

## Project Completion Report Validation

### Rural Development Project in the Likouala, Pool and Sangha Departments (PRODER 3)

Republic of Congo

Date of validation by IOE: January 2018

## I. Basic project data

			Approval (US\$ m)		Actual (US\$ m)	
Region	West and Central Africa	Total project costs	18.7		10.7	
Country	Republic of Congo	IFAD loan and percentage of total	8.6	46%	5.4	50%
Loan number	(DSF 8019)1438	Borrower	2.1	11%	1.8	17%
Type of project (subsector)	Rural Development	Cofinancier 1 (OPEC)	7.0	37%	3.2	30%
Financing type	DSF <sup>1</sup>	Cofinancier 2				
Lending terms	DSF grant	Cofinancier 3				
Date of approval	11/09/2008	Cofinancier 4				
Date of loan signature	08/10/2008	Beneficiaries	0.214	1.1%		
Date of effectiveness	02/02/2009	Other sources				
Loan amendments	2 <sup>2</sup>	Number of beneficiaries (if appropriate, specify if direct or indirect)			20,000 households (42,300 indirect beneficiaries <sup>3</sup> )	
Loan closure extensions	30/09/2015					
Country programme managers	L.Nsimpassi 2007 -2009 M. Manssouri 2009 -2010 P. Saint Ange 2010-2011 B. Hein 2011 - 2013 R. Omar 2013 - 2015	Loan closing date	30/09/2015		30/09/2015	
Regional director(s)	M. Beauvogui 01/02/2001 - 31/10/2011 I. de Willebois (current)	Mid-term review			September 2013	
Project completion report reviewer	Catrina Perch	IFAD loan disbursement at project completion (%)			74.44%	
Project completion report quality control panel	Kouessi Maximin Kodjo	Date of the project completion report			31/03/2015	

Source: PCR; President's Report; Appraisal Report

<sup>1</sup> DSF grants are provided to countries with low level of debt sustainability, as ascertained by the annual debt sustainability assessments carried out by IMF. Countries with 'low' debt sustainability are classified 'red' and countries with medium debt sustainability are classified yellow."

<sup>2</sup> (i) 1 June 2012: amendment on the allocation of IFAD grant resources (reallocation); (ii) 22 February 2013: reallocation.

<sup>3</sup> It is not clear if the 42,300 people were part of the 20,000 households.

## II. Project outline

- 1. Introduction.** The Rural Development Project in the Likouala, Pool and Sangha Departments (PRODER 3) was the third in a series of projects which began interventions in the field in 2004. Common to all three projects was a focus on: (1) improved access to markets through rehabilitation of rural roads; (2) production diversification by propagation of healthy cassava cuttings and livestock; and (3) capacity building of common economic interest groups (CEIGs). PRODER 1 and 2 also included rural finance and fishery activities. PRODER 1 (also referred to as PRODER NORD) covered three departments (Plateaux, Cuvette, Cuvette Ouest) in the central part of the country stretching from east to west. PRODER 2 (referred to as PRODER SUD) also initially covered three departments (Niari, Bouenza and Lékomou) and was later extended with a fourth department (Kouliou) all in the south of Congo. PRODER 3 covered three departments: Pool, located in the centre of the country, and two northern departments, Sangha and Likouala. In total the three projects left only two out of 12 departments uncovered: Brazzaville and Pointe Noire, both small departments with a large urban population. PRODER 3 was approved on 11 September 2009 and was expected to close in 2015. A new project, the Agricultural Value Chains Development Programme (PADEF) was approved in 2012 covering the whole country with explicit activities to finish or reinforce the achievements of the three previous PRODERS.
- 2. Country context.** The Republic of Congo has a small population of 5.1 million and a significant endowment of natural resources, including hydrocarbon and mining resources. However, heavy reliance on hydrocarbon resources has crowded out development of sectors such as agriculture and forestry. Following years of civil war, the restoration of peace and political reconciliation since 2000 has offered an opportunity for the country to focus on strengthening institutions and stimulating robust economic growth to combat poverty.<sup>4</sup> Nonetheless, the country remains fragile. Violence and insecurity due to a militia in Pool department have caused the displacement of about 81,000 people while 138,000 people are in distress.<sup>5</sup>
- 3.** The country is also characterized by weak institutions, which have slowed progress on social and economic transformation. The many years of conflict and unstable governments have severely weakened the country's administration, eroded public accountability, and undercut publicly funded services. Similarly, Congo's administration has been historically centralized. This tradition has, so far, limited the benefits of decentralization as well as the role of local communities in improving service delivery.<sup>6</sup>
- 4. Project area.** The two northern departments Sangha and Likouala were mainly covered by forest while Pool was mainly savannah, with some forest in the north west part of the Department. Their total area was 153 800 km<sup>2</sup> (45 per cent of the national territory). Some of Pool's districts were still characterized by insecurity because of the presence of veterans who were not yet fully rehabilitated in productive activities.<sup>7</sup>
- 5. Project goal, objectives and components.** The overall objective of the project was to improve food security. The specific objectives were to: (i) increase sustainably the production, productivity and income of rural groups engaged in improving the main crops belonging to the cassava-based farming system; and (ii) provide sustainable physical access to production basins.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> World Bank 2012, IEG CPSCR Review, para 3.

<sup>5</sup> <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/congo/overview> (consulted 20 December 2017).

<sup>6</sup> World Bank 2012, Country Partnership Strategy, page 1.

<sup>7</sup> IFAD, 2008, PDR, page 6.

<sup>8</sup> IFAD, 2008, President's Report, page 2.

6. The project had four components: (i) support to agricultural production; (ii) capacity strengthening; (iii) infrastructure to provide access to production basins; and (iv) coordination, communication and management.
7. Table 1 shows the respective allocation of funds and expenditure of the components.

Table 1  
**Component costs**

<i>Component</i>	<i>Estimated cost at design (US\$ 000)</i>	<i>Percentage of base cost</i>	<i>Actual expenditure (US\$ 000)</i>	<i>Percentage of actual expenditure</i>	<i>Expenditure/ estimated cost at design (%)</i>
A. Support to agricultural production	2,584	15%	1,210	11%	47%
B. Capacity strengthening	3,664	20%	1,843	17%	50%
C. Access to production basins	8,948	48%	3,544	33%	40%
D. Coordination, communication and management	3,300	18%	4,069	38%	123%
Total	18,675		10,666		57%

Source: PCR and President's Report

8. **Target group.** The project covered 250 villages and 20,000 households (HH) (approximately 100 000 beneficiaries). The targeting strategy comprised three steps: (i) identification and selection of production basins; (ii) selection of villages; and (iii) selection of farmers' groups within the target villages.
9. The project design report (PDR) provided more details and it stated that the target group would include: (a) traditional smallholders who practiced an agricultural system based on cassava and plantain, and whose holdings were generally very small (less than 2 ha);(b) poor rural women; (c) young people: these were mainly young men and women between the ages of 15 and 25 who were out of school and found themselves unemployed and dependent on the extended family; (d) semi-nomadic populations (Pygmies): the Baka ethnic group, very present in the departments of Likouala, Sangha and to a lesser extent Pool, and economically vulnerable; and (e) young people at risk. These were ex-combatants, mothers and other groups of young people who were extremely vulnerable.
10. The project prioritized the poorest villages within the production basins that responded to the following criteria: (i) isolated villages; (ii) villages that had agricultural potential and were well endowed with natural resources ; and (iii) villages with a high-density population and established and dynamic farmers' groups.<sup>9</sup>
11. **Financing.** Similar to its predecessor, PRODER 3 was financed jointly by IFAD and the OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID), the Government and beneficiaries for an expected total amount of US\$18.7 million. Table 2 below summarizes planned and real contributions by donor.

<sup>9</sup> IFAD 2008, President's Report, page 2.

Table 2  
**Project costs**

	<i>Estimated at appraisal (US\$ m)</i>	<i>Percentage of total (%)</i>	<i>Actual expenditure (US\$ m)</i>	<i>Percentage of total (%)</i>	<i>Expenditure/ estimated cost at design (%)</i>
IFAD	8.6	46%	5.4	51%	63%
OPEC Fund	7.0	38%	3.2	30%	46%
Government	2.1	11%	1.8	17%	86%
Road maintenance funds	0.8	4%	-	-	-
Beneficiaries	0.214	1%	-	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>18.7</b>		<b>10.6</b>		<b>57%</b>

Source: President's Report 2008; PCR 2016

12. **Intervention logic.** Focus was on improving the production of the main crops that were part of the cassava based system (cassava, yam, plantain, maize and peanuts) and to a limited extent restocking of ruminants (goats and sheep). The project logic was to build the capacity of farmers' organisations (CEIGs), provide improved seedlings and seeds for the production of, in particular, cassava, but also other value chains, and ensure access to production areas. This, according to the intervention logic, would lead to enhanced productivity, food security, increase the income of the population, and create sustainable jobs. The focus of the project was support to the CEIGs. These farmers' groups were to be established and reinforced to support the production chains. A number of important assumptions were implicit in this logic. For example, there was an assumption that government, civil society and private enterprises with a limited capacity building would be able to face the technicalities of a rural investment project funded by an IFI.
13. **Changes and developments during project implementation.** Several changes to the project took place during implementation. Firstly, PRODER 3 faced a number of delays. While the project was declared effective on 2 February 2009 the first disbursement was only made nine months later, in November 2009, and the project coordination unit (PCU) was put in place at the end of 2009. Due to cumbersome procurement procedures, the late acquisition of vehicles and office equipment led to further delays. These delays in turn meant that the activities, and the envisaged sequencing of activities, were not followed. In fact many activities were only implemented properly from late 2012.
14. Secondly, the integrated approach of building capacity with a view to increase production, coupled with increased access to the production basins, and enhanced sharing of knowledge, proved to be difficult to implement and led to a number of changes following the mid-term review. Specifically, the quantitative targets were lowered for the components "access to production basins" and "support to agricultural production". It was also decided not to create more new CEIGs and certain activities were abandoned (e.g. the component on knowledge sharing and coordination, the propagation of bananas and restocking of sheep and goats).
15. **Project implementation.** The project was under the responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock and was managed by an independent PCU. A project steering committee oversaw project implementation. It was chaired by the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock and included representatives of key ministries. The IFAD liaison office in Brazzaville offered logistical assistance to prepare missions and send the withdrawal application.
16. **Delivery of outputs.** Annex IV provides a list of physical outputs produced by PRODER 3.

### III. Review of findings

#### A. Core criteria

##### Relevance

17. **Policy relevance.** PRODER 3 was aligned with the 2004 and 2008 Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). The general objective for agriculture and livestock was to bring a sustainable increase in agro-pastoral production, and to reduce imports and guarantee food security. Specifically, the project was consistent with an emphasis on agriculture, livestock and fishery which was the PRSPs' 3<sup>rd</sup> priority sector. There was equally an emphasis on access to socio-economic infrastructure (pillar 4).<sup>10</sup>
18. The project was also in line with the Agricultural Development Strategy (2004) and the National Transportation Plan (2006) that prioritized, among other issues, the opening up and/or rehabilitation and maintenance of water routes and farm roads, and technical advisory services for producers.<sup>11</sup>
19. PRODER 3 followed the logic of the first country strategic opportunities programme (COSOP) for Congo (2002-2009),<sup>12</sup> which focused on a transition from assistance to development, taking into account the post-conflict situation of the country. Within this framework, production capacity would be restored and market access improved. It was also aligned with the COSOP (2010-2014) which emphasized the sustainable improvement of incomes and food security of the rural poor through the development of sectors.<sup>13</sup>
20. **Project design.** The project built on, and was envisaged to work with, PRODER 1 (2004-2012) and PRODER 2 (2006-2014) as well as a World Bank project on agricultural development and rehabilitation of roads (PDARP). Important lessons were highlighted in the PDR and included: the weaknesses of local public and private service providers; the necessity of simple designs to avoid delays during implementation; the need for securing government contributions in order to avoid interruption to implementation; and the need for integrating gender considerations. However, the mitigation measures identified in the PDR and COSOPs<sup>14</sup> proved insufficient to avoid repetition of past difficulties (e.g. targeting, lack of co-financing, unavailability of the road fund, weak capacity of private operators). Both PRODER 1 and 2 were assessed as having had designs that were too ambitious,<sup>15</sup> yet the PRODER 3 design did not differ significantly from these two projects and covered a vast and spread out project area (800 km between departments with different agro-ecological conditions). Consequently a number of changes in the implementation strategy and reduction of targets took place at midterm. The project also struggled to create the expected synergy between the components and there is limited evidence of collaboration with the PDARP.
21. **Relevance to local needs.** The documents reviewed confirmed the relevance of the project activities to the needs of the local population. However, while attempts were made to reach marginalized populations such as the pygmies, the targeting strategies were only partially successful with relatively high numbers of pygmies and women organized in groups but few examples of successful income generating activities (this is discussed further in the effectiveness section).
22. The project rating is assessed as moderately unsatisfactory (3), one point below that of Programme Management Department. This is due to a project design that was too ambitious and not able to adequately address lessons from previous or on-

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<sup>10</sup> IMF 2005, Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, Congo.

<sup>11</sup> IFAD 2009, COSOP, page 5.

<sup>12</sup> Cited in: COSOP 2009.

<sup>13</sup> IFAD 2013, MTR, page 2

<sup>14</sup> IFAD 2009, COSOP page 11.

<sup>15</sup> IFAD 2013 and 2016, PCRV PRODER 1 and 2.

going projects, weaknesses in the targeting strategy and limited collaboration with partners working on similar topics.

### **Effectiveness**

23. **Effectiveness of targeting.** The project applied a mixture of targeting strategies namely, geographic, direct and self-targeting. Geographic targeting was applied in the three departments mentioned above. Specifically, the project targeted production areas with good potential and villages with certain poverty and agricultural characteristics. In addition, PRODER 3 supported the common economic interest groups (CEIG/GIECs in French) as the main entry point for development activities.<sup>16</sup>
24. PRODER 3 targeted indigenous people but by 2012 no activities had been carried out. Subsequently, a participatory diagnosis was developed in collaboration with an NGO (l'Association des Spiritains du Congo), UNICEF, and the Departmental Director of Agriculture in Likouala department which had an estimated indigenous population of 13 000. This diagnosis covered 20 groups of indigenous peoples with 598 members. As part of the diagnosis, a number of potential income generating activities were identified following a participatory approach. They included staple crops, livestock farming, beekeeping, fishing, for an amount of nearly CFA 190 million. It was recommended to include a pilot project in the 2013 AWPB. Based on this an action plan for the three departments would be developed.<sup>17</sup> The RIMS survey noted that 68.5 per cent out of a sample of 712 HH were participating in groups but found that the groups were fragile.<sup>18</sup> According to the project completion report (PCR) seven groups (out of 20 identified) were supported with income generating activities for market gardening seeds, agricultural tools and means of transport. Results were mixed. In the Department of Pool, the PCR observed some fields of propagation of healthy cassava but the harvest had not yet been carried out. In Likouala, however, the revenues (average annual income of CFA 50,000) were too low to improve the living conditions of the groups. Other activities such as renting rickshaws generated substantial income (CFA 300,000 / year on average). However, the number of indigenous beneficiaries reached remained quite limited (234) and the activities were not scaled up as envisaged.
25. Though a partnership with UNDP, attempts were also made to reach 3,000 people "at risk" (ex-combatants, mothers and youth) by supporting them with fish farming, market gardening and livestock and this resulted in various farms, livestock feed factories and breeding centres (eleven in total).<sup>19</sup> However the partnership with UNDP ended at project completion due to non-inclusion of young people. According to the mid-term review, the UNDP decision to adopt a community-based approach to the economic and social reintegration of "at-risk youth" had diluted the targeting.<sup>20</sup> In addition it was found that the groups that were created were not economically viable.
26. Women were targeted as members of CEIGs and the target of 50 per cent female members was met. According to the PCR the project improved the economic and social situation of poor women by facilitating access to cassava cuttings and poultry but the PCR does not substantiate this further.
27. The PCR mentions that the target of 20,000 households was reached, but does not provide further details on how this was counted. Neither does it provide more granular data on the different target groups within these 20 000 households and so it is not very clear how the targeting strategy worked for the groups not covered above.

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<sup>16</sup> IFAD 2009, COSOP: para 16.

<sup>17</sup> IFAD 2012, Supervision Report, page 11.

<sup>18</sup> Nkouika et al 2015, page 25.

<sup>19</sup> IFAD 2015, PCR, page 23.

<sup>20</sup> IFAD 2013, MTR, page 12.

28. The following section describes the achievement of the project according to the specific project objectives.

**Objective (i): Increase sustainably the production, productivity and income of rural groups engaged in improving the main crops belonging to the cassava-based farming system.**

29. This objective was partially reached. PRODER 3 worked on a number of different crops which have shown varied degrees of success. In the case of cassava, more fields of cassava cuttings were established than originally foreseen (314 ha against a target of 279 ha). However, these were used to plant only 1,132 ha of cassava against 24,100 ha envisaged in the PDR.
30. Good adoption rates of improved seeds were reported (10,627 farmers, i.e. 53 per cent).<sup>21</sup> The PCR estimated that the project had potentially contributed to 38,520 tons of cassava based on a prediction estimation of 321 ha per year for four years (30 tonnes /ha). However this estimate was a prediction and not based on actual figures.
31. Activities with maize, beans, groundnut and banana were not successful. In some cases the seeds were delivered late and out of season which led to weakened ability to germinate. The use of improved groundnut seeds appeared not to be relevant to farmers and at completion the farmers were using their usual seeds. In the case of beans most CEIGs were not able to preserve the seeds and some even abandoned the crop. Some success was noted in poultry with the introduction of the Bovan Nera and sales of eggs became profitable for poultry farmers.
32. The project planned to restock sheep and goats through sharecropping. However, the contract with the supplier was not executed according to the protocols and at mid-term review the activity was abandoned. Instead, for the remaining period, the project focused on national immunization coverage to sanitize existing flocks before restarting restocking with PADEF. On completion, a flock of 28,097 small ruminants was vaccinated (including 14,109 sheep and 13,988 goats) by the Directorate General of Livestock.
33. The financial and material support and training provided to CEIGs have according to the PCR had the following results: (i) increased the productivity and production areas; (ii) recognition of diseases and pests that attack cassava (100 per cent of CEIG members recognize cassava mosaic); (iii) knowledge of mosaic-resistant and highly productive varieties that produce high yields of 30 to 40 tonnes / ha, good quality cassava flour and bread.
34. In terms of investments a disbursement rate of 47 per cent was incurred for the agricultural productivity activities. As a result, the picture is mixed with some positive achievements on adoption rates and potential productivity whereas the activities aimed at diversification did not yield the expected results. These results were quite similar to those of PRODER 2.<sup>22</sup>

**Objective (ii): Provide sustainable physical access to production basins.**<sup>23</sup>

35. This objective was only achieved to a limited extent although the PCR notes that some activities would be carried out after project completion due to an extension of the OPEC loan. At completion, the number of km of rehabilitated rural roads was 100 km (target 100 km). In addition 45 crossing structures were completed. However, the project also envisaged that 300 km waterways would be rehabilitated. This target was however reduced to 240 km at the mid-term review but activities had not started at completion.

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<sup>21</sup> IFAD 2016, PCR logframe annex D.

<sup>22</sup> IFAD, 2016, PCRV, page 7.

<sup>23</sup> IFAD 2008, President's Report, page 2.

36. Some capacity building activities were carried out but the number remained very low. Specifically, 28 people were trained in HIMO (Haute Intensité de Main d'Oeuvre/High Labour Intensive Public Works) techniques including 25 representatives of SMEs / NGOs and 3 representatives of DDETPs (Direction Départementale de l'Équipement et des Travaux Publics/Public works).
37. The physical completion rate is estimated at 44 per cent and 21 per cent of activities were in progress at the time of project completion<sup>24</sup>.
38. The PCR notes that the reason for the poor performance of the infrastructure activities was related to poor service providers (failure to meet deadlines; poor quality of the studies; too long periods between completion of studies and execution on the ground resulting in changed physical context). In addition, a lack of monitoring and control of the execution of the works, difficulty to assess the operational capacity of firms in procurement, and misuse of confidential estimates were noted as challenges in the PCR.
39. Despite the challenges mentioned above the PCR reports that the rehabilitation of tracks helped to open up some production basins and improved access to markets. Compared to the baseline survey in 2011, farm households found it easier to sell their products in 2015. Increasing traffic and induced economic activities were observed and the transport time improved. The marketing of agricultural products was facilitated, and as a result, revenues from agricultural production had increased by at least 20 per cent. The PCR provides some anecdotal information to substantiate the above claims (e.g. the number of taxis and vans on the Louinguï-Sakamesso-Moulenda axis doubled). In Moulenda (Louinguï), producers have set up their own market information system using mobile phones. This information system makes it possible to control the evolution of prices on the wholesale markets in Brazzaville and to negotiate directly with the carriers.<sup>25</sup>
40. The results were fragmented with few links between increased capacity, productivity and improved access to the production basins. The overall implementation rate was 51 per cent.<sup>26</sup> Given that this was the third project in a row (although implementation overlapped somewhat between the different PRODERS) with similar scope and activities in Congo since 2004 the rating is moderately unsatisfactory (3), in line with that of PMD.

### **Efficiency**

41. The efficiency of PRODER 3 was weak. The economic internal rate of return (EIRR) in the President's Report was estimated to be 16 per cent based on a conservative hypotheses for yield increases. Upon completion, the project's EIRR was 2.5 per cent. However the PCR observed that it could potentially reach 14 per cent because the sensitivity assumptions showed an increase in gross margins of 10 per cent and areas of 20 per cent.
42. The low economic return of PRODER 3 was due to a considerable discrepancy between the assumptions used in the formulation and the results obtained at completion and these included: small additional areas planted<sup>27</sup> (1,132 ha were planted against a target of 24,100 ha), farm models not respected, higher intervention cost, low investments of OPEC and Government resources, non-inclusion of economic benefits related to the rehabilitation of slopes in the absence of data on monitoring indicators. Nonetheless, it was found that individual

<sup>24</sup> The Country Programme Manager furthermore pointed out that through the PADEF project activities were being followed up.

<sup>25</sup> IFAD 2016, PCR, page 25.

<sup>26</sup> IFAD Project Implementation Report page 19.

<sup>27</sup> The assumptions for the formulation of PRODER 3 are based on a total area of 24,100 ha planted of which 13,980 ha with the adoption of new varieties and improved technical routes and the generation of 15,200 tons of additional production. The EIRR post project was calculated on the basis of a cumulated area of 1,132 hectares planted and additional production of 3,197 tonnes.



producers who cultivated healthy cassava and high-yielding varieties were able to make a profit.

43. The unit cost per beneficiary was estimated at US\$522 (based on an estimate of 20 000 beneficiaries). The PCR considered this efficient, compared to the unit cost per beneficiary of PRODER1 US\$1,468 (based on 8,039 direct beneficiaries) and less efficient compared to PRODER 2 which was US\$285 (60,000 direct beneficiaries).<sup>28</sup> However, this PCRV noted that PRODER 3 appears to be using 20,000 households rather than beneficiaries which means that the figure for PRODER 3 may actually be lower.
44. Project management costs rose to 38 per cent of project costs leaving 62 per cent for the investment activities. This compared with project management costs in PRODER 2 of 55 per cent and PRODER 1 of 81 per cent. This cost overrun was, according to the PCR, due to the vast and spread out nature of the project area which made it difficult to cover. This was in particular true for the department of Likouala which could only be reached by river.<sup>29</sup>
45. Other challenges identified included: successive and recurrent reassignments of key PCU personnel; lack of rigor in the planning of activities at the start of the project; insufficient accounting due to weak internal control mechanisms; non-conforming contracts of service providers under Congolese labour law. Most of these issues were also encountered in PRODER 1 and 2. For example PRODER 1 observed non-compliance with the project operation's manual, deficient tendering procedures and the inability of the PMU to present withdrawal application on time leading to further inefficiencies.<sup>30</sup>
46. In terms of the financial management PRODER 3 was unable to provide information on the cumulative financial execution of the project due to difficulties in reconciling the IFAD disbursements with the Project's recorded expenditure, and subsequent refusal to certify the accounts of the Fund by the auditors in 2011. From the end of 2012, significant improvements were made and subsequently the quality of withdrawal applications developed and submitted to IFAD improved. However, shortcomings remained in terms of cash management and planning.
47. Two distinct periods can be identified in the PRODER's budget performance: (i) 2009-2011, where the average budget execution rate was 47 per cent. The planned spending outlook for components 1 and 2 was too ambitious in view of the lack of coordination and harmonization between the components, and in the implementation of actions at regional level; (ii) 2012-2014 with an average implementation rate of AWPBs of 55 per cent. Expenditure on investment components over this last period represented 82 per cent of the overall investment expenditure of PRODER 3. In addition, the implementation of the annual AWPBs was affected by significant delays in the development / submission for non-objection; this resulted in a reduction in the period of implementation of the AWPB (on average seven to nine months). It is likely that this reduction in time will have affected in particular capacity building activities which take longer to establish.
48. Based on the EIRR and high management cost efficiency is rated unsatisfactory (2), in line with that of PMD.

### **Rural poverty impact**

49. This section draws on evidence from the PCR, a baseline study (2011) and a RIMS survey (2015).

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<sup>28</sup> IFAD 2015, PCR, page 28.

<sup>29</sup> IFAD 2015, PCR, page 23.

<sup>30</sup> IFAD 2013, PCR, page 4.

### **Household income and assets**

50. The PCR reports that due to better access to markets, incomes from agricultural production increased by at least 20 per cent<sup>31</sup> but does not provide any details on how this figure was calculated. The RIMS survey (2015) observed improvements in income-generating activities and highlights processing and trade, the breeding of poultry and small ruminants, fishing and fish farming as potentially affecting the living conditions of the HHs.<sup>32</sup> However, there is no evidence that this was actually taking place at end of project.
51. The RIMS survey (2015) measured the asset accumulation index between 2011 and 2015. The report found that depending on the number of variables used, an increase from 25 to 36 per cent was observed when considering 18 variables. A slightly higher increase from 20 to 39 per cent was found when considering 23 variables. The latter considered all agricultural, pastoral and fisheries activities promoted by PRODER 3. As is to be expected, there was some variability between the different Departments. The percentage of beneficiaries noticing an increase in assets was 19 per cent.<sup>33</sup>
52. As regards asset types, the PCR reports, that mobile phone were the most common property in the project area. Currently it is found in Pool (72 per cent), Sangha (64 per cent) and Likouala (30 per cent). Some households increased their domestic wealth and now hold certain assets they did not have before, namely: television (9.3 per cent), motorcycle (12.4 per cent), generator (8.4 per cent) and to a lesser extent, agricultural machinery. Other households pay service providers for use of tractors and ploughing. However, the extent to which the purchasing of these assets can be attributed to the project interventions are difficult to ascertain because no baseline data on these assets are provided

### **Agricultural productivity and food security**

53. The PCR provides limited data on agricultural production. Scattered results on productivity have, according to the PCR, contributed to a moderate improvement in the agricultural productivity.
54. Individual producers who cultivate healthy cassava and high-yielding varieties are able to make a profit. With a production cost of CFA 386,915 / hectare (US\$774), the gross margin for processed cassava was between CFA 791,618 – CFA 1.1 million / year. The key factor contributing to cassava's very high gross margin was the significant impact of improved early varieties on productivity (20 to 30 tonnes per hectare). However, the crop diversification activities (maize, beans, peanuts, bananas, yams) did not generate substantial income for beneficiaries because of difficulties in transport and seed management. On the other hand, according to the PCR the village poultry farming had generated unexpected financial benefits in particular from income generated through the sale of eggs (70 per cent of turnover).<sup>34</sup>
55. The socio-economic survey and the interviews with CEIG members, showed an improvement in their food situation. Children under five ate meals at least twice a day. The introduction of healthy cassava cuttings into the project area had improved the food security and scarcity was hardly mentioned. Findings from the PCR showed similar results in the three target departments where cassava products reappeared permanently on the market. In Sangha, people no longer import gari okombo (cassava from Cameroon); in Likouala and Pool cassava is no longer imported from DRC or Brazzaville.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> IFAD 2016, PCR, page 25.

<sup>32</sup> Nkouika et al. 2015, Enquete Socio-Economique et Nutritionelle, page 8.

<sup>33</sup> Nkouika et al. 2015, Enquete Socio-Economique et Nutritionelle

<sup>34</sup> IFAD 2016, PCR, page 21.

<sup>35</sup> IFAD 2015, page 25

56. Despite the positive impact of cassava, some shortages appear in the project area. In Likouala Department serious food security problems remains with foods missing during the dry season or the rainy season (fish, meat, cassava, oil). In Pool, scarcity is observed from September to December, at the beginning of the short rainy season, which corresponds to the first crop cycle, a period generally recommended for crop production. In the Sangha, food shortages are observed in January which is a pivotal period between the rainy season and the dry season. A second famine often appears between October and December.
57. The baseline study found that 94.4 per cent of households had experienced a period of hunger or food deprivation. However, at completion, the socio-economic and nutritional study revealed that HHs experienced the first scarcity during the period from September (60 per cent) to December (22 per cent) and that reflects an improvement despite nuances between the Departments.<sup>36</sup> Some of the products for which HH face shortages include green vegetables, nuts, sea fish, farmed meat, fruit, game meat, bread and maize.<sup>37</sup>

### **Human and social capital and empowerment**

58. According to the RIMS report, PRODER 3 had contributed to improved literacy. Specifically, there was an improvement from 33.47 per cent of household heads being literate in 2011 to 41.75 per cent in 2015. Again, there is variability in the progress among the departments, and Likouala continues to have a serious literacy problem.<sup>38</sup>
59. The training of farmers' organizations was much lower than planned and from midterm a new strategy was introduced to consolidate the capacity of the already established CEIGs. This would also support indigenous CEIGs in the Likouala department as well as other CEIGs in their entrepreneurial and associative dynamics. The project planned to put in place the necessary tools for monitoring the functional CEIGs. The goal was to reach 70 per cent of functional CEIGs at completion. The PCR notes, however, that CEIG capacity building was weak. The December 2012 supervision mission observed a lack of project strategy, lack of reference and training tools, and the lack of a mechanism for evaluating transfer of knowledge and skills as some of the challenges encountered.
60. **Institutions and policies.** The project strengthened the capacities of the agriculture department and sector leaders, especially in propagation techniques for healthy cassava cuttings and in farm management. This had, according to the PCR, enabled CEIGs to rapidly adopt sound propagation techniques for cassava and to control poultry farming. The departmental agriculture and livestock staff started spending more time on the ground and less on administrative tasks.
61. **Project impact.** PRODER 3 achieved some good results with certain agricultural products (e.g. poultry and cassava) although the data is scant. The impact of the rehabilitation of the roads was positive and helped to open up some production basins and improve access to markets. Compared to the baseline survey in 2011, farm households were able to sell their products more easily in 2015. Increasing traffic and induced economic activities were observed and the transport time had improved. The marketing of agricultural products was facilitated, and as a result, revenues from agricultural production had increased by at least 20 per cent. Impacts on nutrition and household assets are also positive but again it is not clear how far these impacts can be solely attributed to the project interventions given that effectiveness was quite low. The capacity building of farmers organisations did not reach the expected results. This was an extremely difficult context, the results achieved, although not as many as foreseen in the design document will have had

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid. page 64

<sup>37</sup> Ibid, page 41

<sup>38</sup> Ibid, page 8

an impact on the population. The rating is therefore moderately satisfactory (4), in line with that of PMD.

### **Sustainability of benefits**

62. **Economic and financial sustainability.** The financial analysis in the PCR shows a satisfactory financial viability of the cassava production activities, due to the rapid adoption by the beneficiaries of the high-yielding healthy cassava cuttings (30 tonnes / ha) and early maturing, with a positive impact on the production of cassava. Village poultry also showed satisfactory financial viability once the issue of fodder was resolved, even if the activity was only at the trial phase.
63. The sustainability of the rehabilitation of runways / inland waterways was conditional on the State taking over the maintenance of the waterways. A contribution of US\$800,000 was expected from the Road Fund to finance maintenance activities. Community management and development committees (CGDC) were to be set up by departmental councils to ensure the maintenance of waterways and rehabilitated waterways using the Highly Labour Intensive (HLI) method. However, upon completion, sustainability had not been assured. For example, maintenance was not being carried out and community development committees had not been established. This was despite having trained departmental staff in the HLI method. As a result the PCR provides examples (the Nguéla-Mbamou-Kibouédé (Pool) runway), of tracks being in an advanced state of degradation. In the Sangha, the county council undertook to maintain the rehabilitated tracks in partnership with the Road Fund (FR), CIB (Congolaise Industrielle de Bois) and the enterprise SIFO.
64. **Technical sustainability.** Most of the beneficiaries (90 per cent) trained and supported on cassava cultivation continued to carry out these activities. In the departments of Sangha and Likouala, most CEIG members have individual fields of 2 to 3 ha. In the Pool Department and particularly in the Boko and Louingui area, some CEIGs (existing groupings before PRODER 3) became true professionals in the multiplication of healthy cassava cuttings. For example, the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock purchased healthy cuttings for the sowing of 15 ha from three CEIGs in Boko. In Sangha and Likouala, the PCU purchased cuttings from CEIGs. In addition, the various trainings organized for some of the CEIG members allowed them to learn about other crops (yams, maize, beans, peanuts), which they in turn passed on to their members (families and neighbours).
65. However, the viability of the CEIG could be compromised in the medium and long term by technical constraints (lack of tractors, chainsaws and innovative processing equipment) and commercial constraints (lack of opportunities already faced by some producers of Sangha and of the Likouala). The results of the different trainings will therefore be difficult to sustain if nothing is done to improve the access of these producers to innovative production techniques and markets.
66. **Institutional sustainability.** At the institutional level, the CEIGs were the locus of community development. Some CEIGs are officially recognized at the local and prefectural levels. However, according to the PCR these organizations show a lot of operational, and organizational, management shortcomings and the organisational training provided did not sufficiently address the gaps. It was noted that the producers' support for the groupings was fragile, especially since their creation, in most cases, was prompted by the presence of PRODER3. Many of these groups disintegrated. Of those that were still functional, many of their members left or abandoned them because of: (i) mismanagement; (ii) non-transparency and lack of equity in the distribution of income; and (iii) lack of monitoring.<sup>39</sup> This could undermine their sustainability.

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid, page 8.

67. PADEF project is meant to consolidate some of these activities. However, given that this was the third project more attention should have been paid to exit strategies beyond relying on another IFAD project. Overall, upon completion of PRODER 3, the sustainability of the project is therefore assessed as being 3 moderately unsatisfactory in line with the rating of PMD. This rating is given as activities still require external support for their sustainability and the institutions needed to support them are also in need of continued strengthening other performance criteria

### **Innovation**

68. The President's Report described a number of innovations that PRODER would introduce: (i) setting up of mechanisms for the identification, promotion and diffusion of new farming practices; (ii) use of mobile phones (short messaging service [SMS] and internet) by smallholders for relaying information on markets and prices; (iii) direct use of Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock field staff to provide extension services; and (iv) the use of village economic interest groups for the production, propagation and diffusion of improved mosaic-free cassava planting materials and seeds. In addition PRODER 3 planned for a knowledge-sharing focal point for all rural and agricultural development activities being undertaken in area.<sup>40</sup>
69. In reality PRODER 3 mainly capitalized on the innovations made by PRODER 1 and PRODER 2, which had started operations in 2004 i.e. introducing and testing disease resistant cassava varieties and the participatory multiplication system through the CEIGs. Additional innovations are listed in the PCR but many of these were also introduced in PRODER 2 (i.e. the decontamination of local varieties of cassava; the introduction of yam seed from the Ivory Coast (bété-bété variety); the recruitment of facilitators in the monitoring of project activities at the departmental level; the involvement of the deconcentrated Departmental Director for Agriculture / livestock in the implementation of the project).<sup>41</sup> Nonetheless these activities may have been novel to the departments in PRODER 3. The rating for innovation is assessed as moderately satisfactory (4), in line with the rating of PMD. This rating is justified by the fact that it was difficult and risky to introduce innovations given the difficult context.

### **Scaling up**

70. The PCR includes hardly any information on scaling up. The COSOP mentions briefly that the production and propagation of healthy cassava cuttings through CEIGs, was adopted by other partners, but does not provide details on who and where.<sup>42</sup> It is mentioned though, that some of the above innovations will be further improved and replicated in the PADEF project which has national coverage. Although this is positive, scaling up requires that, in addition to IFAD, other partners (e.g., Government, donors, private sector, communities) mobilize resources and expertise to deliver larger results for a greater number of rural poor in a sustainable way. From the available documentation, it is not evident that the above conditions are set. The rating is moderately unsatisfactory (3), one rating below PMD.

### **Gender equality and women's empowerment**

71. The project's target group included poor rural women and, as a sub-group of young people at risk, there were "girl mothers". The Project was to ensure that the poor women were reached through, in particular, facilitating access to cuttings, seeds, small ruminants / poultry by sharecropping and supporting their organization as an economic interest group. Moreover it was envisaged that at least 50 per cent of the beneficiaries of the training should be women. There is very limited information on

<sup>40</sup> IFAD 2008, President's Report, page 4.

<sup>41</sup> IFAD 2016, PCR, Rural Development Project in the Niari, Bouenza and Lékoumou Departments, page 13.

<sup>42</sup> IFAD 2009, COSOP, paragraph 26.

gender in the PCR. Focus of the reporting was on objective 2 of IFAD's gender policy that deals with giving women a voice and ensuring their representation. The PCR stated positive results in terms of 7,200 (60 per cent) of the CEIG members being women. Additionally, women's representation in the governing bodies of the CEIG was 49 per cent. According to the PCR the project improved the economic and social situation of poor women by facilitating access to cassava cuttings and poultry but does not substantiate this further. Given the limited information on how membership impacted on the women, limited evidence of economic empowerment and equitable workload balance, the above results can be considered only moderately satisfactory (4), which is one point lower than that of PMD.

### **Environment and natural resources management**

72. The COSOP 2009 acknowledges that environmental issues have only been considered to a limited degree in the PRODERs (paragraph 31). No environmental impact assessment was undertaken during the project period but the PCR assessed that the project did not cause any significant impact or risk on the environment.<sup>43</sup> However, a similar World Bank project (PDARP) did undertake environmental assessments and from midterm also social assessments of project impacts. In fact following a recommendation at midterm, a specific study was conducted to protect the indigenous population in the project area in 2012. Measures to mitigate any potential negative impacts were included, such as early warning mechanism about the land acquisition near the rehabilitated roads. In the case of PRODER 3 the risks identified at design were related to the opening up of new production areas and intensification of agricultural production. The PCR found that the rehabilitation of roads had not caused any negative impact on land use or increased deforestation. Given that only 100 km of rehabilitated roads were carried against 1300 in the World Bank project this is plausible. It was observed that, due to the low population density and good land availability, additional pressure on soils and forest had been limited (para 34). As regards crop production, pesticides or chemical fertilizers were not used for the multiplication of cassava cuttings. There was little consideration of environmental as well as safeguards in PRODER 3. The rating is therefore moderately unsatisfactory (3), in line with that of PMD.

### **Adaptation to climate change**

73. The PCR stated that, in terms of environmental awareness, natural resource management and adaptation to climate change, PRODER-3 was limited to awareness-raising activities and had achieved moderately inadequate results. The local population living in the forest zone, along the river and near the coast were considered the most vulnerable to climate change impacts in the Republic of Congo (all three departments had areas of forest). Changes in rain patterns, higher evapotranspiration and drought and more extreme temperatures are affecting agriculture. However, cassava is highly adaptable to changes in climate. Among the major food crops of Africa (including maize, sorghum, millet, beans, potatoes and bananas), cassava is the least sensitive to the climate conditions predicted by 2030. It's drought resistant, can grow almost anywhere, and is not easily destroyed by heavy rains. The rating is therefore moderately unsatisfactory (3), in line with that of PMD.

## **B. Overall project achievement**

74. The project was largely relevant to IFAD and Government policy but the design built on assumptions that proved to be false (e.g. the over reliance on CEIGs to achieve productivity access to markets and increased incomes). As a result several components and activities were changed and project efficiency was low. The most important results remain the multiplication and distribution of improved seed material (especially cassava) and the access to markets. Agricultural productivity

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<sup>43</sup> IFAD 2016, PCR, page 26.

leveraged some results and food security and nutrition has improved although impact on incomes is difficult to ascertain.

75. Sustainability remains a challenge due to lack of consideration of key issues from the outset and insufficient time to consolidate outputs although PADEF may ensure the continuation of some activities. PRODER 3 consolidated some innovations introduced by other PRODER projects and replicated them in new geographical areas. Although good results were found in terms of women's participation in the CEIGs, the fragility of their sustainability puts this activity at risk. Moreover, given the explicit focus on women in the PDR the implementation strategy lacked a more holistic approach to ensuring that women would benefit from all the activities not just from being members on the CEIG. Based on the above the rating is moderately unsatisfactory (3) in line with that of PMD.

### **C. Performance of partners**

76. **IFAD.** IFAD was responsible for the project design. There were some weaknesses in the design in terms of the vast and spread out project area and the overestimation of local management capacity and real costs. As a result, many components had to be changed and targets lowered during project implementation. The PCR found that IFAD was proactive in finding solutions to optimize project implementation but it was only at midterm (2013) that major changes were proposed (i.e. revising project targets downward for component 1 "support to agricultural production" and component 3 "access to production basins" and discontinuation of fast-growing banana and sheep-goat rearing).
77. The PCR observed that supervision missions had led to improvements in the development of the AWPB (improvement of the procurement plan) and in the monitoring of its implementation, which in turn had a positive impact on IFAD's withdrawal application processing times by reducing the number of requests for funding as well as clarifications / explanations of the expenses requested for reimbursement.
78. The IFAD country programme manager) changed five times between 2007 and 2013. This was not ideal in a fragile context which requires continuous follow up. The decision to open a Country Office for Congo in 2011 is highlighted as having significantly facilitated the operational management with resultant improvements in project management (e.g. frequent exchanges with the project team on the progress of the implementation of the AWPB and the request for no objection).
79. IFAD demonstrated flexibility and responsiveness, with some adjustments in the allocation of financial resources (reallocation), to reflect the actual financial costs of the project during implementation. Overall, the withdrawal applications were processed in a timely manner in view of the shortcomings in terms of their quality, where in most cases additional information was required.
80. IFAD's supervision and implementation support consisted of eight missions and teams of several experts to cover the different thematic areas covered by PRODER 3 (agro-economics, rural engineering, farmer organizations), as well as on fiduciary and monitoring and evaluation issues. However, there was a lack of targeting and social experts to ensure that the indigenous people, women and youth benefitted in the best way. By making recommendations that were discussed with the PRODER 3 management team, the supervision missions helped to better orient the project in its operational intervention strategy and methodological approach. The rating is moderately satisfactory (4), in line with that of PMD.
81. **Government.** The performance of the Government was mixed. Initially the performance was weak due to delays and low disbursement of counterpart funds but performance did according to the PCR improve over time although there is

some inconsistencies in the disbursement figures reported in the PCR<sup>44</sup> Following the operating cost overruns for PRODER 2, the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock paid more attention to the implementation of PRODER 3. The response to the cost overruns was to ration the number of field missions to save costs. This practice had negative effect on the monitoring of activities, especially for the component of rural roads rehabilitation. Moreover, the PMU showed poor performance due to weak planning capacity and staff demotivation. In addition, the IFAD - Government relationship suffered from communication deficiencies that often lead to confusion, especially in relation to IFAD procedures. With the opening of the IFAD country office in Brazzaville, this improved. Overall, government performance is rated moderately unsatisfactory (3), in line with that of PMD.

## **IV. Assessment of PCR quality**

### **Scope**

82. The PCR covers the mandatory key sections and addresses all major issues, despite the absence of data on the achievement of objectives. Issues related to the targeting of women and youth could also have been covered better and there is some inconsistencies regarding disbursement figures of the government. . The PCR is well written and articulate in most regards. The rating is satisfactory (5).

### **Quality**

83. The PCR includes information in tabular form where the attainment of output is well documented. However, comparisons with targets are only exceptionally available. There is also no information about the process undertaken to write the report. The rating is moderately satisfactory (4).

### **Lessons**

84. The project includes a number of well-grounded lessons and recommendations for future project design. Nevertheless, they could have included more detail on the context for their application. The rating is moderately satisfactory (4).

### **Candour**

85. The PCR balances achievements and shortcomings of the project. It is remarkably critical. The analysis produced by the PCR was objective, explicitly reporting negative and weak aspects throughout the document. This analysis was also reflected on the PCR project ratings. Therefore, the PCR's candour is rated as (5) satisfactory.

## **V. Final remarks and lessons learned**

### **Final remarks**

86. Previous lessons derived from earlier PRODER projects highlighted the need for better understanding the post conflict context and for taking more proactive measures in supervision and adapting the project. This was the third PRODER, the previous two were rated moderately unsatisfactory for overall project achievement, yet many issues, both administrative and technical, continued in PRODER 3. Close to US\$40 million has been spent, and while some encouraging results on dissemination of cassava cuttings have been achieved, one has to ask why important lessons highlighted in the design reports were not taken up and learnt from in a more systematic manner by the three projects. There were many similarities in the design of the projects and all have ended with a moderately unsatisfactory rating and high operating costs.

### **Lessons learned**

87. The PCR proposes some good lessons and recommendations for future projects such as: (i) avoid working in an overly large, and spread out, geographical zone in

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<sup>44</sup> IFAD, 2015, PCR, page 28 cites US\$2.8 million whereas on page 29 the figure is US\$1.8 million.



order to keep management costs at a reasonable level, and ensure better impact; (ii) contracts (e.g. facilitators) should follow IFAD rules and labour rules of the country; iii) the recruitment of staff for the PCU should follow the procedures as laid down in the loan agreement.

88. In addition, the following two lessons are proposed by the PCRV: (i) the project was based on assumptions that government, civil society and private enterprises were able to face the technicalities of a rural investment project funded by an IFI. This assumption proved to be wrong. The design did not address foreseeable challenges that were to emerge in a fragile country (e.g. that counterpart funding would not occur in a timely manner<sup>45</sup>); (ii) after 12 years **of supporting farmers' organisations with capacity building** only slow progress was observed and there is still a high dependency on states' institutions capacity which remains insufficient at local level. Explicit discussion of whether the approach to capacity development within IFAD (training and provision of infrastructure) projects needs to be adapted, or the level of investment increased, in response to the fragile context should take place and indicators assessing the development of farmers organisations above the level of activities/output be put in place (e.g. whether empowerment took place).

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<sup>45</sup> According to the CPM the issue of counterpart funding persists even in 2017 and 2018. The Government is still in deep financial crisis and it is recommended that the Financial Agreement be amended to avoid penalizing project implementation due to lack of Government counterpart funding.

## Definition and rating of the evaluation criteria used by IOE

Criteria	Definition *	Mandatory	To be rated
<b>Rural poverty impact</b>	Impact is defined as the changes that have occurred or are expected to occur in the lives of the rural poor (whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended) as a result of development interventions.	X	Yes
	<i>Four impact domains</i>		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Household income and net assets: Household income provides a means of assessing the flow of economic benefits accruing to an individual or group, whereas assets relate to a stock of accumulated items of economic value. The analysis must include an assessment of trends in equality over time.</li> </ul>		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Human and social capital and empowerment: Human and social capital and empowerment include an assessment of the changes that have occurred in the empowerment of individuals, the quality of grass-roots organizations and institutions, the poor's individual and collective capacity, and in particular, the extent to which specific groups such as youth are included or excluded from the development process.</li> </ul>		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Food security and agricultural productivity: Changes in food security relate to availability, stability, affordability and access to food and stability of access, whereas changes in agricultural productivity are measured in terms of yields; nutrition relates to the nutritional value of food and child malnutrition.</li> </ul>		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Institutions and policies: The criterion relating to institutions and policies is designed to assess changes in the quality and performance of institutions, policies and the regulatory framework that influence the lives of the poor.</li> </ul>		No
<b>Project performance</b>	Project performance is an average of the ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.	X	Yes
Relevance	The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs institutional priorities and partner and donor policies. It also entails an assessment of project design and coherence in achieving its objectives. An assessment should also be made of whether objectives and design address inequality, for example, by assessing the relevance of targeting strategies adopted.	X	Yes
Effectiveness	The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.	X	Yes
Efficiency	A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results.	X	Yes
Sustainability of benefits	The likely continuation of net benefits from a development intervention beyond the phase of external funding support. It also includes an assessment of the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the project's life.	X	Yes
<b>Other performance criteria</b>			
Gender equality and women's empowerment	The extent to which IFAD interventions have contributed to better gender equality and women's empowerment, for example, in terms of women's access to and ownership of assets, resources and services; participation in decision making; work load balance and impact on women's incomes, nutrition and livelihoods.	X	Yes
Innovation	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have introduced innovative approaches to rural poverty reduction.	X	Yes
Scaling up	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have been (or are likely to be) scaled up by government authorities, donor organizations, the private sector and others agencies.	X	Yes
Environment and natural resources management	The extent to which IFAD development interventions contribute to resilient livelihoods and ecosystems. The focus is on the use and management of the natural environment, including natural resources defined as raw materials used for socio-economic and cultural purposes, and ecosystems and biodiversity - with the goods and services they provide.	X	Yes
Adaptation to climate change	The contribution of the project to reducing the negative impacts of climate change through dedicated adaptation or risk reduction measures.	X	Yes

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Definition</i> *	<i>Mandatory</i>	<i>To be rated</i>
<b>Overall project achievement</b>	This provides an overarching assessment of the intervention, drawing upon the analysis and ratings for rural poverty impact, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, gender equality and women's empowerment, innovation, scaling up, as well as environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change.	X	Yes
<b>Performance of partners</b>			
• IFAD	This criterion assesses the contribution of partners to project design, execution, monitoring and reporting, supervision and implementation support, and evaluation. The performance of each partner will be assessed on an individual basis with a view to the partner's expected role and responsibility in the project life cycle.	X	Yes
• Government		X	Yes

\* These definitions build on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management; the Methodological Framework for Project Evaluation agreed with the Evaluation Committee in September 2003; the first edition of the Evaluation Manual discussed with the Evaluation Committee in December 2008; and further discussions with the Evaluation Committee in November 2010 on IOE's evaluation criteria and key questions.

## Rating comparison

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Programme Management Department (PMD) rating</i>	<i>IOE Project Completion Report Validation (PCRVR) rating</i>	<i>Net rating disconnect (PCRVR-PMD)</i>
<b>Rural poverty impact</b>	4	4	0
<b>Project performance</b>			
Relevance	4	3	-1
Effectiveness	3	3	0
Efficiency	2	2	0
Sustainability of benefits	3	3	0
<b>Project performance</b>	3	2.75	
<b>Other performance criteria</b>			
Gender equality and women's empowerment	5	4	-1
Innovation	4	4	0
Scaling up	4	3	-1
Environment and natural resources management	3	3	0
Adaptation to climate change	3	3	
<b>Overall project achievement</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Performance of partners</b>			
IFAD	4	4	0
Government	3	3	0
<b>Average net disconnect</b>			<b>-3/12=-0.25</b>

<sup>a</sup> Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; nap. = not provided; near. = not applicable.

<sup>B</sup> Arithmetic average of ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.

<sup>C</sup> This is not an average of ratings of individual evaluation criteria but an overarching assessment of the project, drawing upon the rating for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, rural poverty impact, gender, innovation, scaling up, environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change.

<sup>d</sup> The rating for partners' performance is not a component of the overall project achievement rating.

### Ratings of the project completion report quality

	<i>PMD rating</i>	<i>IOE PCRVR rating</i>	<i>Net disconnect</i>
Candour		5	
Lessons		4	
Quality (methods, data, participatory process)		4	
Scope		5	
<b>Overall rating of the project completion report</b>		<b>4.5</b>	

Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable.

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## Physical Outputs

### D. EVALUATION DE L'EFFICACITE DU PROJET

Tableau: Enchaînement des résultats

<b>Résultats finaux à l'achèvement du PRODER-3</b> Version du 6 juin 2016 (Cf. Annexe 4 selon cadre logique)
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Résumé descriptif	Indicateurs objectivement vérifiables
<b>Objectif du Projet</b>	
Améliorer la sécurité alimentaire des populations rurales pauvres	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Index des biens des ménages (RIMS): est passé de 25% à 36%</li> <li>- Niveau de sécurité alimentaire des groupes cibles: Baisse de la disette de 94.4% à 60%</li> <li>- Situation nutritionnelle des enfants de moins de cinq ans Globalement l'état nutritionnel des enfants est relativement préoccupante avec des piques de 45% pour les 1an et</li> </ul>
<b>COMPOSANTE 1: APPUI A LA RELANDE DE LA PRODUCTION AGRICOLE</b>	
Objectifs spécifiques : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Accroître la production et la productivité</li> <li>- Améliorer les revenus des groupes cibles</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Production estimée à 38 520<sup>43</sup> tonnes de manioc et l'augmentation de revenu estimée à 19%<sup>44</sup>.</li> </ul>
<b>Réalisation 1.1.</b> Production, multiplication et diffusion des semences améliorées et boutures saines assurées	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 10 627 paysans adoptent les semences améliorées et boutures saines de manioc, soit 53%.</li> </ul>
<b>Produit 1.1.1 :</b> Pépinières et parc à bois sont installés <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Plan d'opération disponible</li> <li>- Pépinières de district mises en place</li> <li>- Parcs à bois de districts mis en place</li> <li>- Parcs à bois de village mis en place</li> <li>- Boutures saines et plants mis à disposition des bénéficiaires</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 1 plan d'opération est disponible ;</li> <li>- 390 GIEC impliqués (soit 156%);</li> <li>- 304 ha de parcs à bois dont 1 pour les vitro plants produits par le CERAG en pépinière au CDTA (soit 108%) ;</li> <li>- 32 072 400 boutures de manioc produites sur 3207,2 ha, ce qui permet d'emblaver 32 072ha ; soit 213,8%.</li> </ul>

On considère 321ha/an pour 4ans x 30tonnes/ha.

Résumé descriptif	Indicateurs objectivement vérifiables
<p><u>Produit 1.1.2</u> : Multiplication de semences :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Semences de qualité sont disponibles</li> <li>- Formation des groupements</li> <li>- Mise en place des champs de multiplication des semences</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 20 ha d'arachides, soit 153%</li> <li>- 40 ha de maïs;<sup>45</sup>, soit 400%</li> <li>- 20 ha de champs de haricot, soit 400%.mis en place par 371 paysans bénéficiaires (43% des femmes),</li> <li>- 10 ha d'ignames de la variété bété bété et locales ouverts soit 250% à partir de 343 membres de GIEC dont 167 femmes,</li> </ul>
<p><u>Produit 1.1.3</u> : Champs de démonstration sont installés</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Espèces et variétés de qualité acquises.</li> <li>- Formation des cadres nationaux au niveau des DDA</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 12 champs de démonstration (3bananiers, 3haricot et 6 igname)</li> <li>- 74 DDA/DDE/CSA formés et recyclés.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Réalisation 1.2</b> :</p> <p>Une dynamique de reconstitution du cheptel des petits ruminants et de la volaille est lancée</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- L'activité de cheptel ovin a été abandonnée</li> <li>- Taux de remboursement de la volaille, 100%.</li> </ul>
<p><u>Produit 1.2.1</u> : Système de métayage mis en place</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Achat et transport des animaux</li> <li>- Mise en quarantaine et vaccination des animaux acquis</li> <li>- Formation des cadres nationaux au niveau des DDE</li> <li>- Groupements identifiés</li> <li>- Formation des groupements</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Un système de métayage avicole opérationnel ovin/caprin;</li> <li>- 28 097 petits ruminants vaccinés dont 14 109 ovins et 13 988 caprins</li> </ul>
<p><u>Produit 1.2.2</u> : Démonstration de la production de volaille</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Achat des volailles de race</li> <li>- Identification des groupements et des groupes cibles</li> <li>- Formation des groupements</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 45 poulaillers installés avec 1125 sujets bovins nera distribués avec 746 bénéficiaires secondaires avec 100 % taux rétrocession des sujets à d'autres bénéficiaires</li> <li>- 820 sujets de race Sussex distribués à 45 volaillers .</li> </ul>
<b>COMPOSANTE 2: RENFORCEMENT DES CAPACITES</b>	
<p><b>Réalisation 2.1</b> :</p> <p>Les organisations paysannes s'occupent de l'évacuation et de l'accès aux intrants et à la technologie</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 355 organisations paysannes renforcées (dont 115 dans le Pool et 240 dans la Likouala et Sangha)</li> <li>-</li> </ul>
<p><u>Produit 2.1.1</u> : Formation des membres des organisations paysannes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Formation technique commerciale</li> <li>- Formation en organisationnelle</li> <li>-</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Contractualisation de l'INADES pour la formation des formateurs est réalisée ;</li> <li>- 15 membres de la CNOP ont été formés par l'INADES ;</li> <li>- 355 Organisations Paysannes (OP) ont été formées.</li> <li>- 287 kits de petit outillage agricole distribués aux GIEC</li> <li>- 9015 membres des GIEC formés sur la connaissance des maladies et la multiplication rapide de manioc, la technique de mini set et la conservation de l'igname, de la culture de haricot et la multiplication rapide du bananier</li> </ul>
<p><u>Produit 2.1.2</u> : Relais paysans sont formés sur les techniques liées à la production agricole</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- production animale</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 380 personnes formées en OP :</li> <li>- 34 animateurs relais (AR) identifiés, contractualisés ;</li> </ul>

On part du principe de 100kg à l'hectar.

Résumé descriptif	Indicateurs objectivement vérifiables
- technique des vétérinaires auxiliaires	- 19 AR formés en élevage ;
<b>Réalisation 2.2 :</b> Les capacités des DDA et DDE ont été renforcées	- 3 Directions départementales (Likouala, Pool et Sangha) réhabilitées et équipées et le laboratoire du CERAG à Brazzaville est équipé ; - 81 DDA et DDE formés et recyclés
<b>Réalisation 2.3:</b> Une insertion réussie des groupes les plus vulnérables	-
<b>Produit 2.3.1 :</b> Insertion des pygmées - Réalisation du plan d'action - Identification d'un opérateur spécialisé - Mise en œuvre du plan d'action à partir de l'année 4	- 126 autochtones insérés dans le Projet dans la Likouala pour l'appui sur les cultures vivrières, élevage, apiculture (activités génératrice de revenu) ; 20 groupements ont été constitués
<b>Produit 2.3.2 :</b> Insertion des jeunes à risque - Convention signée avec PNUD - Mise en œuvre des activités	- 1486 jeunes à risque appuyés dans les AGR sur 3000 prévus, soit 149% avec 80% de femmes
<b>COMPOSANTE 3: ACCES AUX BASSINS DE PRODUCTION</b>	
<b>Objectif spécifique 3:</b> Améliorer de manière durable l'accès physique aux principaux bassins de production de la zone du projet	- 150 villages et population desservis ; taux de réduction des coûts de transport (au moins de 20%)
<b>Réalisation 3.1:</b> Les pistes rurales sont réhabilitées, les ouvrages de franchissement sont construits et le système d'entretien mis en place est opérationnel	- 100 km des pistes/linéaire des points critiques réhabilités, - 60 ouvrages de franchissement réalisés
<b>Produit 3.1.1 :</b> Les études des pistes sur leurs points critiques sont réalisées.	- 152,9 km de pistes/linéaires de points critiques sont étudiées. - 67 km de pistes/linéaires de points critiques sont réhabilités.
<b>Produit 3.1.2 :</b> Les ouvrages de franchissement sont construits ou réhabilités.	- 45 ouvrages sur les 100 km réhabilités
<b>Produit 3.1.3 :</b> Les pistes sont réhabilitées sur leurs points critiques	- 152,9 km réhabilités en linéaire
<b>Produits 3.1.4 :</b> Les populations riveraines sont organisées de manière durable autour de l'entretien des pistes réhabilitées :	- 0 postes sur 20 postes de barrage de pluies non créés et non fonctionnels ( <b><i>négociation avec les Conseils Départementaux en cours</i></b> ) ; - 0 comités sur 30 comités d'entretien des pistes formés et opérationnels ( <b><i>idem</i></b> ).
<b>Réalisation 3.2</b> La fluidité de la navigation sur le réseau secondaire pour l'accès des bassins de production est améliorée	- 240 km de voies navigables étudiés
<b>COMPOSANTE 4: COORDINATION ET GESTION DU PROJET, GESTION DES CONNAISSANCES ET INNOVATION</b>	



Résumé descriptif	Indicateurs objectivement vérifiables
<b>Réalisation 4.1 :</b> Installation efficace de l'UCP	- UCP fonctionnelle
<b>Produit 4.1.1 :</b> Mise en place de l'UCP - Ressources humaines mobilisées: efficacité et coût - Equipements et moyens de fonctionnement mobilisés et coût	- Personnel réduit recruté et opérationnel - L'UCP dispose d'un ensemble fonctionnel de ressources.
<b>Produit 4.1.2 :</b> Mise en place d'un système de gestion financière - PTBA année 1 élaboré - Manuel des procédures élaboré et maîtrisé	- Manuel de procédures appliquée et respectée
<b>Réalisation 4.2</b> Installation et fonctionnement efficace du système de suivi évaluation	- 1 <sup>er</sup> draft du guide du suivi-évaluation est disponible - 5 supervisions réalisées en 2 missions d'appui - 2SPV conjoint avec le PADEF
<b>Produit 4.2.1 :</b> Enquêtes et évaluations - Enquêtes de référence organisées et analysées - Enquête anthropométrique - Evaluation à mi-parcours - Evaluation finale	- 2 Rapports d'enquêtes de référence (1 pour l'anthropométrie et 1 pour le socioéconomique). - 1 Rapports d'enquêtes sur les effets - 1 rapport d'impact - 1 RMP
<b>Produit 4.2.2 :</b> Rapports de suivi sont disponibles - Rapport de suivi sont disponibles - Audits annuels	- Disponibilité des rapports de S-E - Utilisation des rapports de S-E - Rapports d'audit depuis le début à l'exercice 2012 sont disponibles.
<b>Réalisation 4.3 :</b> Mise en œuvre efficace du Projet	- Respect du PTBA - Calendrier des décaissements - Conformité avec les politiques nationales - Coordination et complémentarité avec les autres projets
<b>Produit 4.3.1 :</b> Produits et réalisations - Préparation et mise en œuvre des PTBA - Organisation efficace pour la gestion des contrats et des marchés	- 6 PTBA et PPM avec calendrier de décaissement réalisés - 55 conventions de partenariat établie avec les institutions déconcentrées de l'Etat et le SNU.
<b>Produit 4.3.2 :</b> Appropriation par le niveau national :	- 5 réunions du Comité et de Pilotage est tenue. - 10 missions de supervision réalisées et qualité des rapports
<b>GESTION DES CONNAISSANCES, COMMUNICATION, INNOVATION</b>	
<b>Réalisation 4.4 :</b> Gestion des connaissances et Innovation - Renforcement du partage de savoirs - Appui à l'intégration systématique de l'innovation dans les processus et pratiques des projets	- Supports didactique et informatique sont produits et diffusés.
<b>Produit 4.4.1 :</b> Les bonnes pratiques, les leçons émergeant des expériences des projets sont collectées, documentées et partagées à travers les projets et sur Fidafrique (foires, événements, articles,	- 3 bulletins d'informations sont diffusés. - 200 documents des Projets (PRODER 3 et 2) collectés, codés et archivés. - Un logiciel CDUSIS est installé.

Résumé descriptif	Indicateurs objectivement vérifiables
notes, brochures)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 1 fond documentaire des PRODER est en production à la Télévision congolaise.</li> <li>- 2 films documentaire de 30 min réalisés. Un sur l'élevage avicole et l'autre sur la production du manioc de laboratoire au champ.</li> <li>- Les émissions sur les Projets (PRODER 3 et 2) sont produites par des radios locales et nationales.</li> </ul>
<u>Produit 4.4.2.</u> : Les Innovations repérées, testées et documentées	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Des innovations sur la production du manioc , l'aviculture villageoise et l'igname.</li> </ul>
<p><u>Produit 4.4.3 :</u> Des plateformes de partage et d'échange des savoirs (avec interface sur Fidafrique et le Portail sur la Pauvreté Rurale du FIDA) sont créées</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Création/animation d'un site web</li> <li>- Voyages d'immersion, d'études et d'échanges organisés</li> <li>- Création d'un centre d'information et de documentation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Site web opérationnel (Facebook, Blog PRODER, page PRODER sur le site Fidafrique).</li> <li>- Un centre d'information et de documentation opérationnel au niveau de la coordination du PRODER 3</li> </ul>
<p><u>Produit 4.4.4:</u> Mise en place d'un système d'information sur les marchés (SIM)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- SIM n'existe pas</li> </ul>
<p><b><u>Réalisation 4.5 :</u></b> Accroître, à travers la communication, la participation des bénéficiaires ; ainsi que la visibilité et l'impact de tous les projets appuyés par le FIDA au Congo</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Participation aux foires, aux Journées Mondiales de l'Alimentation....</li> <li>- Des supports de communication publiés et distribués en langues locales</li> <li>3 radios communautaires ont été appuyées.</li> </ul>
<p><u>Produit 4.5.1:</u> La participation des bénéficiaires aux activités des projets accrue à travers des activités de communication ciblées et appropriées.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Nombre des bénéficiaires ayant participé aux activités du projet grâce aux NTIC et autres activités de communication</li> <li>- Nombre de kiosques d'information mobiles opérationnels</li> </ul>
<p><u>Produit 4.5.2 :</u> La visibilité du programme pays assurée permettant le plaidoyer et le dialogue politique à tous niveaux</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Publication et diffusion d'un bulletin d'information commun à tous les projets</li> <li>- Supports de communication produits</li> <li>- Participation/organisation d'événement grand public autour de l'agriculture et de la sécurité alimentaire au Congo</li> <li>- Relations avec la presse nationale</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Participation à 5 tables rondes entre les Ministères et PTF</li> <li>- Impression des calendriers et autres supports de communication.</li> <li>- Production des séries de sketch.</li> <li>- Radiographie en langues locales.</li> <li>- Traduction de la bande dessinée en langues nationales (lingala et kituba).</li> <li>- Des articles de presse et de reportages radio et vidéo diffusés sur les activités de tous les projets dans les médias nationaux et régionaux</li> <li>- Nombre de visites de terrain avec les médias et les responsables MAE</li> </ul>

## List of acronyms

CEIG	common economic interest groups
COSOP	country strategic opportunities programme
DDA	Departmental Director of Agriculture
DDE	Departmental Director of Livestock
EIRR	economic internal rate of return
HH	households
PADEF	Agricultural Value Chains Development Programme
PCR	project completion report
PCRV	project completion report validation
PCU	project coordination unit
PDR	project design report
RIMS	Result and Impact Management System