

Project Completion Report Validation

Tonga Rural Innovation Project (TRIP)

Kingdom of Tonga

Date of validation by IOE: May 2018

I. Basic project data

			Approval (US\$ m)		Actual (US\$ m)	
Region	Asia and the Pacific	Total project costs	4,030		4,681	
Country	Kingdom of Tonga	IFAD Grant and percentage of total	3,000	74.5%	3,092	66.0%
Grant number	I-DSF-8099-TO	Borrower	411	10.2%	321	6.8%
Type of project (subsector)	Rural development	Beneficiaries	619	15.4%	1,266*	27.1%
Financing type	DSF Grant					
Lending terms	-					
Date of approval	03.04.2012					
Date of Grant signature	25.05.2012					
Date of effectiveness	25.05.2012					
Grant amendments	-	Number of beneficiaries	16,901 direct beneficiaries		13,238 direct beneficiaries	
Grant closure extensions	-					
Country programme managers	Ronald Hartman (2012, and current) Chase Palmeri (2013-2016)	Grant closing date	31.12.2017		31.12.2017	
Regional director(s)	Nigel Brett (current) Hoonae Kim (2011-2017) Thomas Elhaut (2004-2011)	Mid-term review			18.05.2015	
Project completion report reviewer	Nicoletta Lumaldo	IFAD grant disbursement at project completion (%)			96.3%	
Project completion report quality control panel	Catrina Perch Ernst Schaltegger	Date of the project completion report			19/02/2018	

* Includes USD 667,258 of cash and kind contribution of beneficiaries

Source: (IFAD, 2012_01). (IFAD, 2018_01). IFAD ORMS, accessed 23/04/2018.

II. Project outline

1. **Introduction.** The Tonga Rural Innovation Project (TRIP), financed by an IFAD grant under the debt sustainability framework (DSF), scaled up a previous regional IFAD grant programme called the Mainstreaming of Rural Development Innovation (MORDI). The project was approved on 3rd April 2012, and the financing agreement was signed and entered into force on 25th May 2012. The completion was on 30th June 2017, its closure date on 31st December 2017 and the project completion report was finalised in January 2018.
2. **Project area.** Tonga is an archipelago of 176 very dispersed islands, out of which 36 are inhabited.¹ As of 2009, 22.5 per cent of the population lived below the national poverty line.² Tongan poverty is related to isolation and remoteness and lack of access to basic services, capital and other resources. Although not entirely male-dominated, female participation in Tongan communal spaces and decision-making is limited. Furthermore, the country is dependent on tourism, aid and remittances, which diminished greatly during the global economic crisis that started in 2008. Due to its location, the whole country is at risk of natural catastrophes, such as cyclones.
3. The project had a broad coverage of rural areas, both in 'outer' as well as in 'main' islands. At appraisal, it was expected to cover the 29 communities that had benefited from the MORDI grant, and 31 new communities. While the project was being implemented, the Government requested to extend the project's coverage to reach 151 communities in total. This represented 92 per cent of all 163 Tongan communities.
4. **Project goal, objectives and components.** The **goal** was to contribute to improved sustainable livelihoods of vulnerable communities in rural areas of Tonga. The development **objective** was to strengthen the capacity of target communities to plan and manage their development priorities in order to achieve improved sustainable livelihoods. **Specific objectives** were the enhancement of community capacity for sustainable planning and action and enhancing business capability for sustainable financing and investment. The **components** included:
 - **Component 1: Community development.** After training town and district officers in participatory learning methods, the officers would facilitate with old and new Village Councils the creation of community development plans (CDP). Once drafted, a request would be made for community economic infrastructure grants (CEIG) to rehabilitate or construct infrastructure. Moreover, CDPs would be consolidated at district level to create District Development Plans.
 - **Component 2: Business development.** After assessing the due diligence of commercial banks, these institutions would be incentivized to lend to the agriculture and rural sector. Farmers, on the other hand, would be incentivized to commercialize and seek financing to expand their business. The banks would also provide support to potential borrowers for loan assessments, and supplementary equity grants (SEG) for agriculture and rural businesses.
 - **Component 3: Project management.** The project's implementation would be –led by the NGO, Mainstreaming of Rural Development Innovation Tonga Trust (MORDI TT), which had managed the MORDI grant previously.

¹ https://www.unicef.org/pacificislands/TONGAN_SITAN.pdf

² <http://data.un.org> Accessed 24/04/2018.

5. **Target group.** At appraisal, the target group was the 23 per cent of extreme poor and poor households living below the poverty line.³ It included 16,901 people of around 2800 households in the whole country, as poverty was evenly distributed.⁴ The project would benefit 60 rural communities both in main and 'outer' islands. Beneficiary communities would include 29 in the 'outer islands'⁵ (which had already benefited from MORDI), and 31 new communities from the 'main islands'. A Poverty and Vulnerability ranking through key informants at district level would be applied in two districts, Tongatapu and Ha'apai. The targeting approach would make use of geographic, direct and self-targeting.⁶ Based on satisfactory performance, at mid-term review (MTR) the Government decided to add 19 additional communities⁷, and eventually, by completion 91 new communities had been added, reaching a total number of 151 communities. At onset, the project would focus particularly on youth and women (particularly women-headed households) through the inclusion of interest groups in the formulation of CDP, and through the membership of concerned Ministries in the Project Review and Appraisal Committee.⁸
6. **Financing.** At appraisal, the project cost was US\$4,030 million comprising US\$3 million from IFAD, US\$411,000 from the Government of Tonga and US\$619,000 from the beneficiaries.⁹ During MTR, the then unused funds from the second component on business development were reallocated to the first component focussing on community development. At completion, the project expenses were US\$4,681 million in total, composed of a US\$3,093 million IFAD's grant, US\$321,000 Government contribution and US\$1,267 million by the beneficiaries. Table 1 shows the project costs by funding source, while Table 2 shows the financial allocation by component. The PCR also mentions the financial contribution of other partners,¹⁰ but the amount was not quantified.

Table 1

Project costs (US\$'000)

	<i>Planned expenditure at appraisal</i>	<i>% of total</i>	<i>Actual expenditure*</i>	<i>% of total</i>
IFAD	3,000	74.44%	3,093	66.07%
Government of Tonga	411	10.17%	321	6.86%
Beneficiaries	619	15.36%	1,267	27.06%
TOTAL	4,030	100%	4,681	100%

* This includes USD 667,258 of cash and in-kind contributions of beneficiaries that were not planned at appraisal.
Source: (IFAD, 2012_01) Annex 7, Appendix 3; (IFAD, 2018_01).

³ Poverty is defined as the "lack of access to basic services, lack of opportunities to participate in the socio-economic life of the community and a lack of adequate resources to meet daily living expenses and customary obligations" (IFAD, 2012_01) #37.

⁴ (IFAD, 2012_01) #134.

⁵ Communities outside the main islands of Tongatapu, Vava'u, Ha'apai the Niua and 'Eau.

⁶ (IFAD, 2012_01) #23.

⁷ The final target group is not clear, as there are some inconsistencies in the data. The PCR presents a beneficiary population of 13,283 people. (IFAD, 2018_01) On the other hand, the supervision mission report reads as follows: "In 2015, the evident success of the planning process prompted MIA to request that TRIP engage with an additional 91 non-target communities with a total population of 83,252 people, of which about 60% are eligible for TRIP support (50,592 people at least 15 years old)." (IFAD, 2017_05) #18. Moreover, at appraisal the target group of component 1 output 1 (6,901) and output 2 (16,901) differed, but at completion both these groups were the same (13,283).

⁸ (IFAD, 2012_01) Annex 11, Table 1. Concerned Ministries: Ministry of Education and Women's Affairs and Ministry of Training, Sports, Youth and Employment.

⁹ (IFAD, 2018_01).

¹⁰ (IFAD, 2018_01) Appendix 8 # 23.

Table 2
Component costs (US\$'000)

	Allocation at appraisal	% of total	Actual allocation*	% of total
1. Community Development ¹¹	2,584	64%	3,544	75.71%
2. Business Development	592	15%	158	3.39%
3. Project Management	604	15%	978	20.9%
Contingencies	250	6%	-	-
TOTAL	4,030	100%	4,681	100%

* This includes USD 667,258 of cash and in-kind contributions of beneficiaries that were not planned at appraisal.
Source: (IFAD, 2012_01) Annex 9; (IFAD, 2018_01).

7. **Changes and developments during implementation.** After the cyclone Ian (2014), the total number of communities who benefited from economic infrastructure was reduced as some islands got funds from disaster recovery programs. At MTR, the second output of the second component (financial support to rural businesses) was cancelled. This component provided supplementary equity grants (SEG) to beneficiaries through an arrangement with commercial banks. An issue arose during implementation whereby the commercial financing provided under the SEG was not competitive with the increase in subsidized credit provided by the Tonga Development Bank, which had better lending conditions. The corresponding funds were thus reallocated into the CEIG of the first component. The success of the project led the Government of Tonga to request additional 91 communities to be included in the coverage, which corresponded to 13,238 beneficiaries. Despite the total extension from the benefiting communities (from 60 to 151) the total number of beneficiaries was reduced (from 16'901 to 13'238). In response to the population's needs that arose in the CDPs, the sub-projects' financing (component 1, output 2) was expanded to include infrastructure for improving agriculture-based livelihoods.
8. **Project implementation.** This project was a scale-up of the regional IFAD grant MORDI. While the Ministry of Finance and National Planning would be the recipient of IFAD's funds, the project would be managed and implemented by MORDI TT, an NGO that had evolved out of the grant implementation. CEIG (Component 1) and the SEG (Component 2) would be approved by the Project Review and Appraisal Committee. The Project Advisory Committee¹² would advise on topics concerning governance, policy, networking with other organisations and would strategically oversee the project. For component 1, the entry point would be village committees, while Town and District Officers would be selected to act as "project staff" within the communities. These officers would create or reactivate Village Councils into Working Implementation Groups, responsible for materializing the plans. For component 2, commercial banks would promote businesses related to beneficiaries, support them in completing forms related to loans and then provide part of the funds for the SEG.
9. **Intervention logic.** The main pillar in this project was to empower rural communities. By building their capacities, communities would be empowered to take decisions in a participatory and inclusive manner on which economic infrastructures to prioritise in their CDPs. The bottom-up approach would be fostered by town and district officials, which would first be trained in participatory

¹¹ Beneficiaries contributed around USD 667.258 in cash and kind. (IFAD, 2018_01) #100.

¹² Composed by representatives of the Ministry of Finance and National Planning, Ministry of Agriculture, Food Fisheries and Forestry, the National Reserve Bank of Tonga, the Chamber of Commerce, Civil Society Organisations and IFAD.

appraisal methods. The CDPs would translate into the request of CEIGs, which would then result in infrastructure to support income-generating opportunities. On the other hand, SEG would provide funds for developing businesses. Banks would support agriculture and rural businesses for them to understand and complete, first, standard loan application forms, and then SEG forms.¹³ Both the CEIGs and the SEGs would be evaluated on social and environmental criteria by the Project Review and Appraisal Committee and then their funding would be accepted or rejected. In this way, communities would assess their own needs and take ownership of their development to access finance and to plan and maintain infrastructure. The partnership with other actors (public and private actors, and organizations from the third sector)¹⁴ would provide, among others, additional funding and leverage of technical support and capacity building.

10. A precondition for the project to work was that the Government and the implementing agency MORDI TT would collaborate in a smooth manner. Another key assumption was that commercial banks would engage in lending and that beneficiaries would have an interest in borrowing credit.
11. **Delivery of outputs.** As for component 1, the initial target CDPs were 60, all of which should get funds for their activities through the CEIG. During the project, 91 communities were added to the target group. Consequently, the target was exceeded: 151 CDP were developed and 174 subprojects financed by the CEIG. More than one subproject per community was financed due to additional funds being channeled from the second component as a big part of it had been cancelled. Subprojects included community multi-purpose halls (23 subprojects), water supply (32), agriculture (63), livestock (13), commercial infrastructure (3), wharves (7), machinery & tools (14), fisheries (5), education equipment (8) and others (6).¹⁵ In order to develop the CDPs, 409 community groups were established (exceeding the 300 target), and trainings were undertaken (no systematic information was presented on what topics were discussed or the number of trainings undertaken). The supervision mission of 2017 had already pointed out issues related to the monitoring of participants of the CDP formulation and CEIG beneficiaries.¹⁶ At appraisal, these figures were different (6,901 people who participated in CDPs and 16,901 who benefited from infrastructure) but at completion both show 13,283 people having benefited.
12. As for component 2, the activities for the second output were cancelled at MTR. At that time, 4 banks¹⁷ had already signed a memorandum of understanding and 50 publications to promote financing of rural businesses had been done – both achieved the target at appraisal. This was, nevertheless, not the case with the number of businesses accessing financial services (SEGs). The target was 10 and 4 received funding.

III. Review of findings

13. Although the project made efforts to collect data to assess results, this was somewhat limited by problems related to the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system. The M&E focused mainly on the output level. A broader and more strategic approach to learning and results dissemination was not developed. The lack of data beyond output level is a limitation that has to be taken into consideration throughout this PCR.

¹³ (IFAD, 2012_01) Annex 15, #7.

¹⁴ Partners included the Ministry of Finance and National Planning, as well as with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Food & Fisheries, the Government's Agriculture Growth Committee and Island Development Committee, with commercial banks, the Pacific Horticultural and Agricultural Market Access project, and the Tonga Business Enterprise Centre.

¹⁵ (IFAD, 2018_01) Appendix 8, #16.

¹⁶ (IFAD, 2017_05) #20.

¹⁷ RIMS data until 2014 indicates 5 banks.

A. Core criteria

Relevance

14. **Policy relevance.** The project was to a great extent in line with the Government's and IFAD's policies. At appraisal, the project was in line with the Tonga Strategic Development Framework 2011-2014, particularly in its efforts to "create strong inclusive communities in meeting their prioritised service needs", to promote "dynamic public and private sector partnership as the engine of growth", to foster "appropriate, well planned and maintained infrastructure that improves the everyday lives of the people and lowers the cost of business" and to ensure "better governance".¹⁸ Within this framework, the Ministry of Food, Forestry and Fisheries Sector Plan focused on the need to engage in partnerships with the private sector to promote the sector, fostering national food self-sufficiency, increasing food security and reducing rural poverty.¹⁹ Also, this plan had conservation and diversification of resources as objective, a topic that gained importance throughout the project. The Corporate Plan of the Ministry of Agriculture, Food, Forests and Fisheries of 2014 promoted improved producer's performance and the sustainability of resources, with a focus on economic livelihoods.²⁰ Despite the overall policy alignment, the Tonga Development Bank started providing subsidized credits that competed with the SEG because they had better lending terms. On one hand, that pointed to the relevance of the project's grants as instruments. On the other, the change in Government's policy distorted the credit market for such grants, thus undermining the relevance of that particular project instrument. It was then dropped during the project implementation.
15. During the project's design, IFAD did not have a Country Strategic Opportunity Programme for Tonga. However, the project followed IFAD's 2004 Sub-regional Strategic Opportunities Paper for the Pacific Islands. This strategy aimed at strengthening the capacity of rural poor and their organisations, improving equitable access to productive natural resources and technology, and increasing access to financial services and markets. The project was, thus, relevant for IFAD's strategy.
16. **Project design relevance.** The project design was relevant, as it had piloted and tested throughout the MORDI grant. The project had a simple step-wise and flexible design that acknowledged the proactivity of communities which, in most cases, were historically neglected by the Government due to their remoteness. It was right in tackling the lack of service and infrastructure provision that would foster sustainable livelihoods. Leaving the choice open for communities to decide on which infrastructure to build addressed best their needs. Adopting the participatory approach in such a context was a key success factor. Moreover, communities and local civil servants got tailored support from the project team. The concept of financing farm and non-farm income-generating activities through commercial banks was relevant, but the introduction of subsidized credit during project implementation distorted market conditions and undermined the designed approach for commercial financing. The practical implementation of this approach alongside cheap, subsidized financing was not viable. .
17. Having an NGO with clear comparative advantage in community engagement and participatory planning to implement such a project, was pertinent because public agencies did not have enough capacity in that matter. And so was the capacity building of town and district officers to empower local civil servants. Moreover, MORDI TT already had the know-how that had been acquired throughout the previous grant. Through the Project Review Committee, both public and private actors assessed the viability of infrastructure, giving supported projects a broad basis of legitimacy.

¹⁸ (Ministry of Finance and National Planning of Tonga, 2011) p.4.

¹⁹ (Ministry of Finance and National Planning of Tonga, 2011) p.14.

²⁰ (Ministry of Agriculture, Food, Forests and Fisheries, 2014_04) p.4.

18. **Relevance to the needs of the poor.** The project's coverage was nationwide and included communities in very remote outer islands. The lack of data on the characteristics of poverty did not allow for a specific targeting of particularly vulnerable populations, nor did the target of the new communities benefit certain communities in particular.²¹ The open project design allowed communities to address their own particular needs, and funding was allocated according to communities' demands. Moreover, inviting women and youth to form distinct interest groups allowed for their voices to be heard in the participatory appraisal process of CDP definition. A self-targeting strategy was promoted as communities decided to apply for either CEIGs or SEGs. Yet, communities had to raise 25 per cent as cash or in-kind contributions to obtain such grants. The Quality Enhancement report identified that this precondition would exclude communities without that financing capacity.²² In the beginning, this translated into the difficulty of communities to raise the matching contribution.²³ It is noteworthy that the last supervision mission (May 2017) mentioned the fact that some households within communities were not able to meet these preconditions.²⁴ Yet, most communities found diverse solutions to exceed their contribution to the project. Initially, beneficiaries would only contribute 15 per cent of project costs, but at completion, 27 per cent of costs had been covered by beneficiaries. This was explained by the fact that trees were planted as in-kind contributions. The plantation of trees (which had not been planned at appraisal) translated into what the documents of the project assess as Tonga's biggest foresting programme in history.
19. **Relevance of adjustments to project implementation.** Three changes happened throughout the project, which allowed it to remain relevant. First, the target group was adapted in two ways: once after the cyclone Ian hit in 2014 impacted communities were withdrawn from the target group, because reconstruction efforts were able to better address the needs of those communities' issues at the time. Secondly, due to the project's success, the Government of Tonga requested to extend the coverage with an additional 91 communities. The outreach to new communities did, nevertheless, somehow reduce performance in component 1.2 of CEIG, as the attention of the project management unit was focused on the development of the plans rather than the granting of CEIGs.²⁵ Another change in project implementation related to types of infrastructure supported. Sometimes priorities of the communities related less to economic infrastructure and more to other type of infrastructure (i.e. community halls that acted as evacuation centers, mechanization services, etc.), so these were also financed.²⁶ The third main change was that, due to the limited progress in achieving outputs of the second component, its funds were transferred to component 1.
20. Overall, the project was in line with Government's and IFAD's policies, and its design and its changes were appropriate for addressing needs of poor people. Nevertheless, the provision of SEGs was not relevant in the context of other credit's being promoted by Tongan agencies. The relevance is rated as **moderately satisfactory (4)**, in agreement with the PCR.

Effectiveness²⁷

²¹ The choice was made depending on the community's size, relative poverty, comparative deprivation, or expected impact (IFAD, 2017_05) #65.

²² (IFAD, 2011_11) p.4.

²³ (IFAD, 2014_03) p.21.

²⁴ (IFAD, 2017_05) #65.

²⁵ (IFAD, 2017_05) #23.

²⁶ (IFAD, 2017_05) #9.

²⁷ Data used for assessing the following criteria derives from baseline and end-line data gathered for the RIMS and anecdotal evidence presented in the PCR (as there have been issues with the M&E system for results at outcome and impact level). (IFAD, 2017_05) #16.

21. **The first objective "Enhancing community capacity for sustainable planning and action" was achieved.** The attribution of responsibility to beneficiary communities on drafting CDPs gave not only voice but also planning skills to the communities. At the same time, the project strengthened planning capacity of district and town officers. By assisting communities in drafting CDPs, the project communities became interlocutors of local, district and even national public agencies,²⁸ and thus also promoted the dialogue between communities to develop common development plans at district or island level. The CDPs acted as guidelines for investments of other international partners, such as Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.²⁹ The coverage of communities with regard to this objective was significantly increased compared to the initial plan (151 against 60 planned). Once drafted, the CDPs pointed out communities' needs that were then translated into funding from CEIGs, thus translating the plans into concrete livelihood-promoting actions. These included multiple infrastructures mentioned in paragraph 11. In sum, the first project's component attained its intended objective. It exceeded it in quantitative terms, but the PCR does not elaborate on the quality of the CDPs. It is noteworthy though that achievements of the first objective were exceeded partly due to the additional funds that came from component 2.
22. **The second objective "enhancing business capability for sustainable financing and investment" was achieved to a lesser extent.** Although some preliminary outputs were reached, the cancellation of the second component on business development did not allow for results at outcome level to be accomplished. First, commercial banks were supervised for due diligence and publications were drafted, but it is not clear if and how many people were supported in completing loan assessment forms. Moreover, only 4 business (out of 10 planned at appraisal) benefited from SEGs and one would even have borrowed from another lending partner without the project.³⁰ Thus, as agricultural and rural businesses were not supported, their financing and investment capacity was not enhanced.
23. Although its second objective was not achieved, this was due to external factors (subsidized credits from the Tonga Development Bank), and its first objective was achieved for more than the initially planned target group. The effectiveness of TRIP is rated as **moderately satisfactory (4)**, which concurs with the PCR.

Efficiency

24. The project was approved on 3rd April 2012, became effective on 25th May 2012 and the first disbursement was on 27th August of that same year. The project entered into force 1.7 months after its approval, and the first disbursement was 3.1 months after its entry into force. This was less than other previous projects in Tonga, which had an effectiveness lag of between 4 and 7 months.³¹ The increase in benefiting communities led to a delay in building infrastructure in communities that had already drafted CDPs and aspired to receive CEIG.³² This, in turn, led to low expenditure rate until well into the project's duration. Further delays have been mentioned concerning the processing in withdrawal applications and the provision of the counterpart funds, which somewhat restrained the project's implementation.
25. The effective total project costs (US\$4,681 million) represented 116 per cent of the initial budget (US\$4,030 million). This excess is due to the contribution of beneficiaries, which in turn was superior to the appraisal estimates. When not taking that into consideration, actual disbursements were slightly lower than at

²⁸ (IFAD, 2016_01) Appendix 7.

²⁹ (CPM R. Hartman, 2018).

³⁰ (IFAD, 2016_01) #22.

³¹ Grants And Investment Projects System, accessed 23/04/2018. It is noteworthy though that TRIP was the first project after 20 years of inactivity of IFAD in the country.

³² (IFAD, 2018_01) #38.

appraisal.³³ There were additional financial contributions made by other donor agencies and partners, but there is no data on those total expenditures. Concerning the **project management costs**, they were 16 per cent of the total project costs at appraisal. At completion, management costs were 21 per cent of the total. It is possible that the costs of managing very remote communities were underestimated at appraisal. As a comparison, at appraisal TRIP II (the successor of the project here under review, approved in 2017) had project management costs represent 45 per cent of project costs, so comparatively the project management costs for TRIP I were relatively low. For TRIP I, the majority of project management costs were covered by local funds. While at appraisal the **cost per beneficiary** was US\$238.4 per individual and US\$67,167 per community, effective figures at completion were US\$353.6 per beneficiary and US\$31,000 per community. These figures were comparable to those of TRIP II (US\$383 per beneficiary at appraisal) and lower than an IFAD's project in Kiribati (US\$618 per beneficiary). As for the **economic internal rate of return**, at appraisal it was calculated to be 16.8 per cent³⁴ and the Net Present Value at discount rate of 12 per cent was US\$737,160. At completion the calculations resulted in an IRR 28.6 per cent (considering only IFAD, the Government and beneficiaries' contributions, but without including other sources) and 22.5 per cent when all other sources are included.³⁵

26. Overall, the project had a fast start-up, but experienced delays during the project implementation period. The relatively high project management costs can be explained by the remoteness of communities. Both the IRR and the costs per beneficiary present regular figures. This PCRV rates the efficiency as **moderately satisfactory (4)**, in line with PMD.

Rural poverty impact

27. The PCR presented achievements in some criteria related to impact, but it also stated that 70 per cent of economic infrastructure was finalised in 2016 and 2017,³⁶ thus the impact of the project's contribution might still be incipient. Monitoring of the project was limited to data on indicators defined in the IFAD's results and impact management system (RIMS), although more had initially been planned. Consequently, the data presented here draws on the RIMS data of 2012 and 2017, and on the final Community Ratings System,³⁷ but unfortunately no detail was provided on methodological aspects on the data collection.
28. The impact of the project's first component (community development) on income and food security is less straight-forward than the one the second component on business development would have had. Thus, the cancellation of the latter reduced the potential effects on incomes and food security that the project could have had.
29. **Household income and net assets.** Data presented in the RIMS showed improvements in the households' incomes and assets, but the extent could not be assessed. The PCR highlighted certain project interventions that fostered an increase in income,³⁸ but the actions mentioned do not present corresponding figures to assess the extent to which they could have impacted. On the other hand, throughout the report other interventions were mentioned, mainly the building of community halls (allowing for an increased production of mats) that accounted for 26 per cent of subproject investments,³⁹ establishment of fencing and pigsties that reduced damage caused by pigs in productive lands, and the yields of certain tree

³³ (IFAD, 2018_01) #100.

³⁴ (IFAD, 2012_01) #146.

³⁵ (IFAD, 2018_01) #146.

³⁶ (IFAD, 2018_01) Appendix 7, #2.

³⁷ The Community Rating System assesses the satisfaction of beneficiaries (N=2249) in terms of institutional, technical, economic and financial sustainability. There is no baseline databases comparison for this end-line data.

³⁸ (IFAD, 2018_01) #42.

³⁹ (IFAD, 2018_01) #47.

plantations (particularly vanilla and pandanus⁴⁰) as an additional element of the project. The RIMS data showed an amelioration in wealth: a reduction of the poorest households (from 28 per cent in 2012 to 12 per cent in 2017) and poor households (from 23 to 17 per cent); and an increase in richest households (from 10 to 30 per cent), while average and rich households encompassed around 20 per cent of each. The extent to which these actions increased incomes for the totality of beneficiaries could, nevertheless, not be assessed due to the lack of data.

30. As for net assets, increases have been found for radios (71 per cent of households in 2012 compared 85 per cent in 2017), refrigerators (from 29 to 44 per cent), bicycles (from 31 to 59 per cent) and vehicles (from 26 to 45 per cent). Marginal positive changes were found for motorcycles (from 2 to 4 per cent), mobile phones (from 90 to 95 per cent) and the use of hand-tools for cultivating farms (from 99 to 95 per cent), while negative results included television (from 50 to 48 per cent) and boat/engines (from 15 to 7 per cent). Negative results could not be explained.
31. **Human, social capital and empowerment.** Improvements in this criterion were achieved, but the sustainability of social capital enhancement and the extent of the increase in human capital could not be ascertained. According to the PCR and the country director, formulating CDPs was empowering both for the target group as well as for other stakeholders (Town and District officers), because it revived the communities' capacities to formulate their needs and to mobilise funds while raising them as Government's interlocutors.⁴¹ The Community Rating System indicated that, at completion, 36 per cent of respondents considered that communities could identify problems and were sometimes able to address them on their own, and 56 per cent thought that communities were able to identify problems and come up with different solutions. Moreover, beneficiaries participated in the choice, management and supervision of subprojects to be implemented. What puts these results into threat is the continuous need for support of communities in terms of planning and administration, as well as the culture of dependency on external assistance identified at the last supervision mission⁴² and by the Community Rating System.⁴³ On a different note, the PCR informed that by building community halls the physical space was provided for discussions at community level to take place,⁴⁴ thus promoting social capital and group empowerment. Yet, in terms of human capital, no data was presented on number and topic of trainings undertaken, so it could not be verified which related skills were enhanced.
32. **Food security and agricultural productivity.** The project focus was not set on improving food security. Effects under this criterion could have been achieved rather with the second component on business development, which was cancelled. The RIMS data presented on food security showed that of 900 respondents, in 2012 12.2 per cent had had a first hungry season, which was then reduced to 1.3 per cent in 2017, and no second hungry season existed at both points in time. But lack of food security was not Tonga's main issues. Nutrition problems in the country were related to obesity and related non-communicable diseases, which in turn stem from overconsumption of high-fat food. Data on food security presented did not capture this element. The project addressed the needs for agricultural diversification and increased agricultural productivity as demanded by communities.⁴⁵ But alone, these factors did not tackle Tongan nutrition problems. The PCR thus also mentioned the existence of farmer field schools and capacity

⁴⁰ A plant used in South and Southeast Asia for flavouring cooking.

⁴¹ (IFAD, 2018_01) and (CPM R. Hartman, 2018).

⁴² (IFAD, 2017_05) 28-29.

⁴³ 41 per cent of respondents considered that their community had an understanding of external organizations but still needed some help from TRIP to get support and 56 per cent considered that their community was able to access some support from other organizations.

⁴⁴ (IFAD, 2018_01) #19.

⁴⁵ Like tractors, agricultural tools and fencing for pigsties.

building for better nutrition, but no detailed data on this output was provided. Consequently, it is not straight-forward that an increase in income would help solve Tongan dietary issues.⁴⁶

33. **Institutions and policies.** The clearest impact of the project was on policies and institutions. Local public agencies were somewhat empowered through the boosting of districts and town officers' skills with capacity building and their participation in the development of CDPs. Of the respondents of the Community Rating System, 31 per cent thought that routine community activities were done adequately by group leaders and Town Officers, while 55 per cent thought that there were no real problems with community management. Moreover, 58 per cent considered that public officials submitted at least half of the reports with good quality and in a timely manner. Secondly, CDPs were integrated and fed into District and Island development plans, which were then used by other institutions like other donor agencies. The project's bottom-up approach was adopted nation-wide and to foster rural development, public funds were allocated following CDPs.⁴⁷ The importance of CDPs at a national scale is demonstrated by the fact that they were uploaded on Tonga's Ministry of Internal Affairs' website.⁴⁸ The project's success brought about that the Project Management Unit was invited in the development of the new Tonga Agriculture Sector Plan.⁴⁹ Although numerous partnerships were built with diverse stakeholders (including those from the private sector, such as trading agencies), the PCR did not specifically refer to the outcome of the relationship with engaged banks after the second component was cancelled.
34. Incipient impact was seen in the increase of household incomes, social capital and institution and policies. Yet, the data provided was scarce and does not allow assessing the extent of much of these impact criteria. All in all, the rural poverty impact is rated both by the PCR and this PCR as **moderately satisfactory (4)**.

Sustainability of benefits

35. Several factors fostered the project's sustainability, but others clearly undermined it, making TRIP's second phase highly needed. Firstly, TRIP strengthened capacities of both communities and local public agents. They had a higher probability of staying in the project area than project staff who would leave after project completion. The implementing NGO MORDI TT continued its work after IFAD's previous regional grant, proved its capabilities and thus became a strong dialogue partner of the Government. The government's commitment led to the institutionalization of CDPs, to the extent that since TRIP, future interventions from external donor funding would only be accepted through these plans. Also, the existing partnerships with actors from the private sector (among others, with the Tonga Business Enterprise Centre, Nishi Trading, Heilala Vanilla, etc.) continue after project completion. As for beneficiaries, their ownership of the project was strong according to the PCR.⁵⁰ The project's sustainability was also fostered by the fact that the communities already had deliberation fora, but which were exclusive of certain groups of people. With the project, voices of vulnerable groups like women and youth were included in these fora. Finally, CDPs were the main tool for interacting with authorities, which foster their continuity.
36. The supervision report of May 2017 presented very good overall results, but it also states the continuous need of most communities for follow-up support with planning and administration, as well as external assistance.⁵¹ A key factor that would increase the sustainability of benefits, according to that supervision report, is the planting of trees as a way to reduce dependency. Yet, for some project's

⁴⁶ (IFAD, 2018_01) #55.

⁴⁷ (IFAD, 2018_01) #57, (CPM R. Hartman, 2018).

⁴⁸ <https://www.tongalocal.gov.to/community-development-plans> Accessed 30/04/2018.

⁴⁹ (IFAD, 2017_05) #114.

⁵⁰ (IFAD, 2018_01) #149.

⁵¹ (IFAD, 2017_05) #28-29.

benefits to be long-lasting after completion, further external aid is needed. In that sense, sustainability will be possible in the medium term with the support of second phase of TRIP II, financed by IFAD. This second phase will consolidate certain activities, particularly agricultural and economic activities, and will deepen knowledge and functioning of community participatory processes.

37. As for the infrastructure that was built by the project, the compliance of cyclone category 5 safety requirements and the selection criteria of CEIG not to be in zones prone to impact from tsunamis increased the likelihood of them being sustainable. For example, in February 2018 a cyclone hit Tonga, and the infrastructure built withstood it.⁵² Yet, the last supervision mission report discussed challenges that the Government could encounter in terms of maintaining roads with low traffic volume or roads which were damaged by tractors and other heavy equipment.⁵³ This could potentially undermine the sustainability of roads built in remote areas.
38. Although communities and their corresponding local authorities improved their skills and infrastructure was (to a large extent) cyclone-proof, the maintenance of achieved benefits still depended on external funding to achieve long-standing and independent continuation. The project's sustainability of benefits is rated as **moderately satisfactory (4)** in line with that of PMD.

B. Other performance criteria

Innovation and scaling up

39. **Innovation.** TRIP, as a rural innovation project, implemented elements that were innovative for its context, but existing in other regions. First, the MORDI grant had not counted on the contribution of local public agents like town or district officers in helping implement the project. This increased the interaction between the communities and their local authorities. Secondly, according to the PCR, for the first time the Government partnered with an NGO and gave it the full implementation responsibility, but there were no other sources than the project's documents that allowed to cross-check this information. Also, at design, the project's second component planned for banks to disburse and monitor funds, which in turn would have reduced MORDI TT's workload.⁵⁴ This was, as mentioned throughout this report, not achieved though. The PCR also mentioned innovative practices in terms of production and marketing approaches, but no systematic data was provided on the topic. Facilitating the participation of women and youth in traditionally exclusive fora was an innovation introduced by the project.
40. Although the PDR and PCR mentioned that an innovative element was the scale of how beneficiaries were involved through participatory appraisal approach and techniques, this was the output of a scale-up process of MORDI, and not innovative per se. Also, the linkage of the two first components by focusing on income-generating activities and supporting existing businesses or businesses with potential, as stated at appraisal, cannot be seen as an innovative element, and was in any case not achieved.
41. The results in terms of innovation were not substantial, as might be expected given that the project's name is Tonga Rural *Innovation* Project. Some elements were innovative (and relevant) for the project area, while others presented as innovative were actually not, or not achieved. Therefore, the rating given by the PCR concurs with the PCR, being **moderately satisfactory (4)**.
42. **Scaling up.** TRIP is an element of a chain of projects being scaled up, but financed mostly by external funding, particularly IFAD. First, it covered not only the 29 communities that benefited from the previous grant MORDI, but also extended its reach to 31 new communities, as of appraisal. Throughout the project, it was then

⁵² Comments from PMD, 26/07/2018.

⁵³ (IFAD, 2017_05) #80.

⁵⁴ (IFAD, 2012_01) #21 of executive summary.

scaled up to a covering a total of 151 communities.⁵⁵ The second phase of TRIP was a scale up of the project that would have a national outreach targeting almost all households identified as poor in 2009.⁵⁶ Finally, the PCR mentioned that TRIP was replicated by IFAD-funded projects in other countries in the Pacific Regions: Fiji (FAPP), Kiribati (OIWFP 1 and 2) and Solomon Islands (RDP II).⁵⁷ An important aspect of scaling-up is the use of CDPs by other development partners as a means to channel investment funding. For example, MORDI TT is now the lead implementing partner of the significant support from Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade for the Cyclone Gita recovery, and adopts its recommended CDP approaches for community engagement. The scaling up for this project is thus rated as **satisfactory (5)** in line with that of PMD.

Gender equality and women's empowerment

43. The project fostered women's voices being heard, but it is not clear how far it managed to empower them economically and reduce their drudgery. Mainstreaming gender was briefly mentioned at appraisal and women were defined as target groups, because they would get a chance to *raise their voices* during the participatory planning process. Yet, no clear strategy was outlined on how to address the particular issues women face, although it had been highlighted by the Quality Enhancement Panel at appraisal.⁵⁸ Consequently, the biggest achievement in terms of the criterion under consideration was the inclusion of women (and youth) in participating in the traditional *fonos* (community discussion fora), and particularly in drafting CDPs. This was achieved by separating women into distinct interest groups, whose prioritizations fed the plenary discussions. As for their *decision-making power*, women participated (out of 409 interest groups, 148 were women's groups)⁵⁹, but they were not represented in leadership positions.⁶⁰ The extent to which this affected a big or small group of women is not clear, as there was no data referring to it. It is unfortunate that there was no impact data on the topic, because it is possible that a simple action like the formation of women's groups for community decision-making processes could have had important effects on the situation of local women.
44. One type of infrastructure investment *promoted female economic empowerment* through the increase in income: community halls, in which women could weave mats and manufacture other handicraft in a secure and weather protected space. Some other activities related to increased social capital of women were mentioned in the PCR,⁶¹ but it was not clear if the mentioned trainings focused solely or particularly on women. Therefore, its impact on female livelihoods in particular was not straight-forward. Some other infrastructure aimed, among others, to reduce women's *workload* and drudgery. This was the case, for example, with drinking water sub-projects and fencing to create pigsties that increased food in proximity of houses, as women were the primary responsible for household tasks. Nonetheless, this fact is contradicted by the data presented in the PCR's fact sheet, which indicated that 297 of the 352 people interviewed (84 per cent) said the father and children brought water home before the community drinking water was built.⁶² The sex-disaggregated data presented in the PCR showed almost exact 50-50 per cent participation of women in all interventions. Considering the limitations of the M&E system, it is questionable if those figures were correct.
45. The project design allowed for women's priorities to be included in CDPs. Nonetheless, evidence on economic empowerment of women and reduced drudgery

⁵⁵ (IFAD, 2016_01) #5.

⁵⁶ IFAD (2017) Tonga Rural Innovation Project Phase II - Project Design Report.

⁵⁷ (IFAD, 2018_01) #96, Comments from PMD 26/07/2018.

⁵⁸ (IFAD, 2011_11) p.3.

⁵⁹ (IFAD, 2017_05) #59.

⁶⁰ (IFAD, 2017_05) #31.

⁶¹ (IFAD, 2018_01) #67.

⁶² (IFAD, 2018_01) p.140.

only existed for communities with certain infrastructure, like community halls and fencing to create pigsties. It is thus not clear how the results for these sub-criteria were for women in communities who did not benefit from these interventions. Therefore, this PCRV rates the project's gender equality and women's empowerment as **moderately satisfactory (4)**, in line with the PCR.

Environment and natural resources management

46. TRIP took into consideration issues concerning the management of natural resources and the environment, but not all of the project's results could be fully assessed. At appraisal, the project was categorized as B, because no significant negative environmental impact was expected from it. Two factors were determinant in terms of environment and natural resources management. On one side, the planting of trees (320,483 commercial trees and 428,863 perennial crops) was a way for communities to provide in-kind contribution for receiving CEIG. As mentioned before, the PCR indicated that this was the biggest reforestation efforts in Tonga. On the other hand, one of the eligibility criteria to grant CEIG was that the proposal should follow sound environmental principles and that it did not result in degradation of the physical or human environment. Having this selection criteria might have increased the communities' awareness of the topic. Capacity building efforts on the topic were mentioned in the PCR. But its extent and impact could not be assessed because no detailed output data described how many trainings were done, nor which topics were covered and what the impacts were.
47. The project made efforts in terms of environment and natural resources management, but the extent of their effects could only be ascertained for some of the interventions. As a result, TRIP's performance in this criterion is rated as **moderately satisfactory (4)**, in agreement with the PCR.

Adaptation to climate change

48. The geographic location of Tonga makes its population highly vulnerable to natural shocks, in particular extreme weather events increasingly caused by climate change. At appraisal, planned mitigation measures encompassed trainings for disaster risk management. Throughout the project implementation, the partnership with the University of South Pacific and the Pacific Risk Resilience Project translated into the embedding of resilience to climate change into CDPs.⁶³ Resulting infrastructure was built with cyclone category 5 standards and no activities were funded in "red zones", prone to tsunamis.⁶⁴ Examples comprised community halls that provided shelter in case of storms and water infrastructure subprojects that addressed water shortage, particularly relevant after El Niño events.⁶⁵
49. By including climate change considerations as a project risk and allowing beneficiaries to decide on their priorities, TRIP contributed to climate change adaptation in the project area. Therefore, this PCRV agrees with PMD, and rates to the project's adaptation to climate change as **moderately satisfactory (4)**.

C. Overall project achievement

50. Overall, TRIP was relevant in terms of the alignment to the government's and IFAD's policy and its design and the adaptation thereof. The relative broad targeting strategy corresponded with the lack of existing data on characteristics of rural population. The project achieved its first objective but the achievement of the second component was lower. There were some delays in the implementation of the project. Yet, costs related to project management and costs per beneficiaries could be explained by the remoteness of Tongan rural communities. As for the impact on rural poverty, the biggest effects were found for the development of social capital and empowerment, and institutions and policies. The sustainability of

⁶³ (IFAD, 2017_05) #82.

⁶⁴ (IFAD, 2018_01) #37.

⁶⁵ (MONDI TT, 2015_05).

the benefits could be expected due to the empowerment of beneficiaries and local public servants. Sustainability of infrastructure was ensured through the compliance of cyclone category 5 safety requirements. The provision of continuous foreign aid will be important to consolidate some of the project's benefits. TRIP successfully scaled up the community development process approach of the previous MORDI grant. Some elements were innovative, and they worked well enough for the project to be scaled up on a national level. Moreover, the project took natural resources management and the adaptation to climate change into consideration, although the extent thereof could not be assessed. Further results of the project on an impact level and for other criteria could not be fully ascertained due to lack of data. The project's achievement is rated as **moderately satisfactory (4)**, concurring with the PCR.

D. Performance of partners

51. **IFAD.** In terms of the support provided, two country programme managers were responsible for the project, allowing for continuity. At appraisal, two supervision missions per year were planned.⁶⁶ Although this ambitious goal was not met, by completion 8 supervision missions had been undertaken (none in 2016).⁶⁷ IFAD encountered limitations in terms of resources and capacity. The team had thus difficulties to follow up on the implementation of their recommendations.⁶⁸ The Mid-Term Review process was interrupted because it was not defined beforehand who was responsible for undertaking it. As a consequence, the M&E system was never corrected. Nevertheless, to increase oversight of the countries in the region, the position of Country Programme Manager was outposted from Rome to Jakarta. The analysis of fiduciary aspects and state of compliance with financing agreement covenants identified issues when they arose, like the problems related to counterpart funding discussed in the following section.
52. The lack of follow-up on recommendations and the complications related to the MTR process could have been prevented if IFAD had undertaken a closer and more timely supervision; therefore, its performance is rated as **moderately unsatisfactory (3)**, in agreement with the PCR.
53. **Government.** The Government had a strategic and oversight role in the project's implementation as per design, particularly at local level, and partnered with the NGO MORDI TT that had a better comparative advantage than public agencies to implement the project. It has to be recognized that the Government did mainstream the CDPs into its local planning, and it aggregated the plans into District and Island Development Plans. The Ministry of Finance and National Planning was the project's borrower and part of the Steering Committee. Yet, that Steering Committee "provided limited direction to steer project implementation".⁶⁹ What stands out though is that by May 2017, only 43 per cent of the counterpart funds (in form of tax exemption payback) had been provided.⁷⁰ According to the PCR, this affected the project's implementation pace and thus the delivery of results.⁷¹
54. The Government willingness was clear for several aspects of the project's functioning, particularly local Government and the Ministry of Internal Affairs in terms of the development of CDPs at national scale. But it failed to provide funds crucial for the project's implementation in a timely manner. Consequently, this PCR rates the Government's performance rating as **moderately unsatisfactory (3)**.

⁶⁶ (IFAD, 2012_01) #119.

⁶⁷ (IFAD, 2018_01) Appendix 3.

⁶⁸ (IFAD, 2018_01) #142.

⁶⁹ (IFAD, 2018_01) #132.

⁷⁰ (IFAD, 2017_05) #100.

⁷¹ (IFAD, 2018_01) #134.

55. **MORDI TT.** The implementation of TRIP was the responsibility of the NGO MORDI TT. It is noteworthy that this NGO managed to execute the first component even when the target population was extended substantially. Partnerships were built between this NGO and several stakeholders.⁷² The Project Advisory Committee was effective and managed to process the approval of all CEIG. Monitoring the project was not reflected though in a corresponding data collection. The logframe used RIMS indicators at first, second and third level, but only the first were collected systematically. Indicators at second and third level were only collected at baseline and end-line. The lack of a good M&E system translated into lack of key data beyond of what had been planned initially (for example, in terms of number and topics covered in trainings), and into delays in handing in progress reports, annual workplans, etc. Together with high staff turnover,⁷³ some managerial difficulties became evident.⁷⁴ There was also no information provided on the organisation of a yearly one-day lessons-learned workshop by MORDI TT with key stakeholders working towards the rural development from public agencies, non-governmental organisations, donor agencies and representatives of the private sector, as it had been planned at appraisal.

IV. Assessment of PCR quality

Scope

56. The PCR of TRIP covered all criteria as per the guidelines for Project Completion Review (2014) and included all relevant annexes. This PCR rates the scope of the completion report as **highly satisfactory (6)**.

Quality

57. Both beneficiary and non-beneficiary stakeholders were included in the project completion process. Yet, the completion report confused indicators at output, outcome and impact level. Possibly this stems from the weak M&E system. It seems that more has been done than initially planned in the logframe (for example trainings), yet these results could not be presented systematically due to the lack of data. Efforts were thus made by the PCR for collecting data, for example with the provision of case studies and end-line surveys. The quality of the PCR is thus rated as **moderately satisfactory (4)**.

Lessons

58. The PCR integrated elements for improvement throughout the report, which allowed for only the most important lessons to be highlighted at the end of it. This PCR rates the lessons presented in the completion report as **satisfactory (5)**.

Candour

59. Both positive and negative results were presented, as well as the challenges encountered. But there was a discrepancy between the PCR's narrative and its ratings, where the narrative was more positive. This PCR rates the candour as **moderately satisfactory (4)**.

V. Lessons learned

60. As correctly identified by the PCR, the combination of empowerment of beneficiaries together with the opening up of dialogue channels with public agencies can be very powerful. TRIP showed that the participatory approach increased ownership of communities from highly remote places and put them in a position to raise their voices and present their needs to decision makers. A continuous support from the project staff was crucial, but the accompaniment of community facilitators and local public agents, who would remain after project completion, even more so.

⁷² (IFAD, 2018_01) #17.

⁷³ (IFAD, 2016_01) #25.

⁷⁴ (IFAD, 2016_01) #55.

61. Finally, it is noteworthy that a project seemingly with satisfactory performance such as TRIP cannot present evidence on its results because the M&E system fails to provide robust data. According to the country programme manager, corrective measures are already being implemented in TRIP II.

Definition and rating of the evaluation criteria used by IOE

Criteria	Definition *	Mandatory	To be rated
Rural poverty impact	Impact is defined as the changes that have occurred or are expected to occur in the lives of the rural poor (whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended) as a result of development interventions. <i>Four impact domains</i>	X	Yes
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Household income and net assets: Household income provides a means of assessing the flow of economic benefits accruing to an individual or group, whereas assets relate to a stock of accumulated items of economic value. The analysis must include an assessment of trends in equality over time. 		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Human and social capital and empowerment: Human and social capital and empowerment include an assessment of the changes that have occurred in the empowerment of individuals, the quality of grass-roots organizations and institutions, the poor's individual and collective capacity, and in particular, the extent to which specific groups such as youth are included or excluded from the development process. 		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Food security and agricultural productivity: Changes in food security relate to availability, stability, affordability and access to food and stability of access, whereas changes in agricultural productivity are measured in terms of yields; nutrition relates to the nutritional value of food and child malnutrition. 		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Institutions and policies: The criterion relating to institutions and policies is designed to assess changes in the quality and performance of institutions, policies and the regulatory framework that influence the lives of the poor. 		No
Project performance	Project performance is an average of the ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.	X	Yes
Relevance	The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, institutional priorities and partner and donor policies. It also entails an assessment of project design and coherence in achieving its objectives. An assessment should also be made of whether objectives and design address inequality, for example, by assessing the relevance of targeting strategies adopted.	X	Yes
Effectiveness	The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.	X	Yes
Efficiency	A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results.	X	Yes
Sustainability of benefits	The likely continuation of net benefits from a development intervention beyond the phase of external funding support. It also includes an assessment of the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the project's life.	X	Yes
Other performance criteria			
Gender equality and women's empowerment	The extent to which IFAD interventions have contributed to better gender equality and women's empowerment, for example, in terms of women's access to and ownership of assets, resources and services; participation in decision making; work load balance and impact on women's incomes, nutrition and livelihoods.	X	Yes
Innovation	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have introduced innovative approaches to rural poverty reduction.	X	Yes
Scaling up	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have been (or are likely to be) scaled up by government authorities, donor organizations, the private sector and others agencies.	X	Yes
Environment and natural resources management	The extent to which IFAD development interventions contribute to resilient livelihoods and ecosystems. The focus is on the use and management of the natural environment, including natural resources defined as raw materials used for socio-economic and cultural purposes, and ecosystems and biodiversity - with the goods and services they provide.	X	Yes
Adaptation to climate change	The contribution of the project to reducing the negative impacts of climate change through dedicated adaptation or risk reduction measures	X	Yes

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Definition</i> *	<i>Mandatory</i>	<i>To be rated</i>
Overall project achievement	This provides an overarching assessment of the intervention, drawing upon the analysis and ratings for rural poverty impact, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, gender equality and women's empowerment, innovation and scaling up, as well as environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change.	X	Yes
Performance of partners			
• IFAD	This criterion assesses the contribution of partners to project design, execution, monitoring and reporting, supervision and implementation support, and evaluation. The performance of each partner will be assessed on an individual basis with a view to the partner's expected role and responsibility in the project life cycle.	X	Yes
• Government		X	Yes

* These definitions build on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management; the Methodological Framework for Project Evaluation agreed with the Evaluation Committee in September 2003; the first edition of the Evaluation Manual discussed with the Evaluation Committee in December 2008; and further discussions with the Evaluation Committee in November 2010 on IOE's evaluation criteria and key questions.

Rating comparison^a

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Programme Management Department (PMD) rating</i>	<i>IOE Project Completion Report Validation (PCRVR) rating</i>	<i>Net rating disconnect (PCRVR-PMD)</i>
Rural poverty impact	4	4	0
Project performance			
Relevance	4	4	0
Effectiveness	4	4	0
Efficiency	4	4	0
Sustainability of benefits	4	4	0
Project performance^b	4	4	0
Other performance criteria			
Gender equality and women's empowerment	4	4	0
Innovation	4	4	0
Scaling up	5	5	0
Environment and natural resources management	4	4	0
Adaptation to climate change	4	4	0
Overall project achievement^c	4	4	0
Performance of partners^d			
IFAD	3	3	0
Government	3	3	0
Average net disconnect	4	4	0

^a Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable.

^b Arithmetic average of ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.

^c This is not an average of ratings of individual evaluation criteria but an overarching assessment of the project, drawing upon the rating for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, rural poverty impact, gender, innovation and scaling up, environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change.

^d The rating for partners' performance is not a component of the overall project achievement rating.

Ratings of the project completion report quality

	<i>PMD rating</i>	<i>IOE PCRVR rating</i>	<i>Net disconnect</i>
Candour	n.a.	4	-
Lessons	n.a.	5	-
Quality (methods, data, participatory process)	n.a.	4	-
Scope	n.a.	6	-
Overall rating of the project completion report			

Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

CDP	Community Development Plans
CEIG	Community economic infrastructure grants
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
MORDI	Mainstreaming of Rural Development Innovation Program
MORDI TT	MORDI Tonga Trust
PCR	Project Completion Report
PDR	Project Design Report
SEG	Supplementary Equity Grants
TRIP	Tonga Rural Innovation Project

Bibliography

- CD R. Hartman. (2018, April 25). TRIP - Talk with CD.
- IFAD. (2011_11). *QE Panel Report*. Rome.
- IFAD. (2012_01). *TRIP - Project Design Report*. Rome.
- IFAD. (2012_04). *TRIP - President's report*. Rome.
- IFAD. (2013_06). *TRIP - Supervision Mission Aide Memoire*. Rome.
- IFAD. (2014_03). *TRIP - Supervision Mission Aide Memoire*. Rome.
- IFAD. (2015_06). *TRIP - Mid-term Review*. Rome.
- IFAD. (2016_01). *TRIP - Supervision Report*. Rome.
- IFAD. (2017_05). *TRIP - Supervision Report*. Rome.
- IFAD. (2018_01). *TRIP - Project Completion Report*. Rome.
- IFAD. (2018_02). *TRIP - CPMT Minutes*. Rome.
- Ministry of Agriculture, Food, Forests and Fisheries. (2014_04). *Corporate Plan*. Nuku'alofa.
- Ministry of Finance and National Planning of Tonga. (2011). *Tonga Strategic Development Framework 2011-2014*. Nuku'alofa.
- MONDI TT. (2015_05). *TRIP Progress Report*. Nuku'alofa.