

**Project Completion Report Validation**  
**Project Title: Southern Sudan Livelihoods Development Project (SSLDP)**  
**Country: Republic of South Sudan**  
**Date of validation by IOE: January 2018**

**I. Basic project data**

			Approval (US\$ m)		Actual (US\$ m)	
			US \$	% Total	US \$	% Total
Region	East and Southern Africa Division	Total project costs	25.9	100.0	21.64	100.0
Country	Republic of South Sudan	IFAD grant	13.5	52.1	12.72	55.8
Grant number	DSF 8022-SS	Netherlands Government grant	9.0	34.7	7.91	36.6
Type of project (subsector)		Recipient	2.8	10.8	0.37	1.7
Financing type	Grant	Beneficiaries	0.6	2.3	0.64	3.0
Lending terms	-					
Date of approval	11 Sept 2008					
Date of signature	05 Feb 2009					
Date of effectiveness	05 Feb 2009					
Grant financing amendments	29 April 2010 8 Jan 2013	Number of beneficiaries	Intended: direct - 38,000		Actual: direct - 14,175	
Grant closure extensions	1					
Country programme managers	Ulac Demirag Rasha Omar (former)	Closing date	31 Mar 2015		30 Sep 2016	
Regional director(s)	Sana Jatta	Mid-term review			8 Aug - 7 Sept 2012	
Project completion report reviewers	Mark Keating Philippa Morgan	IFAD grant disbursement at project completion (%)			95.6	
Project completion report quality control panel	Prashanth Kotturi Michael Carbon	Date of the project completion report			21 Dec 2016	

Source: Project Completion Report

## II. Project outline

### Country context

1. The Republic of South Sudan, a landlocked country in north-eastern Africa covering an area of 640,000 km<sup>2</sup>, gained independence in July 2011<sup>1</sup>. The relationship between north and south, however, is marred by discontent as territorial disputes with the Republic of Sudan and rivalries within the government continue to inhibit the country's peaceful transition to self-governance. South Sudan has been grappling with limited capacities in many areas including human, financial and technical. Poor road networks and communication infrastructure has limited basic services and a prolonged rainy season makes parts of the country inaccessible for months<sup>2</sup>.
2. Furthermore, six years after gaining independence, the country is torn by civil war with an estimated 50,000 civilian casualties and 1.6 million displaced people. Intercommunal tensions are further inflamed by a lack of governance and justice and a collapsed economic situation. Conservative estimates place the number of people in 2013 who were food insecure at 2.7 million, while a UNICEF 2016 report nearly doubled this figure to 4.8 million<sup>3</sup>.
3. As a new nation, South Sudan has the dual challenge of dealing with the legacy of more than 50 years of conflict and continued instability, along with major development needs. South Sudan<sup>4</sup> has significant oil wealth, which accounts for almost the totality of exports, and around 60 per cent of its Gross Domestic Product. Although the country has vast and largely untapped natural resources, it remains relatively undeveloped, characterized by a subsistence economy. Rural poverty is linked to continuing conflict, population displacement, poor service coverage, inaccessibility, low labour availability and low productivity. Outside the oil sector, livelihoods are concentrated in low productivity, unpaid agriculture and pastoralist activities, accounting for around 15 per cent of Gross Domestic Product. In fact, 85 per cent of the working population is engaged in non-wage work, chiefly in agriculture (78 per cent), which has been identified as the main engine of economic and rural development.
4. The 2009 national Baseline Household Survey also reveals that the country faces several human development challenges. Only 27 per cent of the population aged 15 years and above is literate, with significant gender disparities: the literacy rate for males is 40 per cent compared to 16 per cent for females. The infant mortality rate is 105 (per 1,000 live births), maternal mortality rate is 2,054 (per 100,000 live births), and only 17 per cent of children are fully immunized. Only 55 per cent of the population has access to improved sources of drinking water. Around 38 per cent of the population has to walk for more than 30 minutes one way to collect drinking water, and some 80 per cent of South Sudanese do not have access to any toilet facility.
5. South Sudan is now in hyperinflation.<sup>5</sup> Relative prices of food have increased, and food shortages and hunger are the most alarming signal of the country's broader economic collapse. Rising food prices have put many households, in both urban and rural areas, in a very difficult position, as they are unable to afford the minimum food basket. The incidence of poverty has also worsened, from 44.7 per

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<sup>1</sup> In January 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) created two autonomous systems of governance in The Sudan – and in October 2005, the Government of South Sudan was formed with its own parliament and interim Constitution. Following a referendum held in January 2011, Southern Sudanese overwhelmingly voted for separation. As a result, South Sudan seceded from The Sudan six years after the signing of the CPA. On 9 July 2011, the Republic of South Sudan became independent.

<sup>2</sup> SSLDP PCR, 2017, P.3

<sup>3</sup> SSLDP PCR, 2017, P.3

<sup>4</sup> World Bank: South Sudan Economic Overview, October 20, 2016.

<sup>5</sup> World Bank: South Sudan Economic Overview, October 20, 2016 - The inflation in July and August 2016 was 661 per cent and 730 per cent respectively.

cent in 2011 to 65.9 per cent in 2015, corresponding to a higher depth of poverty. The renewed conflict in South Sudan is undermining development gains achieved since independence and has worsened the humanitarian situation.

### **Project description**

6. The project was IFAD's first operation in Southern Sudan following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in January 2005. IFAD Executive Board approved the Debt Sustainability Framework grant (red) in September 2008, with entry into force on 05 February 2009. Project completion, originally set at 31 March 2015, actually took place on 30 June 2016<sup>6</sup>, following a 15-month extension. The grant closed on 30 September 2016. Its aim was to increase food security and incomes in six counties through improved agricultural productivity and marketing. The planned project duration was six years, divided into two phases. A first phase of two years would serve to launch the project and test its implementation arrangements. During this phase, the project would be implemented firstly in three of the targeted six counties: Terekeka in Central Equatoria State; Magwi in Eastern Equatoria State; and Bor in Jonglei State. At the end of the first phase, a project review would be conducted to assess the project's relevance, efficiency and effectiveness. This review would inform the project expansion to the remaining other three counties.
7. **Project target group.** The President's Report<sup>7</sup> states that the main project target group will be defined on the basis of predominant livelihood activities – i.e. farming, herding and fishing. Within these livelihood groups, three vulnerable groups have been identified on the basis of gender and displacement: women, woman-headed households and returnee households. It was estimated that, of the total 380,000 population or around 60,000 households in the three first-phase counties, about 38,000 households would benefit from the project, corresponding to 80 per cent of the rural population in these counties. In the absence of a functional service delivery mechanism for agriculture inputs and technology, the project would adopt a community outreach approach that consists of mobilizing community organizations, developing their productive capacity in agriculture, and building the capacity of county offices.
8. **Project targeting.** The project would adopt an inclusive and comprehensive targeting approach, by which infrastructure activities were likely to benefit all households in a given community, by ensuring that project resource allocations for productive micro-projects were channelled to the most vulnerable groups, particularly woman-headed households and returnee households.
9. **Project goal, objectives and components.** The overall project goal was to reduce poverty and hunger in the project areas. The project development objective was to increase food security and incomes from farm and off-farm activities by: (i) supporting community-based development of productive activities with the full participation of vulnerable community members, including women; and (ii) promoting infrastructure that supports improved food security and higher incomes derived from agricultural activities. The institutional project objectives were that: (i) communities in the targeted counties are organized and empowered with equal participation of women and vulnerable people; and (ii) the capacity of county offices is strengthened so that they can assume a supervision/ regulatory, planning and budgeting role.
10. The project had three components: (i) community development, which included technical and financial support to agricultural micro-projects (55 per cent of base costs); (ii) rural infrastructure and market facilities (water, roads and market facilities); county coordination in the form of the establishment of County

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<sup>6</sup> This is according to the PCR. However, IFAD Business Intelligence indicates a completion date of 31 March 2016.

<sup>7</sup> EB 2008/94/R.23/Rev.1

Coordination Units; county level support in form of capacity building for the County Offices; and the establishment of a Conflict Resolution Platform (36 per cent); and (iii) project management and coordination (9 per cent).

11. **Institutional and implementation arrangements.** In the absence of a functional service delivery mechanism for agricultural inputs and technology, the project adopted a community outreach approach that consisted of mobilization of community organizations, development of their productive capacity in agriculture, and building the capacity of county offices. **Boma** (cluster of villages) **Development Committees (BDCs)** would be trained to facilitate a participatory process to identify community needs and the related, relevant productive activities in which interest groups could engage. Oversight responsibilities for the project would rest with the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Resources and Forestry, later named Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security of the Government of Southern Sudan (the lead project agency). Project coordination and financial management would be the responsibility of the Project Management Unit (PMU), to be housed in the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. The technical backstopping functions would be the responsibility of the State Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Resources and Forestry, and the State Ministry of Physical Infrastructure. Day-to-day project implementation would be the responsibility of the BDCs (supported by NGOs) and the county offices (supported by the county coordination units). A Project Steering Committee (PSC), already established for agriculture sector projects financed by the Multi-Donor Trust Fund and the European Commission, would meet on a quarterly basis to ensure that project progress was satisfactory.
12. **Project costs and financing.** Based on the President’s Report, the total project cost was an estimated US\$25.9 million over six years, divided into two phases. The sources of external financing were: (i) an IFAD grant of US\$13.5 million (52.1 per cent of total costs); and (ii) a grant from the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands of US\$9.0 million (34.7 per cent of total costs). The recipient Government and beneficiaries would contribute US\$2.8 million (10.8 per cent of total costs) and US\$0.6 million (2.3 per cent of total costs), respectively.
13. At project completion the actual total cost<sup>8</sup> was US\$21.64 million, with a disbursement rate of 99.9 per cent and 87.9 per cent for, respectively, the IFAD grant and the Government of the Netherlands grant. Table 1 below shows the project expenditures by financier. The Project Completion Report (PCR) states that expenditures by component were not available, which “made it difficult to assess the value for money in respect of the investments made for each of the component”.

Table 1

**Project expenditures by financier (USD \$ millions)**

<i>Donor</i>	<i>Planned</i>	<i>Percentage of total (%)</i>	<i>Disbursed</i>	<i>Disbursement rate (%)</i>
<b>IFAD grant</b>	<b>13.5</b>	52.2%	<b>12.72</b>	99.9% <sup>a</sup>
<b>Government of the Netherlands</b>	<b>9</b>	34.8%	<b>7.91</b>	87.9%
<b>Beneficiaries</b>	<b>0.6</b>	2.1%	<b>0.64</b>	108%
<b>Government</b>	<b>2.8</b>	10.9%	<b>0.37</b>	13%
<b>Total</b>	<b>25.9</b>	100%	<b>21.64</b>	83.5%

Sources: Project design report, IFAD Oracle Business Intelligence, Project completion report, Annex 8.

<sup>a)</sup> Disbursement rate on the SDR grant amount.

<sup>8</sup> The PCR is inconsistent with regard to actual project costs. The amounts presented are taken from the IFAD Oracle Business Intelligence system as regards IFAD and Dutch grant disbursements, and the PCR Appendix 8 as regards Government and Beneficiary disbursements.

14. **Amendments to the Grant Financing Agreement.** There has been only one amendment to the IFAD grant financing agreement, after the Mid-term Review (MTR), which concerned: (i) extension of the closing date by 18 months - from 31 March 2015 to 30 September 2016; and (ii) the authorization of the Special Account allocation to increase to US\$1.5 million and relocated resources to increase investment in civil works and to strengthen support to project operations and follow up.
15. **Intervention logic.** The main causes of rural poverty in the project area were linked to the prolonged conflict, displacement of the population, poor service coverage, inaccessibility of large tracts of the land, low labour availability and low productivity. Agriculture has been identified as the main engine of growth and economic development of rural areas. In the absence of a functional service delivery mechanism for agriculture inputs and technology (absence of public extension system and of private input suppliers or producers' organizations), it was deemed most appropriate to ensure community outreach by the mobilization of community organizations and NGOs, disbursement of in-kind financial support (in form of grants) to interest groups (organized around kinship and collective agricultural activities), and support the capacity of the lower tiers of Government, the County office, with their planning/ monitoring and supervisory functions particularly vis-à-vis infrastructure services. Working at the level of the **Boma** (cluster of villages), SSLDP engaged development committees in a participatory process to identify common needs and productive activities to help poor and vulnerable people improve their living standards. Qualified national and international NGOs provided technical assistance to the committees, enabling them to plan and carry out agricultural micro-projects and other development efforts.

#### **Project implementation – delivery of outputs**

16. **Community development component.** At project design, three output targets were set for the Community Development Component, namely: (i) empower 500 community interest groups or 12,500 members (5,625 men and 6,875 women) to identify livelihood options (through so-called micro-projects, in areas such as marketing of smoked fish and horticultural products, dairy processing and agriculture; (ii) train these organised community interest groups to implement the selected productive activities (demand-led training, including agricultural practices, book keeping, computer training, as well as training of trainers to conduct agricultural extension through farmers field schools); and (iii) provide investment grants for the designed activities on the basis of matching grants to at least 12,000 members of the interest groups.
17. By project completion, the following outputs were achieved: (i) formation of 305 community interest groups (61 per cent of appraisal target) with total membership of 5,260 (42 per cent of original target) of whom 2,568 - or 48.8 per cent - females; (ii) 8,498 members (68 per cent of target) of interest groups applied good agronomic practices, of whom 7,622 members (64 per cent of target) attended training; (iii) 16 members were trained in adult literacy; and (iv) 9,564 members (80 per cent of target) accessed grants for micro-projects. The planned training in coordination and supervision of project activities for 45 government staff from the states and counties did not materialize. NGOs worked with animal health workers and the government veterinary departments to sell animal drugs to farmers and refund the cost of the drugs to the veterinary office.
18. **Infrastructure and marketing component.** The component aimed for four outputs: (i) construction/rehabilitation of 170 Km of feeder roads; ii) drilling of 55 boreholes, including operation and maintenance (O&M) training for recipients and government staff at the county and state levels, and equipping construction of livestock water points or valley dams; iii) construction and equipping five county

offices and 15 residential buildings in the selected counties; and iv) setting a platform for conflict resolution.

19. By project end, achievements included: (i) construction /rehabilitation of 112 Km of feeder roads (66 per cent of appraisal target); (ii) construction and equipping of five county offices and 15 residential buildings in the selected counties; (iii) drilling 51 boreholes (93 per cent of target) in five of the six counties, including provision of eight sets of assorted water maintenance equipment and logistics support, serving 38,250 beneficiaries or 7,650 households. The four water points planned in Bor for livestock (*haffirs*) were not constructed due to insecurity; (iv) formation of 48 water user committees, one in each of the sites except three sites (Juba, Terekeka, and in Lafon/Lopa), with a total of 243 members (91 females); (v) training 150 persons (39 per cent of target) in borehole and water O&M; and (vi) distribution to the counties of various equipment, including 3,250 hoes, 2,494 pan-gas, 1,706 axes, 794 malodas and 57 ox-ploughs. The establishment of a Conflict Resolution Platform was not implemented. The rehabilitation works on the Juba-Kajo-Kejito road had to be suspended due to outbreak of conflict in the capital city Juba and other parts of the country. After some delay in handing over the construction site to World Food Programme (WFP), all construction works were completed by 30 April 2017.

### III. Review of findings

#### A. Core criteria

##### Relevance

20. **Policy relevance.** South Sudan is characterized by population displacement due to the prolonged conflict situation, physical inaccessibility to far flung areas, low labour availability and low productivity. In this context, agriculture was identified as a means to generate economic and rural development. With this in mind, the SSLDP was designed to mobilize community organizations, through a community outreach approach, develop their productive capacity in agriculture, and build the capacity of county offices.<sup>9</sup> The grant was proposed under the Debt Sustainability Framework to the Republic of The Sudan to help finance the Southern Sudan Livelihoods Development Project, which is characterized as a "red light" country, making it eligible for 100 per cent grant financing over the 2007-2009 allocation cycle. Furthermore, the project is in line with IFAD's country programme strategy, which is to support the livelihood strategies of targeted groups in order to improve their productive capacity, and to promote an enabling institutional environment and better local governance practices<sup>10</sup>.
21. The project was aligned with the Government of Southern Sudan's national priorities with a focus on two of the key targets stipulated in the "Expenditure Priorities Funding" paper. Targets included: (i) reduce food insecurity in rural households by 20 percent; and (ii) assist at least 20 per cent of producers in accessing markets.
22. The project objectives were also relevant to the Country Strategic Opportunities Paper of 2002, calling for support to the livelihood strategies of targeted groups in order to improve the productive capacity of rural households and to promote an enabling institutional environment, as well as better local governance practices. Emphasis was also placed on fully involving women in development planning and investment decisions.
23. The project objectives were further harmonized with other key donors in the country, namely the Dutch cooperation policy which emphasized higher agricultural productivity, sector related support to agriculture, forestry, livestock

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<sup>9</sup> SSLDP President's Report, P.1.

<sup>10</sup> SSLDP President's Report, P.3.

and fisheries, managed through the Multi-Donor Trust Fund, and the European Union's Sudan Post-Conflict Community Based Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme.

24. The project was highly relevant to the post-conflict needs of the rural poor. It provided basic organisational skills and technical support to the farmers and their leaders and enhanced quality and quantity of food produced and marketed, which resulted in the reduction of prevalence of persistent food gaps and malnutrition among the different categories of beneficiaries. Furthermore, the target areas had experienced challenges in transport and access to markets, as well as frequent conflicts over water and prevalence of water-borne diseases.
25. **Relevance of project design.** Project design overlooked a number of pertinent issues: (i) supporting post-war communities with the view to give them implementation responsibilities without strong coordination led to over burdening them; (ii) capacities at the various levels to make effective decisions became a problem. The project would have required stronger institutions, partnerships and coordination mechanisms - which were all lacking; (iii) the outcomes based on the design required a constellation of outputs from a number of rural sector programmes and actors, which were not effective or fully coordinated at the implementation levels. Moreover, the design lacked sufficient provision to ensure that technical oversight was provided during the construction of the offices and residential buildings under the infrastructure and marketing component, leading to low quality construction and other outputs.
26. Based on the above, *the PCRV rates relevance for the SSLDP as moderately satisfactory (4), same rating provided by the PCR.*

### **Effectiveness**

27. There is a notable lack of outcome level data in the PCR, IFAD's Results and Impact Measurement System (RIMS) reporting and other project documents. The majority of M&E data was captured at the output level therefore, project effectiveness is rated on the basis of project outputs reported in PCR and RIMS reports, in as far as these outputs can be used as proxies for the achievement of immediate project objectives.
28. At project design in 2008, crucial developments had supported the sustainability of peace, with the population reporting increased confidence in the future along with return movements of the population. However, by the time of the referendum in 2011, cracks in the fragile peace had already begun to appear. Since then, the country has faced two civil wars and near economic collapse with the second half of project implementation undertaken during one of the most tumultuous periods in the history of the country.
29. Progress towards target in the first half of the project was good, with a 91 per cent attainment rate in 2013/2014. Progress slowed down in the second half, and overall, the project reached 10,730 people, of whom 6,504 were female; 85 per cent achievement rate of target. By project end, 6,825 households (68 per cent of target); 305 groups (61 per cent of target) and 10 communities (83 per cent of target) had received project services.<sup>11</sup>
30. **Component 1: Community Development.** According to the PCR, the project established 305 community interest groups (61 per cent of appraisal target) with total membership of 5,260<sup>12</sup> (42 per cent of target) of whom 2,568 or 48.8 per cent females. It also managed to train 7,493<sup>13</sup> members (64 per cent of target)

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<sup>11</sup> SSLDP PMU RIMS 2016.

<sup>12</sup> According to the final RIMS 2016, there were 10,262 people in community groups formed/ strengthened (82 percent of target), of whom, 6,160 were female.

<sup>13</sup> RIMS for training on community management topics puts this number at 3,560 (142 percent of target).

and assist 9,564<sup>14</sup> members (80 per cent of target) to access grants for the implementation of various micro-projects, mainly in the agricultural sector. In reality, community mobilisation and empowerment took considerable time to achieve transformative changes in agriculture and did not perform very well. There were no interest groups formed by 2010 and there were only 70 of them by the end 2011. The majority were formed after the MTR of 2012, which suggests that with the subsequent deterioration in the political environment following the 2013 civil war, most of them (66 per cent) remained at an early stage of development.

31. Furthermore, integrating interest-based groups within already established groups faced significant challenges partially due to differing goals and aims with the former focusing on economic development and the latter, poverty reduction.
32. Despite these challenges, the project reported positive outcomes for interest groups from Magwi County who were able to open bank accounts to manage their own money earmarked for lending to members with limited supervision and monitoring from the service provider. In Terekeka County, interest groups were selling surplus ground nuts as seeds for other farmers in the area.
33. The PCR states that only four of the 26 planned activities envisioned to empower the community interest groups, mostly those related to the traditional process of social preparation of the target groups and their leaders, were completed within the six years. The rest of the planned activities, including the functions of mobilisation of the recipients, were either partially or never completed. Only 66 per cent of the planned training of group leaders in organisational and management skills were achieved over the years. The planned training in coordination and supervision of project activities for 45 government staff from the states and counties did not materialize.<sup>15</sup> Similarly, only 16 members were trained in adult literacy, which were envisaged to come in and complement capabilities of interest group members to participate effectively in undertaking project activities. Furthermore, the provision to use 10 per cent of the grant amount for supporting private traders/stockists of crop inputs and animal drugs to provide these inputs to interest groups at fair market prices did not materialize and this need has not been addressed.
34. **Infrastructure and marketing component.** The project constructed/rehabilitated 112 Km of feeder roads (66 per cent of appraisal target<sup>16</sup>) and drilled 51 boreholes (93 per cent of target) in five of the six counties, serving 38,250 beneficiaries or 7,650 households. It also established 48 water user committees with a total of 243 members (91 females). According to RIMS 2016, none of the nine planned stream crossings on the Juba- Kajokeji road were constructed by project end, however, the PCR stated that the outbreak of conflict resulted in a temporary suspension of construction, with completion of all construction works including four additional crossings (bringing the total number to 13 along this road) achieved by project end.<sup>17</sup> In addition, the project constructed and equipped five county offices and 15 residential buildings in six counties. However, supervision and oversight during construction was weak, which affected the quality of all construction work. The PCR states that all contractors hired were without professional skills and unable to generate Bills of Quantities. Similarly, the state directors responsible for roads and water were not qualified to provide technical oversight during construction and the PMU did not have a back-

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<sup>14</sup> According to RIMS 2016, this number is 9,674 people accessing development funds (77 per cent of target).

<sup>15</sup> According to RIMS 2016, 184 government officials were trained (75 per cent of target), of whom 57 were females.

<sup>16</sup> This number is 71 per cent on the RIMS 2016.

<sup>17</sup> The RIMS 2016 reported 0/9 stream crossings constructed. The PCR alludes to a crossing being completed but does not state how many. A review of the May 2017 assessment – which states that works were completed by WFP (past the project's closing date) through a Grant Agreement between WFP and IFAD, is needed to validate these findings.



up technical person to support the process, making the implementation of the entire contract problematic. The Conflict Resolution Platform was not established. However, the mission in 2017 verified that all construction works had been completed by May 2017.

35. Despite project implementation difficulties and severe contextual challenges, including civil war, SSLDP accomplished modest achievements particularly related to the interest groups supported with income generating activities, who demonstrated increased production and incomes, and the rehabilitation of water infrastructure which led to increased domestic water supply. *The PCRV rating for project effectiveness is moderately unsatisfactory (3), in line with the PCR rating.*

### **Efficiency**

36. The efficiency of SSLDP is measured against the benefits achieved as a result of implementation, the number of beneficiaries and in terms of whether the project resources/inputs (funds, time, etc.) were used efficiently for the intended purposes.
37. The project was implemented over seven and half years, in two phases. The grant was approved in September 2008 and became effective in February 2009 after an effectiveness lag of five months. However, the project was affected by low rates of disbursement during the first four years of implementation, largely attributed to delayed implementation of the infrastructure component. Fund disbursements notably increased in the last three years, resulting in a final expenditure of 99.9 per cent of the IFAD grant and 87.9 per cent of the Dutch grant.
38. While a forecasted Economic Internal Rate of Return was omitted from the design report, a summary of the expected increase in net family revenues due to the project intervention was included and stated the following: project investments under component 1 were expected to amount to approximately US\$100 per household and would result in an average increase in income of US\$170 per household.<sup>18</sup> The PCR states that a financial and economic analysis was not carried out due to incomplete information on actual project costs. Therefore, benefits derived by beneficiaries were difficult to ascertain.<sup>19</sup>
39. The cost of drilling boreholes under SSLDP was between US\$12,500 and US\$17,507 compared to US\$7,280 – US\$15,000 for other projects in the same area. According to the PCR, the boreholes were, however, of satisfactory quality. Implementation of the community development component was inefficient, with the overhead costs of the NGO service provider amounting to 72 per cent of the total budget of approximately US\$0.89 million.
40. Project management costs were expected to amount to US\$2.2 million at design (9 per cent of the total budget), with a provisional amount of US\$1.6 million baseline costs which included physical and price contingencies. In the absence of a breakdown of component costs, it was not possible to verify actual expenditure at project end. Absence of such basic accounting is reflective of the lack of management capacity in the project.
41. *The PCRV rates project efficiency as moderately unsatisfactory (3), equal to the PCR rating.*

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<sup>18</sup> SSLDP Design Report, 2009, P.36.

<sup>19</sup> SSLDP PCR, 2017, P.77.

## Rural poverty impact

42. Rural poverty impact was difficult to quantify as there was no project specific baseline study conducted.<sup>20</sup> While a baseline study was jointly carried out by four projects under the Ministry of Animal Resources and Fisheries in 2010, which included SSLDP, analysis was generic and could not be used as a reference to assess impact of the individual projects. In 2011, SSLDP extrapolated quantitative findings from the 2010 joint baseline survey to produce an SSLDP specific baseline report which included counties of operation in order to attain estimates for indicators relevant to project targets.<sup>21</sup> However, the baseline did not capture information on all key SSLDP project indicators as per the log frame data requirement. Furthermore, validity of the findings is questionable in the absence of a robust and functioning M&E system. The M&E database was not regularly updated, and it is not clear how, in the absence of appraisal targets, some levels of achievement were calculated. An Impact Study was carried out in June 2016 by a team of external consultants in coordination with the PMU to assess project impact. The Impact Study further highlights the deficiencies in the baseline studies.<sup>22</sup>
43. **Household incomes and assets.** According to the PCR, the project did not generate information on households' annual incomes due to lack of credible baseline data.<sup>23</sup> The level of surplus produced and marketed by households was selected as a proxy indicator of income increase, and on this basis, the average annual increase of household income was estimated between South Sudanese Pound (SSP) 3,168 and SSP 4,000. Three market avenues were selected. Project beneficiaries sell to: (i) cooperatives; (ii) directly to traders; and (iii) vendors in the markets. The impact study showed that beneficiary households receiving project support increased their sales of surplus crops to market vendors by 34.1 per cent compared to the baseline and sales to cooperatives by 90 per cent.<sup>24</sup>
44. According to the 2016 Impact Study, the average value of the household asset ownership index<sup>25</sup> increased by 2.6 per cent over the baseline from SSP 1,033 to SSP 1,061 during the project period. However, there was a dramatic difference between male-headed and female-headed households. While there was an increase in mean value of the household asset ownership index among male headed households by 14 per cent, there was a reduction by 18 per cent in mean value of household asset ownership among the female headed households 18 per cent. No explanation for this is provided in the Impact Survey. Nonetheless, focus group discussions and case studies seemed to indicate improvements in the livelihoods of most beneficiary households and especially for women. These improvements took the form of beneficiaries having sufficient food for their family; owning a pair of oxen and/or a cow for milk; having additional cash to purchase improved inputs for both irrigated and rainfed farming; being able to send children to school; and having separate rooms for the family and domestic animals. A limited number of farmers changed grass-thatched roofs to corrugated iron sheets. Beneficiary households were able to invest in better seeds and transport. Beekeeping and small businesses emerged as the main source of employment and income for the most vulnerable. The PCR noted that off-farm activities could also be livelihood options that would diversify sources of income and food security. While the impact study did not give specific focus to off-farm activities, beekeeping and small businesses were highlighted as particularly successful.

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<sup>20</sup> Summary Report SSLDP Impact Assessment, 2016, P.5.

<sup>21</sup> SSLDP Baseline Survey Report Operational Counties, 2011, P. ii.

<sup>22</sup> Summary Report SSLDP Impact Assessment, 2016, P.5.

<sup>23</sup> SSLDP PCR, 2017, P. xii.

<sup>24</sup> SSLDP PCR, 2017, P.16.

<sup>25</sup> The analysis of household asset ownership covered mainly productive assets including seeds, ox-ploughs and irrigation equipment.

45. **Human and social capital and empowerment.** It is likely that knowledge and skills in diverse areas were increased for training beneficiaries. The project is also likely to have strengthened local communities' ability to work together and to have promoted solidarity and participation through the self-identification of community issues to be addressed; thus promoting ownership of project activities. Training, awareness creation and skill development will probably have raised the confidence and voice of the vulnerable and woman-headed households, helping these groups to participate and benefit from the project. Overall, it is likely that the capacity of poor rural women and men and their organizations has improved.
46. **Food security and agricultural productivity.** The impact study selected three indicators to assess project impact on reducing poverty and hunger in the project area and included: reduction in the prevalence of chronic malnutrition in children under 5 by gender; reduction in food security, and the mean value of household asset ownership index.<sup>26</sup> Annex 3 provides a full breakdown of impact indicators and results by gender of the household head. Overall, there was a reduction in the prevalence of chronic malnutrition in children under 5 from 48 per cent to 13.4 per cent by project end. The rate of food deprivation or food insecurity was reduced by 60 per cent by project end, and the mean value of the household asset ownership index increased from SSP<sup>27</sup> 1,007 to SSP 1,033. The Impact study found that the project improved agronomic practices and significantly increased yields per feddan. According to the PCR, the yields for maize and beans, for instance, were more than doubled. Additionally, the majority of farmers planted cereals like sorghum and finger millet, and mixed and diversified production with other crops like cassava, groundnut, beans, okra, sesame and sweet potatoes. There was a change in cropping patterns as a result of trainings, the prioritization of crops and livestock on the basis of economic considerations, and the provision of improved technologies and seeds. Women used more vegetables for household food diversification and sold vegetables to buy essential household items.
47. **Institutions and policies.** The project made a strong effort to institutionalize the participatory approach in poverty reduction in South Sudan. The establishment of the steering committee and PMU at the national level and equally, the technical support to the County Coordination Unit, Project Development Committee and BDCs helped to realign their roles and responsibilities with state-led development philosophy. Despite a slow start, the project's coordination of the various stakeholders, albeit in a weak form, was relatively worthy and contributed to the achievement of project objectives. In short, although activities were delayed, the project improved the capacity of the implementation agencies, created new alliances between members and influenced regulations for better results.
48. The project did not perform well under the income and assets categories, given the challenging circumstances in which the latter half of project implementation took place. Modest impact was achieved in other categories, particularly human and social capital and empowerment. Based on the above, *the PCR rating for rural poverty impact is moderately unsatisfactory (3), equal to the PCR rating.*

### **Sustainability of benefits**

49. Sustainability entails two aspects:<sup>28</sup> (i) measuring whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn; and (ii) assessing if benefits are environmentally, as well as financially, sustainable, i.e.

<sup>26</sup> SSLDP Impact Assessment Final Report, 2016, P.43.

<sup>27</sup> South Sudanese Pound.

<sup>28</sup> IFAD, IOE Evaluation Manual, second edition, 13 November 2015.

the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the project's life.

50. The project's participatory approach has strengthened ownership of the outcomes by local communities, and enhanced capacity for undertaking agricultural development in the rural areas, resulting in increased production, improved incomes and food security. In particular, the interest groups that were supported with both grants and adequate training in group leadership and management have strong potential for sustainability. Most of them<sup>29</sup> have started savings and credit schemes either out of grants provided or their own contributions, and these funds are growing. Linkages to markets have been established for some like those involved in vegetable growing, apiary and fishing, which is a clear sign that these groups will be able to sustain themselves. Regarding infrastructure, while communities were sensitized and trained to ensure O&M within their capacity, the sustainability of feeder roads is threatened by understaffing and inadequate budgeting in the responsible county administrations.
51. Sustainability of benefits was further evidenced through RIMS 2016 second level results which reported that beneficiaries were able to acquire assets from their enterprises, and indicated their willingness to adopt innovations such as new goat races, sustainable fish preservation techniques and cost sharing of drugs disbursed through the Veterinary Department.
52. While improvements in capabilities at community level were reported, the project failed to lay strong foundations for sustainability, as core activities designed to establish staff ability at the state and county levels to coordinate and supervise were not realised. Furthermore, the Project Management Unit and the County Coordination Unit may not be sustainable once the funding stops as compared to when government structures are used. The impact assessment noted that there was no evidence of sustainability measures being implemented as part of an exit strategy.
53. *The PCRV rating for sustainability of benefits is moderately satisfactory (3), in line with the PCR rating.*

## **B. Other criteria**

### **Innovation**

54. The project attempted to introduce three key innovations that resonated with post-conflict development: i) putting communities in the front, thereby ensuring ownership by them; ii) use of private (NGOs) and community organizations in the implementation of the interventions; and iii) rationalise how governments (central and locals), private sector, donors and communities could cooperate in delivering one result for the poor. This was a significant shift from previous emergency aid in the country to an integrated development approach.
55. SSLDP's community empowerment approach, envisaged at design, was innovative in that the approach stipulated that local leaders were to be mobilised, sensitized and trained with new skills to enable them to facilitate and lead in the identification of economic activities in each community. This effectively challenged the status quo of dominance of a feudal culture of kinship alliances in favour of economic interests and participation.
56. While the project laid foundations for the evolution of the interest groups and local government including the Boma Development Committees, these innovations were frustrated by lack of government level coordination, but also by the absence of harmonization of operational procedures of the different NGOs working at the local level.

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<sup>29</sup> IFAD, SSLDP Supervision Report, 13-24 April 2015.

57. *The PCRV rates innovation as moderately satisfactory (4), in line with the PCR rating.*

### **Scaling up**

58. Key elements were envisaged at design as critical for replication and scaling up. The establishment of the Boma Development Committees and County Offices, to act as representatives and entry points for service delivery was seen as critical to ensure that the agricultural and economic needs of communities were met. This was to be achieved through the ratification of the Local Government Act which stipulated roles and responsibilities of local government, Boma Development Committee and County Offices in support of decentralisation. While the project directly supported Boma Development Committees to develop their capacity, challenges related to conflict and limitations in administrative capacity and governance hindered a systematic scaling up of project activities. However, the project did report moderate success in building and strengthening capacities and establishing community participation, with the aid of skilled NGOs and local government structures.
59. *In light of the above, the PCRV rates scaling up as moderately satisfactory (3), equal to the PCR rating.*

### **Gender equality and women's empowerment**

60. This is an area that received much focus within the project design and, indeed, the project emphasized women's direct involvement in project activities. Women received selected training in groups to empower them and help them engage more confidently in both Interest Group activities and water users' association decision-making. According to the PCR, at least 38 per cent of women participated in groups and comprised: 49 per cent of the interest groups, 72 per cent of vegetable growers, 8.5 per cent of cereal producers, 68 per cent of those engaged in processing, 67 per cent of members engaged in small businesses, and took 37 per cent of the leadership positions in the activities implemented. Though limited, SSLDP is likely to have increased the self-esteem of members with women taking key roles of leadership within their groups. They have participated in training that allowed them to be involved in water users' association committees. While the participation of women in group activities and committees is in itself positive, the absence of outcome data makes it difficult to judge the actual impact on women's empowerment and mainstreaming of gender sensitive initiatives.
61. Women have also benefited from improved stove production, which saves wood fuel and improves women's health. Furthermore, the drilling of boreholes in project locations has reduced the burden on women and children of travelling long distances for water.<sup>30</sup>
62. *The PCRV rates gender equality and women's empowerment as satisfactory (5), in line with the PCR rating.*

### **Environment and natural resource management**

63. South Sudan is continuously experiencing substantial environmental degradation due to various resettlements of people who have been returning to their ancestral land after a number of civil wars and displacements, including the recent past. Poverty and cropping strategies have also led to natural resource degradation.
64. SSLDP was classified as a Category B operation because it was unlikely to have significant negative environmental impacts. At design, the project was to promote best practice engineering design procedures, which included a simple set of environmental guidelines complemented with skills training in the use of cleaner technologies, energy conservation and improved agricultural practices.<sup>31</sup> The

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<sup>30</sup> SSLDP Supervision Report, 2015, P.6

<sup>31</sup> SSLDP Design Report, 2009, P.53

project introduced a number of natural resource management practices including the introduction of bee hives, and extension approaches which have led to vegetable farming along the river in Pachidi payam.<sup>32</sup> Furthermore, the project promoted sustainable practices, for example restricted use of fertilizers and pesticides for agriculture oriented activities, recycling of organic waste from markets and the promotion of local materials. Project benefits were expected to reduce post-harvest losses, reduce transport costs to markets, stores and other facilities, and to reduce the burden on women by providing labour saving equipment, all of which positively contribute to natural resource management. Although by project end, the PCR reported that beneficiaries were no longer using chemical inputs in agriculture, no further information was provided to validate whether sustainable practices were in fact being applied to reduce natural resource degradation.

65. Due to the lack of information regarding environment and natural resource management at project end, *the PCR rates environment and natural resources management the same as the PCR rating, moderately satisfactory (4).*

### **Adaptation to climate change**

66. Agriculture in South Sudan is predominantly subsistence and rainfall dependent, which has contributed to low productivity and high vulnerability to climate-induced shocks. Drying up of permanent rivers, delayed and shortened rainy seasons, wind erosion and bush fires are amongst South Sudan's major climate-related threats. SSLDP invested in capacity building of farmers and local government for efficient small-scale farming and promoting diversified agriculture production. Crop diversification (e.g. the cultivation of cassava, groundnut, beans, okra, sesame and sweet potatoes) and intercropping were promoted. Changes in cropping patterns were evidenced and attributed to the training and field demonstrations for beneficiary farms.
67. *The PCR rates adaptation to climate change as moderately satisfactory (4), equal to the PCR rating.*

### **C. Overall project achievement**

68. The scope of the project was ambitious at a time of cautious optimism for South Sudan. However, the outbreak of conflict in project areas severely hampered project activities and resulted in less effective implementation. Nevertheless, the project reportedly reached 14,175 beneficiaries through improved agriculture productivity and marketing. As a result of project interventions, interest groups acquired assets and significantly increased the feddans cultivated in the project areas, while project supported groups increased their incomes from the sale of agriculture produce and off-farm income activities. Moreover, the project contributed to the goal of improved food security and nutrition, reporting a reduction in the prevalence of chronic malnutrition among children under 5 in the project area.
69. Despite the modest effectiveness of the project in relation to stated targets, the project made several contributions to impact and the promotion of environmental and natural resources management, as well as gender equality and women's empowerment. In light of this, *the overall achievement of SSLDP is rated moderately satisfactory (4), same as the PCR rating.*

### **D. Performance of partners**

70. **IFAD.** The project was directly supervised by IFAD through five supervision missions and a 2012 MTR and indirectly supported through remote action. However, IFAD had no representation within the country and SSLDP was initially supervised by the Sudan country office for the first two years of project

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<sup>32</sup> SSLDP Final Report Impact Assessment, 2016, P.49.

implementation prior to independence in 2011. The South Sudan portfolio was transferred first to the Kenya, then the Ethiopia, then the Uganda, and finally the Ethiopia country offices (since early 2016). These frequent changes of Country Programme Managers, who, in addition, were in charge of demanding portfolios in the neighbouring countries, was particularly challenging for the SSLDP, which had been classified as an actual problem project and would have required much closer supervision and more proactive support. IFAD was criticized for poor quality and timeliness of supervision by the PMU, which, in some cases, delayed vital procurement processes. Furthermore, the PCR noted that international procedures were difficult to implement and any further projects would require an IFAD in-country presence in order to provide closer supervision and more proactive support.

71. IFAD's performance was also highly influenced by the security situation in the country, limiting its ability to provide the needed technical support for implementation, and for the required close engagement with the Government, at times, even travel to the capital was restricted, limiting also the missions carried out in South Sudan by technical teams.
72. Following project completion, the IFAD Country Director has engaged in intense consultations within IFAD, with the Netherlands Embassy, WFP and the implementing Ministry in South Sudan for the completion of the rehabilitation works on the Juba-Kaio-Keli road, which were completed at the end of the project extension period.
73. Based on the above narrative, *the PCR rates the performance of IFAD as moderately unsatisfactory (3), equal to the PCR rating.*
74. **Government.** At the time of project design, three years after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between North and South, it was envisaged that as one government within the Sudan, the South could draw on technical experience for project implementation from its northern neighbour. In 2011, two years into project implementation, the South successfully seceded from the North forming an independent Republic of South Sudan, meaning that the newly formed Government of South Sudan could no longer utilise technical support from the North. Severe conflict and a lack of technical knowledge and experience hindered the effective management and supervision of the project. Moreover, the long period of conflict has had a significant effect on the institutions of government at all levels, and with this in mind the project elected to use NGOs as service providers to implement interventions on the ground. However, with no legal framework in place to govern partnerships, the NGOs provided limited feedback on their operations.
75. A number of challenges related to performance of the PSC were identified at the 2012 MTR, namely its inability to utilise experiences and lessons learned from previous projects during SSLDP implementation. While as a newly independent country, it is expected that institutions of governance take time to shape and grow, delayed establishment of governing structures at both the national and local levels impacted timely decisions and project guidance. In the case of Lafon county, delays resulted in shortened implementation period from six years envisaged at design to just 2.5 years. The PMU also faced significant challenges from onset, with limited staff capacity to provide support to post-conflict operations. The project took some action to mitigate these challenges by delegating responsibilities to newly established state-based anchors (dedicated staff members at the state level to support with tasks), following MTR recommendations.
76. Government performance was poor in relation to the setting up of a functional M&E system. The PMU did not supervise or undertake a baseline survey and the project suffered from the absence of records leading to weak reporting and the

inability of the project to verify performance monitoring data. The two courses on M&E management, envisaged at appraisal to build local capacity, were not conducted.

77. The Government of South Sudan was generally responsive to IFAD's recommendations and the performance of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development in managing the special account and complying with IFAD's rules and regulations was satisfactory. The PSC was, however, not proactive in providing the required directions and failed to ensure full staffing until complete implementation. Overall, the audit reports were prepared on time and met the required standards.
78. Of the original US\$2.8 million earmarked as government contribution at design, the Government of South Sudan disbursed US\$0.37 million by project end; 13 per cent disbursement rate.
79. *The PCRV rates the performance of the government as moderately unsatisfactory (3), in line with the PCR rating.*

#### **IV. Assessment of PCR quality**

80. **Scope.** The PCR for SSLDP has not followed closely the IFAD Guidelines for Project Completion (2006), for instance the vital sections on 'Review of project outputs' and 'Project costs and financing' are missing and some of the Annexes, e.g., 'Actual project costs' and 'Summary of amendments to the grant amendment' are incomplete. The PCRV assesses PCR scope as moderately unsatisfactory (3).
81. **Quality (data, methods, participatory process).** The PCR process was highly affected by political insecurity and recurrent security threats in the project locations, which delayed the timely production of the PCR. The absence of a project specific baseline, and a non-functioning M&E system affected the project's monitoring data accuracy. Worsening security conditions affected IFAD's ability to provide more adequate technical support for the impact assessment during the final phase of the project. There are significant inconsistencies, particularly with regard to project costs, the disbursement of both the IFAD and Dutch grants and the actual number of beneficiaries reached that impair the assessment of project achievements. *The PCRV assesses quality of the PCR as moderately unsatisfactory (3).*
82. **Lessons.** The PCR produced several lessons which were quite generic. Given that this was IFAD's first operation in Southern Sudan, and the unique contextual challenges the project faced with multiple conflicts and secession occurring midway through project implementation, the PCR missed the opportunity to generate valuable lessons learned which could have been used to inform future projects. Nevertheless, the project documented sound lessons learned from innovations, project management and the need to establish a functioning M&E system from onset. *On this basis the PCRV rates lessons as moderately satisfactory (4).*
83. **Candour.** The PCR provides both positive and negative results, however the assessment is not always supported by sufficient evidence and good data. *Candour is rated as moderately satisfactory (4).*

#### **V. Lessons learned**

84. **Balancing approaches in post-conflict development.** While the project provided a number of important services to increase agricultural production, the intervention failed to address a number of other services. Given the nature of agriculture as a business, in which the ability of farmers to enhance productivity is dependent on access to technologies, markets and services, their linkage with other actors in the value chains is essential and requires a multi-sectoral approach



supported by the project, whereby rural poor receive capacity building and organizational skills and have access to markets and services. While inclusive rural development approaches that promote community governance are relevant in the context of reconstruction and development, future investments will need to outline more clearly the approach to enhance productivity of farm and non-farm livelihood activities.

85. **Capacity needs assessment at the onset of implementation.** The limited skills in civil engineering coupled with inexperienced workers and a general lack of skilled personnel was one of the constraints faced by the Project, which, in addition, was not effectively supervised by IFAD. Future development interventions (projects) should conduct a needs assessment for capacity and skills at the start, so that gaps are identified and resolved through better recruitment and/or outsourcing of activities.
86. **Need for a functional M&E system.** Project management failed to set up a performing M&E system, and hence decision making lacked data and analyses. Future investments must take into account staffing and capacity needs with project-launch in the first year of implementation. In addition, long-term periodic technical assistance is required to develop an efficient participatory and results-based M&E system.

## Definition and rating of the evaluation criteria used by IOE

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Definition</i>	<i>Mandatory</i>	<i>To be rated</i>
<b>Rural poverty impact</b>	Impact is defined as the changes that have occurred or are expected to occur in the lives of the rural poor (whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended) as a result of development interventions.	X	Yes
	<i>Four impact domains</i>		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Household income and net assets: Household income provides a means of assessing the flow of economic benefits accruing to an individual or group, whereas assets relate to a stock of accumulated items of economic value. The analysis must include an assessment of trends in equality over time.</li> </ul>		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Human and social capital and empowerment: Human and social capital and empowerment include an assessment of the changes that have occurred in the empowerment of individuals, the quality of grass-roots organizations and institutions, the poor's individual and collective capacity, and in particular, the extent to which specific groups such as youth are included or excluded from the development process.</li> </ul>		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Food security and agricultural productivity: Changes in food security relate to availability, stability, affordability and access to food and stability of access, whereas changes in agricultural productivity are measured in terms of yields; nutrition relates to the nutritional value of food and child malnutrition.</li> </ul>		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Institutions and policies: The criterion relating to institutions and policies is designed to assess changes in the quality and performance of institutions, policies and the regulatory framework that influence the lives of the poor.</li> </ul>		No
<b>Project performance</b>	Project performance is an average of the ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.	X	Yes
Relevance	The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, institutional priorities and partner and donor policies. It also entails an assessment of project design and coherence in achieving its objectives. An assessment should also be made of whether objectives and design address inequality, for example, by assessing the relevance of targeting strategies adopted.	X	Yes
Effectiveness	The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.	X	Yes
Efficiency	A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results.	X	Yes
Sustainability of benefits	The likely continuation of net benefits from a development intervention beyond the phase of external funding support. It also includes an assessment of the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the project's life.	X	Yes
<b>Other performance criteria</b>			
Gender equality and women's empowerment	The extent to which IFAD interventions have contributed to better gender equality and women's empowerment, for example, in terms of women's access to and ownership of assets, resources and services; participation in decision making; work load balance and impact on women's incomes, nutrition and livelihoods.	X	Yes
Innovation	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have introduced innovative approaches to rural poverty reduction.	X	Yes
Scaling up	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have been (or are likely to be) scaled up by government authorities, donor organizations, the private sector and others agencies.	X	Yes
Environment and natural resources management	The extent to which IFAD development interventions contribute to resilient livelihoods and ecosystems. The focus is on the use and management of the natural environment, including natural resources defined as raw materials used for socio-economic and cultural purposes, and ecosystems and biodiversity - with the goods and services they provide.	X	Yes

Adaptation to climate change	The contribution of the project to reducing the negative impacts of climate change through dedicated adaptation or risk reduction measures	X	Yes
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\* These definitions build on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management; the Methodological Framework for Project Evaluation agreed with the Evaluation Committee in September 2003; the first edition of the Evaluation Manual discussed with the Evaluation Committee in December 2008; and further discussions with the Evaluation Committee in November 2010 on IOE's evaluation criteria and key questions.

## Rating comparison<sup>a</sup>

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Programme Management Department (PMD) rating</i>	<i>IOE Project Completion Report Validation (PCRVR) rating</i>	<i>Net rating disconnect (PCRVR-PMD)</i>
<i>Rural poverty impact</i>	3	3	0
<b>Project performance</b>			
Relevance	4	4	0
Effectiveness	3	3	0
Efficiency	3	3	0
Sustainability of benefits	3	3	0
<b>Project performance<sup>b</sup></b>	3.25	3.25	0
<b>Other performance criteria</b>			
Gender equality and women's empowerment	5	5	0
Innovation	4	4	0
Scaling up	3	3	0
Environment and natural resources management	4	4	0
Adaptation to climate change	4	4	0
<b>Overall project achievement<sup>c</sup></b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Performance of partners<sup>d</sup></b>			
IFAD	3	3	0
Government	3	3	0
<b>Average net disconnect</b>			<b>0</b>

<sup>a</sup> Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable.

<sup>b</sup> Arithmetic average of ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.

<sup>c</sup> This is not an average of ratings of individual evaluation criteria but an overarching assessment of the project, drawing upon the rating for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, rural poverty impact, gender, innovation and scaling up, environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change.

<sup>d</sup> The rating for partners' performance is not a component of the overall project achievement rating.

### Ratings of the project completion report quality

	<i>PMD rating</i>	<i>IOE PCRVR rating</i>	<i>Net disconnect</i>
Scope		3	
Quality (methods, data, participatory process)		3	
Lessons		4	
Candour		4	
Overall rating of the project completion report		3	

Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable.

## Impact level indicators for SSLDP

<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Unit</i>		<i>Realized level of change as % of baseline value</i>	<i>Variance from target</i>
Reduction in the prevalence of chronic malnutrition in children under 5 from 48% to 24% by project end.	%	Overall	72	+22
		Boys	63	+13
		Girls	83	+33
Rate of food deprivation or food insecurity is reduced by 50% by the end of the project	%	Overall	20	-30
		Male-headed households	19	-29
		Female-headed households	23	-27
Mean value of HH asset ownership index for six counties increase from SSP 1,007 to SSP 3,000 for 4,200 HHs by Project end.		Overall	2.6	
		Male-headed households	14	
		Female-headed households	-18	

## List of Acronyms

BDC	Boma Development Committee
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IOE	Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MTR	Mid-term Review
O&M	Operation and Maintenance
PCR	Project Completion Report
PCRV	Project Completion Report Validation
PMU	Project Management Unit
PSC	Project Steering Committee
RIMS	IFAD's Results and Impact Measurement System
SSLDP	South Sudan Livelihood Development Project
SSP	South Sudanese Pounds
WFP	World Food Programme

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