

Project Completion Report Validation

Project for Reviving Food Crops and Small Livestock Production in the Savannah Central African Republic

Date of validation by IOE: July 2019

I. Basic project data

			Approval (XAF billion)		Actual (XAF billion)	
Region	West and Central Africa (WCA)	Total project costs	7.2		5.5	
Country	Central African Republic	IFAD loan and percentage of total	3	41%	5.3	97%
Loan and grant numbers	Loan: L-I-834-CF Grant: G-I-DSF-8080-CF	IFAD grant and percentage of total	3	41%		
Type of project (subsector)	Rural development	Borrower	0.8	12%	0.2	3%
Financing type	Loan and grant	Cofinancier 1				
Lending terms*	Highly concessional	Cofinancier 2				
Date of approval	30 April 2011	Cofinancier 3				
Date of loan signature	12 May 2011	Beneficiaries	0.4	5%	NA	NA
Date of effectiveness	12 May 2011	Other sources				
Financing agreement amendments	Mid-2015, April 2016, mid-July, June 2018 ¹	Number of direct beneficiaries	62,700		54,758	
Financing closure extensions	2					
Country programme managers	S. Marzin; A. Lhommeau; I. Bamba; B. Hien	Financing closing date	31 December 2016		31 July 2018	
Regional director(s)	M. Beavogui; I. De Willebois; L. Martin	Mid-term review			27 April – 14 May 2016	
Project completion report reviewer	Valeria Galletti (Consultant)	IFAD loan and grant disbursement at project completion (%)			88%	
Project completion report quality control panel	Fumiko Nakai	Date of the project completion report			30 June 2018	

Project costs are expressed in XAF (Central African CFA Franc BEAC) due to the lack of coherent and consolidated data on expenditures in US\$ in the Project Completion Report (PCR) (see more in the project outline).

Source: President's Report (2011), Project Status Reports (PSR), PCR, loan and grant agreement.

* 40 years, including a grace period of 10 years, with a service charge of three fourths of one per cent (0.75 per cent) per annum.

¹ It is understood that the financing agreement was amended in mid-2015 and mid-2017 for reallocation of funds. The PCR refers to these two reallocations and the requests by the Government and the internal memorandum for one of them were found in the system, but official communication to the Government was not found in the IFAD record management system, hence, the exact dates not noted. The amendments in April 2016 and June 2018 were for extension.

II. Project outline

1. **Introduction.** The Project for Reviving Food Crops and Small Livestock Production in the Savannah (PREVES)² was a project in the Central African Republic aiming at enhancing food security and raising the incomes of poor rural producers in the target area.
2. PREVES was conceived in a post-conflict context characterized by the destruction of social infrastructure and productive assets, resulting in a return to subsistence farming with families barely able to meet their own food needs. In this context, supporting the mobilization of farmers, intensifying the production of food crops and livestock and improving access to markets were considered key to address issues faced by producers and create the conditions for a sustainable recovery.
3. The project financing was approved by IFAD's Executive Board on 30 April 2011. The agreement was signed and effective on 12 May 2011, with 30 June 2016 and 31 December 2016 as the initial completion and closing dates respectively. Two extensions were granted during implementation (see more in paragraph 16).³ PREVES was the first project to be financed by IFAD after nearly 10 years of portfolio suspension in the country due to loan repayment default and growing social and economic unrest.
4. **Project area.** The project area at design covered four sub-prefectures in the Savannah region (Baoro, Bouar, Bouca and Yaloké).
5. **Project goal, objectives and components.** According to the 2011 President's Report, the overall goal of the project was to help enhance food security and raise the incomes of poor rural producers in the project area. Its specific objectives were to: (i) build the capacity of producers' organizations (POs) to deliver services to their members effectively and sustainably; and (ii) increase the production and marketing of food crops and small livestock.
6. **Components.** The project had three components: (i) capacity-building of producers and their organizations; (ii) production and marketing of food crops and small livestock; (iii) coordination, management, monitoring & evaluation (M&E).
7. *Component 1- Capacity-building of producers and their organizations* aimed at enabling rural producers and their organizations at different levels to articulate their needs and play meaningful roles in input supply, marketing and policy dialogue. In particular, the component planned to support the mobilization of farmers, training and capacity building activities.
8. *Component 2 - Production and marketing of food crops and small livestock* aimed at improving the incomes of rural producers by improving productivity and promoting inter-regional trade. The component planned to support: (i) the distribution to supported households of the needed capital for the revival of their activities (e.g. seeds, small equipment, veterinary products); (ii) the production and marketing of improved seeds; (iii) the set-up of a fund to support micro-projects in the fields of production, processing, marketing of agricultural and animal products; (iv) the rehabilitation of 37 km of rural roads; (v) the construction of latrines and the rehabilitation/construction of boreholes in partnership with UNICEF;⁴ and (vi) capacity building to public institutions (the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development - MADR⁵ and its deconcentrated services).
9. *Component 3 - Project coordination, management and M&E* aimed to ensure project coordination, administrative and financial management and M&E.

² From the French *Projet de Relance des Cultures Vivrières et du Petit Elevage dans les Savanes*.

³ Extended completion and closing dates were 31 December 2017 and 31 July 2018 respectively.

⁴ United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund.

⁵ From the French: *Ministère de l'Agriculture et du Développement Rural*.

10. **Target group.** According to the 2011 President's Report, the project directly targeted about 10,450 households of food-insecure small-scale crop and livestock producers (approximately 62,700 individuals grouped in 350 grassroots POs). Special attention was to be given to women and youth. During the first year of implementation, the project would also support about 1,000 decapitalized households strongly affected by the conflict (displaced / destitute farmers).
11. **Financing.** The total project cost at approval was US\$13.17 million, of which US\$10.88 million⁶ was financed by IFAD through a highly-concessional loan (US\$5.44 million) and a grant under the Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF) (US\$5.44 million). Additional sources of financing included the Government (US\$1.56 million) and beneficiaries (US\$0.72 million).

Table 1

Estimated project costs at design (in US\$ million)

Source of Funding	Type of financing	Estimated amount (US\$ m)	Estimated amount (% of total)
IFAD	Loan	5.44	41.3
IFAD	Grant	5.44	41.3
Government		1.56	11.9
Beneficiaries		0.72	5.5
Total Financing		13.17	100

Source: 2011 President's Report.

12. Due to the lack of consistent and comparable information in terms of project costs/expenditures in the Project Completion Report (PCR),⁷ the tables below present project expenditures expressed in billion XAF as of 31 May 2018. Tables do not include the expected and actual contribution of beneficiaries that could not be traced.

Table 2

Project costs as of 31 May 2018 (in billion XAF)

Source of funding	Type of financing	Estimated amount (billion XAF)	Estimated amount (% of total)	Actual expenditure (billion XAF)	Expenditure (% of total)	Disbursements (% of estimated amount)
IFAD	Loan and grant ⁸	6	88	5.3	97	88
Government		0.8	12	0.2	3	24
Total		6.8	100	5.5	100	81

Source: PCR.

Table 3

Component costs as of 31 May 2018 (in billion XAF)

Components	Planned (XAF billion)	Planned amount (% of total)	Actual amount (XAF billion)	Actual (% of total)
Component 1	0.9	13,6	0.2	3,5
Component 2	4.6	67,8	2.4	43,6
Component 3	1.3	18,6	2.9	52,9
Total	6.8	100	5.5	100

Source: PCR.

⁶ The budget in the financing agreement was expressed in Special Drawing Rights totaling 6.9 million.

⁷ In particular: (i) consolidated tables on expenditures in US\$ are not available; (ii) inconsistencies were found in terms of expenditures and/or percentages of expenditures referred to in the different sections and annexes of the PCR.

⁸ The PCR only includes reference to consolidated expenditures against the IFAD contribution.

13. **Project implementation.** The project was designed to be implemented by MADR and guided by a national steering committee. A project coordination and management unit (PCMU) was to be established in Yaloké. Oversight of operations and technical support in each of the four sub-prefectures was to be provided by four non-governmental organizations (NGOs) identified through a competitive process. Also, the project was expected to enter into partnership with the government decentralized services/public institutions to support implementation.
14. **Changes and developments during implementation.** Significant changes occurred during implementation. In particular, following a successful start-up of the project in a relatively stable environment, PREVES was affected by a security and humanitarian crisis with multiple military and political conflicts between 2012 and 2015 that devastated the economy and caused a large part of the population to flee their homes. This resulted in an increase of poverty and a deterioration of the living conditions of rural populations and did not allow a normal execution of project activities.
15. Due to the above, the following main adjustments were made in the implementation arrangements: (i) the PCMU could not be established in Yaloké but was hosted at the offices of the Food and Agriculture Organization in Bangui; (ii) PREVES could not be implemented in the sub-prefecture of Bouca; and (iii) NGOs involved in the implementation in Yaloké and Baoro⁹ disengaged from the project and were replaced by Mercy Corps (already working in Bouar). Also, IFAD supervision missions could not be fielded regularly and the Mid-Term Review (MTR) could be organized in 2016 only¹⁰ following the gradual restoration of peace and the improvement of security conditions in the aftermath of the presidential and legislative elections.
16. Further, based on MTR findings, the following changes were implemented: (i) an extension of project duration by 18 months;¹¹ (ii) an increase of the initial advance to the designated account from XAF100 million to XAF300 million; (iii) the non-renewal of the agreement with Mercy Corps (see more in Section D); (iv) the cancellation of some activities (i.e. the rehabilitation of 37 km of roads). In addition, according to the PCR, two reallocations among categories of expenditures were made in 2015 and 2017 (PCR appendix 6)¹² and a one-month extension to the loan closing date was granted in June 2018 to enable settling eligible winding-up expenditures incurred between loan completion and closing.
17. **Intervention logic.** PREVES was designed to support beneficiaries to enhance their food security and improve incomes through complementary interventions to be implemented gradually and in three phases.¹³
18. The strong focus on POs under component 1 was expected to improve their capacity to deliver relevant services for the benefit of their members. The role of women in POs decision-making was expected to be enhanced through women's participation in capacity building and economic initiatives. The inclusion of youth as a target group would generate employment and improve livelihoods in rural areas. The support to the implementation of economic initiatives of producers through micro-projects under component 2 was expected to improve crop and livestock

⁹ Cooperazione Internazionale and the Catholic Relief Services respectively.

¹⁰ On implementation year 5 rather than year 3, as expected.

¹¹ Extended completion and closing dates were 31 December 2017 and 30 June 2018.

¹² In 2015, the budget for category III (assistance, training and studies) was increased by 26 per cent. In 2017, IFAD proceeds under categories I (infrastructure) and IV (funds for micro-projects) and unallocated funds were allocated to categories II (equipment), III (assistance, training and studies) and V (functioning costs). By comparing the original budget with the budget revised in 2017 the following is observed: an increase by 90 per cent of funds allocated under category III and by 36 per cent under category V; a decrease by 50 per cent in the budget under category IV.

¹³ During the first phase, "quick wins" activities (e.g. distribution of improved seeds, animals, agricultural tools and equipment) with immediate effects were to be implemented to facilitate the adhesion of the target population to the project. In a second phase, PREVES would focus on the mobilization of farmers for their grouping into POs and the financing of micro-projects. The last phase of implementation was aimed at consolidating results achieved.

production by addressing key constraints faced by producers (e.g. low productivity, little public investment in agriculture). Complementary to the above, the development of market infrastructure aimed to improve access of agricultural products to the market, thus contributing to economic growth and reduced vulnerability in rural areas. Capacity building to MADR and public agricultural support services was expected to further address the lack of capacity and funds preventing them from supporting producers in a sustainable way.

19. **Delivery of outputs.** According to the PCR, the delivery of outputs by the project was mixed. In particular, a relatively good level of achievements was recorded under component 1, principally in relation to training and capacity building. Activities under component 2 were only partially implemented.

III. Review of findings

A. Core criteria

Relevance

20. **Relevance vis-à-vis IFAD and Government policies and strategies.** The project's objectives were aligned with the Government and IFAD strategies.
21. In particular, as indicated in the 2011 President's Report, the project was in line with IFAD's 2007-2010 strategic framework as contributing to many of its strategic objectives, as well as with IFAD's Policy on targeting. It continued to be coherent with subsequent IFAD frameworks (2011-2015 and 2016-2025). Also, it aligned with the 2018-2019 Country Strategy Note focusing on the improvement of food and nutrition security and the resilience of the rural poor through improved production, strengthened infrastructure and services offered to producers.
22. PREVES was fully aligned with the national strategies for poverty reduction and food security and for agricultural sector development. This includes the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers¹⁴ 2008-2010 and 2011-2015, the Strategy for Rural Development, Agriculture and Food Security 2011-2015¹⁵ and the National Plan for Agricultural Investment and Food and Nutritional Security 2013-2018¹⁶ with their focus on the promotion and revival of agriculture through: strengthened capacities of producers, POs and rural support services; diversified agricultural sector; improved access to markets for producers.
23. The project was also designed to fill the gaps in the panorama of initiatives of main international agencies such as the African Development Bank, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Bank, the World Food Programme (WFP), particularly focusing on infrastructure rehabilitation and emergency assistance.
24. **Relevance of design.** PREVES strategies and supported activities reflected the needs of the targeted populations and were relevant to meet project objectives. In particular, the objectives of the two technical components addressed major structural constraints to rural and agricultural development among small-scale producers who had most often lost all they had during the conflict period (e.g. low productivity, poor access to improved seeds and other inputs, quasi total dismantlement of agricultural support services, little public investment in agriculture, restricted access to markets due to the lack of essential infrastructure). At the same time, with regained stability, there were good opportunities and potential for improving agriculture and livestock production.¹⁷
25. The targeting approach was also relevant. In line with the IFAD Policy, the multi-pronged targeting strategy combined: (i) geographical targeting, with the selection of areas that suffered most from conflicts. Selected zones ranked as the poorest of

¹⁴ From the French: *Documents de Stratégie de Réduction de la Pauvreté.*

¹⁵ From the French: *Stratégie de Développement Rural, d'Agriculture et de Sécurité Alimentaire.*

¹⁶ From the French: *Programme National D'investissement Agricole, de Sécurité Alimentaire et Nutritionnelle.*

¹⁷ Source: IFAD, PREVES Concept Note, June 2018.

the country and were covered by previous IFAD-financed projects; (ii) self-targeting; (iii) direct targeting of women and youth; (iv) community-based targeting of vulnerable categories through POs.

26. Nonetheless, the design showed some weaknesses. In particular, although this aspect was not discussed in relation to the relevance in the PCR, the formulation of PREVES was based on ambitious hypothesis of stability not taking into account the risks associated with the possible resurgence of conflict. Some deficiencies were observed in the organization of expected results under the project components¹⁸ and in the selection of some indicators (not specific or not corresponding to the related component).¹⁹ Finally, the selection of partners that did not have the needed capacities and experience to implement the project (e.g. Mercy Corps and public sector institutions) might indicate a weak assessment of their strengths and weaknesses at design (see more in the section on effectiveness and in section D).
27. In summary, the project was aligned with both national and IFAD's priorities and the main areas of intervention were relevant to the poor. Further, changes and adjustments made during implementation (see Chapter II above) were relevant and can be seen as an indicator of the capacity of the project to adapt to emerging needs in a very challenging context. Nonetheless, some weaknesses were identified in the assessment of risks, the identification of partners, the organization of project activities under the different components and the definition of indicators.
28. Overall, project relevance is rated *moderately satisfactory (4)* by the PCR, one point lower than the PCR.

Effectiveness

29. **Objective 1 - Build the capacity of POs to deliver services to their members effectively and sustainably.** The strategy for strengthening the capacity of POs was focused both on small grassroots groups at village level and national apex organizations and was aimed at enabling them to deliver relevant services to their members by improving their technical and organizational capacities.
30. According to the PCR, PREVES supported the establishment of consultation frameworks in seven municipalities (against 11 planned) to enable PO members and leaders to periodically consult on relevant issues, coordinate requests for support, and identify synergies in the implementation of activities.
31. Training was provided to 1,014 technical farmers champions (referred to as Technical Delegates - TDs) against 80 planned in order to provide them with the needed capacities to deliver agricultural advisory support/technical assistance to producers (e.g. in vegetable and livestock production, farm management, etc.). Trainings were also conducted to support PO staff, leaders and field agents (e.g. in participatory evaluation, lobbying and advocacy, good governance, design, management and M&E of micro-projects). According to the PCR, the results from the trainings were not homogeneous. For example, as a result of training on crop year, 87 POs (out of 108 participating in the activity) elaborated their 2016-2017 crop year plans. Conversely, training on micro-projects did not cover key aspects (e.g. business plan preparation), which could have improved beneficiaries' understanding of the issues, risks and profitability associated with them.
32. Capacity building activities also concerned literacy through the training of trainers (57 against 50 expected) and the opening of 54 literacy centres attended by 2,822 people (of which 71 per cent women). However, a high dropout rate (up to 40 per

¹⁸ For example, the result relating to the improved technical advisory services offered to producers and POs was found to be more coherent as expected results of component 1 rather than component 2.

¹⁹ For example, the indicator "percentage of production processed and marketed by farmers" was not considered specific. Further, it had to be linked to component 2 and not to component 1 that related to the capacity building of farmers and POs.

cent) was registered. Overall, according to the PCR, 729 attendees, including 487 women, passed the tests and were declared literate.

33. Overall, 355 POs against an initial target of 350 were supported by PREVES. While the project contributed to strengthening their organizational and technical capacities, the PCR mission was not able to fully appreciate their ability to deliver services to their members due to the weak M&E of the project (see more in the section on project impact and in section D). The functioning of POs was found generally weak and additional support was to be needed for the consolidation of achievements.
34. PREVES also contributed to the strengthening of apex structures (e.g. CNOP-CAF²⁰ and ONFR²¹) through training, the financing of statutory meetings, and equipment. Nonetheless, as also mentioned in the MTR report, these organizations did not have the capacity to coordinate the actions of POs at the grassroots level and were not able to efficiently represent and defend the interests of their members.
35. **Objective 2 - Increase the production and marketing of food crops and small livestock.**²² Through component 2, PREVES was expected to: (i) reintegrate decapitalized producers into economic activities; (ii) increase vegetable and animal production and productivity through improved access to financing (micro-projects), effective rural services as well as the set-up of a functional, sustainable and autonomous seeds system; (iii) increase the marketed share of agricultural products; (iv) improve access to water and sanitation.
36. *Reintegration of decapitalized households.* PREVES supported 1,625 decapitalized households (against 1,000 expected) through the distribution of plant material and kits with basic means of production and the provision of training to facilitate their engagement in agricultural and livestock production. According to the PCR, part of the beneficiaries participating in the stakeholders' workshop recognized that the acquisition of agricultural equipment/farming tools and material enabled them to increase planted areas or productivity. However, others pointed out that agricultural equipment was often delayed, insufficient, of defective quality or did not meet their needs. Further, beneficiaries also highlighted the low level of transparency and traceability in relation to the quantities received. According to the PCR, 63 per cent of supported households (against 80 per cent expected) became members of POs thus facilitating their socio-economic reintegration.
37. *Micro-projects.* Due to security reasons, the set-up of the fund for the implementation of micro-projects was suspended in 2013 although a manual of procedures had already been developed. According to the MTR, the process for the design and implementation of micro-projects was cumbersome and lengthy with several steps from the launch of calls to concrete access to financing. Overall, only 100 micro-projects were elaborated and 90 implemented (against a target of 1,318 at design and 400 at MTR) leading to frustration and disappointment among beneficiaries.
38. *Development of a system for the productions and commercialization of seeds.* According to the 2014-2015 Project Status Report (PSR), a key result of PREVES was that it contributed to the relaunch of the seeds value chain in the three sub-prefectures that became self-reliant in terms of quality seeds (maize, red beans, cassava and groundnuts).
39. In particular, with the support of the Central African Institute of Agricultural Research (ICRA) ²³ PREVES promoted the reorganization and strengthening of 148

²⁰ *Concertation Nationale des Organisations Paysanne de Centrafrique.*

²¹ *Organisation Nationale de Femmes Rurales.*

²² According to IFAD's Quality Assurance Compliance Note, project support was expected to focus on priority crops produced and consumed by the local population (e.g. cassava, peanuts, beans) and small livestock (goats and poultry).

²³ From the French: *Institut Centrafricain de Recherche Agronomique.*

Networks of Seeds Producers²⁴ in Baoro, Bouar and Yaloké. These networks enabled the establishment of 62 ha of nurseries for three cassava varieties and of 459 ha for the multiplication of groundnuts, maize, cassava and red beans seeds. According to the 2014-2015 PSR, after two campaigns of seeds multiplication, the bulk of seeds distributed to farmers were locally sourced. Overall, 88.52 tons of seeds were distributed between 2013 and 2017 (against a target of 35 tons).

40. However, the control and certification system was not established as planned and an insufficient organization of grouped sales was observed by the PCR mission due to the lack of a well-developed seeds marketing strategy.
41. *Livestock production.* With the support of ICRA and the National Agency for Livestock Development (ANDE),²⁵ PREVES planned to support improved livestock production through the direct supply of genetically improved breeds of animals for decapitalized households, vaccination campaigns, the implementation of micro-projects and the establishment of a network for the repository and sale of zoo-technical and veterinary inputs.
42. According to the PCR, livestock production remained weak until the MTR though it slightly improved after the engagement of a livestock expert within the PCMU. Vaccination campaigns were conducted on 12,554 chickens in 1,841 households, and on 1,046 heads of small ruminants in 65 households. The National Federation of Central African Breeders received veterinary material/medicines and 12 cold chain kits (e.g. including freezers and batteries). Further, PREVES distributed 421 goats and 364 poultry. Nonetheless, according to the PCR the support of the project in terms of vaccination did not meet the needs of the beneficiaries and animal mortality rates remained high.
43. *Marketing.* PREVES was expected to improve the commercialization of agricultural products and livestock particularly through training, grouped sales, the rehabilitation of roads, as well as the financing of micro-projects focusing on the rehabilitation / construction of small village storage warehouses, the acquisition of processing equipment, the purchase of means of transport. Nonetheless, results were limited particularly due to the difficult socio-political context.
44. Overall, 70 TDs within POs and 70 women from 35 women groups received training to facilitate the organization of grouped sales. As a result, the ONFR managed to enter into partnership with the WFP and CARITAS for the marketing of the products of their members in 2014 and 2015 (19 tons red beans produced in 2014-2015). As far as infrastructure is concerned, as previously mentioned, the rehabilitation of roads was not carried out due to security constraints and the micro-projects ended up focusing on production only.
45. *Water and sanitation.* The PCR indicates that the project was not proactive in establishing partnership with UNICEF as defined at design and activities started after the MTR only. However, PREVES was able to rehabilitate and construct 40 and 25 boreholes respectively as planned, organize 65 hygiene mobilization and awareness campaigns, train 22 repair agents, and set-up 65 water point management committees against 70 planned. Activities enabled PREVES to reach 32,500 beneficiaries and improve their access to drinkable water and sanitary conditions.
46. *Support to the government and public services.* PREVES support to the government mainly focused on the elaboration of the 2011-2015 Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and the Strategy for Rural Development, Agriculture and Food Security as well as the National Plan for Agricultural Investment and Food and Nutritional Security 2013-2018 in collaboration with other development partners. Furthermore, the technical capacities of staff from the Regional Directorate for

²⁴ From the French: *Réseau des Producteurs de Semences.*

²⁵ From the French: *Agence Nationale de Développement de l'Élevage.*

Rural Development,²⁶ the Central African Agency for Agricultural Development (ACDA),²⁷ ICRA and ANDE were strengthened in the field of production, storage, conservation, marketing, and the implementation of micro-projects. Nonetheless, their performance and capacity to deliver relevant services in rural areas remained weak with the exception of ICRA (see more in section D).

47. **Summary.** The implementation of PREVES suffered from a situation of instability and crisis that resulted in a limited achievement of results particularly in terms of livestock production, improved marketing and the implementation of micro-projects. Nonetheless, some successes were also observed such as in relation to the development of a system for the production of seeds. Training and capacity building activities benefitted POs and public services. Nonetheless, their capacity to provide services in rural areas was found limited and further support needed to consolidate results.
48. In terms of the outreach, the project reportedly reached 54,758 direct beneficiaries (or 87 per cent of the target at design). Of these, 49 per cent were women. As previously mentioned, the project operated in only three of the four sub-prefectures targeted at design.
49. The effectiveness of PREVES is considered both in the PCR and PCRV *moderately unsatisfactory (3)*.

Efficiency

50. The implementation of PREVES was affected by socio-political instability and multiple conflicts between 2012 and 2015 that did not allow a normal execution of activities. The project also suffered from the instability of the PCMU, financial management and M&E issues and a limited mobilization of resources from the government (see more in section D).
51. According to the available financial information on the status of cumulative expenditures, as of 31 May 2018 the overall financial execution stood at 77 per cent of the total estimated project cost.²⁸ According to the PCR, expenditures related to project management under component 3 largely exceeded the planned allocations. The actual component 3 cost was 53 per cent of the total actual costs, which is quite high compared to 19 per cent as per the original allocation. The PCR does not clearly explain the reasons for the significant over-expenditure under component 3.²⁹ While the section on the performance of partners refers to the high management costs of Mercy Corps (see footnote 33), this aspect is not explicitly linked to component 3. According to the PCR, the cost per beneficiary was XAF101,074 or US\$172 (against XAF105,548 or US\$180 expected).³⁰ Finally, the PCR indicates that a sound and detailed financial and economic analysis could not be undertaken due to the lack of sufficient data collected by the project.
52. Taking into account the high project management cost, pace of disbursement and implementation, and the problematic output delivery, efficiency is rated *unsatisfactory (2)* in both the PCR and the PCRV.

Rural poverty impact

53. According to the PCR, the assessment of the impact of the project was challenging. While the project was expected to conduct a baseline survey and three impact studies (i.e. an impact study at mid-term; a socio-economic impact study and a results and impact management system (RIMS)³¹ survey at completion) only the

²⁶ From the French: *Direction Régionale de Développement Rural*.

²⁷ From the French: *Agence Centrafricaine de Développement Agricole*.

²⁸ The percentage is calculated against a total expected contribution, which includes co-financing, by beneficiaries.

²⁹ According to the PCR, expenditures under component 3 covered the following: civil engineering works (4.8 per cent); equipment (20.9 per cent); technical assistance, training and studies (18.1 per cent); the fund for micro-projects (0.1 per cent); operating costs (29.7 per cent); and salaries and allowances (6.3 per cent).

³⁰ Exchange rate US\$-XAF at 24 May 2019: XAF1=0,00170561US\$.

³¹ From French: *Système de gestion des résultats et de l'impact*.

baseline study and the RIMS survey were conducted. Further, the PCR mission could not conduct field missions due to security reasons.

54. This lack of information coupled with a weak M&E system and performance did not allow the PCR team to conduct a thorough and relevant analysis of the effects and impacts of the project.
55. **Household incomes and assets.** According to the PCR, information on income generated through marketing of products supported by PREVES was not systematically captured by the project. An increase in income by 60 per cent was observed among seeds producers, although they represented only part of the beneficiaries.³² With regard to micro-projects, interviews with beneficiaries generally showed an increase in income. Nonetheless, due to the fact that the majority of micro-projects were implemented in the final phase of implementation, no data on their profitability could be recorded.
56. Overall, improvements were noted in the RIMS survey in the levels of poverty with a larger increase (over 9 per cent) in the incomes of better-off households, and only a 2 and 5 per cent increase in the income of the poor/poorer respectively.
57. In the opinion of the beneficiaries at the stakeholders' workshop, household assets also improved, particularly in terms of housing and equipment.
58. **Food security and agricultural productivity.** According to the 2014-2015 PSR, PREVES interventions contributed to mitigating the adverse effects of the crisis on food security in the target area. The RIMS survey particularly shows a substantial decrease in the average duration of the food shortage period during implementation (from 6.2 months to 4.5 months). According to the PCR, this might be linked to the increase in agricultural production and incomes. However, the percentage of households heavily affected by food scarcity increased from 8.4 percent to 10 percent. Further, while a decrease by 4 per cent on average was observed in the underweight of children under 5 years of age, acute and chronic malnutrition affecting them increased by 2 and 5 per cent respectively. According to the PCR, these mixed results could be explained with the successive crises happening during implementation which were likely to put beneficiaries in iterative situations of decapitalisation-recapitalization.
59. The RIMS survey also revealed a reduced engagement in livestock production, justified by the late investments of PREVES in that area. Although beneficiaries at the stakeholders' workshop indicated that productivity increased through the distribution of kits, the use of improved seeds and improved agricultural practices, productivity could not be assessed by the PCR due to the unavailability of data.
60. **Human and social capital and empowerment.** According to the PCR, PREVES contributed to the generation of a positive dynamic in the project area in terms of the organization of farmers, resulting in strengthened associative spirit and improving social cohesion. The organization of seeds producers particularly represented a human and social capital to be built upon. Also, thanks to the support provided by PREVES, 729 people were declared literate. Further, according to the RIMS survey, a reduction by over 20 per cent was observed in the number of households without access to drinking water. Nonetheless, according to the PCR, the strategy to endow beneficiaries with kits and agricultural equipment led to opportunistic behaviours and could not guarantee a positive dynamic resulting in their empowerment. Also, more support was needed to build the capacity of POs to effectively provide services to their members and the articulation between POs at the grassroots level, their members and apex organization was to be improved.
61. **Institutions and policies.** The project reinforced the technical capacities of ACDA, ANDE and ICRA, and supported the rehabilitation and equipment of their

³² According to the PCR, PREVES supported approximately 2,600 seeds producers organized in 148 organizations.

offices. Nonetheless, with the exception of ICRA, their performance remained weak. Overall, further support was needed to enable them to provide quality services in rural areas. As a result of supported activities and project-led policy dialogue, key policy and strategic documents and plans relevant to the sector were elaborated (see paragraph 46).

62. **Rural poverty impact.** Based on the above, poverty impact is rated *moderately unsatisfactory (3)* in both the PCR and PCR.V.

Sustainability of benefits

63. **Social sustainability.** According to the PCR, the project gained strong participation and ownership by beneficiaries particularly through the capacity building and support to POs and water and sanitation activities, thus introducing key elements for the sustainability of its interventions. Nonetheless, the sustainability of POs was fragile. In particular, POs were not able to develop managerial and financial resources mobilization capacities that could give real impetus to their activities. Targeted actions were still needed to achieve their empowerment and ensure sustainability, particularly within the new Project to Revitalize Crop and Livestock Production in the Savannah (PREPAS)³³.
64. **Economic and financial sustainability.** According to the PCR, the sustainability of micro-projects was fragile particularly in the absence of plans for their consolidation and of exit strategies. Additional technical, institutional and financial support was also needed.
65. **Technical sustainability.** Activities promoted by PREVES such as the distribution of improved seeds and the adoption of improved production techniques enabled the project to relaunch the seeds value chain, providing a basis for the successful implementation of future seeds production programs and initiatives. Conversely, the following was observed in the PCR: (i) the deficiencies found in the kits and material distributed to beneficiaries affected the technical sustainability of the investment; (ii) the poor quality of animal health services provided led to inadequate treatment of diseases resulting in high mortality rates particularly for small ruminants; (iii) the water-point management committees set were not fully operational and the prospects of management and maintenance of infrastructure beyond project support was thus considered challenging.
66. **Institutional sustainability.** Direct support to deconcentrated services of MADR contributed to improve the capacity of staff, the rehabilitation of offices, the endowment of financial tools and equipment. However, their capacity to provide effective services to beneficiaries remained weak and largely dependent on external funding.
67. **Environmental sustainability.** According to the PCR, PREVES did not have a negative impact on the environment. In particular, as mentioned in paragraphs 77-78, it promoted environmentally friendly agricultural techniques enabling beneficiaries to increase productivity and production in a sustainable manner.
68. Overall, although key elements for the sustainability of project interventions were introduced through capacity building activities and the mobilization of farmers, significant sustainability risks were observed and associated with the maintenance and management of infrastructures, support services required by producers, the implementation of micro-projects, the capacities of POs to mobilize funding. Furthermore, the project did not develop an exit strategy. The continuation of the support through PREPAS is expected to improve sustainability prospects building on and consolidating results achieved through PREVES. Based on the above, sustainability is rated *moderately unsatisfactory (3)* both in the PCR and PCR.V.

³³ From the French: *Projet de relance de la production agropastorale dans les savanes*. See more in paragraph 71.

B. Other performance criteria

Innovation and scaling up

69. **Innovation.** Innovations very briefly referred to in the PCR include the capacity building and support to field level capacities through the training of TDs, the promotion of social cohesion, the integration of socio-economic activities and the reintegration of populations affected by the conflict. Nonetheless, these can be hardly considered as innovations. The innovations to be promoted as per the President's Report (i.e. an open-nucleus breeding scheme to upgrade local livestock; the fund for financing micro-projects; and support for privatizing the network of producers of improved planting materials (seeds, cuttings) as rural microenterprises) are not included as innovations in the PCR. Nonetheless, information provided by the PCR in other sections (e.g. the section on effectiveness) seems to indicate that those activities were only partly implemented (e.g. the fund for financing micro-projects was set up but only a limited number of projects financed; livestock activities were not supported by the project in a successful way). Based on the above, innovation is rated *unsatisfactory (2)* in the PCR, one point lower than the PCR.
70. **Scaling up.** The PCR rated the "potential" for scaling up moderately satisfactory. This rating, however, is not adequately supported by the narrative, which is very limited and only refers to the need to pursue innovations promoted. Nonetheless, few elements that might be relevant in terms of scaling up, particularly at the local level, were extracted from other project related documents. In particular, the MTR report informed that the German cooperation provided complementary support for the production of seeds in Bolé for the purpose of marketing. Also, as mentioned in the section on effectiveness, ONFR managed to enter into partnership with WFP and CARITAS for the marketing of the products of their members.
71. It is worth to be noted that in April 2018 IFAD approved a grant to the Central African Republic for the implementation of PREPAS to consolidate and scale up gains under PREVES. The project area covers the sub-prefectures of Baoro, Bouar Bossemptélé and Yaloké, with a possible expansion to Bozoum. The project plans to support the 355 POs involved in PREVES in achieving a higher stage of professionalization, and to structure 445 new grass-roots groups. Although the project expanded outreach and increased the budget compared to PREVES (US\$29.04 million), the contribution from the government decreased (US\$12.4 million) and a financing gap of US\$12.6 was to be filled.
72. Based on the above, scaling up is rated *moderately unsatisfactory (3)* in the PCR, one point lower than the PCR.

Gender equality and women's empowerment

73. PREVES planned to facilitate the empowerment and participation of women in project activities particularly through the establishment of quotas, the provision of training on gender approaches for staff, beneficiaries and service providers, tailored support to women, and a gender sensitive M&E.
74. According to the PCR, the gender strategy developed by the project was too general and M&E tools were not developed to adequately monitor expected results in terms of gender participation. Nonetheless, the participation of women in project activities was moderately satisfactory in quantitative terms, with 49 per cent of beneficiaries being women. Also, the percentage of women and youth in POs decision-making bodies reached 72 per cent against 60 per cent forecast. Similarly, approximately 72 per cent of the resources to finance micro-projects supported projects conducted by women or youth led POs against a target of 60 per cent. Functional literacy activities also involved women with 67 per cent of people declared literate being women. PREVES also provided specific support to women's umbrella organizations such as ONFR and FMNM (Fédération des Maraichers de Nana Mambéré. Contrariwise, while in terms of support to TDs the project largely

exceeded the expected output with the training of 1,014 TDs, it was able to only involve 12 per cent of women TDs against 20 per cent expected.

75. The analysis in the PCR mainly refers to quantitative information without attention to the quality of women's participation or to gains and benefits achieved by women through project-supported activities (e.g. training and capacity building). Nonetheless, this might be attributable to the weak M&E of the project.
76. Overall, efforts were made to facilitate the participation of women and they accounted for a significant number of beneficiaries. Furthermore, according to the MTR report, PREVES contributed to improve the social status of women. Based on the above, this criterion is rated *moderately satisfactory (4)* in the PCRV as in the PCR.

Environment and natural resources management

77. According to the PCR, while environmental impact was not specifically assessed by PREVES, project related documents indicate that activities supported by the project did not have a negative impact on the environment. In fact, the rehabilitation of roads (that might have had an impact on the environment) was not implemented. Activities related to the processing of agricultural products to be financed through micro-projects were very limited and agricultural techniques proposed were not much polluting. Also, the project promoted awareness raising and capacity building activities to support farmers to address soil erosion (e.g. farmers improved their capacity to select plantation sites by avoiding to plant in steep terrains that could cause soil erosion). Nonetheless, the rating in the matrix and the narrative are different (moderately unsatisfactory in the matrix and moderately satisfactory in the narrative). Environment and natural resources management is rated *moderately satisfactory (4)* in the PCRV, one point above the PCR.

Adaptation to climate change

78. According to the design document of PREVES, climate change was found to be affecting seasonal cycles in the country and posing a threat to basic food production. It was considered to have potential impacts on the country's food security and particularly on rural populations whose agricultural production depended mainly on rainfall. Nonetheless, the PCR does not explicitly assess this criterion and does not provide a justification for this gap. However, information provided in other sections of the PCR indicates that the varieties promoted by ICRA allowed to mitigate the impact of the seasonal cycles in the project zones of intervention. Also, most of the varieties developed were drought tolerant and allowed an acceptable level of production despite the variability of the climate. On the other side, rural producers remained poorly informed about the causes, consequences and possible ways to mitigate the effects of climate change.
79. Overall, there has been some improvement in empowering communities to cope with, mitigate or prevent the effects of climate change but much more needs to be done. Despite the absence of a rating in the PCR, based on the above, adaptation to climate change is rated *moderately satisfactory (4)* in the PCRV.

C. Overall project achievement

80. PREVES was implemented in an unstable environment with multiple crises and socio-economic unrest that widely affected the achievement of results particularly in terms of the implementation of marketing activities, support to livestock production and the implementation of micro-projects. Also, project performance was further hindered by a weak M&E system, weak management by MADR and a low level of mobilization of counterparts financing (Government and beneficiaries). Expenditures stand at 77 per cent of the planned budget, with 53 per cent of project budget used for project management.
81. Despite the very challenging circumstances the project managed to carry out some activities and obtain some results particularly by promoting social cohesion and

endogenous capacities through the mobilization and capacity building of farmers, POs and TDs, opening literacy centres, recapitalizing households, supporting the relaunch of the seeds value chain and increasing access to drinking water. To some extent, this contributed to enhancing the resilience of the population affected by conflicts and mitigating the adverse effects of the crisis on food security.

82. The PCRV assesses PREVES overall achievement as *moderately unsatisfactory (3)*, in line with the PCR.

D. Performance of partners

83. **IFAD.** According to the PCR, IFAD effectively supervised the project (11 supervision missions fielded), provided training to project staff, and supported their participation in IFAD regional fora and events. Furthermore, it ensured the continuity of financing despite the challenging context. The withdrawal applications and requests of no-objection were also processed in a timely manner (27 and nine days on average respectively). Nonetheless, the PCR underlines that IFAD could have been more proactive in engaging in partnership with UNICEF and addressing implementation issues experienced with some of the project partners (e.g. Mercy Corps). Further, turnover of country programme managers (three) might have affected the quality of support provided.
84. Based on the above, and taking into account the identified weaknesses in terms of project design, the performance of IFAD is rated in the PCRV *moderately satisfactory (4)*, same as the PCR.
85. **Government.** According to the PCR, the government was effective in kick starting the project with a timely signing of the financing agreement, and the set-up of the PCMU six months after. Despite the successive crises, the sessions of the steering committee were held when possible (seven sessions held against 12 planned). The appointment of a focal point at MADR specifically dedicated to IFAD-financed projects contributed to improved ownership. Furthermore, staff from MADR joined some monitoring/supervision missions. Notwithstanding positive aspects, some weaknesses were also identified, although these should be read taking into account the context of crisis in which implementation was conducted. In particular:
- The national steering committee was affected by the discontinuity in the leadership of MADR with six changes in presidency over implementation;
 - The PCMU was affected by instability with the resignations of key staff (e.g. M&E and gender and targeting staff, accountant, assistant to the Director). In some cases, staff was not replaced (e.g. the position of rural infrastructure specialist remained vacant since 2016). Insufficiencies in the attribution of roles and responsibilities were also observed;
 - The M&E system of the programme was not fully operational mainly due to the lack of human resources with the needed capacities. The M&E function of the project was weak, with the monitoring being conducted in Excel, focusing almost exclusively on output delivery and with the participation of several staff with limited coordination, resulting in incoherent data collected;
 - Weak contractual frameworks were established with Mercy Corps and public institutions. In particular, contracts did not link the financing with the delivery of outputs and the achievement of results. Furthermore, there were weaknesses in planning, technical and financial monitoring and supervision of their activities by the PCMU. This resulted in an inefficient use of resources and negatively impacted implementation;³⁴

³⁴ In particular, according to the PCR, Mercy Corps was selected based on their experience working in unstable security and humanitarian contexts. Nonetheless, the NGO did not have the capacity (in quantity and quality) to provide technical support and supervision. To meet their obligations with regard to the project, they used human resources that came from public structures such as ACDA and ANDE. The heaviness of this modus operandi had a negative impact

- Financial management was weak, particularly in relation to: (i) internal control; (ii) the non-systematic reconciliation of disbursements made by IFAD with expenditures recorded in the accounts by the project; (iii) the absence of financial reports prepared beyond status of expenditures; (iv) assets management;³⁵ (v) procurement; and (vi) timely submission of the final audit.
- A low level of implementation of recommendations from supervision missions was observed;
- The Government showed a limited capacity to mobilize the expected co-financing for the project. According to the PCR, only 24 per cent of the Government's expected contribution was mobilized.

86. Based on the above, the performance of the Government is rated *moderately unsatisfactory (3)* in the PCR, one point lower than the PCR.

IV. Assessment of PCR quality

Scope

87. The scope of the PCR is generally in line with the PCR guidelines, although some sections and criteria are not fully covered (e.g. climate change is not explicitly assessed). Also, some basic project information (e.g. data on expenditures by component and financier in US\$, youth beneficiaries) is missing. The scope of the PCR is considered moderately satisfactory (4).

Quality

88. The report's biggest drawback is that data on impact is incomplete, due to a weak M&E by the project. Also, the PCR mission could not conduct field visits due to security reasons. Although an effort was made in the PCR to collect information, the lack of data did not allow a full assessment of impacts.
89. Analysis in some sections or for some criteria are rather weak (e.g. the sections on innovation and scaling up) or are not developed in a clear manner. This is particularly relevant for Annex 7 and the section on project costs: data presented in the narrative, tables and annex are not consistent or not comparable due to different implementation periods referred to or different currencies used. As a result, project expenditures by components and financiers in US\$ do not clearly emerge from the report.
90. The document is not accurate in the organization of the contents. In particular: (i) it has many repetitions (several issues/themes are treated or repeated more than once); (ii) some contents are not included in the pertinent sections (e.g. recommendations are made in the section on effectiveness; reference to the rehabilitation of roads is made in the section referring to results achieved in terms of access to water and sanitation; in the impact section natural resources and environment are included among impact domains while human and social capital and empowerment is treated in annex only, etc.); (iii) imprecisions/inconsistencies were found (e.g. reported number of staff in the PCMU and outputs achieved; acronyms not spelled out); (iv) in some cases, the ratings in the narrative do not correspond with those in the rating matrix. In addition, sometimes statements and

on efficiency. Further, the agreement did not link the high management fees with performance and output delivery of Mercy Corps. The analysis of the budget execution for the period 2012-2015 showed that 84 per cent of the resources disbursed by PREVES covered operating costs/management fees and only 16 per cent concerned field activities. The very weak control and verification on the use of resources negatively impacted implementation and did not enable to address issues or reorient support provided by Mercy Corps in a timely manner.

³⁵For example, according to the PCR based on the 2017 inventory report carried out in March 2018, materials and equipment allocated to the PCMU worth 17 million FCFA were not found.

ratings are not substantiated with evidence or ratings are not consistent with the narrative (e.g. the sections on innovation and scaling up).

91. The scope of the PCR is considered *moderately unsatisfactory (3)*.

Lessons

92. The PCR presents several lessons which are generally relevant. Nonetheless, some of them are formulated in the form of recommendations, or are self-evident or obvious (e.g. the PCR indicates among lessons that an exit strategy should be developed to ensure sustainability of project interventions). Lessons in the PCR are rated *moderately satisfactory (4)*.

Candour

93. The narrative tone of the PCR is objective and the report states positive as well as less positive results. The rating is *satisfactory (5)*.
94. **Overall** the quality of the PCR is rated *moderately satisfactory (4)*.

V. Lessons learned

95. The main lessons and recommendations gleaned from the PCR and its validation include the following:
- The design of PREVES was based on ambitious assumptions in terms of the return to a normal situation following crises. Project design in contexts of post-conflict should better integrate the consideration of the risks of resurgence of conflict. Taking into account that situations of conflict/crisis also affect the capacity of public institutions and potential partners from the private sector and civil society to implement the project, it might be advisable to engage in implementation with United National agencies or NGOs with proven expertise working in contexts of socio-economic recovery;
 - The project suffered from the low quality of technical assistance and services provided by selected partners. For future projects, special attention should be given to the quality and capacities of selected partners. Furthermore, their performance should be regularly and closely monitored;
 - PREVES did not develop an exit strategy, leaving beneficiaries with unmet needs of further support and capacity building. Within PREPAS, an exit strategy and a plan for the consolidation of achievements under PREVES should be developed from the very beginning. This would also help minimizing the risks of failure of micro-projects and consolidate results achieved particularly in seeds production;
 - To avoid implementation delays and challenges that can affect project efficiency and effectiveness, M&E and financial management also need strengthening. In the context of the new PREPAS project, it will be appropriate to ensure the operationalization of an M&E system from the very beginning with the participation of project implementers and beneficiaries, in order to effectively conduct baseline surveys and collect and monitor project outputs and results. For this purpose, also the recruitment of qualified staff should be granted. More assistance should be provided by IFAD to support financial management.

Definition and rating of the evaluation criteria used by IOE

Criteria	Definition *	Mandatory	To be rated
Rural poverty impact	Impact is defined as the changes that have occurred or are expected to occur in the lives of the rural poor (whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended) as a result of development interventions.	X	Yes
	<i>Four impact domains</i>		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Household income and net assets: Household income provides a means of assessing the flow of economic benefits accruing to an individual or group, whereas assets relate to a stock of accumulated items of economic value. The analysis must include an assessment of trends in equality over time. 		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Human and social capital and empowerment: Human and social capital and empowerment include an assessment of the changes that have occurred in the empowerment of individuals, the quality of grass-roots organizations and institutions, the poor's individual and collective capacity, and in particular, the extent to which specific groups such as youth are included or excluded from the development process. 		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Food security and agricultural productivity: Changes in food security relate to availability, stability, affordability and access to food and stability of access, whereas changes in agricultural productivity are measured in terms of yields; nutrition relates to the nutritional value of food and child malnutrition. 		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Institutions and policies: The criterion relating to institutions and policies is designed to assess changes in the quality and performance of institutions, policies and the regulatory framework that influence the lives of the poor. 		No
Project performance	Project performance is an average of the ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.	X	Yes
Relevance	The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, institutional priorities and partner and donor policies. It also entails an assessment of project design and coherence in achieving its objectives. An assessment should also be made of whether objectives and design address inequality, for example, by assessing the relevance of targeting strategies adopted.	X	Yes
Effectiveness	The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.	X	Yes
Efficiency	A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results.	X	Yes
Sustainability of benefits	The likely continuation of net benefits from a development intervention beyond the phase of external funding support. It also includes an assessment of the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the project's life.	X	Yes
Other performance criteria			
Gender equality and women's empowerment	The extent to which IFAD interventions have contributed to better gender equality and women's empowerment, for example, in terms of women's access to and ownership of assets, resources and services; participation in decision making; work load balance and impact on women's incomes, nutrition and livelihoods.	X	Yes
Innovation	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have introduced innovative approaches to rural poverty reduction.	X	Yes
Scaling up	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have been (or are likely to be) scaled up by government authorities, donor organizations, the private sector and others agencies.	X	Yes
Environment and natural resources management	The extent to which IFAD development interventions contribute to resilient livelihoods and ecosystems. The focus is on the use and management of the natural environment, including natural resources defined as raw materials used for socio-economic and cultural purposes, and ecosystems and biodiversity - with the goods and services they provide.	X	Yes
Adaptation to climate change	The contribution of the project to reducing the negative impacts of climate change through dedicated adaptation or risk reduction measures	X	Yes

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Definition *</i>	<i>Mandatory</i>	<i>To be rated</i>
Overall project achievement	This provides an overarching assessment of the intervention, drawing upon the analysis and ratings for rural poverty impact, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, gender equality and women's empowerment, innovation and scaling up, as well as environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change.	X	Yes
Performance of partners			
• IFAD	This criterion assesses the contribution of partners to project design, execution, monitoring and reporting, supervision and implementation support, and evaluation. The performance of each partner will be assessed on an individual basis with a view to the partner's expected role and responsibility in the project life cycle.	X	Yes
• Government		X	Yes

* These definitions build on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management; the Methodological Framework for Project Evaluation agreed with the Evaluation Committee in September 2003; the first edition of the Evaluation Manual discussed with the Evaluation Committee in December 2008; and further discussions with the Evaluation Committee in November 2010 on IOE's evaluation criteria and key questions.

Rating comparison^a

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Programme Management Department (PMD) rating</i>	<i>IOE Project Completion Report Validation (PCRVR) rating</i>	<i>Net rating disconnect (PCRVR-PMD)</i>
Rural poverty impact	3	3	0
Project performance			
Relevance	5	4	-1
Effectiveness	3	3	0
Efficiency	2	2	0
Sustainability of benefits	3	3	0
Project performance^b	3.25	3	-0.25
Other performance criteria			
Gender equality and women's empowerment	4	4	0
Innovation	3	2	-1
Scaling up	4	3	-1
Environment and natural resources management	3	4	1
Adaptation to climate change	-	4	-
Overall project achievement^c	3	3	0
Performance of partners^d			
IFAD	4	4	0
Government	4	3	-1
Average net disconnect			-0.27

^a Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable.

^b Arithmetic average of ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.

^c This is not an average of ratings of individual evaluation criteria but an overarching assessment of the project, drawing upon the rating for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, rural poverty impact, gender, innovation and scaling up, environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change.

^d The rating for partners' performance is not a component of the overall project achievement rating.

Ratings of the project completion report quality

	<i>PMD rating</i>	<i>IOE PCRVR rating</i>	<i>Net disconnect</i>
Candour		5	
Lessons		4	
Quality (methods, data, participatory process)		3	
Scope		4	
Overall rating of the project completion report		4	

Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACDA	Central African Agency for Agricultural Development
ANDE	National Agency for Livestock Development
DSF	Debt Sustainability Framework
ICRA	Central African Institute of Agricultural Research
MADR	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
MTR	Mid-Term Review
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
NGO	Non-governmental organization
ONFR	National organisation of rural women From French: Organisation Nationale de Femmes Rurales
PCMU	Project Coordination and Management Unit
PCR	Project completion report
PCRV	Project completion report validation
PO	Producers' organization
PREPAS	Project to Revitalize Crop and Livestock Production in the Savannah
PREVES	Project for Reviving Food Crops and Small Livestock Production in the Savannah
PSR	Project status report
RIMS	Results and Impact Management System
TD	Technical Delegate
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
XAF	Central African CFA Franc BEAC
XDESK	IFAD intranet
WFP	World Food Programme

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