (against 12 per cent expected at design). In addition, the Government was responsible for reallocating BOAD resources to another project and cutting PASPRU from considerable resources, without finding an alternative donor. Government performance was also hampered by the social and political turmoil which occurred during project implementation (2014-2015).
73. At operational level, the Government was not prompt in replacing key vacant positions among project management staff (director, monitoring and evaluation manager, regional managers), even though it took difficult decisions in accepting to remove three project directors and relevant staff. There was also no close monitoring of the project interventions by the executing agency which, explains why the project implementation manual was never elaborated and the monitoring and evaluation manual was only elaborated three years after project design. Overall, the Government shares with IFAD the responsibility of the weak M&E system. In addition, the frequent mobility within the steering committee affected project implementation and sustainability due to the loss of "institutional memory".
74. As a result, the PCR rates the Government performance as **moderately unsatisfactory (3)**, which is the same rating given by PMD.

IV. Assessment of PCR quality

Scope

75. The PCR covers the key questions and follows broadly the PCR guidelines. However, some criteria, mainly relevance, environment and natural resource management, adaptation to climate change, gender and women's empowerment could have been further analyzed. Therefore, PCR rates PCR scope as **moderately satisfactory (4)**.

¹⁶ Minutes, CPMT meeting, Project completion report, 9 June 2017.

Quality

76. The PCR methodology is sound and well detailed in the report. However, the project impact section was limited by the available data, questioned by the PCR itself (project studies) and the completion mission, due to time and resources constraints, did not collect more credible and reliable additional data, to assess the project impact. A final stakeholder's workshop was organized in the regional capitals, Fada Ngourma and Bobo Dioulasso, gathering stakeholders at local level (RMEs, CREER, local authorities...). There is however very limited use of the evidence collected during these workshops in the final report. In addition, there are discrepancies between the narrative and the final rating as sometimes the text mentions a moderately satisfactory rating while the final PMD rating is below (e.g. IFAD and Government performance, overall project achievement). As a result, the PCR quality is rated as **moderately unsatisfactory (3)**.

Lessons

77. The PCR identified a number of relevant key lessons learned from PASPRU, based on the available evidence. The PCR's lessons are rated **satisfactory (5)**.

Candour

78. The analysis produced by the PCR was objective, acknowledging the limits of the available evidence and explicitly reporting negative and weak aspects throughout the document. This analysis was also reflected on the PCR project ratings, which prudent and took into account the evidence available at the time of project completion (e.g. sustainability, innovation, scaling up). The PCR was also critical of the MTR and supervision missions. Therefore, the PCR's candour is rated as **satisfactory (5)**.

V. Lessons learned

79. Key lessons to be learned from PASPRU are as follows:
80. **Rural finance.** Access to sustainable financial services remains a key issue for RMEs. PASPRU aimed at enhancing access to financial services by working with local MFIs to develop new financial products and by establishing funds. The project strategy was unsuccessful and RMEs are still in need for financial products, which match their needs. The CREERs could facilitate the collaboration between RMEs and MFIs by providing support to submit viable credit requests. As for the funds, should an appropriate funding mechanism be identified, it is necessary to thoroughly assess its relevance, carefully design clear approval process, governance structure, risk sharing mechanisms, and exit strategy.
81. **Programme management.** PASPRU implementation was hampered by the low performance of the PMU unit, which led to frequent changes in management staff. It is therefore important to carefully pay attention to project staff skills during the recruitment process. In addition, relying on another ongoing project for the implementation, as it was planned with PROFIL, should be intended only if the latter has reached a satisfactory implementation progress and has a solid and stable institutional set-up. Furthermore, the Government, at central and decentralized level, should be more involved in every steps of the project, including monitoring, to ensure an adequate level of ownership from stakeholders. The M&E system should be also strengthened to provide reliable data about the project performance and impact as well as lessons learned.
82. **Targeting.** For better results, targeting a smaller number of value chains could avoid resources to be spread too thin and the PCR suggests criteria such as market needs, the critical mass of people involved in value chains and economic profitability to guide the selection. Besides, a differentiated approach is necessary from a chain to another as the pro-poor dimension is different from one chain to

another. Finally, women targeting was highly relevant and should be pursued with interventions more tailored to their needs, such as literacy and trainings.

83. **RMEs development.** The RMEs remain insufficiently integrated units in the value chains and need to be further supported to defend their specific interests and set up their priority and issues at the policy dialogue level. Market access is also a condition for the economic development of the RMEs, which need better access to market information as well as business events that allow them to advertise their products and expand their outreach. In addition, rather than introducing sophisticated technologies for RMEs, it is more appropriate to mobilize an adequate expertise capable of developing / disseminating appropriate and accessible technologies according to the levels of evolution of the MER. Finally, it is necessary to ensure a balance between ensuring the viability of BDS providers and the objective of reaching mainly the poorer rural enterprises.

Definition and rating of the evaluation criteria used by IOE

Criteria	Definition *	Mandatory	To be rated
Rural poverty impact	Impact is defined as the changes that have occurred or are expected to occur in the lives of the rural poor (whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended) as a result of development interventions.	X	Yes
	<i>Four impact domains</i>		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Household income and net assets: Household income provides a means of assessing the flow of economic benefits accruing to an individual or group, whereas assets relate to a stock of accumulated items of economic value. The analysis must include an assessment of trends in equality over time. 		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Human and social capital and empowerment: Human and social capital and empowerment include an assessment of the changes that have occurred in the empowerment of individuals, the quality of grass-roots organizations and institutions, the poor's individual and collective capacity, and in particular, the extent to which specific groups such as youth are included or excluded from the development process. 		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Food security and agricultural productivity: Changes in food security relate to availability, stability, affordability and access to food and stability of access, whereas changes in agricultural productivity are measured in terms of yields; nutrition relates to the nutritional value of food and child malnutrition. 		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Institutions and policies: The criterion relating to institutions and policies is designed to assess changes in the quality and performance of institutions, policies and the regulatory framework that influence the lives of the poor. 		No
Project performance	Project performance is an average of the ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.	X	Yes
Relevance	The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, institutional priorities and partner and donor policies. It also entails an assessment of project design and coherence in achieving its objectives. An assessment should also be made of whether objectives and design address inequality, for example, by assessing the relevance of targeting strategies adopted.	X	Yes
Effectiveness	The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.	X	Yes
Efficiency	A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results.	X	Yes
Sustainability of benefits	The likely continuation of net benefits from a development intervention beyond the phase of external funding support. It also includes an assessment of the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the project's life.	X	Yes
Other performance criteria			
Gender equality and women's empowerment	The extent to which IFAD interventions have contributed to better gender equality and women's empowerment, for example, in terms of women's access to and ownership of assets, resources and services; participation in decision making; work load balance and impact on women's incomes, nutrition and livelihoods.	X	Yes
Innovation	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have introduced innovative approaches to rural poverty reduction.	X	Yes
Scaling up	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have been (or are likely to be) scaled up by government authorities, donor organizations, the private sector and others agencies.	X	Yes
Environment and natural resources management	The extent to which IFAD development interventions contribute to resilient livelihoods and ecosystems. The focus is on the use and management of the natural environment, including natural resources defined as raw materials used for socio-economic and cultural purposes, and ecosystems and biodiversity - with the goods and services they provide.	X	Yes
Adaptation to climate change	The contribution of the project to reducing the negative impacts of climate change through dedicated adaptation or risk reduction measures.	X	Yes

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Definition</i> *	<i>Mandatory</i>	<i>To be rated</i>
Overall project achievement	This provides an overarching assessment of the intervention, drawing upon the analysis and ratings for rural poverty impact, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, gender equality and women's empowerment, innovation, scaling up, as well as environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change.	X	Yes
Performance of partners			
• IFAD	This criterion assesses the contribution of partners to project design, execution, monitoring and reporting, supervision and implementation support, and evaluation. The performance of each partner will be assessed on an individual basis with a view to the partner's expected role and responsibility in the project life cycle.	X	Yes
• Government		X	Yes

* These definitions build on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management; the Methodological Framework for Project Evaluation agreed with the Evaluation Committee in September 2003; the first edition of the Evaluation Manual discussed with the Evaluation Committee in December 2008; and further discussions with the Evaluation Committee in November 2010 on IOE's evaluation criteria and key questions.

Rating comparison^a

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Programme Management Department (PMD) rating</i>	<i>IOE Project Completion Report Validation (PCR) rating</i>	<i>Net rating disconnect (PCR-PMD)</i>
Rural poverty impact	3	3	0
Project performance			
Relevance	4	4	0
Effectiveness	3	3	0
Efficiency	3	2	-1
Sustainability of benefits	3	3	0
Project performance^b	3,25	3	-0,25
Other performance criteria			
Gender equality and women's empowerment	5	4	-1
Innovation	3	3	0
Scaling up	3	3	0
Environment and natural resources management	3	4	+1
Adaptation to climate change	NA	NA	-
Overall project achievement^c	3	3	0
Performance of partners^d			
IFAD	3	3	0
Government	3	3	0
Average net disconnect			-0.9

^a Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable.

^b Arithmetic average of ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.

^c This is not an average of ratings of individual evaluation criteria but an overarching assessment of the project, drawing upon the rating for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, rural poverty impact, gender, innovation, scaling up, environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change.

^d The rating for partners' performance is not a component of the overall project achievement rating.

Ratings of the project completion report quality

	<i>PMD rating</i>	<i>IOE PCR rating</i>	<i>Net disconnect</i>
Candour	-	5	
Lessons	-	5	
Quality (methods, data, participatory process)	-	3	
Scope	-	4	
Overall rating of the project completion report			

Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable.

Review of outputs

Composante A: Accès durable des microentreprises rurales aux services non financiers améliorés		
Sous composante A1 : Facilitation de l'accès des MER aux SDE		
Produits attendus	Produits à l'achèvement	TAUX
Une base de données opérationnelle sur les MER ciblées est mise en place	1	100
12000 demandes d'appui émanant des groupes cibles par type sont traitées	9888	82
- Dont 1200 PIE	1124	93,67
- Dont 1200 AGR	3124	260,33
- Dont 4800 MER	3436	71,58
- Dont 1800 PEI	190	10,56
- Dont 3000 GPT/ASS	2014	67,13
12000 MER encadrées	4959	41,33
60 CREER recrutés, formés, déployés dans la ZIP, opérationnalisés	56	93,33
7000 contrats de services / conseils signés entre les MER et les CREER	6116	87,37
17400 prestations de services fournies	7430	42,70
- Dont 6000 relevant de l'accès au marché	2512	41,87
- Dont 2400 relevant de l'accès au financement (FODEMER)	2219	92,46
- Dont 9000 relevant du renforcement de capacité de gestion / comptabilité	2699	29,99
Une organisation nationale des CREER mise en place	1	100
500 MER participent à des manifestations commerciales	183	37
Sous composante A2 : Facilitation de l'accès à la formation aux métiers et à l'apprentissage		
Produits attendus	Produits à l'achèvement	TAUX
Une base de données opérationnelle sur les prestataires de formation professionnelle et aux métiers et mise en place	1	100
9000 formations en entrepreneuriat et à la gestion simplifiée au profit des MER	1629	18
3000 formations en entrepreneuriat et à la gestion poussée au profit des MER	788	26
9000 formations techniques et professionnelles au profit des MER	3233	36
3600 MER recevant une formation en alphabétisation fonctionnelle	985	27,36
500 MER ayant pris part à des voyages d'échanges	183	36,6
1000 apprentis ou employés des MER ont bénéficié de formation professionnelle duale	242	24,2
300 formateurs endogènes ont bénéficiés de renforcement pédagogique	0	0
17000 outils pédagogiques et documents d'appuis conseils élaborés et diffusés	9750	57
Sous composante A3 : Facilitation de l'accès aux informations, technologies et innovations		
Produits attendus	Produits à l'achèvement	TAUX
2000 plaquettes, catalogue sur les technologies conçues, traduites et diffusées	237	11,85
170 campagnes de démonstration d'équipements ou de procédés techniques réalisées	46	27
67 unités artisanales installées et opérationnelles	25	37,31
12000 MER estiment trouver l'information dont elles ont besoin (objectif plus de 50%)	6442	53,68
170 séances de visites commentées auprès d'unités plus expérimentées, et qui utilisent avec succès des équipements et des procédés performants, réalisées	40	24
Composante B: Amélioration de l'environnement des MER		
Sous composante B1: Amélioration de l'offre de services financiers		
Produits attendus	Produits à l'achèvement	TAUX
Un guichet de financement compétitif (FODEMER) est mis en place pour financer les microprojets	1	100
2400 microprojets financés	326	13,58
67 innovations technologiques, commerciales et organisationnelles introduites auprès des MER et financés par le Fonds	36	53,73
Sous composante B2 : Renforcement des associations des MER		
Produits attendus	Produits à l'achèvement	TAUX
Un dispositif de structuration mis en place par les autorités compétentes (DOPAIR)/	1	100
60 CREER habilités pour diagnostic/ structuration groupements de MER :	29	48,33
100 organisations de MER dans les filières d'intervention créées et/ou renforcées	36	36
40 formations pour les femmes leaders en techniques de plaidoyer et de lobbying	20	50
2 nouvelles lois sur les structures coopératives et sur l'acte uniforme OHADA traduites en langues nationales	2	100
Une formation réalisée pour les CREER et les agents STD, de la CRA et de la ZIP sur l'acte uniforme et l'enregistrement	1	100

Source: PCR 2017.

Review of outcomes

Résultats	Unité	Réalisé	Objectif	Taux
Personnes ayant bénéficié des services du projet	Nombre	15193	84000	18%
	Homme	2604	54600	5%
	femme	12589	29400	43%
Groupes ayant bénéficié des services du projet	Nombre	2290	3000	76%
	Homme	207	1000	21%
	femme	2084	2000	104%
Ménages ayant bénéficié des services du projet	Nombre	2336	12923	18%
Entreprises ayant accès aux services non financiers mis en place	Nombre	8998	12170	74%
	Homme	1535	4340	35%
	femme	6474	7830	83%
Personnel des prestataires de services formé	Nombre	165	360	46%
	Homme	112	252	44%
	femme	53	108	49%
Personnes ayant bénéficié d'une formation professionnelle	Nombre	242	1000	24%
	Homme	120	500	24%
	femme	122	500	24%
Personnes formées dans les domaines de la post-production, de la transformation et de la commercialisation	Nombre	2714	9000	30%
	Homme	1044	3000	35%
	femme	1670	6000	28%
Personnes formées dans le domaine des activités génératrices de revenus	Nombre	1618	12000	13%
	Homme	245	4200	6%
	femme	879	7800	11%
Personnes formées aux affaires et à l'entrepreneuriat	Nombre	762	12000	6%
	Homme	174,2	4200	4%
	femme	587,8	7800	8%
Institutions financières participant au projet	Nombre	5	6	83%
Groupes de commercialisation formés/consolidés	Nombre	81	110	74%
Membres des groupes de commercialisation formés/consolidés	Nombre	466	440	106%
	Homme	51	110	46%
	femme	415	330	126%
Groupes de commercialisation comptant des femmes dans leurs instances de direction	Nombre	80	33	242%

Source: RIMS 2016.

Bibliography

Design

FIDA, Burkina Faso, Programme d'options stratégiques pour le pays 2007 (COSOP)

FIDA, PASPRU, Accord de financement, Septembre 2009

FIDA, PASPRU, Document de conception de projet, Aout 2008

FIDA, PASPRU, QE Panel Report, Septembre 2008

FIDA, PASPRU, Rapport du Président, Avril 2009

Implementation

FIDA, PASPRU, Rapports des missions de supervision, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016 (Juillet), 2016 (Novembre)

FIDA, PASPRU, Revue à mi-parcours, Juillet 2014

FIDA, PASPRU, Lettres de gestion pour la transmission des rapports de missions de supervision et de la revue à mi-parcours

Completion

FIDA, PASPRU, Rapport d'achèvement, Juin 2017

FIDA, PASPRU, Enquête finale SYGRI, Juin 2016

FIDA, PASPRU, Compte-rendu de la réunion CPMT sur le RAP du PASPRU, Juin 2017

Context

World Bank, Systematic Country Diagnosis, April 2016

Acronyms

BDS	Business Development Support
BOAD	Banque Ouest-Africaine de Développement
CEAS	Albert Schweitzer Ecological Center
CREER	Centre de ressources en entrepreneuriat rural
COSOP	Programme d'options stratégiques par pays
CPMT	Country Programme Management Team
FIDA	Fonds international de développement agricole
FODEMER	Fonds de Développement des Microentreprises rurales
IOE	Independent Office of Evaluation
IRSAT	Institut de recherche en sciences appliquées et technologies
MTR	Mid-Term Review
PAMER	Projet d'appui aux microentreprises rurales
PASPRU	Programme d'appui et de promotion du secteur privé en milieu rural
PCR	Project Completion Report
PCRV	Project Completion Report Validation
PNSR	Programme National du Secteur Rural
PMD	Programme Management Department
PMU	Programme Management Unit
PROFIL	Projet d'appui aux filières agricoles
PROFINDER	Projet pour la Promotion d'Outils Innovateurs pour la Microfinance et le Développement des Entreprises Rurales
RIMS	Results and Impact Management System
RME	Rural Micro Enterprise
SCADD	Stratégie de croissance accélérée et de développement durable
USD	Dollars des États-Unis
WCA	Division Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre – FIDA
XOF	Franc de Communauté Financière Africaine (XOF)