

Project Completion Report Validation

Smallholder Livelihood Development Project in Eastern Indonesia

Republic of Indonesia

Date of validation by IOE: December 2019

I. Basic project data

			Approval (US\$ m)		Actual (US\$ m)	
Region	Asia and the Pacific	Total project costs	65.00		58.14	
Country	Republic of Indonesia	IFAD loan and percentage of total	49.11	75.6%	47.15	81.1%
IFAD loan number	L-I-835-ID	IFAD grant	1.08	1.6%	0.99	1.7%
IFAD grant number	G-I-C-835_ID					
Type of project (subsector)	Rural development					
Financing type	Loan and grant	Borrower (Indonesian Government)	14.81	22.8%	10.0	17.2%
Lending terms (IFAD loan)	Intermediate terms	N/A				
Date of approval	11.05.2011	N/A				
Date of loan signature	05.07.2011	Beneficiaries				
Date of effectiveness	05.07.2011	Other sources (N/A)				
Loan amendments	February 2017 August 2017	Number of beneficiaries	33 600		26 907	
Loan closure extensions	None	Project completion date			31.01.2019	
Country programme managers	Ivan Cossio Cortez Ronald Hartmann	Financing closing date			31.07.2019	
Regional director(s)	Nigel Brett (current) Hoonae Kim	Mid-term review			June 2014	
Project completion report reviewer	Ernst Schaltegger	IFAD loan disbursement at project completion (%)			96	
PCRV quality control panel	F. Felloni	Date of the project completion report			30.07.2019	

Sources: Financing Agreement (2011), Project Completion Report (2019)

** Ordinary loan terms: interest is borne on the principal amount outstanding at the IFAD reference interest rate as determined semi-annually by the Executive Board. Ordinary loans have a maturity period of 15 to 18 years including a grace period of three. The Government of Indonesia requested an extension of the grace period from three to five years, consistent with the length of the project implementation period.

II. Project outline

1. **Introduction.** The Smallholder Livelihood Development Project in Eastern Indonesia (SOLID) was approved by IFAD's Executive Board in May 2011. Total project financing was US\$65.0 million, funded by an IFAD loan of US\$49.11 million, an IFAD grant of US\$1.08 million and a contribution by the Government of Indonesia of US\$14.81 million. The project financing agreement was signed on 5 July 2011, with project implementation starting thereafter. The project completion date was 31 January 2019.¹
2. **Project area.** In the period prior to 2010, the eastern provinces of Maluku and North Maluku had been relatively neglected in terms of effective support for agriculturally-based development, despite having a rich natural resources base. The project area was dispersed over two provinces, a dozen major and a big number of smaller islands, East of the Molucca Sea, in an area of over one million square kilometres. Conflicts in Maluku and North Maluku during the period 1999-2003 have had a major effect on the economic prosperity and livelihoods of people in these areas. The combined economy of Maluku and North Maluku contracted by approximately 30 per cent in real terms. A share of 28 per cent of the population in Maluku was living below the poverty line in 2009 and 10 per cent in North Maluku with high level of unemployment and cereal deficit, due to a lack of access to various forms of human, physical, financial, natural, and social capital.²
3. The project targeted a total of 11 districts, five in Maluku and six in North Maluku. The target group of the project included a total of around 49,500 farm households as direct beneficiaries belonging to the Self-Help Groups (SHGs) and Federations. Additional poor or very poor households were expected to benefit from the project's investments in productive rural infrastructure and natural resource management.
4. **Project context.** The causes of poverty in Maluku and North Maluku can be summarised as: (i) a lack of income, employment and business opportunities and at times a shortage of food; (ii) a lack of access to good quality services: health, education, water and sanitation; (iii) a lack of formalised land rights; and (iv) in some places a deteriorating environment and lack of access to natural resources; (v) the violent conflicts a decade ago; and (vi) a lack of participation by the population in local planning and in prioritising development priorities. These causes can be summarised as a lack of access to various forms of human, physical, financial, natural, and social capital.
5. **Project objective and components.** The objective of the project was to improve the livelihoods (incomes and food security) and reduce the incidence of poverty for people in the targeted villages in the two provinces. On the basis of the priorities identified by the potential members of the target groups during the social assessment, by the provincial and district governments and by the villagers during the Design Mission's field work, the project had the following components: (i) Community Empowerment; (ii) Productivity Improvement and Integrated Farming Systems; (iii) Value Chain Development and Marketing; and (iv) Productive Rural Infrastructure Investment; and (v) Institutional Strengthening and Project Management. Capacity building and gender mainstreaming was an integral part of all activities. Component costs and percentages of the total cost at appraisal are shown in Table 2.
6. **Target group and targeting.** The targeting strategy used a participatory approach in the selection of an estimated 49,500 households in the target villages using a gender-sensitive poverty and livelihood analysis e.g. participatory wealth ranking, identification of common interests etc. The criteria for selecting the sub-districts and

¹ IFAD. Indonesia, Smallholder Livelihood Development Project in Eastern Indonesia, Project Completion Report, Rome, 30.07.2019.

² IFAD. Republic of Indonesia, Smallholder Livelihood Development Project in Eastern Indonesia, Project Design Report, Rome, May 2012.

villages for participation in the project included: (i) exclusion of all urban villages and urban sub-districts; (ii) incidence of poverty >20 per cent; (iii) potential for agricultural productivity and livelihoods improvement and rural poverty reduction; (iv) commitment from the local government to participate in the project; (v) availability of providers of rural serves (public, private and/or NGOs) with the capacity to deliver the services to the target groups; (vi) accessibility with a maximum journey time from the district or sub-district HQ of around four hours; and (vii) availability of a district agricultural office and/or office of food security at the sub-district level.

7. **Financing.** Total project cost was US\$65.00 million, whereby the appraisal estimate of the share of the Government of Indonesia was 22.8 per cent (Table 1). Table 2 exhibits component costs at appraisal and at the time of the Project Completion Report (PCR). The latter contains only scant and contradictory information of actual component cost at project completion. While total project cost is given as US\$58.14 million in Table 1, the same is only US\$46 million in Table 2. The PCR does not explain this discrepancy. The Programme Management Department (PMD) comments infer that these differences are due to exchange rate fluctuations between SDR and USD, and by the project cost that were incurred in Indonesian Rupiah. These differences are considerable, however. With the PMD comments at hand, it is still not possible to display consistent per components costs at project completion (Table 2).

Table 1

Project costs (in US\$ million)

	<i>Approval (1)</i>	<i>% of total</i>	<i>Actual (2) *</i>	<i>% of total</i>	<i>Disbursement rate (2/1) *</i>
IFAD loan	49.110	75.6%	47.140	81.1%	96%
IFAD grant	1.080	1.6%	0,990	1.7%	92%
Government	14.810	22.8%	10.000	17.2%	67.6%
Total	65.000	100%	58.140	100%	89.4%

Table 2

Component costs (in US\$ million)

	<i>Approval (1)</i>	<i>% of total</i>	<i>Actual (2) *</i>	<i>% of total</i>	<i>Disbursement rate (2/1) *</i>
Component 1	12.809	20%	9.000	20%	70%
Component 2	6.130	9%	4.000	9%	65%
Component 3	17.989	28%	9.000	20%	50%
Component 4	9.181	14%	19.000	41%	207%
Component 5	15.935	25%	3.000	7%	19%
Price contingencies	2.957	4%			
Total	65.001	100%	46.000	97%	70%

Sources: (1) Project Design Report (2012), (2) Project Completion Report (2019).

8. **Implementation arrangements.** SOLID's main implementing agency was the Agency for Food Security of Ministry of Agriculture. At the national level, the National Project Management Office (NPMO) was responsible for guiding overall project implementation and providing management support. A project steering committee was formed and expected to provide project oversight and coordination. The project steering committee rarely met and was largely ineffective. The Provincial Project

Management Offices and District Project Implementation Units in both Maluku and North Maluku were responsible for project implementation activities at the district and village levels. The Project staff was comprised of a mix of government officials under the line Ministry, teams of consultants, NGOs and individual specialists. SOLID availed of community driven participatory planning processes leading to formation of SHGs that were then supported to plan and manage their key factors of production, notably land and finance.

9. **Intervention logic.** The PCR goes at some length in looking at the internal logic of SOLID. While the original design addressed issues of gender equity and empowerment, food security, agriculture productivity, and value chain engagement, it also contained significant elements of natural resource management, community infrastructure, forestry and fisheries. As a post-conflict area, at the time of design, there was a broad range of needs at village level and limited social cohesion. The PCR underlines the fact that the original design was internally synergistic, as each component complemented and supported the others in achievement of objectives. The assessment of relevance will look at the relevance of objectives and design in more detail.
10. **Theory of change.** While the Project Design Document does not contain a theory of change, the PCR states: *"the overall premise of the project was to develop a replicable approach to improving livelihoods in remote communities in Maluku and North Maluku. The theory of change underlying the project was to address the constraints of smallholder farmers, including access to technology, inputs and markets, in order to improve the competitiveness of smallholder agriculture and growth of the agricultural sector. This would lead to sustainable increases in farm incomes and improved household food security. The adoption of a community empowerment and participatory development approach would also contribute to ensure the long-term sustainability of SOLID interventions."*
11. **Delivery of outputs.** The most comprehensive information of the delivery of outputs can be found in Annex 9 of the PCR, for the Components 1 to 3,³ in connection with the related outcome (objective) indicators. Both types of indicators refer to the mid-term review (MTR)-adjusted logframe. They are analysed in the section on effectiveness.
12. **Changes and developments during implementation.** The report of the second supervision mission of July 2013⁴ considered the need for clear support and direction from IFAD on orientating the project towards the value chain approach envisaged in the project design. It recommended IFAD to consider advancing the MTR to November 2013 to simplify the project design and clarify the project implementation approach related to value chain development.
13. The MTR of 2014⁵ was indeed a turning point for significant changes in project design and implementation arrangements. At MTR, 16.4 per cent of IFAD loan funds, 24 per cent of IFAD grant funds and 33.4 per cent of government's funding has been spent. Under the review of relevance, this PCR will look into more detail of these changes and the underlying reasons.

III. Review of findings

A. Core criteria

14. As the review of findings critically depends on credible information, mostly thanks to comprehensive, coherent and irrefutable data in the PCR, two caveats need to be made here. First, the PCR does not display detailed information on actual costs per

³ The MTR has recommended to eliminate Component 4 (Productive Rural Infrastructure Investment).

⁴ IFAD. Republic of Indonesia, Smallholder Livelihood Development Project in Eastern Indonesia. Supervision report, Rome, 24 July 2013.

⁵ IFAD. Indonesia, Smallholder Livelihood Development Project in Eastern Indonesia (SOLID), Mid-term review report, Rome, 31 December 2014.

component at project completion (Paragraph 7 and Table 2). This is in contrast with other parts of the PCR, for instance the painstaking recalculation of several crop budgets for reassessing the internal rate of return of the project. Second, the PCR is displaying two rating tables that differ substantially, notably in terms of project performance. The first table is found in the initial section "Project a Glance", which is designated as the correct one in the PMD comments. This PCR will consequently rely on this project rating table. Thanks to the PMD comments, it is now possible to ascertain that the MTR reduced the number of target households from 49,500 to 40,350, of which 33,600 households directly benefitting from the project. The above means that the review of findings must be taken with some caution when relying on quantitative evidence.

Relevance

15. **Relevance of objectives.** SOLID's development objective was to improve livelihoods (both food security and income) and to reduce the incidence of poverty. The project sought to achieve these objectives by: (i) strengthening village institutions, self-help groups and federations; (ii) improve sustainable smallholder production systems and low levels of purchased inputs; (iii) improve post-harvest practices and aggregation of produce; (iv) introduce a value chain and market strategy for targeted commodities; (v) improve small-scale infrastructure and ensure sustainability through local ownership.
16. While the project development objective was certainly a pertinent response to the prevailing poverty situation in both provinces, the chosen design was ambitious. It was not adapted to the complexity of the project area with its communication and logistical challenges. In complex project settings, with visible post-conflict symptoms, simplicity in design and implementation layout would have been less risky.
17. **Adequacy of project design.** According to the PCR, the initial design was mostly consistent with the needs of the target groups and aligned to IFAD and Government policies, and the design remained relevant until project completion. In particular, SOLID was relevant in providing support for the achievement of 6 of 11 priorities outlined in the Government's Medium-Term Development Plan for 2010-2014 and was fully aligned with the 2010-2014 National Medium-Term Priority Framework for Agriculture, which focused on the revitalisation of the agricultural sector to increase competitiveness in the national and global economies. Similarly, SOLID was aligned with the 2016-2019 IFAD Country Strategic Opportunities Programme, which includes strategic objectives of: (i) assisting small scale producers to participate in remunerative markets; (ii) making small scale producers and their families more resilient to risks; and (iii) making rural institutions more responsive to small scale producer needs.
18. However, a re-design of the SOLID Project was considered necessary at MTR to improve its likelihood of achieving its goal and objectives, as the design lacked some elements of practicality, which militated against initial success. The MTR is critical in assessing the coherence of SOLID, and unlike the PCR qualifying the project "*internally synergistic*", as cited in Paragraph 9 above, the MTR is clear about one point: "*one of the main problems (with all project components) has been the delinked nature of each component, from a comprehensive and cohesive whole with inter-component complementary to a situation where each component has tended to be implemented on a stand-alone, mini-project basis. Conclusion - limited measured output.*" The core statement of MTR is: "*Perhaps the most significant issue in the original design of SOLID was the conceptual weakness of trying to engage poor, food insecure villagers directly in value chain activities without adequately addressing the key issue for beneficiaries – i.e. their food insecurity.*"
19. **Project adjustments during implementation.** The above must have been a major driving force for relatively far-reaching changes after the MTR (Paragraph 12). The PCR keeps track of these changes:

- A reduced scope with less total beneficiaries, from 49,500 down to 40,350.
 - The removal of the productive rural infrastructure component.
 - A greater focus on food production and marketing.
 - The value chain focus was reduced to three predominant estate crops (coconut, cacao and nutmeg).
 - Federation roles were re-focused to sustaining market linkages and to ensure sustainable funding of maintaining pre-MTR infrastructure.
 - Regarding project management, the simplification of project structure the structure of the Project; a focus on requirements to implement the major activities being funded; and a revision of the staffing structure by focusing more resources at the district and village levels and formation of a project management team at national level.
 - Reallocation of project funds, responding to demand-driven beneficiary needs spent at the community level.
20. The extensive re-adjustments at MTR are indicative that the design relevance of SOLID was less than perfectly adapted to reality. Consequently, the PCR rating of relevance is *moderately satisfactory (4)*, at par with the PMD rating.

Effectiveness

21. Paragraph 14 relates to the total number of beneficiary households of 49,500 at appraisal, which at MTR were reduced to 40,350. The PCR mentions a revised target of 33,600 direct beneficiaries after MTR, of which 26,907 or 80 per cent were reached at project completion
22. As indicated in Paragraph 11, information on *the delivery of outputs* is scarce, which makes it more difficult to build an evidence-based case for project effectiveness. The mission aide-memoire in Annex 9 of the PCR contains comparisons between targets and actual values in for outcome and output indicators.
23. **Objective 1: Communities with enhanced capacity for household food security and agriculture income planning.** The PCR indicates the number of SHGs re-oriented or trained in participatory rural appraisal and group management, which reaches 98 per cent of the MTR target. At output level, related to the indicator measuring human and financial group capability, the results obtained appear to be very good: 50 per cent of SHGs are assessed as very good, 44 per cent as good, and 6 per cent as poor, based on annual outcome surveys (AOS). On the other hand, the indicator specific to the groups' capacity of planning and implementing their production and post-harvest activities is measured by trends in individual household assets, which substantially increased. This indicator may not have been the most pertinent choice for measuring group capabilities.
24. **Objective 2: Productivity Improvement and Integrated Farming Systems.** The two outcome indicators referring to household food security and sales of produce to the market have been complied with in accordance with the PCR. 85 per cent of SOLID households are reported to be fully food-secure, compared with 74 per cent of non-SOLID households (control group), at project completion. Cropping patterns changed to "market ready" cash crops and had the effect that 90 per cent of households were regularly engaged with the market.
25. The results reached in the reduction of child stunting are remarkable, as measured by an output indicator. At project completion, 6 per cent of under 5 years are reported as stunted versus 61 per cent at pre-SOLID times, including 60 per cent with severe stunting. SOLID-household income increased in real terms by 81 per cent compared to baseline values. The average per capita income of SOLID respondents in 2018 was 7 per cent higher than non-SOLID respondents, a comparison inferring also income growth in control groups. The PCR notes that this achievement was due to an

expansion in cropping areas and an increase in area productivities. The comparison with non-SOLID household yields obtained infers visible differences in area productivities.

26. **Objective 3: Value Chain Development and Marketing.** The SOLID MTR reduced the range of estate crops down to the three main tree crop products – cacao, copra and nutmeg. The MTR also moved the value chain development of food crops to Component 2 (see above). This was to endeavour to integrate production and local/short value chains into one “farming and value chain system”.
27. Due to a lack of disaggregation in AOS data, the outcome indicator, which is referring to the mentioned tree crops, does not display specific income data. Likewise, out of the three output indicators, only the one regarding the completion of three value chain studies according to international standards has been met. The direct involvement of growers in value chain development has not been substantiated. Federations failed to actively support growers via links to traders and other value chain players and/or adding value to the three selected estate crops. These are factors that further justify, in hindsight, the re-dimensioning of Component 3 at MTR. This resolute move has produced a stronger focus of SOLID on food security and food-security relevant short value chains. At completion, 80 per cent of the MTR targets in terms of direct beneficiaries were attained.
28. Given the above, the PCR rating for effectiveness is *satisfactory (5)*, in alignment to the PMD rating.

Efficiency

29. The effectiveness lag of SOLID was two months only. The Indonesia Country Strategy and Programme Evaluation of 2016⁶ displays an average time between loan approval and loan effectiveness of 17 months, which is higher than the IFAD average of 14.5 months, and the Asia and Pacific regional average of 11.4 months reported in the evaluation of IFAD’s regional strategy (EVEREST).
30. **Project management costs.** Due to the scant and contradictory information on actual component cost at project completion (Paragraph 7 and Table 2 above), actual project management costs cannot be calculated. Table 2 infers that, out of an appraisal estimate of US\$15.935 million for Component 5, only US\$3 million were spent. This appears to be improbable, considering a total disbursement rate of the IFAD loan of 96 per cent (Chapter I).
31. **Total project cost per beneficiary household.** Although being a very general ratio because of the aggregate nature of the numerator and denominator used, it may be indicative of the outreach generated by cost unit. With the actual total project costs and the actual direct beneficiaries indicated in Chapter I, the per household project cost is US\$1.957. This is on the higher side in IFAD operations, but not untypical in dispersed project areas with communication and logistical challenges.
32. **Economic rate of return.** The PCR goes at some length in revisiting the cost-benefit analysis at appraisal. Despite the actual total of direct beneficiary households being smaller than the revised MTR target (26,970 instead of 33,600), the PCR reports an overall economic return rate of 41 per cent, and a financial return rate of 58 per cent, with benefit-cost ratios in the positive in all cases, even under lower prices assumed in sensitivity analyses. This is above appraisal estimates but not implausible, considering that cropping areas have been expanded over project life, and area productivities increased (Paragraph 25). It is also possible that the inclusion of collateral benefits, such as improved quality of life and of children’s health, as indicated in the PCR, has contributed to these results inferring the efficiency of project investments.

⁶ IFAD. Republic of Indonesia, Country programme evaluation, Rome, 21-22 September 2016.

33. The PCR rates efficiency as moderately unsatisfactory, mainly due to the sluggish three first project years. This PCRV weighs the short effectiveness lag and the high internal return rates achieved, on the positive side, against the lacking evidence related to per-component and project management costs and the relatively high per-beneficiary costs, on the down side. The IOE rating for efficiency is *moderately satisfactory (4)*, one point higher than the APR/PMD rating of moderately unsatisfactory (3).

Rural poverty impact

34. Data used in the PCR in support of the project's claims of rural poverty impact are taken from two sources, namely the Result and Impact Management System and AOS surveys. In many instances, the information from the AOS also displays data of non-SOLID households, i.e. control groups. This is commendable because it makes project attribution of impacts more plausible.
35. **Household incomes and assets.** The PCR shows that there was a 17 per cent increase in ownership index of SOLID beneficiary household assets compared to the baseline survey. The asset ownership index of SOLID beneficiary villages was 11 per cent greater than that of non-SOLID villages. It is fair to conclude, even without variance analysis - which would have been easy to perform - that household asset ownership was partly driven by the project.
36. The accumulation of household assets is a consequence of increased household incomes. The PCR makes the case that this was driven by growing sales of agricultural products, with at least 90 per cent of SOLID households selling crops at project completion. To achieve this, they have increased total output, by area expansion, improved yields and changed cropping patterns to include more saleable vegetables. The logframe target of increased income of 30 per cent has been exceeded, with an achievement of a 54 per cent increase, in real terms, since the MTR.
37. **Food security and agricultural productivity.** The PCR exhibits the results of the 2018 impact study that indicates an important reduction in child stunting rates, with 61 per cent of children stunted or severely stunted in 2012, down to only 6 per cent in 2018. In comparison, stunting rates for non-SOLID households in 2018 were estimated at around 19 per cent. This appears to be a substantial achievement, considering that child stunting is not only the result of deficient food intake, but much more a consequence of a lack of environmental hygiene.
38. The final impact survey, cited by the PCR, delivered relevant data on the duration of food shortages, and access to, and utilization and stability of food supply. Under all these criteria, SOLID households performed better than household of the control group. In 2016, 39 per cent of SOLID household were subject to food shortages of two weeks, against 47 per cent of non-SOLID households with more than three weeks of food shortages. The PCR identifies the increased income as the main driver for improved access to food, citing anecdotal evidence, which seemed to confirm that farmers who had switched to non-staple food production for sale had no difficulty in obtaining their family food requirements through cash transactions.
39. Food utilization in SOLID households also saw a shift to considerably more vegetable consumption, with a concomitant decrease of rice consumption over project life. In non-SOLID households, rice consumption remained high, and vegetable consumption only increased at a third of the pace observed in SOLID households. The higher household asset endowment of project-supported beneficiary groups contributed to food supply stability.
40. **Human and social capital and empowerment.** The 2018 impact survey reports that 75 per cent of the respondents stated that SOLID provided them with a large or very large improvement in their capacity to exploit economic opportunities and develop stronger relationships with markets and external partners. As for social capital, the same source reports that 81 per cent of the respondents found that SOLID

provided them with a large or very large improvement in their capacity for better social interaction, and 79 per cent in empowering them in sharing knowledge with those who hold social authority. It also revealed that 82 per cent perceived that SOLID empowered them to negotiate more effectively to improve their lives.

41. The PCR also includes some critical remarks about social capital, namely:
 - a. Most members of SHGs market their produce individually, and this both increases the costs of marketing (ultimately borne by the farmer), and reduces efficiency of market access;
 - b. There is some evidence of elite capture, especially within given federations, where some members and leaders have unequal access to benefits; and,
 - c. Progress in building effective and trusted relationships in value chains for farmers' products is much slower than required, in part because of the reluctance of government extension workers (PPLs) to foster and facilitate engagement with brokers, middlemen and traders, due to their belief that these entities have interests adversarial to farmers.
42. **Institutions and policies.** The PCR states that there has been some important progress in institutional development. The 2018 impact survey reports that in aggregate, the majority of respondents valued the impact of SOLID activities on institutional and service improvement positively. Some 45 per cent reported the impact to be large, and 16 per cent said it was very large.
43. On the other side, the PCR does not hide the fact that there have been several less than expected outcomes in institutional development. Firstly, cohesion between PPLs and village facilitators (VFs) has been a relative weakness of SOLID. There has not been close cooperation between the permanently employed PPLs and the VFs, despite their commonality of purpose. This meant that village institutions have not realised their full potential, especially in sustainable economic activities on behalf of their members. Secondly, there is no significant evidence that there has been any systematic effort to engender improved natural resources management. Thirdly, little or no evidence has been presented to demonstrate that villages and community organisations are actually contributing to and paying for maintenance of improved infrastructure.
44. In view of the tangible impacts reported in terms of household income and assets as well as food security, against limited evidence on the formation of social capital and SOLID's bearing on institutions and policies, this PCR rates the overall rural poverty impact of SOLID as *moderately satisfactory (4)*. This is in agreement with the rating provided by PMD.

Sustainability of benefits

45. **Financial and economic sustainability.** According to the PCR, a central factor in economic and financial sustainability is the apparent financial viability of most investments supported by SOLID, as shown in the economic and financial analyses. This tends to provide all stakeholders with a strong motivation to continue operations and activities in the post-project scenario. On the other hand, the general sustainability of SOLID investments is weakened by the lack of consistent support from district mayors and local governments in committing greater local government investment in post-closure SOLID.
46. **Exit strategies.** The PCR does mention *exit strategies*, which were explicitly included in the Project Design Report (Paragraphs 361-363) and also proposed in the IFAD supervision report of April 2018, which remarked that exit strategies were lacking at that moment.⁷ The PCR mentions, in its Paragraph 216, that SOLID only made

⁷ IFAD. Republic of Indonesia, Smallholder Livelihood Development Project in Eastern Indonesia Supervision report, Rome, June 2018.

recommendations with regards to exit strategies in its draft PCR. This suggests that they were not (yet) effectively in place.

47. **Community engagement, participation and ownership.** The PCR is relatively critical on the prospects of sustainability with regards to community performance. While each of the 224 villages have formed a federation, basic institutional documents to guide the management and running of these federations are lacking. Furthermore, while tree crop product processing was undertaken as a group (SHG), marketing was mixed between individuals and SHGs. Marketing by a federation was the exception unless there was some value adding dimension undertaken by a federation. In these situations, although nominally members of the federation, SHG members had little understanding of the financial aspects of "their" federation. Federations and business groups which are engaged in value adding to tree crop products do so with enthusiasm and energy but an equally notable lack of business acumen. Financial management (cash flow) and medium-term business planning are weaknesses that seriously undermine sustainability prospects.
48. Another downside flagged by the PCR in this respect is the long-term institutional sustainability of the SHGs and Federations, mainly due to the poor quality of group revolving fund management. While many groups showed strong institutional capacity, strong cohesion, clear group vision and intuitive business planning, more than 50 per cent of them have high rates of outstanding loans. This is compromising their financial sustainability.
49. **Commercial value chain viability.** SOLID has established and operationalised 53 business units and five federations, adding value to SOLID crop outputs. However, the intended business planning has not been undertaken, which greatly undermines sustainability. In addition, SOLID engagement with value chains has been by way of establishment of parallel value chain linkages on farmers' behalf, rather than establishing linkages with local traders. Further undermining this process was the fact that Component 3 funds were disbursed to federations immediately prior to the 2014 MTR.
50. Weighing the tangible impacts obtained in domains such as household income and assets, and food security, which are factors of sustainability, against the weaknesses compromising longer term benefits in e.g. the formation of social capital and institutions and policies, this PCRV rates the sustainability of the benefits of SOLID as *moderately satisfactory (4)*, which is identical to the rating provided by PMD.

B. Other performance criteria

Innovation

51. The President's Report⁸ was explicit on the innovations SOLID was to introduce. It referred to three main innovative features: (i) as part of the project's value chain approach, village federations would handle larger volumes of agricultural products, as required by the market; (ii) quarterly project coordination and consolidation processes were to be introduced to improve operational performance; and (iii) an intensive and strategic approach to capacity-building would be adopted.
52. The MTR did fundamentally re-dimension the array of the first innovation as the village federations were not prepared to handle larger volumes of agricultural products without addressing a major concern of the families, that of food security. The MTR was also critical about the performance of the provincial, district and village coordination mechanisms, which indeed improved thereafter.
53. The PCR highlights in particular that, in the social and technical implementation context, against the backdrop of a fractured village social environment after the inter-religious fighting (1999-2003), SOLID introduced community, agriculture production

⁸ IFAD. Proposed loan and grant to the Republic of Indonesia for the Smallholder Livelihood Development Project in Eastern Indonesia, President's Report, Rome, 10-12 May 2011.

and market linkage activities, which in the context of Maluku and North Maluku, were both innovative and challenging. By using the participatory approach, placing farmers and community at the centre of the project, there was good progress in rebuilding social cohesion. The formation of SHGs with membership that crossed gender and religious lines was central to this.

54. Another innovation considered noteworthy by the PCR was that farmer field schools and demonstration plots being run by agriculture extension workers (PPLs) went from being a difficult-to-grasp concept to an everyday reality in SOLID villages. Introduction of new farm technologies through demonstration plots such as agricultural machinery and equipment for cultivation of food crops, horticulture and estate crops provided a basis for improved farmer performance. It is true that the farmer field schools were not innovative at national or international level at the time of application, but may have been novel in the project area.
55. In view of the above, the PCRV rating for innovation is *moderately satisfactory (4)*, at par with the rating given by PMD.

Scaling up

56. The President's Report expected that, in particular, the project's investment in restructuring selected value chains was innovative and had good potential for scaling up. The MTR has dampened these ambitions and made this investment more modest, but also more tangible in hindsight. The PCR confirms that several good practices of SOLID had the potential of being scaled up. It cites the following: savings and loan activities, the federation activities for processing and marketing (industrial and food processing: coconut oil, virgin coconut oil, cocoa powder, peanut, sago and coconut shell charcoal), demonstration plots in farmer field schools for application of technology used for cultivation of food crops, horticulture and estate crops.
57. As the PCR provides no evidence of such practices having been actually scaled up, or otherwise streamlined, and as no other source is confirming such facts or trends, the PCRV opts for a scaling-up rating of *moderately unsatisfactory (3)*, one point lower than the PMD rating,

Gender equality and women's empowerment

58. **Women's role in general and influence in decision-making.** Both the President's Report and the MTR state and confirm SOLID's project gender targets of including 50 per cent of women in all project activities and 30 per cent of leadership positions in SHGs and Federations held by women. The PCR notes that 90 per cent of the respondents of the final impact survey rated SOLID activities as having a large or very large impact on gender equality in local non-governmental organizations and institutions. The same survey highlighted that women have equal opportunities in determining decisions in the SHG, federations and business centres (96 per cent respondents rated women participation as good or very good), as well as equal opportunities in making decisions in other institutions (93 per cent) and in the decisions making process with regards to village activities (91 per cent).
59. Anecdotal evidence of the impact on gender described in the impact study include the fact that previously illiterate women were taking up book-keeping roles within the SHG and other women becoming cadres within village administration. Nonetheless, the study also revealed that some social restrictions remained, and that it was difficult to attribute these improvements solely to SOLID.
60. The Final impact study examined gender issues from four aspects, namely access, participation, benefits and control.
 - a. Access. The results of the study indicate that both men and women have the same opportunity to get access to their needs. Men and women also have the same opportunity to choose the position they want both in knowledge management (KM), federations and business centres. In addition, men and

women also have the same opportunity to choose the position they want in an organization other than those promoted by SOLID.

- b. Participation. Study results show that men and women have equal opportunities in determining family decisions, in determining decisions in KM, federations and business, in making decisions in other institutions and in determining decisions for carrying out activities in the village.
 - c. Benefits. The data shows that men and women have equal opportunities to use family assets, to use SOLID loan funds, in utilizing SOLID assets / assistance tools, in utilizing other loan funds, and to use facilities in the village.
 - d. Control. Data shows that men and women have the same authority in family decision making, the same authority in decision making in KM, federations and business centres, the same authority in making decisions in other activities, and the same level of control in determining the use of assets.
61. The above infers that gender inclusion and women's empowerment were pursued systematically from the start of SOLID, and that there is evidence of tangible achievements. In agreement with PMD, the PCRV rates this criterion as *satisfactory (5)*.

Environment and natural resources management

62. According to the President's Report and pursuant to IFAD's environmental assessment procedures, the project has been classified as a Category B operation in that it was not likely to have any significant negative environmental impact. The Design Report underlined the fact that the project's main emphasis was on capacity building in poor village and on improved livelihoods and increased incomes by improving product quality and market links and agricultural productivity. The latter involved the use of improved management techniques (e.g. integrated pest management, green manuring, weeding, pruning, use of new varieties through grafting, enrichment planting etc.), but also the extensive use of purchased inputs, either fertilizers, or agricultural chemicals for the control of pests and diseases. The MTR confirmed the essence of this assessment.
63. The PCR makes the case that SOLID's environmental sustainability has been enhanced through:
- a. The switch from shifting to settled agricultural systems;
 - b. The promotion and development of organic agriculture to meet market demand;
 - c. Mangrove planting to prevent sea water erosion in SOLID villages;
 - d. The reduction of pesticide and herbicide use;
 - e. Technical training on compost making at the farm level, and use of compost from cacao waste for vegetable crops;
 - f. Re-plantation and rejuvenation of estate crops; and,
 - g. The shift from small-scale mining to the farming sector after SOLID was introduced.
64. The PCR also identifies some continuing potential environmental hazards. These have a potential for significant negative impact in localised sites, but as yet there has been little actual impact. Some examples of these potential risks are:
- a. The use of inorganic fertilizers in areas vulnerable to excessive run-off and subsequent stream and sea-water contamination; and
 - b. The use of sloping land for crop cultivation, which has the potential to cause excessive soil erosion.
65. As the good practices mentioned above have a considerable aggregate weight, this PCRV rates this evaluation criterion as *satisfactory (5)*, one point higher than the APR/PMD rating of moderately satisfactory (4).

Adaptation to climate change

66. **Climate risk awareness and analysis.** The Project Design Report displays a certain sensitivity to climate change, referring to recent insight, indicating that the most likely impact of climate change in Indonesia would be an increased variability in rainfall with longer drought periods but also an increased intensity of rainfall at other times. Thus, the project should assist in assessing the drought tolerance of varieties of annual crops e.g. upland rice, ground nuts, maize etc. to enable smallholders to mitigate the impact of drought and especially the impact on household food security. An increased reliance of estate crops was a strategy that could help reduce the impact of an increasing incidence of periods of drought, although this could make households less food secure (estate crops are cash crops).
67. The PCR concludes that, on balance, the project has positively impacted on adaptation to climate change, and to some extent, mitigation. Although adaptation to climate change was not an explicit project objective, the project has managed to strengthen the resilience of local communities vis-à-vis climate-related shocks and stresses. Through their increased asset ownership, increased incomes and higher agricultural productivity, SOLID households are more resilient to climate shocks and their potential impacts on food security and poverty.
68. More in technical terms, the project was contributing to adaptation and mitigation, largely as anticipated by the Project Design Report. Through demonstration plots, farmers learned new methodologies and good agricultural practices, for instance effective use of fertilizer and pesticides, and mixed cropping. In some cases, precision and organic agricultural practices are being promoted. Crops such as upland rice, groundnuts and maize have indeed been promoted. Farmers reported also cultivating drought tolerant staple crops such as cassava and sweet potato. Through linking with the International Centre for Tropical Agriculture, the project was also experimenting with raised bed cultivation of improved varieties of cassava for further enhancing drought tolerance.
69. Given the above, the PCRV rates the adaptation to climate change of SOLID as *satisfactory (5)*, one point higher than the APR/PMD rating of moderately satisfactory (4).

Overall project achievement

70. At the end of project life, and without extension of the project completion date, SOLID displays a picture of fair success, despite an initial period of sluggish implementation. The various supervision missions flagged the problems early, but the most significant document in this respect is the MTR report. It rightly pointed to a major conceptual flaw of SOLID: it was unrealistic to bank on full-fledged and "long" value chains in a context of widespread food insecurity, which was moreover embedded in a profound post-conflict situation. The shift of combining value chain pull forces with food security concerns and of simplifying the project architecture, with a concomitant streamlining of project management, was apparently a winning formula.
71. The ensuing strengthening of village-level institutions, i.e. SHGs and federations including VFs, was another successful shift that allowed attaining and exceeding income, productivity and food security targets. Only 80 per cent of the downsized MTR targets regarding beneficiary households were attended. This was compensated by increased cropping areas, higher productivities and a crop mix that had higher market demand. The revisited cost-benefit analyses do suggest that this was indeed the case.
72. The assessments made in this PCRV, often shared with perceptions of the PCR, infer that many evaluation criteria stalled at the lower tier of the satisfactory range of ratings. Consequently, this is also the PCRV rating of the overall project achievement, *moderately satisfactory (4)*, which is identical to the PMD rating.

C. Performance of partners

IFAD

73. **Supervision and implementation support.** Between April 2012 and March 2018, IFAD fielded eight supervision missions, three implementation support missions and the MTR in June 2014, which was on time when considering the project timetable. These 12 interventions over six years generated a supervision and implementation support density of two per year.
74. The essence and extent of the MTR is indicative of how serious IFAD took the underperformance of SOLID in its first three years. The MTR was indeed an exercise looking into the essential why-questions of deficient project progress. In hindsight, the MTR can be considered as the ignition spark for a significantly better project implementation performance – and impact. As Paragraph 70 points out, the main merit of the MTR was to point to a fundamental design flaw of SOLID: the attempt of building demanding value chains in a post-conflict context where widespread food insecurity was rampant. With this manifest turn-around capacity, it is not unreasonable to ask the question below.
75. **Why was it not possible to design SOLID as a conceptually solid project from the start?** The initial design disregarded various, longstanding, lessons from many IFAD projects, such as the existential importance of food security that should not be side-tracked by the prospects of potentially attractive value chains, or the inherent top-down management mechanisms that were finally enriched with village-level organizations and facilitators. Given the fact that many IFAD projects appear to suffer from analogous issues, it may be warranted to systematically look into the underlying causes. The problem seems to converge on unrealistic initial project designs with ensuing implementation delays, which are then remediated at MTR, quite frequently with significant or even spectacular, positive, outcomes.
76. In view of the above sketched combination of initial design weaknesses with intact turn-around capabilities, this PCRV rates IFAD's performance regarding SOLID as *moderately satisfactory (4)*, in accordance with the PMD rating.

Government

77. **Project management.** According to the PCR, government performance was initially inadequate, but it improved over the period of implementation, to the point where it was satisfactory. The provision of counterpart funds and compliance with loan covenants by the government was satisfactory. Also, government was generally responsive to IFAD's recommendations. However, the support from senior management of the Ministry of Agriculture Directorate of Food Availability and Vulnerability to the various project director appointees was inadequate and was not generally proactive during initial years of implementation. There was high turnover of project directors, with a total of four being appointed and subsequently leaving the project after a limited period of service during the first years of implementation. Project management advisers also provided only limited impact. Financial management was lacking at times with the designated project account in Ministry of Finance being overdrawn on three occasions. However, these issues were ultimately addressed when the current project director was appointed after MTR and NPMO management was significantly improved.
78. After the MTR, the project management structure (management and technical) was being re-structured and focusing more resources at the district and village levels. The restructuring enabled reallocation of staff resources to district and village levels and making the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system more relevant and more functional with data analysis for management reporting being completed at district level. The Project Implementation Manual was revised to ensure it addressed all aspects of implementation in sufficient detail. Further, procurement processes were refined to become more functional and timelier, and financial controls strengthened to address the issues raised in the 2013 Audit Report. Finally, a data base on the status

of SHGs and Federations, detailing their activities, savings and loan fund balances, actual membership by gender and quality was established. This was to be an important tool for NPMO staff to plan post MTR activities.

79. **Baseline survey and M&E systems.** The fact that the PCR was able to draw extensively on baseline and impact survey data goes also to the benefit of government performance. The inclusion of control groups (non-SOLID households) has been commended in the section on rural poverty impact. This allowed the PCR to be fairly affirmative regarding the attribution of certain impacts to the effects of SOLID
80. Considering the finally effective M&E system, the adequate reporting, audit compliance, improved procurement procedures and implementation capacity after MTR, this PCR rates government performance related to SOLID as *moderately satisfactory (4)*, identical to the PMD rating.

IV. Assessment of PCR quality

Scope

81. The PCR contains all chapters, sections, and annexes as per the Guidelines for Project Completion Review (2015) and provides substantive and relevant content, barring the exceptions mentioned below. This PCR rates the scope of the PCR as *satisfactory (5)*.

Quality

82. The PCR goes at great lengths in certain aspects, such as the recalculation of the economic internal rate of return and financial internal rate of return including extensive sensitivity analyses. This has, among other factors, produced a very voluminous report of 122 pages. The PCR relied on the Result and Impact Management System, baseline and final impact survey data, which partially also displayed data captured in non-SOLID households. The use of insight from control groups is commended.
83. On the other hand, the PCR does not draw the attention of the reader to the presence of two different PCR rating matrices, which do differ in a number of key ratings, such as relevance, effectiveness and performance of partners. More seriously, the PCR has apparently not attempted to compile the necessary information related to per-component actual project cost, which should have been possible by the project's closing date of 31 July 2019, which coincided with the PCR publication date. Other major discrepancies related to financial data appear in terms of IFAD loan and grant disbursement rates, between the initial part of the PCR and Appendix 3. Final quality control could have avoided such flaws. These penalize a document into which much commitment and expertise has been invested. PCR quality is thus rated as *moderately unsatisfactory (3)*.

Lessons

84. The PCR contains ten main lessons, which can be considered meaningful in view of the quality at entry and the performance of SOLID. The PCR is clear on the need of inclusion of poor farmers, but not the exclusive reliance for poor farmers in value chain-driven projects. In this context, one of the lessons deserves to be mentioned: traders and middlemen are key components of any value chain. They should be encouraged to interact with farmers to build trust and mutual understanding. Coaching and mentoring for agri-business development should be done in partnership with the private sector, through PPP arrangements. This PCR rates the lessons criterion for the PCR as *satisfactory (5)*.

Candour

85. **Narrative objectivity and candour of results reporting.** The PCR narrative is overwhelmingly positive, and rightly so considering the tangible impacts achieved in terms of household incomes, assets and food security variables. The conclusions and recommendations would, however, have gained by underlining that the MTR

considered SOLID as a venture close to a problem project. The three years between effectiveness and the MTR were marred by such underperformance that indeed the period after MTR can be considered as a remarkable turn-around. Consequently, this PCRV rates the candour criterion for the PCR *as only moderately satisfactory (4)*.

V. Final remarks and lessons learned

Lessons learned

86. Key lessons extracted from the PCR comprise the following:
 - a. Widespread poverty and food insecurity, coupled with a post-conflict context, as well as remote areas with communication and logistical challenges, are best addressed with simple project messages and layouts.
 - b. SOLID is an example showing that combining food security concerns with "short value chain" pull factors can generate win-win situations that make a difference.
 - c. Not independent for this lesson is the insight that the driving forces of a project must be where the risks of food insecurity and the opportunities of adding value are felt most: at village level.
 - d. Project management has to follow this logic, not inverting it towards a typically administrative project management mode, where a hierarchical trickle-down paradigm prevails.

Definition and rating of the evaluation criteria used by IOE

Criteria	Definition *	Mandatory	To be rated
Rural poverty impact	Impact is defined as the changes that have occurred or are expected to occur in the lives of the rural poor (whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended) as a result of development interventions.	X	Yes
	<i>Four impact domains</i>		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Household income and net assets: Household income provides a means of assessing the flow of economic benefits accruing to an individual or group, whereas assets relate to a stock of accumulated items of economic value. The analysis must include an assessment of trends in equality over time. 		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Human and social capital and empowerment: Human and social capital and empowerment include an assessment of the changes that have occurred in the empowerment of individuals, the quality of grass-roots organizations and institutions, the poor's individual and collective capacity, and in particular, the extent to which specific groups such as youth are included or excluded from the development process. 		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Food security and agricultural productivity: Changes in food security relate to availability, stability, affordability and access to food and stability of access, whereas changes in agricultural productivity are measured in terms of yields; nutrition relates to the nutritional value of food and child malnutrition. 		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Institutions and policies: The criterion relating to institutions and policies is designed to assess changes in the quality and performance of institutions, policies and the regulatory framework that influence the lives of the poor. 		No
Project performance	Project performance is an average of the ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.	X	Yes
Relevance	The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, institutional priorities and partner and donor policies. It also entails an assessment of project design and coherence in achieving its objectives. An assessment should also be made of whether objectives and design address inequality, for example, by assessing the relevance of targeting strategies adopted.	X	Yes
Effectiveness	The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.	X	Yes
Efficiency	A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results.	X	Yes
Sustainability of benefits	The likely continuation of net benefits from a development intervention beyond the phase of external funding support. It also includes an assessment of the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the project's life.	X	Yes
Other performance criteria			
Gender equality and women's empowerment	The extent to which IFAD interventions have contributed to better gender equality and women's empowerment, for example, in terms of women's access to and ownership of assets, resources and services; participation in decision making; work load balance and impact on women's incomes, nutrition and livelihoods.	X	Yes
Innovation	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have introduced innovative approaches to rural poverty reduction.	X	Yes
Scaling up	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have been (or are likely to be) scaled up by government authorities, donor organizations, the private sector and others agencies.	X	Yes
Environment and natural resources management	The extent to which IFAD development interventions contribute to resilient livelihoods and ecosystems. The focus is on the use and management of the natural environment, including natural resources defined as raw materials used for socio-economic and cultural purposes, and ecosystems and biodiversity - with the goods and services they provide.	X	Yes
Adaptation to climate change	The contribution of the project to reducing the negative impacts of climate change through dedicated adaptation or risk reduction measures.	X	Yes

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Definition *</i>	<i>Mandatory</i>	<i>To be rated</i>
Overall project achievement	This provides an overarching assessment of the intervention, drawing upon the analysis and ratings for rural poverty impact, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, gender equality and women's empowerment, innovation, scaling up, as well as environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change.	X	Yes
Performance of partners			
• IFAD	This criterion assesses the contribution of partners to project design, execution, monitoring and reporting, supervision and implementation support, and evaluation. The performance of each partner will be assessed on an individual basis with a view to the partner's expected role and responsibility in the project life cycle.	X	Yes
• Government		X	Yes

* These definitions build on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management; the Methodological Framework for Project Evaluation agreed with the Evaluation Committee in September 2003; the first edition of the Evaluation Manual discussed with the Evaluation Committee in December 2008; and further discussions with the Evaluation Committee in November 2010 on IOE's evaluation criteria and key questions.

Rating comparison^a

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Programme Management Department (PMD) rating</i>	<i>IOE Project Completion Report Validation (PCRVR) rating</i>	<i>Net rating disconnect (PCRVR-PMD)</i>
Rural poverty impact	4	4	0
Project performance			
Relevance	4	4	0
Effectiveness	5	5	0
Efficiency	3	4	+1
Sustainability of benefits	4	4	0
Project performance^b	4	4.25	+0.25
Other performance criteria			
Gender equality and women's empowerment	5	5	0
Innovation	4	4	0
Scaling up ²	4	3	-1
Environment and natural resources management	4	5	+1
Adaptation to climate change	4	5	+1
Overall project achievement^c	4	4	0
Performance of partners^d			
IFAD	4	4	0
Government	4	4	0
Average net disconnect			+0.17

^a Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable.

^b Arithmetic average of ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.

^c This is not an average of ratings of individual evaluation criteria but an overarching assessment of the project, drawing upon the rating for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, rural poverty impact, gender, innovation, scaling up, environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change.

^d The rating for partners' performance is not a component of the overall project achievement rating.

¹ An overall project performance rating was not provided by the PMD; the arithmetic average across the four components was computed by the PCRVR evaluator.

² This criterion read as "Potential for scaling up" in the PMD rating matrix.

Ratings of the project completion report quality

	<i>PMD rating</i>	<i>IOE PCRVR rating</i>	<i>Net disconnect</i>
Candour		4	
Lessons		5	
Quality (methods, data, participatory process)		3	
Scope		5	
Overall rating of the project completion report		4	

Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AOS	Annual outcome survey
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
KM	Knowledge management
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
PCR	Project Completion Report
PCRv	Project Completion Report Validation
PPL	Government extension worker
NPMO	National Project Management Office
SHG	Self-Help Group
SOLID	Smallholder Livelihood Development Project in Eastern Indonesia
VF	Village facilitator

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The MTR has recommended to eliminate Component 4 (Productive Rural Infrastructure Investment).