

## Project Completion Report Validation

### Small-scale Irrigation Development Project (PPI-2)

#### Republic of Haiti

Date of validation by IOE: June 2018

## I. Basic project data

			Approval (US\$ m)		Actual (US\$ m) <sup>1</sup>	
Region	Latin America and the Caribbean	Total project costs	34.2		21.6	
Country	Republic of Haiti	IFAD loan (% of total)	13.2	39%	10.18	47%
		IFAD grant (% of total)	5.6	16%	5.49	25%
Loan/grant number	Loan: 715-HT Grant: 8041-HT	Borrower	4.4	13%	1.18	5%
Type of project (subsector)	Small scale irrigation	OFID	8.0	23%	4.73	22%
Financing type	Loan, DSF grant	Cofinancier 2				
Lending terms*	High Concessional	Cofinancier 3				
Date of approval	Loan: 4/12/2006 Grant: 15/09/2009	Cofinancier 4				
Date of loan signature	15/5/2007	Beneficiaries	3	9%	NA	NA
Date of effectiveness	5/11/2008	Other sources				
Loan amendments	20/10/2009 <sup>2</sup>	Number of beneficiaries	21,000		7,648	
Loan closure extensions	1 for six months	Project Completion date	31/12/2015		30/06/2016	
Country programme managers	L. Anwandter (current) <sup>3</sup>	Loan closing date	30/06/2016		31/3/2017	
Regional director(s)	J. Lozano (current) <sup>4</sup>	Mid-term review			14-30/03/2012	
Project completion report reviewer	Valeria Galletti	IFAD loan and grant disbursement at project completion (%)			76% (loan) 98% (grant)	
Project completion report quality control panel	Chitra Deshpande Fumiko Nakai	Date of the project completion report			24/11/2017	

Source: Project Completion Report (PCR), President's Report, Loan and Grant agreements, Mid-Term Review (MTR) Report.

\* IFAD loans granted on highly concessional terms are free of interest. A service charge of three fourths of one per cent (0.75 per cent) per annum and a maturity period of forty years, including a grace period of ten years are applied, starting from the date of the approval by the Executive Board (EB). The Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF) grants are provided to countries.

<sup>1</sup> Data on beneficiaries is unavailable. Percentages are calculated against a total with a zero beneficiaries' contribution.

<sup>2</sup> All IFAD Portfolio Performance Reports (PPRs) consulted refer to 20 October 2009 as the only amendment formalized during implementation. Nonetheless, the Project Completion Report (PCR) does not mention it. Further, in its Annex 6 the PCR refers to another amendment (2013) to revise the project budget following the Mid-Term Review. No IFAD document was found confirming this information.

<sup>3</sup> Previous: E. Kasalu (Country Director); M. Camagni; A. Pietikainen; J. J. Gariglio.

<sup>4</sup> Previous: J. Stubbs; I. Lavadenz-Paccieri, with low level of debt sustainability, as ascertained by the annual debt sustainability assessments carried out by the International Monetary Fund.

## II. Project outline

1. **Introduction.** The Small-scale Irrigation Development Project (PPI-2) was a project in the Republic of Haiti aiming to improve incomes and living conditions of beneficiaries by optimizing water resources, developing a sound productive basis and strengthening community organizational capacities, including through better marketing and access to credit.
2. The project was designed to be implemented in a fragile context with a serious environmental situation (e.g. soil erosion, scarcity of water resources, deforestation and desertification) and vulnerability to climatic shocks, linked, *inter-alia*, to socio-political factors, low level of education and rural poverty. In this context, irrigation, particularly for the smallholders who constitute the large majority of Haiti's producers, was considered a central lever for increasing productivity and production.
3. IFAD's Executive Board (EB) approved the loan on 14 December 2006. The loan agreement was signed on 15 May 2007 and ratified by the Parliament of the Republic of Haiti in June 2008. It became effective on 5 November 2008<sup>5</sup> with 31 December 2015 and 30 June 2016 as the initial completion and closing dates respectively. Additional grant financing from IFAD was approved by the EB on 15 September 2009 (see below). The grant agreement was signed by IFAD on 9 December 2009 and countersigned by the Government of the Republic of Haiti on 28 January 2010. In January 2016, the completion and financing closing dates were extended by six months, however the actual closing date is recorded in the IFAD system as 31 March 2017.
4. **Project area.** The project area at design covered the North-East and North-West departments, two of the country's poorest zones. Additional financing made available by IFAD in 2009 allowed the project to extend its area of intervention to the Centre department, also characterized by high levels of poverty and extreme poverty.
5. **Project goal, objectives and components.** According to the President's Report, the project's overall goal was to significantly reduce rural poverty in its area of intervention. Its development objective was to improve the livelihoods and incomes of rural poor households in a sustainable manner, especially households of the most vulnerable groups. The specific objectives included: (i) sustainable intensification and increase of agricultural production through efficient water management and consolidation of irrigated agriculture on both a collective and individual basis; (ii) development of agricultural production systems and other productive and income-generating activities; and (iii) strengthening of communities' planning, organization and management capacity, in order to facilitate market linkages and access to financial services.<sup>6</sup>
6. **Components.** The project had four components: (i) Development of irrigation; (ii) Support to productive activities; (iii) Capacity-strengthening; and (iv) Project coordination and management.
7. *Component 1* – Development of irrigation aimed to support: (i) the establishment of a national programme for the management of water resources for agricultural purposes, including the elaboration of master plans for the development of high-potential zones of irrigation; (ii) capacity-building of private and public actors in the small-scale irrigation sector, in particular the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development (MARNDR<sup>7</sup>) and its decentralized services, and water users' associations (WUAs); (iii) the testing and dissemination of innovative

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<sup>5</sup> The PCR does not specify why almost two years passed from the date of EB approval to the date of effectiveness.

<sup>6</sup> Although some discrepancies might relate to the translation from French into English, the formulation of project objectives is not consistent across project documents, slightly differing from what is indicated in the President's Report.

<sup>7</sup> From the French "Ministère de l'Agriculture, des Ressources Naturelles et du Développement Rural".

irrigation technologies; (iv) the rehabilitation and creation of new small-scale irrigation schemes and the promotion of individual irrigation; and (v) environmental protection measures such as the creation of an emergency fund for infrastructures.

8. *Component 2* - Support to productive activities aimed to provide technical and financial support for the implementation of micro-projects (MPs) emanating from development plans. MPs had to be identified through a participatory approach, and focus on: (i) improving traditional crop production, introducing new crops and boosting animal production; (ii) promoting non-agricultural income-generating activities and rural microenterprises, especially for the most vulnerable groups; and (iii) conducting research and development activities to meet the priority needs identified by the target group.
9. *Component 3* - Capacity-strengthening aimed to reinforce existing grass-roots organizations and build new associations open to the most vulnerable groups. More specifically it aimed at: (i) building community capacity to elaborate development plans and identify priority needs; (ii) strengthening the marketing capacities of producers' organizations; and (iii) developing microfinance institutions.
10. *Component 4* - Project coordination and management aimed to ensure project coordination and monitoring and evaluation (M&E).
11. **Target group.** The project initially targeted 18,000<sup>8</sup> households. The target group included small-scale producers with secure access to land and irrigation, small-scale subsistence farmers with insecure access to these resources, and rural households with little or no land and no access to irrigation. Among these, 6,200 households from the most vulnerable groups (women, rural youth, women-headed households) were targeted to receive special support and benefit from the project's income-generating activities. The additional financing made available by IFAD in 2009 allowed the project to target additional 3,700 households, bringing the total targeted population to 21,700 households.<sup>9</sup>
12. **Financing.** The total project cost at approval was US\$27 million, of which US\$13.2<sup>10</sup> million was financed by a highly-concessional IFAD loan.
13. On 15 September 2009 IFAD's EB approved a supplementary financing of US\$5.66 million in grant under the Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF), bringing the total cost of the project to US\$34.2 million and IFAD's total contribution to US\$18.86 million. Other sources of financing as per the 2009 President's Report<sup>11</sup> included: the OPEC<sup>12</sup> Fund for International Development (OFID) (US\$8.0 million), the Government (US\$4.4 million), and the beneficiaries (US\$3.0 million).

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<sup>8</sup> Some inconsistencies were found in terms of the number of beneficiaries targeted by comparing the different project related documents (e.g. 18,000 households in the President's Report, 13,000 in the design document).

<sup>9</sup> Source: PCR and other project related document (e.g. the logframe in the 2009 President's Report). Nonetheless, other documents, including the 2009 President's Report in its narrative section, refer to 21,000 targeted households.

<sup>10</sup> The amount reflects data available in the PCR. Nonetheless, it slightly differs depending on the consulted document (e.g. US\$13 million in the 2006 President's Report; US\$13.01 million in some PPRs). The agreement being expressed in Special Drawing Rights, differences might be attributed to the exchange rate used for conversion.

<sup>11</sup> The amount of cofinancing by the Government and beneficiaries in the revised cost (2009) was different from what had been indicated in the 2006 President's Report, i.e. a Government contribution of US\$2.5 million and a contribution from beneficiaries of US\$3,5 million.

<sup>12</sup> Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries.

Table 1  
**Project costs**

Source of Funding	Type of financing	Estimated amount (US\$ m <sup>13</sup> )	Estimated amount (% of total)	Actual expenditure (US\$ m <sup>14</sup> )	Expenditure (% of total)	Disbursements (% of estimated amount)
IFAD	Loan	13.2	39	10.18	47	77
IFAD	Grant	5.6	16	5.49	25	98
OFID	Loan	8.0	23	4.73	22	59
Government		4.4	13	1.18	5	27
Beneficiaries *		3.0	9	NA	NA	NA
Total Financing		34.2	100	21.6	100	0.63

Source: IFAD 2007 and 2009 President's Report, Project Completion Report (PCR), Grant and Loan agreements  
\* PCR indicated that the contribution by beneficiaries was not recorded.

Table 2  
**Costs by component**

Components	Planned (US\$ m)	Planned amount (% of total)	Actual amount <sup>15</sup> (US\$ m)	Actual (% total)
Development of irrigation	16	47	8.2	40
Support to productive activities	7.5	22	2	10
Capacity-strengthening	3	9	3	14
Project coordination and management	7.7	23	7.5	36
Total	34.2	100	20.7	100

Source: PCR.

14. **Project implementation.** The project was designed to be implemented by the MARNDR and guided by a national steering committee that included representatives of other ministries, public institutions and participating donors. A project coordinating unit (PCU) had to be established within the MARNDR, with responsibility for planning, managing and supervising project activities. The PCU was to be represented in the three targeted departments through three departmental offices supported by three geographical partners/service providers and 25 specialized partners for the mobilization and capacity building of beneficiaries and the implementation of activities in the irrigation schemes respectively. Operational fieldwork had to be implemented by service providers hired by the project.
15. **Changes and developments during implementation.** Significant changes occurred during implementation, including the following:
- Based on IFAD's EB decision in 2007, the responsibility for project supervision was transferred to IFAD, although the project was initially approved to be supervised by the United Nations Office for Project Services;

<sup>13</sup> Source: 2009 President's Report;

<sup>14</sup> Data on expenditures by donor are extracted from the PCR narrative section - Project costs and financing. The figures are not consistent with those presented in the PCR summary table and Annex 7 - Costs of the Project.

<sup>15</sup> Data on expenditures by component are extracted from the summary table of the PCR. Errors were detected in the calculation of components subtotals. In addition, figures in the summary table do not correspond to those presented in the Annex 7 of the PCR – Costs of the project.

- Additional grant financing was mobilized in September 2009 resulting in: (i) the extension of the project area of intervention; (ii) an increase in the surface area of irrigation from 3,000 ha to 4,000 ha; (iii) an increase in the number of beneficiaries. The loan agreement was amended on 20 October 2009 to integrate the DSF grant and align to supervision arrangements;
  - Following the earthquake that hit the country in January 2010 and the inflow of displaced people in project areas, a Special Programme for agricultural production and soil and space conservation (PSPACSE<sup>16</sup>) was implemented between July 2010 and March 2011, targeting 902 households;
  - Based on 2012 Mid-term Review Report (MTR) findings and assessment, the following changes were implemented: (i) a reallocation of resources among components (e.g. with an increase of budget under component 2); (ii) a restructuring of components with marketing and micro-finance related activities moved from component 3 to component 2; (iii) a resizing of project objectives and targets;
  - Since 2012, the PCU was transformed to ensure the coordination of both PPI-2 and the Small Irrigation and Market Access Development Project in the Nippes and Goavienne Region (PPI-3), launched in 2012. However, based on the findings of the PPI-3 MTR in 2016, which showed that the single PCU was not capable of managing two projects, and taking into account financial management issues experienced on PPI-2, two separate PCUs were re-established;
  - In 2015, financial management was transferred to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), due to a negative financial management performance by the MARNDR, and the subsequent decision by IFAD on 12 June 2014 to suspend the disbursement of funds. The suspension was withdrawn on 13 April 2015;
  - In January 2016, the project completion and closing dates were extended to 30 June 2016 and 31 December 2016 respectively, to facilitate the implementation of some critical on-going activities.
16. In addition, the project was affected by natural disasters and other events<sup>17</sup> including the 2010 earthquake in Port-au-Prince that affected more than 3 million people. Political and institutional issues were also experienced (e.g. political instability with four presidents, seven prime ministers, eight ministers of agriculture and five general directors of MARNDR alternating in the period from 2008 to 2016; high turn-over of IFAD's country programme managers during the implementation period).
17. **Intervention logic.** The project was designed to enable beneficiaries to increase and diversify their agricultural production and income through integrated development of irrigation infrastructure, technologies for improved production, stocking facilities, and improved market information and access. Moreover, non-farm income-generating activities, especially for the disadvantaged groups of rural youths, were expected to create sustainable livelihoods in the rural areas.
18. Communities were expected to strengthen their resilience and bargaining power, through capacity strengthening and improved health, nutrition and food security. This would contribute to reduced vulnerability to external shock and crisis. The roles of women in planning and decision-making in community organizations was also expected to be enhanced through women's participation in capacity building and economic activities. Similarly, the inclusion of rural youth as a target group was expected to contribute to mitigate migration factors and offer youth viable

<sup>16</sup> From the French "Programme special de production agricole et conservation des sols et de l'espace".

<sup>17</sup> E.g. 2008 storm, cyclone and hurricane; 2010 cholera epidemic; 2013-2014 extreme drought in the North West, North-East and Centre .

reasons to remain in their communities, building the basis for their long-term development.

19. Finally, better planning and monitoring capacities of MARNDR for the irrigation sector and direct linkages in the field with other projects (such as the IFAD-funded *Programme d'appui aux initiatives productives en milieu rural*, PAIP) were expected to create higher synergies between development initiatives in the country.
20. **Delivery of outputs.** According to the PCR, the following main activities were implemented and outputs delivered by the project:
  - Under *component 1*, the project supported the elaboration of a database on existing hydro-agricultural facilities; the elaboration of a master plan for the plain of Maribaroux (North-East); the formulation of a law on water and infrastructures use; the implementation of drip micro-irrigation technologies including the provision of support to beneficiaries in implementing them, the delivery of 50 micro-irrigation kits and irrigation equipment; the rehabilitation and construction of irrigation schemes; the reinforcement of WUAs;
  - Under *component 2*, the project supported the identification, selection and implementation of 288 MPs; the organization of 137 technical training on agricultural intensification benefiting 2,787 people; the organization of agricultural fairs; the establishment of community-based saving and credit centers (CREPs<sup>18</sup>) with 1,493 members including 945 women;
  - Under *component 3*, the project delivered training to grass-roots organizations and WUAs in project management; supported the establishment and strengthening of 86 grass-roots organizations; organized over 50 trainings on nutrition; trained over 1,130 people in functional literacy;
  - Under *component 4*, the project supported the creation of the PCU; the development of a manual of procedures as well as an M&E manual; the production of Annual Work Plans and Budgets (AWPBs), reports and audits; the recruitment of UNDP in 2015; the organization of seven steering Committee meetings.

### III. Review of findings

#### A. Core criteria

##### Relevance

21. **Relevance vis-à-vis IFAD and Government policies and strategies.** The project's objectives were fully aligned with the Government and IFAD strategies.
22. In particular, they were coherent with the IFAD 2009 country strategic opportunities paper (COSOP) in that they sought to reduce rural poverty through the sustainable increase of agricultural and non-agricultural income and improvement of target group living conditions, prioritizing the participatory approach, strengthening grass-roots organizations, improving small farmers' access to water resources and production services as well as market access.
23. The development and modernization of the agricultural sector was identified as a pillar for pro-poor growth in the Haiti's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2008-2010. Also, access to water for irrigation and the management of small irrigated areas was one of the priorities of the 2010-2025 Agricultural Development Policy. Further, the project aligned to the *Programme Triennal de Relance du Secteur Agricole* 2013-2016 of the MARNDR, which included a sub-programme on rural infrastructure development and watershed management; and to the strategic objectives of the *Plan National d'investissement Agricole* (PNIA) 2010-2016 in that

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<sup>18</sup> From the French "Centre ruraux d'épargne et de prêts".

it contributed to its strategic axes (development of rural infrastructures, production and development of value chains, institutional support and agricultural services).

24. **Project design.** The project structure along the three components and the supported activities reflected the needs of the targeted populations and were relevant to meet project objectives. In particular, the component 1 objective to increase the irrigable surface responded to beneficiaries' needs and issues (e.g. low productivity; obsolescence of agricultural tools, practices and techniques; deterioration of irrigation infrastructure, and vulnerability to natural threats). Also, capacity building of MARNDR was critical to boost their capacity to coordinate activities in the irrigation sector. Support through MPs coupled with better access to financial services and to markets under component 2 was also relevant to the targeted population. The capacity building of local stakeholders under component 3 directly addressed issues related to the weak planning, structuring and capacities of local communities, preventing them to become effective and reliable stakeholders in the sector.
25. The targeting approach was also relevant. The project intervened in some of the country's poorest departments and focused on populations living in remote rural areas with little engagement in the essentially informal economy, limited access to services, high transaction costs and vulnerability to natural disaster. The prioritization of most vulnerable groups and the participatory approach in irrigation schemes were also in line with the IFAD's Targeting Policy.
26. Nonetheless, the design showed some weaknesses particularly in terms of the institutional arrangements and strategic approaches selected.
27. According to the PCR, the approach of the project to combine four different strategic orientations<sup>19</sup>, and the organization of activities under 13 sub-components<sup>20</sup>, proved to be too complex and difficult to put in place resulting in implementation delays.
28. The project also revealed weak capacities and performance of the implementing agency, particularly in terms of financial management and M&E (see more below). This might indicate a weak assessment of its strengths and weaknesses at design and a weak capacity of the project to internalize the lessons learnt and experience from the previous phase of the project, although these two aspects are not discussed much in relation to the relevance in the PCR.
29. At the same time, changes and adjustments made during implementation (see Chapter II above) can be seen as an indicator of the capacity of the project to adapt to emerging needs as well as the flexibility adopted in determining sustainable interventions. This includes the decisions to transfer financial management to UNDP, to implement the PSPACSE to face emerged needs of the populations, and to restructure components and budget at MTR to ensure better effectiveness.
30. Overall, project relevance is rated moderately satisfactory (4) by the PCRV, one point below the PCR.

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<sup>19</sup> Participatory decentralized approach through the support of local development plans; "faire-faire" approach through the participation of local stakeholders in the implementation of activities; programme approach; value chain approach.

<sup>20</sup> Sub-component 1.1 - Capacity building; Sub-component 1.2 - Innovative irrigation technologies; Sub-component 1.3 – Physical investments in collective irrigation schemes; Sub-component 1.4 – Environmental risks mitigation and emergency funds for infrastructure; Sub-component 2.1 – Support to agricultural intensification; Sub-component 2.2 - Support to marketing; Sub-component 2.3 - Micro-finance development; Sub-component 2.4 - MPs for the most vulnerable groups; Subcomponent 3.1 - Planning and management of irrigation schemes; Sub-component 3.2 - Capacity building to grass-roots organizations and support staff; Sub-component 3.3 - Functional literacy; Sub-component 4.1 - Administrative and financial management; Sub-component 4.2 – M&E and Knowledge Management (KM).

## Effectiveness

31. The assessment of effectiveness is constrained by the lack of data in the PCR. This may be on the one hand due to the project's low level of delivery of outputs and on the other hand to the weak performance of M&E.
32. **Objective 1 - Sustainable intensification and increase of agricultural production through efficient water management and consolidation of irrigated agriculture on both a collective and individual basis.** The initial objective of the component was to rehabilitate and build 36 irrigation schemes with a total surface of 4,000 ha. This target was lowered at MTR at 2,430 ha.<sup>21</sup> At completion only 1,029 ha were rehabilitated/constructed resulting in 42 per cent of the target set at MTR achieved.
33. The construction and rehabilitation of irrigation schemes was not undertaken with the planned timing. According to the MTR report, this was mainly due to delays in planning and lengthy tendering and procurement procedures. This delay did not enable the project to grant a sustainable support to WUAs, with the exception of the North-West region where the project benefitted from the intervention of Agro Action Allemande (AAA) (Welt Hunger Hilfe) the German NGO.
34. According to the PCR, the implementation of the component was also affected by very high costs of execution (US\$5,800 per ha).
35. Innovative drip micro-irrigation technologies were tested in 20 sites in the three targeted departments, and support provided on their use and maintenance (e.g. through training and the production of information supports, radio emissions and the development of a video-documentary). At completion, 30 micro-irrigation plots of 100 m<sup>2</sup> were set up in the North-West, and 3.5 ha were enhanced by micro-irrigation in the North East. In particular, in Paulette (Fort Liberté) the site was planted and beneficiaries received additional support by another MARNDR project funded by the Inter-American Development Bank. In the Centre, 106 people working on 12 ha benefitted from the delivery of six motor-pumps.
36. A draft law on water and infrastructures use was formulated and expected to be submitted to the parliament. However, the PCR makes no reference to the contents of the law and the benefit it may bring to target populations if approved.
37. **Objective 2 - Development of agricultural production systems and other productive and income-generating activities.** The project initially planned to finance 500 MPs and establish a network of 19 CREPs to facilitate access for small producers to financial services and market. The target of 500 MPs was lowered to 350 at MTR while the number of CREPs to be created reduced to 13.<sup>22</sup>
38. According to the PCR, the execution rate of this component at completion was at 28 per cent. Overall, 288 MP were identified, selected and prioritized by beneficiaries. Of these, 176 were financed entirely or partially; 66 were completed and 110 not completed. Only 4 per cent of MPs were considered financially sustainable. MPs could not be completed by the end of the project due to the lack of financing after IFAD suspension of disbursements. Also, the 6-month planned set up by the MANRDR and IFAD during the last semester of project implementation did not include activities under component 2.
39. The main factors explaining the low profitability of MPs further included: (i) climatic hazards limiting the activities of MPs focusing on crop production and storage; (ii) diseases, lack of veterinary services and thefts affecting MPs focusing on goat and sheep farming; (iii) non-profitability of MPs focusing on hens; (iv) serious marketing

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<sup>21</sup> Data reflects the information in the PCR. However, the recommendations in the MTR report refer to a reduced surface of 3,500.

<sup>22</sup> Data reflects the information in the PCR. Nonetheless, the recommendations in the MTR report refer to a reduced number of CREPs to be created from 19 to 12.



issues experienced by MPs led by women's organizations focusing on fruit processing; (v) weak monitoring by project managers.

40. The PCR does not provide a detailed account of how MPs were designed and selected. Nonetheless, the Ex-post Evaluation of MPs (December 2016) overall confirms the assessment in the PCR and adds that the quantity of MPs in the targeted regions was not significant and impacts not visible. Further, the evaluation integrates among factors explaining the weak performance of MPs a very long and complex design and selection process; a weak management; and the absence of local support for planning and implementation.
41. The Inter-American Institute of Cooperation for Agriculture (IICA) was involved in the project to provide training on agricultural intensification. It delivered 137 training sessions to benefit over 2,787 people, 30 per cent of which were women (e.g. on soil preparation, use of fertilizers and pesticides, etc.). Nonetheless, following the suspension of disbursements by IFAD in 2014, IICA interrupted activities. In the North-West IICA was replaced by the NGO AAA, enabling the construction of four input shops, supporting farmers during three crop years, and delivered training. The effects/results of training and capacity building activities on beneficiaries is not assessed in the PCR.
42. Marketing activities only started in 2013 with the organization of agricultural fairs. The PCR does not provide details on the benefit derived from this activity for the 32 grass-roots organizations participating in fairs. Ten input shops were also created and 224 people trained in post-production.
43. Micro-finance related activities were implemented by the *Fonds d'Assistance Economique et Sociale* (FAES) and enabled the establishment of 256 community level savings and credit solidarity groups out of the planned 500, and 13 CREPs. Nonetheless, CREPs were not institutionalized and the partnership with FAES was interrupted in 2015. As a result, at completion, target groups did not have access to adapted financial services.
44. **Objective 3 - Strengthening of communities' planning, organization and management capacity, including most vulnerable groups, in order to facilitate market linkages and access to financial services.** Progress in the achievement of the objective was closely linked to the pace of rehabilitation and development of irrigation schemes. Hence, even if at completion the implementation rate of the component was estimated at 99 per cent of the targets set at MTR, overall results did not benefit beneficiaries as expected since activities under 1 and 2 were implemented only partially.
45. At completion, 458 leaders (of which 175 women) of WUAs and grass-roots organizations were trained in organizational development; 298 beneficiaries (of which 117 women) were trained in project management and implementation; 86 grass-roots organizations were established and strengthened. Further, training in nutrition and literacy were delivered and sensitization activities on gender conducted to improve the understanding of gender issues at the level of PCU.
46. As above, although several capacity building activities were implemented under the component 3, there is little information in the PCR or in project-related documents in terms of outcomes achieved.
47. **Summary.** Overall, the project objectives were only partially achieved and activities were implemented with consistent delays, with the exception of the North-West region where PPI-2 performed satisfactorily.
48. At completion, only 1,029 ha were rehabilitated/constructed out of the 4,000 planned, a limited number of MPs were implemented with limited impact and low profitability, and marketing and micro-finance activities could not be fully implemented. Although the project performed better under component 3, with

relevant capacity building activities being conducted for the benefit of WUAs and grass-roots organizations, there is limited information in terms of results achieved. The project reached 7,648 households only, or 35 per cent of the planned target.

49. The suspension of the disbursements by IFAD in 2014, although largely justified by serious financial management issues (see Chapter D below), is also indicated in the PCR as a factor that severely constrained the possibility for the project to achieve results.
50. Further, although the PCR does not make reference to this aspect, external factors such as the 2010 earthquake further caused implementation delays, with an impact in project effectiveness.
51. Based on the above, the effectiveness of PPI-2 is considered both in the PCR and PCR/V moderately unsatisfactory (3).

### **Efficiency**

52. PPI-2 was designed to be implemented over a period of seven years approximately, with a completion date set at 31 December 2015. Following the 2015 IFAD supervision mission, an extension was requested and granted to facilitate the implementation of some critical on-going activities, *inter alia* the number of civil works that could not be completed.
53. In the period between 2008 and 2012 implementation was particularly affected by a slow start in the activities with a low implementation rate of AWPBs (30 per cent on average). The period that followed the MTR (2012-2016) was marked by the downscaling of project activities with more reasonable targets and difficulties in implementing the MTR recommendations. The suspension of disbursement by IFAD further increased delays. The delay in the implementation of component 1 particularly penalized the planned investments and affected the overall efficiency of the project.
54. The project also suffered from the permanent instability of the PCU with successive resignations of staff;<sup>23</sup> weak accounting and financial management leading to the suspension of disbursements by IFAD in 2014 coupled with a limited mobilization of resources from the Government; the lack of a M&E system and the recruitment of M&E staff with a delay of four years.
55. According to the available financial information on the status of cumulative expenditures, the overall financial execution stands at around US\$21.6 million, or 63 per cent of the budget, with the following rates of disbursement under the different components: 49.3 per cent for component 1; 32 per cent for component 2; 99 per cent for component 3; 98 per cent for component 4. Also, the project showed very high management costs which represented 44 per cent of IFAD resources and 34 per cent of the total project costs.
56. Exogenous factors such as the cost of labor that increased considerably<sup>24</sup> during implementation (more than 100 per cent) further affected project efficiency.
57. The PCR indicates that the economic and financial analysis was carried out in the absence of a reliable database on yields and incomes generated by the project. The results appear to be well below forecasts at design, as could be expected from the low level of achievements of outputs and outcomes. The project generated an additional net economic benefit of approximately US\$959,000, showing it was far from being economically justified. Economic benefits are at least 75 per cent lower than those calculated in the design document for each region.

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<sup>23</sup> According to the PCR staff salaries were reduced during implementation. Also, following the suspension of disbursements by IFAD, payments were made with up to six months of delay. The MTR report further adds that the recruitment processes were very long.

<sup>24</sup> According to the PCR, the increase was due to inflation and the works in progress in the project area.

58. There were serious efficiency issues that cannot be explained only by factors that were beyond the project control (e.g. 2010 earthquake). Most project activities were implemented with delays and output delivery was problematic throughout implementation. The internal rate of return was much lower than expected at design stage and showed no value for money. Efficiency is rated unsatisfactory (2) in the PCR, one point lower than the PCR/IFAD rating.

### **Rural poverty impact**

59. **Lack of data.** In October 2011, three years after effectiveness, the PCU conducted a baseline survey on a sample of 900 households. According to the PCR, these reference data were never updated, making it difficult to quantify the project's impact. Further, indicators linked to project objectives were not monitored, the project being affected by the absence of M&E staff during the first four years of project implementation.
60. Upon completion, the PCU conducted an impact study on 900 households in January 2017. However, it does not give measure for relevant indicators such as the rate of reduction in the incidence of poverty, the rate of increase in average annual income, the number and percentage of households having increased their income.
61. This lack of information coupled with a weak M&E system and performance did not allow the PCR team to conduct a thorough and relevant analysis of the effects and impacts of the project. However, the PCR indicates the information contained in the impact study, data collected in the field as part of the discussions with the beneficiaries and implementing partners, as well as the conclusions of three departmental workshops and the national stakeholders' workshop, enabled the PCR mission to partly assess the impact of the project in the three target departments.
62. **Household incomes and assets.** The results of the focus group discussion in the impact study revealed an improvement in terms of income in the lower North-West and in Paulette (North-East). According to the PCR, the report from the national stakeholders' workshop (2016) indicates in the lower North-West the average income by farmer participating in the 2014-2015 crop year campaign at Nan Trou is estimated at HTG 71,863 (Gourdes, Haitian currency) against HTG 6,682 before the project. Nonetheless, the reliability of such figures indicating a significant increase of more than tenfold could not be verified. Also, it is not clear to what extent the difference could be due to PPI-2 intervention.
63. **Food security and agricultural productivity.** Overall, the level of food security remained unsatisfactory in the project area with about 86 per cent of the population having experienced a period of food shortage ranging from 2 to 12 months. The recurrent food shortage crisis seems to indicate that PPI-2 did not contribute to an improvement in the level of food security in the targeted departments. The impact of exogenous factors on food security, such as the 2010 earthquake or the political instability, is not taken into account in the PCR.
64. An improvement of the nutritional status of children in households was registered at completion. Nonetheless, given the low rate of achievement of project activities and taking into account the fact that the majority of irrigated schemes financed by PPI-2 were also supported by other donors' initiatives, the project is unlikely to have contributed much in this regard.
65. There is limited assessment of project impact on agricultural productivity in the PCR. The analysis only refers to the use of instruments used in households to cultivate land as a sign of an economically unprofitable agriculture. No information is provided in terms of increased yields, cropping intensity, land productivity, levels of agricultural production. There are some limited data available only in relation to the North-West region, where encouraging results were achieved thanks to the support from the NGO AAA. In particular, six irrigation schemes were made

functional and capacity of users strengthened through training, resulting in higher cropping intensity (from 140 per cent to 240 per cent), improved yields (plus 60 per cent on average), and 70 per cent improved margins for staple crops.

66. **Institutions and policies.** According to the PCR, the project strengthened the capacities of the *Bureaux Agricoles Communales* (BAC) and the *Directions Départementales Agricoles* on water management and on gender approaches but the implication and the accountability of the government's structures were not effective. This statement is not further substantiated or justified with evidence (data, information or examples).
67. **Human and social capital and empowerment.** While the PCR indicates the project ensured the participation of women as planned, the analysis of benefits achieved by women is very general (see more in section B below). Information relating to targeted youth was not tracked by the project. The PCR also lacks an in-depth analysis of changes in the capacities of the various grass-roots organizations supported during project implementation and in the level of empowerment of targeted individuals and organizations.
68. **Rural poverty impact.** Based on the above, rural poverty impact is rated moderately unsatisfactory (3) in both the PCR and PCR.V.

### **Sustainability of benefits**

69. **Social sustainability.** The project supported the development of grass-roots organizations and WUAs. Nonetheless, according to the PCR, their capacity and level of development was generally found very weak which poses challenges on their sustainability and autonomy in maintaining and managing irrigation schemes.
70. As above mentioned, although the PCR indicates the benefits of the project affected both men and women, it lacks an assessment of benefits achieved by supported-women, as well as of capacities and skills achieved by women to continue the approaches or manage the investments promoted by the project. Similarly, although the PCR indicates that many youth members of supported-organizations interviewed were willing to continue conducting income-generating activities, the lack of systematized data and information on youth participation in the project does not allow properly assessing this aspect.
71. **Economic and financial sustainability.** As previously mentioned, the PCR indicates the project was economically- and financially-viable only in the lower North-West and parts of North-East regions, with a very positive impact on revenues and returns. Nonetheless, the presence of the NGO AAA did not guarantee the sustainability of activities: beneficiaries showed dependence on the technical support from the NGO, with a lack of an exit strategy. Based on the above, the economic and financial sustainability of activities seemed to be problematic even within successful interventions and experiences.
72. **Technical sustainability.** Overall the technical sustainability of project activities is considered in the PCR unsatisfactory. In particular, it was affected by the lack of a framework to ensure the maintenance of the infrastructures (e.g. absence of policies and regulations for water use), the limited adoption of improved technologies (due to the lack of access to credit), and the absence of a sustainable support structure (notably due to the low involvement of the BACs / DDAs from the French *Direction départementale agricole*).
73. Nonetheless, technical sustainability can be appreciated differently from one department to another. For example, the know-how diffused in the low North-West in terms of the rational management of water and improved production techniques had positive impact at the level of small producers and most of the beneficiaries trained and supported continue to operate despite the closure of the project.

74. Although the PCR covers several criteria to assess project sustainability, the analysis is silent on key aspects. In particular, it does not assess the following: (i) the impact on sustainability caused by the lack of counterpart financing and mobilization of resources by the government and the beneficiaries; (ii) external factors such as the political and environmental instability that might have a huge bearing on overall sustainability; (iii) an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of government bodies and their capacity to deliver public services to rural populations due to the project intervention; (iv) aspects related to policy dialogue, knowledge management (KM) and partnership-building, which are critical success factors for the sustainability of projects, with a poverty reduction focus; (vi) linkages and synergies with other complementary investment projects.
75. Sustainability is rated in both the PCR and PCRV moderately unsatisfactory (3).

## **B. Other performance criteria**

### **Innovation and scaling up**

76. **Innovation.** PPI-2 aimed to promote the systematic integration of innovation in the execution of the project and the sharing of results with other projects and initiatives. Nonetheless, the KM function of the project did not perform well and the only innovation promoted relates to the use and dissemination of the drip micro-irrigation technique, including through the development of an audiovisual documentary and learning material. The quality of the material developed is not assessed in the PCR.
77. Innovation is rated unsatisfactory (2) by the PCR, the same as the PCR.
78. **Scaling up.** The PCR stated that the use of drip micro-irrigation technique – the only innovation in the project reported (see previous paragraphs) - has been replicated in another MARNDR project funded by the World Bank. The PCR then discusses that scaling up (presumably with a specific reference to drip irrigation) is conditioned by several factors including: (i) the presence of motivated farmers, equipment suppliers for the drip irrigation techniques and repair craftsmen; (ii) the accessibility and availability of agricultural inputs; and (iii) the presence of MFIs to meet the financing needs of farmers.
79. The PCR rated the criterion "*potential* of replication and scaling-up" as moderately satisfactory. This rating, however, is not adequately supported by the narrative, which is very limited and only refers to the replication of drip irrigation in another project but without presenting evidence on how the PPI-2 experience has led to and prompted such replication or scaling-up. The rating in the PCRV is moderately unsatisfactory (3) versus the PCR rating of moderately satisfactory (4).

### **Gender equality and women's empowerment**

80. Gender equality and women's empowerment were given prominence in PPI-2 design. According to the PCR, the project achieved the goal set at design to ensure the participation of women. This happened mainly through the support to grass-roots organizations and WUAs - composed by 35 per cent of women - and through training and capacity building activities, with 50 per cent of the participants being women. Also, the project supported awareness raising activities at the level of the PCU and elaborated a strategy for the integration of gender.
81. Nonetheless, the analysis in the PCR is weak, only referring to quantitative information without attention to the quality of women's participation or to gains and benefits achieved by women through project-supported activities (e.g. training and capacity building, implementation of MPs etc.). No information is provided in terms of changes in gender roles or gender relations or to changes in women status that were induced by project activities. Changes promoted at the household level (workload, women influence on decision-making) or at the community level (participation in local elections or decision-making processes) are not examined.

Further, no information is provided on the PCU developed strategy in terms of contents and achievements.

82. Gender equality and women empowerment is rated in the PCR moderately satisfactory. While some limited measures were taken to strengthen the gender focus and facilitate the participation of women, taking into account the low level of achievement of the project and the analysis above, the rating of the PCRV is moderately unsatisfactory (3).

### **Environment and natural resources management**

83. PPI-2 did not develop an Environmental and Social Management Plan as originally planned but developed a manual on the mitigation of environmental risks. The manual provides guidance on how environmental concerns should be taken into account in the implementation of activities through a participatory approach. Training and demonstrations were also conducted in the North-West and North-East.
84. The planned emergency fund for infrastructure, although restructured at MTR into two funds<sup>25</sup> to support watershed damage and fund emergency post-disaster work, was finally not established.
85. Although no environmental impact study was carried out at project completion, according to the PCR the development of irrigated schemes did not cause major environmental problems. This statement is not substantiated with evidence. The same applies to the rating assigned (moderately satisfactory).
86. Based on the above, the PCRV rating on environment and natural resource management is moderately unsatisfactory (3), one point lower than the PCR.

### **Adaptation to climate change**

87. According to the PCR, small producers adapted the crop calendar and are trying to diversify sources of income to deal with changing conditions. Some adopt more intensive farming practices and others engage in non-agricultural related activities. Actions developed by the project to adapt to climate change included: (i) the implementation of MPs focusing on poultry breeding; (ii) the establishment of irrigation systems to rationalize water use and increase the resilience of producers to climate change.
88. Adaptation to climate change is rated moderately satisfactory (4) in both the PCR and PCRV.

## **C. Overall project achievement**

89. Overall, PPI-2 did not have a significant impact on improving the living conditions of beneficiaries in its area of intervention. The low rate of achievement of components 1 and 2 did not allow the project to generate substantial revenue that could change their conditions with the exception of the Lower North-West region.
90. Project performance was hindered by significant delays in the implementation of activities, the absence of an M&E system, weak management by the MARNDR and the suspension of the disbursement by IFAD for ten months, coupled with a low level of mobilization of counterparts financing (Government and beneficiaries).
91. Expenditures stand at 63 per cent of the planned budget, with more than 34 per cent of project budget used for project management. This inevitably resulted in the project achieving less than was foreseen.
92. The PCRV assesses PPI-2 overall achievement as moderately unsatisfactory (3), in line with the PCR.

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<sup>25</sup> The environmental remediation fund and the emergency fund for infrastructure.

## D. Performance of partners

93. **IFAD.** According to the PCR, PPI-2 benefited from 12 IFAD supervision and monitoring missions bringing improvements particularly in the development and implementation of AWPBs and procurement. Further, missions facilitated the adjustments of the targets during the mid-term review in light of the time available and the overall project performance enabling to better align the project to the fragile context and making the intervention more realistic. The IFAD Office in Port-au-Prince also provided support to the project management through frequent exchanges. On the other hand, there was a high turnover of country programme managers over the implementation period which might have affected the pace and the quality of implementation support. Also, a more proactive approach or close support and dialogue might have enabled IFAD to address financial management issues experienced by the project and avoid the suspension of disbursements in 2014, which was perceived by the MARNDR as a sanction and damaged the relationships of IFAD with the Government.
94. Overall, the Withdrawal Applications were processed in a timely manner by IFAD in spite of the inadequacies in the quality of the documents submitted, which in most cases required the provision of additional information.
95. Some synergies with other IFAD funded projects were also developed, such as with the IFAD-funded *Programme d'appui aux initiatives productives en milieu rural*, PAIP, for the implementation of rural finance related activities. Although an effort was made to collaborate with PPI-3 through the set-up of a single PCU for the two projects, results were not positive (see Section II).
96. The performance of IFAD is rated both in the PCR and PCRV moderately satisfactory (4).
97. **Government.** Overall, the performance of the Government was weak, with project implementation affected by key challenges including the following<sup>26</sup>:
- *Weak coordination, management and planning* with a strong compartmentalization between the different units and managers, weak or non-transparent approaches and working methods, delays or partial implementation of the recommendations made by supervision missions. The MTR report also underlines little delegation of administrative and financial tasks and responsibilities to the regional offices coupled with their limited pro-activity. Further, annual implementation was penalized by significant delays in the development and submission of AWPBs, resulting in the reduction of the annual implementation period to on average to 7-9 months;
  - *Weak financial management and procurement.* The project was affected by the lack of an appropriate accounting and financial management framework that met the minimum standards, resulting in the impossibility to reconcile IFAD disbursements with expenditures recorded by the project. Also, the accounting and financial management software was available only in 2014.

Internal control was defective with a lack of rigor and annual audits were produced with delays. The audits covering the period 2011-2012 further provided qualified opinions. Compliance with the principles of procurement was also limited.

The weak performance of the Government in terms of financial management caused the suspension of disbursements by IFAD on 12 June 2014 and the transfer of financial management to UNDP. This resulted in significant improvements and the suspension was withdrawn on 13 April 2015. UNDP, however, has a management cost for the project and government of 7 per cent.

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<sup>26</sup> Sources: PCR, MTR report, PPRs.

- *Instability of the PCU.* The staff of the PCU was recruited through open and competitive processes. Nonetheless, it operated in constant instability with recurrent resignations and successive recruitment of staff;<sup>27</sup>
  - *Co-financing.* The Government showed a limited capacity to mobilize the expected co-financing for the project. According to the PCR, only 27 per cent of the Government's expected contribution was mobilized;
  - *Weak M&E and KM.* Although the design attached particular importance to M&E, the M&E system was never operational and the M&E staff was recruited with a 4-years delay resulting in the impossibility to monitor activities in the field and to track progress against indicators. Also, the plan to recruit the Faculty of Agronomy to put in place a KM system never materialized.
98. The PCR contains limited assessment of the performance of Government services providing support to the project, such as the Directorate of Agricultural Infrastructure or the deconcentrated services of agriculture. Nonetheless, it emerges that their involvement and participation in operational aspects was generally weak/limited compared with expectations at design.
99. The suspension of the disbursements by IFAD in 2014 is questioned in the PCR as severely affecting the possibility for the project to achieve results and bring the expected benefits to the supported communities. Nonetheless, IFAD's decision was largely justified by severe issues experienced in terms of financial management (see Chapter D).
100. Overall, the low managerial quality of the project led to significant losses in terms of the effectiveness and efficiency of the project. Therefore, government performance is found to be unsatisfactory (2), versus the PCR rating of moderately unsatisfactory.

## **IV. Assessment of PCR quality**

### **Scope**

101. The scope of the PCR is considered moderately satisfactory (4), as it is generally in line with the PCR Guidelines and covers most evaluation criteria. Annex 13 (minutes from the final wrap up meeting) of the IFAD's outline was not included.

### **Quality**

102. The report's biggest drawback is that data on outcomes and impact is missing, due to a weak M&E by the project, and an incomplete impact study conducted upon completion. Although a big effort was made in the PCR to compensate this deficiency with the use of other sources, the lack of data did not allow a full assessment of impact and results, and the PCR very much focuses on outputs.
103. In addition, the analysis of project results in the PCR is sometimes superficial or lacks a more critical analysis. An effort could have been done to further analyze results and more critically analyze issues. For example, in relation to MPs realized, the document does not describe the contents of implemented projects or the description of the selection processes and criteria. The assessment of results from capacity-building activities is particularly weak.
104. Also, the contents of some activities (e.g. those under the PSPACSE) and the quality of some project outputs (e.g. the law on water and infrastructures use; KM material developed) are not assessed.
105. The report lacks a comprehensive analysis and assessment of some key aspects such as project's achievements in terms of promoting gender equality and women empowerment, synergies and complementarities with other IFAD-funded projects

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<sup>27</sup> Two coordinators, four administrative and financial managers, four monitoring and evaluation officers, seven accountants, three procurement officers.



and initiatives, and the performance of Government services supporting the project.

106. The section on relevance might have benefited from an analysis of lessons learnt from the previous phase and how these were integrated in the design.
107. Additional weaknesses include the following: (i) statements and rating sometimes are not substantiated with evidence or ratings are not consistent with the narrative (e.g. innovation and scaling up); (ii) the document often lacks reference to sources; (iii) inconsistencies were in the presentation of project costs and IFAD's budget (e.g. IFAD's budget is US\$13.4 million in the summary table and US\$13.2 million in the narrative).
108. The rating of the quality of the PCR is moderately unsatisfactory (3).

### **Lessons**

109. The PCR presents several lessons which are generally relevant. Nonetheless, some of them are formulated in a general way or in the form of recommendations, or are self-evident or obvious (e.g. the PCR indicates among lessons that an M&E and financial management systems should be put in place to ensure effectiveness). In some cases, recommendations are not based on explicit findings (e.g. there is a recommendation to focus on selected value chains in future interventions that is not backed by information or analysis in the document). Some key aspects such as those related to the strengths and weaknesses of stakeholders in implementing the project or to the non-availability of counterpart financing, are not treated.
110. Considering that the project went into a third phase and taking into account the low level of achievement, lessons could have been more strategic and detailed.
111. The rating is a moderately satisfactory (4).

### **Candour**

112. The narrative tone of the PCR is objective and the report states positive, as well as less positive results. The rating is satisfactory (5).

## **V. Lessons learned**

113. The main lessons and recommendations gleaned from the PCR and its validation include the following:
  - Given Haiti is classified by IFAD as among the Most Fragile Situations, it is important that contextual and institutional analysis is conducted thoroughly during project design to identify appropriate interventions to meet the needs of its target groups. Based on this institutional analysis, the implementing agency (in this case MARNDR) should be strengthened through a first phase of capacity development or with the support of another organization such as UNDP. To avoid implementation delays and challenges that can affect project efficiency and effectiveness, M&E and technical and financial management, including procurement, need strengthening. Support to MARNDR decentralized services should be provided to enable them ensure advisory services and monitoring of technical operations in the field.
  - Early start-up of the project with the timely implementation of preparatory activities should be ensured, with particular attention to: (i) the set-up of the institutional, technical and project logistics; (ii) the preparation of the manuals for M&E, financial management and accounting; (iii) the preparation of the procurement plan, the recruitment of service providers and PCU staff; and (iv) the establishment of the PCU.
  - Results of the projects of other international financial institutions in rural development in Haiti should be evaluated for benchmarking, knowledge management and learning purposes. By sharing lessons learned with other

international financial institutions, IFAD could better understand its comparative advantages and limits in Haiti.

- Continuous dialogue between IFAD and technical counterparts in key ministries should be ensured, to establish stability and trust in an otherwise rapidly changing political context.

## Definition and rating of the evaluation criteria used by IOE

Criteria	Definition *	Mandatory	To be rated
<b>Rural poverty impact</b>	Impact is defined as the changes that have occurred or are expected to occur in the lives of the rural poor (whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended) as a result of development interventions.	X	Yes
	<i>Four impact domains</i>		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Household income and net assets: Household income provides a means of assessing the flow of economic benefits accruing to an individual or group, whereas assets relate to a stock of accumulated items of economic value. The analysis must include an assessment of trends in equality over time.</li> </ul>		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Human and social capital and empowerment: Human and social capital and empowerment include an assessment of the changes that have occurred in the empowerment of individuals, the quality of grass-roots organizations and institutions, the poor's individual and collective capacity, and in particular, the extent to which specific groups such as youth are included or excluded from the development process.</li> </ul>		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Food security and agricultural productivity: Changes in food security relate to availability, stability, affordability and access to food and stability of access, whereas changes in agricultural productivity are measured in terms of yields; nutrition relates to the nutritional value of food and child malnutrition.</li> </ul>		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Institutions and policies: The criterion relating to institutions and policies is designed to assess changes in the quality and performance of institutions, policies and the regulatory framework that influence the lives of the poor.</li> </ul>		No
<b>Project performance</b>	Project performance is an average of the ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.	X	Yes
Relevance	The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, institutional priorities and partner and donor policies. It also entails an assessment of project design and coherence in achieving its objectives. An assessment should also be made of whether objectives and design address inequality, for example, by assessing the relevance of targeting strategies adopted.	X	Yes
Effectiveness	The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.	X	Yes
Efficiency	A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results.	X	Yes
Sustainability of benefits	The likely continuation of net benefits from a development intervention beyond the phase of external funding support. It also includes an assessment of the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the project's life.	X	Yes
<b>Other performance criteria</b>			
Gender equality and women's empowerment	The extent to which IFAD interventions have contributed to better gender equality and women's empowerment, for example, in terms of women's access to and ownership of assets, resources and services; participation in decision making; work load balance and impact on women's incomes, nutrition and livelihoods.	X	Yes
Innovation	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have introduced innovative approaches to rural poverty reduction.	X	Yes
Scaling up	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have been (or are likely to be) scaled up by government authorities, donor organizations, the private sector and others agencies.	X	Yes
Environment and natural resources management	The extent to which IFAD development interventions contribute to resilient livelihoods and ecosystems. The focus is on the use and management of the natural environment, including natural resources defined as raw materials used for socio-economic and cultural purposes, and ecosystems and biodiversity - with the goods and services they provide.	X	Yes
Adaptation to climate change	The contribution of the project to reducing the negative impacts of climate change through dedicated adaptation or risk reduction measures	X	Yes

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Definition</i> *	<i>Mandatory</i>	<i>To be rated</i>
<b>Overall project achievement</b>	This provides an overarching assessment of the intervention, drawing upon the analysis and ratings for rural poverty impact, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, gender equality and women's empowerment, innovation and scaling up, as well as environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change.	X	Yes
<b>Performance of partners</b>			
• IFAD	This criterion assesses the contribution of partners to project design, execution, monitoring and reporting, supervision and implementation support, and evaluation. The performance of each partner will be assessed on an individual basis with a view to the partner's expected role and responsibility in the project life cycle.	X	Yes
• Government		X	Yes

\* These definitions build on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management; the Methodological Framework for Project Evaluation agreed with the Evaluation Committee in September 2003; the first edition of the Evaluation Manual discussed with the Evaluation Committee in December 2008; and further discussions with the Evaluation Committee in November 2010 on IOE's evaluation criteria and key questions.

## Rating comparison<sup>a</sup>

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Programme Management Department (PMD) rating</i>	<i>IOE Project Completion Report Validation (PCR) rating</i>	<i>Net rating disconnect (PCR-PMD)</i>
<b>Rural poverty impact</b>	3	3	0
<b>Project performance</b>			
Relevance	5	4	-1
Effectiveness	3	3	0
Efficiency	3	2	-1
Sustainability of benefits	3	3	0
<b>Project performance<sup>b</sup></b>	3.5	3	-0.5
<b>Other performance criteria</b>			
Gender equality and women's empowerment	4	3	-1
Innovation	2	2	0
Scaling up	4	3	-1
Environment and natural resources management	4	3	-1
Adaptation to climate change	4	4	0
<b>Overall project achievement<sup>c</sup></b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Performance of partners<sup>d</sup></b>			
IFAD	4	4	0
Government	3	2	-1
<b>Average net disconnect</b>			<b>-0.5</b>

<sup>a</sup> Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable.

<sup>b</sup> Arithmetic average of ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.

<sup>c</sup> This is not an average of ratings of individual evaluation criteria but an overarching assessment of the project, drawing upon the rating for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, rural poverty impact, gender, innovation and scaling up, environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change.

<sup>d</sup> The rating for partners' performance is not a component of the overall project achievement rating.

### Ratings of the project completion report quality

	<i>PMD rating</i>	<i>IOE PCR rating</i>	<i>Net disconnect</i>
Candour		5	
Lessons		4	
Quality (methods, data, participatory process)		3	
Scope		4	
Overall rating of the project completion report			

Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable.

## Abbreviations and Acronyms

AAA	Agro Action Allemande (from the German Welt Hunger Hilfe)
AWPB	Annual Work Plan and Budget
BAC	From the French Bureaux Agricoles Communales
CREP	Community-based Saving and Credit Centre
DSF	Debt Sustainability Framework
EB	Executive Board
KM	Knowledge Management
MARNDR	Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MP	Micro-project
MTR	Mid-term Review
OFID	OPEC Fund for International Development
PSPACSE	Special Programme for Agricultural Production and Soil and Space Conservation
PCR	Project Completion Report
PCU	Project Coordinating Unit
PPI-2	Small-scale Irrigation Development Project
PPI-3	Small Irrigation and Market Access Development Project in the Nippes and Goavienne Region
PPR	IFAD Portfolio Performance Report
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WUA	Water Users' Association

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In addition, IFAD internal MEMOs, communications and documents available in the Electronic Records Management System (ERMS) and xdesk were consulted.