

Project Completion Report Validation

Rural Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise Support Programme (MUVI)

United Republic of Tanzania

Date of validation by IOE: January 2018

I. Basic project data

			Approval (US\$ m)		Actual (US\$ m)	
Region	East and Southern Africa	Total project costs	25.32		18.62	
Country	Tanzania	IFAD loan and percentage of total	Loan: 19.5 Grant: 0.45	77% 1.8%	Loan: 15.99 Grant: 0.11	85.9% 0.5%
Loan number	Loan No. 708-TZ Grant No. 896-TZ	Borrower	4.23	16.7%	1.259	6.8%
Type of project (subsector)	Rural enterprise	Cofinancier 1 Irish Aid	0.91	3.6%	1.043	5.6%
Financing type	Loan and Grant	Cofinancier 2				
Lending terms	HC	Cofinancier 3				
Date of approval	14 Dec 2006	Cofinancier 4				
Date of loan signature	22 Feb 2007	Beneficiaries	0.23	0.9%	0.222	1.2%
Date of effectiveness	12 Jul 2007	Other sources				
Loan amendments	One September 2014	Number of beneficiaries			Direct: 363 448 Indirect: 823 968	
Loan closure extensions	2 years					
Country programme managers	Francisco Pichon	Loan closing date	31 March 2015		31 March 2017	
Regional director(s)	Sana Jatta	Mid-term review			22 April 2011	
Project completion report reviewer	Joana Guerrin	IFAD loan disbursement at project completion (%)			Loan: 82% Grant: 24%	
Project completion report quality control panel	Ernst Schaltegger Fumiko Nakai	Date of the project completion report			31 March 2017	

Source: President's Report 2006, Project Completion Report (PCR) 2017.

* The loan portion of the IFAD financing was a special loan on highly concessional terms, free of interest but bearing a service charge of three fourths of one per cent (0.75%) per annum and having a maturity period of 40 years, including a grace period of 10 years.

II. Project outline

1. **Introduction.** The Rural Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise Support Programme (MUVI) aimed at improving skills, knowledge and access to markets of rural entrepreneurs to help increase household food security and cash incomes in poor areas of the United Republic of Tanzania, in particular through the structuration and development of value chains.
2. IFAD's board approved the project on 14 December 2006. The loan and grant agreements were signed on 22 February 2007 and became effective on 12 July 2007 for an initial period of seven years. However, the loan closing date was extended for two additional years and the programme was completed on 31 March 2017 instead of 31 March 2015.
3. **Country context.** Tanzania ranked 152nd out of 187 countries in the 2013 Human Development Index. The average life expectancy at birth increased to 59 years in 2012 from 50.6 years in 1990. The share of agriculture as a percentage of gross domestic product declined from 33 per cent in 2000 to 28 per cent in 2010, and it is expected to decline further to 18 per cent by 2025. Of the total land area, about 51 per cent is considered fit for agriculture, of which only 23 per cent is cultivated. Smallholder farmers grow about 85 per cent of the total cultivated land and agriculture provides livelihood to 75 per cent of its active workforce. The agricultural sector is characterized by low productivity, and value chains for food commodities are still underdeveloped compared to other countries in the sub-region (they exhibit low vertical integration, non-transparent price formation mechanisms, and high transportation costs).¹
4. **Programme area.** The MUVI programme area covered six of the 21 regions of the mainland (Iringa, Manyara, Mwanza, Pwani, Ruvuma and Tanga) selected on the basis of poverty and entrepreneurship potential.² At the time of project conception, three of the project regions were poorer than national average.³ Given the objectives of the project regarding value chains, the six targeted regions were selected because of their entrepreneurship development potential.⁴
5. **Project goal, objectives and components.** The project's goal was to increase household food sufficiency and cash incomes of the targeted population (in particular the rural poor, the women and the young) by developing their entrepreneurship capacities through skills/knowledge and access to market improvement. The programme developed three components: (i) communication in rural business; (ii) rural business support services; and (iii) institutional strengthening.
6. **Component 1 - communication in rural business** was designed to improve client awareness of market opportunities. Through media (radio and cell phones), the project aimed at supporting the rural poor who wished to engage in microenterprises and commerce. This component had the objective of enhancing capacities of the rural households, of implementing a communication strategy for rural businesses and of supporting networking among programme participants. The targets of component 1 were in particular the rural producers who were not eligible for component 2.
7. **Component 2 - rural business support services** was expected to deliver an improved value chain coordination and cohesion and strengthen the growth of rural

¹ Country Programme Evaluation Tanzania, IOE, 2015.

² In 2015, the Region Njombe split from Iringa to form an independent region, and PCR refers to seven Regions where MUVI was implemented (PCR 2017, p.6).

³ According to President's Report (2006), compared with the national average of poverty incidence for mainland Tanzania (36 per cent in 2006), Mwanza, Pwani and Ruvuma were poorer (respectively 43 per cent, 38 per cent and 37 per cent), while Manyara, Iringa and Tanga were less poor (respectively 31 per cent, 28 per cent and 26 per cent).

⁴ Assessed through the percentage of the rural population being already engaged in off-farm self-employed activity, with or without employees (4 per cent in 2006) compared to national average (3 per cent in 2006).

micro, small and medium enterprises (RMSMEs). In particular, component 2 had the objectives of: (i) prioritizing and consolidating value chains; (ii) improving access to information and markets; (iii) strengthening the capacity of market intermediaries; (iv) increasing the quantity and quality of value chain commodities; (v) improving access to value-addition technologies and shared resources; (vi) improving access to financial services; and (vii) establishing policies and advocating for effective value chain functioning.

8. **Component 3 - institutional strengthening** was expected to give public and private sectors the skills to support RMSMEs.
9. **Target groups.** The programme's target group was rural poor entrepreneurs, specifically: (i) rural microenterprises, which are mostly owned by economically active poor households including women and youths, as well as households with chronically ill, disabled and HIV/AIDS-affected members); (ii) smallholder farmers and fishers with the potential to produce and sell their produce to processors; and (iii) economically active, rural poor households with available workforces.
10. **Financing.** IFAD, the Government of Tanzania, the Irish Aid and the beneficiaries would finance the programme for an expected total amount of US\$25.32 million. Total project expenditure at closure was US\$18.53 million. Table 1 summarizes project costs by each financier. Table 2 shows the respective allocation of funds and expenditure of project components.

Table 1
Project costs

<i>Funding sources</i>	<i>Estimated amount (m USD)</i>	<i>Estimated amount (% of total)</i>	<i>Expenditure (m USD)</i>	<i>Expenditure (% of total)</i>	<i>Disbursement rate (%)</i>
IFAD	19.95	78.7	16.1	86.88	80.70
Government	4.23	16	1.259	6.8	29.76
Irish Aid	0.91	3.5	1.043	5.6	114.61
Beneficiaries	0.23	0.9	0.222	1.19	96.52
TOTAL	25.32		18.6		73.47

Source: President's Report 2006, PCR 2017.

Table 2
Component costs

<i>Components</i>	<i>Estimated amount (m USD)</i>	<i>Estimated amount (% of total)</i>	<i>Expenditure (m USD)</i>	<i>Expenditure (% of total)</i>	<i>Disbursement rate</i>
Communication in rural business	4.722	18.6	2.245	12.1	47.5
Rural business support services	13.524	53.4	10.136	54.7	74.9
Institutional strengthening	5.216	20.6	6.15	33.2	117.9
Other Costs*	1.854	7.3			
TOTAL	25.32		18.533		73.47

Source: Appraisal Report 2006 (estimation), PCR 2017 (effective).

*Physical and price contingencies.

11. **Project implementation.** The project was initially planned to span seven years (2007-2014) but was granted a two-year no-cost extension to address slow inception and implementation challenges, justified by the novelty of a value chain development concept in the area and the difficulties encountered by the

implementing agency to manage contracts of service providers. MUVI was then restructured, some activities were scaled-down (component 1) and others were reprioritized (component 2).

12. **Intervention logic.** The project had the aim of integrating rural poor with entrepreneurship potential into agricultural value chains to improve their access to secure markets and to raise their income. This logic fitted within a broader aim of transforming an agricultural-based economy into an export market-led economy that builds on competitive rural industries. This was consistent with the choice of MUVI to turn to the Ministry of Industry instead of the Ministry of Agriculture to implement the programme.
13. MUVI's intervention logic is based on the consideration of farmers as rural entrepreneurs. As such, farmers must be aware of prices and market information to be able to sell their surplus production at the best price. By structuring producers into formal groups and training them, MUVI would strengthen the capacities of farmers to negotiate with private sectors. The structuring of value chains would enable coordination between farmers and the private sector (i.e. inputs suppliers, processors) and administration, to get their interests represented during policy-making.
14. MUVI draws on the importance of communication for potential entrepreneurs to be known and to know market opportunities. The programme considered RMSMEs not as targets but as instruments to reach the targeted groups, the rural poor entrepreneurs. MUVI was mainly directed towards specific commodity value chain participants that fulfil a set of criteria based on market opportunities and potentially impact large numbers of the rural poor (component 2). However, the participants that did not fit into this category could benefit from communication support (component 1). MUVI started to work with existing producer groups, and new groups were created along the years. MUVI also aimed at providing capacity development to local institutions (component 3) in order to support value chain development, such as the Small industries Development Organization (SIDO), a parastatal organization of decentralized offices at the regional level of the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment (MITI).
15. **Delivery of outputs.** This section indicates the delivery of major outputs of the project per component based on the logical framework and project completion report (PCR) data. The details of the output delivery can be found in Annex III.⁵
16. **Component 1 - communication in rural business.** The programme developed a communication strategy aimed at enabling the programme branding and awareness raising, strengthening the capacity of radio partners, enabling market information distribution and establishing regional communication centres. The MUVI programme consistently increased the number of rural adults and of farmers accessing information through radio programmes but also through communication interactive boards (by more than 100 per cent of the targets). However, the information through SMS was not developed in practice. The project produced and distributed printed material, developed 700 radio broadcasts (out of the 1,152 planned), established 323 communication committees and distributed as much of interactive boards. Agricultural information magazines were produced (nine out of 12 planned). MUVI also provided infrastructures and equipment to eight radio stations (100 per cent of the target), ensured that they were running agricultural programme, secured two sponsors for a radio programme (out of 10 sponsored planned), trained a 40-person staff from the eight radio stations, supported six regional information centres, organised two training sessions for 35 persons from SIDO and the regional offices (100 per cent of the targets). To improve communication among programme participants, the programme produced a

⁵ Only the outputs indicators are displayed in Annex III, not the indicators linked to the impacts of the programme. The data come from the PCR logframe.

knowledge management strategy document, organized learning events at national (seven) and regional scales (two) each year, produced one commodity audio-visual documentary, organised a lesson-learning workshop each year, and organized 10 study visits to exchange experiences. Furthermore, a website of the project was developed and is regularly updated.

17. **Component 2 - rural business support services.** Under this component, 15,580 RMSMEs provided services to value chains (89 per cent of the target), and 15,212 were trained in improved business techniques (111 per cent of the target). Furthermore, 764 farmers groups reached financial and operational sustainability, and 45 per cent of the formal associations were registered. To prioritize value chains, six value chain implementing partners (VCIPs) were contracted and six value chain development plans were approved by stakeholders. The component enabled a 25 per cent increase in the membership of producer and trader organisations and an 18 per cent increase in volume of commodities marketed by producer groups or trader organizations, and 400 processors were supported. To increase agricultural production, farmers were trained in good agricultural practices (35 per cent of the target) and in farming as a business (31 per cent of the target). A total of 139 demonstration plots were established (out of 171 planned). To increase access to markets, supply contracts were secured between producers and RMSMEs (38 instead of the 22 planned), but only 5 per cent of farmers participated in the brokered relationships with RMSMEs (out of 25 per cent planned). Only five marketing infrastructures were established out of 16 planned, but a total of 43,232 tons of products handled through the established infrastructures (out of 7,333 tons planned). Regarding the target of increasing access to inputs, half of the farmers improved their seeds (54 per cent of the target), and 48,216 tons of inputs were sold to farmers (out of 206,827 tons planned). Farmers had access to the inputs required in 96 per cent of the wards. To improve access to financial services, MUVI enabled the support of value chains by three banks and 25 Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs) and 1,213 loans were advanced to RMSMEs for a total value of Tanzanian Shilling (TZS) 615 million, representing 100 per cent of the target in terms of number of loans but only 70 per cent in terms of loan value. To improve value chain coordination, 23 platforms agendas were approved by stakeholders and 25 were established, but only 11 were functioning, despite a total of 148 platform meetings that were organized. Regarding the policy agendas, 19 were approved by stakeholders (out of 40 planned), but seven policy interventions were implemented (instead of the three planned).
18. **Component 3 - institutional strengthening.** The programme contracted with five VCIPs and one Media Implementing Partners (MIP), but in view of the poor performance of the MIP and livestock VCIP in Manyara, only four contracts were renewed in year 3 (out of a target of seven implementing partners renewed in year 3) and SIDO took over the role of VCIP in Manyara. The programme provided administrative support to seven partners. To strengthen the capacity of MITI, the programme trained 21 ministry staff members on technical issues and five members on small and medium enterprise development. A total of 16 MUVI national steering committees were held out of 36 planned. Even though MUVI had planned to prepare an implementation strategy for small and medium enterprises (SME) policy, it was not developed by the programme. To increase SIDO capacity, 62 person-courses were organized on specific technical issues (out of a target of 44 person-courses), six SIDO staff members received specialized SME training (out of four planned), half of the working time of three SIDO staff members was allocated to the programme support as planned in the first seven years of the programme, and the Project Coordinator was assigned full time during the last two years (extension period). Twenty-four people were trained in international procurement, tendering and contract management as planned. To strengthen regional and district administration capacity, MUVI organized 12 awareness-building training courses for regional staff members (as planned) and 14 for district staff members

(out of 36 planned), to which 19 district staff members attended (18 planned). Furthermore, the programme organized four study tours for district-level persons out of 36 planned. To strengthen private sector service providers' capacity, the programme organized 105 person-courses for the private sector (instead of the 60 planned). To organize coordination of Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E), no consultant was contracted, but one independent review was conducted, and the SIDO M&E system was upgraded and is operational.

III. Review of findings

19. Findings below are based mainly on the PCR, which was triangulated against other documentation, including the project design document, mid-term review, supervision reports as well as the results-based country strategic opportunities programme (COSOP). Exchanges were held with the current IFAD country programme officer and the country director to obtain clarification on certain issues.

A. Core criteria

Relevance

20. MUVI's objectives were consistent with those of IFAD and the government. The 2003 COSOP highlighted the need to assist the country in undertaking additional policy and regulatory reforms in critical areas of rural growth (e.g., rural finance, agricultural taxation and natural resources) to further liberalize the economy and ensure competitiveness, production incentives for producers and improved productivity. In 2005, the government of Tanzania adopted the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP). The first cluster of the NSGRP is based on growth and reduction of poverty, to be achieved through scaling up investments towards modernizing small-, medium- and large-scale agricultural enterprises; promoting off-farm activities including small- and medium-size enterprises with emphasis on agro-processing; and promoting more sustainable use of natural resources for the benefit of poor communities. MUVI sought to turn agriculture production into rural enterprises. The first cluster of NSGRP also highlighted the need to achieve an equitable growth and to promote sustainable use of natural resources, which was not the main focus of MUVI. However, MUVI did target specifically the rural poor entrepreneurs and produced an environmental toolkit to sensitize districts regarding public and private sector investments that could have environmental impacts and the need to put in place adequate mitigation measures. MUVI is also in line with the country's 2003 Small and Medium Enterprise Policy that underlines the role of SMEs in employment creation, income generation and more equitable distribution of growth. The SME policy indicates that "SIDO remains the main government arm for promoting SMEs in the country" (p.10).
21. MUVI's design was mainly consistent with its objectives in terms of targeting the poor regions with entrepreneurship potential and placing the responsibility of the programme under the MITI.
22. However, the programme made four assumptions that did not fully materialize and were highlighted by the PCR. The first such assumption related to the availability of financial services and products. At design stage, the programme did not provide a line of credit to deal with financial services' needs. However, a weak access to finance was a bottleneck that limited the programme's impact on target groups. For example, regarding sesame and citrus value chains, the lack of capital caused the producers to sell their harvest at low prices. Secondly, the design assumed the targets group had already reached a level of productivity with surplus produce to be marketed. In reality, at the beginning of the project, farmers were experiencing very low yields. Therefore, the programme had to develop strategies to intervene in the value chains upstream and promote good agricultural practices, and facilitate access to seeds and agricultural material. The programme design mainly focused on value chain structuration, market information and communication, with little

attention to agricultural development. Third, the implementing agency, SIDO, was not conversant with the agricultural value chain, and was more accustomed to working with entrepreneurs working in major regional cities. Therefore, their limited experience led to difficulties when it came to managing the contracts of VCIPs. Lastly, the programme design did not fully define the roles of the broker, and the brokerage function was finally put under the responsibility of the VCIPs. However, after the first half of the project some VCIP encountered performance issues and SIDO took over the implementation of some additional activities.⁶ These changes were made to address implementation delays linked to VCIP contracting issues.

23. Despite those failing assumptions, MUVI adapted the design to meet the challenges faced by the programme. For example, Business Development Service providers were used for the brokerage function and thus became VCIPs. This gave SIDO more responsibilities since the performance of some partners was poor. Moreover, the upstream of the value chain structuration was developed by promoting good agricultural practices, and additional value chains not identified at the design stage (i.e., sunflower but also maize, paddy, beans, sesame and sorghum) also were included, based on market demand and production capacity. Finally, given slow implementation in initial years and low disbursement level of IFAD's funds close to the original completion date but at the same time the potential for improved implementation performance observed in later years a two-year loan extension was granted.
24. Given the four assumptions made by the project that did not fully materialize which had an impact on effectiveness, the Project Completion Report Validation (PCRVR) rates relevance as *moderately satisfactory* (4), despite the rating of satisfactory (5) by the IFAD's Programme Management Department (PMD).

Effectiveness

25. MUVI's programme implementation suffered extensive delays.⁷ Furthermore, the effectiveness has been uneven. Component 1 was scaled-down during the two-year extension and suffered budget restrictions, which explains why some of the targets were not fully achieved. Component 2 took a long time to take off, but it recorded significant achievements in the value chains that were prioritized during the two-year extension. The effectiveness assessment below draws from the detailed outputs (Annex III) as well as outcomes discussed in PCR and supervision reports.
26. **Component 1 - communication in rural business.** The detailed outputs of component 1 show a high level of achievement, close to 100 per cent or higher for the majority of targets set in the log frame (see Annex III). However, some targets were not fully reached, such as: (i) three radio stations were self-financed at the end of the project against a target of six; (ii) the aim of enabling rural dwellers to access to information by SMS was abandoned, and no SMS service provider was contracted despite the aim of MUVI to develop such media;⁸ (iii) fewer radio broadcasts were produced than planned (60 per cent of achievement), and only two radio sponsors were secured instead of 10 planned; (iv) nine agricultural magazines were produced out of 12 planned; and (v) half of the planned training sessions that targeted SIDO and regional officers were realized.
27. Furthermore, the quality of some outputs was questionable. A knowledge management strategy was produced but according to PCR, this issue had not been

⁶ SIDO took over the activities of the MIP (component 1), the activities of the livestock VCIP and sunflower value chain in Manyara region. During the extension period, SIDO kept on implementing the livestock value chain and took in charge the sunflower value chain in all regions.

⁷ Close to the end of the implementation period (2014), the programme did have disbursed only 64 per cent of IFAD's loan and grant.

⁸ Based on the government newly introduced policy, SIDO was required to link SIDO Web Portal with government portal/server instead of using SIDO server as earlier planned. This delayed the process and the activities could not be finished during programme life time.

taken seriously by the MIP and was developed at the end of the project (after 2013) by SIDO. The strategy was operational but late (2016) and was missing key elements (roles, responsibilities, methodologies, and definitions). The print media was developed and targets were achieved, but PCR mission members were dubious on its real effect among users. A total of 323 communication centres were developed and interactive boards were installed in each village (100 per cent of target), but the actual content was not ascertained since brokers could influence the process and post price information that was not favourable to farmers. The radio was the media that was most developed by MUVI, but it remained unclear what kind of impact it had on farmers. Later, eight radio stations were running agricultural programmes, but only one was continuing to run them in 2017.

28. **Component 2 - rural business support services.** The level of achievements under this component was dependent on region, value chain and the performance of VCIPs.
29. **Capacity of market intermediaries.** Effectiveness regarding producer organisations was irregular. Half of the planned increase in farmers group memberships was reached (25 per cent instead of 50 per cent); only 46 per cent of the intended farmer groups were financially and operationally sustainable (764 instead of 1,633), and 45 per cent of the formal associations were registered instead of the 80 per cent target. Less than half of the targeted processors were linked to service providers such as repairs and maintenance technicians but 15,212 RMSMEs were trained to acquire improved business skills (110 per cent of initial target). MUVI achieved 72 per cent of its target regarding the increase in volume of commodities marketed by producer groups and trader organisations.
30. **Agricultural production.** Regarding the training, 35 per cent of the target was reached in terms of number of farmers trained in good agricultural practices, and 31 per cent regarding training in farming as business. However, VCIPs included in their training the agricultural extension officers at ward and district level with the objective to form a sound basis for Training of Trainees. Eighty-one per cent of the target was reached in terms of demonstration plots established.
31. **Access to inputs** was low in terms of effectiveness (half of the targeted farmers were able to meet their improved seed requirements, 23 per cent of the intended quantity of inputs was sold to farmers, and 37 per cent of the targeted new smallholder purchasers of inputs was achieved).
32. **Access to markets.** 172 per cent of the intended supply contracts were secured between producers and RMSMEs, and the achievement for tons of products handled through established infrastructures was much higher than expected (589 per cent). However, only 5 per cent of farmers were participating in brokered relationships with RMSMEs instead of the 25 per cent intended, and five marketing infrastructures were established and operational instead of 16.
33. **Access to finance.** Regarding access to financial services, effectiveness was rather high for quantitative targets since 100 per cent of targeted banks and MFIs supported value chains and 70 per cent of the intended value of loans was advanced to RMSMEs. However, according to the PCR, access to financial services was a bottleneck for many value chains, which means that the target figures were too low or the selected indicators were inadequate to assess improved access to finance.
34. **Value chain coordination.** 71 per cent of the target was reached in terms of the platform agenda approved by stakeholders, and at least one value chain platform was established in each district and region, but according to the PCR only 11 were functioning well.⁹ Nevertheless, a total of 148 platform meetings were organised

⁹ 25 platforms were established out of 36 planned. However, the project was implemented in seven regions and 23 districts, and the number of targeted platforms could have been reduced. According to the IFAD country programme

instead of 126. Regarding policy interventions, seven were implemented (out of three intended) but only 47 per cent of the targeted policy agendas were approved by stakeholders. An average 3 per cent of District Agricultural Development budgets were committed to support the development of value chains, against an initial target of 5 per cent (60 per cent achievement). However, this must be put in perspective with the State budget restrictions occurring in Tanzania.

35. MUVI outcomes on a number of value chains are noted. **Citrus value** chain was structured through a chain coordination platform that gathered 10 associations (307 growers) selling collectively 16 million oranges (224 per cent increase in the volume of citrus collective sales) through improved pricing mechanisms; a Fruit Task Force was initiated to develop fruit fly control, coordinated by district agricultural authorities that led to an average yield increase of 600 fruits per tree; 10 private nurseries were established. Regarding **beans** value chain, the 14 Producer Market Group (PMG) supported by MUVI organized collective marketing and average yield increase by 900 kg/acre due to trainings and access to improved seeds. Regarding **tomato** value chain, MUVI enabled the creation of a producers' association that reached 3,300 members able to engage collectively with buyers, suppliers, and financial institutions; farmers using irrigation equipment increased from 1 tomato grower to 174; tomato yield increased threefold. Two strategies were intended to develop processing (dried tomatoes and tomato sauce) but none of them bore significant results. Regarding **sesame** value chain, 90 PMGs were strengthened and 13 sesame grower associations established and linked to sesame buyers; a 15 per cent price increase was reported in 2015; improved varieties were adopted thanks to Good Agronomic Practices (GAP) training and Quality Declared Seeds (QDS) production. Regarding **cassava**, MUVI changed its perception among farmers from a staple food commodity to a valuable cash crop, the price of cassava flour raising from TZS 600/kg to TZS 1,500/kg; cassava surface increased by 25 per cent and its production raised by 40 per cent; High Quality Cassava Flour processing techniques were developed and access to market supported. Regarding **livestock**, good husbandry practices were hardly adopted by farmers, but MUVI enabled the construction of a large charcoal dam and the rehabilitation of two market centres (however late in the implementation process); MUVI developed leather processing but limited to a small number of beneficiaries. MUVI developed the **sunflower value chain**, through processors development, trained 23,000 producers through GAP and enabled access to improved seeds.
36. **Component 3 - institutional strengthening.** Most of the targets were fully achieved in terms of training sessions for MITI and SIDO staff members, towards regional administration members and towards private sector service providers.
37. However, trainings for district members were fewer (38 per cent of training courses targeted and 11 per cent of study tours planned were actually realized) and other targets could not be achieved such as the support to develop an implementation strategy for SME policy; the M&E consultants who were supposed to be contracted and operational were not hired, but SIDO M&E was upgraded and operational.
38. **Effectiveness - summary.** There were good achievements under components 1 and 3, but the performance of component 2 on value chains varied and the most progress was made late in the implementation process. Therefore, the PCRV rates effectiveness as *moderately satisfactory* (4) one point lower than the PMD rating of satisfactory (5).

manager, each district with a priority value chain had its related value chain platform, and these priority value chain platforms were functioning well in most cases (sesame, citrus, beans, tomatoes, cassava and sunflower).

Efficiency

39. In nine years' time, the programme spent US\$18.6 million, representing a total disbursement rate of 73 per cent. However, the disbursement rates were very low during the first years of the project implementation. In year 7 when the programme was originally scheduled to be completed, the programme had spent only 53 per cent of the intended total project costs. These low disbursement rates are explained by the implementation difficulties (see effectiveness).
40. The actual expenditures for components 1 and 2 were notably below the estimated amount (47.5 per cent and 74.0 per cent, respectively), but that for component 3 was 117.9 per cent.
41. In terms of project costs by category, the majority of the costs represented contracts for service providers (62 per cent, executed at 95 per cent). Other major costs represented training and workshops (16 per cent, executed at 42 per cent) and technical assistance (13 per cent, executed at 83 per cent).
42. Regarding financiers, IFAD's loan was disbursed at 82 per cent, IFAD's grant at 49 per cent, Irish grant at 115 per cent and beneficiaries' contribution at 100 per cent. However, the government's in-kind and cash contributions were low (15 per cent and 19 per cent, respectively), explained by budget deficit. In-kind contribution through tax exemption was also very low since substantial procurements could not take place before the project completion and were thus cancelled.
43. The internal rate of return was not calculated at the appraisal, at the mid-term review, or at the PCR stage. Instead, PCR conducted a cost-per-beneficiary analysis based on the total investments made in component 2 for each of MUVI's regions. This analysis presented very different figures, ranging from US\$6/beneficiary for livestock and sunflower value chains in the Manyara Region to US\$68/beneficiary for sesame, cassava and fruits value chains in the Pwani Region, depending on value chains and type of service provision. Regarding the 11 value chains, the average cost per beneficiary for component 2 is estimated at US\$28 per beneficiary. The IFAD loan cost per beneficiary was estimated at US\$53 per beneficiary. At project completion, this amount dropped to US\$44 per beneficiary.¹⁰
44. Project management costs represented 3.7 per cent of the total project costs if the budget is defined as "operational expenses". However, the Country Programme Evaluation (CPE) pointed out that there were also "transaction costs" of supporting the beneficiaries and delivery capacity-building support, i.e. overhead cost and administration costs included in the contracts with service providers under component 2, as well as capacity development of the "managers and suppliers" under component 3. The CPE estimated that in total such "transaction costs" could be above 20 per cent.
45. The programme experienced slow implementation and low disbursements during the first seven years of implementation, which led to time overrun with two-year extension. The realization of programme benefits came late. The cost per beneficiary was reasonable but management and administrative costs were on the high side. The PCR rates efficiency as *moderately unsatisfactory* (3) despite PMD rating of 4.

Rural poverty impact

46. The assessment of programme impact is informed by the PCR and the impact assessment study conducted in 2017.¹¹ The PCR draws from the data provided by VCIPs, interviews with beneficiaries and local government authorities (LGAs), and data estimated at the outcome stage.

¹⁰ The number of beneficiaries at project design stage was not estimated. To calculate these figures, we used the number of direct beneficiaries at project completion (363,448).

¹¹ However, the impact assessment study is mainly qualitative, and is rather assessing the outcome of the programme rather than its impacts.

47. **Household income and assets.** According to PCR, three-quarters of the beneficiaries interviewed declared an improvement in their housing conditions and assets linked to the programme, as well as a higher level of education that was provided to their children, thanks to their ability to pay school fees for boys and girls. Additional income also was used to buy farmland and develop businesses such as trade of groceries or transportation, thanks to motorbikes.
48. The data provided in the log frame, based on the Tanzania household budget survey in 2011, show that the proportion of households under the poverty line decreased from 39 per cent before the programme to 28 per cent. However, at this time (2011) there was still little programme implementation progress, and such change in the poverty level would have been hardly linked to the programme. Before the project's implementation, agricultural Gross Domestic Product growth was estimated at 5 per cent and reached 7.2 per cent in 2016. Finally, according to the PCR, 13,757 jobs were created. However, no information was provided about the methodologies used for those estimations, which make them difficult to link directly to the programme's impact. The CPE also questioned the basis and the quality of data on the number of jobs created.¹²
49. **Agricultural productivity and food security.** MUVI's focus was on value chain structuration rather than improving agricultural productivity. However, MUVI did have an impact on agricultural productivity, especially through training. The impact on the farmers' production varied from a two- to a fourfold increase.¹³ According to PCR interviews, household income was used by some beneficiaries to buy additional farming land and to expand agricultural production. Staple crops recommended by the programme had an impact on food security through the extra yields that were obtained, and the additional income was used to buy extra food for the households. Key impacts at local level were reported in terms of the number of meals (25 per cent increase in the number of farmers having three meals a day in Pwani between 2010 and 2016), in the percentage of food insecurity (7.5 per cent decrease in Iringa between 2010 and 2014) and in the increased quality and diversity of meals (e.g., through the consumption of sunflower oil and cassava by-products). According to PCR, the level of food poverty reduced from 33.3 per cent in 2007 to 9.7 per cent in 2012,¹⁴ 62,929 producers reported an increase in production (89 per cent) and 65,929 producers adopted recommended technologies (92 per cent).¹⁵
50. **Human and social capital, empowerment.** The programme facilitated the creation and capacity strengthening of farmer groups that are particularly strong in the sesame, tomato, citrus, sunflower and beans value chains. Farmers were trained to calculate the costs of their products so they could be better equipped to negotiate prices, and to calculate their potential returns on investment, thanks to the projected income statement calculation. Rural entrepreneurs also were trained to run businesses. This was intended to empower farmers by giving them more clues to sell their production. Sunflower processors in all regions quote a significant increase in their self-confidence gained through their exposition to various regional and national trade fairs. However, the livestock value chain did not have similar impacts.
51. **Institutions and policies.** The number of producer groups increased significantly during MUVI, and their capacities (bargaining power, saving) have strengthened,

¹² The CPE commented that jobs creation reported by the project could not be observed on the ground and that income improvements were coming from the support to the district agricultural extension staff that was working with the farmers to improve production, and not from the link between the PMGs and the value chains (CPE, p.36).

¹³ For citrus trees the increase was even higher since the reported average yield increase is estimated at 600 fruits per tree, tomato yields increased threefold, sesame twofold, etc.

¹⁴ However, no information is given regarding the methodology to obtain such data.

¹⁵ According to the IFAD country programme manager, data on agricultural productivity and food security have been recorded and documented each year in SIDO and VCIP reports, and steadily confirmed during PCR interviews with both beneficiaries and district extension staff.

as well as their formalization. Local government authorities (LGAs), regional and national staff authority capacities also were developed to deal with SMEs matters, which resulted in improvement of the services delivered during and beyond programme's life, according to PCR. Furthermore, some local policies were implemented to the benefit of farmers in value chains, such as the interdiction to sell citrus at the flowering stage, the use of weigh scales (i.e., regarding beans and cassava) and the affordability of standards of Tanzania Bureau of Standards and Tanzania Food and Drug Authority for sesame. Through value chain platforms meetings MUVI lobbied intensively to the local and regional authorities for the enforcement of these rules and procedures that have a direct impact on beneficiaries. A total of 51,920 MUVI stakeholders (against the target of 64,283) considered policy and regulatory framework as favourable (80 per cent achievement).

52. **Rural poverty impact – summary.** Data is missing to enable quantifying the impacts of MUVI project and this section drew on results provided at the outcome level. However, these data indicate that MUVI is likely to have had positive impacts on project's beneficiaries. The beneficiaries declared an improvement in their assets and household income and the project participated to jobs creation. The impact on agricultural production varied from a two- to a fourfold increase in yields. Capacity of beneficiaries increased through trainings of farmers' groups. Rules were implemented to the benefit of farmers in value chains. The PCR rates rural poverty impact as *satisfactory* (5), in accordance with PMD rating (5).

Sustainability of benefits

53. The potential for sustainability of benefits is enabled by the trainings provided to beneficiaries and public and private actors at multiple levels. Involvement of LGAs favours the sustainability of the local innovations developed (see below). Moreover, the strengthening capacity of producer associations to enlarge their memberships and negotiate with private actors also favours the potential for sustainable benefits of the MUVI programme. In particular, the link between PMGs and MFIs or Saving and Credit Cooperative Society favours the sustainability of these organisations.
54. However, CPE highlights the threat to sustainability of benefits from MUVI, because of the limited resources and weak representation of the implementing agency at field level and the outsourcing to external service providers of implementation activities, as service providers could not be expected to continue their support after the termination of their contract at the end of the programme.¹⁶ Nevertheless, during MUVI extension period, SIDO capacity was enhanced to support value chain development in their respective districts. At the same time, some elements in the implementation difficulties represent a threat regarding sustainability (such as the difficulties to find sponsorship for the community radio, the limited number of farmer groups that are financially sustainable and registered and the limited number of farmers participating in brokered relationships with RMSMEs, etc.).
55. PCR rates sustainability as *moderately satisfactory* (4), despite a PMD rating of satisfactory (5).

B. Other performance criteria

Innovation and scaling up

56. **Innovation.** MUVI introduced several innovations such as the QDS that enabled farmers to improve the quality and the origin of seeds regarding sunflower and sesame, GAP training through demonstrations plots at school levels, the use of youths brigades for fruit fly management, the manufacturing briquette (see below), the introduction of new tomato solar drying technologies that help minimize post-harvest losses (despite low market performance of dried tomatoes), farmers to link directly to input suppliers (an innovation according to PCR).

¹⁶ CPE Republic of Tanzania, IOE, 2015.

57. **Scaling up.** The programme did not develop a specific approach for scaling up its innovations at design stage. However, MUVI implementation partners as well as SIDO Regional Offices engaged and built capacities of LGAs, developed collaboration with other development partners, and formalized supply contracts with key off-takers.¹⁷ Some of the innovations have been developed by LGAs such as QDS production or fruit fly control (incorporated in the regional consultative committee meeting agenda and which SIDO seeks to develop at a national scale). Furthermore, some private actors have taken over the development of MUVI's activities (i.e. building tomato processing factories). Finally, the Chamber of Commerce of Tanzania (Manyara Region) has already taken over the sunflower value chain development.
58. The PCRV rates both innovation and scaling up as *satisfactory* (5) in accordance with PMD rating.

Gender equality and women's empowerment

59. MUVI's design emphasized that one of the factors to consider in the selection of value chains should be the number of potential jobs that may be created for youth and women. The share of women beneficiaries in components 1 and 2 reached 45 and 44 per cent, respectively. Women were active members of PMGs but were also chairs, secretaries and treasurers. They played a particular role in some of the small-scale processing activities (such as cassava by-products, tomato sauces/wine and leather groups). However, few specific measures were implemented by the programme towards gender equality. Furthermore, some value chains remained with limited female participation such as paddy, maize, citrus, beans, sesame and sunflower. PCRV rates gender equality as *moderately satisfactory* (4) in accordance with PMD.

Environment and natural resources management

60. MUVI developed a toolkit specifically designed for SIDO to undertake environmental impact assessments to improve its environmental understanding and capacity and to undertake its own assessment of each operation in order to identify the possible risks and necessary mitigation measures. However, the PCR makes no mention on the performance and actual use of such toolkit. Besides this toolkit, MUVI had few specific measures towards improving the environment or natural resources management, except for training in good agricultural practices. In Iringa, MUVI tried to curb the use of pesticides in tomato farming, but no impact of these measures was assessed. In Tanga, GAPs have contributed to preventing soil erosion through slope cultivation of beans. Also, the programme enabled the production of manufacturing briquettes made from sunflower and paddy residues to produce energy.
61. However, some programme activities had an adverse environmental impact since in two Regions (Ruvuma and Pwani), sunflower and sesame cultivations led to an increased demand for land and had a deforestation effect. Moreover, in Iringa, the use of pesticides and fertilizer (tomato) has resulted in an increase in reactive nitrogen.
62. Therefore, the PCRV rates environmental and natural resources management as *moderately unsatisfactory* (3) despite PMD rating of 4.

Adaptation to climate change

63. MUVI's programme did not include activities specifically dedicated to climate change adaptation. However, GAP trainings must have developed the awareness of beneficiaries regarding the methods of farming under circumstances of resource scarcity, such as water. The programme developed a collective method to fight

¹⁷ These details were shared by PMD.

fruit flies (fruit fly task force), thus limiting the impact of pests, and some PMGs have bought irrigation pumps to secure water provisions.

64. The PCR rates adaptation to climate change as *moderately satisfactory* (4) in accordance with PMD.

C. Overall project achievement

65. The relevance of MUVI's programme was satisfactory in terms of general objectives, but it was based on some assumptions that did not fully materialize and therefore have brought challenges to effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. The programme realized major achievements, but it also had significant implementation delays, which impacted effectiveness and sustainability. MUVI's efficiency was difficult to assess, but the programme experienced very low disbursement rates during the first seven years of implementation. MUVI's programme was likely to have had a positive impact on beneficiaries and this was acknowledged by the interviews conducted by the PCR team, although the impact assessment was mainly built on outcome level. Sustainability is favoured by the trainings and capacity-strengthening activities realized by the project, but it was impeded by the late timing of activity implementation and by project management issues. MUVI's innovations and scaling up potential are interesting and should be developed for further programmes. MUVI could have developed more explicit gender-oriented activities. Regarding environmental management and climate change adaptation, the programme did not tackle these themes but did have some interesting outputs. The overall achievement of MUVI's programme is rated as *moderately satisfactory* (4), despite a PMD rating of satisfactory.

D. Performance of partners

66. **IFAD.** Supervision missions were undertaken every year between 2007 and 2016, with the exception of 2010.¹⁸ In the first half of the programme, IFAD performance was weak in terms of light guidance combined with a high turnover of country programme managers (three in six years). However, during the extension period, the choices of scaled-down and prioritized activities over others enabled the organisation to improve the disbursement rate and the effectiveness during the two last years of the programme. Therefore, the PCR rates the performance of IFAD as *moderately satisfactory* (4), in line with PMD rating (4).
67. **Government.** MITI supported the programme implementation through the National Steering Committee meetings and through periodic M&E visits to the programme areas. However, according to the PCR, MITI could have provided more guidance on the implementation of MUVI's activities. MITI through SIDO ensured compliance with the recommendations of the supervision's missions. However, SIDO management of M&E was weak during the whole programme's lifespan. Moreover, SIDO experienced difficulties with the management of contracts of service providers (i.e. inadequate terms of reference), technical project management issues (i.e. coordination methods to replenish MUVI's bank account), accounting issues and weak control towards service providers regarding the justification of their expenses. Finally, the Government of Tanzania's counterpart funding was only 29 per cent of the planned amount. Several supervision missions stated that the government counterpart funded was urgently needed for the continuity of the programme. Therefore, the PCR rates the performance of Government as *moderately unsatisfactory* (3), despite a PMD rating of 4.

IV. Assessment of PCR quality

68. **Scope.** The PCR includes relevant information for an evaluation. All standard criteria were discussed adequately. Some data were missing regarding efficiency (i.e. internal rate of return). The scope of the PCR is rated as *satisfactory* (5).

¹⁸ PCR, Annex 5.

69. **Quality.** The PCR entails discrepancies between the text and the quantitative targets (explained by a version of the log frame not updated). The sources of data used are not always provided and did not always mention the methodologies of the surveys used. Moreover, the quality of data provided by the project were questioned by the CPE. The PCR advances conclusions, especially on impacts, that lack tangible evidence. The quality of the PCR is rated as *moderately satisfactory (4)*.
70. **Lessons.** Lessons documented in the PCR are numerous, and are in majority drawn from project implementation and little from the reflection on project design. Lessons are not always based on clear analysis and evidence.¹⁹ Key lessons learnt are summarized in the next section. The lessons of the PCR are rated as *moderately satisfactory (4)*.
71. **Candour.** The PCR reports positive and negative results, but sometimes the narrative lacks neutrality, i.e., regarding scaling up potential of the programme. Moreover, the ratings seem often too high compared to the narrative. The candour of the PCR is rated as *moderately satisfactory (4)*.

V. Lessons learned

72. The experience of MUVI programme suggests that value chain development is key to increasing farmers' incomes. However, future value-chain development programmes should not underestimate the need for agricultural productivity activities since marketing and processing are not a priority for farmers with weak yields.
73. Value chain development activities can have adverse environmental effects. Future value chain development programmes should address issues of environmental management as key techniques of agricultural productivity development.
74. Financial issues can represent bottlenecks for rural entrepreneurs to develop their business. As such, future value chain development programmes should include a line of credit to enable access of farmers to financial capital instead of counting on the interest of MFIs.

¹⁹ For example, the PCR questions the impact of radio (§8) but proposes as a lesson learned that radio communication is very effective (§192).

Definition and rating of the evaluation criteria used by IOE

Criteria	Definition *	Mandatory	To be rated
Rural poverty impact	Impact is defined as the changes that have occurred or are expected to occur in the lives of the rural poor (whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended) as a result of development interventions.	X	Yes
	<i>Four impact domains</i>		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Household income and net assets: Household income provides a means of assessing the flow of economic benefits accruing to an individual or group, whereas assets relate to a stock of accumulated items of economic value. The analysis must include an assessment of trends in equality over time. 		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Human and social capital and empowerment: Human and social capital and empowerment include an assessment of the changes that have occurred in the empowerment of individuals, the quality of grass-roots organizations and institutions, the poor's individual and collective capacity, and in particular, the extent to which specific groups such as youth are included or excluded from the development process. 		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Food security and agricultural productivity: Changes in food security relate to availability, stability, affordability and access to food and stability of access, whereas changes in agricultural productivity are measured in terms of yields; nutrition relates to the nutritional value of food and child malnutrition. 		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Institutions and policies: The criterion relating to institutions and policies is designed to assess changes in the quality and performance of institutions, policies and the regulatory framework that influence the lives of the poor. 		No
Project performance	Project performance is an average of the ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.	X	Yes
Relevance	The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, institutional priorities and partner and donor policies. It also entails an assessment of project design and coherence in achieving its objectives. An assessment should also be made of whether objectives and design address inequality, for example, by assessing the relevance of targeting strategies adopted.	X	Yes
Effectiveness	The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.	X	Yes
Efficiency	A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results.	X	Yes
Sustainability of benefits	The likely continuation of net benefits from a development intervention beyond the phase of external funding support. It also includes an assessment of the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the project's life.	X	Yes
Other performance criteria			
Gender equality and women's empowerment	The extent to which IFAD interventions have contributed to better gender equality and women's empowerment, for example, in terms of women's access to and ownership of assets, resources and services; participation in decision making; work load balance and impact on women's incomes, nutrition and livelihoods.	X	Yes
Innovation and scaling up	The extent to which IFAD development interventions: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) have introduced innovative approaches to rural poverty reduction; and (ii) have been (or are likely to be) scaled up by government authorities, donor organizations, the private sector and others agencies. 	X	Yes
Environment and natural resources management	The extent to which IFAD development interventions contribute to resilient livelihoods and ecosystems. The focus is on the use and management of the natural environment, including natural resources defined as raw materials used for socio-economic and cultural purposes, and ecosystems and biodiversity - with the goods and services they provide.	X	Yes
Adaptation to climate change	The contribution of the project to reducing the negative impacts of climate change through dedicated adaptation or risk reduction measures	X	Yes

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Definition *</i>	<i>Mandatory</i>	<i>To be rated</i>
Overall achievement	project This provides an overarching assessment of the intervention, drawing upon the analysis and ratings for rural poverty impact, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, gender equality and women's empowerment, innovation and scaling up, as well as environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change.	X	Yes
Performance of partners			
• IFAD	This criterion assesses the contribution of partners to project design, execution, monitoring and reporting, supervision and implementation support, and evaluation. The performance of each partner will be assessed on an individual basis with a view to the partner's expected role and responsibility in the project life cycle.	X	Yes
• Government		X	Yes

* These definitions build on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management; the Methodological Framework for Project Evaluation agreed with the Evaluation Committee in September 2003; the first edition of the Evaluation Manual discussed with the Evaluation Committee in December 2008; and further discussions with the Evaluation Committee in November 2010 on IOE's evaluation criteria and key questions.

Rating comparison^a

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Programme Management Department (PMD) rating</i>	<i>IOE Project Completion Report Validation (PCR) rating</i>	<i>Net rating disconnect (PCR-PMD)</i>
Rural poverty impact	5	5	0
Project performance			
Relevance	5	4	-1
Effectiveness	5	4	-1
Efficiency	4	3	-1
Sustainability of benefits	5	4	-1
Project performance^b	4,75	3,75	
Other performance criteria			
Gender equality and women's empowerment	4	4	0
Innovation	5	5	0
Scaling up	5	5	0
Environment and natural resources management	4	3	-1
Adaptation to climate change	4	4	0
Overall project achievement^c	5	4	-1
Performance of partners^d			
IFAD	4	4	0
Government	4	3	-1
Average net disconnect			-0.5

^a Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable.

^b Arithmetic average of ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.

^c This is not an average of ratings of individual evaluation criteria but an overarching assessment of the project, drawing upon the rating for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, rural poverty impact, gender, innovation and scaling up, environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change.

^d The rating for partners' performance is not a component of the overall project achievement rating.

Ratings of the project completion report quality

	<i>PMD rating</i>	<i>IOE PCR rating</i>	<i>Net disconnect</i>
Candour		4	
Lessons		4	
Quality (methods, data, participatory process)		4	
Scope		5	
Overall rating of the project completion report		4	

Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable.

Detailed output-level data

Target	Achievement (PCR 2017)	%
COMPONENT 1		
550 000 rural adults accessing information through radio programs	823 968 rural adults accessing information through radio programs	150%
165 000 farmers able to recall messages from a radio program	286 000 farmers able to recall messages from a radio program	173%
6 radio-stations are self-financed	3 radio-stations are self-financed	50%
13 750 rural dwellers access information through print media materials	55 000 rural dwellers access information through print media materials	400%
13 750 rural dwellers access market information through SMS	none	0%
13 750 rural dwellers have access to information through ward and village communication interactive boards	27 500 rural dwellers have access to information through ward and village communication interactive boards	200%
550 000 members of target groups are aware of the existence of the program	550 000 members of target groups are aware of the existence of the program	100%
Communication strategy developed	Communication strategy developed	100%
323 communication interactive boards installed and maintained at village level (1 per village)	323 communication interactive boards installed	100%
323 communication committees established	323 communication committees established and trained	100%
60 000 copies of printed material produced and distributed	59 587 copies of printed material produced and distributed	99%
1152 radio broadcasts (48 radio broadcast per year/radio station)	700 radio broadcasts	60%
1 SMS service provider contractor	none	0%
12 quarterly agricultural information magazines produced	9 quarterly agricultural information magazines produced	75%
MUVI website created and regularly updated	MUVI website created and regularly updated	100%
8 radio stations provided with improved infrastructures and equipment	8 radio stations provided with improved infrastructures and equipment	100%
8 radio stations running agricultural programme	8 radio stations running agricultural programme	100%
10 sponsors secured for the radio programme	2 sponsors secured for the radio programme	20%
40 staff of 8 radio partner trained	40 staff of 8 radio partner trained	100%
6 regional information centers supported by the project	6 regional information centers supported by the project	100%
4 training sessions targeting SIDO and Regional officers	2 training sessions targeting SIDO and Regional officers	50%
35 officers staff trained	35 officers staff trained	100%
KM Strategy document produced	KM Strategy document produced	100%
1 national and 2 regional learning events organized per year	7 national and 2 regional learning events organized per year	300%
1 lesson learnt documentation by each of the MUVI service providers	7 commodity audio-visual documentaries produced	100%
1 lesson learning workshop organized per year	1 lesson learning workshop organized per year	100%
1 study visit per year to exchange experiences organized by each service provider	10 study visits organized to exchange experiences organized by each service provider.	170%
COMPONENT 2		
114 000 households participating in the programme	105 449 households participating in the programme	92%
17 424 RMSMEs providing services to the value chain	15 580 RMSMEs providing services to the value chain	89%

Target	Achievement (PCR 2017)	%
1633 farmer groups financially and operationally sustainable	764 farmers groups financially and operationally sustainable	46%
64 283 stakeholders consider policy and regulatory framework as favorable	51 920 stakeholders consider policy and regulatory framework as favorable	80%
6 VCIPS contracted	6 VCIPS contracted	100%
6 Value chain development plans approved by stakeholders (one per area)	6 Value chain development plans approved by stakeholders (one per area)	100%
50% increase in the number of membership of producer and trader organizations	25% increase in the number of membership of producer and trader organizations	50%
25% increase in volume of commodities marketed by producer groups/trader organizations	18% increase in volume of commodities marketed by producer groups/trader organizations	72%
80% of formal associations registered	45% of formal associations registered	56%
13 720 RSMEs trained in improved business techniques	15 212 RSMEs trained in improved business techniques	110%
899 processors supported (linked to service providers)	400 processors supported (linked to service providers)	44%
All target farmers trained in good agricultural practices (151 900)	53 503 target farmers trained in good agricultural practices	35%
All target farmers trained in farming as business (151 900)	48 203 farmers trained in farming as business	31%
171 demonstration plots established	139 demonstration plots established	81%
22 supply contracts secured between producers and RMSMEs	38 supply contracts secured between producers and RMSMEs	172%
25% of farmers participating in the brokered relationship with RMSMEs	5% of farmers participating in the brokered relationship with RMSMEs	20%
16 marketing infrastructures established and operational	5 marketing infrastructures established and operational	31%
7 333 tons of products handled through the established infrastructures	43 232 tons of products handled through the established infrastructures	589%
15 910 farmers improved seeds requirements are met through local seed production (QDS)	8 609 farmers improved seeds requirements are met through local seed production (QDS)	54%
206 827 tons of inputs sold to farmers by intermediaries	48 216 tons of inputs sold to farmers by intermediaries	23%
Inputs required by farmers are available in each ward level (152 wards)	Inputs required by farmers are available in 146 wards	96%
50% increase in number of smallholder purchasers of inputs (79 000)	30 505 smallholder purchasers of inputs	37%
28 financial institutions supporting value chains	3 banks and 25 MFIs supported selected value chains	100%
1205 loans advanced to RSME (value of TZS 870 million)	1213 loans advanced to RSME (value of TZS 615 million)	100% (70% value)
32 platform agenda approved by stakeholders	23 platform agenda approved by stakeholders	71%
36 platforms established and functioning	25 platforms established (but only 11 functioning well)	69%
126 platform meetings organized	148 platform meetings organized	117%
40 policy agenda approved by stakeholders	19 policy agenda approved by stakeholders	47%
3 policy interventions implemented to enhance performance of the value chain	7 policy interventions implemented	233%
COMPONENT 3		
Contracts with 7 implementing partners correctly awarded and supervised, renewed in year 3	Contracts with 5 VCIPs and 1 MIP, but 4 renewed in year 3	
Administrative support to 1 MIP and 6 VCIPs provided	Administrative support to 1 MIP and 6 VCIPs provided	100%

Target	Achievement (PCR 2017)	%
21 ministry staff persons attended courses on specific technical issues	21 ministry staff persons attended courses on specific technical issues	100%
6 MITI staff persons trained on SME development	5 MITI staff persons trained on SME development	83%
Implementation strategy for SME policy prepared by year 2	none	0%
36 national SME steering committees operating effectively	16 MUVI national steering committees were held	44%
SIDO staff attended 44 person-courses on specific technical issues	SIDO staff attended 62 person-courses on specific technical issues	140%
4 SIDO staff receive specialized SME training	6 SIDO staff received specialized SME training	150%
3 SIDO staff allocated to MUVI support function for 50% of their time	3 SIDO staff allocated to MUVI support function for 50% of their time	100%
24 people trained in international procurement, tendering and contract management	24 people trained in international procurement, tendering and contract management	100%
12 MUVI awareness building training courses completed for regional staff	12 MUVI awareness building training courses completed for regional staff	100%
18 district staff attended MUVI awareness raising sessions	19 district staff attended MUVI awareness raising sessions	105%
36 specific MUVI training courses completed for district staff	14 specific MUVI training courses completed for district staff	38%
36 study tours completed for district level personnel	4 study tours completed for district level personnel	11%
60 person-courses for private sector service providers	105 person-courses for private sector service providers	175%
M&E consultants for components contracted and operational	None	0%
Independent reviews conducted	1 Independent reviews conducted	na
M&E system for SIDO upgraded and operational	M&E system for SIDO upgraded and operational	

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Abbreviations

COSOP	Country Strategic Opportunities Programme
CPE	Country Programme Evaluation
GAP	Good Agronomic Practices
LGA	Local Government Authority
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MITI	Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment
MIP	Media Implementing Partner
MFI	Micro Finance Institution
MUVI	Rural Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise Support Programme
NSGRP	Growth and Reduction of Poverty
PCR	Project Completion Report
PCRV	Project Completion Report Validation
PMD	Programme Management Department
PMG	Producer Market Group
QDS	Quality Declared Seeds
RMSMEs	Rural Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
SIDO	Small industries Development Organization
SME	Small and Medium Enterprise
TZS	Tanzanian Shilling
VCIP	Value Chain Implementing Partner