

## Project Completion Report Validation

**PRONEA<sup>1</sup> Support Project**

**Republic of Mozambique**

**Date of validation by IOE: October 2019**

### I. Basic project data

			Approval (US\$ m)		Actual (US\$ m) <sup>2</sup>	
Region	East and Southern Africa	Total project costs	24.98		21.22	
Country	Republic of Mozambique	IFAD financing (% of total)	19.99	80%	19.99	94%
Loan and grant numbers	Loan - MZ-690 Grant – G-C-ECM-690	EC grant (% of total)	1.5	6%	0.32	2%
Type of project (subsector)	Agricultural Development	Borrower (Government of Mozambique)	2.07	8%	0.91	4%
Financing type	Loan, grant	Local private sector <sup>3</sup>	1.00	4%	Na	
Lending terms <sup>4</sup>	Highly Concessional	Beneficiaries <sup>4</sup>	0.42	2%	Na	
Date of signature	20/12/2006 <sup>5</sup>					
Date of effectiveness	Loan: 25/11/2007 <sup>6</sup>					
Loan amendments	1 in 2012 and 1 in 2013 <sup>7</sup>	Number of beneficiaries <sup>8</sup>	Total people: 200,000		Total People:190,000	
Financing closure extensions	<sup>9</sup>	Project Completion date	31/12/2015		31/12/2017	
Country programme manager	Robson Mutandi (current country director) <sup>10</sup>	Loan closing date	30/06/2017		30/06/2018	
Regional director(s)	Sara Mbago-Bhunu (current) <sup>11</sup>	Mid-term review:			23/11-04/12/2015 <sup>12</sup>	
Project completion report reviewer	Chiara Calvosa	IFAD loan disbursement at project completion (%)			100%	
Project completion report quality control panel	Fumiko Nakai	Date of the project completion report			06/09/2018 <sup>13</sup>	

Source: Project completion report (PCR) (2018), PRONEA ASP PR (2006), PRONEA PSP amendment to loan agreement (2012).

\* IFAD loans granted on highly concessional terms are free of interest. A service of three fourths of one per cent (0.75 per cent) per annum and a maturity period of forty years, including a grace period of ten years are applied, starting from the date of the approval by the Executive Board.

<sup>1</sup> From *Programa Nacional de Extensão Agrária* in Portuguese (National Agricultural Extension Programme).

<sup>2</sup> Percentages are calculated against the total of co-financiers. Figures provided in the PCR for co-financiers are updated as of June, 2018. The disbursement rate of the IFAD financing in denominated currency (Special Drawing Right, SDR) is 100 per cent (i.e. SDR13.846 million vis-à-vis SDR13.85 million approved). For sake of clarity, given the 100 per cent disbursement rate accomplished by the project, the entire IFAD financing is reported in the table as actual disbursement in US\$. When inconsistencies are found between IFAD's reporting systems and PCR, the main source of data used in this PCR is the IFAD reporting system (see Project costs tables 1 and 2 of the PCR).

<sup>3</sup> Source: IFAD reporting system.

<sup>4</sup> Foreseen as monetary contribution at approval. However, throughout implementation, it was agreed for beneficiaries to provide only in-kind contribution. At completion, it was not quantified in the PCR.

<sup>5</sup> In order to ensure consistency with the IFAD internal systems and the PCR, the approval date reported by the PCR refers to the original ASP loan (loan no. MZ-690). The 2012 amendment to the loan agreement approved by the Executive Board renamed the project without any change in the loan number.

<sup>6</sup> See above for the rationale.

<sup>7</sup> 2012 amendment refers to project restructuring and the related Executive Board's approval of the PRONEA PSP. The second loan amendment, in 2013, refers to the EC financing.

<sup>8</sup> Outreach refers of total number of people benefitting from the extension services in the project area. Source: PCR and CSPE.

<sup>9</sup> It was introduced with the 2012 amendment to the loan agreement.

<sup>10</sup> Previous: Alessandro Marini, Claus Reiner, Ambrosio Barros.

<sup>11</sup> Previous: Ides De Willebois, Perin Saint Ange, Sana Jatta.

<sup>12</sup> IFAD reporting systems also indicate dates of PRONEA ASP Mid-term Review (MTR), which took place from 4/09/2012 to 30/09/2012.

<sup>13</sup> Recorded as the PCR submission date in the IFAD system.

## II. Project outline

1. **Introduction.** The PRONEA Support Project (PSP) was a programme of the Government of Mozambique financed by IFAD. It was originally approved by the IFAD's Executive Board on 20 April 2006 under the name of Agricultural Support Programme (ASP) as IFAD's contribution to the Government of Mozambique's Programme for National Agricultural Extension (PRONEA) through a basket funding mechanism following a sector-wide approach (SWAp). ASP had been conceived under the framework of the second phase of the National Programme for Agricultural Development (PROAGRI II) and the IFAD financing became effective on 25 November 2007 with 31 December 2015 as completion date.
2. Following several implementation constraints,<sup>14</sup> on 20 September 2012, the Executive Board approved an amendment to the loan agreement, which included renaming of ASP to PRONEA Support Project (PSP), reduced project area coverage and changes in the flow of funds, while the project objectives and thrusts remained the same. Consequently, PSP became a stand-alone project supporting the national agricultural extension programme but no longer within the PROAGRI framework, with 31 December 2017 and 30 June 2018 as the extended completion and closing dates respectively. In 2013, a grant by the European Commission (EC) was approved to complement the PSP activities.
3. The Project Completion Report (PCR) being validated in this document exclusively covers the PSP after the loan amendment in 2012 and implemented thereon through IFAD and EC financing. It does not discuss the ASP performance up to the reformulation, although it provides some background information when deemed appropriate, considering that the 2012 amendment to the loan agreement makes reference to the original design.
4. **Project area.** As per ASP design, the project area covered all 128 districts of the country. With the 2012 amendment to the loan agreement, the targeted area was reduced to 42 rural districts in 10 provinces. This was done with the aim of piloting some approaches for future scaling-up at national level under the PRONEA framework.
5. **Project goal, objectives and components.** The project goal, objectives and components remained the same for the ASP and PSP. According to the president's report, the project goal was to contribute to absolute poverty reduction and improve the quality of life of rural Mozambican men and women in its area of intervention. Its key development objective was to increase returns and improve smallholders' farmer food security through the steady increase of agricultural production efficiency, particularly in support of women-headed and disadvantaged households. The three intended outcomes were: (i) wider access to effective technical support services focused on districts; (ii) better organized producer groups with influence on the supply of services; and (iii) demand-led delivery of support services. The EC financing complemented the above with the goal of accelerating the achievement of the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 1c<sup>15</sup> in the country by supporting the delivery of the agricultural extension services at all levels.
6. **Components.** The project had three components: (i) supply-side development; (ii) demand-side development; and (iii) agricultural service delivery.

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<sup>14</sup> As reported in the 2012 president's memo on proposed amendment to the loan agreement, PROAGRI II and PRONEA were facing the four following main constraints: (i) insufficient managerial capacity for a complicated sector-wide programme; (ii) unclear coordination arrangements at all level; (iii) inadequate accounting and financial management structure; and (iv) inadequate disbursement system in place. Due to these difficulties, PROAGRI II was discontinued in December 2011.

<sup>15</sup> Reduce by half, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger.

7. *Component 1: Supply-side development.* This component aimed at improving the quality, effectiveness and efficiency of the public and non-public agricultural extension services. It comprised the two following sub-components: (i) reorientation and support for public sector extension; and (ii) promotion and support for private sector and non-governmental organizations extension.
8. *Component 2: Demand-side development.* It aimed at empowering farmers' associations and groups to influence and actively participate in the district development plans and their development. It was articulated in two sub-components, namely: (i) farmer organization and empowerment; and (ii) group, association and enterprise development.
9. *Component 3: Agricultural service delivery.* The component aimed at ensuring that provinces provided effective support services, advice and better access to knowledge and technology to participating districts in responses to smallholders' needs. Its two subcomponents targeted both the provincial-level as well as district-level service delivery.
10. **Target group.** According to the original design, ASP directly targeted a total of 140,900 households or a total of 700,000 people, which comprised smallholder farmers as well as women and disadvantaged households. The 2012 amendment to the loan agreement, while providing a qualitative description of the target group (which did not substantially change from the ASP design document), lacked specific targets. A total of 200,000 direct beneficiaries, of whom 50 per cent women, is reported as target group in the PCR as total number of people benefitting from the extension services in the project area. The original loan agreement for ASP stated that the programme would "directly and indirectly benefit the rural population" and would "include targeting mechanisms to ensure access by the poorest farmers to the full range of assistance under the programme, which shall include assistance that is targeted at the poorest". The 2012 amendment did not affect the definition of the target group.
11. **Financing.** Total revised PSP's cost was estimated at approximately US\$25 million, of which approximately US\$20 million was to be financed through an IFAD loan under high concessional terms, approximately US\$1.5 million through the EC grant.<sup>16</sup> The Government's contribution was estimated at US\$2.07 million, the local private sector's contribution to US\$1 million<sup>17</sup> and the beneficiaries' contribution at approximately US\$0.42 million.<sup>18</sup> Tables 1 and 2 show the estimated and actual project costs by financier and by component, respectively. The PCR also refers to another complementary IFAD grant of approximately US\$130,000 added in 2013,<sup>19</sup> which is not reflected in the tables below.

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<sup>16</sup> EC financing at approval was Euro 1.1 million.

<sup>17</sup> Source: IFAD reporting systems. Not explicitly presented in the PCR (ref. cost and financing section).

<sup>18</sup> Initially foreseen in the form of matching grants became in-kind contribution during implementation.

<sup>19</sup> It appears to be a regional grant to ICIPE (G-I-R-1370) with activities in several countries, including Mozambique.

Table 1  
**Project costs**

Source of Funding	Type of financing	Estimated amount (US\$ m)	Estimated amount (% of total)	Actual expenditure (US\$ m)	Expenditure (% of total)	Disbursements (% of estimated amount)
IFAD	Loan	19.99	80%	19.99	94%	100%
EC	Grant	1.5 <sup>20</sup>	6%	0.32 <sup>21</sup>	2%	21%
Government		2.07	8%	0.91	4%	44%
Private Sector local		1.00	4%	Na		
Beneficiaries		0.42	2%	Na		
<b>Total Financing</b>		<b>24.98</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>21.22</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>85%</b>

Source: 2012 Amendment to loan agreement, Operational Results Management System (ORMS) and PCR for estimated amount; PCR and ORMS for actual expenditure.

Table 2  
**Costs by component**

Components	Planned(US\$ m)	Planned amount	Actual amount <sup>22</sup>	Actual (% total)
Supply-side development	13.50	54%	13.60	64%
Demand-side development <sup>23</sup>	3.94	16%	3.61	17%
Agricultural services provision <sup>24</sup>	7.54	30%	4.016	19%
<b>Total</b>	<b>24.98</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>21.22</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: Mid-term Review (MTR) for planned; PCR and ORMS for actual.

12. **Project implementation.** In its initial design, the project was designed under the broad logic of a SWAp (PROAGRI, 2006-2011) financed through the common flow of funds mechanism.<sup>25</sup> The Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (MASA) was the overall project's lead coordinating agency through a dedicated coordination unit and was expected to liaise with other involved ministries.<sup>26</sup> Given the complexity of the design, the above-mentioned difficulties faced in managing the SWAp and the resulting termination of the SWAp implementation modalities were rearranged in 2012 when the project became a stand-alone operation. The National Directorate for Agricultural Extension (DNEA) of the MASA became the implementing agency supported by a dedicated project management unit (PMU). A single treasury account with a specific reporting system was foreseen to replace the basket fund approach. At the provincial and district levels, the project was implemented by the Agrarian Extension Departments, in collaboration with the District Service of Economic Activities. PSP working groups were created at district level to oversee

<sup>20</sup> This is the amount reported in ORMS from approved amount of Euro 1.1 million. The amount reported in the PCR is US\$1.39 million. Inconsistencies are probably due to the exchange rate fluctuations over the time.

<sup>21</sup> As for the estimated amount, a discrepancy is also noted between the amount reported in ORMS equal to US\$0.318 million and the figure indicated in the PCR of US\$0.618 million. This could be due to exchange rate fluctuations although further explanations would be necessary. In order to ensure consistency, figures reported in the PCR tables are extrapolated from IFAD reporting systems.

<sup>22</sup> Actual disbursement by component is available in the PCR and updated as of June 2018 in US\$. For sake of clarity, given the 100 per cent disbursement rate accomplished by the project in SDR, the entire IFAD financing is reported in the table as actual disbursement in US\$ for all components. Differences among PCR and IFAD's reporting systems are probably due to the exchange rate. As for actual expenditures, this PCR refers to amounts provided in the IFAD reporting systems.

<sup>23</sup> It includes the private sector contribution.

<sup>24</sup> It includes EC financing.

<sup>25</sup> Financial instrument pooling together donors' and government's funds to PROAGRI II for total programme costs equal to approximately US\$50.82 million.

<sup>26</sup> Specifically, the Ministries of Planning and Development, State Administration and Finance.

the activities in the field and the progress made throughout implementation. A working group was set-up at central level for coordination purposes, particularly during the first two years of project implementation after the restructuring.

13. The underlying principle of project implementation was the provision of unified extension services, which included crops, livestock and agro-forestry activities under a demand-driven approach. Public-private collaborations were foreseen to carry out several project extension activities, through outsourcing contracts with NGOs and private sector as well as other public institutions. Core management functions linked to the project implementation remained under the MASA's responsibility.
14. **Changes and developments during implementation.** After the shift to a stand-alone operation under the name PSP in 2012, several further changes occurred during implementation, including the following:<sup>27</sup>
  - *Additional grant financing.* In 2013 the EC grant financing of approximately US\$1.5 million was approved to finance "the Support to Accelerate Progress towards MDG [Millennium Development Goal] 1C<sup>28</sup> in Mozambique" fully allocated to the component 3.
  - *Complementary grant support.* There was also a relevant IFAD regional grant, which covered several countries including Mozambique. This grant supported, since 2013, the integration of two pilot subprojects into the PSP (i.e. the Plant Clinics and the Biological Control of Cabbage Moth, respectively covering three and eight districts within the PSP target area).
  - *Adjustments introduced by the PSP Mid-term review (MTR).*<sup>29</sup> Several changes were introduced, including: (i) adjustments in the implementation modalities; (ii) expansion to six provinces of the two pilot subprojects; (iii) additional emphasis on knowledge management and sharing activities; (iv) revision of certain project targets; and (v) reallocation of the loan funds, to include, inter-alia, the development of a nutrition training module.
15. **Intervention logic.** In its initial design, the intervention logic responded to the Government of Mozambique request to start a phase II of the agricultural SWAp by promoting donors' coordination and reforms in the agricultural sector. Hence, ASP was designed to be integrated in a nation-wide multi-donor development initiative aiming at promoting the effectiveness of the agricultural extension services. Following the 2012 amendment to the loan agreement, the PSP, while set-up as a stand-alone project, did not change the original ASP's project goal or development objectives of promoting a more effective and innovative delivery of the agricultural extension services. The intervention logic remained anchored on the development of demand-driven extension approach aiming at improving the quality and the effectiveness of the services provided to farmers and their organizations. By simultaneously addressing the challenges faced by both the demand and the supply side of the agricultural extension services in the selected area, PSP aimed at comprehensively improving the performance of the Mozambican agricultural sector.<sup>30</sup> By reducing the area of intervention to 42 districts from the original 128, PSP was also expected to pilot some innovative approaches, which could eventually feed the national extension master plan.
16. Activities from the reinforcement of the supply side were expected to enhance extension performance of both public and non-public service providers by providing training, appropriate equipment and materials as well as technical advisory. More

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<sup>27</sup> Source: PCR.

<sup>28</sup> "Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger".

<sup>29</sup> Source: 2016 MTR Report of PSP based on findings of 2015 missions.

<sup>30</sup> Including, inter-alia, decline in land and labour productivity, limited adoption of improved technologies as well as low access to markets, agricultural inputs and extension services (Source: National Strategic Plan for Agricultural Development).

specifically, they aimed at consolidating linkages between extension and research, mainly through on-farm trials and in-service training – which were subsequently reinforced with the introduction of the plant clinics and cabbage moth pilot subprojects. Activities financed under the demand side development aimed at strengthening farmers’ and their associations’ role in the promotion of a market-oriented and sustainable agricultural production system. They included, inter-alia, exchanges of experiences, sharing of success stories as well as development of community radios. Overall, these interventions were supposed to feed the supply side of extension services within the framework of demand-driven approach. Finally, activities under component 3 linked both the demand and supply sides with the aim of developing delivery services at provincial and district levels able to adequately respond to the needs expressed by farmers and their associations (reinforced under component 2). Under this framework, the EC-funded interventions aimed at fully financing the technical assistance for service provision, with a specific focus on nutrition and the MDG1.

17. Finally, synergies were expected to be established with the IFAD-funded Rural Markets Project (PROMER) approved by the Executive Board in September 2008.<sup>31</sup>
18. **Delivery of outputs.** A detailed table summarising PSP’s output delivery by component is presented in Annex III. Overall, the outputs enumerated in the PCR met, and in some cases, exceeded their respective targets, with some exceptions.<sup>32</sup> As for component 1, an achievement rate of 100 per cent (i.e. the totality of 42 districts) was reported for the number of districts trained in using a new National Extension Monitoring and Evaluation System (SMEA), which was supported by the PSP. However, only 28 of them (equal to 67 per cent) are reported to operate it. In terms of training provided, a total of 517 extension workers, 42 district supervisors and nine NGOs members were trained against the targets of 645 workers, 42 supervisors and 42 NGOs. As for delivery of outputs under component 2, most targets were met in terms of number of trained associations (i.e. 1,264) and in case of producers’ associations legalized, a total of 463 was reported against the target of 340 (equal to 136 achievement rate). As for the number of agreements signed by farmers’ organisations for supply of inputs or sales of products 74 are reported (against a target of 170). With reference to the targets of production (crops and livestock) sold by target producers, both outputs listed were exceeded. With reference to component 3, outputs exceeded most of the targets in terms of outsourcing at district and provincial levels as well as in terms of number of technologies disseminated and demonstrated through various methodologies. The only two exceptions related to the farmers field schools (687 vs the target of 864) and improved barns (412 against 600). Finally, outputs for technologies and practices to be disseminated are outlined in the PCR and exceeded (i.e. a total of 32 technologies was disseminated against a target of 16).<sup>33</sup>

### III. Review of findings

#### A. Core criteria

##### Relevance

19. **Relevance vis-à-vis IFAD and Government policies and strategies.** The PSP’s goal and objectives were aligned with the objectives of the Government of Mozambique. Specifically, it was in line with the following government strategic plans and policies: (i) 2006-2013 Poverty Reduction Strategy; (ii) 2010-2019

<sup>31</sup> PSP and PROMER overlapped in eight community radios in their districts of intervention. Nevertheless, the full potential of developing synergy was not exploited and linkages among the two projects remained weak (Source: CSPE).

<sup>32</sup> The outputs summary table, as reported in the PCR, while clearly indicating the outputs per components, does not consistently report the achievement towards the targets set. However, these are indicated in the results-based logical framework (ref. Annex XI PCR).

<sup>33</sup> Specifically, 14 related to crops and two for livestock.

Strategic Plan for Agricultural Development; (iii) 2011-2014 Poverty Reduction Action Plan; and (iv) the 2012-2022 Master Plan for Agricultural Extension.

20. As for IFAD's strategies and relevance to the needs of the rural poor, PSP's objectives were coherent with IFAD's Strategic Framework and both the 2004 and 2011 Country Strategic Opportunities Programmes in that they intended to improve food security and reduce rural poverty by: (i) increasing the access of smallholders to production factors, technologies and resources; (ii) increasing the access and participation of smallholders to markets; and (iii) improving productivity and production by promoting technology transfer.
21. **Relevance vis-à-vis project design.** PSP internal logic among outputs, activities and components was complex. It aimed at meeting the intervention's development objective by comprehensively addressing the main challenges faced in the agricultural extension system, both from the demand and supply side. More precisely, the logic of investing in the provision of integrated extension services is considered appropriate and in line with the complexity of farmers' needs. In addition, attention was given to the existing institutional arrangement without adding any new structure to an already complex set-up. The design took into account the limited implementation capacity of the country's public sector shown in the past by promoting outsourcing and NGO/private sector involvement. However, the project while conducting a thorough poverty analysis, did not foresee adequate implementation mechanisms "to ensure access by the poorest farmers" as was intended in the design/financing agreement. In addition, as highlighted in the Country Strategy and Programme Evaluation (CSPE), the project primarily targeted small and medium commercial farmers. This approach presented some limitations vis-à-vis IFAD's core mandate.
22. Knowledge management activities and dissemination mechanisms were linking the three components and, consequently, the demand and the supply side of the project interventions. Component 1 combined the training of technical and extension agents together with the dissemination of improved agricultural technologies and techniques. Innovations were, therefore, to be scouted and subsequently demonstrated together with the farmers under the components 2 and 3. Simultaneously farmers and their associations were trained in improved agricultural techniques, and agribusiness agreements were promoted with a view to increase the share of marketed production. However, the design did not develop a proper strategy to promote farmers' access to agricultural inputs and/or mechanised services which, together with the training provided and the improved access to extension services, would have boosted agricultural productivity.<sup>34</sup> Moreover, the design presented some weaknesses in defining a coordination mechanism among DNEA and PMU.
23. In **summary**, PSP's goal and objectives were aligned with the government's priorities, particularly of a more effective national agricultural extension services (NAES). However, they presented some limitations vis-à-vis IFAD's strategy and its core mandate. The design was complex but overall appropriate to meet the intended development objectives although some weaknesses are identified. The overall project relevance is rated *moderately satisfactory (4)* by the project completion report validation (PCR), one point lower than the PCR.

### **Effectiveness**

24. **Project outreach.** According to the PCR, the number of direct beneficiaries reached by the PSP at completion was 190,000, out of which 93,100 women.<sup>35</sup> However, given the nature of the project, which makes it hard to quantify direct

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<sup>34</sup> As highlighted by the completion mission, certain yields are still below their full potential (i.e. cassava).

<sup>35</sup> No targets were set in the loan amendment. The total population of 200,000 people is considered in the PCR as a target.

and indirect beneficiaries, and as highlighted by the CSPE, until the new SMEA<sup>36</sup> is fully operational, it will not be possible to adequately quantify and qualify the number of beneficiaries.

25. **Objective 1: wider access to effective technical support services focused on districts.** This objective was meant to be reached mainly through the following: (i) improved participatory planning capacities of private and public extension services and contract management capacity for outsourcing the provision of the above services; and (ii) increased number and quality of private extension providers and NGOs agents.
26. The two performance indicators and related targets set in the logframe to measure the achievement of the objective were: the proportion of districts supported by the project with networks of operational extension services (100 per cent, i.e. 42 districts), and a 5 per cent increase in the number of disseminated technological innovation. At completion, the achievements were 100 per cent and 50 per cent respectively. However, the indicators are not clearly described nor is the methodology to assess results against the baseline. Several outputs indicators were included to support the PCR's effectiveness analysis showing, for instance, that 517 extension agents (against 645 targeted), 42 supervisors (target fully met) and nine local NGOs (against 42 targeted) were trained in agribusiness, agricultural production and association development. 273 private promoters in several technology packages were trained, 84 agribusiness development agents were trained in various areas, including the preparation of agricultural business plans (a total of 94 business plans were developed). Unfortunately, for none of the above outputs, targets are reported, and it is difficult to assess whether the actors being trained actually translated into operational extension services developed. The reason of the low project's performance regarding training to NGOs, is not articulated in the PCR. This could be due to bottlenecks experienced in the outsourcing<sup>37</sup> as well as to disbursement delays reported to have hampered the timely and effective implementation of field activities (ref. Efficiency section).<sup>38</sup> Training in participatory planning was also delivered to extension agents as per reported figures; this is considered a key aspect towards both the effectiveness and sustainability of PSP's results. However, clear figures are not reported, and the log-frame does not present indicators to assess the skills developed from the above-mentioned training. Nevertheless, the implementation of 68 on-farm trials (against the target of 40),<sup>39</sup> 687 farmers field school (against a total of 864 targeted) and 50 field days (against the target of 40), presumably indicates that some competencies were developed at all levels.
27. With reference to outsourcing, it was meant to expand the areas covered by extension services by adding those where NAES had no skills to meet this specific demand. Delays were registered with outsourced activities being implemented only in the last two years of PSP's life (i.e. 24 contracts signed and implemented in 2016 and 44 for 2017 – no targets appeared to have been set) following an upward revision of the district and provincial budget for outsourcing – which in turns encouraged NGOs and private sector's participation to the tenders. Finally, with the EC funding, PSP expanded the coverage of crop-specific extension for small farmers in the PROMER area, filling the gap left by local NAES who had no skills in this domain.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> To which the PSP contributed.

<sup>37</sup> According to the PCR, main challenges reported in the various provinces in the outsourcing included: difficulties in monitoring outsourced activities given the vast dimensions characterizing the geographic area of intervention, inadequate training by service providers and delays in the disbursement of funds

<sup>38</sup> Including the outreach of PROMER-recruited extension agents (source: CSPE).

<sup>39</sup> A socio-economic analysis was supposed to be carried out during the trials to better understand the relevance of the activities, proving, at the same time, important information on existing and future targeting strategies.

<sup>40</sup> Source: CSPE.



28. **Objective 2: better organized producer groups with influence on the supply of services.** This objective was to be reached through empowerment and capacity building activities of farmers and producers' organisations as well as promotion of business development activities.
29. Three performance indicators were set to measure the achievement of this objective: (i) 20 per cent of agricultural produce sold (baseline 15 per cent); (ii) 2 per cent of livestock production sold by target producers – against a baseline of 0.5 per cent; and (iii) 15 per cent of functional agribusiness agreements and market links – starting from the non-existence of such agreements prior to the project. The above indicators are clear and adequate to assess the objective. Additional targets were introduced at MTR.<sup>41</sup> However, more challenging targets could have been set, particularly in the sales of crops (where a 7 per cent increase in the average agricultural yield of participating producers was expected to be achieved). Reported figures show *inter-alia*: 100 per cent increase in marketed sesame in Marrupa district, 100 per cent increase in commercialised tomatoes in the provinces of Nampula and Gaza, and 101 per cent increase in Barué district for several products (including, legumes, cereals, fruits, vegetables).<sup>42</sup> As for livestock, the reported output indicator specifically refers to approximately 30 per cent increase in the sales of rabbits in Inhambane province. Despite the above results achieved in specific areas, a summary table with a clear indication of results achieved in all targeted districts for both agricultural and livestock sales would have been helpful to better understand the increase in the commercialization and marketing levels of agricultural produce globally achieved by the project.
30. With reference to the empowerment of producers' organisations and their access to the market, 15 per cent of functional agribusiness agreements and market links were expected to be established. This indicator does not fully capture the level of achievement of the intended objective and the overall legal support provided by PSP to target users. This is presumably why additional outputs indicators are reported in the PCR, including: 873 farmers field schools established, 463 producers' association legalised,<sup>43</sup> 170 contracts signed, and 1,200 farmers organizations trained. As for the development of agribusiness agreements, it is reported that 74 agreements were registered in two provinces (i.e. 71 in Niassa and three in Inhambane province). Additional figures are provided for business development activities carried out in other provinces, especially for training.
31. **Objective 3: demand-led delivery of support services.** This objective was to be achieved mainly through training and knowledge management activities to improve the service provision as well as the development of several extension methodologies through which disseminate and transfer technologies developed with and by the producers.
32. At output level, with reference to the number of services provided, it is worth mentioning that the number of monitoring visits and fields day by the public extension workers was not tracked by the project. The PSP support through vehicles and computer equipment to the NAES (i.e. 52 vehicles between districts and provinces, 84 computers for all 42 districts as well as information technology tools for the 10 provinces) and NGOs (figures not available), presumably, contributed to improve the quantity of visits (as compared to the baseline) and increased the possibilities of the extension services to timely reach the producers. As for the quality of service delivered, farmers' interviews seem to show a mixed level of satisfaction regarding the presence of extension service providers throughout the project's life, which also varies by province. With reference to the

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<sup>41</sup> Namely, proportion of participating households marketing their agricultural products, percentage increase in farm production marketed by target producers.

<sup>42</sup> These figures appear to be increased in the volume of produce marketed.

<sup>43</sup> It would appear that the number of associations established is higher but, given the lack of funds on the part of associations, the proper legalization process was not performed by the district administrator.

transfer of technologies, it is reported that a total of 32 technologies was disseminated, including 19 for food production, six for beekeeping and seven for livestock (against the targets of 14 related to crop production and two to livestock). Additional details of the above technologies are provided in the PCR.

33. With reference to the adoption level of the agronomic technologies and practices, the following is reported: 42 per cent for good practices and pre-harvest technologies, 40 per cent control of pests and diseases in food crops, 22.5 per cent in post-harvest practices and 19 per cent in animal husbandry.<sup>44</sup> Reported delays in the inputs supply to extension agents negatively affected the adoption rates by end users. Yet, achievements exceed the targets set in the logframe of 10 per cent for crop production technologies and 5 per cent for livestock's (versus a baselined of 7 per cent for crops and 3 per cent for livestock technologies).
34. Moreover, specific training and radio broadcasting activities were also provided in nutrition at district level as a completely new activity for the NAES, presumably as a result of demands raised by the target group. Satisfactory outputs were reported in the PCR, including: 5,158 producers trained (against a target of 5,000), nearly 14,740 farmers took part in specific farmers' field schools, and 215 farmers trained as facilitator. In terms of the quality of the services provided, innovative approaches were introduced also through the plant clinics subproject where 171 plant doctors were trained in data management and equipment was provided for the trials. In addition, training provided to extension agents included the nutrition and nutrition-sensitive agriculture.<sup>45</sup>
35. **Summary.** At completion, SMEA was not fully operational which limited the assessment of the project effectiveness. Based on the information available in the PCR, moderately satisfactory levels of accomplishments are reported for the second and third objectives. The achievement of the first objective particularly suffered from initial delays in disbursement and outsourcing although progress was made throughout implementation. Based on the above, the effectiveness is rated *moderately satisfactory (4)* by the PCR in agreement with PCR rating.

### **Efficiency**

36. **Efficiency in the pace of implementation.** As reported by the PCR, implementation during the first two years of PSP was particularly slow: 40 per cent of planned project activities were executed during year 1 and 58 per cent during year 2. However, it sped up in the second half thanks to the elimination of some intermediate approval steps and the introduction of a new mechanism to monitor contract-awarding process and evaluate payments. This pace of implementation is in line with the project's disbursement rates (ref. section below). Overall, procurement delays were reported in the outsourcing processes and in specific tender procedures,<sup>46</sup> mainly due to the reported poor participation of different juries involved.
37. **Project financing and disbursement.** In line with the pace of the implementation described above, the PCR reported a slow disbursement path, particularly during the first two years of project implementation. At completion, 100 per cent disbursement rate was reported; even though disbursement per year is not provided, it is reported that it was mainly concentrated in the last two years of project life. According to the PCR, initial delays were mainly due to difficulties in the use of the new electronic public finance budgetary and reporting system (introduced with the project restructuring) and related limited operating knowledge by dedicated ministry staff. In addition, deficits in the internal budget (particularly for provinces) and general delays in the counterpart resources to be provided were registered. With reference to the EC financing, at completion only US\$318,760

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<sup>44</sup> Source: 2018 DNEA study.

<sup>45</sup> Through the EC financing but also the 2015 MTR reallocation of resources to the topic.

<sup>46</sup> Namely, the international competitive bidding as well as the quality and price selection for consultants.

were disbursed equal to 21.6 per cent of total financing.<sup>47</sup> The reasons for this low performance are not clearly explained in the PCR.

38. Regarding **project management costs**, the PCR indicates that, at completion, total project operational costs accounted for approximately 12 per cent of the total budget. These costs are below the regional average (approximately 14 per cent at the time of the CSPE).<sup>48</sup>
39. **Economic financial analysis.** A standard cost-benefit analysis was not carried out in the PCR and thus the economic rate of return not assessed. The analysis detailed in the PCR annex 6 shows inefficiencies in terms of duration of procurement processes during the first years of PSP's life, which improved over the years.
40. Considering the disbursement delays since approval and the related implications for the activities in the field and in light of the particularly low disbursement rate of EC financing, efficiency is rated *moderately unsatisfactory (3)* in the PCR, one point lower than PMD's (*moderately satisfactory, 4*)

### **Rural poverty impact**

41. **Availability of data.** SMEA, the M&E system promoted by the PSP, was expected to be fully operational by 2016 in three provinces and in the remaining provinces the following year. At completion, SMEA reporting was not fully available yet and technicians not adequately trained.<sup>49</sup> The weak M&E system constraints the assessment of rural poverty impact limiting the degree of certainty to attribute impacts directly to project activities.
42. **Household incomes and assets.** Specific targets for household's assets were set in the logframe to measure PSP's impacts including the percentages of households owning mobile phones, bicycles and motorbikes. In addition, the target of 10 per cent was set in the income increase of participating households. In terms of household's assets, the PCR (annex 11) contains quantitative data that indicate some improvements: 46 per cent of households with mobile phones (baseline 45 per cent; target 48 per cent), nearly 60 per cent with bicycles (baseline 38.2 per cent; target of 40 per cent) and 23 per cent with motorbikes (baseline 7.3 per cent; target 8 per cent). However, these data are not adequately discussed in the PCR narrative, which seems rather anecdotal. In addition, it is also not clear how these data (both baseline and completion) presented in annex 11 were generated, probably during the completion mission; hence it is difficult to assess their reliability. Furthermore, the targets appear quite close to the baseline data and not particularly challenging.
43. With reference to household incomes, PCR assessment is mainly qualitative and based on farmers' interviews, which reported improvements in their family income from increased agricultural productivity and sales of the products.<sup>50</sup> As for the quantitative data provided, they primarily refer to the increases in commercialized products (ref. Effectiveness section), not to net income changes at household level.<sup>51</sup> According to the PCR, households' income increase was not substantial mainly because of the general low levels of selling prices from individual and on-farm sales. However, better results are mentioned for those with contracts between farmers' associations and agents supported by PROMER.<sup>52</sup> In conclusion, it

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<sup>47</sup> Source ORMS. As highlighted above, inconsistency is noted with the amount reported in the PCR.

<sup>48</sup> At the time, PSP project management costs were assessed at 8.6 per cent of total budget.

<sup>49</sup> Several bottlenecks are identified in the PCR, including the following: lack of basic skills in data collection, poor monitoring at districts level and validation issues.

<sup>50</sup> According to the CSPE, link between PSP support and increased incomes at the household level is provided through adequate examples.

<sup>51</sup> In addition, figures provided by the Results and Impact Management System for 2015, 2016 and 2017 are incomplete and are not fully in line with IFAD's requirement, thus making it hard to measure project's quantitative impacts on the above.

<sup>52</sup> Figures not provided.

is worth noting that PSP lacked a clear market access strategy, which could have increased the marketing of agricultural products as well as the overall PSP impacts on household incomes, especially if coupled with the provision of adequate support to processing or storing techniques.

44. **Human and social capital and empowerment.** PSP contributed to human capital development of target beneficiaries through improved knowledge and skills in the domain of agricultural production (i.e. diversified production, improved seeds use, raw planting and spatial plant arrangements), agribusiness, basic repair and maintenance of irrigation systems including small dams, HIV/AIDS as well as nutrition and nutrition sensitive agriculture (i.e. training to NAES agents and inclusion of nutrition in the farmers' field schools curricula). In terms of social capital, PCR narrative refers to the strengthening of farmers' organizations also through support provided by PSP for the registration of their legal status. Finally, through the set-up of coordination and consultation fora with the involvement of NGOs and farmers' organizations, farmers were implicated in participatory planning processes at central level.
45. **Food security and agricultural productivity.** Improved food security for participating producers was explicitly stated in PSP's development objective. A reduction of 1 per cent of the incidence of malnutrition in the project area was set as a target. At completion, figures related to this target are not provided. Given the nature of the project's interventions and the issues with the M&E system, a comprehensive assessment of the PSP impact on food security cannot be made.<sup>53</sup> However, the qualitative information deriving from interaction with beneficiaries during supervision and completion missions indicated increased knowledge on nutrition, increased dietary diversity at household level as well as general improvements in food preparation. In terms of agricultural productivity, increases in crops' yields were reported in some localities, including the following: 1-1.2 t/ha for rice (against the target of 0.7 t/ha), approx. 8.5t/ha of cassava (against the target of 5 t/ha), 1-1.5 t/ha for intercropped maize (versus 700 kg/ha without project) and 1.6 t/ha for peanuts (no target provided). No additional information is provided. Despite the above increases, according to the PCR, productivity levels were still below potential and, in some cases, below national average. This is explained in the PCR mainly by the limited use of certified seeds as well as the initial procurement delays.
46. **Institutions and policies.** According to the PCR, PSP developed NAES's capacities in providing demand-driven support services at district, provincial and central levels. This was done through: (i) capacity building on agricultural technical aspects as well as planning and management skills (i.e. planning and operationalization of farmers field schools, agribusiness, functioning of farmers' organizations etc.); (ii) institutional support provided at all levels; and (iii) provision of equipment and materials for agents' daily activities and their field work. As highlighted by the CSPE, as a result of PSP's efforts, well-trained and adequately equipped NAES agents are able to provide higher-quality extension services to a larger number of smallholder farmers.<sup>54</sup> PSP did not directly contribute to the development of new national policies, however, it is expected that once the same is in place, it will contribute to the NAES work and the overall decision-making process in the agricultural sector.
47. In **summary**, the evidence of PSP's impact on rural poverty is limited given issues with the reporting systems. Despite the above, based on the information collected during the supervision and completion missions and the PCR qualitative

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<sup>53</sup> According to the CSPE, this is also difficult given the wide coverage of the NAES agents work and the long causality chain between the project and producers.

<sup>54</sup> In 2017, PSP supported 37 per cent of the total number of farmers' field schools put in place in the 10 provinces and approximately 21 per cent of the results demonstration fields.

assessment, rural poverty impact is rated *moderately satisfactory (4)* in both the PCR and PCR.V.

### **Sustainability of benefits**

48. **Social and institutional sustainability.** According to the PCR, although the active participation of beneficiaries throughout the project activities varied among the districts, a critical mass of both producers and NAES<sup>55</sup> was trained so that field activities are expected to continue to be carried out at field level following the PSP approach. Yet, with reference to the sustained functioning of the producers' groups supported the project, differences exist among the districts with some organizations less in need of additional support than others. The incorporation of PSP's activities into the regular work plan of the public agricultural extension is seen by this PCR.V as a positive step towards its sustainability.
49. **Sustainability of the project's investments.** Knowledge and materials developed throughout PSP's life were communicated and disseminated with the aim of promoting their adoption and sustained use over the time. As noticed by the CSPE, PSP's activities in collaboration with DNEA were mainstreamed in the regular NAES operations and agenda. With specific reference to the sustainability of PSP's investments on nutrition, despite the PSP's efforts, PCR acknowledged several challenges are still faced given the novelty of the topic and the limited skills generally available in the country. Government commitments after the PSP closing date for the provision of operation and maintenance of the goods allocated at different level by the project are not presented in the PCR but would be critical to ensure NAES agents support over time. Similarly, government commitment for the SMEA operationalization<sup>56</sup> and its full integration in the MASA monitoring information system are not confirmed in the PCR narrative, although government's intention in this direction is outlined.
50. Finally, at completion an exit strategy was not developed, leaving a degree of uncertainty especially in the supply-side of the agricultural extension. Based on the above, the sustainability is rated as *moderately satisfactory (4)* by this PCR.V in line with the PCR.

## **B. Other performance criteria**

### **Innovation and scaling up**

51. **Innovation.** In the case of PSP, innovation is mainly assessed in terms of new approaches introduced throughout implementation. Key PSP's innovative feature was the promotion of collaboration among NAES, private sector and NGOs in delivering unified extension services. In addition, the following three main innovations are reported: (i) inclusion of nutrition aspects in the extension services which led to involvement of other departments and public structures (namely related to health) into PSP activities; (ii) development of the plant clinics and introduction of related topics (i.e. phytosanitary issues) in the NAES through the support of the grant; and (iii) financing of local impact projects to develop inclusive projects in the province of Inhambane to the benefit of the most vulnerable groups.<sup>57</sup> Innovation is rated *satisfactory (5)* by the PCR.V, as in the PCR.
52. **Scaling up.** Clear examples of scaling-up or the existence of a scaling-up strategy are not provided in the dedicated section, although scaling-up was key in the PSP design (reformulation). Both CSPE and PCR reported wider adoption under the PSP of the plant clinics and diamond back moth biological control that were piloted through a regional grant programme. There was a substantial increase in the number of clinics (from 10 in the pilot phase to 80 implemented with PSP funds)

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<sup>55</sup> Figures provided in the PCR.

<sup>56</sup> Including the integration of plant clinics into it.

<sup>57</sup> Small and medium scale projects developed with the support of extension agents to improve rabbit and honey productions to the benefit of the most vulnerable and disadvantaged groups.

and 14 technicians were trained as trainers, which was expected to reduce the need for external assistance. However, there is little information on scaling-up of these practices after and beyond the PSP. Furthermore, it is not clear whether the innovation of local impact projects developed in one province mentioned above (paragraph 51, (iii)) was scaled up in other areas. Based on the limited information available, the rating by this PCRV is *moderately satisfactory (4)*, one point lower than PMD assessment.

### **Gender equality and women's empowerment**

53. A dedicated section on PSP achievements in terms of gender equality and women's empowerment is missing in the PCR. However, project impacts on this regard are mentioned in various sections of the PCR narrative and a clear gender-based disaggregation of PSP's outputs indicators is available in the log-frame. Figures indicate that PSP promoted gender equality mainly by providing women's access to extension services and training farmers and extension agents in gender-equity matters. Efforts to promote women's empowerment were made through the delivery of training to women in leadership positions within the farmers' organizations as well as through general support to women to take up leading positions in their groups. However, outcomes of these trainings are not available. In 2016 a consultant was hired to develop a Gender, Nutrition and HIV/AIDS Strategy; unfortunately, no assessment of the strategy and its outcomes is provided in the PCR. Finally, as highlighted by the CSPE, a more systematic and in-depth capacity development on gender issues could have been put in place by the project.
54. Based on the above, the rating by the PCRV is *moderately satisfactory (4)*, in line with PMD's.

### **Environment and natural resources management**

55. A dedicated section on PSP achievements in terms of environment and natural resource management is missing in the PCR. Although the environmental benefits are not clearly reported, the following could be extrapolated: (i) pest and disease control was promoted in the plant clinics with related positive environmental effects; (ii) the diamond back moth biological control technology promoted a more sustainable natural resource management; and (iii) the small-irrigation technologies introduced, encouraged a more sustainable water management. The project contributed to developing capacities to deal with the natural resource management and environmental risks of involved public and non-public stakeholders with specific reference to appropriate use of seeds and fertilizers as well as water sources. Based on the above, the rating of the PCRV is *moderately satisfactory (4)*, in agreement with PCR's.

### **Adaptation to climate change**

56. PSP's achievements towards adaptation to climate change are not clearly presented in the PCR narrative, however, additional information is provided in the CSPE's findings. More precisely, conservation agriculture and small-scale irrigation practices were included as part of the NAES's effort to address climate change despite the fact that the design did not mention it. In addition, increased awareness to climate change among farmers is explicitly reported in the findings of interviews in the Angonia district where two farmers' associations declared they learned about climate change. With reference to the climate change mitigation, it is reported that PSP contributed by building small dams for water retention (and providing related training to farmers) and by promoting good production practices like conservation agriculture in the field activities (although not foreseen at design). Presumably, awareness on adaptation to climate change was also raised in PSP's activities at field level (i.e. farmers' field school, plant clinics etc.) although this is not clearly described in the PCR. Adaptation to climate change is rated *moderately satisfactory (4)* by the PCRV, in agreement with PMD.

### C. Overall project achievement

57. PSP was set up to provide holistic support to the national agricultural extension system by closely involving farmers and their organizations, NAES agents as well as private sector and NGOs extension workers. It originated from the PROAGRI sector-wide approach but the amendment to the loan, without modifying its goal and objectives, changed the project's institutional and implementation arrangements to promote efficiency and effectiveness in the project management, pilot innovative approaches in participating districts and support the adoption of an innovative monitoring and evaluation system in the country.
58. Capacities were built at the level of the supply-side of agricultural extension (public and private sector agents as well as NGOs) through significant investments in training in participatory planning, M&E, agribusiness and other relevant topics. Equipment and materials were also provided to help the extension agents' work, including their travels and field work. As for the support provided to the demand side, association and enterprise development among farmers were promoted through the development of marketing contracts and the legalization of farmers' associations. Farmers were trained in improved agricultural and livestock practices as well as nutrition systems in view of developing a market-oriented production. Several innovations were introduced by the project and its complementary grant-financed activities and, subsequently, transferred within the project area. Overall, PSP positively contributed to the development of the national agricultural extension agenda and increases in production and sales were reported at farm level.
59. Nonetheless, initial delays negatively affected the overall PSP implementation and related disbursement path which, in turn, resulted in some mismatching of project activities vis-à-vis the agricultural calendar during the first years and led to the concentration of most activities during the second half of the project's life. Improvements in agricultural productivity in the target area were reported, although they are still below their potential. Difficulties faced in setting-up and operationalize the new M&E system hampered the data collection and limited the assessment of project's impacts. Finally, project's achievements in terms of promotion of natural resource management and adaptation to climate changes were not sufficiently elaborated in the PCR and prevented a full assessment of PSP's impacts by this PCR.
60. Overall project achievement is assessed as *moderately satisfactory (4)*, in line with PMD.

### D. Performance of partners

61. The PCR, while generally assessing the performance of services providers, (particularly those outsourced for the implementation of the activities in the field) and institutional partners (FAO and Mondlane University among others), does not specifically review IFAD's, Government's and PMU's performance throughout the project life in a dedicated section (as per IFAD's guidelines). The following assessment is drawn from the PCR narrative.
62. **IFAD.** Supervision missions and MTR were regularly carried out throughout the project implementation. However, IFAD's supervision and implementation support provided especially at the beginning did not successfully address PSP's initial bottlenecks.<sup>58</sup> Yet, in the second half of the project's life, IFAD's supervision missions addressed several challenges faced by the project especially with reference to the financial management and procurement procedures. Partnerships with FAO was developed for specific PSP activities and linkages with PROMER sought, although presented some limits mentioned above. Finally, whether and

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<sup>58</sup> The CSPE found that, while noting overall positive feedback on supervision and implementation support provided by IFAD, very little was done by IFAD until 2016 to effectively solve the challenges the projects (including the PSP) faced in terms of financial execution and alignment with e-SISTAFE and governmental procedures for procurement of services.

how the IFAD country office was involved throughout PSP's life is not elaborated in the PCR. Based on the above and the limited information provided, IFAD's performance is rated *moderately satisfactory (4)*, one point lower than the PCR rating.

63. **Government.** In 2011, following PROAGRI closure, the government played a proactive role in proposing changes that resulted in PSP. During implementation, the government managed to involve several key national actors (i.e. research institute and university, district and provincial offices) in the project activities, especially for the activities under component 1 and 3. It has shown flexibility in introducing new development approaches (particularly through the plant clinics as well as the formulation and implementation of the MDG1c) and promoting institutional collaboration and coordination towards their implementation. Nevertheless, several crucial issues affected government's performance, including: (i) inadequate disbursement modalities of its counterpart financing which did not follow the *pari-passu model* envisaged at design;<sup>59</sup> (ii) limited knowledge of the e-Sistafe functioning at central level where the procurement process was managed and related delays reported for the implementation of project's activities; (iii) lack of trained staff at district level and related inefficiencies during implementation; (iv) lack of alignment between the central and provincial levels in the development of some activities; and (v) general delays in the outsourcing also due to national complex procurement procedures. A comprehensive assessment of PMU's performance is missing in the PCR. Based on the above, government's performance is rated *moderately satisfactory (4)*, one point lower than PMD.

#### IV. Assessment of PCR quality

64. **Scope.** The PCR, while containing most required chapters, sections and annexes outlined in the 2015 Guidelines for Project Completion Review, has the following critical omissions: (i) section D.2 lacks detailed PSP's assessment in terms of natural resources and the environment, climate change adaptation and gender equity and women empowerment; (ii) section of quality of project management is missing; and (iii) several annexes are not included in the report such as dates of supervision and follow-up missions, and environmental assessment. An annex presenting a success story is added which provides useful insights on PSP's achievements. The scope of the PCR is considered *moderately satisfactory (4)*.
65. **Quality.** The PCR was prepared in September 2018 and considered outcomes of three regional stakeholders' workshops held in the Southern, Central and Northern areas in June 2018. It also takes into account outcomes from producers' groups interviewed during the completion mission (with a clear indication of their number and location). Qualitative and quantitative results have been collected during the supervision and completion mission, but as acknowledged by the PCR, limits in the M&E system did not provide adequate data and affected the PCR assessment. The rating by the PCR is *moderately satisfactory (4)*.
66. **Lessons.** A set of lessons is presented in the PCR (see Section V) which refer to PSP's institutional arrangements, its approach and its implementation. The lessons appear reasonable and presented in a clear and coherent manner. The rating by the PCR is *satisfactory (5)*.
67. **Candour.** PCR narrative is objective and reports both positive as well as less positive results. This PCR rates the candour for the PCR as *satisfactory (5)*.
68. Based on the above, the **overall** rating of the PCR quality is *moderately satisfactory (4)*.

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<sup>59</sup> Source: CSPE.



## V. Lessons learned

69. The following key lessons can be gleaned from the PCR and its validation:
- a) Based on PSP experience in outsourcing and considering the difficulties faced by the country during the project implementation (i.e. inflation, price volatility of some agricultural products, environmental alerts and related calamities and politico-military instabilities in some areas), the role of private/NGOs service providers in providing extension services was of fundamental importance in complementing the NAES mission and providing a diversity of methodologies. Therefore, their role should be promoted outside the project area as well as in other similar contexts of IFAD's intervention provided that high standards in service delivery are guaranteed;
  - b) A key determinant for farmers' access to financial markets is the recognition of their legal status. Important results were achieved by PSP in this domain; yet project's final achievements would have been greater if additional attention and support was provided for the legalization of associations targeted;
  - c) The role of the local development committees was strategic to ensure farmers' participation in project's activities in some areas. The promotion of a demand-driven agricultural extension approach should reinforce the local committees' involvement; and
  - d) Communication and collaboration among provinces, districts and central levels were key during the project implementation and need to be supported.

## Definition and rating of the evaluation criteria used by IOE

Criteria	Definition *	Mandatory	To be rated
<b>Rural poverty impact</b>	Impact is defined as the changes that have occurred or are expected to occur in the lives of the rural poor (whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended) as a result of development interventions.	X	Yes
	<i>Four impact domains</i>		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Household income and net assets: Household income provides a means of assessing the flow of economic benefits accruing to an individual or group, whereas assets relate to a stock of accumulated items of economic value. The analysis must include an assessment of trends in equality over time.</li> </ul>		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Human and social capital and empowerment: Human and social capital and empowerment include an assessment of the changes that have occurred in the empowerment of individuals, the quality of grass-roots organizations and institutions, the poor's individual and collective capacity, and in particular, the extent to which specific groups such as youth are included or excluded from the development process.</li> </ul>		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Food security and agricultural productivity: Changes in food security relate to availability, stability, affordability and access to food and stability of access, whereas changes in agricultural productivity are measured in terms of yields; nutrition relates to the nutritional value of food and child malnutrition.</li> </ul>		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Institutions and policies: The criterion relating to institutions and policies is designed to assess changes in the quality and performance of institutions, policies and the regulatory framework that influence the lives of the poor.</li> </ul>		No
<b>Project performance</b>	Project performance is an average of the ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.	X	Yes
Relevance	The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, institutional priorities and partner and donor policies. It also entails an assessment of project design and coherence in achieving its objectives. An assessment should also be made of whether objectives and design address inequality, for example, by assessing the relevance of targeting strategies adopted.	X	Yes
Effectiveness	The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.	X	Yes
Efficiency	A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results.	X	Yes
Sustainability of benefits	The likely continuation of net benefits from a development intervention beyond the phase of external funding support. It also includes an assessment of the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the project's life.	X	Yes
<b>Other performance criteria</b>			
Gender equality and women's empowerment	The extent to which IFAD interventions have contributed to better gender equality and women's empowerment, for example, in terms of women's access to and ownership of assets, resources and services; participation in decision making; work load balance and impact on women's incomes, nutrition and livelihoods.	X	Yes
Innovation	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have introduced innovative approaches to rural poverty reduction.	X	Yes
Scaling up	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have been (or are likely to be) scaled up by government authorities, donor organizations, the private sector and others agencies.	X	Yes
Environment and natural resources management	The extent to which IFAD development interventions contribute to resilient livelihoods and ecosystems. The focus is on the use and management of the natural environment, including natural resources defined as raw materials used for socio-economic and cultural purposes, and ecosystems and biodiversity - with the goods and services they provide.	X	Yes
Adaptation to climate change	The contribution of the project to reducing the negative impacts of climate change through dedicated adaptation or risk reduction measures	X	Yes

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Definition *</i>	<i>Mandatory</i>	<i>To be rated</i>
<b>Overall project achievement</b>	This provides an overarching assessment of the intervention, drawing upon the analysis and ratings for rural poverty impact, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, gender equality and women's empowerment, innovation and scaling up, as well as environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change.	X	Yes
<b>Performance of partners</b>			
• IFAD	This criterion assesses the contribution of partners to project design, execution, monitoring and reporting, supervision and implementation support, and evaluation. The performance of each partner will be assessed on an individual basis with a view to the partner's expected role and responsibility in the project life cycle.	X	Yes
• Government		X	Yes

\* These definitions build on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management; the Methodological Framework for Project Evaluation agreed with the Evaluation Committee in September 2003; the first edition of the Evaluation Manual discussed with the Evaluation Committee in December 2008; and further discussions with the Evaluation Committee in November 2010 on IOE's evaluation criteria and key questions.

## Rating comparison<sup>a</sup>

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Programme Management Department (PMD) rating</i>	<i>IOE Project Completion Report Validation (PCR) rating</i>	<i>Net rating disconnect (PCR-PMD)</i>
<b>Rural poverty impact</b>	4	4	0
<b>Project performance</b>			
Relevance	5	4	-1
Effectiveness	4	4	0
Efficiency	4	3	-1
Sustainability of benefits	4	4	0
<b>Project performance<sup>b</sup></b>	4.25	3.75	-0.5
<b>Other performance criteria</b>			
Gender equality and women's empowerment	4	4	0
Innovation	5	5	0
Scaling up	5	4	-1
Environment and natural resources management	4	4	0
Adaptation to climate change	4	4	0
<b>Overall project achievement<sup>c</sup></b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Performance of partners<sup>d</sup></b>			
IFAD	5	4	-1
Government	5	4	-1
<b>Average net disconnect</b>			<b>-0.42</b>

<sup>a</sup> Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable.

<sup>b</sup> Arithmetic average of ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.

<sup>c</sup> This is not an average of ratings of individual evaluation criteria but an overarching assessment of the project, drawing upon the rating for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, rural poverty impact, gender, innovation and scaling up, environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change.

<sup>d</sup> The rating for partners' performance is not a component of the overall project achievement rating.

### Ratings of the project completion report quality

	<i>PMD rating</i>	<i>IOE PCR rating</i>	<i>Net disconnect</i>
Candour		5	
Lessons		5	
Quality (methods, data, participatory process)		4	
Scope		4	
Overall rating of the project completion report		4	

Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable.

## Delivery of main outputs

### Component 1: Supply-side development of agricultural extension services

#### 1.1. Public Sector Reorientation and Support

#### Comments

220 male rabbits and 1100 improved female rabbits, 35 shelters and 190 rabbit cages, 154 improved hives, 1 honey processing unit, and packaging, equipment and labels for honey (250 direct beneficiaries); distribution of 389 roosters and 1307 chickens, construction of 200 henneries

Result (May 2018) Progress in 75% of the expected technologies for the development of improved rabbits and beekeeping, and in 150% of technologies expected for improved shelters for rabbits and improved henneries for chickens

Training of 517 extension agents, 42 supervisors and 09 NGOs in some areas including associativism, agribusiness and crop production.

Output (April 2018)

46 trained NGO technicians

Progress in 103.5% of extension workers, 100% of supervisors and 21.4% of trained NGOs.

Medium-term training plan for the DNEA

Output

#### 1.2. Private sector/NGO Promotion and Support

273 Promoters (195 Men and 78 Women) trained in different technological packages (Sofala)

Output (May 2018)

### Component 2: Demand-side development for agricultural extension services

#### 2.1. Farmer Organization and Empowerment

1264 FOs trained and 463 legalized associations. 15 Producer unions trained 197 Local service providers trained

Output (April and May 2018) Progress in 105.3% of trained FOs and 136.2% of legalized associations

#### 2.2. Group, association and enterprise development

74 Marketing contracts concluded (71 in the province of Niassa and 03 in the province of Inhambane)

Result (May 2018) Progress in 43.5% of the 170 contracts foreseen for commercialization.

### Component 3: Agricultural extension service delivery

190,160 Direct beneficiaries of whom 94,570 (49.5%) are women

Result (April 2018)

21 technologies of which 18 are crop production technologies and 3 are animal husbandry technologies

Result (April 2018) Progress in 129% of crop production technologies and 25% of livestock technologies

Established 68 (170%) on-farm trials

Output (April 2018) Progress in 267,5% of on-farm trials

Established 687 (80%) FFSs (Still to add FFSs established by FAO) Established 1415 (141%) result demonstration fields (CDRs)

Output (April 2018) Progress in 75.9% of the FFS and in 140.7% of the CDR

Action Plan for the Revitalization of Farmer Field Schools

It is under the contract with FAO to operationalize 365 FFS and training of 30 masters and 154 facilitators

National Program for Strengthening Plant Protection in Mozambique (PROFOSSAVE)

Prepared as part of the interinstitutional collaboration between DINAS, UEM/FAEF

#### District level

Training of producers in several relevant areas 5158 (103%) producers trained in production and nutrition systems of which 3380 are women 14739 (6136 women) producers participating in FFSs 215 Trained as FFS facilitators

Output (April 2018) Progress in 103%

Outsourcing Celebrated and implemented 6 (3 provincial and 3 district covering three districts) (SMEA) The performance matrices indicate that 17 contracts were signed in 21 districts of Nampula, Niassa, Inhambane, Zambézia, Sofala, and benefited 8615 producers - 02 service contracts concluded with Mundukid and Kulima and 4 dams and 1 training provider agreement were created, 5582 beneficiaries in 04 districts of Niassa province. - 02 service contracts with NGOs and Agri-business enterprises for fruit trees in 06 districts of Nampula province. - 01 contract with SOFRECO to strengthen organizational capacities and technical assistance to producers benefited 6668 producers in 05 districts of Zambezia. - 08 service contracts awarded with NGOs for the implementation of local impact projects in 3 three districts of Inhambane province with 1947 beneficiaries,

Output (April 2018)

Radio programs More than 50 hours of radio broadcasting in 3 provinces (Manica, Sofala and Tete) - 03 contracts concluded for the dissemination of agricultural technologies with the Community Radios of the districts of Dondo, Gorongosa and Nhamatanda in the province of Sofala. - Broadcast 14.6 radio hours on the provincial RM antenna in the province of Manica to publicize the practice of conservation agriculture, good practices of maize production and the use of improved seed - Disseminated 02 hours on community radio in the province of Manica to publicize the vaccination campaign against New Castle. - Broadcasted 17 radio messages on 8 community radio stations in the province of Tete

Plant Clinics - 4766 of which 2543 women participated in plant clinics

Output (April 2018) Progress in 119.2% of expected participants

Nutrition-Sensitive Agriculture - 307 extension technicians were trained at different levels (central, provincial and district), 72% of them male. - trained 2,953 FFS producers and members of producer associations - 3 Culinary demonstration fairs in Chibuto, Mandimba and Metarica - Around 6000 posters and brochures produced - KITS for culinary demonstrations purchased and distributed in Mossuril, Monapo, Zavala, Montepuez and Mandimba

3 Units of culinary demonstrations set up in Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Nampula.

#### Diamond Back Moth Biological Control Project

Plan of Action on Plant Health discussed

Important document for the MASA

Source: PCR.

## **Abbreviations and acronyms**

ASP	Agricultural Support Programme
CSPE	Country Strategy and Programme Evaluation
DNEA	National Directorate for Agricultural Extension
EC	European Commission
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
MASA	Ministry of Agricultural and Food Security
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MTR	Mid-term review
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
NAES	National Agricultural Extension System
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
ORMS	Operational Results Management System
PCR	Project Completion Report
PCRv	Project Completion Report Validation
PMU	Project Management Unit
PROAGRI II	National Programme for Agricultural Development – second phase
PROMER	Rural Markets Project
PRONEA	Programme for National Agricultural Extension
PSP	PRONEA Support Project
SMEA	Agrarian Extension Monitoring System
SWAp	Sector Wide Approach

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