

**Project Completion Report Validation**  
**Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP)**  
**United Republic of Tanzania**  
**Date of validation by IOE: May 2018**

## I. Basic project data

			Approval (revised) (US\$ m) <sup>b</sup>	Actual (US\$ m) <sup>b</sup>
Region	East and Southern Africa	Total project costs	444.1	386.5
Country	United Republic of Tanzania	IFAD loan and percentage of total	98.6	98.6
Loan numbers <sup>a</sup>	Loan 642, 672, 765-TZ	World Bank	185.0	164.0
Type of project (subsector)	Agricultural and rural development	AfDB	62.6	62.5
Financing type	Loan	Irish Aid	48.0	40.4
Lending terms*	HC	Embassy of Japan	40.3	11.6
Date of approval	02/12/2004 (642) 08/09/2005 (672) 17/12/2008 (765)	European Union	9.4	9.4
Date of loan signature	14/02/2005 (642) 08/05/2006 (672) 19/02//2009 (765)	Government		
Date of effectiveness	30/01/2007 (642 & 672) 21/08/2009 (765)	Other sources		
Loan amendments	09/06/2009 (642) 09/06/2009 (672) <sup>c</sup>	Number of beneficiaries (if appropriate, specify if direct or indirect)		228 000 (direct)
Loan closure extensions		Project completion date	31/03/2014 (642) 30/06/2015 (672) 30/09/2016 (765)	31/03/2014 (642) 30/06/2015 (672) 30/09/2016 (765)
Country programme managers	Francisco Pichon	Loan closing date	30/09/2014 (642) 30/09/2015 (672) 31/03/2017 (765)	30/09/2014 (642) 30/09/2015 (672) <sup>c</sup> 31/03/2017 (765)
Regional director(s)	Sana Jatta Ides de Willebois	Mid-term review		Sep-Oct 2008
Project completion report reviewer	Joana Guerrin Fumiko Nakai	IFAD loan disbursement at project completion (%)		100% for all three loans
Project completion report quality control panel	Ernst Schaltegger	Date of the project completion report		21 March 2017
The project documents did not provide all data. In particular, the actual costs of the programme could not be determined since the amounts mentioned by the ICR do not match the approved costs.				

Source: ASDP implementation completion report (2017) by the Government of Tanzania.

<sup>a</sup> As explained in the main text, IFAD made financial contribution to the ASDP basket fund with three IFAD loans (whole amount for the loan no. 765 and partial amount for the loans no. 642 and 672).

<sup>b</sup> The implementation completion report (ICR) by the Government does not report the contribution by the Government. The Government contribution reported in the ICR by the World Bank is provided in table 1 in the main text. It is also noted that the figures in the ICR by the Government and by the World Bank are inconsistent as shown in table 1.

<sup>c</sup> Additional financing by IFAD for the loan no. 672 approved in 2015 (SDR2.63 million, equivalent to US\$3.7 million) concerned only the Zanzibar sub-programme and therefore not reflected here. The closing date for the loan no. 672 in the IFAD system is recorded as 30 September 2017.

\* IFAD loans on highly concessional terms, free of interest but bearing a service charge of three fourths of one per cent (0.75 per cent) per annum and having a maturity period of 40 years, including a grace period of 10 years.

## II. Project outline

1. **Introduction.** The Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP)<sup>1</sup> is a programme of the Government of Tanzania financed by multiple donors, including IFAD, through a basket funding mechanism following a sector-wide approach (SWAp). ASDP, launched in 2006, was conceived as a 15-year programme in the context of the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (commonly referred by its Swahili acronym MKUKUTA), in which agriculture was considered one of the critical focus areas, and as a mechanism to implement the Government's Agricultural Sector Development Strategy. The ASDP's first phase was expected to cover 2006/07-2012/13, but this phase was eventually extended to September 2016. The SWAp-based ASDP has been implemented in the mainland Tanzania and has not covered Zanzibar, which benefited from a sub-programme in a more traditional "project mode".
2. The total funding by IFAD for the ASDP (mainland) has been reported as US\$98.6 million in the ASDP documents. IFAD's financial contribution to ASDP was through three loans (in full or in part) as shown in table below, even though these loans carried different project/programme titles. Two initial loans (642 and 672) were to finance the ASDP in mainland through the basket funding mechanism, as well as what was called "Zanzibar sub-programme". The third loan (765) was called a supplementary loan to the ongoing ASDP (with the whole amount) which was to "ensure...the programme [ASDP]...is not adversely affected by the shortage of funds as the initial commitments of development partners are used up".<sup>2</sup>

Table 1

**IFAD financial contribution to ASDP basket fund (at approval)**

<i>Project/programme title</i>	<i>Loan no.</i>	<i>Total loan amount (US\$ mill)</i>	<i>Loan allocation for ASDP mainland at design (US\$ mill)<sup>d</sup></i>	<i>Approval</i>	<i>Effective</i>	<i>Completion</i>
Agricultural Sector Support Programme (ASSP) <sup>a</sup>	642	25	20.4	02/12/2004	30/01/2007	31/03/2014
Agricultural Sector Development Programme – Livestock (ASDP-L) <sup>abc</sup>	672	20.6	16.8	08/09/2005	30/01/2007	31/03/2015
(supplementary loan to) Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP)	765	56	56	17/12/2008	21/08/2009	30/09/2016

Source: President's reports for three loans. Oracle Business Intelligence.

<sup>a</sup> Part of the loan proceeds for ASSP (642) and ASDP-L (672) was allocated for the Zanzibar sub-programme.

<sup>b</sup> Additional financing of US\$3.7 million was approved in 2015 but it was only for the Zanzibar sub-programme.

<sup>c</sup> There was a co-financing by the Belgium Survival Fund for the ASDP-L loan (642) in the amount of US\$4.8 million specifically for the health and water component of ASDP-L but this component was treated separately and it did not follow the basket funding modality.

<sup>d</sup> The total comes to US\$93.2 million. It is not clear how the difference between this and US\$98.9 million (reported as estimated contribution by IFAD) can be explained. One possible explanation may be the grant funding by the Belgium Survival Fund for the loan no. 672.

3. In the above context, it is important to emphasize that the ASDP was not a usual project/programme financed by IFAD in that: (i) with the basket fund modality, funding by a particular financier cannot be traced to specific project investment and activities/outputs; and (ii) the programme implementation was supervised through "Joint Implementation Reviews" with representatives from multiple donors.
4. There are three completion reports prepared for the ASDP: (i) implementation completion report (ICR) dated July 2014 by the Government at the originally foreseen end of the first phase; (ii) ICR dated 21 March 2017 prepared by the

<sup>1</sup> ASDP was the title of the SWAp-based Government programme, as well as the title given to one of the three IFAD loans that contributed to the ASDP basket fund. In this PCRV, unless specified as "ASDP loan", ASDP refers to the overall Government programme.

<sup>2</sup> ASDP loan (765) President's Report (2008).

Government at the end of the extended first phase as an updated version of the 2014 ICR (referred to as GOT-ICR); and (iii) implementation and completion and results report dated 27 March 2017 prepared by the World Bank (referred to as "WB-ICR" in this document). The GOT-ICR dated March 2017 shared with the Independent Office of Evaluation (IOE) by IFAD was treated as a basis for this PCRV, but triangulated with other documents, especially the WB-ICR (2017) as well as its review by the Independent Evaluation Group of the World Bank. The Country Programme Evaluation (CPE) in Tanzania conducted by IOE in 2015 was also reviewed.

5. **The GOT-ICR and this PCRV cover the three IFAD loans but excluding the Zanzibar sub-programme financed by part of the first two loans (642 and 672).** The GOT-ICR largely followed the World Bank ICR format but it is a government document and not intended to cater for any specific interest or assessment criteria by development partners.
6. **Project context.** Tanzania was ranked 152<sup>nd</sup> out of 187 countries in the 2013 Human Development Index. The average life expectancy at birth increased to 59 years in 2012 from 50.6 years in 1990. The share of agriculture as a percentage of gross domestic product declined from 33 per cent in 2000 to 28 per cent in 2010, and it is expected to decline further to 18 per cent by 2025. Of the total land area, about 51 per cent is considered fit for agriculture, of which only 23 per cent is cultivated. Smallholder farmers grow about 85 per cent of the total cultivated land, and agriculture provides livelihood to 75 per cent of Tanzania's active workforce.<sup>3</sup> The agricultural sector is characterized by a low productivity. Nearly 90 per cent of the poor in Tanzania were located in rural areas at the time of the programme design, and 75 per cent of their household income depended on agricultural products.<sup>4</sup> The majority of agricultural systems in Tanzania are rain-dependent, which makes food access a major concern for many rural households in the semi-arid areas of the country's central and northern regions. Food security in Tanzania is affected by high post-harvest losses, inefficient distribution systems and low incomes. ASDP covered all 132 rural districts of mainland Tanzania.
7. **Project goal, objectives and components.** The ASDP was to contribute to the MKUKUTA targets of raising agricultural growth from 5 per cent per annum in 2002/2003 to 10 per cent by 2010, and raising livestock sub-sector growth from 2.7 per cent to 9 per cent over the same period. The **specific objectives** of ASDP<sup>5</sup> were: (i) to enable farmers to have better access to and use of agricultural knowledge, technologies, marketing systems and infrastructure;<sup>6</sup> and (ii) to promote agricultural private investment based on an improved regulatory and policy environment.
8. Beyond these common programme objectives, the IFAD's programme design report for the ASDP supplementary loan noted that the Fund was specifically committed to addressing the following issues:<sup>7</sup> (i) improving mechanization services (regarding farm operations, production, processing and commodity marketing); (ii) developing sensitization and awareness creation among the general public about the ASDP and the participatory approach; (iii) training, capacity building and empowerment of farmers; (iv) stronger private-sector participation in programme implementation;

<sup>3</sup> Country Programme Evaluation Tanzania, IOE, 2015.

<sup>4</sup> ASDP loan programme design report, IFAD, 2008.

<sup>5</sup> The first two loans (ASSP no. 642 and ADSP-L no. 672) initially had differently formulated objectives in the financing agreements but they were rephrased, when the financing agreements were amended in 2009, to be in line with the wording of the ASDP objectives. The original objectives had more explicit reference to rural poverty and the rural poor, reflecting the IFAD's focus.

<sup>6</sup> This is the objective for the ADSP revised in 2010. It was originally formulated as follows: "to enable farmers to have better access to and use of agricultural knowledge, technologies, marketing systems and infrastructure, all of which contribute to higher productivity, profitability and farm incomes." The revision was basically to remove the link to higher order sector objective outcomes of productivity and incomes, presumably to circumscribe the project's accountability and attribution. (ASDP WB-ICR 2017).

<sup>7</sup> ASDP loan programme design report, IFAD, 2008.

(v) the rehabilitation of basic facilities and services relating to agricultural research, training and extension for sustainable technology services; (vi) strategic development of grazing land to enhance environmental and natural resource management; and (vii) improving policy and mitigating initiatives for environmental safeguards, including climate change.

9. **Programme components.** The ASDP comprised two components: local level support and national level support.<sup>8</sup>
10. **Component 1: Local level support.** The ASDP developed agricultural sector activities at the village, ward and district levels and entailed three sub-components: (i) local agricultural investments; (ii) local agricultural services; and (iii) local agricultural capacity building and reform. This component was to be organized by prioritizing local investments through district agricultural development plans (DADPs) on a cost-sharing basis with beneficiaries.
11. **Component 2: National level support.** The ASDP assisted the agricultural sector lead ministries in implementing the policy and institutional reforms with five sub-components: (i) agricultural services; (ii) irrigation development; (iii) market and private-sector development; (iv) food security; and (v) coordination and Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E).
12. **Target group.** The target group for the three IFAD loans for ASDP (mainland) was defined as poor women and men in the programme area with a potential to improve their agricultural productivity and incomes, as well as the food insecure.<sup>9</sup> The ASDP as a government programme does not seem to have had a clear definition of the target group as such, although the general inclination to smallholder farmers and poverty reduction is quite clear from the programme documents.
13. **Financing.** At the time the last of the three IFAD loans for ASDP (loan no 765) was approved in 2008, the total costs were estimated at US\$315.5 million with funding by six development partners and contribution by the Government and beneficiaries. The revised programme costs and the actual costs reported in the GOT-ICR and WB-ICR are somewhat different as shown below. In addition, the total amounts by financier and by component in the GOT-ICR are different (US\$386.5 million vs. US\$164 million) without any explanation.<sup>10</sup>

Table 2  
Project cost by financier (US\$ million)

Funding sources	Estimated amount – initial <sup>a</sup>	Revised estimate (GOT ICR)	Revised estimate (WB-ICR)	Actual (GOT-ICR)	Actual (WB-ICR)
IFAD <sup>b</sup>	92	98.9	98.9	98.6	98.6
World Bank	90	185.0	199.25	164	189.99
AfDB	60	62.6	62.6	62.5	62.5
Irish Aid	1	48.0	48	40.4	40.4
Japan	3	40.3	26.05	11.6	2.97

<sup>8</sup> The initial loan allocation for the loans 642 and 672 (for the Mainland sub-programme) was for multiple categories (e.g. civil works, vehicles, technical assistance), but when the financing agreements were amended in June 2009, these loan categories were discarded for the ASDP mainland. While the loan categories are not necessarily synonymous to project/programme components, this move reflected the basket funding modality.

<sup>9</sup> The original loan agreements for the first two loans (642 and 672) contained slightly different definition of the target group: for ASSP (mainland), "all farmers in rural districts in the programme, while specifically concentrating on small farmers and in particular targeting the poor (falling below the basic needs poverty line), most poor (falling below the food poverty line) and least advantage farmers"; for ASDP-L (mainland), all classes of livestock farmers in the programme area, although it shall primarily benefit small livestock-dependent farmers, in particular the poor (i.e. those falling below the basic needs poverty line), the most poor (i.e. those failing below the food poverty line), women. These were revised in 2009 to be in line with the definition laid out in the ASDP loan agreement.

<sup>10</sup> According to the IFAD country programme manager, the ASDP did have difficulties in tracking the costs per component during the implementation process.

European Union (STABEX)	8.5	9.4	9.4	9.4	9.4
<b>Development partners total</b>	<b>254.5</b>	<b>444.1</b>	<b>444.2</b>	<b>386.5</b>	<b>403.86<sup>b</sup></b>
Government	28.74		95.5		82.9
Beneficiaries	23.15				
Gap					
<b>TOTAL**</b>	<b>315.5</b>	<b>444.1</b>	<b>539.7</b>	<b>386.5</b>	<b>486.76<sup>c</sup></b>

Source: IFAD ASDP programme design report 2008, GOT-ICR 2017, WB-ICR 2017.

<sup>a</sup> According to the IFAD programme design document for ASDP loan (765), including all three IFAD loans.

<sup>b</sup> According to the IFAD system (Oracle Business Intelligence), the disbursement rate for all the three loans for ADSP basket funding was about 98 per cent and US\$91.3 million.

<sup>c</sup> The WB-ICR (p.22) shows the sub-total as US\$393.45 million which does not match the computed total of the breakdown. The table shows the computed sub-total.

<sup>d</sup> The WB-ICR (p.22) shows US\$476.35 million but does not match with the total of breakdown items. The figure in the above table is the calculated total.

Table 2

**Project cost by component**

Components	Estimated amount – initial <sup>a</sup>	"Appraisal estimate" (GOT-ICR)	Allocation (WB-ICR)	Actual (GOT-ICR)	Actual (WB-ICR)
Local level support	212.38	144.2	297	297	288.4
National level support	103.17	40.8	243	36.7	186.0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>315.5</b>	<b>185.0</b>	<b>540</b>	<b>164</b>	<b>474.4</b>

<sup>a</sup> IFAD programme design document for the ASDP loan (765)

Source: IFAD programme design report 2008, GOT-ICR 2017, WB-ICR 2017.

14. **Changes during implementation.** Changes made during the programme implementation included additional financing, notably by the World Bank, IFAD and Japan<sup>11</sup> and reconfiguration of some of the activities for supporting the second objective under the "market and private sector development" rubric as they were seen as over-ambitious.<sup>12</sup> The first phase of ASDP was conceived to have a 7-year horizon (2006/07–2012/13) but was extended for three additional years, until September 2016, "given the delay in the preparation and launching of ASDP II" (GOT-ICR). According to the current IFAD country director for Tanzania, the main activities implemented during the extension period were the completion of civil works and capacity building at irrigation schemes. This "extension", however, did not affect the completion/closing dates of the IFAD loans.
15. **Intervention logic.** IFAD committed itself to funding the ASDP from its beginning in 2006. IFAD's commitment also had the objective of enabling the ASDP to address issues such as private-sector development and private-public partnerships, better linkages between the agricultural sector and financial services, climate change issues, the HIV/AIDS pandemic, effective M&E and policy dialogue for sectoral development.<sup>13</sup> The ASDP is based on the objective of providing farmers with support for agricultural development adapted to their needs. Through DADPs, farmers would organize to identify their needs and will benefit from government support to access agricultural infrastructure (such as irrigation facilities), training (through farmer field school, FFS) and other agricultural services. ASDP interventions are based on the idea that better access to and use of agricultural knowledge, technologies, marketing systems and infrastructure would increase productivity and incomes. SWAp and basket fund modality would facilitate outreach

<sup>11</sup> GOT-ICR 2017.

<sup>12</sup> Both GOT-ICR and WB-ICR. The activities were reconfigured as follows: (i) improving local regulatory environment for private investment; (ii) promoting forward and backward linkages along value chains; (iii) targeting investments in processing; (iv) promoting contract farming and outgrower opportunities; and (v) promoting access to financial services.

<sup>13</sup> ASDP Programme Design Report, IFAD, 2008.

in broad geographic areas and secure alignment between the donor-funded programmes and government priorities.

16. **Delivery of outputs.** This section discusses the delivery of outputs organized per component compared to the targets, when available. Detailed data are provided in annex IV which show discrepancies (some unexplainably large) between the GOT-ICR and the WB-ICR. There also seems to be confusion about which outputs were delivered and reported under which component or sub-component.
17. **Component 1 - Local level support.** At the local level, ASDP supported agricultural investments, services and capacity building and reform.
  - (i) **Sub-component 1.1 - Local agricultural investments.** The investment included infrastructure rehabilitation and construction such as feeder roads (31,813 km according to the GOT-ICR; 492.2 km according to the WB-ICR), food storage facilities (608 according to the GOT-ICR); small-scale irrigation schemes (386,907 ha of irrigation areas developed according to the GOT-ICR,<sup>14</sup> 450,393 ha in the WB-ICR) and market infrastructure. ASDP also promoted agricultural mechanization (65 tractors, 1,972 power tillers and 1,321 ploughs purchased) and agro-processing.<sup>15</sup> ASDP also invested in the livestock sector, including 105 oxen training centres established; 104 veterinary clinics built, 51 livestock development centres created and 2,364 dip tanks constructed or rehabilitated (according to the GOT-ICR; 680 dip tanks in the WB-ICR). Animals were distributed to local government authorities (LGAs) and to farmers.<sup>16</sup>
  - (ii) **Sub-component 1.2 - Local agricultural services.**<sup>17</sup> Support was to be provided in form of Extension Block Grants for contracting, by farmer groups, of private agricultural service providers for advice on agricultural production and marketing. The funds could also be used to facilitate farmer-to-farmer visits and learning and extension services were developed by the programme. ASDP facilitated the contracting of 441 private-sector service providers (79 per cent of the target).
  - (iii) **Sub-component 1.3 - Local agricultural capacity building and reform.** A number of trainings were held for farmers (774,156 farmers through FFS<sup>18</sup>), public extension officers (16,556 through short courses and 1,519 through long courses), as well as prospective private agricultural service providers (2,328).
18. **Component 2 - National level support.**
  - (i) **Sub-component 2.1. Agricultural services.** ASDP supported agricultural services reforms in research and extension with the Zonal Agricultural Research and Development Institutes and through the Zonal Agricultural Research and Development Funds (ZARDEFs) across all agro-ecological zones. The number of ZARDEF research projects increased from 73 to 126<sup>19</sup> and the share of operational research flowing through Zonal Agricultural Research and Development Plans increased from 0 to 73.3 per cent against the target of 75 per cent. Eighty-six improved crop varieties were released from research development and validated by the National Seed Release Committee, and technologies involving integrated pest management as well as fertilizers were

<sup>14</sup> This figure is in the main text. GOT-ICR annex 1 shows a different figure, 365,514 ha.

<sup>15</sup> Agro-processing was developed with 13,525 milling machines and 626 oil-extracting machines installed (GOT-ICR).

<sup>16</sup> An amount of 139 dairy cattle, 213 heifers, 374 bulls and 5,285 cockerels were distributed LGAs to help increase livestock production. Moreover, the GOT-ICR further stated that "it also distributed the following improved livestock breeds to farmers: (i) 115 Mpwapwa calves and their crosses; (ii) 122 improved bulls and 200 improved dairy cows to 15,513 farmers; and (iii) 128 improved goats and 16,350 improved poultry to 2,750 farmer group members". It is not clear how some of the animals were distributed to a much larger number of farmers (than the number of animals), for example, 122 bulls and 200 cows to 15,513 farmers.

<sup>17</sup> The output data reported in the GOT-ICR under this sub-component seems to relate more to the sub-component 1.3. The GOT-ICR figures on sub-components 1.2 and 1.3 are confusing.

<sup>18</sup> This output is also reported under sub-component 2.1.

<sup>19</sup> The WB-ICR reports 236 research projects financed through ZARDEF.

developed. The programme purchased various materials and invested in human resources to support agricultural research.<sup>20</sup> For extension services, the programme established 319 ward agricultural resource centres and distributed materials to LGAs such as motor vehicles, motor cycles and bicycles as well as computers/ printers.

- (ii) **Sub-component 2.2 National irrigation development.** Support under this sub-component was to facilitate the carrying out of due diligence preparatory work for future small, medium and large-scale irrigation investments in national and international basins. The GOT-ICR does not clearly report on the outputs except for the development 1,325 irrigation schemes (which in fact fall under sub-component 1.1). The WB-ICR reports on the development of a number of frameworks<sup>21</sup> and training of zonal and district staff, but also noted that no technical studies were done or any investments done under this subcomponent.
- (iii) **Sub-component 2.3 Marketing and private sector development.** The GOT-ICR reported the outputs under this sub-component including, in relation to warehouse receipt system, 450 warehouses<sup>22</sup> and market centres established in 26 LGAs, but such outputs would fall under sub-component 1.1. The outputs reported in the WB-ICR include a number of laws and regulations for, among other things, "establishing standards in various sub-sectors (namely cereals, cashew nuts, sisal, cotton and coffee) in order to improve these commodities competitiveness and thus enhance their potential to attract private investment."<sup>23</sup> The GOT-ICR also refers to the Cabinet Paper on the establishment of Tanzania Commodity Exchange Market.
- (iv) **Sub-component 2.4 Food security.** The sub-component financed activities for inclusion of vulnerable and food insecure groups in planning, preparation and implementation of DADPs through technical advisory services and training to LGAs and conducting rural vulnerability assessments.

### III. Review of findings

- 19. The findings below are based on the review of the GOT-ICR (2017), triangulated with other documents, in particular the WB-ICR. Exchanges were with the IFAD staff responsible for the Tanzania portfolio to obtain clarification on certain issues.

#### A. Core criteria Relevance

- 20. The ASDP and its objectives are aligned with the objectives of the government and the development partners. The modality based on the SWAp and basket-fund mechanism is in line with the country/Government-led and owned development process. ASDP echoes the priority areas of MKUKUTA I. One of the MKUKUTA's clusters, growth and reduction of poverty, is based on the aim of scaling up investments towards modernizing small, medium and large-scale agricultural enterprises and promoting off-farm activities, with an emphasis on agro-processing and with attention to trade, services and markets, infrastructure and creating a conducive environment to attract private investment.
- 21. The ASDP's objectives are in line with the IFAD priorities of developing agricultural production, marketing systems and the share of private actors in rural

---

<sup>20</sup> 22 vehicles and 7 motorcycles were procured for research activities; 2 new staff houses were constructed; 87 computers, 52 printers and 22 photocopiers were procured 31 PhD, 76 MSc and 37 bachelors were supported (GOT-ICR).

<sup>21</sup> Including the Strategic Environmental and Social Assessment for the national irrigation master plan and the national irrigation policy completed in May 2011; the Comprehensive Irrigation Guidelines; new National Irrigation Act passed in 2013.

<sup>22</sup> Paragraph 36. GOT-ICR annex 3 shows 170 warehouses in 26 LGAs, however.

<sup>23</sup> Such as the Cereals and Other Produce Act of 2009 and related Regulations of 2011; the Cashew Nut Industry Act of 2009; the Sisal Industry Regulations of 2011; the Cotton Regulations of 2011; the Coffee Industry Regulations of 2013. (WB-ICR).

development, and more specifically with the three priorities of 2007 COSOP (improved access to productivity-enhancing technologies and services; enhanced participation of farmer organizations in ASDP planning; increased access to markets and opportunities for rural enterprises) and, to a lesser extent, with the fourth priority (increased access to sustainable rural financial services).

22. However, as highlighted by the GOT-ICR and the CPE, attention to M&E was not sufficient. The system was complicated, initially with over 100 indicators that could not all be filled in. The GOT-ICR states that most of these indicators were difficult to measure and achieve and that "the preparation team should have kept the indicators simple and focused on those that could easily be measured". The WB-ICR goes beyond the preparation team and the initial design, and notes that, when the activities associated with the second objective were reconfigured, "the corresponding key performance indicators should have been reformulated to render them more coherent with the reformulated activities".<sup>24</sup>
23. The WB-ICR discusses a number of good features with the programme design and the implementation approach,<sup>25</sup> as well as design shortcomings including: (i) using sector-wide indicators in the results framework to gauge project performance, even where a case for attribution could not be possibly made; and (ii) overambitious territorial coverage that diluted impact, and made close monitoring difficult.
24. The GOT-ICR states that the main programme risks identified at appraisal were mitigated, but while the report discusses some measures taken, it is not clear whether they actually served to mitigate the risks. For example, with regard to the risk with the use of programme funds (efficient, economical and exclusive for the purpose), despite the measures taken, there were ineligible expenditures of about US\$1.4 million. The WB-ICR also discusses the risks identified but they do not match those noted in the GOT-ICR. The WB-ICR assessment is that "a number of the identified possible threats materialized to varying degrees of severity, and where they did materialize, the project's proposed measures were generally inadequate to mitigate them".
25. In summary, while the programme objectives were highly relevant, there were weaknesses in the design (initial and revised) and risk mitigation measures. The PCRV rates the relevance as moderately satisfactory (4), one point lower than the rating by the IFAD's Programme Management Department (PMD).<sup>26</sup>

### **Effectiveness**

26. Effectiveness measures the extent to which the project's immediate objectives were achieved, also considering the delivery of the outputs presented above, compared to the targets, when available. However, the data should be considered carefully, given the weakness of the M&E system and the attribution difficulty explained by the size of the programme and the nation-wide coverage of the programme through a sector wide approach.
27. **Objective 1: Improving the access to and the use of agricultural knowledge, technologies, marketing systems and infrastructure.** According to the reported data, the target of increasing extension coverage from 10 to 55 per cent (in terms of the percentage of farmers receiving visits from private and public extension staff) was over-achieved with the reported result of 60 per cent.

---

<sup>24</sup> The WB-ICR goes on to say that "for instance, the new, more local level oriented activities could not lead to *processed agricultural exports*." (Paragraph 16).

<sup>25</sup> Such as: (i) the basket funding approach to ensure coherence among development partners and reduce transaction costs; (ii) aligning disbursements with government's funding mechanisms for LGAs; (iii) local community empowerment; (iv) using a participatory experiential/hands-on learning approach to agricultural extension through farmer field schools to enhance adoption; (v) promoting client oriented research and development management; and (vi) emphasizing capacity building for LGAs in participatory investment planning.

<sup>26</sup> The GOT-ICR rated the relevance "high", the WB-ICR "substantial", the WB-ICR review rated "high" for relevance of objectives but "modest" for the design. The ratings by the World Bank are on a four-point scale: high, substantial, modest and negligible. It is understood that the Government's rating also followed this scale.



Regarding the percentage of farm households using improved farm inputs, there were some increases but all below the targets: (i) use of improved seeds - from 18 per cent at baseline to 19.8 per cent against the revised target of 25 per cent; (ii) use of fertilizer - from 12 per cent at baseline to 16.8 per cent against the revised target of 22 per cent; and (iii) use of improved livestock breed - from 2 per cent at baseline to 4 per cent against the revised target of 5 per cent. There are different reported figures for the percentage of smallholder farmers using tractors. According to the GOT-ICR, it increased from 10 per cent at baseline to 14 per cent against the target of 5 per cent: thus, the target was lower than the baseline data, which indicates there may have been an error. According to the WB-ICR it increased from 3 per cent at baseline to 14 per cent against the target of 5 per cent. The percentage of smallholder farmers using oxen increased from 20 per cent at baseline to 24 per cent against the target of 30 per cent (underachievement).

28. In order to create awareness about the practice and economics of value addition,<sup>27</sup> the programme distributed processing machines (including for coffee, maize, paddy, sunflower, cassava, etc.). Again, the reported output data are very different in the GOT-ICR and WB-ICR (see annex IV). Moreover, the GOT-ICR contains little data beyond the output level (i.e. number of processing machines distributed), except for the reference to one of the indicators, "ratio of processed exported agricultural products to total exported agricultural products", which is reported under component 2 but would anyway be difficult to link to the programme activities in either component as pointed out in the WB-ICR (see also paragraph 31).
29. The programme supported various market infrastructure and facilities, such as crop/livestock/community markets and warehouses. The output data reported in the Government and the World Bank ICRs differ greatly for various indicators (see annex IV) and it is difficult to make sense out of them. While the GOT-ICR does not discuss much outcome level results related to market infrastructure and facilities, the WB-ICR reports that rice farmers are getting up to 60 per cent intertemporal price gains by avoiding selling during the glut period and that in one region, sunflower farmers obtained 243 per cent price increase from storage.<sup>28</sup> At the same time the WB-ICR also noted inadequacies in quality assurance during construction of market infrastructure, especially for warehouses.
30. In terms of access to irrigation infrastructure, data on irrigation areas at the end of the programme are different in the Government and World Bank ICRs, though baseline data are the same (249,992 ha): GOT-ICR reported 386,907 ha and WB-ICR 450,393 ha, but in both cases above the target of 380,000 ha. At the same time, there was an issue with the quality of the schemes. According to the irrigation impact assessment report (2013), programme interventions in many schemes were not supported by complete feasibility studies to guide designs. The CPE conducted by IOE in 2015 also pointed out that many schemes only provided supplementary irrigation during the rainy season, some schemes were not operational or operated below their intended capacity due to poor maintenance and in some schemes had problems of salinity.
31. **Objective 2: Promoting private investment based on an improved regulatory and policy environment.** The ratio of processed exported agricultural products to total exported agricultural products increased from 18.7 per cent at baseline to 27.4 per cent against the target of 23 per cent. The WB-ICR reports the same figures, but also cautioned that it was a global figure that was not necessarily limited to direct programme beneficiaries and that the data source was National Panel Surveys. The number of smallholder households participating in contract

---

<sup>27</sup> WB-ICR paragraph 34.

<sup>28</sup> WB-ICR paragraph 36.

farming increased from 821,000<sup>29</sup> to 2,713,037. As indicated earlier (paragraph 18, (iii)), the programme supported various laws and regulations. The WB-ICR states that although their impact on private investment flows to the various levels of the agriculture value chain is not yet known, a more conducive regulatory framework might have contributed to an upward trend in contract farming.

32. The flow of private funds into agriculture increased from Tsh 167,000 million to Tsh 691,000 million (149 per cent of the target). However, also for this indicator it is difficult to link this increase to the programme activities. Nonetheless, the WB-ICR points out that the programme contributed to the growth of warehouse receipt financing (capital flows) by financing warehouse constructions.
33. **Summary.** The programme made investment and some progress in relation to the first objective; however, outcome-level data are limited in the GOT-ICR. The GOT-ICR also highlights the inability to decipher the number of beneficiaries in the various activity segments to more adequately gauge the programme's sub-sectoral outreach. The second objective ostensibly reached all of the planned targets, but the objective statement and the key performance indicators therefore were not highly relevant to the programme interventions. In relation to the second objective, the GOT-ICR also highlights the limited role of private extension services compared to public extension services. The GOT-ICR does not discuss the quality of the outputs or their geographical distribution. The CPE noted issues of uneven quality of outputs and outcomes depending on geographical areas and sectors during field visits that were not highlighted by the GOT-ICR. The CPE also questioned the quality of the M&E data.
34. Considering the reasonable level of output delivery and the performance indicators presented above although with caution in interpreting the data, the PCRV rates the programme's effectiveness as moderately satisfactory (4) in line with the PMD rating.<sup>30</sup>

### **Efficiency**

35. The validation of the GOT-ICR's assessment on efficiency is also challenged, given the missing data and the unexplained calculations appearing in the report. With the SWAp and basket-funding mechanism, some of the proxy indicators usually used to assess the programme's efficiency, such as the project disbursement lags or project management costs, are not necessarily useful or the reliable data not available.
36. The GOT-ICR calculated the average cost per beneficiary as US\$0.028,<sup>31</sup> based on the cost of selected activities (dams, irrigation, bridge, tractors, etc.) and the number of beneficiaries for each activity. It is difficult to understand the data reported in the GOT-ICR annex 4. Firstly, some of the figures are simply implausible, e.g. US\$432 million for chaco dams or US\$2.4 billion for new irrigation schemes, when the total programme cost is reported as close to US\$480 million. Even if the cost of activity was accurate, the calculation ignores the unit "US\$ million" (i.e. dividing US\$4.61 by the number of beneficiaries instead of US\$4.61 million). Secondly, the number of beneficiaries used for this calculation is 344,560, while it is reported as 228,000 in other parts of the report. If we consider the total costs of the programme (US\$386.5 million) and the number of direct beneficiaries

---

<sup>29</sup> WB-ICR noted that this indicator was added in 2009 and that the baseline and target figures changed from the time it was added and the implementation status report in 2011 but without clear justification. The baseline of 821,000 is based on the 2011 report.

<sup>30</sup> The GOT-ICR's assessment was "moderately satisfactory" and the WB-ICR's "modest". The rating "modest" is defined as follows: the project partly achieved or is expected to partly achieve its objective (intended outcome).

<sup>31</sup> Calculating backwards, it seems that a total cost of US\$9,652 (instead of US\$9,652 million as presented in the table 16, GOT-ICR annex 4) and a total of 344,000 beneficiaries were considered to estimate the cost per beneficiary (ICR p.57), whereas the total cost of the programme was US\$386.5 million and the number of direct beneficiaries was estimated at 228,000 (ICR p.21).

(228,000<sup>32</sup>), the programme costs are estimated at US\$1,695 per beneficiary (household).

37. The GOT/WB-ICRs indicate that the programme encountered operational, administrative and procurement difficulties in its early years, which affected the disbursement rates. The problem of late release of funds persisted throughout the programme and affected the implementation of key activities, including delays in construction works in some areas. The WB-ICR also notes that while financial management performance was initially rated satisfactory with improved planning and budgeting, adequate and appropriate number of accounting staff at both national and local level, improved internal controls and financial reporting, and establishment of financial accounting software, the following challenges were experienced: (i) late release of funds due to delays in submission of quarterly reports from the LGAs; (ii) lack of harmonization of donor deposits into the basket fund (later resolved); and (iii) belated parliamentary budget approvals which usually took place in August.
38. Regarding project management costs and returns, they are difficult to estimate, since the GOT-ICR does not give estimations of these costs. According to the CPE, the programme used 3.5 per cent of expenditures for planning, monitoring and evaluation,<sup>33</sup> although the CPE considered that the figure would probably be higher if all administrative costs are included. Nevertheless, the CPE also commented that the total transaction costs of managing a financial flow of close to US\$400 million in ASDP are likely to be significantly low.<sup>34</sup>
39. The programme did not estimate internal rates of return for all the activities but only considered the irrigation investments. The impact evaluation for irrigation undertaken in 2013 estimated high internal returns on the investments (110 per cent from investing in improvement, 65 per cent in rehabilitation, but 20 per cent for building new schemes) but also stated that there was large room to reduce infrastructure costs and increase water use efficiency. The GOT/WB-ICRs reported the unit cost for irrigation as follows: (a) US\$3,050 for new scheme (versus US\$5,600 Sub-Saharan Africa); (b) US\$1,030/ha for rehabilitation (versus US\$2,000 in Sub-Saharan Africa); and (c) US\$2,240/ha for improving existing traditional schemes (versus US\$2,000 in Sub-Saharan Africa).<sup>35</sup> In any case, most of the schemes encountered performance issues.<sup>36</sup>
40. The WB-ICR's assessment was that "although the programme demonstrated many efficiency attributes, including a high likelihood of significant rates of returns on programme investments, these are tempered by questions surrounding the quality of some of the investments (especially the irrigation infrastructure), occasional lengthy procurement processes...".
41. PCRV rates the efficiency as *moderately satisfactory* (4), in accordance with PMD. This is also in line with the GOT-ICR's assessment of "moderately satisfactory".<sup>37</sup>

---

<sup>32</sup> GOT-ICR 2017, p.21. The WB-ICR specifies this as the number of direct beneficiary households.

<sup>33</sup> However, this figure could not be confirmed through the information given by the ICR.

<sup>34</sup> In particular, considering the alternative of having 20 separate projects with budgets of US\$20 million, since it should be noted that programme management and M&E costs at completion often constituted more than 20 per cent of total expenditures at the completion of previous IFAD traditional projects.

<sup>35</sup> The way the unit costs for different types of irrigation development (new, rehabilitation and improvement) are presented in the GOT-ICR and irrigation impact assessment is not clear. The investment cost per hectare presented in the table is very different from the computed figures based on the "irrigated area (ha)" and the total investment cost for different types of irrigation works. Here, the investment costs per hectare as presented in these reports are used.

<sup>36</sup> Most schemes are faced with water insufficiency/stress and cropping intensity is low; the annual contribution of irrigators is low, and some schemes do not have annual fees; soil management is inefficient, including low and imbalanced fertilizer application, and salinity is building up in some schemes; and software investments (training and technical assistance) in improving production and scheme management as well as marketing have been insufficient (CPE 2015, ASDP Irrigation Impact Assessment, 2013).

<sup>37</sup> The WB-ICR assessed efficiency as "modest". "Modest" is defined as follows: the project partly achieved or is expected to partly achieve its objective (intended outcome).

## **Rural poverty impact**

42. The rural poverty impact section focuses on domains that are directly related to the programme's objectives. Impact assessments for some selected interventions were conducted around 2014 but did not tackle all of the main programme's activities. No baseline survey was conducted, limiting the information about the link between economic and social changes and the programme's impacts. The WB-ICR also highlighted three issues on M&E systems: (i) some of the performance indicators could hardly be attributed to the ASDP's activities (e.g. growth in processed exported agricultural goods or increase use of tractors); (ii) due to LGA's weak capacity, data were largely focused on financial data and activities, with generally no reporting on outcomes such as yields; and (iii) data from National Panel Survey, which would have helped fill some of the data gaps, as intermittent and too general to draw attribution. The following data should therefore be considered carefully.
43. **Household income and assets.** The data on this impact domain is limited. An assessment of service extension performance under the ASDP estimated that the total income for farmers who benefited from Farmers Fields Schools technologies amounted to TSH 1,469,000, compared with TSH 733,649 for the non FFS group. However, the CPE moderates the impact of the service extension activities because of its limited coverage at the national level.<sup>38</sup> Moreover, livestock producers generated limited household incomes because of the difficulty for them to access markets and their obligation to sell their production locally, for lower prices.
44. **Agricultural productivity and food security.** The GOT-ICR reported that the programme contributed significantly to increased use of agricultural mechanisation, which in turn has increased area under cultivation by 148 per cent for crop production, from 64,494 hectares at program inception, to 160,042 hectares at end of program. For example, through DADP implementation, the program supported farmers to acquire 275 power tillers out of a total of 1,363 tillers; 1,088 of these were purchased by farmers through loan arrangements under SACCOs in Mbeya region.
45. According to the CPE, the most profitable crops were vegetables, followed by maize and paddy, but profits depended on the quality of the management. Rice productivity under the irrigation schemes increased from 4.5 MT/ha to 5.0 MT/ha at the end of the programme (but was lower than the end-of-programme target value of 6 MT/ha). Average irrigated area per household was about 0.6 ha at the end of the programme but ranged from only 0.3 ha/farmer in Dodoma to about 1 ha/farmer in Mbeya. The fundamental issue, however, is that in many cases, the outcomes and impact of irrigation scheme works are not optimal due to poor quality.
46. According to the GOT-ICR, the provision of improved livestock breeds led to increased productivity of milk from 1.9 litres to 2.1 litres per day at the end of the programme for traditional cows, and from 6.5 litres to 6.8 litres per day for improved cows.<sup>39</sup> However, the magnitude of such improvement in the productivity is not clear, also because the reported number of improved breed animals, if accurate, seems to be marginal for the country-wide programme, i.e. 139 dairy cattle and 200 improved cows.
47. **Human and social capital, empowerment.** The ASDP promoted the participation of beneficiaries in the development of the village and district plans and FFS participations, that have provided opportunities for increased interaction among community members both in qualitative and quantitative terms, thus enhancing social capital strengthening. However, the organizations created to

---

<sup>38</sup> CPE 2015, p.35.

<sup>39</sup> The WB-ICR reports higher figures, stating reported that through livestock revolving arrangements and later through artificial insemination, "herd improvement where it occurred was remunerative to the beneficiaries, with milk production increasing from 2 litres/cow/day to 10-12 litres/cow/day". It is not clear, however, to what extent this actually occurred.

manage facilities (irrigation schemes, warehouses groups, dip tanks, marketing centres) had weak capacity to manage and operate efficiently facilities and collect operation and maintenance contributions from their members.

48. **Institutions and policies.** The programme represented the first effort to harmonize sectoral policies, institutional arrangements, investments, including support to the Government's decentralization policies and mechanisms. The principal focus of the programme's institutional strengthening efforts was the LGAs. This entailed both physical and human capacity building, especially in the areas of planning, financial management, and monitoring and evaluation. The programme established new procedures through the district agricultural development plans and the village agricultural development plans, which created a system that enabled funds to be channeled from the centre to rural territories to support their agricultural development at the district and village levels. According to the CPE, the programme has efficiently provided the district director of agriculture, irrigation and cooperatives and staff with a strategic and budgetary framework that strengthened their capacity and performance. ASDP strengthened the coordination capacity of the agricultural sector lead ministries by establishing thematic working groups. The programme's actions have improved the relations between government staff and farmers. The FFS approach has moved "the office" of the extension workers to the farmers' fields, where they are of more use. However, the ASDP objective of increasing the involvement of private service providers was not fully met.
49. Furthermore, even though the quality of GOT-ICR is questionable (see paragraphs 73-77), the ICR preparation led by the Government itself is said to have served to enhance the latter's ownership over the process and leadership for the formulation of the ASPD second phase in coordination with key development partners.<sup>40</sup>
50. **Summary – rural poverty impact.** Despite the limited data available, the ASDP is likely to have had impact on rural poverty, particularly regarding the farmers' capacity to improve their irrigation and cultivation techniques as well as knowledge through FFSs, on enhancing institutions' capacity to improve their agricultural development support on the ground. ASDP supported the development of district agricultural development plans and village agricultural development plans in order to identify local agricultural needs, but the programme impact on strengthening and empowerment of farmers' organizations was rather limited. Therefore, the PCRV rates the rural poverty impact as *moderately satisfactory* (4), in accordance with PMD.

### **Sustainability of benefits**

51. Institutional capacity development supported under the programme at national and local level could serve as a basis for sustaining the programme benefits. However, the financial conditions towards sustainability are more at risk, considering the government's low financial capacity, the difficulty of attracting donors and the low participation of users in facility management.
52. Both the GOT-ICR and WB-ICR recognize the serious challenges with the maintenance of irrigation schemes. This is not a new issue in Tanzania but it is further aggravated by the low quality of infrastructure combined with inadequate or limited feasibility studies, low contribution of user fees, lack of political will in some LGAs, among other things. The irrigation impact assessment study noted that none of the schemes visited had established a proper operation and maintenance budget. Furthermore, the WB-ICR also points out lack of consideration for the environment and water resource beyond each irrigation scheme, with not unusual practice of upstream irrigators abstracting more waters than they are supposed to or excessive sedimentation loads.

---

<sup>40</sup> Based on the comments on the draft PCRV by IFAD country programme manager.

53. The PCRV rates the sustainability of the benefits as moderately unsatisfactory (3). This is one point lower than PMD, but is more in line with the WB-ICR and WB-ICR review assessments of "risk to development outcome" as high.<sup>41</sup>

## **B. Other performance criteria**

### **Innovation and scaling up**

54. **Innovation.** Being a SWAp-based government programme, the pursuit of innovations as such was not really the feature of the programme as would be expected in a usual IFAD-financed project. Nonetheless, the ASDP enabled the establishment of relative innovations (processes that existed before the programme but were new to many smallholder farmers) such as the utilization of the Farmer Field Schools and access to improved farming technologies. The president's report for the ASDP loan presented the use of SWAp as an innovation as this was to reduce transaction costs, align and harmonize development aid around country systems, enabling Government officials to lead the joint implementation reviews, and deliver sustainable development results. The use of SWAp may have been a novel practice for IFAD that it decided to follow, but not an innovation it proposed and promoted. Innovation is rated as *moderately satisfactory* (4) in line with the PMD rating.
55. **Scaling up.** Scaling-up is in a way inherent in how the ASDP is conceptualized, as a long-term Government-owned programme with multiple donor contributions. The programme did not propose any major technical innovations, but the adoption of district agricultural development plans nationwide represents the scaling up of an institutional innovation that proposes a new way of organizing cooperation in agricultural development and makes local agricultural development more participatory. The application of the DADPs across the country can be considered as upscaling of an institutional innovation, and also the development of FFSs. ASDP II is likely to continue the scaling up of relative innovations in the future, such as aquaculture technologies, veterinary services and climate-smart and resilience practices.<sup>42</sup> Scaling-up is rated as *moderately satisfactory* (4) in line with the PMD rating.

### **Gender equality and women's empowerment**

56. The GOT-ICR hardly contains any data/information on the programme performance and impact in relation to gender equality and women's empowerment. According to the WB-ICR, of the 344,986 farmers who participated in the 16,330 farmer field schools organized on various technologies by the project, 138,461 (or 40 per cent) were women.<sup>43</sup> Gender equality was to be promoted by the design of the ASDP through IFAD financing (i.e. in the guideline documents for the DADPs, 40 per cent of the project committee members had to be women). However, ASDP government documents do not mention any specific targeting approach towards women.<sup>44</sup> The CPE highlighted the difficulties with enhancing women's participation in the DADPs in the implementation processes, particularly given the social and cultural context, which limited women's participation in public meetings. However, 50 per cent of those who participated in irrigation schemes, both as farmers and members of the irrigators' organizations, were women; 22 per cent of extension staff were women; and 51 per cent of the FFSs were led by women. According to the CPE, the ASDP actively promoted female extension workers and discouraged the formation of male-only groups.

---

<sup>41</sup> For ICRs by the World Bank, the criterion "risk to development outcome" is defined as "the risk, at the time of evaluation, that development outcomes (or expected outcomes) will not be maintained (or realized)" and is considered to be comparable to the criterion used by IOE "sustainability of benefits". The World Bank uses four-point scale: Negligible to Low; Moderate; Significant; and High.

<sup>42</sup> IFAD, programme concept note: United Republic of Tanzania: IFAD Support Operation for the Agriculture Sector Development Programme II (ASDP II), 21 March, 2017.

<sup>43</sup> However, the same report also reports that 774,516 farmers were trained in farmer field schools.

<sup>44</sup> This is clearly stated by the programme design report of IFAD ASDP supplementary loan (2008), pp. 10-11.

57. The piece of relevant information documented in the WB-ICR but not included in the GOT-ICR is that women benefited indirectly from some technologies developed under the project, such as the "push weeder" which not only reduced time of weeding one acre from 2 weeks to 2 days, but men found it more user-friendly and got more involved in weeding, a backbreaking chore generally reserved for women.
58. Based on the seemingly reasonable level of participation of women and relatively positive CPE findings but with little data on women's empowerment in the GOT-ICR, the PCRV rates gender equality and women's empowerment as *moderately satisfactory* (4), in line with the PMD rating.

### **Environment and natural resources management**

59. The ASDP programme had no specific commitments towards natural resource management or the environment except through the irrigation activities. However, the programme did not have a negative impact on the environment. According to the CPE, the technologies promoted by the extension services and in the FFSs were environmentally friendly overall, such as the use of composting and animal manure, stall-feeding and good agricultural practices. However, irrigation facilities would be better managed and agricultural productivity enhanced if water management practices had been disseminated. The irrigation impact assessment study (2013) highlights the need to reducing the acreage under paddy rice and replacing it with crops that require less water and increase water use efficiency. This would need appropriate methods of reducing soil erosion and consequent siltation which is a serious problem at reservoir-based schemes.
60. The PCRV rates the environmental and natural resources management as *moderately unsatisfactory* (3) the same as the PMD rating.

### **Adaptation to climate change**

61. Except for the development of irrigation as a coping strategy for climate change, the programme did not develop any activities to promote climate change adaptation. Irrigation can improve farmers' resilience to climate change, but the development of irrigation itself can also create environmental issues such as salinity of soils and siltation in schemes based on reservoirs, which was the case in several areas. In many areas of the country, water is scarce during the dry season, and competition for water exists. The quality of the irrigation schemes is also questioned. The PCRV rates adaptation to climate change as *moderately unsatisfactory* (3), one point below the PMD rating of moderately satisfactory.

## **C. Overall project achievement**

62. The ASDP was a particular "programme" in that it followed the SWAp and the basket-funding modality and it departed from traditional way of project preparation, implementation and supervision. The objectives and design of ASDP were well aligned with the policies and strategies of the Government, as would have been expected for a programme of this nature. The overall objectives and design of the programme, with a focus on the agricultural sector and smallholder farmers, were also in line with the IFAD strategy.
63. While the IFAD decision to channel financial contribution through the basket funding mechanism promoting donor harmonization and the country ownership was laudable, the SWAp set-up and the scale amplified even more the challenges often faced in usual projects, in particular, M&E, fiduciary aspects (e.g. financial management, procurement) and quality of irrigation infrastructure works. These weaknesses affected the implementation, the quality of data and reporting, and the ability to detect issues and adjust the programme course accordingly.

64. The programme spent over US\$380 million between 2006 and 2014.<sup>45</sup> Various output levels reflect some of the concrete investments made, such as various infrastructure works (e.g. irrigation schemes, warehouses, ward agricultural resource centres, markets, rural roads, etc.), equipment and machinery distributed, training of farmers, government staff and service providers, among other things. The programme also supported the development of legislative and regulatory frameworks, but the related outcomes for the second objective are not clear. While the performance indicators were not always well-defined in any case, outcome-level data are limited and there are questions on the quality of available data. Nonetheless, based on the output-level data and limited outcome level data, the ASDP is likely to have had some impact on rural poverty. Perhaps the most crucial aspect to be highlighted in the overall assessment is that this was a long-term Government-led programme which development partners sought to support in a harmonized manner and entailed an important element of national/local institutional building.
65. The PCRV rates the overall project achievement as *moderately satisfactory* (4), in accordance with PMD.

#### **D. Performance of partners**

66. **IFAD.** The CPE gives the recognition to IFAD for joining the first agricultural SWAp through the ASDP basket fund. IFAD's collaboration with other development partners ensured harmonious and complementary interventions through a basket-funding approach, which also supposedly lessened the transaction burden on the Government. There were quarterly meetings of the Basket-Funding Steering Committee (including IFAD and other development partners) to ensure the programme's smooth execution. Joint implementation reviews were conducted jointly between all donors.
67. However, IFAD and the other donors did not manage to successfully guide and advise the Government on developing and operationalizing a comprehensive and effective M&E system. Government's own budgetary processes should have been studied to assess their implication for the programme, which was dogged by belated and erratic release of funds. A more thorough assessment of the Government's implementation capacity would have influenced the programme's architecture, especially the choice between a pragmatic gradual roll-out versus an immediate country-wide coverage.<sup>46</sup> It should be noted, however, these shortcomings would go for all development partners involved, and not only IFAD.
68. The PCRV rates the performance of IFAD as *moderately satisfactory* (4), in accordance with the PMD rating.
69. **Government.** The Government of Tanzania developed a comprehensive and effective framework to enable coordinated public investment in the agricultural sector, represented by the ASDP SWAp format. However, the programme's implementation encountered issues and weaknesses, such as M&E and fiduciary aspects. Programme costs per component were difficult to track down, since the financing of activities was not allocated to components. The ICR was prepared twice by the Government (in 2014 and updated in 2017). While the inherent challenges associated with the preparation of a completion report for a SWAp programme are acknowledged, the quality of the two ICRs is questionable (see the next section). As a SWAp programme, no traditional project management unit was in charge of the implementation. At local level, LGAs were the implementers of the programme, but this created difficulties in tracking down the programme's results and was associated with delays regarding the transfer of funds between the central and local levels.

---

<sup>45</sup> There is no difference in the total programme cost by financier reported in the 2014 and 2017 ICRs by the Government.

<sup>46</sup> WB-ICR.



70. The WB-ICR's assessment is that while the Government's performance was generally good on the policy front and in terms of following up on recommendations from implementation support missions, there were important weaknesses that affected the programme performance such as "belated release of funds that plagued the programme throughout its implementation period, triggering poorly monitored carry-overs of funds at LGAs, and incomplete designs and works which in some cases undermined the quality of the programme's investments."<sup>47</sup> At the time of the GOT-ICR preparation, the reimbursement of ineligible expenditures (amounting to about US\$1.4 million<sup>48</sup>) remained a pending action on the part of the Government. The fiduciary-related issues also strained relations with various development partners.
71. The PCRV rates the performance of the government as *moderately unsatisfactory* (3), one point below the PMD rating.

#### IV. Assessment of PCR quality

72. **Scope.** The GOT-ICR is missing a clear and synthesizing presentation of the programme stating the key dates as well as the actual costs of the programme per financier and per component. There are no specific sections dealing with innovation, scaling up or environmental management and climate change. The impact section is very limited. There is little information about the quality of the outputs or their geographic distribution. The dates of the supervision missions are not specified. It is understood that these missing sections and information are because the ICR was prepared by the Government not specifically for IFAD (nor any other financiers). However, assessed against the PCRV guidelines and standard outline, the scope of the ICR is rated as moderately unsatisfactory (3).
73. **Quality.** As illustrated throughout this PCRV, the reliability of data provided and the quality of analysis in the GOT-ICR is questionable. There are discrepancies in the data for the same indicators in different sections (e.g. text and annex 3), some data are implausible and are likely to be errors (e.g. average cost per beneficiary of US\$0.028), the data source used not always mentioned, etc. There is also confusion on which activities and outputs are reported under which component/sub-component. The assessment of the achievement of the programme objectives tends to be limited to the discussion on outputs or the reference to the indicators that are actually not very relevant (e.g. flow of private funds) without a critical reflection. Furthermore, the methodology of the ICR did not include the beneficiaries' inputs, since the field visits by the ICR team were very limited, as acknowledged in the methodology (p.17).
74. There is very little difference between the two versions of ICRs by the Government (2014 and 2017, before and after the project extension): most of the reported results, the actual costs, and the persons interviewed are identical. Little difference between the two versions was explained<sup>49</sup> by the fact that the programme activities during the extension period were limited to completion of ward resource centres and capacity building at irrigation schemes (implying no or little expenditures incurred). At the same time there were also implausible or incoherent data that could have been revisited and corrected in the later version of the ICR, but this was apparently not done. In fact, it seems that the ICR "updating" mainly concerned the inclusion of a more explicit acknowledgement in the 2017 GOT-ICR on the ineligible expenditures.
75. Based on the above, the quality of the ICR is rated as *unsatisfactory* (2).

---

<sup>47</sup> WB-ICR.

<sup>48</sup> The amount of ineligible expenditures is mostly indicated as US\$1.4 million in the GOT-ICR but there are also other figures such as US\$1.5 million (page x, executive summary) and SDR 1.4 million (paragraph 72).

<sup>49</sup> According to IFAD country programme manager.

76. **Lessons.** Lessons provided in the GOT-ICR appear reasonable but not always is it clear whether these are grounded upon the data, findings and assessment contained in the ICR. Some of these lessons also resonate with the lessons documented in the WB-ICR. The recommendations follow the lessons learned. The lessons of the ICR are rated as *moderately satisfactory* (4).
77. **Candour.** The narrative presents both positive and negative results. However, the quality of the data used was not always critically assessed, and some of the data used by the GOT-ICR were questioned by the CPE. The ratings seem rather coherent with the narrative *within* the GOT-ICR, but the PCRV triangulation with other sources reveals some divergences in the ratings (from the WB-ICR). The candour of the GOT-ICR is rated as *moderately unsatisfactory* (3).

## V. Lessons learned

78. Some of the lessons distilled from the GOT/WB ICRs are highlighted below.
- It is important to design a sound M&E system at the onset. The M&E system must be clear and developed through a coordinated mechanism between all of the development partners and the Government and entail a proper baseline survey and impact surveys being realized mid-term and after completion of the programme.
  - Farmers' organizations do not always have the capacity to manage infrastructures such as irrigation facilities, which leads to agricultural performance issues. Further development programmes developing agricultural infrastructures should consider strengthening the capacities of farmers' organizations in managing resources and infrastructure.
  - FFSs and DADPs are key instruments to promote participatory agricultural development but should be accompanied by greater reactivity regarding financial transfers from the central to local levels to avoid fiduciary issues.
  - Sector-wide basket-fund approach programmes could in theory be useful to attract several development partners funding in a coherent and coordinated way and it can reduce transaction costs. However, coordinating and harmonizing support and inputs from participating development partners can be a challenge. For example, as repeatedly noted in the PCRV, apparently the development partners did not manage to guide and work with the Government to develop and operationalize effective M&E systems. While the Government leading the PCR preparation is in principle a good practice, inadequate quality of the GOT-PCR can also be a reflection of limited effective support by donors for the exercise itself combined with lack of reliable data. Some donors pulled out during implementation, and other did not participate. While the approach is conceptually good and is in line with the principle of aid harmonization and country ownership, it should be acknowledged that there may be some trade-offs. The GOT-ICR states that "options for a better way of bringing all donors on board to support government development agenda should be explored in the follow-up programme". The WB-ICR suggests that, "in cases where challenges associated with basket-funding outweigh the risk, one alternative is for each development partner to, while maintaining the basic tenets of donor-harmonization, identify aspects of the Government programme to support in a separate operation, albeit well-coordinated with other development partners."
  - Furthermore, for a SWAp to work, the strong leadership of the Government - in programme preparation as well as throughout programme implementation - is fundamental. Otherwise, the development effectiveness will not be attained no matter how much support is jointly provided by development partners.

## Definition and rating of the evaluation criteria used by IOE

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Definition</i>	<i>Mandatory</i>	<i>To be rated</i>
Rural poverty impact	Impact is defined as the changes that have occurred or are expected to occur in the lives of the rural poor (whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended) as a result of development interventions. Four impact domains Household income and net assets: Household income provides a means of assessing the flow of economic benefits accruing to an individual or group, whereas assets relate to a stock of accumulated items of economic value. The analysis must include an assessment of trends in equality over time. Human and social capital and empowerment: Human and social capital and empowerment include an assessment of the changes that have occurred in the empowerment of individuals, the quality of grass-roots organizations and institutions, the poor's individual and collective capacity, and in particular, the extent to which specific groups such as youth are included or excluded from the development process. Food security and agricultural productivity: Changes in food security relate to availability, stability, affordability and access to food and stability of access, whereas changes in agricultural productivity are measured in terms of yields; nutrition relates to the nutritional value of food and child malnutrition. Institutions and policies: The criterion relating to institutions and policies is designed to assess changes in the quality and performance of institutions, policies and the regulatory framework that influence the lives of the poor.	X	Yes
Project performance	Project performance is an average of the ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.	X	Yes
Relevance	The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, institutional priorities and partner and donor policies. It also entails an assessment of project design and coherence in achieving its objectives. An assessment should also be made of whether objectives and design address inequality, for example, by assessing the relevance of targeting strategies adopted.	X	Yes
Effectiveness	The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.	X	Yes
Efficiency	A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results.	X	Yes
Sustainability of benefits	The likely continuation of net benefits from a development intervention beyond the phase of external funding support. It also includes an assessment of the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the project's life.	X	Yes
Other performance criteria			
Gender equality and women's empowerment	The extent to which IFAD interventions have contributed to better gender equality and women's empowerment, for example, in terms of women's access to and ownership of assets, resources and services; participation in decision making; work load balance and impact on women's incomes, nutrition and livelihoods.	X	Yes
Innovation and scaling up	The extent to which IFAD development interventions: (i) have introduced innovative approaches to rural poverty reduction; and (ii) have been (or are likely to be) scaled up by government authorities, donor organizations, the private sector and others agencies.	X	Yes
Environment and natural resources management	The extent to which IFAD development interventions contribute to resilient livelihoods and ecosystems. The focus is on the use and management of the natural environment, including natural resources defined as raw materials used for socio-economic and cultural purposes, and ecosystems and biodiversity - with the goods and services they provide.	X	Yes
Adaptation to climate change	The contribution of the project to reducing the negative impacts of climate change through dedicated adaptation or risk reduction measures	X	Yes
Overall project	This provides an overarching assessment of the intervention, drawing	X	Yes

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Definition</i> *	<i>Mandatory</i>	<i>To be rated</i>
achievement	upon the analysis and ratings for rural poverty impact, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, gender equality and women's empowerment, innovation and scaling up, as well as environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change.		
<b>Performance of partners</b>			
• IFAD	This criterion assesses the contribution of partners to project design, execution, monitoring and reporting, supervision and implementation support, and evaluation. The performance of each partner will be assessed on an individual basis with a view to the partner's expected role and responsibility in the project life cycle.	X	Yes
• Government		X	Yes

\* These definitions build on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management; the Methodological Framework for Project Evaluation agreed with the Evaluation Committee in September 2003; the first edition of the Evaluation Manual discussed with the Evaluation Committee in December 2008; and further discussions with the Evaluation Committee in November 2010 on IOE's evaluation criteria and key questions.

## Rating comparison<sup>a</sup>

Criteria	Programme Management Department (PMD) rating	IOE Project Completion Report Validation (PCRVR) rating	Net rating disconnect (PCRVR-PMD)
Rural poverty impact	4	4	0
<b>Project performance</b>			
Relevance	5	4	-1
Effectiveness	4	4	0
Efficiency	4	4	0
Sustainability of benefits	4	3	-1
<b>Project performance<sup>b</sup></b>	<b>4.25</b>	<b>3.75</b>	<b>0.5</b>
<b>Other performance criteria</b>			
Gender equality and women's empowerment	4	4	0
Innovation	4	4	0
Scaling up	4	4	0
Environment and natural resources management	3	3	0
Adaptation to climate change	4	3	-1
<b>Overall project achievement<sup>c</sup></b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Performance of partners<sup>d</sup></b>			
IFAD	4	4	0
Government	4	3	-1
<b>Average net disconnect</b>			<b>-0.33</b>

<sup>a</sup> Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable.

<sup>b</sup> Arithmetic average of ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.

<sup>c</sup> This is not an average of ratings of individual evaluation criteria but an overarching assessment of the project, drawing upon the rating for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, rural poverty impact, gender, innovation and scaling up, environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change.

<sup>d</sup> The rating for partners' performance is not a component of the overall project achievement rating.

### Ratings of the project completion report quality

	PMD rating	IOE PCRVR rating	Net disconnect
Candour		3	
Lessons		4	
Quality (methods, data, participatory process)		2	
Scope		3	

Overall rating of the project completion report

Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable.

## Comparison of performance ratings at programme completion in different reports

	<i>GOT-ICR<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>WB-ICR</i>	<i>WB-ICR review by the Independent Evaluation Group</i>	<i>PMD/IFAD (1-6 scale)</i>	<i>PCRVR rating (1-6 scale)</i>
Relevance	High (Relevance to objectives)	Substantial*	High (relevance of objectives)*  Modest (relevance of design)*	5	4
Efficacy / effectiveness	"Achievement of the objectives was mixed"  Overall rating of programme outcome – "moderately satisfactory"	Modest*	Modest (objective 1)*  Negligible (objective 2)*	4	4
Efficiency	Moderately satisfactory	Modest*	Negligible *	4	4
Outcome	Moderately satisfactory	Moderately unsatisfactory **	Unsatisfactory **	NA	NA
Risk to development outcome	NA	High *	High *	NA	NA
Sustainability of benefits	NA	NA	NA	4	3
Government performance	Moderately satisfactory	Moderately unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	4	3
WB-ICR quality	NA	NA	Substantial	NA	NA

NA: not applicable.

Source: GOT-ICR 2017, WB-ICR, WB-ICR review, PMD/IFAD ratings on GOT-ICR.

<sup>a</sup> Rating scales used in the GOT-ICR are not clearly explained in the report.

\* Four-point scale: high, substantial, modest or negligible.

\*\* Six-point scale from highly unsatisfactory to highly satisfactory, the same as the one used by IOE.

## Key output and outcome data reported in ICRs by the Government and the World Bank<sup>50</sup>

### Output-level data

	<i>GOT-ICR (targets in parentheses when indicated)</i>	<i>WB-ICR (targets in parentheses when indicated)</i>	<i>PCR comment</i>
Rural roads (feeder roads rehabilitated/constructed, km)	31,813 km	492.2 km	Large discrepancy
Small-scale irrigation schemes developed/rehabilitated (no)	1,325 (1,520) [baseline 1.000]	386 (600) [baseline 0]	WB-ICR data seems to be an incremental figure. WB-ICR data drawn from the irrigation impact assessment report
Irrigation areas developed (new and rehabilitated) (ha) Baseline 249,992 ha	386,907 (380,000)	450,393 (380,000 – revised target)	The same targets but discrepancy in reported achievement.
Food storage facilities	608 storage facilities constructed		
Warehouses rehabilitated and constructed (no)	450	921	921 (WB-ICR) provided for the indicator "food storage facilities"
Livestock markets built (no)	<u>Main text</u> 137 livestock markets  <u>Annex 3</u> 365 livestock primary markets 46 livestock secondary markets 336 hides and skin sheds	58	Large discrepancy
Crop markets	Not reported	351	
Community markets	382 (46.4% of total community markets in the country)	NA	No data on "community markets" in WB-ICR (except for the part summarizing the GOT-ICR).
Processing	13,525 milling machines installed 626 oil extracting machines installed 7,280 agro-processing machines installed, "5,889 of this amount, including 556 machines supported by the program are operational" 556 processing machines for cassava, maize, sunflower, paddy, sorghum and wheat installed	1,852 general processing machines installed  598 agro-processing machines	Difficult to make sense out of these numbers and explain the discrepancies.
Mechanization	65 tractors, 1,972 power tillers, 1,321 ploughs	Same as left	Same figures reported
Chaco dams constructed (no)	1,008	473	Large discrepancy
Shallow wells built (no)	80	80	Same figures reported
Dip tanks constructed / rehabilitated(no)	2,364 (640)	680 (640)	The same targets but large discrepancies in the achievements reported
Oxidation centres established	105		Possibly intended as "oxen training centres".
Oxen training centres established	105	105	

<sup>50</sup> Source: GOT-ICR and WB-ICR. Columns with figures with notable discrepancies between the two sources are highlighted.

	<i>GOT-ICR (targets in parentheses when indicated)</i>	<i>WB-ICR (targets in parentheses when indicated)</i>	<i>PCR comment</i>
Veterinary clinics built (no)	104	104	Same figures
Number of farmer field school established	64,469 in annex 3; 16,330 in text	16,330	Discrepancy within the GOT-ICR
Number of farmers trained in FFS	774,156	774,156	

#### Data on programme development objective level indicators

	<i>Source</i>	<i>Baseline value</i>	<i>Original target</i>	<i>Revised target</i>	<i>Actual value</i>
Direct project beneficiaries	GOT-ICR				228,000
Direct project beneficiary households	WB-ICR	0	Not set at appraisal	285,000	228,000
Ratio of processed exported agricultural products to total exported agricultural products (%)	GOT-ICR	18.7	23		27.4
	WB-ICR	18.7	23		27.4
Flow of private funds into agricultural (Tsh mill)	GOT-ICR	467,000	463,000		691,000
	WB-ICR	467,000	463,000		691,000
Irrigation areas developed (new & rehabilitated) (ha)	GOT-ICR	249,992	370,814	380,000	363,514
	WB-ICR	249,992	500,000	380,000	450,393
Smallholders using oxen (%)	GOT-ICR	20	30		24
	WB-ICR	20	30		24
Smallholders using tractors (%)	GOT-ICR	10	5		14
	WB-ICR	3	5		14
Farm households using improved seeds (%)	GOT-ICR	18	35	25	19.8
	WB-ICR	18	35		19.8
Farm households using fertilizers (%)	GOT-ICR	12	25	22	16.8
	WB-ICR	12	25		16.8
Farm households using improved livestock breeds (%)	GOT-ICR	2	5		4
	WB-ICR	2	5		4
LGAs that qualify to receive performance bonus (%)	GOT-ICR	0	100		96
	WB-ICR	0	100		98
Agricultural marketing regulations and legislations in place (no)	GOT-ICR	7	21		23
	WB-ICR	7	21		23
Smallholder households participating in contract farming and marketing outgrower schemes (no)	GOT-ICR	821,000	1,400,000		2,713,037
	WB-ICR	821,000	1,400,000		2,713,037
Operational research budget flowing through ZARDEF (%)	GOT-ICR	0	75		73.3



	Source	Baseline value	Original target	Revised target	Actual value
	WB-ICR	0	75	90	73.3
Private agricultural service providers in LGAs contracted for service delivery	GOT-ICR	0	558		441
	WB-ICR	0	558		441
Productivity of rice in irrigation schemes (mt) <sup>a</sup>	GOT-ICR	4.5	6		5
	WB-ICR	4.5	6		5.8
Farmers receiving visits from private and public extension staff (%)	GOT-ICR	10	55		60
	WB-ICR	10	55		60
Dip tanks constructed or rehabilitated (no.)	GOT-ICR	0	640	640	2,364
	WB-ICR	0	640		680
Markets constructed or rehabilitated (no)	GOT-ICR	0	250		450
	WB-ICR	0	1,185		1,266 <sup>b</sup>
Irrigation schemes constructed or rehabilitated (no.) <sup>c</sup>	GOT-ICR	1,000	1,520		1,325
	WB-ICR	0	600		386

<sup>a</sup> The WB-ICR commented on the data as follows: The figures "don't seem to represent the weighted average of schemes developed under the Programme. The Programme dealt with three types of schemes, each with a different baseline. First, brand new schemes (36 per cent of total developed area) had an initial rice yield baseline of zero. Second, traditional schemes, which were upgraded under the Program (comprising 52 percent of total area developed), typically had a baseline of 1–1.5 tonnes/hectare. Third, old, previously developed schemes which were rehabilitated (about 12 percent of total area developed under the Program) had a baseline line yield of about 2-3 tonnes/hectare. The weighted average baseline yield for all these schemes, based on data from the independent Impact Evaluation for Irrigation, was about 1.61 metric tonnes per hectare, and the weighted achieved yield was about 3.43 tonnes per hectare. However, a small number of already rehabilitated schemes that benefited from the System for Rice Intensification under the Program are the ones with the kind of high baseline and high endline profile that corresponds to what is reported in project documents and ISRs."

<sup>b</sup> Explained as the sum of 921 ware houses, 351 crop markets and 58 livestock markets.

<sup>c</sup> Actual values show a big difference but the incremental values are more comparable (though still with discrepancy) 325 in the GOT-ICR and 386 in the WB-ICR.

## Bibliography

Government of Tanzania. *National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty I, 2005, and II, 2010.*

\_\_\_\_\_. 2014 and 2017. *ASDP Implementation Completion Report*, United Republic of Tanzania.

International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). 2004. *Agricultural Sector Support Programme. President's report.*

\_\_\_\_\_. 2005. *Agricultural Sector Support Programme. Programme loan agreement.*

\_\_\_\_\_. 2005. *Agricultural Sector Development Programme – Livestock: Support for Pastoral and Agro-pastoral Development. President's report.*

\_\_\_\_\_. 2006. *Agricultural Sector Development Programme – Livestock: Support for Pastoral and Agro-pastoral Development. Programme loan agreement.*

\_\_\_\_\_. 2007. *Country Strategic Opportunities programme (COSOP), United Republic of Tanzania.*

\_\_\_\_\_. 2016. *COSOP, United Republic of Tanzania.*

\_\_\_\_\_. 2008. *ASDP Design Report.*

\_\_\_\_\_. 2008. *ASDP President's Report.*

\_\_\_\_\_. 2009. *ASDP Loan Agreement.*

\_\_\_\_\_. 2010. *ASDP Fifth Joint Implementation Review, Aide-Memoire.*

\_\_\_\_\_. 2011. *ASDP Sixth Joint Implementation Review, Aide-Memoire.*

\_\_\_\_\_. 2012. *ASDP Seventh Joint Implementation Review, Aide-Memoire.*

\_\_\_\_\_. 2013. *ASDP 28<sup>th</sup> extended steering committee meeting, Minutes.*

\_\_\_\_\_. 2013. *ASDP Impact evaluation of the irrigation investment.*

\_\_\_\_\_. 2013. *Assessment of the performance of extension services under the ASDP in Tanzania.*

\_\_\_\_\_. 2014. *Assessment of achievements of the ASDP: returns to local infrastructure report.*

\_\_\_\_\_. 2015. *ASDP 12th Joint Implementation Review, Aide-Memoire.*

\_\_\_\_\_. 2014. *Desk review for ASDP, IOE.*

\_\_\_\_\_. 2015. *Tanzania Country Programme Evaluation, IOE.*

\_\_\_\_\_. 2017. *Programme concept note, United Republic of Tanzania, IFAD Support Operation for the Agriculture Sector Development Programme II (ASDP II).*

World Bank. 2017. *ASDP Implementation completion and results report.*

\_\_\_\_\_. 2017. *ASDP Implementation completion report (ICR) review*, Independent Evaluation Group.

## Abbreviations

ASDP	Agricultural sector development program
ASDS	Agricultural sector development strategy
ASSP	Agricultural Sector Support Programme
CPE	Country Programme Evaluation
DADP	District agricultural development plans
FFS	Farmer Field Schools
GOT-ICR	Implementation Completion Report by the Government
ICR	Implementation Completion Report
IOE	Independent Office of Evaluation
JIR	Joint Implementation Review
LGA	Local Government Authorities
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MANRLF	Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources, Livestock and Fisheries
MKUKUTA	National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty
NSRC	National Seed Release Committee
SWAp	Sector-wide approach
WB-ICR	Implementation Completion Report by the World Bank
WRSM	Warehouse receipt system and marketing
ZARDEFs	Zonal Agricultural Research and Development Funds