

Project Completion Report Validation

Competitive Local Innovations for Small-scale Agriculture Project (CLISSA) Republic of Seychelles

Date of validation by IOE: November 2019

I. Basic project data

			Approval (US\$ m)		Actual (US\$ m) ¹	
Region	East and Southern Africa	Total project costs	3.74		2.94	
Country	Republic of Seychelles	IFAD loan (% of total)	3	80%	2.71	90%
Loan project number	SC-894	Borrower	0.28	8%	0.23	82%
Type of project (subsector)	Agricultural Development	Private companies	0.12	3%	0.00	
Financing type	IFAD initiated and exclusively financed	Other donors	0.25	7%	0.00	
Lending terms	Loan on ordinary terms [*]	Beneficiaries	0.09	2%	N/A	
Date of approval	07/04/2013	-----				
Date of effectiveness	14/11/2013	-----				
Loan amendments	3	Number of beneficiaries	Direct: 9,589 ² Indirect: N/A		Direct: 1,764 Indirect: N/A	
Financing closure extensions	0	Project Completion date	31/12/2018		31/12/2018	
Country programme managers	Ibrahima Bamba (current country director) ³	Financing closing date	30/06/2019		30/06/2019	
Regional director(s)	Sara Mbago-Bhunu (current) ⁴	Mid-term review			29/02/2016	
Project completion report reviewer	Chiara Calvosa	IFAD disbursement at project completion (%)			96.6% ⁵	
Project completion report quality control panel	Fumiko Nakai	Date of the project completion report			02/07/2019	

Source: President Report (2013), Project design report (2013), Project completion report (2019).

^{*} Terms of the IFAD loan on ordinary terms: 15 years, including a grace period of 3 years, with an interest rate equal to the reference interest rate per annum as determined by the Fund semi-annually.

¹ The IFAD database shows the disbursement amount of US\$2.71 million for the loan but records an actual disbursement rate of 96.6% in the denominated currency of the financing (SDR 1.91 million disbursed out of the approved allocation of SDR1.98 million). This is due a loss in the exchange rate between US\$ and SDR. For sake of clarity, the percentage reported in the PCRV refers to the US amount, also in the percentages.

² Revised to 3,993 at mid-term together with other indicators (ref. Changes and developments during implementation).

³ Previous: N. Messer, A. Barros, V. Achancho.

⁴ Previous: I. de Willebois, P. Saint Ange, S. Jatta.

⁵ See above.

II. Project outline

1. **Introduction.** The Competitive Local Innovations for Small-scale Agriculture Project (CLISSA) was a project of the Government of Seychelles financed by IFAD. The financing for CLISSA was approved by IFAD's Executive Board on 7 April 2013 and became effective on 14 November 2013, with 31 December 2018 and 30 June 2019 as completion and closing dates, respectively. The project's duration was not extended.
2. Seychelles is a small island development state. Its political stability since the 1976 independence and a conducive business environment contributed to significant progress made by the country over the last decades (i.e. steady increase in per capita gross national income and strong social indicators being the second highest Human Development Index ranking in Africa). Notwithstanding the above, the country still faces several challenges mainly related to its remoteness, insufficient economic diversification and vulnerability to external shocks with its economy mainly dependent on three industries (i.e. tourism, financial services and fish exports) and about 75 per cent of food requirements imported. Over the years, agricultural sector suffered from increased tourism sector and accelerated urbanization, resulting in losses of arable land. Changes in climate patterns such as rainfall and temperature affect the cropping systems and the agricultural productivity. In addition, most arable land is in remote mountainous areas, which limits access to market and water supply.⁶
3. **Project area.** The project area covered the entire country, with key interventions focused on the islands of La Digue, Mahé and Praslin. These three islands, also known as the Inner Islands of the 115 forming the Seychelles archipelago, is where most people lived.
4. **Project goal and strategic objectives.** According to the President's Report, the project's overall goal was to contribute to equitable and sustainable pro-poor agricultural and rural economic growth and employment. Its key development objective was to promote modern and sustainable agricultural and fishery practices, and to increase and diversify market access for smallholder farmers and fishers. The three intended outcomes were: (i) smallholder farmers and artisanal fishers have capacity to identify and service market demand; (ii) smallholder farmers and artisanal fishers have improved access to equitable financial services; and (iii) smallholder farmers and artisanal fishers have increased access to public services, technologies and collective infrastructure.
5. **Components.** The programme had four components: (i) enhancing business arrangements through capacity development of small farmers, rural micro entrepreneurs and fishers; (ii) improving access to agricultural and rural finance; (iii) strategic capacity strengthening and infrastructure; and (iv) project management.
6. *Component 1 - Enhancing business arrangements through capacity development of small farmers, rural micro entrepreneurs and fishers.* This component aimed to establish business ventures between small farmers, fishers and buyers and strengthen the capacity of small-scale actors in agriculture, fisheries and livestock sectors. This was meant to be achieved through the following two subcomponents: (i) public private partnerships and technology development; and (ii) food security and productivity development.
7. *Component 2 - Improving access to agricultural and rural finance.* By liaising with the other components, it was intended to improve access to finance for small farmers, fisheries and rural micro-entrepreneurs. This was meant to be reached by the development and piloting of innovative agricultural and value chain financing

⁶ Country Strategy Note, 2016.

models and their scaling-up through financial institutions. The two subcomponents were: (i) the refinancing fund (offering a line of credit to provide refinancing to agricultural, fisheries and rural micro enterprise); and (ii) complementary support to participating banks.

8. *Component 3 - Strategic capacity strengthening and infrastructure.* The component was designed with the objective of strengthening public sector and collective institutions for their long-term continuity and facilitate the implementation of component 1. It was meant to be achieved through two subcomponents, namely: (i) strategic capacity building; and (ii) public and collective infrastructure, particularly for irrigation and water harvesting.
9. *Component 4 – Project management.* The component was designed to ensure complementary among the project coordination, knowledge management and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) between the central level of ministries, private and public institutions involved in the steering committee and the operational level of project coordinating unit.
10. **Target group.** The project directly targeted: (i) 768 farmers producing for the domestic market; (ii) 1,330 people dependent on artisanal fishing, fish handling and processing; and (iii) 7,500 poor households involved in backyard gardening. The President’s Report identified the following three main groups of beneficiaries: small-scale producers, processors and marketers; micro-entrepreneurs; and women and youth.
11. **Financing.** Total project cost at approval was estimated at approximately US\$3.74 million, of which approximately US\$3 million was to be financed through an IFAD loan on ordinary terms. At design, the Government of Seychelles’ contribution was estimated at US\$282,000, and the beneficiaries’ in-kind contribution at US\$91,000. Additional co-financing from other development partners and private companies was estimated at US\$368,000. Tables below show the estimated and actual project costs by financier and by component, respectively.

Table 1
Project costs by financier

Source of Funding	Type of financing	Estimated amount (US\$ m) ⁷	Estimated amount (% of total)	Actual expenditure (US\$ m)	Expenditure (% of total)	Disbursements (% of estimated amount)
IFAD	Loan	3.00	80%	2.71	92%	90%
Government		0.28	8%	0.23	8%	82%
Private companies		0.12	3%	0.00		
Other donors		0.25	7%	0.00		
Beneficiaries		0.09	2%	NP		
Total Financing		3.74	100%	2.94	100%	79%

Source: President’s Reports for estimated amount. Project Completion Report (PCR) and IFAD’s internal reporting systems for the actual expenditure. The IFAD database in US\$ shows the disbursement amount of US\$2.71 million for the loan but records an actual disbursement rate of 96.6 per cent in the denominated currency of the financing (SDR 1.91 million disbursed out of the approved amount SDR1.98 million). This is due to a loss in the exchange rate between US\$ and SDR.

⁷ Estimates were revised at MTR for government (to US\$0.95 million), private companies (to US\$0.14 million) and beneficiaries (to US\$0.11 million) but not updated in the IFAD’s internal reporting systems. For the purpose of the PCR total amounts estimated at design are taken into account.

Table 2
Project costs by component

Components	Planned (US\$ m)	Planned amount	Actual amount ⁸	Actual (% total)
Enhancing business arrangements	1.63	44%	0.87	29%
Improving access to agriculture and rural finance	1.14	30%	0.03	1%
Strategic capacity strengthening and infrastructure	0.62	17%	1.59	54%
Project management	0.35	9%	0.45	15%
Total	3.74	100%	2.94	100%

Source: President's Report for planned; PCR for actual.

12. **Project implementation arrangements.** The project was designed to be implemented by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Industry (MNRI) in collaboration with the Ministry of Finance, Trade and Investment and other relevant ministries.⁹ The Project Management Unit (PMU) was to be established in the Office of the Principal Secretary in MNRI with three professionals and additional support staff. Memorandum of Understanding between CLISSA, selected financial institutions, service providers (including, the Seychelles Agriculture Agency, SAA and the Seychelles Fishing Authority, SFA) were to be signed for the project's implementation. Project oversight was to be provided by a national project steering committee chaired by the MNRI which included government (including parastatal) and private sector representatives in equal numbers for a maximum of 10 participants. In addition, the project design report envisaged the establishments of three technical working groups (one for agriculture and livestock, one for rural and agricultural finance and one for fisheries) with an advisory and guidance role in the respective domains. Each working group was composed of approximately 10-15 participants' representatives of private sectors, local associations, non-governmental organizations, financial institutions as well as relevant public institutions active in the specific domain. A results-based M&E system was envisaged to be undertaken at three levels (outputs, outcome and impact) to monitor project's progress and feed the IFAD's Results and Impact Management System (RIMS).
13. **Changes and developments during implementation.** Limited but significant changes took place during the implementation, including the following:
- *Three amendments to the financing agreement.* These amendments were introduced in order to: (i) modify the letter to the borrower and allow two financial institutions (namely, Development Bank of Seychelles and Seychelles Credit Union) to act as main implementing partners under component 2 - 2014 and 2015 amendments; and (iii) cancellation of component 2, in 2016.
 - *Discontinuation of component 2.* As recommended by the 2016 mid-term review (MTR), component 2 was dropped. A feasibility study commissioned by the project and the November 2015 mission pointed out that the CLISSA line of credit was not financially viable vis-a-vis the cheaper credit alternatives subsidized by the government. Budget was, therefore, reallocated among the

⁸ Actual amount by component reported in the PCR is updated to 31/12/2018. The difference with actual expenditures at completion (equal to approximately US\$240,000 has been proportionally spread among components).

⁹ Supervision missions from 2015 onwards, MTR and PCR, all refer to the Ministry of Fisheries and Agriculture (MFA) as implementing partner and chair of the project's steering committee.

other three components and non-lending rural finance activities were introduced to be implemented under component 1. Particularly, capacity building activities targeting both the financial institutions as well as the project's end beneficiaries were introduced with the aim of broadly facilitating access to credit; and

- *Log-frame revision.* Project's log-frame was significantly modified three times throughout the project life to adjust to the changes in the project's structure (i.e. discontinuation of component 2), revise indicators, (including the downsizing of the outreach indicators and modifications in the second outcome) and set intermediate targets as a response to IFAD's internal Operational Results Management System's guidelines.

14. **Intervention logic.** CLISSA was expected to strengthen the small-scale artisanal fisheries and develop the agricultural domestic production capacity in the three main islands of Seychelles. This was to be achieved mainly through: (i) productivity improvements for smallholder farmers, backyard gardeners, artisanal fisheries and livestock owners involved in pig production; (ii) promotion of efficient and effective management of agricultural and fisheries resources; (iii) improved access to financial services through collaborations of local participating banks and financial institutions; and (iv) investments in enabling infrastructure (mainly construction and/or rehabilitation of roads, market storage and irrigation facilities). Capacity building activities were designed to support the demand (i.e. producers) and the supply sides (i.e. private, public and parastatal actors) as well as to promote public-private partnerships. The underlying idea was that the CLISSA institutional set-up together with the capacity building activities and the institutional strengthening would ensure institutional continuity and enable beneficiaries to sustain the project's benefits over time.
15. **Delivery of outputs.** The outputs were delivered at different rates ranging from 25 per cent to 650 per cent of revised targets, with general underperformance in most of the outreach targets. Component 1, *enhancing business arrangements*, did not meet the initial targets in terms of the number of people trained in crops (a total of 915 as opposed to 3,200 targeted, or 29 per cent of end target) and partially met its targets in income generating activities or business management (181 versus 261 targeted, equal to 69 per cent) and the number of public-private partnerships facilitated (seven vis-à-vis 10 targeted). However, it exceeded the initial targets in terms of people trained in fisheries (64 vis-à-vis 39 targeted, or 164 per cent). Targets related to *capacity building activities for non-lending activities* introduced by the MTR were all met and exceeded (as in the case of 26 staff of financial institutions trained vis-à-vis the target of four). Component 3, *capacity building and infrastructure*, met nearly all its targets in terms of productive infrastructure constructed or rehabilitated and in one case exceeded them (i.e. seven irrigation schemes vis-à-vis four targeted). However, CLISSA only partially met targets related to dams' construction/rehabilitation (five dams of the 10 targeted) and farmland under water-related infrastructure (212 hectares vis-à-vis 261 targeted, or 81 per cent).
16. A detailed table summarising CLISSA's output delivery is presented in Annex III.

A. Core criteria

Relevance

17. **Relevance vis-à-vis IFAD and Government policies and strategies.** CLISSA's goal and objectives were aligned with the government's priorities to strengthen the country resilience to external price shocks and its capacity to deliver on its food supply, promoting the domestic agricultural sector. More precisely, it was in line with: (i) 2008-2011 National food and nutrition security policy; (ii) 2013 National flagship food and nutrition security policy; (iii) 2013-2017 Seychelles medium term

national development strategy; and (iv) 2015-2020 National agricultural investment programme.

18. As for IFAD's strategies, CLISSA's objectives were coherent with IFAD's Strategic Framework in that they intended to improve food security and reduce rural poverty in the project area. They were also aligned with IFAD's policies on private sector development, gender and climate change. In addition, CLISSA's objectives pertained their relevance also vis-à-vis the 2017-2019 IFAD Country strategic note, developed after CLISSA's MTR.¹⁰
19. With regards to the relevance to the needs of smallholders' farmers and artisanal fishers, the project aimed at specifically addressing their needs for a market-oriented production and their engagement in more sustainable livelihoods.
20. **Relevance vis-à-vis project design.** The project design together with its components were relevant in meeting project objectives. The three operational components were designed to specifically address some of the main challenges faced by the target population in the project area, particularly in terms of access to market. The focus was clearly defined and there was no attempt to improve the entire value chains with the limited resources available. More precisely, component 1 and 2 were designed to promote access to market and financial services. Complementarily, component 3 focused on building and/or rehabilitating productive infrastructure as well as providing capacity building services to support the operations under component 1. However, several weaknesses can be identified in the project design, as outlined in the PCR and the IFAD's internal quality control mechanisms. First of all, the beneficiaries' targets were unrealistic¹¹ and the targeting strategy had no poverty focus *per se*. A self-selection mechanism was foreseen for the beneficiaries' participation into project activities without specific incentives to mobilize the expected number of beneficiaries and involve the most vulnerable groups into the project's interventions, particularly women-headed households and youth. In addition, the project design underestimated local producers' associations and local institutions' weaknesses (particularly for SAA and SFA), which is often an issue in small island development states. Finally, several issues related the design of the rural finance component in the specific context, including its credit subcomponent as well as the participation of the local financing institutions, led to the discontinuation of the intended lending-activities.
21. In **summary**, CLISSA's goal and objectives were aligned with the government's and IFAD's policies and strategies to support agricultural development and support access to market in the country. The design presented significant weaknesses, particularly with regards to the rural finance component and its targeting strategy. The overall project relevance is rated *moderately unsatisfactory (3)* by the PCR/V, in agreement with the Programme Management Department (PMD).

Effectiveness

22. **Project outreach.** This PCR/V assessment refers to the revised MTR targets which downscaled appraisal targets. The number of direct beneficiaries reached by the project at completion was 1,764 households against the MTR revised target of 3,993 households (45 per cent achievement).¹² While project's outreach was particularly poor for backyard gardeners (i.e. 915 versus 3,200 targeted) and artisanal fishers (i.e. 195 vis-à-vis a target of 532), it reached approximately 80 per cent of intended farmers. This limited outreach was mainly due to weak capacities of local development partners and organizations to mobilize the intended

¹⁰ No Result-based Country Opportunity Strategies Paper was developed for Seychelles in the past given its low funding allocation. The two strategic objectives identified in the Country note were: (i) improved agricultural value chains and increased opportunities for young agribusinesses and entrepreneurs; and (ii) smallholder farmers' production capital modernised and sustainable.

¹¹ According to the PCR, the number of targeted beneficiaries was higher than farmers that existed in the country (150 per cent) or almost equal in the case of backyard gardeners (94 per cent).

¹² Equivalent to 18 per cent of targets set at design (i.e. 9,598).

number of beneficiaries and integrate the poor small-scale farmers and artisanal fishers, within the logic of the self-targeting strategy promoted by the project.

23. Gender disaggregated data presented in the log-frame show different degrees of women participation depending on the nature of the project activities (ref. Section on gender for additional details) but do not provide adequate information on youth.
24. **Objective 1: smallholder farmers and artisanal fishers have capacity to identify and service market demand.**
25. This objective was expected to be achieved mainly through: (i) training and capacity building activities in production practices and modern technologies and income generating activities; and (ii) promotion of private public partnerships.
26. Training activities provided to farmers and artisanal fishers were based on the findings of a need assessment exercise commissioned by the project. Although the number of people benefitting from capacity building was lower than expected for both artisanal fishers (37 per cent) and farmers (28 per cent), its overall quality was reported by the PCR to be useful. Training on income generating activities and business management was delivered to a total of 181 beneficiaries (against the target of 261, or 69 per cent achievement rate).
27. According to the PCR, the practices promoted by the project contributed to production increases reported by 76 per cent of involved smallholder farmers (against a target of 50 per cent) and 69 per cent backyard gardeners (against the target of 50 per cent set at design).
28. Finally, it is reported that the project brokered a total of seven private public partnerships against the target of 10. Farmers were linked to organized markets in the country including, the Hilton Hotel, the Seychelles Trading Company (Government Parastatal) and the Lead Farmers (private sector). The partnership established with Hilton Hotel was the first example of linking smallholder producers (more precisely 12) to a high-end hotel through an IFAD-funded project (ref. Innovation section). It is reported that this experience was replicated in several other countries worldwide (ref. scaling-up section). The partnership with the Seychelles Trading Company involved a total of 100 smallholder farmers, while the linkage through Lead Farmers a total of 13 farmers.
29. **Objective 2: smallholder farmers and artisanal fishers have improved access to equitable financial services**
30. With the dropping of the component 2 and the activities related to the introduction of the line of credit, this objective was meant to be reached mainly through non-lending activities. These included capacity building support for access to finance both on the supply side (local financial institutions) and on the demand side (producers).
31. Results reported in the PCR are mainly at output level and refer to the number of training sessions provided to local staff of financial institutions. A total of 10 banks and non-financial stakeholders were trained (100 per cent achievement rate) and 26 local staff trained versus the target of four. Yet, baseline is not available for none of these two indicators and, particularly the second target (four local staff to be trained) seems low. Support was to be provided also to the Central Bank of Seychelles to organize a workshop in agricultural lending, but the information is missing in the PCR. In addition, results at outcome levels are not adequately elaborated in the PCR despite the importance of developing human and institutional capacities in the country for the reasons explained in Section II, country context.
32. Outputs and outcomes on the demand side, are not fully reported in the PCR nor in the log-frame. At MTR it was foreseen that training modules on business records and understanding the financial services were to be delivered. At completion, it is

reported that smallholder farmers and artisanal fishers still faced some difficulties in accessing existing financial services.

33. **Objective 3: smallholder farmers and artisanal fishers have increased access to public services, technologies and collective infrastructure.**
34. Two sets of interventions were meant to contribute to the achievement of this objective: (i) infrastructure development and rehabilitation; and, (ii) strengthening public institutions to provide improved services to farmers and fishers.
35. With regards to the infrastructure development, output indicators were all met or nearly met in terms of kilometers of roads rehabilitated (i.e. 2km), storage facilities rehabilitated or constructed (i.e. 6) and other productive infrastructure constructed and rehabilitated (i.e. 17 out of 19). A total of 212 ha of farmland was serviced by water-related infrastructure resulting in production and productivity increases. In terms of outcomes, following to the above investments, access to markets was reported to be facilitated, adequate stocking of both farming and fishing inputs became possible and production losses reduced.
36. Capacity building activities were also delivered to eight local service providers (out of 12 targeted) to improve their skills and provide equipment in delivering targeted and timely services to their end users (i.e. farmers, fishers or students). These included public and private extension service providers in the domain of fisheries and agriculture. Specific training was also delivered to 127 staff of local service providers (against a target of 60, or 212 per cent achievement rate) to improve their capacities to understand and better meet demand from local producers. It is reported that the above activities contributed to improve local services providers' capacities in understanding CLISSA's target group needs.
37. **Summary.** Achievements of objectives 1 and 3 were moderately satisfactory. On one hand, performance was hampered by the self-targeting approach which failed in mobilizing the intended number of beneficiaries but, on the other, it benefited from the infrastructure development and market linkages established. Following the changes introduced by MTR, the achievement of the second objective depended mainly from the success of the non-lending activities which was not very visible at completion. Based on the above and considering the difficulties to work in a small island context, CLISSA effectiveness is rated *moderately satisfactory (4)* by the PCRV in agreement with PMD rating.

Efficiency

38. **Disbursement.** IFAD's financing was streamlined into the national budget system. Overall disbursement trends were not consistent throughout the project life, alternating a pick of good performance followed by a year of low disbursement trends (i.e. 18 per cent in PY1, 5 per cent in PY2, 25 per cent in PY3, 17 per cent in PY4 and 35 per cent in PY5). PMU understaffing and weak planning capacities¹³ contributed to the low efficiency level in treasury management. Nevertheless, IFAD's disbursement rate at completion was satisfactory at 97 per cent. Consequently, the core of CLISSA's interventions took place in the second half of project life and during the last year. With regards to expenditure by component, component 1 accounted for 29 per cent of total actual expenditures, component 3 for 54 per cent, and component 4 for 15 per cent.¹⁴ It is worth noting that expenditures on productive investments through civil works and infrastructure accounted for nearly half of total project costs (i.e. 46 per cent, with an overdraft of 120 per cent when compared with design) followed by technical assistance and training (i.e. 26 per cent, with 100 per cent overdraft vis-à-vis design estimated needs). Cost savings are reported for the category of vehicles (only 33 per cent of allocated amount used). According to this PCRV, these figures show efficiency in

¹³ Ref. Section D Performance of partners for additional details.

¹⁴ Component 2 was discontinued by MTR and accounted for 1 per cent of total actual expenditure.

allocating resources to productive investments and the strategic decision of investing in capacity building in the Seychelles context where limited human resources are locally available. Both aspects also positively contribute the sustainability of project's interventions (ref. related section).

39. **Efficiency in the pace of implementation.** In line with the disbursement trends described above, the PCR reported a seasonal implementation pace with an acceleration after MTR and a pick of 78 per cent annual work plan and budget execution in the final year of project life. During the first four years, budget performance was overall below 45 per cent. This is also linked to the underperformance of component 2, which was subsequently dropped. The above pace of implementation implies that the infrastructure investments were mostly financed in the second half of project life, hence the related impacts might not have been fully captured by the completion mission.
40. In terms of **project management costs**, detailed expenses are not reported. However, the related component was expected to account for approximately 9 per cent of total project costs at design (or approximately 11 per cent of total government and IFAD's planned financing) versus 15 per cent reported at completion. In terms of salaries and allowances, minor changes are reported between design estimates (i.e. 6 per cent) and actual disbursement (i.e. 8 per cent).
41. **Economic rate of return.** The ex-post financial and economic shows the economic rate of return at completion equal to 18.3 per cent. This is higher than the 12 per cent opportunity cost of capital, thus showing the project's viability. The discrepancy with design (i.e. 21 per cent estimated economic internal rate of return) and mid-term (i.e. 22 per cent) is mainly explained by the significant lower outreach and the lack of benefits from livestock development (particularly the pigs' model included at design, which was very profitable).¹⁵ The analysis carried at completion shows the main drivers of project benefits are the agricultural productivity increases of fruit and vegetables, sale increases and reduced food imports. The financial analysis shows the profitability of all productive models supported by CLISSA, with benefic cost ratio ranging from 1 (i.e. home gardening) to 2 (i.e. extensive fruit and vegetable farmers receiving training).¹⁶ Increased quantities and related value of non-marketable production deriving from home gardening models were also assessed. In addition, achievements in terms of human and social capital development as well as environmental benefits reported in the PCR were not quantified in the above EFA analysis. Finally, the cost per beneficiary of US\$1,464 is higher than its initial estimation and MTR revision (i.e. respectively, US\$385 and US\$851). This is mainly attributable to the significant reduction of project's final beneficiaries. Generally, high cost per beneficiaries is expected from interventions in small island states and remote areas and were already discussed during the IFAD's quality assurance process.
42. The overall rating on efficiency is *moderately satisfactory (4)* in the PCR, in line with PMD.

Rural poverty impact

43. **Availability of data.** The assessment of rural poverty impact is based on the data collected by the completion mission, three sets of RIMS data (although they do not consistently provide second and third level indicators) and CLISSA M&E system – which presented some weaknesses in capturing outcomes and poverty impacts. The reliability of the outcome studies commissioned by the project is questioned by

¹⁵ The same EFA carried out at design without the pig component would have led to an economic internal rate of return of 14 per cent (i.e. 7 per cent lower).

¹⁶ In addition, B/C ratio equal to 5.7 was reported for the SAA pilot hydroponic system.

the PCR due to the unclear methodology adopted in the analysis and the lack of reference to project's outcome indicators.

44. **Household incomes and assets.** The PCR indicated that 57 per cent of beneficiary households reported an income increase (against the target of 40). The percentages of income increase are detailed in the financial analysis varying from 4 per cent (farmers practicing extensive fruit and vegetable production who received only training from the project and did not benefit from water-related investment) to 40 per cent (fishermen), with the exceptional rate of 139 per cent of home gardeners benefitting from project's investment. Similarly, increases in beneficiaries' net margin for all supported agricultural and fishery activities are reported in the financial analysis varying from SCR 197 (equal to approximately US\$15, for farmers practicing extensive fruit and vegetable production who received only training from the project) to SCR 67,000 (equal to approximately US\$4,900, for farmers practicing extensive fruit and vegetable production benefitting from project investments in irrigation). Savings are mentioned for the backyard gardeners due to increased domestic productions of fruit and vegetables – yet, the PCR assessment in this domain is mainly qualitative. Finally, at design, rises of producers' prices were expected to positively contribute to increased beneficiaries' income. At completion, however, significant increases in prices or negotiating power for farmers were not reported except for those involved in the public-private partnerships. Main improvements at completion related to increase in land-use, extended production cycles and increased agricultural productivity.
45. In terms of household assets, the only indicator reported shows that 51 per cent of the surveyed population owns a vehicle (against the baseline of 25 and the target of 30 – which was not particularly challenging). Data on the RIMS indicator of people owning a house was not reported at completion although included in the log-frame.¹⁷ The assessment of CLISSA's impact on household assets is therefore limited by the lack of data provided.
46. **Human and social capital and empowerment.** CLISSA contributed to human capital development of target beneficiaries through improved knowledge and skills in the domain of agricultural production (i.e. intercropping, harvesting and pruning, use of organic fertilizers, use of micro-irrigation and water harvesting techniques), fisheries and basic repair and maintenance of irrigation systems. In terms of social capital, PCR narrative refers to the clustering of farmers for market access¹⁸ and the strengthening of local governmental organizations (including *inter-alia* the SAA and SFA).¹⁹ Linkages among extension agents and farmers, fishermen and their associations were supported. However, at completion, producers' associations were not involved in the project's activities as envisaged at design due to several weaknesses reported in the PCR.
47. **Food security and agricultural productivity.** No specific indicator was set to assess improvements in food security for participating beneficiaries. A 20 per cent reduction in the incidence of child malnutrition (from 7.9 per cent to 6.3 per cent) was foreseen at design but the actual achievement is not reported in the PCR. The PCR reports that 69 per cent of smallholder households and 62 per cent of backyard gardeners acknowledged increased consumptions of fruit and vegetables; while no evidence is provided for artisanal fishermen. In terms of agricultural productivity, extension of production cycles to the entire year as well as expanded farmlands are outlined in the PCR. Regrettably, specific productivity increases were not part of the project's reporting system, thus limited data is available. At design, a 5 per cent increase in productivity was estimated for the financial analysis but

¹⁷ Baseline 66 per cent and end target 79 per cent.

¹⁸ Despite the existence of some issues, some successful examples are presented in linking small-holder farmers with important market buyers (i.e. hotels and Seychelles trading company) through lead farmers.

¹⁹ Both the SAA and SFA showed limited implemented capacity in the initial phase.

data used at completion are not clearly specified.²⁰ The only figure reported in the log-frame refer to a survey carried out in January 2019 according to which 76 per cent of farmers and 69 per cent of home gardeners reported agricultural productivity increases (against the targets of 50 per cent for both). With reference to the fisheries activities, increases in the annual catch were not registered in the financial analysis, but only benefits from storage facilities.²¹

48. **Institutions and policies.** According to the PCR, CLISSA had a transformational effect onto the Seychelles agricultural sector by increasing government's attention on this domain. Although, at completion, the national budget allocation to agriculture was still low when compared to other sectors,²² MFA budget tripled during CLISSA's life and SAA budget increased by 50 per cent. Furthermore, CLISSA was reported to have influenced the 2018-2021 Comprehensive national agricultural plan as well as the SAA's and the MAF's strategies and investment plans.²³
49. Finally, the project developed capacities of local government agencies involved in the agricultural and fisheries sector through capacity building, better equipment and institutional support (i.e. this is the case of SAA, national maritime agency and the institute of agriculture and horticulture among others). Whether the above translated into more timely, accurate and effective service provided to smallholder farmers and fishers could have been further elaborated in the PCR.
50. In **summary**, the evidence of CLISSA impact on rural poverty is limited given the above-mentioned issues with the M&E systems, particularly in terms of outcomes and impact. The assessment is negatively affected by its limited outreach, both in terms of number of beneficiaries targeted, as well as their *status* (it is not clear to what extent the poor households, particularly those women-headed or youth benefited from project's interventions). Based on the above and despite the influence on institutions and policies, which should be visible in the future, rural poverty impact is rated *moderately unsatisfactory (3)* by the PCR and the PCR.

Sustainability of benefits

51. **Sustainability of the project's investments.** Good prospects for the sustainability of project's infrastructure are generally reported in the PCR. With reference to the 2 km of roads rehabilitated, responsibility for the regular maintenance is clearly allocated to the competent national authority (i.e. Seychelles Land and Transport Agency). In addition, the general good conditions and standards of roads in the country, positively contribute to their sustainability prospect. With regards to the water infrastructure, the monthly water tariff paid by end users is not fully covering the operation and maintenance costs. Sustainability will therefore depend on subsidy from the SAA which, according to the PCR, is expected to remain. Similarly, the continued subsidy on the price of ice, will be critical to ensure the sustainability of the ice machine provided by CLISSA to SFA. Input stores used for agricultural and fisheries inputs appears to be the only infrastructure run on a cost-recovery basis.
52. Notwithstanding the reported ownership and willingness of project's beneficiaries to continue the supported interventions, sustainability of most CLISSA's investments is strongly dependent on the continuation of government's subsidies as well as local agencies commitments for the provision of operation and maintenance.
53. **Social and institutional sustainability.** The incorporation of CLISSA's activities into the regular workplan of relevant public institutions as well as the training

²⁰ Productivity increases in the range of 15 to 50 per cent are indicated for home gardeners.

²¹ Benefits mainly derive from value addition and storage (ice-machinery).

²² Namely, 1.5 per cent of national budget.

²³ Particularly in the sense of promoting local food production and continuing the support of the backyard gardening.

provided is seen by this PCRV as a positive step towards the sustainability.²⁴ The functioning of the producers supported the project is strong for those cases where market linkages were established. In the other cases, on the contrary, sustainability is weak. Their future extension and replication to the benefit of other targeted farmers and fishermen is therefore critical for their long-term sustainability.

54. At design the **exit strategy** was outlined in the objectives of the component 3 in terms of ensuring institutional continuity through strengthening the capacities of local institution and providing suitable infrastructure. At completion, a proper exit strategy for all project's activities was not in place. The involvement of some local agencies and the private-sector-driven nature of the market linkage activities, indicate positive prospects for the continuation of certain CLISSA's interventions. In other cases, however, the sustainability will depend on the continued subsidies backed by the government.
55. Based on the above, the sustainability is rated as *moderately satisfactory (4)* by this PCRV in line with the PCR.

B. Other performance criteria

Innovation and scaling up

56. **Innovation.** CLISSA introduced new technologies for the agricultural and fisheries development in the country, particularly the hydroponic and tropic greenhouses. The most important innovation, however, was the public-private partnership model developed among local producers, hotel industry and local development agencies. Particularly innovative was the solution of linking small producers to buyers (private sector and parastatal) through lead farmers as a response to the failure of more traditional attempts. The project was innovative in promoting small farming and backyard gardening, particularly in urban areas²⁵ to reduce vulnerability to external shocks, mainly price volatility and climate change. Based on the above, innovation is rated *satisfactory (5)* by the PCRV, as by PMD.
57. **Scaling up.** According to the PCR, the results of the successful partnership with the Hilton Hotel which was first piloted in Seychelles has been expanded to Sri Lanka and Argentina, and there are ongoing consultations between IFAD and the Hilton Hotel for its replication in countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Cameroon. The available information indicates that the partnership with Hilton has been formalized through a Letter of Intent covering multiple countries.²⁶ Replication and wider adoption at country level of the technical packages promoted by the project, particularly the two above mentioned innovations, is expected to be promoted by the 2018-2021 Comprehensive Agricultural Plan. It is reported that 100 potential farmers were already identified by the MFA for scaling-up activities. In addition, the replication of backyard gardening approach as introduced by CLISSA is being already replicated in the country by a local NGO. Finally, the scaling-up potential of some pilot technologies (SAA hydroponics) seems high given the financial returns foreseen in the analysis. In addition, the chances to replicate and upscale the market approaches developed by CLISSA appear very good, also in other contexts. The scaling up rating by this PCRV is *satisfactory (5)*, one point higher than PMD assessment.

²⁴ Reference is made particularly to the SAA, national maritime agency as well as the institute of agriculture and horticulture.

²⁵ Also through vertical crop production.

²⁶ <https://agrifood.net/iafn-updates/433-ifad-partners-with-olam-and-hilton>: "Hilton Hotels and IFAD moved a step forward with the signing of a Letter of Intent to formalize the partnership and continue to connect smallholder farmers supported by IFAD investments with Hilton Hotels supply chains. The collaboration is already on-going in the Seychelles, and beginning to gain traction in Sri Lanka, Fiji and Argentina, with further exploration on-going elsewhere in East and West Africa."

Gender equality and women's empowerment

58. At design, high incidence of relative poverty among female-headed households was identified and special efforts were foreseen to encourage their participation into the project's activities. As noticed by the MTR, however, specific indicators to monitor outputs and outcomes of project activities in this domain were not yet in place. At completion, the information provided on CLISSA's achievements in terms of gender equality and women's empowerment is limited. Specifically, it mainly refers to the output indicator of women participation in project's activities (equal to 33 per cent against the target of 50 per cent), which is not enough to adequately assess project impacts in this domain. Several activities were foreseen at design to promote gender equality, including the collaboration with the Gender Secretariat and the Agency for Social Protection in Seychelles, but no information is provided in the PCR. Based on the limited information provided, the rating by the PCR is *moderately unsatisfactory (3)*, in line with PMD's.

Environment and natural resources management

59. CLISSA achievements in terms of environment and natural resource management are presented in the PCR mainly in terms of technologies and knowledge introduced to promote the efficient use of land and water resources. These included: a more efficient use of farming inputs, particularly in terms of organic and environmentally friendly fertilizers, intercropping and water harvesting. Overall, project activities were reported to be undertaken towards the promotion of natural resource use efficiency, especially for land and water, which are scarce resources in the context of small islands. Also, CLISSA advocated for the importance of carrying out an environmental impact assessment for the opening up of new lands to agriculture– which is particularly relevant for government's policy framework in the agricultural sector. According to the environmental assessment, project's activities were not implemented in environmentally sensitive areas of the archipelago. In addition, certain potential negative environmental impacts were identified along with mitigation measures put in place during CLISSA's implementation. Yet, as pointed out by the PCR, opportunity was missed by CLISSA for a more proactive approach to environmental and natural resources management. Based on the above, the rating of the PCR is *moderately satisfactory (4)*, in agreement with PCR's.

Adaptation to climate change

60. CLISSA's efforts and achievements in promoting beneficiaries' resilience to climate change resilience are outlined in the PCR. They refer to both technologies introduced (mainly related to irrigation) and knowledge developed among beneficiaries. Given their importance in the country and their positive results towards mitigation and adaptation to climate change, this PCR believes that this section could have been further elaborated in the PCR. The following is listed in the PCR: on-farm technology trials in integrated crop management, use of hydroponics, organic fertilizers, drip irrigation, shade house technology and farm mechanization. As a result of CLISSA's intervention, farmers' resilience to climate change was reported to be increased. Adaptation to climate change is rated *moderately satisfactory (4)* by the PCR, in agreement with PMD.

C. Overall project achievement

61. CLISSA was set up to contribute to a revival of the Seychelles agricultural sector by supporting artisanal fisheries, promoting rural micro-enterprises and creating an enabling environment through strategic capacity building and infrastructure development. This was expected to be achieved in the context of a small island economy characterized inter-alia by remoteness and high dependence on food imports and international trade.
62. Capacities were built at local level among farmers, fishers and backyard gardeners to improve agricultural production, extend the production cycle of the targeted

crops and develop, in certain cases, a market-oriented production. Related equipment and infrastructure, particularly for efficient water management and input stores, were provided in view of sustaining project's benefits after completion. Public private partnerships and business links were established between some targeted producers and market buyers (including hotels), albeit a small coverage out of the whole project beneficiaries. Technological innovations were promoted by the project for the use of farmers or local agencies as pilot activities and, some of them, were replicated by other development actors. Above all, the project was innovative in its approach to link farmers to the market through lead farmers, as a way to overcome local producers' organizations weaknesses. Finally, the project increased government attention on the agricultural sector and fed relevant national policies on agricultural and tourism development, with good prospects for the sustainability of its achievement. For the above reasons, sustainability prospects are good, but, in most cases, dependent on government's subsidies.

63. Nonetheless, CLISSA's performance was negatively affected by three main issues, namely: weak targeting strategy and related limited outreach, failure in facilitating access to financial market and M&E and knowledge management systems inadequate to fully capture outcomes and impacts. The self-targeting approach adopted by the project failed in mobilizing the intended number of beneficiaries and involving the most disadvantaged groups, particularly women-headed households. Difficulties faced in operationalizing the M&E system hampered the data collection and limited the assessment of project's impacts. The lack of a dedicated knowledge management officer within the project led to poor knowledge capture, notwithstanding some important results achieved. With reference to the rural finance component, the project did not improve access by the target group to financial services despite the non-lending activities put in place after mid-term.
64. Based on the above, overall project achievement is assessed as *moderately satisfactory (4)*, in line with PMD.

D. Performance of partners

65. **IFAD.** In addition to the MTR mission, IFAD carried out 10 supervision and implementation support missions, about two per year. The missions were described as participatory and allowed interactions with local stakeholders and beneficiaries. Yet, the lack of continuity for the country programme managers and several changes in the missions' composition negatively affected their execution and created delays. Timely and proactive identification of existing problems by IFAD was reported, however, according to the PCR, it was followed up by limited guidance provided on how to implement recommendations. It is reported that IFAD did not fully understand the support required by the PMU especially at start-up after two decades of lack of IFAD's supported interventions in the country. Specifically, assistance provided to PMU staff, particularly in fiduciary aspects and M&E, was reported to be appropriate but not timely provided with negative implications on project's implementation, especially during the first years. Based on the above, the rating of IFAD's performance is *moderately satisfactory (4)*, in agreement with the PCR.
66. **Government.** The following are the main aspects reported by the PCR where the Government's performance were suboptimal: (i) underperformance of the two key government institutions (i.e. SAA and SFA) both in terms of capacities as well as limited participation especially during the first two years; (ii) weaknesses in organizing and supporting meetings of the technical working groups and steering committee; and (iii) low level of co-financing vis-à-vis MTR's revised targets.²⁷

²⁷ Equal to US\$228.69 equal to 13 per cent of MTR target (i.e. US\$954,000). However, government's cofinancing is equal to 81 per cent of the appraisal target (i.e. US\$282,000).

67. With regards to the **PMU** performance, several issues are highlighted in the PCR, including: (i) high staff turnover and understaffing; (ii) delays in submitting required documents; and (iii) limited capacity especially for M&E and fiduciary aspect (as mentioned above). Overall, government's performance is rated moderately *unsatisfactory* (3), in line with PMD.

III. Assessment of PCR quality

68. **Scope.** The PCR contains all chapters, sections and annexes outlined in the 2015 Guidelines for Project Completion Review except for annex 9 RIMS data – available in a separate file. PCR scope is considered *satisfactory* (5).
69. **Quality.** The PCR, prepared in 2019, was more focused on outputs than outcomes and impacts, particularly for certain sections. However, as acknowledged in the PCR itself, this was mainly due to the weaknesses of the CLISSA M&E and knowledge management system as well as the lack of reliability of outcome survey. Outcomes of the stakeholder workshops were reported in annex 9 but the final wrap-up did not take place due to the absence of key government officials. The rating by the PCRV is *moderately satisfactory* (4).
70. **Lessons.** A set of lessons is presented in the PCR (see Section V) which comprehensively refer to CLISSA's set of activities, its approach and its implementation. The lessons are clearly presented and linked to specific recommendations for IFAD and the Government. The rating by the PCRV is *satisfactory* (5).
71. **Candour.** PCR narrative is objective and reports both negative as well as positive results. This PCRV rates the candour for the PCR as *highly satisfactory* (6).
72. Based on the above, the **overall rating** of the PCR quality is *satisfactory* (5).

IV. Lessons learned

73. The following key lessons can be gleaned from the PCR and its validation:
- i. The two main challenges affecting the design and the implementation of projects in small islands relate to weak local institutions and high implementation costs. CLISSA implementation was negatively affected by the limited capacities of local service providers as well as weak producers' groups. Farmer organizations are generally given a prominent role in IFAD's interventions in the continent. However, the success of this approach depends on their degree of representativeness, a solid organizational structure and the level of trust among members. This was not the case of Seychelles, where alternative and less common arrangements were to be found during implementation;
 - ii. Self-targeting approach not accompanied by participatory assessment tools and specific mechanisms adapted to the most vulnerable groups is likely to fail to reach and mobilize the intended beneficiaries;
 - iii. Collaboration with private sector service providers needs to be clearly defined in order to ensure high quality standards and timely delivery. Two tools recommended by the PCR are performance-based contracts and memorandum of understanding;
 - iv. Promotion of backyard gardening is an important entry point to support the domestic production capacity in a small island developing state, particularly for its potential in urban and peri-urban areas; and
 - v. The lack of a dedicated knowledge management expert in the PMU was a missed opportunity to capture, document and share project's achievements with potential partners and other IFAD's beneficiaries within and outside the country.

Definition and rating of the evaluation criteria used by IOE

Criteria	Definition *	Mandatory	To be rated
Rural poverty impact	Impact is defined as the changes that have occurred or are expected to occur in the lives of the rural poor (whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended) as a result of development interventions.	X	Yes
	<i>Four impact domains</i>		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Household income and net assets: Household income provides a means of assessing the flow of economic benefits accruing to an individual or group, whereas assets relate to a stock of accumulated items of economic value. The analysis must include an assessment of trends in equality over time. 		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Human and social capital and empowerment: Human and social capital and empowerment include an assessment of the changes that have occurred in the empowerment of individuals, the quality of grass-roots organizations and institutions, the poor's individual and collective capacity, and in particular, the extent to which specific groups such as youth are included or excluded from the development process. 		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Food security and agricultural productivity: Changes in food security relate to availability, stability, affordability and access to food and stability of access, whereas changes in agricultural productivity are measured in terms of yields; nutrition relates to the nutritional value of food and child malnutrition. 		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Institutions and policies: The criterion relating to institutions and policies is designed to assess changes in the quality and performance of institutions, policies and the regulatory framework that influence the lives of the poor. 		No
Project performance	Project performance is an average of the ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.	X	Yes
Relevance	The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, institutional priorities and partner and donor policies. It also entails an assessment of project design and coherence in achieving its objectives. An assessment should also be made of whether objectives and design address inequality, for example, by assessing the relevance of targeting strategies adopted.	X	Yes
Effectiveness	The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.	X	Yes
Efficiency	A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results.	X	Yes
Sustainability of benefits	The likely continuation of net benefits from a development intervention beyond the phase of external funding support. It also includes an assessment of the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the project's life.	X	Yes
Other performance criteria			
Gender equality and women's empowerment	The extent to which IFAD interventions have contributed to better gender equality and women's empowerment, for example, in terms of women's access to and ownership of assets, resources and services; participation in decision making; workload balance and impact on women's incomes, nutrition and livelihoods.	X	Yes
Innovation	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have introduced innovative approaches to rural poverty reduction.	X	Yes
Scaling up	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have been (or are likely to be) scaled up by government authorities, donor organizations, the private sector and other agencies.	X	Yes
Environment and natural resources management	The extent to which IFAD development interventions contribute to resilient livelihoods and ecosystems. The focus is on the use and management of the natural environment, including natural resources defined as raw materials used for socio-economic and cultural purposes, and ecosystems and biodiversity - with the goods and services they provide.	X	Yes
Adaptation to climate change	The contribution of the project to reducing the negative impacts of climate change through dedicated adaptation or risk reduction measures	X	Yes

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Definition *</i>	<i>Mandatory</i>	<i>To be rated</i>
Overall project achievement	This provides an overarching assessment of the intervention, drawing upon the analysis and ratings for rural poverty impact, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, gender equality and women's empowerment, innovation and scaling up, as well as environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change.	X	Yes
Performance of partners			
• IFAD	This criterion assesses the contribution of partners to project design, execution, monitoring and reporting, supervision and implementation support, and evaluation. The performance of each partner will be assessed on an individual basis with a view to the partner's expected role and responsibility in the project life cycle.	X	Yes
• Government		X	Yes

* These definitions build on the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management; the Methodological Framework for Project Evaluation agreed with the Evaluation Committee in September 2003; the first edition of the Evaluation Manual discussed with the Evaluation Committee in December 2008; and further discussions with the Evaluation Committee in November 2010 on IOE's evaluation criteria and key questions.

Rating comparison

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Programme Management Department (PMD) rating</i>	<i>IOE Project Completion Report Validation (PCR) rating</i>	<i>Net rating disconnect (PCR-PMD)</i>
Rural poverty impact	3	3	0
Project performance			
Relevance	3	3	0
Effectiveness	4	4	0
Efficiency	4	4	0
Sustainability of benefits	4	4	0
Project performance^b			0
Other performance criteria			
Gender equality and women's empowerment	3	3	0
Innovation	5	5	0
Scaling up	4	5	+1
Environment and natural resources management	4	4	0
Adaptation to climate change	4	4	0
Overall project achievement^c	4	4	0
Performance of partners^d			
IFAD	4	4	0
Government	3	3	0
Average net disconnect			+0.08

^a Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable.

^b Arithmetic average of ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.

^c This is not an average of ratings of individual evaluation criteria but an overarching assessment of the project, drawing upon the rating for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, rural poverty impact, gender, innovation and scaling up, environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change.

^d The rating for partners' performance is not a component of the overall project achievement rating.

Ratings of the project completion report quality

	<i>PMD rating</i>	<i>IOE PCR rating</i>	<i>Net disconnect</i>
Candour		6	
Lessons		5	
Quality (methods, data, participatory process)		4	
Scope		5	
Overall rating of the project completion report		5	

Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable.

Delivery of main outputs

<i>Activity</i>	<i>End target</i>	<i>Cumulative results</i>	<i>Cumulative results (%)</i>
Percentage of persons/ households reporting adoption of new/improved inputs, technologies or practices:			
Market oriented small farmers	50	70	140
Backyard gardeners	40	0	0
Artisanal fishers	50	69	138
Total persons trained in crop	3200	915	27
Total persons trained in fishery	532	915	172
Number of persons trained in income-generating activities or business management	261	181	69
Number of PPPPs brokered	10	7	70
Capacity building of banks and non-financial stakeholders	10	10	100
Staff of financial institutions trained	4	26	650
Market oriented smallholder farmers with access to water throughout the year	261	212	81
Public service institutions strengthened	12	8	67
Staff of service providers trained	60	127	212
Productive infrastructure constructed/rehabilitated:			
Dams	10	5	50
Irrigation scheme	4	7	175
Storage facilities constructed/rehabilitated	6	6	100
Ha of Farmland under water-related infrastructure constructed/rehabilitated	261	212	81

Source: CLISSA PCR, Annex 1.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

CLISSA	Competitive Local Innovations for Small-Scale Agriculture Project
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
MFA	Ministry of Fisheries and Agriculture
MNRI	Ministry of Natural Resources and Industry
MTR	Mid-term review
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
PCR	Project Completion Report
PCRV	Project Completion Report Validation
PMD	Programme Management Department
PMU	Project Management Unit
RIMS	Results and Impact Management System
SAA	Seychelles Agriculture Agency
SCR	Seychelles Rupee
SFA	Seychelles Fishing Authority

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IFAD's Operational Results Management System was also consulted.