

Project Completion Report Validation

Support to Agricultural Production and Marketing Project/*Projet d'appui à la Production Agricole et à la Commercialisation (PROPACOM)*

Republic of Côte d'Ivoire

Date of validation by IOE: June 2019

I. Basic project data

			Approval (US\$ m)		Actual (US\$ m)	
Region	West and Central Africa	Total project costs	28.97		23.86	
Country	Republic of Côte d'Ivoire	IFAD DSF grant (% of total)	22.50	77.7%	20.52 ¹	86%
		Borrower	5.41	18.7%	3.28	14%
Grant no.	G-I-DSF-8090	Beneficiaries	1.06	3.6%	0.06	0.3%
Project number	1589					
Type of project (subsector)	Rural Development	-----				
Financing type	DSF Grant*	-----				
Financing terms	N/A	-----				
Date of approval	13/12/2011	-----				
Date of grant signature	16/03/2012	-----				
Date of effectiveness ²	16/03/2012	-----				
Financing amendments	Five	Number of beneficiaries	Direct: 25,000 households ³ Indirect: 50,000 individuals		Direct: 17,133 households Indirect: NA	
Financing closure extensions	1 extension for 3 months	Project Completion date	31/03/2018		30/06/2018	
Country programme managers	Abdoul Wahab Barry ⁴	Grant closing date	30/09/2018		31/12/2018	
Regional director(s)	Lisandro Martin ⁵	Mid-term review			2-20/05/2016	
Project completion report reviewer	Chiara Calvosa	IFAD grant disbursement at project completion (%)			91% ⁶	
Project completion report quality control panel	Fumiko Nakai	Date of the project completion report			15/11/2018	

Source: Project completion report (PCR) (2018), President Report (2011), Project design report (PDR) (2011), Operational Results Management System (ORMS) and Financial Management Dashboard (FMDB).

*DSF grants are provided to countries with low level of debt sustainability, as ascertained by the annual debt sustainability assessments carried out by the International Monetary Fund.

¹ The actual IFAD grant amount disbursed is indicated in the FMDB as SDR 13.69 million. The discrepancy with the amount indicated in the PCR can be understood to have resulted from factoring in exchange rate losses.

² Source: FMDB and PCR.

³ Approximately 175,000 people (source: PDR).

⁴ Previous: Luyaku Loko Nsimpati.

⁵ Previous: Mohammed Beavogui; Ides De Willebois.

⁶ According to FMDB, disbursement is 94 per cent (i.e. SDR 13.69 million vs SDR 14.50 million approved). The difference could be attributed to the exchange rate loss and discrepancies with the projections made in the PDR. ORMS indicates 87 per cent disbursement (i.e. approx. US\$19.6 million).

II. Project outline

1. **Introduction.** The Support to Agricultural Production and Marketing Project (PROPACOM⁷) was a project of the Government of Côte d'Ivoire financed by IFAD. PROPACOM was approved by IFAD's Executive Board on 13 December 2011 and became effective on 16 March 2012, with 31 March 2018 and 30 September 2018 as the initial completion and closing dates respectively. IFAD's contribution to PROPACOM was through a grant of approximately US\$22.5 million under the Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF).
2. PROPACOM was conceived in a post-crisis context, complementing and extending the activities supported by the Small Horticultural Producer Support Project⁸ and the on-going Agricultural Rehabilitation and Poverty Reduction Project (PRAREP)⁹ with the aim of shifting from an emergency situation to a sustainable medium-term strategy to promote agricultural development in Côte d'Ivoire.
3. The project was designed to be implemented in a fragile environment, characterized by high levels of socio-economic vulnerability and lack of production inputs. Since 1999, Côte d'Ivoire suffered from unprecedented socio-political and economic crises, with two civil wars¹⁰ which led to the decline of both public and private investments in all sectors and the significant deterioration of all socio-economic indicators. The main rural poverty challenges in the area included: limited access to production inputs, inexistent and/or very poor infrastructure, low agricultural yields, severe difficulties in accessing markets, food insecurity and malnutrition, as well as natural resource degradation and climate change.
4. **Project area.** At design the project area was the same as PRAREP's, and covered the three northern regions of Savanes, Bandama Valley and Zanzan. This area corresponds to almost a third of the national territory, with nearly 20 per cent of the total population and high incidence of extreme poverty and food insecurity. In these regions the project targeted the following three production systems: rice, maize, and small market gardening products.
5. **Project goal, objectives and components.** According to the president's report the project's overall objective was to contribute to a reduction in rural poverty and to stimulate economic growth in the regions of intervention. This was meant to be achieved through its key development objective of sustainably improving the food security and incomes of the targeted population through smallholder access to markets, effective services and appropriate technologies. The two main intended outcomes were to: (i) qualitatively and quantitatively improve the supply of agricultural products; and (ii) improve the structuring and empowerment of producers' organizations (POs) to support agricultural produce.
6. **Components.** The project had three components: (i) enhancing agricultural production; (ii) value addition and marketing; and (iii) coordination, monitoring and evaluation and knowledge management. The cost per component is detailed in table 2.
7. *Component 1- Enhancing agricultural production.* This component aimed to qualitatively and quantitatively improve the supply of agricultural products. This was meant to be achieved mostly by facilitating producers' access to: (i) agricultural production inputs such as equipment and materials (including improved seeds and other inputs); (ii) mechanized farming; and (iii) agricultural advisory services. In

⁷ From French *Projet d'appui à la production agricole et à la commercialisation*.

⁸ From French *Projet d'appui aux petits producteurs maraichers dans les régions des savanes*. The project was approved by the EB 4 May 2000 and the reported actual completion date was 31 December 2011 (Source: ORMS)

⁹ From French *Projet de réhabilitation agricole et de réduction de la pauvreté*. It was approved by the EB on 17 December 2009 and actual completion date was 31 December 2014 (Source: ORMS).

¹⁰ First Ivorian civil war from September 2002 to March 2007 and second Ivorian civil war from November 2010 to April 2011. The project formulation started in September 2010 but was put on hold during the second civil war and resumed in July 2011.

addition, the component was designed to support the rehabilitation of low-lands as well as rice and market gardening production sites.

8. **Component 2 - Value addition and marketing.** It was intended to improve the structuring and empowerment of POs to support agricultural processing. This was meant to be reached by: (i) developing adequate infrastructure for storing, processing and packaging the agriculture produce; (ii) developing a Market Information System;¹¹ and (iii) providing capacity building to Agricultural Professional Organizations (OPA),¹² cooperatives and grass-roots organizations.
9. **Component 3 – Coordination, monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and knowledge management.** The component was designed to ensure complementary with the PRAREP in the project coordination, knowledge management and M&E.
10. **Target group.** The project directly targeted 25,000 households or a total of approximately 175,000 people, which included women and young girls, young rural producers, unemployed young people and ex-combatants,¹³ as well as grass-roots and apex producers' organizations. Indirectly the project was meant to benefit an additional 50,000 people living in the three regions.
11. **Financing.** The project was IFAD-initiated and exclusively financed with no international co-financing. Total project cost at approval was estimated at approximately US\$28.97 million, of which approx. US\$22.50 million was to be financed through an IFAD grant under the DSF. The Government's contribution was estimated at US\$5.41 million, and the beneficiaries' in-kind contribution at US\$1.06 million.¹⁴ Tables below show the estimated and actual project costs by financier and by component, respectively.

Table 1

Project costs by financier

Source of Funding	Type of financing	Estimated amount (US\$ m)	Estimated amount (% of total)	Actual expenditure (US\$ m)	Expenditure (% of total)	Disbursements (% of estimated amount)
IFAD	DSF Grant	22.50	77.7%	20.52	86%	91%
Government		5.41	18.7%	3.28	14%	11.3%
Beneficiaries		1.06	3.7%	0.06 ¹⁵	0.3%	0.2%
Total Financing		28.97	100.0%	23.86	100%	82%

Source: 2011 President's Reports for estimated amount; FMDB and PCR for the actual expenditure.

Table 2

Project costs by component

Components	Planned(US\$ m)	Planned amount	Actual ¹⁶ amount	Actual (% total)
Enhancing agricultural production	16.10	56%	14.24	60%
Value addition and marketing	7.95	27%	1.49	6%
Coordination, M&E and KM	4.92	17%	8.13	34%
Total	28.97	100%	23.86	100%

Source: President's report for planned; PCR for actual.

¹¹ From French *Système d'information sur les marchés*.

¹² From French *Organisation Professionnelle Agricole*.

¹³ Formally added by the MTR through the target of 14 ex-combatants' groups (additional details in Annex III).

¹⁴ Quantification of beneficiaries' in-kind contribution estimated at design, mainly to infrastructure development and irrigated agricultural schemes.

¹⁵ This low level of beneficiaries' contribution is explained in the PCR by the lack of an adequate mechanism to quantify in-kind contributions provided.

¹⁶ Last set of withdrawal applications submitted to IFAD and reported in the PCR during the completion mission have been added entirely to component 1 and 3 for IFAD's and Government's contributions respectively.

12. **Project implementation arrangements.** The project was designed to be implemented by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MINADER)¹⁷ and guided by the PRAREP national steering committee. The committee included representatives of other ministries, public institutions, particularly the national secretariat for reconstruction and reinsertion,¹⁸ POs and regional members. Regional antennas were intended to be formed in each region to facilitate activities in the 22 districts across the three regions. In addition, regional consultation networks¹⁹ had to be established, bringing together local stakeholders²⁰ and linking field activities with the national level coordination. A project coordinating unit (PCU) was designed to join the existing PRAREP PCU, with responsibility for planning, managing and supervising project activities. To this end, additional staff dedicated to the PROPACOM were employed in the original PRAREP PCU and two antenna units set-up in the other two regions to ensure overall coordination. Project implementation was to be carried out through two main types of actors, namely: (i) service providers, principally responsible for the provisions of goods and services; and (ii) strategic partners from national institutions in charge of advisory services, inputs supply, promotion of dialogue and knowledge management as well as monitoring activities and service providers' performance. Finally, the establishment of a functioning M&E system was given prominence in the design, involving the PCU (creating linkages with the PRAREP but at the same time recruiting additional staff), its satellite units, as well as the other project stakeholders (MINADER, service providers and beneficiaries).
13. **Changes and developments during implementation.** Several changes took place during the implementation, including the following:
- In May 2013 an agreement was signed between PROPACOM and the Authority for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (ADDR).²¹ This agreement responded to the Government's request to promote social inclusion of 2,000 former militants and 500 young people of the ex-combatants' communities within the agro-pastoral system;
 - The mid-term review (MTR) took place in May 2016 and introduced several adjustments including the following: (i) revision of logframe indicators and targets, including a detailed gender disaggregation; (ii) finalization of a partnership agreement with the National Office of Technical Studies for Development (BNEDT)²² to speed-up project implementation, particularly with regards to the agricultural water management schemes;²³ (iii) request of an independent evaluation on the quality of the training and capacity building provided to OPA; and (iv) mainstream of microproject approach;
 - In November 2016 a budget reallocation was approved by IFAD. Several changes took place among the six categories of expenditures including an increase of approximately 6 per cent in the salaries and indemnities (from approximately 6 per cent approved at design to 10 per cent of the total) and a 7 per cent increase in the technical assistance/studies category (from approximately 18 per cent to 25 per cent); and
 - A three-month extension of project completion date was approved bringing the completion date to 30 June 2018. The extension was agreed to allow for the conclusion of the ongoing agricultural water management schemes.
14. **Intervention logic.** PROPACOM was designed in the same geographical area of the Small Horticultural Producer Support Project and PRAREP with the aim of

¹⁷ Design documents refer to the Ministry of Agriculture. Supervision and completion reports to MINADER.

¹⁸ From French: *Secrétariat national à la reconstruction et à la réinsertion*.

¹⁹ From French *Cadre régional de concertation*.

²⁰ Including service providers, development partners, local government institutions and beneficiaries.

²¹ From French *Autorité pour le désarmement, démobilisation et réintégration*.

²² From French *Bureau National d'Etudes Techniques pour le Développement*.

²³ The Office was also in charge of the monitoring of the hydro-agricultural schemes.

building on achieved results and complementing the ongoing activities. These two projects had mainly focused on providing an immediate response to the target population in a post-crisis environment and restoring the agricultural production assets. Although PROPACOM responded to the demands of a post-crisis country, it embedded a broader intervention logic of moving from emergency to reconstruction. In this regard, the project was designed to combine the delivery of production inputs and marketing infrastructure with capacity building and empowerment of targeted groups, with the aim of shifting from a local agricultural system oriented to self-consumption towards market-driven profitable agriculture. Producers' organizations, which were severely affected and/or completely dismantled during the civil wars, were designed to be at the center of the project intervention through a "faire-faire" approach. Therefore, a strategic pillar of this intervention logic was the professionalization of the POs and their organizations into more structured associations. With reference to the production systems, rice, maize and small market garden products were chosen for several reasons clearly presented in the Project Design Report (PDR).²⁴

15. Activities under component 1 were expected to enhance production and productivity in the selected agricultural systems managed by the POs, mainly through input delivery, support to micro projects - to be originated and submitted by the producers - and capacity building activities for local producers and their professional organizations. Under component 2, activities deriving from investment in market infrastructure were coupled with efforts to professionalize the POs with the aim to improve market access and generate additional incomes.
16. **Delivery of outputs.** This section presents the delivery of the main outputs reported in the PCR (ref. to Annex III for details). PROPACOM's delivery was significantly affected by implementation delays, which include a 14-month delay in the start-up of project activities and almost three-year delay for infrastructure development.²⁵ Overall, targets set at appraisal have not been fully met, with a particularly weak delivery under the component 2, specifically for the agriculture mechanization and POs empowerment. Higher execution rate was generally reported with reference to activities under component 1 and the market infrastructure development.
17. *Component 1 - Enhancing agricultural production:* (i) *sub-component 1.1 - Access to production inputs:* the project distributed 271 tons of certified seeds of rice against the target of 300 tons and 95 tons of certified seeds of maize against the target of 75 tons; (ii) *sub-component 1.2 - Agricultural mechanization:* the project distributed 66 tillers against the target of 120 and 26 threshing-winnowers against 100 targeted; (iii) *sub-component 1.3 - Access to agricultural advisory services and training:* the project trained 3,316 farmers against the target of 3,250 and a total number of 8,127 beneficiaries had access to advisory services against 13,500 targeted; and (iv) *sub-component 1.4 - Development of hydro-agricultural schemes:* 1,299 ha were rehabilitated against the target of 2,490 and 131 infrastructure management committees developed against 660.
18. *Component 2 - Value addition and marketing:* (i) *sub-component 2.1 - Support to processing and marketing of agricultural products:* 177 processing and marketing groups were developed against the target of 660; 1,971 people received training in processing and marketing techniques against the target of 5,000 and 1,976 people were trained in entrepreneurship against the target of 3,300; (ii) *sub-component 2.2 - Development of Market Information System:* the Market Information System

²⁴ Including the following: (i) interest expressed by target population; (ii) unexploited potential both in terms of agricultural production and productivity; (iii) existence of market demand; (iv) prominent role in the local diet but also their potential for income-generating activities; and (v) involvement of women and youth in the production and processing activities.

²⁵ According to the MTR, this was mainly due to inadequate institutional arrangements and weak PCU capacities which led to inefficiencies in the project procurement.

for cereals and small market garden products was not put in place;²⁶ (iii) *sub-component 2.3 – Development of marketing infrastructure*: 55 km of access roads were rehabilitated against the target of 60 km and five storage warehouses were built against the target of six and eight mills built against 20 targeted; and (iv) *sub-component 2.4 – Empowerment of agricultural POs*: the project trained 124 POs against the target of 660 and 700 organization managers against the target of 1,980.

19. *Component 3 - Coordination, monitoring and evaluation and knowledge management*. The project supported the creation of the PCU joint to PRAREP; the development of a manual of procedures as well as an M&E manual; the production of Annual Work Plans and Budgets as well as reports and audits.
20. Finally, with regards to the agreement between PROPACOM and ADDR for the social inclusion of ex-combatants, the project provided 1,851 training sessions against the target of 2,000, distributed 1,814 kits for the development of agro-pastoral activities against 2,000 targeted and integrated in the society 13 groups against the target of 14 set by the MTR (ref. Annex III for details).

III. Review of findings

A. Core criteria

Relevance

21. **Relevance vis-à-vis IFAD and Government policies and strategies.** PROPACOM's goal and objectives were aligned with the government's priorities to support agricultural development and reduce rural poverty. More precisely, it was in line with: (i) the Poverty Reduction Strategic Paper for 2009–2015; (ii) the National Agricultural Investment Plan for 2010-2015; (iii) the Plan for Irrigation Development; and (iv) the National Rice Development Strategy (2008).
22. As for IFAD's strategies, PROPACOM's objectives were coherent with IFAD's Strategic Framework and the 2010-2015 COSOP in that they intended to improve food security and reduce rural poverty by promoting value chains development in the food and horticulture sector. More precisely, it was aligned with both strategic objectives of empowering producers' organizations and providing small producers with access to appropriate production inputs and agricultural technology as well as market.²⁷
23. With regards to the relevance to the needs of the rural poor in the country, the project aimed at addressing their key development constraints in terms of lack of production inputs, agricultural advisory services and access to market.
24. **Relevance vis-à-vis project design.** The internal logic of the project design among outputs, activities and components was coherent and adequate to meet the intervention's outcomes. Similarly, financial allocations were coherent with the project's objectives and institutional arrangements. Component 1 and 2 were designed to comprehensively address the main challenges faced by local producers in the project area by responding to their immediate needs introducing simultaneously the logic of sustainable agricultural development. More precisely, component 1 focused on the supply of the agricultural products by addressing the following three key challenges for agricultural development in the country: (i) limited availability and accessibility of production inputs; (ii) lack of mechanized technology; and (iii) inadequate access to advisory services. Complementarily, component 2 focused on processing, value addition and marketing of local produces which are critical steps to ensure a sustainable agricultural

²⁶ As per design document, it was intended to be set-up at the beginning of project life. However, given its relevance, MTR supported its development even at a later stage.

²⁷ 2017 Country strategy also included OPA empowerment as its first strategic objective.

development.²⁸ The above interventions were designed to be implemented through a demand-driven approach focused on the POs and their capacity building and submissions of microprojects. However, the institutional analysis carried out at design did not identify the critical issues and weaknesses affecting most OPA and service providers in a post-crisis conflict. In addition, as reported in the MTR, the design document and the related microprojects financing manual and microprojects M&E system, did not explain the above logic, which led to its weak ownership by project beneficiaries and inadequate monitoring at project level (ref. section on Effectiveness for details).

25. As for the design of component 3, linkages with PRAREP project management through a joint PCU and shared M&E system, were expected to create synergies and efficiencies among the two projects. However, according to the PCR, assumptions made were optimistic and adequate training regarding the "programme approach" was not planned for the PCU. The regional antennas and the regional consultation networks were supposed to harmonize activities carried out in the field in the three regions as well as provide required data on logframe indicators (as in the case of the antennas). Nevertheless, the design presented some weaknesses with regards to its M&E system which lacked adequate results indicators to provide guidance to the coordination and implementation. Furthermore, the sources of information as outlined in the logical framework were not clearly presented to PCU.
26. Although the design presented several weaknesses, the overall project relevance is rated *moderately satisfactory (4)* by the PCR in line with the PCR.

Effectiveness

27. **Project outreach.** The total number of beneficiaries reached by the PROPACOM at completion was 17,133 households or 119,931 individuals against an appraisal target of 25,000 households; this represents a success rate of approximately 68 per cent. The PCR stated that women beneficiaries were between 30 and 60 per cent of total beneficiaries depending on the nature of the activities (ref. Appendix III for additional details).
28. **Objective 1: qualitatively and quantitatively improved supply of agricultural products.** The improved production was meant to be reached through the following: (i) access to agricultural inputs; (ii) development of mechanized agriculture; (iii) delivery of advisory services; and (iv) development of agricultural water management schemes.
29. The objective was expected to be reached through the execution of micro projects in the production of maize, rice and small market garden products. Support to micro projects in maize production was reported to be one of the most successful project results with 102 per cent execution rate and positive impacts on women's incomes, as well as spin-off effects related to other small income generating activities set-up by women. Micro projects in rice production reported 22 per cent success rate with reference to the targeted production (3,160 tons against the target of 14,400 tons). It is reported that irregular rainfall, negatively affected the productivity levels also for small garden market products micro projects, which reported an average of 33 per cent success rate. However, according to the PCR, inefficiencies at project level (i.e. inadequate training and uncoordinated inputs delivery) contributed to the low productivity.
30. More precisely, with reference to the distribution of agricultural inputs, the reported execution rates are high: 90 per cent for the distribution of the certified variety of irrigation rice (271 tons delivered to seed multipliers versus 300 tons targeted),

²⁸ Similarly, 2017 Country Strategy identifies some of the above as major risks hampering the development of the agricultural sector. It refers, inter-alia, to the limited accessibility to agricultural inputs, adequate processing technology and financing sources as well as lack of storage infrastructure.

127 per cent for the certified maize variety (95 tons versus 75 targeted) and nearly 90 per cent for the distribution of fertilizers, precisely 92 per cent for NPK and 89 per cent for urea. Seeds provided were expected to be multiplied by selected farmers to be subsequently adopted in the agricultural water management schemes to enhance agricultural production. However, PROPACOM suffered from significant delays in the development of these schemes with nearly 80 per cent completed during the last two years of the project life.²⁹ For these reasons, the production inputs were not always used by farmers in the irrigation schemes in line with the agricultural calendar and the training provided.³⁰

31. The distribution of machinery (ref. Delivery of output section for details) was carried out through the selection of microprojects submitted by OPA and the training to selected OPA members (116 machine operators). Despite the outputs presented above, delivery of machinery was not aligned with provision of advisory services or development of agricultural water management schemes also because of the reported inefficiencies and delays in PROPACOM procurement procedures.³¹
32. Finally, the agricultural water management schemes registered a 52 per cent execution rate (1,212 ha of rice plus 87 ha of small garden market products against the target of 2,490 ha in total). In addition, according to the PCR, 38 per cent of the implemented schemes were not fully performing.³² This has been explained in the PCR by the weak delivery of the initially selected service providers whose capacities were severely affected during the civil wars. However, the PCR does not clearly explain the specific problems that contributed to the above low performance and related poor results achieved in the irrigation schemes.
33. **Objective 2: improved structuring and empowerment of producer organizations to support agricultural produce.** The objective was expected to be reached through: (i) support to processing and marketing of agricultural products; (ii) Development of a Market Information System³³ and market infrastructure; and (iii) OPA empowerment.
34. According to the PCR, inadequate attention was generally paid to this objective and the related activities, carried out mostly under component 2.³⁴ A weak execution rate (below 40 per cent) was reported for most activities contributing to the achievement of this objective, with the exception of the activities carried out under the market infrastructure development framework (nearly 100 per cent execution rate for access road and, on average, above 60 per cent of the appraisal targets - ref. Appendix III for details). Although the rehabilitation of roads facilitated the market access of concerned producers, overall the activities linked to processing and commercialization of agriculture produces were marginally accomplished. With reference to the OPA capacity building, training was delivered on market strategies and pricing as well as on how to put in place marketing committees within the professional organizations. However, despite the outputs delivered³⁵, it is reported that the delivery of training sessions was not consistently aligned to beneficiaries' needs and OPA's negotiating power still limited.³⁶

²⁹ It is also reported that approximately 40 per cent of those previously built had construction issues.

³⁰ The PCR reported that the seeds had to be stored, not always in an adequate manner, and training on their use was not provided in a timely manner.

³¹ Main reasons explaining the delays in project procurement are the following: weak project readiness at start up, optimistic procurement plans and weak links with the Annual Work Plans and Budgets as well as issues to recruit procurement experts.

³² Mostly those developed outside the partnership with BNETD.

³³ Not done – ref. Delivery of output.

³⁴ In March 2018, disbursement rate was 19 per cent for component 2 and 81 per cent for component 1 (ref. also Efficiency section).

³⁵ A total of 1,971 OPA members were trained in agricultural processing and marketing (against 5,000 targeted), 1,173 trained in commerce (against the target of 3,795) and 1,976 trained in entrepreneurship against the target of 3,300.

³⁶ With reference to pricing of agricultural produces, it is reported that in 67 per cent of the cases, price was still imposed by the buyers and 76.5 per cent of selling continued to happen through local farm-gate buyers and

35. OPA's empowerment was expected to be reached also through the setting-up of inputs funds for fertilizers and herbicides to be managed by OPA aiming at ensuring a sustainable agricultural production through adequate recovery levels over time. A comprehensive assessment on the inputs' fund recovery level per OPA was not systematically carried out throughout the project life. Data reported at completion show a diverse performance depending on the value chain and specific site. Overall, more structured OPA successfully manage the inputs fund compared to other OPA. More precisely, the recovery level in the maize value chain was 29 per cent but 100 per cent in Korhogo, 7 per cent in Bondoukou and 18 per cent in Bouaké.³⁷ As for the rice value chain, during the same years, the reported recovery level was 37 per cent (39 per cent in Bondoukou, 47 per cent in Bouaké and 14 per cent in Korhogo).
36. At completion, most OPA were assessed to be weak with limited negotiating power, and not in conditions to provide adequate economic and technical support to their members. Overall, the objective of graduating at least 35 per cent of OPA from a less structured organization (level 1) to a better organized arrangement (level 2) was not reached.³⁸
37. Finally, activities carried out under the agreement between PROPACOM and ADDR, although not foreseen at appraisal, positively contributed to the achievement of the project goal by promoting social inclusion of 13 ex-combatants' groups against the target of 14 groups. The integration process was put in place through the support to microprojects in the domain of livestock and agricultural development and related execution rates were reported above 60 per cent for most targets and, in some case, above 150 per cent.³⁹
38. **Summary.** Overall, the first objective was only partially met. At completion production of rice improved by 22 per cent vis-à-vis appraisal targets, small market garden products by 33 per cent and maize by 82 per cent. Regarding the second objective, which was to be met mainly through activities under the second component, the PCR reported a general unsatisfactory performance. Finally, the performance related to the social inclusion of ex-combatants is positively assessed both by the PCR and PCR.V. Based on the above, the PROPACOM effectiveness is rated *moderately unsatisfactory (3)* by the PCR.V in agreement with PCR rating.

Efficiency

39. **Efficiency in the pace of implementation.** At mid-term, component 2 was reported to register 10 per cent execution rate, while most of the activities under component 1 were carried out as per approved time-frame. Similar pattern was reported at completion, with nearly 40 per cent execution rate of most of the activities under component 2 and above to 90 per cent for some of the activities under component 1 (particularly sub-component 1.1). However, as described in the section above, a deeper analysis of implementation pace for component 1 has shown that the phasing of the sub-activities did not follow the agricultural calendar and the internal coherence indicated at design. With regards to the activities under the agreement between PROPACOM and ADDR, the implementation was generally in line with the expected timeframe. Overall, the pace of implementation was characterized by several uncoordinated activities and significant delays in the

cooperatives (Source, Le Mont Horeb survey 2018). Overall, according to the PCR, PROPACOM performance in terms of promoting access to market was unsatisfactory.

³⁷ Data refer to 2015-2016.

³⁸ More precisely, at completion, 19 OPA against the target of 25 (76 per cent) were reported to be in level 1, 5 OPA (20 per cent) graduated to level 2 and only one from level 2 to level 3 (*Coopérative des riziculteurs de Sakassou*).

³⁹ Training on commerce and transport, 196 per cent and 157 per cent respectively, and kit for commerce and transport 192 per cent and 154 per cent.

execution of the procurement plan⁴⁰ thus negatively affecting the overall project efficiency.

40. **Disbursement and project management costs.** In line with the pace of the implementation described above, the PCR reported two different disbursement paths for the two components: in March 2018 disbursement rate was 81 per cent for component 1 and 19 per cent for component 2. Globally, at completion, the reported disbursement was 60 per cent of the total cost for component 1; 6 per cent for component 2; and 34 per cent for component 3 (doubled from 17 per cent envisaged), which was for project coordination/management, monitoring and evaluation and knowledge management. More precisely, an increase by 6 per cent was reported in the salaries and indemnities category of expense. According to the PCR, this was mainly due to the increase in the PCU staff which hired former PRAREP staff.
41. **Economic rate of return.** The ex-post economic and financial analysis shows the economic rate of return at completion equal to 13 per cent which is lower than the 18 per cent estimated at design but, in any case, higher than the 8 per cent opportunity cost of capital. The discrepancy with design has been explained by the implementation delays as well as optimistic assumptions made at design. The financial analysis confirmed, however, the initial hypothesis that the project profitability was mainly dependent on rice and maize productions more than the small market garden productions.⁴¹ Finally, the cost per beneficiary appears to be in line with the design⁴² while other indicators of project efficiency such as the unit cost per km of rural roads and unit cost per ha of agricultural water management schemes developed, show an increase when compared to initial estimates.⁴³
42. Overall, efficiency is rated *moderately unsatisfactory (3)* in the PCR, in line with PMD.

Rural poverty impact

43. **Availability of data.** The assessment of rural poverty impact is mainly based on data collected by PROPACOM M&E system and its three antenna units through three Results and Impact Management System (RIMS) surveys,⁴⁴ two beneficiary surveys⁴⁵ as well as a data collection study carried out by a local service provider. As highlighted by most supervision missions, PROPACOM M&E system was composed of several important monitoring tools which were not properly articulated throughout the project life despite recommendations provided by IFAD. As a result, according to the PCR, the overall performance of the monitoring and evaluation system was unsatisfactory, especially with regards to data provided by the regional antennas and local service providers.
44. **Household incomes and assets.** At completion, no data was reported to be available to adequately assess PROPACOM's impact on household incomes. PCR assessment was mainly based on some data collected during the mission and elaborated in the project's economic and financial analysis. Figures reported show positive net margins for all productions targeted by the projects distinguishing between with and without project scenario.⁴⁶ Specific figures include the following: FCFA 116,825 or US\$200 per hectare of cultivated low-land rice (versus FCFA -150,875 or -US\$258 without project), FCFA 122,975 or US\$222 per hectare of rainfed rice (versus FCFA -129,125 or -US\$220 without project), FCFA 1,105 or

⁴⁰ 43.6 per cent in 2015, 51.9 per cent in 2016, 66.7 per cent in 2017 and 85.7 in 2018 (Source: PCR, Appendix 7).

⁴¹ This is mainly due to the size of specific production site.

⁴² US\$1,197 per household at completion versus US\$1,168 at design.

⁴³ 161 per cent increase for km rural roads (i.e. FCFA 8 million at design versus FCFA 12,9 million at completion), 119 per cent increase for ha of small garden products (i.e. FCFA 8 million at design versus FCFA 9,5 million).

⁴⁴ Carried out in 2013 (baseline), 2016 and 2017.

⁴⁵ In 2013 and at completion.

⁴⁶ It is not clear whether the "without project scenario" refers to a control group or to beneficiaries' conditions *ex-ante*, before project's interventions in 2013.

US\$2 per hectare of maize (versus FCFA -90,825 or -US\$155 without project) and FCFA 5,115,778 or US\$8,744 per hectare of small market garden products (versus FCFA 1,896,485 or US\$3,241 without project). It would appear that these results are estimates which would be reached at full project development – which is reported to vary from 2 to 10 years depending on the production model.⁴⁷ Each model presented in the annex seems to be based on assumptions which are generally higher than the actual level of yields achieved (ref. Section on food security and agricultural productivity).⁴⁸ Finally, the above negative net margin presented for the rice and maize productions in the “without project situation” is not explained in the PCR (presumably it is due to the incidence of self-consumption and production losses).

45. In terms of household assets, RIMS data show some positive results including motorbikes from 39 per cent in 2013 to 52 per cent in 2017, radios from 47 per cent to 52 per cent or mobile phones from 64 per cent to 83 per cent over the same period. Nevertheless, other RIMS indicators seemed to outline a negative impact such as a decline from 19 per cent in 2013 to 12 per cent in 2017 of the percentage of households owning a television or a reduction from 5 per cent to 2 per cent of households with a fridge.
46. **Human and social capital and empowerment.** PROPACOM’s impacts on human and social capital and empowerment are measured vis-à-vis its support to OPA and to ex-combatants, although this latter was not explicitly quoted in the PCR under this impact domain. PROPACOM contributed to OPA empowerment mainly through: (i) the setting up of producers’ committees for management of agricultural inputs and market infrastructure; (ii) trainings to OPA managers; and (iii) literacy campaigns, particularly targeted at women. With specific reference to this last point, significant benefits were presented from literacy training, particularly for women who get empowered economically and in terms of making their voice heard.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, it is reported that the training provided was not very effective given the lack of uptake by participant producers especially with regards to the microprojects development process.⁵⁰ As a result, OPA were reported to be generally fragile and in need of further support. With reference to the ex-combatants, according to the PCR, they developed skills and capacities to start a new life in the society. Finally, PROPACOM contributed to develop skills at local level to eventually provide services in the future such as fixing agricultural machines and multiplication of improved seed varieties.
47. **Food security and agricultural productivity.** According to the PCR, PROPACOM did not show a significant positive impact on food security of the target population.⁵¹ With reference to food security, the following RIMS indicators were reported among others: 36 per cent chronic malnutrition in 2017 versus 35 per cent in 2013, 12 per cent of children under 5 years old with critical malnutrition in 2017 versus 18 per cent in 2013 and 92 per cent of households experiencing food shortages in 2017 versus 82 per cent in 2013. As for agricultural productivity, the following was reported to be achieved at completion: 3.93 t/ha for rice versus 2.7 t/ha baseline in 2013 and 6 t/ha targeted at appraisal; 1.85 t/ha for maize versus 1.4 t/ha baseline and 2.5 t/ha targeted; and 3.46 t/ha for small garden products versus 2 t/ha baseline and 4.65 t/ha targeted. With specific reference to maize production, a significant productivity improvement was reported during the first three years of the project, especially for well-structured farmers' organizations. This production was weakened by the decline in rainfall in 2015 and 2016. Overall,

⁴⁷ Specific benefit path for each model is not presented in the annex 10, hence it is not possible to assess for which production models the expected benefits were fully reached at completion.

⁴⁸ Questions on the reliability of the data used for yield in the economic and financial analysis were also questioned by the CPMT (source CPMT minutes on PROPACOM PCR, Oct. 2018).

⁴⁹ For this reason, 70 per cent of targeted trainees were women.

⁵⁰ Source: Supervision mission report, December 2017.

⁵¹ Increases were mainly reported in those cases where more structured OPAs were involved.

although the project contributed to some increase in the productivity of selected crops, the targets set at appraisal were not met. In addition, during PROPACOM's implementation, a general decline in the agricultural productivity was reported in the second half of the project life due to low rainfall.

48. **Institutions and policies.** According to the appraisal report, the project was expected to strengthen the capacities of agricultural professional organizations and other strategic partners, particularly within the MINADER.⁵² In this regard, several targeted activities were carried out through the provision of goods and advisory services and the establishment of a partnership with the national support agency for rural development.⁵³ Nevertheless, as reported in the PCR, PROPACOM did not fully reach the intended institutional impact mainly because of the significant implementation delays mentioned above and the lack of involvement of key strategic actors in field activities like MINADER regional and departmental directions. Finally, it would appear that PROPACOM was not involved in the policy dialogue in the country.
49. Overall, rural poverty impact is rated *moderately unsatisfactory* (3) in both the PCR and PCR.V.

Sustainability of benefits

50. **Exit strategy.** An exit strategy was developed by the PCU and MINADER. Agreements were developed with strategic partners and national institutions to capitalize on projects' activities mainly with regards to the small garden products value chain.⁵⁴ However, as reported by the PCR, the exit strategy presented the following two main weaknesses: limited attention to the activities related to the other two value chains, particularly maize, and ambiguity in terms of follow-up with OPA presenting a low maturity level.
51. **Sustainability of the project's investments.** Despite the viability of the project's investments as presented in the economic and financial analysis, the significant implementation delays together with the low level of ownership by OPA, negatively affected their sustainability. As reported by the PCR, the sustainability of the investments was the primary concern of the completion mission.⁵⁵ With specific reference to the technical sustainability, the following was reported: (i) the drip irrigation system was an appropriate choice in the project area. However, it has been recommended to shift from diesel pumps to solar-pumps – easier to operate and maintain; (ii) agricultural water management schemes developed in partnership with BNEDT are overall functioning, despite some challenges; (iii) infrastructure and equipment developed for storing and processing are technically sound, easy to use and repair and, in general, well suited to the local context; and (iv) nearly 40 per cent of agricultural schemes, mainly those developed outside the partnership with BNEDT, require additional investments.
52. At design PROPACOM **sustainability** was mainly anchored to POs empowerment and OPA graduation to higher maturity levels. At completion, it is reported that most OPA are weak (ref. Effectiveness) and not able to provide adequate support to their members. This was mainly explained by the delays in the infrastructure development, the delivery of production inputs as well as the inadequate training provided to targeted OPA.⁵⁶ Moreover, the inputs fund recovery level was reported

⁵² Including: *Direction de la planification et de la programmation, Direction du contrôle des projets and Directions régionales de l'agriculture* (Source: PDR).

⁵³ From French *Agence Nationale d'Appui au Développement Rural*.

⁵⁴ *Fonds interprofessionnel pour la recherche et le conseil agricole* through the *Projet d'appui sur les filières maraîchères* financed by EU/*Fonds européen de développement*, Memorandum of understanding with the PROFIAB II/GIZ as well as the *Office national de développement de la riziculture* together with *Agence pour le développement de la filière du riz*.

⁵⁵ Several reasons have been reported including: poor understanding of technical packages by beneficiaries, low and unpredictable yields and related market prices as well as lack of stakeholders' ownership in the downstream value chain.

⁵⁶ More based on a theoretical approach than practice.

to be below 50 per cent for most OPA which poses questions on its sustainability over time.⁵⁷ With regards to the institutional sustainability, it is reported that the national agricultural institutions were involved only towards the end of the project activities, and the local technicians/community mobilisers trained by the project to ensure advisory services at local levels were not operational at completion.

53. In **summary** most OPA are still fragile and did not achieve the targets set at appraisal while the inputs fund recovery rates are not strong. Nevertheless, the exit strategy, although presents the main two weaknesses described above, represents a positive step and shows PROPACOM efforts to build sustainability. Based on the above, sustainability is rated as *moderately unsatisfactory (3)* by this PCR, in agreement with the PCR.

B. Other performance criteria

Innovation and scaling up

54. **Innovation.** At design, PROPACOM lacked a KM and innovation strategy and at completion, no report comprehensively assessing all innovations developed by the project was prepared. However, the completion mission identified several innovations, including: (i) drip irrigation system for small garden productions; (ii) improved seeds varieties and fertilizers; (iii) production schemes following the contour lines; (iv) rubble stone masonry used in water management schemes; (v) rainfed onion in the site of Kafiokaha; and (vi) mechanized agriculture technologies. In addition, throughout the project implementation, selected beneficiaries took part to several important fairs-exchange activities both in Abidjan as well as in other districts.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, concrete outcomes from the participation to the above was not reported in the PCR and several challenges were identified in the use of some innovations (i.e. broken pumps, mechanized tools, inadequate waste disposal and limited skills due to low quality of training provided). Based on the above, innovation is rated *moderately unsatisfactory (3)* by the PCR, as in the PCR.
55. **Scaling up.** It is reported that the above innovations were scaled-up at project level. Yet, this does not necessarily constitute scaling-up as per the IFAD definition.⁵⁹ In addition, PCR acknowledged their implementation, particularly for the drip-irrigation and the inputs funds, presented several challenges (ref. Effectiveness and sustainability sections) and need to be adequately monitored and validated in the perspective of scaling-up in other IFAD-supported projects or other development interventions. Furthermore, the narrative section does not provide evidence on whether IFAD proactively engaged with the other donors or the private sectors to facilitate these innovations uptake in other contexts. Therefore, the scaling-up is rated as *moderately unsatisfactory (3)* in agreement with the PCR.

Gender equality and women's empowerment

56. At appraisal, several indicators were set to measure PROPACOM's implementation and impacts in terms of gender equality and women's empowerment and a clear indication of a gender disaggregated M&E system was emphasized during the MTR.⁶⁰ At completion, a limited set of data was provided and the gender-

⁵⁷ The success rate of the inputs fund for fertilizers and herbicides is strictly linked to OPA maturity level and concerned value chain (generally it performed better in the case of rice value chain). It is reported that adverse meteorological conditions negatively affected the production levels, thus posing difficulties to ensure its recovery level. However, it is reported that in other cases inputs were distributed only to some OPA leaders. In addition, structured OPA, used other productions' revenues (i.e. cashew nuts) to ensure adequate recovery of their input funds.

⁵⁸ I.e. 2015 *Salon de l'agriculture et des ressources animales* in Abidjan, the 2014 *Journées de l'administration agricole délocalisée* in Korhogo and the 2014 *Journées nationales de valorisation de l'agriculture* in Bondoukou.

⁵⁹ "Expanding, adapting and supporting successful policies, programmes and knowledge, so that they can leverage resources and partners to deliver larger results for a greater number of rural poor in a sustainable way" (IFAD operational framework for scaling up results, 2015). It further noted that "scaling up results does not mean transforming small IFAD projects into larger projects", but rather it is about "how successful local initiatives will sustainably leverage policy changes, additional resources and learning to bring the results to scale".

⁶⁰ Ref. Annex 2 PDR.

disaggregated M&E system was not duly implemented. In addition, the project failed to execute the 2014 strategic communication plan targeting women and youth in rural areas as well as the gender strategy (which was developed only in March 2017).⁶¹

57. Available figures show, inter-alia, that women represented: (i) 41 per cent of total beneficiaries of advisory services; (ii) 55 per cent of producers trained in new agricultural technology; (iii) 17 per cent of beneficiaries trained in marketing techniques and; (iv) 6 per cent of beneficiaries trained in entrepreneurship. In terms of land access, the equitable access to land plots for women is reported both for rice and small garden products. However, it is not clear whether this result is directly attributable to the project and if and how the framework is different in the case of maize and what the project has concretely done vis-à-vis the promotion of equitable access to land. Also, it is reported that the introduction of mechanized agricultural tools contributed to the reduction in women's workload, although a proper impact analysis could not be carried out given the delays in project implementation and the limited timeframe. Finally, it is reported that OPA, particularly their women members, expressed their need of literacy campaigns,⁶² which were provided by PROPACOM. In terms of women representation within the OPA's decision-making bodies, an inadequate representation was reported at completion despite project's intervention. Based on the above, the rating of the PCRV is *moderately satisfactory (4)*, in agreement with the PCR's.

Environment and natural resources management

58. Detailed social and environmental impact assessment studies have not been systematically carried throughout the project implementation for the agricultural water management schemes. Similarly, a comprehensive social and environmental analysis of PROPACOM's impact was not carried out at completion. The PCR evaluation is based on two studies,⁶³ field visits carried out during the final mission as well as the outcomes of the stakeholders' workshop.
59. Overall, the project introduced a more sustainable water management system, particularly with the introduction of the drip irrigation techniques.⁶⁴ The activities linked to the development of the water management schemes, particularly for rice, and the rehabilitation of market access roads were based on the rehabilitation of old infrastructure. On the contrary, deforestation for the development of small garden products plots put additional pressure on the existing natural resources and is expected to have a negative environmental impact mainly on wild fauna and flora. Furthermore, the protocol for the use and disposal of phytosanitary products was not duly followed during the field activities and appropriate technical services had not been consistently involved throughout the project life. PCRV rates the environment and natural resources management as *moderately unsatisfactory (3)*, in line with PCR.

Adaptation to climate change

60. A comprehensive assessment on whether and how producers' vulnerability to changing climatic conditions has been reduced following the project's interventions is missing in the PCR. According to the PCR, PROPACOM supported the adaptation to climate change through several activities, including:⁶⁵ (i) the promotion of more sustainable water use through the drip irrigation systems; (ii) the promotion of short season varieties requiring limited water; and (iii) the introduction of rainfall

⁶¹ This was due to several reasons including: (i) indicators not adequately declined to include gender aspects; (ii) limited understanding of gender development strategy and its analytical tools; and (iii) weak ownership of gender and youth integration tools.

⁶² The MTR reported 90 per cent illiteracy rate among women in the villages visited by the mission.

⁶³ In the project areas of Kpato and Katiola.

⁶⁴ Other agricultural technologies were developed requiring limited use of water including aménagement par seuils déversant en maçonnerie de moellons et un aménagement suivant les courbes de niveau.

⁶⁵ PCR main section and Annex 11.

observations in the locality of Katiola to adapt the agricultural calendar to the climatic conditions. However, whether adapted calendars were subsequently developed and followed by the producers in the entire project area is not clearly presented in the PCR. In addition, the run-of-the-river technique introduced did not show substantial positive results in the hydro-agriculture schemes.⁶⁶

61. With reference to water management, according to the PCR, it was agreed to invest on water infrastructure maintenance in order to increase storage capacity and ground water levels to adapt to variable climatic conditions. However, it is not clearly explained which funds will be used for the operations and management. In addition, the PCR narrative identifies infrastructure maintenance as a particularly weak point for project sustainability also in light of the low level of ownership demonstrated by most producers' organizations vis-a-vis project activities.⁶⁷ Finally, the design presented the use of composting, agricultural residues, manure and animal waste as part of the strategy for climate change adaptation. Whether the above has been carried out is not reported in the PCR. Based on the above, adaptation to climate change is rated *moderately unsatisfactory (3)* in the PCR, lower than the PCR rating (4).

C. Overall project achievement

62. Following Côte d'Ivoire's 1999 socio-political crisis, PROPACOM was the first IFAD-supported project to introduce a medium-term strategy promoting the agricultural development in the northern regions of the country.
63. The production inputs delivered by the project contributed to some increases in production yields of target crops. Access to markets was facilitated through the development of rural roads, and infrastructure facilities were developed to store agricultural produces. Efforts have been made to build local capacities, especially at the level of producers' organizations, particularly for maize and small garden market products. In addition, through changes introduced during implementation, the project positively contributed to the social integration of nearly all targeted ex-combatants' groups.
64. Nonetheless, significant implementation delays, particularly in the development of the agricultural water management schemes, mismatching in the delivery of production inputs with the agricultural calendar, and the generally low quality of training provided to producers, negatively affected overall project performance. The main target of empowering OPA was only partially achieved, with most OPA reported to be weak and in need of further support. Despite the development of appropriate market infrastructure, the failure in establishing a market information system and the low quality of training provided to local producers did not considerably improve producers' negotiating power in market transactions. Finally, knowledge management, innovation and scaling up were reported to be among the project weaknesses.
65. Overall, PROPACOM reported some positive results but did not significantly improve food security and incomes of its target group. Based on the above, project achievement is assessed as *moderately unsatisfactory (3)*, in line with the PCR.

D. Performance of partners

66. **IFAD.** Reported positive aspects related to the IFAD performance include, inter-alia: (i) regular supervision missions; (ii) timely processing of withdrawal applications; (iii) regular participation of IFAD country office in coordination meetings; (iv) management stability.⁶⁸ Less positive aspects include: (i) weak proactivity to address PCU weaknesses to adequately manage and implement the

⁶⁶ As a part of the lessons learned section, particularly regarding the failure registered in the agricultural water management system with run-of-the-river technique, the PCR recommends the mobilisation of surface water.

⁶⁷ Ref. PCR Section on lesson learned.

⁶⁸ Both the country programme manager and the country programme officer did not change over time.

project activities;⁶⁹ (ii) late undertaking of the MTR;⁷⁰ and (iii) inaccurate attention paid to the activities under the ADDR partnership during supervision missions despite its relevance in the country context and the amount involved.⁷¹ Based on the above, the rating of IFAD performance is *moderately unsatisfactory (3)*, in agreement with the PCR.

67. **Government.** It is reported that the government has significantly contributed to the PROPACOM implementation. Nevertheless, its performance through the MINADER and its regional structures faced several challenges, including the following: (i) weak coordination among involved directorates;⁷² (ii) inadequate coordination support provided by regional directorates to the PCU as well as at field level; and (iii) weak information sharing among various government structures also vis-à-vis the annual work programme and budget approval and its implementation. Notwithstanding the lack of coordination between regional directorates and PROPACOM at local level, according to the PCR, MINADER regional directorates positively contributed to the project implementation through to the distribution of production inputs, monitoring of the agricultural schemes' development and follow-up activities when regional antennas have been closed.⁷³
68. With regards to the **PCU**, notwithstanding some positive results mentioned above, a generally weak performance was reported by the PCR which underlined several issues including: (i) staff turnover, particularly for the posts of project coordinator and key experts;⁷⁴ (ii) limited understanding and capacity of the staff for results-based project management; (iii) weak communication among PCU, regional antennas and MINADER. It is worth highlighting that the PCU contemporarily coordinated two projects in parallel without adequate staffing through the project life.⁷⁵ Overall, government's performance is rated *moderately unsatisfactory (3)*, in line with the PCR.

IV. Assessment of PCR quality

69. **Scope.** The PCR contains most chapters, sections and annexes outlined in the 2015 Guidelines for Project Completion Review. Annex 11 "Environmental assessment" does not provide a detailed assessment as per the above guidelines and Annex 13 "Final wrap-up meeting minutes" refers to the mid-term review not the completion review. Therefore, PCR scope is considered *moderately satisfactory (4)*.
70. **Quality.** The PCR was prepared in November 2018 and reported findings of stakeholder workshop held in April 2018 in Bouaké. Findings are clearly organized by value chain indicating participant responses and lessons learned by the moderator.⁷⁶ A detailed list of all relevant stakeholders participating at the workshop is provided but adequate information on how they have been involved in the review process is missing thus making it difficult to assess the level of inclusiveness. Qualitative and quantitative results were collected during the

⁶⁹ Even though most supervision missions since project start-up had highlighted the above PCU weaknesses, which was also in charge of managing two projects at the time, IFAD took action only towards the end of the project by providing technical assistance in management and, most importantly, M&E.

⁷⁰ Notwithstanding the status of project at risk since September 2014, MTR took place 22 months before original project completion.

⁷¹ Nearly 15 per cent of total project budget.

⁷² Specifically, Regional Directorate, Departmental Directorate and Directorate for programme evaluation.

⁷³ At the end of June 2016 due to the lack of funds to implement agricultural schemes under the partnership with BNETD (source: Supervision mission, Dec. 2017).

⁷⁴ Overall, PROPACOM had two coordinators and one coordinator at interim and replaced the M&E and procurement experts as well as the project financial manager.

⁷⁵ During the first half (2013-2015) PROPACOM and PRAREP. In September 2014, the IFAD Executive Board approved the Support to agricultural production and marketing project - western expansion (PROPACOM Ouest) as the PROPACOM extension to western regions. Additional staff dedicated to the new project were consequently recruited by the joint PCU for its management and coordination.

⁷⁶ However, key information is missing regarding maize value chain, specifically regarding the assessment of sustainability and productivity.

supervision missions, but as acknowledged by the PCR, the M&E system did not provide adequate data throughout the project. Based on the above, the rating by the PCR is *moderately satisfactory (4)*.

71. **Lessons.** A set of lessons is presented in the PCR (see Section V) which refer to the project approach and its implementation, the project management and M&E system as well as project's impacts and related sustainability. The lessons appear reasonable, presented in a coherent manner and are linked to recommendations. The rating by the PCR is *satisfactory (5)*.
72. **Candour.** PCR narrative is objective and reports both negative as well as positive results. This PCR rates the candour for the PCR as *highly satisfactory (6)*.
73. Based on the above, the **overall rating** of the PCR quality is *moderately satisfactory (4)*.

V. Lessons learned

74. The following key lessons can be gleaned from PCR and its validation:
 - (i) The introduction of a "*faire-faire*" approach, as presented in the PROPACOM design documents, requires a very careful institutional assessment, specifically of producers' organisations and service providers. The very positive assessment of the country context at design did not take into account weaknesses in service providers and human resources. A thorough institutional assessment should have paid particular attention to the country fragility and its institutional weaknesses, especially of OPA and strategic service providers and might have avoided most of the bottlenecks during implementation. In addition, in a fragile post-crisis context like Côte d'Ivoire, the implementation through the demand-driven approach and microprojects from weak farmers' organization was slow. Adequate support had to be systematically provided to local stakeholders throughout the project implementation;
 - (ii) The "programme approach" through a common PCU between two projects or more projects in the country did not present the expected positive results. In order to be successful, it needs to be accompanied by appropriate capacity-building and support activities to ensure a sufficient number of qualified staff both within the Ministry of Agriculture and the PCU. At the same time, effective coordination should be consistently ensured between the PCU and the central and decentralized government structures;
 - (iii) Activities linking agricultural production, transformation and commercialization need to be logically planned in order to implement a coherent set of actions and, at the same time, should be adapted to local producers' capacities. Mismatching among the delivery of production inputs, capacity building activities and agricultural calendars, is considered the main challenge in the assessment of PROPACOM's effectiveness;
 - (iv) OPA active involvement throughout the implementation, specifically during the infrastructure development, is a key requirement towards the sustainability of project's results and should have been more emphasized (i.e. ensuring ownership and constant maintenance); and
 - (v) The project M&E system, its manual and the RIMS survey require to be better aligned to project objectives and its intervention logic in the area of intervention. MINADER staff could have been trained in M&E also through opportunities offered by ongoing projects in the country.

Definition and rating of the evaluation criteria used by IOE

Criteria	Definition *	Mandatory	To be rated
Rural poverty impact	Impact is defined as the changes that have occurred or are expected to occur in the lives of the rural poor (whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended) as a result of development interventions.	X	Yes
	<i>Four impact domains</i>		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Household income and net assets: Household income provides a means of assessing the flow of economic benefits accruing to an individual or group, whereas assets relate to a stock of accumulated items of economic value. The analysis must include an assessment of trends in equality over time. 		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Human and social capital and empowerment: Human and social capital and empowerment include an assessment of the changes that have occurred in the empowerment of individuals, the quality of grass-roots organizations and institutions, the poor's individual and collective capacity, and in particular, the extent to which specific groups such as youth are included or excluded from the development process. 		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Food security and agricultural productivity: Changes in food security relate to availability, stability, affordability and access to food and stability of access, whereas changes in agricultural productivity are measured in terms of yields; nutrition relates to the nutritional value of food and child malnutrition. 		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Institutions and policies: The criterion relating to institutions and policies is designed to assess changes in the quality and performance of institutions, policies and the regulatory framework that influence the lives of the poor. 		No
Project performance	Project performance is an average of the ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.	X	Yes
Relevance	The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, institutional priorities and partner and donor policies. It also entails an assessment of project design and coherence in achieving its objectives. An assessment should also be made of whether objectives and design address inequality, for example, by assessing the relevance of targeting strategies adopted.	X	Yes
Effectiveness	The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.	X	Yes
Efficiency	A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results.	X	Yes
Sustainability of benefits	The likely continuation of net benefits from a development intervention beyond the phase of external funding support. It also includes an assessment of the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the project's life.	X	Yes
Other performance criteria			
Gender equality and women's empowerment	The extent to which IFAD interventions have contributed to better gender equality and women's empowerment, for example, in terms of women's access to and ownership of assets, resources and services; participation in decision making; work load balance and impact on women's incomes, nutrition and livelihoods.	X	Yes
Innovation	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have introduced innovative approaches to rural poverty reduction.	X	Yes
Scaling up	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have been (or are likely to be) scaled up by government authorities, donor organizations, the private sector and others agencies.	X	Yes
Environment and natural resources management	The extent to which IFAD development interventions contribute to resilient livelihoods and ecosystems. The focus is on the use and management of the natural environment, including natural resources defined as raw materials used for socio-economic and cultural purposes, and ecosystems and biodiversity - with the goods and services they provide.	X	Yes
Adaptation to climate change	The contribution of the project to reducing the negative impacts of climate change through dedicated adaptation or risk reduction measures	X	Yes

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Definition *</i>	<i>Mandatory</i>	<i>To be rated</i>
Overall project achievement	This provides an overarching assessment of the intervention, drawing upon the analysis and ratings for rural poverty impact, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, gender equality and women's empowerment, innovation and scaling up, as well as environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change.	X	Yes
Performance of partners			
• IFAD	This criterion assesses the contribution of partners to project design, execution, monitoring and reporting, supervision and implementation support, and evaluation. The performance of each partner will be assessed on an individual basis with a view to the partner's expected role and responsibility in the project life cycle.	X	Yes
• Government		X	Yes

* These definitions build on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management; the Methodological Framework for Project Evaluation agreed with the Evaluation Committee in September 2003; the first edition of the Evaluation Manual discussed with the Evaluation Committee in December 2008; and further discussions with the Evaluation Committee in November 2010 on IOE's evaluation criteria and key questions.

Rating comparison^a

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Programme Management Department (PMD) rating</i>	<i>IOE Project Completion Report Validation (PCR) rating</i>	<i>Net rating disconnect (PCR-PMD)</i>
Rural poverty impact	3	3	0
Project performance			
Relevance	4	4	0
Effectiveness	3	3	0
Efficiency	3	3	0
Sustainability of benefits	3	3	0
Project performance^b	3.25	3.25	0
Other performance criteria			
Gender equality and women's empowerment	4	4	0
Innovation	3	3	0
Scaling up	3	3	0
Environment and natural resources management	3	3	0
Adaptation to climate change	4	3	-1
Overall project achievement^c	3	3	0
Performance of partners^d			
IFAD	3	3	0
Government	3	3	0
Average net disconnect			-0.08

^a Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable.

^b Arithmetic average of ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.

^c This is not an average of ratings of individual evaluation criteria but an overarching assessment of the project, drawing upon the rating for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, rural poverty impact, gender, innovation and scaling up, environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change.

^d The rating for partners' performance is not a component of the overall project achievement rating.

Ratings of the project completion report quality

	<i>PMD rating</i>	<i>IOE PCR rating</i>	<i>Net disconnect</i>
Candour		6	
Lessons		5	
Quality (methods, data, participatory process)		4	
Scope		4	
Overall rating of the project completion report		4	

Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable.

Delivery of main outputs

Tableau 1: Synthèse réalisations physiques de la composante «Amélioration de l'offre des produits agricoles»

Activités	Réalisations	Objectif initial	Objectif révisé (RMP)	Taux d'exécution
Accès aux facteurs de productions				
Semences R1 certifiées de riz irrigué distribuées (tonnes)	271,44	300	300	90%
Semences R1 certifiées de maïs distribuées (tonnes)	95,01	75	75	127%
NPK distribuées (tonnes)	497,74	540	540	92%
Urée distribuées (tonnes)	722,55	810	810	89%
Mécanisation agricole				
Motoculteurs (nombre)	66	120	120	55%
Batteuses-vanneuses (nombre)	26	100	100	26%
Sacs de collecte (nombre)	132100	171450	171450	77%
Appui-conseil				
Personnes ayant accès à des services de conseil (nombre)	8 127	25000	13500	33%
Producteurs formés aux bonnes pratiques de production agricole (nombre)	3316	3250	3250	102%
Aménagements hydro-agricoles				
Superficies aménagées/réhabilitées (ha)	1289	2490	2490	52%
Groupes de gestion de l'infrastructure de production créés/consolidés (nombre)	131		660	20%

Tableau 2: Synthèse des réalisations de la composante «Valorisation et mise en marché»

Activités	Réalisations	Objectif initial	Objectif révisé (RMP)	Taux d'exécution
Appui à la transformation et commercialisation				
Personnes formées aux méthodes et techniques de transformation/ conservation/ commercialisation (Nombre)	1 971		5 000	39%
Groupements de commercialisation formés/consolidés (Nombre)	177	660	660	27%
Membres de groupes de commercialisations formés/consolidés (Nombre)	1 173	3 795	3 795	31%
Groupes de commercialisation comptant des femmes dans leurs instances de direction (Nombre)	73	264	264	28%
Personnes formées aux affaires et à l'entrepreneuriat (Nombre)	1 976	3 300	3 300	60%
Infrastructures marchandes				
Pistes d'accès réalisées / réhabilités (km)	58	60	60	97%
Magasin de stockage ⁷⁷ (nombre)	5	6	6	83%
Centre de groupage et de conditionnement (nombre)	1	6	6	17%
Bâtiments de mini rizerie (nombre)	2	3	3	67%
Moulin (nombre)	8	20	20	40%
Décortiqueuses riz (nombre)	24	40	40	60%
Professionalisation des OPA				
OP appuyées par le projet dans la professionnalisation	124	660	660	19%
Dirigeants formés à la structuration et à la gestion	700	1980	1980	35%

⁷⁷ 6 magasins effectivement construits, mais 5 réceptionnés (celui de Ferké est à démolir).

Tableau 3: Synthèse des réalisations de la convention ADDR

Activités⁷⁸	Réalisations	Objectif	Taux d'exécution
Formation et appui conseil	1851	2000	93%
Formation production agricole	383	600	64%
Formation Elevage	514	800	64%
Formation Commerce	782	400	196%
Formation Valorisation	15	100	15%
Formation Transport	157	100	157%
Kits microprojets	1814	2000	91%
Kits microprojets Agriculture	382	600	64%
Kits microprojets Elevage	501	800	63%
Kits microprojets Commerce	767	400	192%
Kits microprojets Valorisation	10	100	10%
Kits microprojets Transport	154	100	154%
Appui à la structuration	14	51	27%
Nombre de groupements d'ex-combattants réinsérés formalisés	13	14	93%

⁷⁸ Activités exécutées en sus des réalisations des composantes techniques du projet.

Abbreviations and acronyms

ADDR	Authority for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration From French: <i>Autorité pour le désarmement, démobilisation et réintégration</i>
BNEDT	National Office of Technical Studies for Development From French: <i>Bureau National d'Etudes Techniques pour le Développement</i>
DSF	Debt Sustainability Framework
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
FCFA	Franc de la Communauté Financière Africaine
FMDB	Financial Management Dashboard
MTR	Mid-term review
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
MINADER	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
ORMS	Operational Results Management System
OPA	Agricultural Professional Organization From French: <i>Organisation Professionnelle Agricole</i>
PCR	Project Completion Report
PCRV	Project Completion Report Validation
PCU	Project Coordination Unit
PDR	Project Design Report
PO	Producers' Organisation
PRAREP	Agricultural Rehabilitation and Poverty Reduction Project From French <i>Projet de réhabilitation agricole et de réduction de la pauvreté</i>
PROPACOM	Support to Agricultural Production and Marketing Project From French: <i>Projet d'appui à la Production Agricole et à la Commercialisation.</i>
RIMS	Results and Impact Management System

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