

Project Completion Report Validation

Agricultural and Rural Development Project

Gabonese Republic

Date of validation by IOE: March 2019

I. Basic project data

			Approval (US\$ m)		Actual (US\$ m)	
Region	Western and Central Africa	Total project costs ¹	15.2		13.8	
Country	Gabonese Republic	IFAD loan 722-GA percentage of total	5.7	37%	5.4	39%
Loan/grant number	Loan: 722-GA Grant: 970-GA Loan: 2000000441	IFAD grant 970-GA percentage of total	0.27	2%	0.27	2%
Type of project (subsector)	Rural development	IFAD loan 2000000441 percentage of total	5.4	35%	4.6	33%
Financing type	Loan and grant	Borrower	3.2	21%	NA	NA
Lending terms	Ordinary terms*	OFID	0.2	1%	0	0%
Date of approval	12/09/2007 (722-GA; 970-GA) 11/12/2013 (2000000441)	Cofinancier 1				
Date of loan signature	26/10/2007 (722-GA; 970-GA) 3/12/2014 (2000000441)	Beneficiaries	0.45	3%	NA	NA
Date of effectiveness	20/03/2008 (722-GA; 970-GA) 07/08/2015 (2000000441)	Other sources				
Loan and grant amendments	March 2014, February 2015 and March 2017	Number of beneficiaries	28,000 direct 70,000 indirect		32,489 direct	
Loan closure extensions	2					
Country programme managers	A. Barry; L. Sarr; N. Gbossa; B. Hien (current)	Closing dates 722-GA and 970-GA 2000000441	30/09/2014 30/09/2017		30/09/2017 31/03/2018	
Regional director(s)	M. Beavogui; I. De Willebois; L. Martin (current)	Mid-term review			2-22 May 2012	
Project completion report reviewer	Valeria Galletti	IFAD loans and grant disbursement at project completion (%)			722-GA: 94 970-GA: 100 200000044: 85	
Project completion report quality control panel	Fumiko Nakai, Ernst Schaltegger	Date of the project completion report				

Source: Project Completion Report (PCR), President's Reports, Loan and Grant agreements, Mid-Term Review (MTR) Report.

* A maturity period of 15 to 18 years including a grace period of three years, with an interest rate equal to the reference interest rate per annum as determined by the Fund annually.

¹ Data on expenditures in US\$ against beneficiaries and borrower contribution was not available in the PCR.

II. Project outline

1. **Introduction.** The Agricultural and Rural Development Project (PDAR)² was a project in the Gabonese Republic aiming to reduce rural poverty in the target area by enhancing the access of the rural poor to value chains.
2. PDAR was designed to be implemented in an economic context characterized by very limited diversification and strong dependence on external factors, high levels of public expenditure, labour costs and external debt. The rural sector was dominated by subsistence farming, with the vast majority of the population chronically poor and vulnerable. In this context, supporting smallholders to be integrated into value chains was considered key for increasing production and diversifying rural activities.
3. IFAD's Executive Board (EB) approved the financing on 12 September 2007. The agreement was signed on 26 October 2007. It became effective on 20 March 2008, with 31 March 2014 and 30 September 2014 as the initial completion and closing dates respectively. In March 2014, the project was extended by three years³ (see more in paragraph 16).
4. Additional loan financing from the Spanish Food Security Co-financing Facility Trust Fund (Spanish Trust Fund) was approved by the EB on 11 December 2013. The loan agreement was signed by IFAD on 10 November 2014 and countersigned by the Government of the Gabonese Republic on 3 December 2014. Initial completion and closing dates were 31 March 2014 and 30 September 2014 respectively. A six-month extension of both dates was approved by IFAD in March 2017 (see more in paragraph 16).⁴
5. **Project area.** The project area at design covered the Woleu Ntem province with its five departments (High Komo, High Ntem, Ntem, Okano, and Woleu).
6. **Project goal, objectives and components.** According to the 2007 President's Report, the overall goal of the project was to help reduce rural poverty in the target area by enhancing the access of the rural poor to value chains with market potential. Specifically, the project aimed to: (i) develop value chains (for banana, cassava and groundnut) to the benefit of the target groups; (ii) strengthen the capacity of smallholders and smallholder organizations involved in these value chains; and (iii) strengthen the capacity of the providers of services to rural communities.
7. **Components.** The project had three components: (i) promotion of agricultural value chains with market potential; (ii) strengthening the capacity of various value chains stakeholders; and (iii) project coordination, monitoring and evaluation (M&E). Project activities were organized around five subcomponents.⁵
8. *Component 1 – Promotion of agricultural value chains with market potential* aimed to develop the three target value chains through better access to inputs, improved farming techniques, processing and marketing. In particular, the component planned to support: (i) the production of improved seeds; (ii) the provision of technical training to farmers for the improvement and multiplication of seeds; (iii) the set-up of a cassava and groundnut transformation centre; (iv) the financing of value chain micro-projects (MPs) to be implemented by farmers' organizations (FOs); (v) the development of market studies and market information systems

² From the French *Projet de développement agricole rural*.

³ Extended completion and closing dates were 31 March 2017 and 30 September 2017 respectively.

⁴ Extended completion and closing dates were 30 September 2017 and 31 March 2018 respectively.

⁵ For component 1: (1.1) Regional support programme to commodity production; (1.2) Support to farmers' groups; (1.3) Support to marketing and commodity competitiveness. For component 2: (2.1) Strengthening the capacity of the rural poor and their organizations; (2.2). Strengthening institutional capacity.

(MIS); (v) the organization of consultations to link smallholder farmers and their organizations with traders and transporters.

9. *Component 2 - Strengthening the capacity of value chain stakeholders* aimed to support: (i) the provision of capacity building to FOs; (ii) the mobilization of FOs for the creation of three commodity-based organizations; (iii) the provision of training to private and public service providers, private operators and micro-entrepreneurs; (iv) information, education and communication activities; (v) the set-up of a rural support centre; (vi) the set-up of a provincial statistics unit to improve the collection and dissemination of quality information on markets.
10. *Component 3 - Project coordination and M&E* aimed to ensure project coordination, administrative and financial management, M&E and knowledge management.
11. **Target group.** The project directly targeted 28,000 smallholder farmers involved in the selected value chains and organized in 240 FOs in 160 villages. Targets included 50 per cent of women and 30 per cent of youth, elderly and indigenous peoples (Baka Pygmies). The project was expected to indirectly reach 70,000 people.
12. **Financing.** The total cost at approval was US\$8.6 million, including US\$6 million from IFAD (US\$5.7 million loan on ordinary terms and US\$0.3 million grant);⁶ US\$0.2 million from the OPEC⁷ Fund for International Development (OFID); US\$2.2 million from the Gabonese government; and US\$0.3 million from the beneficiaries.
13. In December 2013, IFAD's EB approved of US\$5.4 million⁸ of supplementary loan financing under the Spanish Trust Fund. Additional contributions from the Government (US\$1 million) and beneficiaries (US\$0.1 million) were also mobilized bringing the total cost of the project to US\$15.2 million. Nonetheless, the OFID financing never materialized, resulting in a total cost of PDAR of US\$15 million.

Table 1

Estimated project costs (as revised in 2013) (in US\$ million)

<i>Source of Funding</i>	<i>Type of financing</i>	<i>Estimated amount (US\$ m)</i>	<i>Estimated amount (% of total)</i>
IFAD	Loan	5.7	37
IFAD	Grant	0.2	2
Spanish Trust Funds	Loan	5.4	35
OFID		0.2	1
Government		3.2	21
Beneficiaries		0.5	3
Total Financing		15.2	100

Source: 2007 President's Report and 2013 President's Memorandum.

14. Due to the lack of consistent and comparable information in terms of project costs/expenditures in the Project Completion Report (PCR),⁹ the tables below present project expenditures expressed in billion XAF and referring to different points in time.

⁶ The budget in the financing agreement was expressed in Special Drawing Rights (SDR) as follows: SDR3.8 million (loan) and SDR0.2 million (grant).

⁷ Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries.

⁸ The budget in the financing agreement was expressed in EUR corresponding to a total amount of EUR4.2 million.

⁹ In particular: (i) consolidated tables on expenditures in US\$ are not available; (ii) costs by financier are expressed in XAF as of 20 February 2018; (iii) costs by component are expressed in XAF as of 28 February 2017.

Table 2
Project costs (in billion XAF, as of 20 February 2018)

Source of Funding	Type of financing	Estimated amount	Estimated amount (% of total)	Actual expenditure	Expenditure (% of total)	Disbursements (% of estimated amount)
IFAD	Loan	2.9	35	2.7	36	94
IFAD	Grant	0.1	2	0.1	2	100
Spanish Trust Fund	Loan	2.8	34	2.4	32	85
Government		2.1	26	1.8	24	83
Beneficiaries		0.2	3	0.5	6	239
Total Financing		8.1	100	7.5	100	92

Source: PCR.

Table 3
Component costs (in billion XAF, as of 28 February 2017)

Components	Planned (XAF billion)	Planned amount (% of total)	Actual amount (XAF billion)	Actual (% total)
Promotion of agricultural value chains with market potential;	5.3	65	3.4	57
Strengthening the capacity of various value chain participants	1.3	16	0.5	8
Project coordination and M&E	1.5	19	2.1	35
Total	8.1	100	5.9	100

Source: PCR.

15. **Project implementation.** The project was designed to be implemented by the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Rural Development (MAEDR)¹⁰ and guided by a national steering committee. A Provincial Technical Coordination Committee was to be set up to ensure the exchange of information and maximization of synergies with other projects implemented in the province. Further, taking into account the limited presence of MAEDR deconcentrated support services (e.g. extension) the project would set up a technical support system, with advisory services to be provided by fifteen technicians (TAC)¹¹ based in the project intervention area, and two supervisors. A project coordination unit (PCU) was to be established in Oyem, capital of Woleu Ntem province, with responsibility for planning, managing and supervising project activities.
16. **Changes and developments during implementation.** Significant changes occurred during implementation, including the following:
- Based on IFAD's EB decision in 2007, the responsibility for project supervision was transferred to IFAD, although the project was initially approved to be supervised by the United Nations Office for Project Services ;
 - In May 2012, the Government of Gabon made a request to IFAD for supplementary financing to reinforce investments under subcomponent 1.3 *Support to marketing and commodity competitiveness* (see more in paragraphs 41-42). Supplementary resources mobilized by IFAD in December 2013 were

¹⁰ From the French: *Ministère de l'agriculture, l'élevage et du développement rural.*

¹¹ From the French: *technicien d'appui conseil.*

expected to cover the construction of 12 warehouses, the rehabilitation of 104 km of roads, and the establishment of sustainable mechanisms for infrastructure management and maintenance;

- In March 2014, the project completion and closing dates were extended by three years due to: (i) the need to enable the execution of activities under subcomponent 1.3 following the mobilization of supplementary financing; (ii) the limited implementation progress and low level of disbursement recorded;
 - In March 2017, a six-month extension to the supplementary financing was granted by IFAD upon request of the government to complete the delayed rehabilitation of roads and construction of warehouses caused by: (i) conflicts related to the 2016 presidential election; (ii) a 3-month suspension of the IFAD's portfolio in the country in 2016 due to a delayed payment of the debt;
 - Based on project design, FOs were expected to be the main entry point for the provision of direct support to producers through MPs. According to the PCR, the decision was based on the assumption of the existence of a significant number of associations of considerable size (15 members on average) with the needed capacities to implement MPs. Nonetheless, according to the PCR, in the absence of organizations with these characteristics, a decision was taken to support 700 family groups (composed of five members on average) instead of 240 FOs;
 - In line with the recommendations from the 2014 IFAD supervision mission, the financing agreement was amended in 2015 to reallocate the IFAD loan proceeds under categories V and IX (implementation of MPs and non-allocated resources respectively) to the other categories. The reallocation was particularly aimed at covering additional operational costs and salaries following the three-year extension of the project;
 - Due to the absence of a local NGO with the needed capacities to manage it, the plan to set-up a rural support centre was cancelled. Also, due to their limited capacity, no agreement was concluded with CIAM¹² and IRAF¹³ for the supply of improved cassava and banana plant material. Instead, partnership was established with CARBAP¹⁴ and IITA,¹⁵
 - The expected financing from OFID never materialized.
17. **Intervention logic.** PDAR was designed to enable beneficiaries to improve their livelihoods through improved production and marketing.
18. A steady and sustainable production of improved seeds coupled with training on improved farming techniques under component 1, were expected to enable farmers to implement their MPs and increase their production. The provision of support for the upstream (e.g. development of MIS, market research, networking) and downstream of production (e.g. development of infrastructure) would result in improved competitiveness in the target area and strengthened access of the target groups to market opportunities.
19. The support to FOs under component 2 was to enable better planning and management of economic initiatives and empower farmers to influence decision-making within their value chains. Capacity building to private sector operators and service providers was expected to contribute to an enabling environment for improved access to relevant support services for smallholder farmers and their groups.

¹² Centre d'Introduction d'Adaptation et de Multiplication du Matériel Végétal.

¹³ Institut de Recherches Agronomiques et Forestières.

¹⁴ Centre Africain de Recherches sur les Bananiers et Plantains.

¹⁵ Institut International d'Agriculture Tropicale.

20. **Delivery of outputs.** According to the PCR, the delivery of outputs¹⁶ by the project was mixed. In particular, a good level of achievements was recorded under component 1 and principally subcomponent 1.1 (Regional support programme to commodity production). Conversely, planned training and capacity building activities and the mobilization of and support to stakeholders (FOs, service providers) were partly implemented.

III. Review of findings

A. Core criteria

Relevance

21. **Relevance vis-à-vis IFAD and Government policies and strategies.** The project's objectives were aligned with the Government and IFAD strategies.
22. In particular, the project was in line with IFAD's 2007-2010 strategic framework focusing, among others, on the development of competitive markets for agricultural inputs and products and on the need to strengthen the capacity and organization of poor rural producers to engage in markets more profitably.
23. The objectives of PDAR were in line with the 2005 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper of the Gabonese Republic, in which agriculture is considered key for the diversification of the economy and poverty reduction in rural areas. The focus on smallholder farming to improve agricultural production was a crucial aspect of the 2006 Orientation Law on the Economic and Social Development Strategy¹⁷ and the 2006 Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper.¹⁸
24. PDAR also aligned with sectoral policies, such as the 2003 law on Development and Territorial Planning¹⁹ and the 2005 Agro-pastoral and Rural Development Policy²⁰ in which the diversification and enhancement of production, the development of value chains, the organization of producers and marketing were considered a priority.
25. The project was also coherent with national policies and strategies approved after its launch, such as: (i) the 2009 strategic plan of the government Emerging Gabon by 2025, confirming the importance of the agriculture sector for the country's development; (ii) the 2017-2023 National Agricultural Investment and Food Security and Nutrition Plan;²¹ (iii) and the Strategy for Economic Recovery of the Agriculture Sector²² 2016-2023 with its focus on food security and the need to reduce food imports and boost agricultural exports.
26. **Project design.** The project structure and supported activities reflected the needs of the targeted populations and were relevant to meet project objectives. In particular, the objective of component 1 to promote agricultural value chains through better access to inputs, improved farming techniques, processing and marketing responded to beneficiaries' needs and issues (e.g. lack of market information and infrastructure, low productivity, obsolescence of agricultural tools and techniques, limited quality input supply and access to markets). The choice of banana, cassava and groundnuts as priority value chains further responded to the need to improve food and nutrition security and was balanced in relation to gender equality concerns.²³

¹⁶ Several inconsistencies and discrepancies were found in the PCR in relation to expected and effective outputs when comparing the information presented in the narrative, the different tables and annexes. An effort was made in the PCR to only include reasonable data based on the PCR overall analysis or data on which no incoherencies were found. Nonetheless, output data should be considered with caution.

¹⁷ *Loi d'orientation de la stratégie de développement économique et social en République gabonaise.*

¹⁸ *Document de stratégie de croissance et de réduction de la pauvreté.*

¹⁹ *Loi de développement et d'aménagement du territoire.*

²⁰ *Politique de développement agropastoral et rural.*

²¹ *Programme National d'Investissement Agricole et de Sécurité Alimentaire et Nutritionnelle.*

²² *Stratégie de relance de l'économie dans le secteur agricole.*

²³ Banana was cultivated mainly by men for commercial purposes while cassava and groundnut especially by women, both for self-consumption and commercial purposes.

27. The capacity building of key actors under component 2, was critical to create an enabling environment for the engagement of smallholders into value chains and address issues related the weak planning, structuring and capacities of local communities, preventing them to become effective and reliable stakeholders in the market.
28. The targeting approach was also relevant. The project intervened in some of the country's poorest areas with a high agricultural potential. The prioritization of most vulnerable groups with high levels of poverty and the participatory approach adopted were also in line with the IFAD's Targeting Policy.
29. Nonetheless, the design showed some weaknesses. In particular, the need to implement changes in the project strategic orientations in terms of the support to FOs (see paragraph 16) due to inexact assumptions at design might be the result of weak or incomplete context and stakeholders' analysis at design. The project failure to involve Batwa people, not interested in activities supported by PDAR (see footnote 34), the disengagement of identified partners at design due to their limited capacities (e.g. CIAM²⁴, not able to product plants in vitro as expected) or the cancellation of planned activities due to the absence of organizations with the capacities to implement them (e.g. the set-up of a cassava and groundnut transformation centre) seem to corroborate this hypothesis.
30. The project also revealed weak capacities and performance of the implementing agency, particularly in terms of implementation support, financial management and M&E (see more in section D). This might indicate a weak assessment of its strengths and weaknesses at design or a limited capacity of the project to plan mitigating measures well in advance. These design issues affected implementation and the achievement of results as will be discussed in the next section on effectiveness.
31. In summary, the project was aligned with both national and IFAD's priorities and the main areas of intervention were relevant to the poor. However, some key context aspects and stakeholders' capacities were not properly assessed at design and some of the activities planned were not suitable to reach the most vulnerable. Based on the above, project relevance is rated moderately satisfactory (4) by the PCR, one point below the PCR.

Effectiveness

32. **Objective 1 – Development of value chains with market potential to the benefit of the target groups.** Through component 1, PDAR aimed at developing the three selected value chains through a comprehensive approach including improved access to inputs, farming techniques, production and marketing of agricultural products.
33. *Support to seeds production.* PDAR succeeded in developing 89 ha against 46 expected among seeds fields and nurseries contributing to the production of 7.8 million cassava cuttings against 5.3 million planned, 0.3 million banana plants against 0.6 million planned and 4,71 tons against 63.3 tons planned of improved groundnut seeds.²⁵ This guaranteed a steady and sustainable supply of quality plant material for producers for the implementation of their MPs. In addition, it is worth noting that thanks to PDAR, 48 cassava seeds producers became suppliers of cassava cuttings for Olam, a leading agri-business company operating worldwide.
34. With the support of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), IRAF, IITA and CARBAP, capacity building and training to farmers (e.g. on multiplication techniques, phytosanitary aspects, improving yields and quality of production, the

²⁴ Centre d'Introduction d'Adaptation et de Multiplication du Matériel Végétal.

²⁵ According to the PCR, low productivity and pathological constraints were observed for groundnuts seeds. Although the MTR recommended to support the development of new seed fields, the recommendation was not pursued. As a result, PDAR enabled the production of only 7 per cent of the total quantity of seeds expected.

Farmer Field School (FFS) approach) to improve plant material and multiplication was provided. These activities benefitted 1,378 people, of which 465 women.

35. According to the PCR, the set-up of the cassava and groundnut transformation centres never materialized due to lack of organizations with the capacities to ensure its management and the high costs of the investment. The project finally opted for the set-up of pilot cassava processing units at the level of two beneficiaries' groups and three business centres for the collection of agricultural products.
36. **Support to MPs.** PDAR planned to finance 288 MPs²⁶ to be implemented by 240 FOs. The project strategy was revised at MTR establishing a target of 700 family groups which were to be smaller in size compared to FOs. Overall, PDAR supported the implementation of 793 MPs²⁷ by 573 groups. According to the PCR, expenditures for the implementation of MPs reached 84.4 per cent of forecasts at design. Beneficiaries' contribution, expected to finance 10 per cent of the costs of MPs, went beyond expectations, reaching 37 per cent.
37. MPs enabled farmers to plant 1,629 ha (against 1,563 ha planned) and produce over 43,000 tons of cassava, bananas and groundnuts against 20,500 tons expected. Nonetheless, while results were particularly positive for cassava and banana, this was not the case for groundnuts (39 ha planted against 63 ha planned and approximately 28 tons produced against 101 tons planned).²⁸
38. A technical assistance framework was set-up with the participation of two supervisors and 15 TACs to ensure the mobilization of the necessary expertise for the provision of proximity advisory support services to producers.
39. **Support to marketing.** PDAR aimed to improve the access of the target populations to market opportunities through improved dissemination of market information, the collective collection and storage of production, and the facilitation of linkages between producers, traders and transporters. Also, PDAR aimed to create a consultation platform with the participation of stakeholders to define a common strategy to improve market access through the identification of roads to be rehabilitated and the mobilization of financing.
40. The significant delays in the implementation of above activities affected the achievement of results. In particular, the market study to be conducted at project start was finalized only in 2013. According to the PCR, this delay did not allow the project to make the relevant strategic choices on the viability of the promoted value chains. Although the planned MIS was not fully operational at project closing, provincial radio stations were used to broadcast relevant information on markets (i.e. spots on price and market opportunities) and to organize debates between producers, farmers and public services. The planned organization of consultation workshops to link producers with traders and transporters did not take place.
41. Market infrastructure was originally to be developed under PARIR,²⁹ a project to be financed by the African Development Bank, designed with the support of and in complementarity with PDAR and expected to focus on the development rural infrastructure in the same area of intervention.
42. While PARIR was expected to be launched in 2012, it never materialized. Based on the above and on other key factors (i.e. the findings and recommendations from the 2012 MTR, revealing that project results were affected by limited marketing infrastructure in the intervention area; the need to align with the new strategic

²⁶ MPs mainly focused on the production, transformation and marketing of project supported commodities.

²⁷ Of these, 259 were related to cassava production, 487 to banana and 47 to groundnut.

²⁸ Data was taken from the PCR. Nonetheless, some inconsistencies were found in the document in relation to tons produced. In particular, the production of groundnuts ranges in the document from 28,5 tons to 31,5 tons; banana production from 32,877 tons to 9,924 tons; and cassava from 10,291 tons to 6,634 tons. Data included in the PCR/V were those more frequently referred to in the PCR and more coherent with the narrative.

²⁹ *Projet d'appui à la réhabilitation des infrastructures rurales (PARIR).*

plan of the government Emerging Gabon by 2025, identifying the isolation of production areas among the main hindrances to agricultural development) supplementary financing was mobilized by IFAD in 2013 upon request by the government. Nonetheless, the loan was effective in July 2015 only, due to the late signature and ratification of the agreement by the government. This, coupled with lengthy procurement processes³⁰ (see more in section D) affected the implementation of the activities. As a result, only four warehouses were developed, against the 12 planned.

43. The project performed better with the rehabilitation of roads (102.6 km rehabilitated against 104 expected). According to the PCR, this infrastructure positively affected over 6,318 people reducing transport times to connect with national roads and improving access to production areas that before project intervention were only reachable through the forest and by foot.
44. **Objective 2 – Strengthen the capacity of smallholders and smallholder organizations involved in value chains.** PDAR was aimed at strengthening farmers and their organizations through awareness-raising, knowledge management, training activities and the mobilization of farmers.
45. Several information, education and communication activities were conducted³¹ mainly through community radio stations (e.g. an information campaign about PDAR, the dissemination of weekly information on the progress of project activities, monthly thematic broadcasts, the dissemination of market prices) and the distribution of leaflets and pamphlets. According to the PCR, these activities enabled the project to: (i) directly reach beneficiaries, who became aware of the existence of the project and approached its headquarters to solicit support; (ii) mobilize project beneficiaries; (iii) share knowledge on successful tools and practices to increase productivity.
46. PDAR enabled the training to 1,272 farmer champions against 1,400 planned³² from the supported family groups in organizational development, value chain approach and MPs management. However, according to the PCR, trained people did not fully apply knowledge and tools acquired.³³ Further, 365 members of producers' groups management committees against 960 planned were trained in organizational and financial management, planning and leadership.
47. According to the 2008-2017 project final report elaborated by MAEDR, PDAR supported the creation and formal registration of a cooperative union (*Union des Coopératives du Canton Bissok*) in conformity with the Uniform Act on Cooperatives of the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa.
48. Finally, 20 exchange visits were organized at the provincial and sub-regional level (against 52 planned), benefiting over 480 people, including 50 per cent women. According to MAEDR,³⁴ exchanges enabled participants to share experiences on how to increase production and marketing of banana, cassava and groundnut, and improve knowledge and understanding on how to mobilize farmers and form FOs.
49. **Objective 3 - Strengthen the capacity of the providers of services to rural communities.** PDAR aimed to support the strengthening of service providers and other private sector actors intervening in the value chain such as suppliers, processors, traders and transporters and to set-up a rural support centre.
50. Nonetheless, only a limited part of planned activities was implemented. This included the provision of training to TACs (e.g. in organizational development,

³⁰ According to the PCR, the contracts for works were awarded in April 2017 only.

³¹ E.g. the launch of 76 radio emissions and 24 spots and the production of 12 brochures on the project.

³² Source: 2008-2017 PDAR final report elaborated by MAEDR.

³³ For example, farmers did not record data on activities and on financed MPs (e.g. in terms of production, revenues, expenditures) in the forms and templates provided.

³⁴ Source: 2008-2017 project final report elaborated by MAEDR.

value chain approach and management of MPs) and the set-up of a statistics agricultural service at the provincial level. Although training to statistics agents (e.g. on data capturing and market monitoring techniques) and equipment were provided, the unit was not fully operational at project completion due to the lack of financing to implement its plan of action. As previously mentioned, the creation of the rural support centre never materialized and the project only focused on linking existing service providers with beneficiaries.

51. **Summary.** Overall, the project objectives were partially achieved. Under component 1, although with significant implementation delays, several targets were met. This is particularly true for the production of improved seeds and the support to producers provided through MPs, enabling to exceed the size of cultivated areas targeted and to increase cassava, banana and groundnut production. However, PDAR was able to only support 573 groups against 700 planned. Support for improved marketing was less effective with only few activities implemented/partly implemented and limited results achieved, with the exception of the rehabilitation of roads. Under component 2, while a good number of information, education and communication activities and exchanges among producers were conducted, the mobilization and organization of farmers was limited and the support for the emergence of private operators did not succeed.
52. In terms of the outreach, the project reportedly reached 32,489 direct beneficiaries. In particular, according to the PCR, 26,171 beneficiaries against 28,000 targeted were reached through activities planned at design, and additional 6,318 through additional ones under supplementary financing (the rehabilitation of roads). Overall 47 per cent of direct beneficiaries were women and 38 per cent youth. PDAR failed to support Baka indigenous peoples.³⁵
53. Although the project operated in the five departments of the province, the duration of the support was not homogeneous. In particular, until 2013 the project only operated in Ntem and Woleu, the nearest departments to Oyem, due to the delayed recruitment and deployment of TACs³⁶ in the field.
54. The effectiveness is considered both in the PCR and PCRV moderately satisfactory (4).

Efficiency

55. PDAR suffered significant implementation delays since the very beginning. Also, while supplementary financing was approved in December 2013, the financing agreement was signed only in December 2014 and ratified in July 2015. This delay has de facto reduced the duration of the implementation period of additional financing by one year.
56. A low level of achievements and disbursement rate³⁷ were recorded until 2012. A better performance was recorded after the MTR in 2012, particularly following the recruitment of a new project management team (see more in section D).
57. The project also suffered from the instability of the PCU, financial management and M&E issues and a constantly late mobilization of resources from the government.
58. According to the available financial information on the status of cumulative expenditures, as of 20 February 2018 the overall financial execution stood at 92 per cent of the total estimated project cost. According to the PCR, expenditures related to project management under component 3 largely exceeded the planned allocations due to the three-year extension of the project (resulting in additional operational and salary costs) and the aging and late renovation of vehicles

³⁵ According to the PCR, due to the limited participation of indigenous peoples in project activities, a study was commissioned to identify their needs and concerns. The findings of the study showed that Batwa people were interested in forestry activities, in line with their way of life, rather than in activities supported through PDAR.

³⁶ According to the MTR report, TACs were recruited in 2011 only.

³⁷ In particular, 33 per cent of IFAD loan and 48.5 per cent of IFAD grant had been disbursed as of 2012.

(resulting in increased maintenance costs). The actual component 3 cost was 35 per cent of the total actual cost, which is quite high, compared to 19 per cent as per the original allocation.

59. The monitoring of the impact of MPs showed some deficiencies and did not enable the project to reliably and systematically record key data (e.g. increase in income and production). The PCR mission therefore made assumptions to conduct the ex-post financial and economic analysis and estimate PDAR impact. Assumptions were based on two scenarios of increased cassava and banana yields through project support. Based on the first scenario, which takes into account rather cautious assumptions, the economic internal rate of return of PDAR was estimated at 10 per cent (45 per cent based on the second scenario).
60. According to the PCR, the project had a positive impact and was economically viable, despite the many difficulties encountered. However, in light of low efficiency in other areas, including the project management cost, pace of disbursement and implementation, efficiency is rated moderately unsatisfactory (3) in both the PCR and the PCR.V.

Rural poverty impact

61. According to the PCR, four surveys were conducted within PDAR: (i) a baseline survey (2010); (ii) an intermediate evaluation survey (2014); (iii) a socio-economic survey (2017); and (iv) a SYGRI³⁸ survey for the impact assessment (2017).
62. While the SYGRI survey covered 900 households in 30 villages (30 households per village) randomly selected in Woleu Ntem province, the 2017 socio-economic survey covered a sample of 1,290 households in 43 out of the 160 villages involved in PDAR. The PCR does not specify if these surveys included control groups. This might raise questions in terms of the attribution of impacts to the project. Some deficiencies were also observed in the monitoring of the impact of MPs and the PCR team was not able to conduct a thorough analysis of the effects and impacts of the project (see paragraph 59).
63. **Food security and agricultural productivity.** The results of the impact assessment demonstrate the positive results of PDAR with the majority of households (54 per cent) reporting an increase in production in 2010-2017.³⁹
64. According to the PCR, although data vary depending on the source, PDAR undeniably led to a significant increase in cassava and banana productivity thanks to the introduction of improved high yielding varieties and to the adoption of new agricultural techniques. In particular, the PCR estimates that productivity increased from 8 to 20 tons per ha for cassava and from 12 to 17 tons per ha for banana. However, crop damage by pests (e.g. by elephants) continued to be a challenge.
65. No major changes were registered in terms of food security, and no food shortages were reported by surveyed households. An improvement of the nutritional status of children was registered at completion with chronic malnutrition decreasing from 26 per cent in 2010 to 21.7 per cent in 2017. Nonetheless, malnutrition in PDAR implementation area remained high. In any event, how the project was to contribute (or might have contributed) to improving nutrition was not clear in project documents.
66. **Household income and assets.** According to the PCR, the socio-economic survey indicated that the increase in production resulted in a significant increase of sales with the value of annual sales per household of cassava tubers increasing from XAF115,000 to XAF399,000 and those of banana doubling from XAF190,000 to

³⁸ From the French: *Système de gestion des résultats et de l'impact*.

³⁹ Nonetheless, according to the PCR, 17 per cent of households reported a decrease, particularly in the Okano and High Komo departments. This was partly explained by the destruction of crops due to the attack of pachyderms.

XAF410,000 on average. The decrease registered in the sale of other agricultural products over 2014-2017, reflected a repositioning of producers on crops supported by PDAR.

67. The share of producers that were able to sell all production brought to the market increased from 38 per cent in 2010 to 81 per cent in 2017, showing the strong demand for local food products and a reduction in losses and unsold products. Overall, according to the PCR, the majority of households (58 per cent) indicated their income increased during the project period.⁴⁰
68. Further, a large majority (77 per cent) of households indicated that their living conditions improved. Households with a low standard of living decreased from 66.5 per cent to 42.8 per cent. Income generated from increased production and sales enabled households to acquire material goods and improve housing (e.g. the overcrowding rate index decreased from 0.81 to 0.56; the percentage of households having electricity in their house increased from 23 to 32 per cent).
69. **Human and social capital and empowerment.** According to the PCR, the project contributed to strengthening the capacities of farmers through training and capacity building.
70. The initial strategy of the project to support FOs did not work as expected due to the absence of large and formal organizations to be engaged in the implementation. As a consequence, PDAR focused on family groups. The PCR indicates that although PDAR started a process of mobilization and organization of farmers in FOs, results remained fragile and further efforts were needed to consolidate them. Nonetheless, the PCR lacks an in-depth analysis of changes in the capacities of the organizations/groups supported during project implementation and in the level of empowerment of targeted individuals and organizations.
71. Finally, while the PCR indicates that the project ensured the participation of women and youth as planned, the analysis of benefits achieved by women is general and nothing is said about youth (see more in section B). Further, the project failed to support Baka people.
72. **Institutions and policies.** According to the PCR, the project did not bring changes in the policy or institutional framework as a result of project-led policy dialogue activities, as it was not planned at design. The capacity of MAEDR agents participating in the implementation of the project improved particularly thanks to their involvement in the monitoring of PDAR, as well as in field and training activities.
73. **Rural poverty impact.** Based on the above, rural poverty impact is rated moderately satisfactory (4) in both the PCR and PCR.V.

Sustainability of benefits

74. **Technical sustainability.** According to the PCR, a significant proportion of producers continued to apply improved production techniques introduced by PDAR. Incomes generated from the implementation of MPs were rarely reinvested to conduct the same activity (e.g. improved cassava plantations) but often used to acquire material goods, improve housing, invest in the education of children or diversify activities (e.g. start small business or open shops).
75. Concerning infrastructures, the PCR informs that responsible institutions did not have the necessary resources for the regular maintenance of roads. Also, while infrastructures management committees were set-up, they were not fully operational and further efforts were needed to ensure sustainability.

⁴⁰ The differences observed between departments reflected those concerning production, with households of Woleu, Haut-Ntem and Ntem particularly reporting an increase.

76. **Economic and financial sustainability.** The project enabled supported groups to implement MPs that were designed in a participatory way based on their needs and priorities with a positive result in terms of increased incomes for the beneficiaries.
77. According to the PCR, a good number of groups continued production activities supported under PDAR, though often on a smaller scale due to the lack of sufficient financial resources. The overall sustainability of MPs was found weak and only 37 per cent of supported groups participating in the self-evaluation workshop reported satisfaction in terms of the financial autonomy reached.
78. **Social sustainability.** Despite training and capacity building provided, the family groups and FOs supported by PDAR, were still fragile, lacked organizational dynamism and effective collective management. Targeted actions were still needed to achieve their empowerment and ensure sustainability, particularly within the second phase of PDAR (PDAR II).⁴¹
79. The support and capacity building to service providers expected to enable smallholder farmers to benefit from advice even after project completion did not materialize as expected. Further, the reported decrease in the size of rural households as a result of rural exodus (from 4.9 to 3 persons in the period 2010-2017) that especially affected youth, raised important questions in terms of sustainability. According to the PCR, measures were needed to make the rural environment more attractive to youth and address this phenomenon within PDAR II.
80. **Institutional sustainability.** Direct support to deconcentrated services of MAEDR contributed to improve the capacity of agents. According to the PCR, although a redeployment of staff to other provinces might have undermined sustainability, it might have contributed to the dissemination of good practices and lessons learnt in other regions. While a statistics unit was set-up and equipped it was not effective, and further support was needed to make it operational and ensure the sustainability of its activities.
81. **Environmental sustainability.** According to the PCR, PDAR did not have an impact on the environment (see paragraph 95). However, some risks related to the environment were found in areas adjacent to national parks and reserves (e.g. High Komo and Okano) where pachyderms destroyed plantations. According to the PCR, the sustainability of PDAR support in these areas is not guaranteed in the absence of tailored policies or interventions for the safeguard of plantations.
82. In summary, despite positive aspects, such as the application of improved agricultural techniques, sustainability risks were observed, associated with the maintenance and management of infrastructures, support services required by producers, the capacity of family groups and FOs, the sustainability of MPs. Further, the project did not develop an exit strategy. At the same time, the continuation of the project support through PDAR II is expected to improve sustainability prospects building on and consolidating results achieved.
83. Sustainability is rated moderately unsatisfactory (3) both in the PCR and PCR V.

B. Other performance criteria

Innovation and scaling up

84. **Innovation.** According to the PCR, the main innovation promoted within PDAR was the dissemination of improved practices and tools for cassava and banana production enabling a significant increase in cultivated areas and a substantial increase of productivity. These included the use of high yielding plant material resistant to the mosaic virus and row plantations.

⁴¹ PDAR II was approved by the EB in April 2018 for a total financing of EUR20.9 million including a contribution of EUR5.4 million from IFAD, EUR10.2 million from the government and EUR0.3 million from beneficiaries.

85. In collaboration with CARBAP and IRAF, PDAR introduced the stem fragments technique⁴², an innovative and cost-effective technique for reproducing vegetal material enabling the production of 100 banana sheaths from one sucker in two months (compared to five sheaths generally produced after six months with traditional methods). Thanks to the adopted technique, farmers produced over 260,000 in-vivo plants. These were bought by PDAR and distributed to other producers for the implementation of MPs and by other development projects. Also, several improved varieties and research-derived hybrids were disseminated.
86. As far as cassava is concerned, the rapid multiplication of cassava cuttings was promoted through micro-cuttings, the reduction of the length of cassava cuttings, and land preparation through the ridging system and flat ploughing. In collaboration with FAO, the FFS approach was adopted to support learning and dissemination of innovations. As a result, farmers were able to produce improved cuttings, a very lucrative activity in the project area.
87. At the same time, one of the key innovations to be developed by the project as per the President's Report, i.e. the rural support centre, did not materialize.
88. Innovation is rated satisfactory (5) in the PCR, as in the PCR.V.
89. **Scaling up.** According to the PCR, taking into account the results achieved and technical innovation proposed, the potential to scale up project activities, reach more producers in other villages and neighbouring provinces with similar socio-economic and natural conditions was high. This materialized in the design of a second phase of the project with an increased budget from the government (i.e. approximately EUR10.2 million against US\$3.2 in phase I), the extension of project activities to two neighbouring provinces (Ngounié and Ogooué Ivindo) and the diversification of supported value chains.
90. In view of the geographical extension and the significant increase in the expected Government contribution both in the amount and the proportion (almost 50 per cent of the total project cost), scaling up is rated moderately satisfactory (4) in PCR, as in the PCR.V.

Gender equality and women's empowerment

91. According to the PCR, while a targeting and gender equality strategy was not developed within PDAR, all project related documents and activities integrated targets to ensure the participation of women. This resulted in the participation of 15,324 women (47 per cent of direct beneficiaries).
92. The PCR informs that, while within family groups supported through MPs women often represented more than half of the members, widowed and divorced women with minor children were sometimes unable to associate with other village members to form family groups and might have been de facto excluded from support. The increased labour demand resulted from the expansion of cassava and banana cultivated areas (e.g. for maintenance, harvesting, transport), traditionally devolved to women probably increased the workload of women.
93. The analysis in the PCR mainly refers to quantitative information without attention to the quality of women's participation or to gains and benefits achieved by women through project-supported activities (e.g. training and capacity building, implementation of MPs etc.). According to the PCR, this was mainly due to weak M&E of the project and its limited capacity to capture results and benefits for the different target groups.
94. Gender equality and women empowerment is rated in the PCR.V moderately unsatisfactory (3), as in the PCR.

⁴² From the French: *plantes issues de fragments de tiges*.

Environment and natural resources management

95. According to the PCR, while environmental impact was not specifically assessed by PDAR, project related documents indicate that activities supported by the project did not have a negative impact on the environment. The increase of cultivated areas using the slash-and-burn farming system were marginal, mineral fertilizers and pesticides were used very rarely, and the rehabilitation of roads took into account environmental safeguards in compliance with national and IFAD requirements.
96. Based on the above, the rating on environment and natural resource management is moderately satisfactory (4), both in the PCR and the PCR.V.

Adaptation to climate change

97. Adaptation to climate change was not specifically assessed at design and during PDAR implementation. Further, according to the PCR, Gabon, and more specifically the project area, were only slightly affected by climate change related risks. Based on the above, this criterion is not rated neither in the PCR nor the PCR.V.

C. Overall project achievement

98. Overall, PDAR was aligned with Government and IFAD priorities and had a positive impact on the living conditions of beneficiaries in its area of intervention. The positive rate of achievements under component 1 particularly enabled target groups to increase productivity, improve marketing and generate revenue. The project also implemented several innovative agricultural techniques with a potential for replication and sustainability. Nonetheless, consolidation of achievements was needed particularly with reference to the organization and mobilization of farmers while the support for the emergence of service providers and other private sector actors intervening in the value chain was ineffective.
99. Further, project performance was hindered by implementation delays, a weak M&E system, weak management by the MAEDR and a delayed mobilization of government financing. This particularly affected infrastructure development.
100. The PCR.V assesses PDAR overall achievement as moderately satisfactory (4), in line with the PCR.

D. Performance of partners

101. **IFAD.** PDAR suffered from a high turnover of country programme managers (four), especially during the first years of project implementation affecting the quality of support provided.
102. However, the establishment of an IFAD Country Office in Cameroon in 2011 enabled increased and close implementation support and supervision by IFAD, including through: (i) the provision of training to project staff (e.g. on M&E, financial management, procurement); (ii) the support for the participating project staff to IFAD regional fora and events to stimulate learning and promote the sharing of experiences; (iii) the organization of two supervision and monitoring missions per year on average; (iv) the organization of a MTR in 2012.
103. IFAD missions, often including the participation of MAEDR staff, helped to address technical and financial constraints experienced by the project and to adjust targets at mid-term resulting in an acceleration of activities in 2013-2017. According to the PCR, IFAD was overall active and responsive with the review of over 260 requests of non-objections between 2008 and 2017. Also, IFAD was effective in the mobilization of additional financing for the project to fill the financing gap for the development of infrastructure. During the self-evaluation workshop, the relevance of IFAD support was rated satisfactory.

104. Based on the above, and taking into account the identified weaknesses in terms of project design, the performance of IFAD is rated in PCRV moderately satisfactory (4), one point lower than the PCR.
105. **Government.** According to the PCR, from the start of the project until the MTR in 2012, the implementation of the project by the government was unsatisfactory and particularly affected by the stability of the PCU. A new team was recruited resulting in a considerably improved physical and financial performance from 2014.
106. Although the provisions of the financing agreement were overall respected, the following issues were observed:
- *Process of signature and ratification of agreements.* Lengthy processes for the signature and ratification of the financing agreements were observed resulting in a reduction of PDAR implementation period;
 - *Mobilization of funds.* Systematic delays were experienced in the mobilization and disbursement of government funds⁴³ resulting in serious cash flow problems, implementation delays and delays in the payment of salaries of field staff. The special account was used to pre-finance government expenses regularly and against IFAD rules;
 - *Financial management.* The financial management by the PCU was particularly hindered by: (i) a high turnover of staff (three financial managers and three administrative and financial assistants); (ii) a limited familiarity of the financial managers with IFAD procedures; (iii) cash flow issues; (iv) delays in the submission of financial documents; (v) weak internal control. Further, lengthy procurement procedures (also due to the unsuccessful recruitment of a procurement specialist, as suggested by IFAD supervision missions), coupled with the absence of quality companies did not allow the completion of infrastructure as planned. Financial management progressively improved with the support from IFAD;
 - *M&E.* According to the PCR, the project focused on the monitoring of outputs and physical targets rather than impact and results and proposed non-adapted tools for the collection of data by beneficiaries resulting in the lack of key information (e.g. on production and revenues generated from MPs). The irregular presence of TACs in the field and their limited capacity to ensure data collection and reporting were also observed.
107. The performance of the Government is rated moderately unsatisfactory (3) in the PCRV, the same as the PCR.

IV. Assessment of PCR quality

Scope

108. The scope of the PCR is generally in line with the PCR guidelines, but some sections and criteria are not fully covered (e.g. the section on scaling up). Also, some basic project information (e.g. data on expenditures by component and financier in US\$; the number of indirect beneficiaries) is missing. The scope of the PCR is considered moderately satisfactory (4).

Quality

109. The report's biggest drawback is that data on impact are incomplete, due to a weak M&E by the project. Although an effort was made in the PCR to compensate this deficiency with the use of other sources, the lack of data did not allow a full assessment of impacts.

⁴³ According to the PCR more than one year was needed on average to mobilize funds to finance annual work plans and budgets. In addition, in the aftermath of the presidential elections, the country experienced a post-election crisis that did not allow the administration to honor its commitments to IFAD with respect to the payment of the debt. This resulted in the suspension of Gabon for 3 months, resulting in further uncertainty.

110. Some sections of the PCR are not developed in a clear manner. This is particularly relevant for the Annex 7 and the section on project costs: data presented in the narrative, tables and annex are not consistent or not comparable due to different implementation periods referred to or different currencies used. As a result, project expenditures by components and financiers in US\$ do not clearly emerge from the report.
111. Further, several output data presented in the different PCR sections are not consistent (e.g. the number of warehouses built; the number of tons produced or ha planted; the number of FOs created or supported).
112. While an effort was made in the PCR to focus on results rather than activities, the assessment of results from capacity building and support provided to family groups and FOs is particularly weak. Further, the report lacks a comprehensive analysis and assessment of some key aspects such as project's achievements in terms of promoting gender equality and women empowerment, youth, and a detailed explanation of some issues (e.g. the reasons behind the lack of financing from OFID or PARIR). Nonetheless, this was partly due to the weak M&E of the project.
113. In some sections, the PCR could have been better systematized and less repetitive (e.g. the impact section).
114. The rating on quality is moderately unsatisfactory (3).

Lessons

115. The PCR presents lessons which are generally relevant. Nonetheless, they are formulated in a very general way or in the form of recommendations. Considering that the project went into a second phase, lessons could have been more sound, strategic, elaborated and detailed. The rating is moderately unsatisfactory (3).

Candour

116. The narrative tone of the PCR is objective and the report states positive, as well as less positive results. The rating is satisfactory (5).
117. **Overall** the quality of the PCR is rated moderately satisfactory (4).

V. Lessons learned

118. The main lessons and recommendations gleaned from the PCR and its validation include the following:
 - The contribution from the government was mobilized with systematic delays with an impact in terms of the progress of implementation. For future projects, IFAD and the Government should ensure project contributions are mobilized before starting implementation;
 - Design should be more realistic particularly taking into account the limited entrepreneurial or associative culture of producers and the weak implementation capacities of the participating institutions;
 - More support and capacity building, particularly in terms of financial management, should be provided at project start;
 - Future projects should: (i) create the conditions for improved youth participation, promoting their integration into value chains. This includes the creation of favourable policy and regulatory frameworks for agricultural entrepreneurship; (ii) support the development of a seed network to enable the multiplication of high yielding cassava and banana varieties that meet the need of the sector, serving as a basis for the development of a certified seed market; (iii) extend the introduction of FFS to other sectors; (iv) make an effort to link farmers and their organizations to other stakeholders (e.g. traders, transporters, buyers, processors), particularly through ICT.

Definition and rating of the evaluation criteria used by IOE

Criteria	Definition *	Mandatory	To be rated
Rural poverty impact	Impact is defined as the changes that have occurred or are expected to occur in the lives of the rural poor (whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended) as a result of development interventions. <i>Four impact domains</i>	X	Yes
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Household income and net assets: Household income provides a means of assessing the flow of economic benefits accruing to an individual or group, whereas assets relate to a stock of accumulated items of economic value. The analysis must include an assessment of trends in equality over time. 		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Human and social capital and empowerment: Human and social capital and empowerment include an assessment of the changes that have occurred in the empowerment of individuals, the quality of grass-roots organizations and institutions, the poor's individual and collective capacity, and in particular, the extent to which specific groups such as youth are included or excluded from the development process. 		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Food security and agricultural productivity: Changes in food security relate to availability, stability, affordability and access to food and stability of access, whereas changes in agricultural productivity are measured in terms of yields; nutrition relates to the nutritional value of food and child malnutrition. 		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Institutions and policies: The criterion relating to institutions and policies is designed to assess changes in the quality and performance of institutions, policies and the regulatory framework that influence the lives of the poor. 		No
Project performance	Project performance is an average of the ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.	X	Yes
Relevance	The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, institutional priorities and partner and donor policies. It also entails an assessment of project design and coherence in achieving its objectives. An assessment should also be made of whether objectives and design address inequality, for example, by assessing the relevance of targeting strategies adopted.	X	Yes
Effectiveness	The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.	X	Yes
Efficiency	A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results.	X	Yes
Sustainability of benefits	The likely continuation of net benefits from a development intervention beyond the phase of external funding support. It also includes an assessment of the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the project's life.	X	Yes
Other performance criteria			
Gender equality and women's empowerment	The extent to which IFAD interventions have contributed to better gender equality and women's empowerment, for example, in terms of women's access to and ownership of assets, resources and services; participation in decision making; work load balance and impact on women's incomes, nutrition and livelihoods.	X	Yes
Innovation	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have introduced innovative approaches to rural poverty reduction.	X	Yes
Scaling up	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have been (or are likely to be) scaled up by government authorities, donor organizations, the private sector and others agencies.	X	Yes
Environment and natural resources management	The extent to which IFAD development interventions contribute to resilient livelihoods and ecosystems. The focus is on the use and management of the natural environment, including natural resources defined as raw materials used for socio-economic and cultural purposes, and ecosystems and biodiversity - with the goods and services they provide.	X	Yes
Adaptation to climate change	The contribution of the project to reducing the negative impacts of climate change through dedicated adaptation or risk reduction measures	X	Yes

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Definition</i>	<i>Mandatory</i>	<i>To be rated</i>
Overall project achievement	This provides an overarching assessment of the intervention, drawing upon the analysis and ratings for rural poverty impact, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, gender equality and women's empowerment, innovation and scaling up, as well as environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change.	X	Yes
Performance of partners			
• IFAD	This criterion assesses the contribution of partners to project design, execution, monitoring and reporting, supervision and implementation support, and evaluation. The performance of each partner will be assessed on an individual basis with a view to the partner's expected role and responsibility in the project life cycle.	X	Yes
• Government		X	Yes

* These definitions build on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management; the Methodological Framework for Project Evaluation agreed with the Evaluation Committee in September 2003; the first edition of the Evaluation Manual discussed with the Evaluation Committee in December 2008; and further discussions with the Evaluation Committee in November 2010 on IOE's evaluation criteria and key questions.

Rating comparison^a

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Programme Management Department (PMD) rating</i>	<i>IOE Project Completion Report Validation (PCRVR) rating</i>	<i>Net rating disconnect (PCRVR-PMD)</i>
Rural poverty impact	4	4	0
Project performance			
Relevance	5	4	-1
Effectiveness	4	4	0
Efficiency	3	3	0
Sustainability of benefits	3	3	0
Project performance^b	3.75	3.5	-0.25
Other performance criteria			
Gender equality and women's empowerment	3	3	0
Innovation	5	5	0
Scaling up	4	4	0
Environment and natural resources management	4	4	0
Adaptation to climate change	n.p.	n.p.	n.a.
Overall project achievement^c	4	4	0
Performance of partners^d			
IFAD	5	4	-1
Government	3	3	0
Average net disconnect			-0.18

^a Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable.

^b Arithmetic average of ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.

^c This is not an average of ratings of individual evaluation criteria but an overarching assessment of the project, drawing upon the rating for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, rural poverty impact, gender, innovation and scaling up, environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change.

^d The rating for partners' performance is not a component of the overall project achievement rating.

Ratings of the project completion report quality

	<i>PMD rating</i>	<i>IOE PCRVR rating</i>	<i>Net disconnect</i>
Candour		5	
Lessons		3	
Quality (methods, data, participatory process)		3	
Scope		4	
Overall rating of the project completion report		4	

Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

CARBAP	From French: <i>Centre Africain de Recherches sur les Bananiers et Plantains</i>
DSF	Debt Sustainability Framework
EB	Executive Board
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FFS	Farmer Field School
FO	Farmer organization
IITA	From French: <i>Institut International d'Agriculture Tropicale</i>
IRAF	From French: <i>Institut de Recherches Agronomiques et Forestières</i>
MAEDR	Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Rural Development
MIS	Market information system
MP	Micro-project
MTR	Mid-Term Review
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
OFID	OPEC Fund for International Development
PARIR	From French: <i>Projet d'appui à la réhabilitation des infrastructures rurales</i>
PCR	Project completion report
PCRV	Project completion report validation
PCU	Project Coordination Unit
PDAR	Agricultural and Rural Development Project
SYGRI	From French: <i>Système de gestion des résultats et de l'impact</i>
TAC	From French: <i>Technicien d'appui conseil</i>
XDESK	IFAD intranet

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