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Independent Office of Evaluation

# Republic of Indonesia Village Development Programme

PROJECT PERFORMANCE EVALUATION







**Republic of Indonesia**  
**Village Development Programme**  
**Project Performance Evaluation**

**February 2022**  
**Report No. 5891-ID**  
**Document of the International Fund for Agricultural Development**

Photos of activities supported by the Village Development Programme in the Republic of Indonesia

Front cover: A woman hangs seaweed out to dry in Sisir village, West Papua. ©IFAD/Joanne Levitan

Back cover: A family harvests seaweed in Sisir village, West Papua (left) ©IFAD/Joanne Levitan; Women's group farm in Wandoki, West Papua (right) ©IFAD/Roger Arnold.

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## **Preface**

*This report presents the findings of the project performance evaluation undertaken by the Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD (IOE) of the Village Development Programme (VDP) in Indonesia. VDP was the redesigned version of the National Programme for Community Empowerment – Agriculture, which was operational in Papua and West Papua from 2009 to 2014.*

*The population in Papua and West Papua is predominantly indigenous and the provinces are characterized by challenges such as remoteness, lack of infrastructure, governance deficit and civil unrest. IFAD made a bold choice in engaging with the government flagship community-driven development programme in Papua and West Papua. VDP had the advantage of working in close interaction with policymakers and development partners and could thus help to scale up interventions. On the other hand, policy changes resulted in disruptions. In such a scenario, IFAD had little control over the quality of its programme implementation.*

*The lack of a robust facilitation structure to promote community-based planning, implementation, monitoring and learning also led to target groups not being included in community group activities and in a lack of a market-driven orientation in livelihood activities. Facilitators were found to be unclear on their role in the project and to lack capacity for carrying out their duties.*

*The evaluation recommends that IFAD invest in a long-term and well-resourced cadre of facilitators and facilitation services, which can maintain a presence in project area(s) after a project exits and promote a community-driven monitoring and evaluation system. The PPE also recommends a longer-term orientation for IFAD's community-driven development programmes in Papua and West Papua, which stretches beyond one project cycle. Improved participation of target groups in local government processes was not promoted by the project.*

*I hope that the findings of this evaluation will be instrumental in improving the future results of the collaboration between the Government of Indonesia and IFAD.*



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Director  
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## **Acknowledgements**

This project performance evaluation was led by Prashanth Kotturi, Evaluation Officer, IOE, with substantial contributions from IOE consultants Diana Jupp, Iqbal Abisaputra and Deborah Tobing. Fabrizio Felloni, Deputy Director, IOE, Johanna Pennarz, Lead Evaluation Officer, IOE and Fumiko Nakai, Senior Evaluation Officer, IOE, provided comments on the draft report. Serena Ingrati, IOE Evaluation Assistant, provided administrative support.

IOE is grateful to IFAD's Asia and the Pacific Division and to the Government of Indonesia, in particular the Ministry of Villages, Development of Disadvantaged Regions and Transmigration, for their insightful inputs at various stages of the evaluation process and the support they provided to the evaluation team.

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## Currency equivalent, weights and measures

### Currency equivalent

Currency unit = Indonesia Rupiah (IDR)

US\$1 = IDR 14 470

### Weights and measures

1 kilogram (kg) = 2.204 pounds (lb)

1 000 kg = 1 metric tonne (t)

1 kilometre (km) = 0.62 miles

1 metre (m) = 1.09 yards

1 square metre (m<sup>2</sup>) = 10.76 square feet (ft)

1 acre (ac) = 0.405 ha

1 hectare (ha) = 2.47 acres

## Abbreviations and acronyms

APR	Asia and the Pacific Division of IFAD
CLA	community/citizen-led approach
CDD	community-driven development
IDR	Indonesian rupiahs
IOE	Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD
MoHA	Ministry of Home Affairs
MoV	Ministry of Villages, Development of Disadvantaged Regions, and Transmigration
MTR	mid-term review
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
PCR	project completion report
PNPM	National Programme for Community Empowerment
PNPM-RESPEK	PNPM-Rural
PPE	project performance evaluation
PSF	VDP Support Facility
P3MD	Programme for Development and Rural Community Empowerment
RPJMN	National Medium-Term Development Plan
TEKAD	Integrated Village Transformation Programme
ToC	theory of change
VDP	Village Development Programme



# Map of the project area

## Republic of Indonesia

Village Development Programme (ex National Programme for Community Empowerment in Rural Areas Project) (VDP (ex PNPM))

*Project performance evaluation*



The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IFAD concerning the delimitation of the frontiers or boundaries, or the authorities thereof.  
IFAD Map compiled by IFAD | 22-04-2021

**A young girl cleans seaweed in her home in Sisir village, West Papua.**

**©IFAD/Joanna Levitan**



## Executive summary

1. **Background.** The Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD undertook a project performance evaluation (PPE) of the Village Development Programme (VDP) in the Republic of Indonesia. The main objectives of the PPE were to: (i) assess the results of the programme; (ii) generate findings and recommendations for the design and implementation of ongoing and future operations in the country; and (iii) identify issues of corporate, operational or strategic interest that merit further evaluative work. In light of COVID-19, the PPE undertook remote data collection. The PPE's data collection focused on a bottom-up approach by examining the experiences and perceived benefits of farmer/fishing groups, first through interviews and then triangulating these with the perspectives and views of project staff, such as village facilitators, district facilitators and regency facilitators.

### Context

2. **Papua and West Papua.** Papua and West Papua are the eastern-most provinces of Indonesia and are well endowed in terms of natural resources but lag behind the rest of Indonesia in terms of socio-economic development. The poverty rate is roughly three times higher than the average for Indonesia at large. Access to sanitation facilities and clean potable water also remains a challenge, particularly in Papua.
3. **Project structure and evolution.** The National Programme for Community Empowerment (PNPM)<sup>1</sup> was a countrywide umbrella of community-driven development (CDD) programmes initiated in 2007 and implemented by the World Bank and the Government of Indonesia through a dedicated support facility. PNPM-Agriculture was a pilot programme in Papua and West Papua, which focused on agriculture-oriented livelihood activities under the PNPM umbrella. VDP was a follow-up programme under the newly formed Ministry of Villages and Development of Disadvantaged Regions and a dedicated project management unit. VDP was closed in June 2019, after two years of implementation. IFAD's financing for PNPM and PNPM-Agriculture was US\$58.8 million; the financing for VDP was US\$7.2 million.

### Main findings

4. **Relevance.** In 2014, the newly elected Government in Indonesia enacted the "Village Law", with the aim to devolve responsibilities and empower village governments. The programme was in line with the priorities of the Government of Indonesia and its intention to focus on Papua and West Papua. PNPM-Agriculture and VDP dovetailed existing government programmes and thus remained in line with national priorities even in times of rapid policy environment change. However, the local communities did not own the group-based targeting approach, as they were used to working as individuals or family units. Groups were formed only to access programme benefits rather than out of any inherent community dynamics.
5. **Effectiveness.** The dual objectives of the programme were to strengthen local governance and enhance economic livelihoods, to be achieved through a robust structure facilitating community planning and action. However, throughout the programme, the facilitator capacities were far too weak to achieve these objectives. Facilitators did not have a common understanding of their roles and faced logistical constraints in visiting project villages. As a result, facilitators could not link community groups to inputs, markets and information and encourage productive economic activities. Target groups also could not participate in local government planning and implementation. In addition, due to lack of facilitation and coordination, VDP's activities did not attract additional resources from ongoing public programmes.
6. **Efficiency.** PNPM-Agriculture's implementation lagged due to insufficient attention given by the PNPM support facility. In addition, there was a gap between PNPM-Agriculture and VDP. VDP was affected by lengthy tendering and procurement

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<sup>1</sup> *Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat (PNPM) in Indonesian.*

processes due to delays in obtaining No Objection from IFAD. This was due to the poor quality of bidding documents prepared and submitted by VDP.

7. **Rural poverty impact.** VDP and PNPM-Agriculture did not have a substantial impact on the incomes of the households. The impact on human and social capital was marginal, as the facilitators did not give priority to technical capacity-building and training of the groups. Groups were formed for the purpose of availing project benefits without any particular affinity among group members. PNPM-Agriculture had a positive influence on policies, and its operations fed into the creation of the Village Law. VDP also had a positive influence on the experiences of the Ministry of Villages and Development of Disadvantaged Regions in the form of feedback into the design of the Integrated Village Transformation Programme (TEKAD), which is the follow-on and scaled-up version of VDP.
8. **Sustainability.** Given the programme's short duration, it was difficult for VDP to put in place enablers of sustainability such as market access and local institutional capacities. Once the project had closed, project groups no longer benefited from facilitation support or backstopping. The lack of focus on market-driven livelihood activities resulted in weak economic sustainability beyond the closure of the project.
9. **Innovation.** The programme included several innovative features. PNPM-Agriculture followed a system of giving grants directly to village governments without them having to compete. Every village (nearly 4,000) received funding on an annual basis, which was a new idea under the PNPM umbrella. Similarly, VDP used social media extensively for disseminating information, knowledge management and monitoring and evaluation (M&E).
10. **Scaling up.** The scaling up of VDP through TEKAD is the biggest success of the project. The Government of Indonesia had indicated a preference for IFAD in cofinancing a scaled-up version of PNPM-Agriculture. To this end, VDP was seen as a transitional project between PNPM-Agriculture and the scaled-up project (TEKAD). TEKAD represents a much larger cofinancing of over US\$560 million by the national government, with a smaller investment of US\$34.3 million by IFAD.
11. **Gender equality and women's empowerment.** Gender aspects were not well addressed. The assumptions around gender dynamics specific to Papua and West Papua were not carefully examined in programme design. The PPE found that women were often included in the groups to meet programme guideline requirements rather than to ensure any meaningful social and economic engagement and empowerment. Both PNPM-Agriculture and VDP were hampered by the lack of recent research and studies related to gender carried out in Tanah Papua.
12. **Environment and natural resource management.** There was no systematic attention to environment and natural resource management in PNPM-Agriculture and VDP. VDP produced 26 booklets which pertained to different products on which the project wished to train the target groups. A review by the evaluation team reveals that none of these booklets contain instructions on sustainable natural resource management.

## Conclusions

13. **IFAD made a bold choice in engaging with the Government's flagship CDD programme in Papua and West Papua**, which had the advantage of IFAD being in close interaction with policymakers and development partners and helping in scaling up through TEKAD. On the other hand, PNPM-Agriculture and VDP's performance were affected by the changes in policy environment (Village Law) and the nascent capacities of institutional partners such as the Ministry of Villages. As a result, both PNPM-Agriculture and VDP were characterized by short and disrupted implementation timelines. The governance, geographic and social challenges in Papua and West Papua also negatively affected the performance of the project.
14. **Linking CDD and livelihood generation requires an iterative process of feedback and facilitation.** PNPM and VDP overlaid CDD onto economic livelihoods generation. Such an orientation requires an iterative process of feedback between the programme and its target groups for a bottom-up elaboration of beneficiary priorities, market linkages, input provision and M&E. This would require the presence of a robust facilitation structure. The programme lacked the presence of a robust and permanent facilitation structure embedded in local communities which can respond to the needs of the communities during the life of a programme and after its closure.
15. **Accountability, learning and feedback system in a CDD programme is a prerequisite to ensure adaptive, relevant and participatory programming.** VDP and PNPM-Agriculture lacked an M&E system which could track participatory processes as well as outputs and outcomes. Such a system would have required the presence of a robust facilitation structure, which was missing in the project.

## Recommendations

16. **Recommendation 1: IFAD should invest in a long-term and well-resourced cadre of facilitators and facilitation services which can maintain a presence in project area(s) after a project exits.** This should include coordination and harmonization with existing programmes which also use facilitation services. The facilitators should be well resourced to carry out their duties in the communities and have provisions for receiving support in the form of refresher trainings, mentoring, coaching and backstopping throughout the project life. This becomes important in the context of TEKAD, which envisages engagement in building sustainable livelihoods.
17. **Recommendation 2: Livelihood enhancement interventions should have a market orientation.** Future projects should include a detailed diagnostic analysis of the existing market demand and map it with existing production patterns in the project area. Commodities and activities of focus should be selected with a view to meeting the market gaps identified in the diagnostic analysis. Additional emphasis should be placed on those groups that are already market-oriented, in terms of product quality and quantity. This would provide demonstration and learning for other community members and groups on critical building blocks for market-oriented livelihoods
18. **Recommendation 3: Future CDD programmes working in challenging geographies such as Papua and West Papua will need to take a phased, longer-term view of operations.** As a consequence of the two recommendations above, a market orientation of livelihood activities and a strategic view of facilitation services in challenging environments such as Tanah Papua will require a systemic and transformational change in institutional capacities. This will require a long-term and phased engagement of IFAD's interventions. To that end, IFAD should make a strategic choice to look beyond one project cycle and plan its interventions/projects over a longer time horizon.

19. **Recommendation 4: Monitoring and evaluation systems of future CDD projects should be built to create downward accountability to target groups and place sufficient emphasis on measuring the quality of participatory processes in addition to economic outcomes.** This would involve target groups having a role in defining the indicators of their interest and having a role in measuring the progress on those indicators. This requires project staff to adopt the role of advisors and facilitators, providing capacity-building, guidance and linkages to markets and public and private services and is thus contingent on project(s) having a robust facilitation structure (refer to annex IX).

## IFAD Management's response<sup>1</sup>

1. Management welcomes the project performance evaluation (PPE) of the Village Development Programme (VDP, ex-National Programme for Community Empowerment in Rural Areas Project) conducted by the Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD. Management acknowledges the quality, thoroughness and fairness of the PPE report, despite the COVID-related restrictions under which it was prepared. Furthermore, Management appreciates the timeliness of this evaluation given that the Integrated Village Economic Transformation Project (*Transformasi Ekonomi Kampung Terpadu*) project, which is in its early implementation stage, is scaling up a number of VDP initiatives and has the opportunity to benefit from this evaluation.
2. Management concurs with the PPE that engaging with the Government in community-driven development programmes in Papua and West Papua provinces was a bold choice that entailed advantages and risks. As mentioned in the PPE, one of the advantages was to be involved with policymakers, which helped to scale up VDP through the ongoing TEKAD project and, management would add, to contribute to discussions that led to the preparation and approval of the Village Law in Indonesia. Management also highlights that this choice responds to IFAD's mandate to target poor rural populations in remote areas, and is in line with the UN commitment to leave no one behind in order to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030. As fairly discussed along the PPE report, working in such conditions also entails risks that IFAD consciously assumed, being aware of the institutional, economic and social challenges that Eastern Indonesia faces and that, unavoidably, influence the performance of any programme or project implemented in that region.
3. Management agrees with the PPE recommendations, although with some nuance in the case of Recommendation 1 as discussed below. In this regard, Management would like to acknowledge the following:
  - (a) **Recommendation 1: IFAD should invest in a long-term and well-resourced cadre of facilitators and facilitation services which can maintain a presence in project area(s) after a project exits.** This should include coordination and harmonization with existing programmes which also use facilitation services. Such capacity building should focus on creating facilitation services which can be used by groups after the project closes, through village government funds. The facilitators should be well resourced to carry out their duties in the communities and have provisions for receiving support in the form of refresher trainings, mentoring, coaching and backstopping throughout project life. This becomes important in the context of TEKAD which envisages engagement in building sustainable livelihoods.

**Partially agreed.** Management agrees on the need to invest in a sustainable facilitation services system that remains after a projects exits, and considers that IFAD should invest in developing and consolidating such system as a key factor towards sustainability. Management considers, however, that IFAD should play a catalytic role in the development and consolidation of such systems, and that they should not depend on IFAD resources. Instead, the long-term sustainability of these services should rely on the different government levels (mainly province, district and village), not only for their funding but also by embedding these systems within the local public structures. In cases where both local social cohesion and some economic dynamism exist, the facilitators who support productive activities could access certain level of economic recognition by the villagers to whom they provide services. This, in

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<sup>1</sup> The Programme Management Department sent the final Management's response to the Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD on 14 April 2021.

turn, requires that the facilitators support activities that are profitable for the villagers.

- (b) **Recommendation 2: Livelihood enhancement interventions should have market orientation.** Future projects should include a detailed diagnostic analysis of the existing market demand and map it with existing production patterns in the project area. Commodities and activities of focus should be selected towards meeting the market gaps identified in such diagnostic analysis. Additional emphasis should be placed on those groups that are already market oriented, in terms of product quality and quantity. This would provide demonstration and learning for other community members and groups on critical building blocks for market oriented livelihoods.

**Agreed.** Management agrees that strengthening livelihoods needs to be complemented with improved market access to develop its potential; otherwise, it will be kept circumscribed to self-consumption, which is essential but has limited room to leverage further productive and income growth. For most poor small farmers local markets are those feasible to reach, at least at initial stages, although moving beyond them is a pathway to follow in further productive development stages. Therefore, mapping existing market demand at local level and using this information to guide production decisions is needed to create a virtuous circle anchored on livelihood enhancement and market orientation.

- (c) **Recommendation 3: Future CDD programmes working in challenging geographies as Papua and West Papua will have to take a phased, longer term view of operations.** As a consequence of the two recommendations above, a market orientation of livelihood activities and a strategic view of facilitation services in challenging environments as Tanah Papua will require a systemic and structural transformational change in institutional capacities. This will require a long term and phased engagement of IFAD's interventions. To that end, IFAD should make a strategic choice to look beyond one project cycle and plan its interventions/projects over a longer time horizon.

**Agreed.** Management is aware that rural transformation is a structural long-term process and, therefore, fully agrees with this recommendation. One of the most valuable aspects of this evaluation is precisely its focus on previous projects on which the ongoing TEKAD is built, which is conceived to become an anchor for IFAD's long-term contribution to rural transformation in the most disadvantaged regions of Indonesia.

- (d) **Recommendation 4: Monitoring and evaluation system of future CDD projects should be built to create downward accountability to target groups and place sufficient emphasis on measuring the quality of participatory processes in addition to economic outcomes.** This would involve target groups having a role in defining the indicators of their interest and them having a role in measuring the progress on their indicators of interest. This requires project staff to adopt the role of advisors and facilitators, providing capacity building, guidance and linkage and is thus contingent on project(s) having a robust facilitation structure.

**Agreed.** Management agrees on the importance of M&E systems as a management tool and, in the case of CDD projects, also as the way to strengthen beneficiaries' ownership and their participation in deciding what is important and needs to be monitored. It is also agreed that productive and economic indicators should be complemented with others aimed at monitoring the intensity and quality of participation, the advances in local empowerment and the strengthening of social fabric at local/village level.



# Republic of Indonesia

## Village Development Programme

### Project Performance Evaluation

#### I. Evaluation objectives, scope, methodology and limitations

1. **Evaluation objectives.** The main objectives of the project performance evaluation (PPE) are to: (i) assess the results of Village Development Programme (VDP) and the National Programme for Community Empowerment in Rural Areas Project (PNPM) – Agriculture;<sup>1</sup> (ii) generate findings and recommendations for the design and implementation of ongoing and future operations in Indonesia; and (iii) identify issues of corporate, operational or strategic interest that merit further evaluative work.
2. **Scope of the evaluation.** The PNPM is the umbrella programme with multiple subprogrammes under it. IFAD's financing to PNPM was to two particular subprogrammes. About 85 per cent of the US\$68.5 million went towards financing block grants in North, Central and South Sulawesi as part of PNPM-Rural. The remaining 15 per cent went initially towards implementation of PNPM-Agriculture and later towards the redesigned VDP in Papua and West Papua.<sup>2</sup> This evaluation is focused predominantly on the operations of PNPM-Agriculture and VDP in Papua and West Papua. The explanation for the reasons is laid out in the approach paper (refer to annex IV).
3. **Methodology.** The PPE comprised: (i) an extensive desk review of predecessor and successor programmes as well as recent literature providing insights into the particular challenges of undertaking development programmes in Papua and West Papua; (ii) interviews with key persons in the relevant line ministries as well as experts including those with experience in the application of community-driven development (CDD) in Indonesia and Papua and West Papua; (iii) phone and video interviews with farmers and village heads; (iv) phone interviews with programme staff including village, district and regency facilitators and provincial coordinators, and the former monitoring and evaluation (M&E) coordinator; and (v) use of available M&E data (for full description of the PPE methodology, see annex VI). At the start of the evaluation, field visits, even if with local consultants, were envisaged. However, in light of travel restrictions due to COVID-19, only phone and video interviews and consultations were undertaken.
4. In order to capture the key elements of this CDD programme (fine-tuning the CDD approach, piloting integration or CDD with the use of village funds (*dana desa*) and demonstration of opportunities for doing business in Papua and West Papua) the PPE team re-constructed the theory of change and underlying assumptions (see annex VII) and used this as a basis for the evaluation. Considering the specificities of CDD projects, the PPE included evaluation questions which examined process as well as outcomes. The PPE team interviewed relevant project stakeholders and beneficiaries.
5. In terms of interviews with beneficiaries, the PPE adopted a bottom-up lens in line with the intentions of CDD. It did this by examining the experiences and perceived benefits of farmer/fishing groups, first through interviews and then triangulating these with the perspectives and views of project staff such as village facilitators, district facilitators and regency facilitators who are in charge of facilitating these groups.
6. The villages were first selected through a simple random sampling procedure within each province using the village database available, which was then subject to random

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<sup>1</sup> *Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat*, in Indonesian.

<sup>2</sup> Project Completion Report.

sampling of the groups in each selected village. As mentioned in annex VI, the evaluation selected seven villages – five in Papua and two in West Papua – out of the 222 villages in the database. Once the village and group was selected, a vertical hierarchy of facilitation support was identified and all relevant facilitators in the vertical chain were included for interviews (refer to annex VI). The inputs from these consultations have also been mapped in tables in the form of traffic lights: red, yellow and red. Red implies negative response and green refers to a positive response. In one table, yellow has been used in order to demonstrate an indirect impact (refer to annex X).

7. The evaluation tried to use the M&E data of the project but was unable to do so in light of lack of accurate M&E data even at output level. The M&E data available and the shortcomings are also laid out in annex VIII (and in the Limitations section below). Many of the indicators in the M&E portal of the project were found to be unclear and lacked explanation on what they meant. The data were also found to be inconsistent with the findings of the evaluation team in terms of group strength, commodity, year of intervention(s), among other factors.
8. **Limitations.** A major challenge for the PPE team was the poor quality of the programme's M&E system. Data made available to the PPE team were inconsistent, contained significant gaps and were poorly conceived for the purposes of a CDD programme and one which had specific expectations as a pilot project (VDP). There was no baseline data and only a limited "beneficiaries' perspective" survey conducted at endline, with data being contained in the project completion report (PCR). Other limitations related to (i) poor recall because of the long time elapsed since completion of the programme (VDP completed nearly two years ago and PNPM-Agriculture six years ago); (ii) widespread knowledge that the Integrated Village Transformation Programme (TEKAD), the successor programme, was due to commence shortly and the resultant fear of appearing critical and potentially thwarting opportunities for future benefits; and (iii) relatively small sample size of villages selected given the remoteness of project villages and the time and effort required to reach the target groups through telephone.
9. Remote research presented a number of challenges. In terms of methodological challenges: (i) the programme finished nearly two years ago and phone numbers provided by facilitators were not always operational; cold-calling meant that calls were rejected or not picked up; (ii) phone signals are often poor in Papua/West Papua resulting in contact being made only when farmers happened to visit the city or connections being of poor quality; (iii) frequent unfulfilled promises by respondents to return calls;<sup>3</sup> (iv) not all farmers for interview had their own phone and used village facilitators' phones, introducing bias; (v) tendency (especially in West Papua) for men to take over phone calls initiated with their wives; and (vi) lack of familiarity with the use of the Indonesian language by some farmers.
10. To mitigate these limitations, the team had to replace some farmer groups which were initially randomly selected with other randomly selected groups. Where that failed, in one case, it was replaced with a group which was known to be within range of a phone signal. In some cases, the team had to provide phone credit so that respondents could log video responses to a list of questions provided and send them to the team when convenient. The team also texted questions ahead of calls so that problems with phone connections and language were reduced. The evaluation team made efforts to put respondents at ease through informal introductions and by adopting a conversational rather than interview approach.
11. To compensate for the lack of reliable M&E data, the PPE team had to rely extensively on phone interviews with field-based stakeholders. To validate the findings of target group interviews, the project followed an interviewing strategy wherein farmer groups were interviewed first, followed by corresponding village facilitators, district

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<sup>3</sup> Credit for making these calls was sent by the evaluation team.

facilitators and regency facilitators. In this manner, the findings from the field were triangulated and confirmed at the level above, as applicable (refer to annex VI). This ensured that the evaluation team maintained internal validity of the findings in spite of having a relatively small sample size of villages and groups.

## II. Country and project context

### A. Country context

12. **Country context.** The largest economy in Southeast Asia, Indonesia – a diverse archipelago nation of more than 300 ethnic groups – has charted impressive economic growth since overcoming the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s. Today, Indonesia is the world’s fourth most populous nation, the world’s tenth largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity, and a member of the G-20. Furthermore, Indonesia has made enormous gains in poverty reduction, cutting the poverty rate by more than half since 1999, to 9.78 per cent in 2020.
13. Indonesia’s economic planning follows a 20-year development plan, spanning from 2005 to 2025. It is segmented into five-year national medium-term plans, called the RPJMN,<sup>4</sup> each with different development priorities. The current medium-term development plan – the last phase of the long-term plan – runs from 2020 to 2024. It aims to further strengthen Indonesia’s economy by improving the country’s human capital and competitiveness in the global market.<sup>5</sup>

Table 1  
Comparison on socio-economic indicators

Indicator	Papua	West Papua	Indonesia average
Percentage of households with improved sanitation (2019)	38.27%	76.39%	77.39%
Percentage of households with improved source of drinking water (2019)	60.85%	81.85%	89.27%
Percentage of rural people under the poverty line <sup>6</sup> (2019)	35.36%	33.2%	12.6%
Per capital income (in IDR 000s in 2019) <sup>7</sup>	39 854	64 683	41 231
Human Development Index	60.84	64.7	71.92
Democracy index (2018)	62.2	58.29	72.39
Prices received by farmers’ indices (Base year = 2012) in 2019	123.62	136.22	140.51
Average calorie intake (in calories)	1 863	1 992	2 120.52

Source: Statistical Handbook 2020, Central Bureau of Statistics, Indonesia.

14. **Papua and West Papua.** Papua and West Papua are the eastern-most provinces of Indonesia. They are well endowed in terms of natural resources. West Papua is known for its liquefied natural gas reserves while Papua is known for its mining industry. Mining and liquefied natural gas dominate the economies of Papua and West Papua, respectively, with a share of regional gross domestic product of 46.5 per cent and 54 per cent, respectively, in 2012. Economic growth in Papua and West Papua is also driven by public spending.<sup>8</sup>
15. However, as table 1 above elaborates, Papua and West Papua are relatively marginalized in terms of socio-economic development, as compared to the rest of the country. The poverty rate is roughly three times higher in Papua and West Papua

<sup>4</sup> *Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional* in Indonesian.

<sup>5</sup> World Bank Indonesia Profile Page: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/indonesia/overview>. Accessed on 9 October 2020.

<sup>6</sup> The poverty line is determined in March and September. The stated figure here is as of September 2019.

<sup>7</sup> At constant market prices as of 2010.

<sup>8</sup> [http://people.anu.edu.au/budy.resosudarmo/2011to2015/Chapter\\_17.pdf](http://people.anu.edu.au/budy.resosudarmo/2011to2015/Chapter_17.pdf).

when compared to the average for Indonesia at large.<sup>9</sup> Access to sanitation facilities and clean potable water also remains a challenge, particularly in Papua. As covered in table 1, the per capita income of West Papua is significantly above the national average while Papua's per capita income is closer to the national average. However, this is skewed by the mining and mineral industry in these provinces. In terms of the overall Human Development Index too, Papua and West Papua lag substantially behind rest of the country. However, various studies<sup>10</sup> have nuanced the situation of deprivation, finding that both food intake and diet diversity are often better in Papua and West Papua than in other poor parts of Indonesia.

16. **Governance.** The central government granted special autonomy to Papua (West Papua was carved out of Papua only in 2002) through the enactment of Law No. 21/2001 (Special Autonomy Law). This accompanied special autonomy funding from the federal government for a period of 20 years. The law established the Papuan People's Assembly comprising members from *adat* (indigenous) communities, women's organizations and religious institutions in equal numbers to be elected by their constituencies. However, the local governments in Papua and West Papua are characterized by challenges in terms of capacity and accountability. This is reflected in the relatively low Democracy Index score for Papua and West Papua in 2018 (table 1).<sup>11</sup> The literature review suggests that public programmes often face the problem of accountability and reporting with the channelling of benefits of such programmes undertaken by local elites.<sup>12,13</sup>
17. **Social dynamics and conflict.** Papua and West Papua are inhabited by local indigenous populations as well as populations from numerous parts of Indonesia. The informal authority in Papua and West Papua is exercised at numerous levels such as church groups (*suku*), extended family (*marga*) and linguistic boundaries. Civil disturbance is often witnessed as a result of clashes among the different clans, clashes within the same clan, clashes between clans and state armed forces, and domestic violence. Deprivation as a result of scarce state presence, especially in areas away from coastal areas, is also a contributor to conflict.<sup>14</sup>
18. **Community empowerment and changes in governing institutions and policies pertaining to CDD projects in Indonesia.** The Kecamatan Development Programme was launched in 1997 as a World Bank-funded government project. It was taken over by the Government of Indonesia and expanded with additional funding from the Government's own sources and renamed in 2007 as PNPM. PNPM had grown into the world's largest CDD project. The programme was managed by Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA). In 2014, the Government of Indonesia issued Law No. 6/2014 on Villages (the "Village Law"), with the express intention of addressing gaps in Indonesia's decentralization paradigm and of enshrining the principles of CDD into formal governance systems. The law formally recognizes the autonomy of Indonesia's villages, affirming their right to prioritize and manage village-level development according to the principles of self-governing communities and of local self-government.

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<sup>9</sup> However, a certain amount of caution is needed in interpreting these figures, as the Central Bureau of Statistics uses the expenditure approach and multi-dimensional poverty scores.<sup>9</sup> Both measures are challenging in the context of Papua and West Papua. The monetizing of family poverty is often problematic in Papua and West Papua, where access to toilets and garbage collection is poor and where historical underinvestment in public infrastructure (despite the introduction of the Special Autonomy Funds) makes access to roads and electricity difficult.

<sup>10</sup> S. Jupp et al. *Universal Child Grant Baseline Qualitative Review* (Jakarta, Palladium: 2018).

<sup>11</sup> Alistair D.B. Cook. *Investing in Papua: The Dual Challenges of Governance and Development*. NTS Perspectives, Issue N. 2 (Singapore, Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies: 2010).

<sup>12</sup> Beneficiary assessment of PNPM/Respek:

<http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/715271501508329178/pdf/117801-WP-PUBLIC-P159825-BeneficiaryAssessmentofPNPMRESPEKENG.pdf>.

<sup>13</sup> Bobby Anderson, *Papua's Insecurity*, <https://www.eastwestcenter.org/system/tdf/private/ps073-1.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=35252>.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

19. To support village autonomy, the law mandated the devolution of authority; in 2018 more than US\$5 billion of funding was devolved to the village government in 2018, with these funds being divided between almost all of Indonesia's roughly 75,000 rural villages, where around 40 per cent of its population of more than 267 million people still lives. The Ministry of Villages, Development of Disadvantaged Regions, and Transmigration (MoV) was formed to take over the responsibilities of such programmes.<sup>15,16</sup> However, the transition process was characterized by confusion regarding the division of roles between MoV and MoHA, which was only subsequently clarified. MoV is thus a relatively new ministry, with its capacity and experience growing with the implementation of programmes.

## **B. Project description**


20. **Evolution from PNPM to VDP.** PNPM was a countrywide umbrella CDD programme initiated in 2007. It was financed by the World Bank and cofinanced by the Government of Indonesia and IFAD. PNPM had various components under it such as PNPM-Urban, PNPM-Rural and PNPM-Support for Poor and Disadvantaged Areas. Within the PNPM-Support for Poor and Disadvantaged Areas, PNPM-Rural was initiated in Papua and West Papua provinces. IFAD financing for PNPM-Rural was approved by IFAD's Executive Board in September 2008 and became effective in March 2009.
21. With the approved financing, IFAD also financed a pilot programme in Papua and West Papua – PNPM-Agriculture – which focused on agriculture-oriented livelihood activities. Within the PNPM umbrella programme, IFAD financed PNPM-Rural programme in North, Central and South Sulawesi provinces. The project underwent a mid-term review (MTR) in 2013 and made some reallocation in financing. In 2014, IFAD discontinued the arrangements with World Bank as the cooperating institution for administering the IFAD loan and supervising the project under the PNPM umbrella. This was in light of the fact that the newly elected Government of Indonesia asked IFAD and World Bank to put PNPM operations on hold.
22. The new government introduced a new Village Law that stipulated increased devolution of responsibilities and power to the village governments. Consequently, IFAD was asked to redesign PNPM-Agriculture in Papua and West Papua to be consistent with the new community development approach. IFAD redesigned the project and relaunched it in 2016, with the gap between the pause of PNPM-Agriculture and VDP being two years. VDP closed in June 2019. The VDP redesign document indicated that "processes will need to be put in place to ensure continued follow-up, either through government activities or a follow-on IFAD-supported project". VDP was therefore regarded by both IFAD and the Government of Indonesia as a transition and a pilot project that would initiate support to the newly formed MoV.
23. **Implementation.** Both PNPM-Agriculture and VDP operated in West Papua and Papua (see map below), in the periods 2010-2014 and 2017-2019 (March-December), respectively.

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<sup>15</sup> Best Practices under the Pnpm-Rural Program and Lessons Learned from Its Implementation: <https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/178696/mainstreaming-cdd-indonesia.pdf>.

<sup>16</sup> Indonesian Village Governance under the Village Law: <http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/220661590726265687/pdf/Indonesian-Village-Governance-Under-the-New-Village-Law-2015-2018-Sentinel-Villages-Report.pdf>.

Figure 1  
Relevant components of PNPM



24. PNPM-Agriculture targeted 11 districts and VDP added two more, thereby covering 13 districts, 46 subdistricts and 224 villages over its two-year project period. PNPM-Agriculture is said to have reached 125,000 beneficiaries (against a target of 82,000) while the VDP is said to have reached 10,000 beneficiaries (against a target of 14,000). It is unclear how the target numbers were determined and why the target for VDP remains lower even though it was operational in more districts. The project documents do not specify the degree of overlap between beneficiary outreach of PNPM-Agriculture and VDP.
25. Due to changes in the political and institutional landscape, the programme objectives evolved through two distinct phases. While both provided access to financial resources for investment in small-scale infrastructure and equipment to enhance agricultural/aquacultural livelihood development combined with access to facilitation and technical advice, the modalities differed significantly.
26. *Phase 1: PNPM-Agriculture.* PNPM-Agriculture evolved from the national programme PNPM-Rural and operated only in Papua and West Papua. PNPM-Agriculture shared the same overall objectives as PNPM-Rural:
  - (i) Improved socio-economic conditions of villagers in PNPM locations; and
  - (ii) Improved local governance conditions.
27. However, its modality differed from PNPM-Rural in three important ways. First, PNPM-Agriculture worked in conjunction with the Tanah Papua's<sup>17</sup> version of PNPM-Rural from 2010 and provided block grants directly to village heads<sup>18</sup> for them to oversee implementation. Second, the block grants were non-competitive. Third, the block grants were intended exclusively for agriculture.
28. According to the PCR, the demonstration of the viability of first and second elements were key to PNPM-Agriculture being promoted by the Government as a model to

<sup>17</sup> Tanah Papua's literal translation is Papua Land.

<sup>18</sup> Decision of the Governor of West Papua, 2010.

implement the 2014 village development strategy through realization of the Village Law.

29. *Phase 2: VDP.* Upon the passing of the Village Law, all PNPM activities were terminated and efforts were redirected to capacity-building of village governments to use their own allocated village funds for development activities. In response, a new programme, VDP, was established as both a pilot (using village funds instead of block grants) and a transition/bridge to a larger-scale continuation programme, TEKAD.
30. **Programme objectives/outcomes.** VDP's stated overall goal was "to reduce poverty and improve local-level governance in rural areas through the provision of investment resources to support productive proposals developed by communities, using a participatory planning process". It had three interlinked intended outcomes:
  - (i) Village Fund (*dana desa*) used to create economic opportunities for poor rural women and men;
  - (ii) Effective facilitation provided for rural communities for development planning; and
  - (iii) Community groups supported in increasing agricultural productivity, using village funds for economic livelihood activities according to village priorities.
31. VDP had limited resources from the reallocation of unused PNPM-Agriculture funds and therefore strategically focused on the provision of facilitation and technical assistance to help communities utilize village funds effectively towards agriculture-related objectives. A further consideration in the redesign was a greater emphasis on profitability and market linkages.
32. **Programme components.** Apart from programme management, there were three components in PNPM-Agriculture and VDP, with subcomponents under them.
33. *Component 1 – Block grants (PNPM)/implementing the Village Law for livelihood activities (VDP).* In PNPM-Agriculture, villagers participated in a process to plan, select and manage basic social and economic infrastructure provided through block grants. A fundamental difference between PNPM-Agriculture and VDP was that under the PNPM umbrella programme, IFAD funding was used as block grants in Papua and West Papua. VDP supported the preparation of annual plans with farmer groups in the 224 villages. After two years, 149 of these village plans, or 66.5 per cent, included agriculture activities.
34. *Component 2 – Effective community facilitation and technical support.* The purpose of this component was to establish a facilitation structure, staffed with well trained, locally recruited individuals at village and subdistrict levels, supervised and managed at district and national levels. This component involved recruiting facilitators at provincial, regency, district, subdistrict and village levels. Training packages for district and subdistrict facilitators included a pre-service training of 12 days that provided an introduction to the objectives and operation of PNPM-Agriculture and VDP; and a 21-day "barefoot agronomy" course (originally planned for three months) that covered social mobilization issues but was mainly focused on agronomy. In addition, VDP trained village agriculturists/facilitators who were existing village community members. The facilitators, alongside village agriculturists/facilitators, mobilized the communities and imparted trainings for specific economic activities.
35. *Component 3 – Economic livelihood empowerment.* This component was introduced during the redesign of PNPM-Agriculture and launch of VDP and had a greater emphasis on livelihood activities. The aim of this component was to support villagers to sustainably use their natural resources, making them more secure by transitioning them further along their respective product value chains. This empowerment component was funded from the village fund, and individual village priority crops and products were to be selected by the villagers themselves. Some of the main modes



of promoting livelihood activities were through agricultural training (e.g. training courses, demonstration plots, farmer field schools, guidance manuals), governance training (e.g. group formation and organization, financial management), linkage to markets and advice on allocating and accounting for Village Fund allocations to maximize economic livelihoods.

36. Given the diverse topography and accompanying agroclimatic zones, the programme had a menu of different kinds of economic activities planned. In the highlands, the programme had planned sweet potato, vegetables, coffee and small livestock. The priority crops/products in the lowland regions of Papua were cacao, nutmeg, copra and small livestock. In coastal areas, VDP envisaged support for seaweed production, squid-fishing, salted fish and squid/fish cracker production.
37. **Implementation arrangements.** PNPM was implemented under MoHA, through the *Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Desa* (translated as village community empowerment) located in the General Directorate of Community Empowerment, and through the PNPM Support Facility (PSF), staffed with World Bank and Government personnel. The World Bank was the cooperating institution to administer the IFAD financing up to 2013. At the national, provincial and district levels, programme oversight, coordination and management were undertaken by project management units, while technical consultants (at the provincial level) and facilitators (at the district and subdistrict levels) were responsible for technical implementation. At the village and subdistrict levels, community facilitators and village facilitators (a volunteer receiving an incentive fee) supported the planning and implementation of community investments.
38. In February 2015, the Government created MoV. While MoHA remained responsible for organizing and supporting village governance structures, MoV was tasked with promoting village development and community empowerment and became the implementing agency for VDP, through its General Directorate of Village Community Development and Empowerment. The process of setting up the new ministry and developing basic implementation instruments for the Village Law, transferring PNPM-Agriculture to MoV, redesigning PNPM-Agriculture in alignment with the Village Law and signing the revised financing agreement incorporating the shift to VDP took about two years, during which all activities were put on hold.
39. VDP activities started in March 2017, with a largely similar structure to that of PNPM-Agriculture at the provincial level and down to village. The project duration was limited to two years, in accordance with the remaining funds and in line with government regulations, whereby project implementation cannot extend past the beginning of loan repayment, and IFAD's rule that project extensions are only allowed for up to two years.
40. **Project financing.** At the design phase of PNPM, in 2008, IFAD financing was planned to be US\$68.53 million, including a loan of US\$ 68.13 million and a grant of US\$0.4 million. The design report envisaged World Bank cofinancing of US\$32.95 million. In 2016, IFAD approved an extension of PNPM-Agriculture, now VDP, for two years. To ensure a smooth transition until the start of VDP's successor project, the Government provided bridge financing of approximately US\$3 million, covering VDP activities in 2019 to ensure continuity of operations until the follow-on project was approved. The Government's contribution was initially envisaged at US\$98.86 million and beneficiaries' contribution at US\$16.42 million. The redesigned project was completed in December 2018 and closed in June 2019. Table 2 below notes the actual contributions of IFAD, the Government of Indonesia, beneficiaries and the World Bank towards PNPM-Agriculture and VDP.

Table 2  
**Financing (in million US\$) (actual)**

<i>Component</i>	<i>IFAD</i>	<i>Government</i>	<i>World Bank</i>	<i>Beneficiaries</i>	<i>Total</i>
<b>PNPM</b>					
Block grant	55.7	875.2	1 112.5	41.2	2 084.5
Facilitation support	1.9		205		206.9
Implementation Support/Technical Assistance, Goods, Consultant Services, Training and Workshops	1.2		80		81.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>58.8</b>	<b>875.2</b>	<b>1 397.5</b>	<b>41.2</b>	<b>2 372.6</b>
<b>VDP</b>					
Implementing the Village Law for Livelihood Activities	0.391				0.391
Effective Community Facilitation and Technical Support	3.93				3.93
Economic Empowerment		5.806			5.806
Project Management	2.94				2.94
<b>Total</b>	<b>7.27</b>	<b>5.806</b>			<b>13.06</b>

Source: PCR.

### **Key points**

- Papua and West Papua are relatively marginalized in socio-economic terms as compared to the rest of Indonesia.
- The project was implemented in the context of an evolving policy environment with the introduction of Village Law in 2014 and the formation of Ministry of Villages. PNPM-Agriculture under the broader PNPM umbrella of CDD projects was discontinued in 2013 and redesigned in 2016, and VDP came into being as a pilot project to demonstrate impact.
- The evaluation was conducted remotely using telephone interviews. The methodology of interviewing everyone in a vertical facilitation chain ensures internal validity of the findings.

### III. Main evaluation findings

#### A. Project performance and rural poverty impact

##### Relevance

41. **The project was aligned with medium-term plans, national policies and laws.** The VDP design met several priorities of the 2015-2019 RPJMN. The Country Fact Sheet prepared by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (dated 2017<sup>19</sup>) notes that the RPJMN overall prioritized infrastructure development and social assistance programmes (related to education and health). The priorities noted specifically in agriculture were to: (i) increase rice production in order to move towards self-sufficiency; and (ii) develop higher-value cropping to improve rural livelihoods. To achieve these, the Government provided farmers with significant market price support and fertilizer subsidies.
42. To that end, the programme's efforts in working directly with village governments and leveraging existing programme operations is consistent with the national priority on decentralization and strengthening local governance. The Government's continuing decentralization efforts were given a particular boost by the introduction of the Village Law 2014 are promoted in the RPJMN.
43. The PCR noted that PNPM-Rural was regarded as the Government's flagship poverty reduction and community empowerment programme and was intended to benefit rural locations with improved local governance and socio-economic conditions. Using a CDD approach, it was intended to empower villages and communities to identify and implement village infrastructure subprojects that were cost-effective, pro-poor and productivity-enhancing. The activities included construction of infrastructure, a microcredit and livelihoods scheme, and the delivery of training activities – all of which are supported by an extensive facilitation network. PNPM-Agriculture and VDP continued this focus on CDD.
44. The pilot VDP was specifically designed to test the application of CDD principles to the use of village funds rather than block grants as envisaged under the 2014 Village Law, and was based on the experience of using non-competitive grant allocations to villages which had only previously been tested in PNPM-Agriculture and PNPM-Rural. Of all the programmes under the PNPM umbrella, these programmes are therefore the most closely aligned with the Government's ambitions to decentralize budgets and decision-making to the village government level.
45. **There was dissonance between intention and implementation of VDP as a pilot project.** VDP's original intention was to serve as a pilot for testing workable models in the Papuan context, for the successor project TEKAD. However, VDP's implementation envisaged operations over a wider area of 13 districts compared to PNPM-Agriculture, which had targeted 11 districts. In addition, the structure of implementation – with a programme management unit, accompanying facilitation and a target-driven M&E framework – meant that the programme tried to achieve wider impact as a conventional project than the stated purpose as a pilot project.
46. **Focus on Papua/West Papua was in line with the Government's priorities.** In line with the Government's intentions to focus on areas of the country with high levels of poverty, deprivation and other challenges, a Presidential Instruction, 9/2017 "Accelerating Welfare Development in Papua Province and West Papua Province", was issued in 2017 to promote stronger coordination across 25 government departments, including MoV, for improved health and education, local economic development, basic infrastructure, and digital infrastructure and connectivity. PNPM-Agriculture and VDP targeted Papua and West Papua, the two provinces that were

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<sup>19</sup> Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO). *Indonesia Country Fact Sheet on Food and Agriculture Policy Trends* (Rome: FAO, August 2017).

identified as having the highest rural poverty rates in Indonesia and lacking services, economic opportunities and connectivity.<sup>20</sup> Thus, a focus on Papua and West Papua remains relevant in terms of geographic focus and priorities of the Government.

47. **The project is aligned with the objectives and priorities of the country strategic opportunities programme (COSOP).** The 2008 COSOP prioritized East Indonesia for community development and local institution-building, describing its strategy to: (i) *assist small-scale producers to participate in remunerative markets;* (ii) *make small-scale producers and their families more resilient to risks;* and (iii) *make rural institutions more responsive to small-scale producers' needs.* Furthermore, the COSOP noted that "IFAD will (inter alia) assist the [Government] to implement the new Village Law by developing capacities and tools, at the village, district and national levels, to deliver village fund resources and generate impact for local economic growth". Thus, PNPM-Agriculture and VDP were envisaged in the COSOP itself.
48. **The use of a conventional farmer-group approach does not fit well with the way Papuans generally organize their livelihood activities.** Community groups were identified as the modality through which programme interventions would be delivered. However, a group approach was not necessarily recognized as relevant for beneficiaries, who are more accustomed to working independently in household or extended family groups. While land is often owned by the clan under customary law, it is rarely cultivated collectively. Rather, families are granted permissions to utilize land for their own purpose, and swidden cultivation is still widely practised. Both beneficiaries and facilitators interviewed in this PPE indicated that groups were formed because it was a requirement to access programme benefits<sup>21</sup> (according to the Programme Implementation Manual), and some group members indicated that they actually preferred to work individually, something the PCR also noted ("*traditionally farmers have individualistic behaviours*"). They shared that they did not have a sense of working as a group and could not identify any other benefits of the group other than positioning themselves for group-based assistance. It was also noted that in some areas, because of programme quotas on number of groups to be served, some groups had become very large (more than 40 members). This was the only way programme benefits could be more widely shared. Thus, group formation was largely driven by VDP and PNPM requirements rather than by desire to work together or derive other collective benefits. While it is acknowledged that the formation of groups provides for efficiency in delivering inputs and services and is intended to enhance collective voice, bargaining power and enable more cost-effective marketing, these objectives can be achieved by targeting communities with common livelihood interests without formalisation as groups, which group members themselves perceived no value in. Only one group, among those interviewed, functionally existed after the end of VDP.
49. **Inclusion was not well addressed.** Both PNPM-Agriculture and VDP had targeting strategies which focused at the village level and adopted a group-targeting approach for farmers and those involved in aquaculture/fisheries, most of them belonging to indigenous groups. VDP intended to target common-interest segments of the community and anticipated that 30 per cent of the 14,000 beneficiaries would be from households with no or limited productive assets. Additionally, other segments were identified as special target groups, including women, young people, single parent households, minority clans, households with members with special needs, and

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<sup>20</sup> Deprivation across Tanah Papua differs widely and in some cases may be overstated. Economic growth in the area has been encouraging and at times above the average for Indonesia. While it is true is that Papua and West Papua continue to exhibit the lowest Human Development Index among Indonesian provinces, the year-on trends are positive and accelerating. The key determinants of inequality in relation to other parts of Indonesia primarily relate to poor connectivity in terms of road access, transport networks and telecommunications. Thus, a focus on Papua and West Papua remains relevant in terms of geographic focus and priorities of the Government.

<sup>21</sup> The Programme Implementation Manual confirms that groups are a mechanism for targeting in VDP (chapter 3, p. 34).

households with large numbers of children or additional dependents. The criteria noted above to target specific groups were not followed.<sup>22</sup> Despite an intention to include women and youth (to persuade them that there was a future in agriculture), interviews and examination of the VDP web portal suggest that this was not actually a priority during implementation. Of the eight farmer groups interviewed during the PPE, those in Papua comprised mostly older men and, in West Papua, the groups comprised married couples. Such lack of inclusion was driven by an inadequate focus on and presence of facilitation (covered in detail under effectiveness), and limited understanding of the situation of the special target groups, including a weak appreciation of their needs and reasons for exclusion. A conventional farmer-group approach often does not work well as a means to meet inclusion criteria; alternative means to engage with special target groups may have been more relevant. For example, TEKAD looks at family units as a unit of account for the project.

50. **In summary**, the project was in line with the priorities of the Government and its intention to focus on Papua and West Papua. PNPM-Agriculture and VDP dovetailed existing government programmes and thus remained in line with national priorities even in times of rapid policy environment change. However, the group modality for targeting beneficiaries was found to be less relevant and useful for group members themselves and was not rooted in the community dynamics of the target villages. Gaps in situation analysis and facilitation capacities in PNPM-Agriculture and in VDP precluded sufficient inclusion of different target groups, and the farmer-group approach could have been adapted to suit community dynamics. In light of the information and evidence, relevance is rated as **moderately satisfactory (4)**.

### **Effectiveness**

51. The effectiveness of the programme is assessed across three outcomes resulting from the shared objectives and outcomes of PNPM-Agriculture and VDP; (i) Utilization of village funds to create economic opportunities for poor rural women and men; (ii) Effective facilitation provided to rural communities for development planning and economic empowerment activities; and (iii) Improved local governance conditions. The last outcome on local governance is derived from the objective 2 of PNPM-Agriculture and is also reflected in the objectives of VDP. In the process of evaluation, the evaluation team found that improved local governance was in fact perceived as an outcome of the programme. Hence, it is included as such as outcome 3. The evaluation team interviewed eight groups, of which five groups existed or were formed during PNPM-Agriculture. Similarly, most of the district facilitators interviewed were involved in PNPM-Agriculture. Thus, the findings elaborated in this section pertain to VDP as well as PNPM-Agriculture, unless stated otherwise.

### **Outcome 1 – Utilization of village fund to create economic opportunities<sup>23</sup>**

52. PNPM-Agriculture departed from the national PNPM model by providing direct funds to villages without the requirement of competitive bidding for block grants. This model provided the evidence needed to pilot the use of village funds in VDP. VDP programme design intended to promote village governance in favour of allocating at least 20 per cent of the annual village funds for village governments towards economic opportunities for the community, including agricultural, aquaculture and fisheries activities such as storage, drying facilities and irrigation. This allocation is distinct from the village-owned enterprises (*badan usaha milik desa*) allocation, which was not intended to be used in VDP, except for pilots such as the seaweed programme in West Papua.
53. **The target of at least 20 per cent allocation from village funds was not generally met.** The evaluation team accessed the M&E portal of VDP to understand how much of village funds were allocated to economic activities. Examination of the

<sup>22</sup> “Anyone can be a group member if they have coffee bushes,” said one group leader in Papua, echoing the sentiments of others interviewed.

<sup>23</sup> This outcome deals predominantly with VDP.

regency-wide composite figures for use of village funds (see table 3) accessed from the VDP M&E portal indicates that between 0 and 19.35 per cent of village funds had been allocated to economic activities, with an average of 5.98 per cent of village funds in 2017 and 8.65 per cent of village funds in 2018 having been allocated to economic activities. Five regencies recorded a drop in such allocation between 2017 and 2018. However, there is a possibility that there were individual villages which had allocated 20 per cent of their village funds to economic activities. Thus, the PPE team also looked in more detail at the allocations, specifically for the sample of villages selected by the team (refer to annex VI) in table 4 below.

Table 3  
**Spending from village funds on productive enterprises as per the M&E system of VDP (IDR)**

Province/Regency	Spending from village funds		Funds for productive enterprises		Percentage of village funds spent on productive enterprises	
	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018
<b>Papua</b>	<b>80 525 201 286</b>	<b>132 730 830 057</b>	<b>4 830 186 070</b>	<b>12 845 115 770</b>	<b>6%</b>	<b>9.68%</b>
Boven Digoel	15 773 958 356	17 754 600 061	796 323 669	673 538 469	5.05%	3.79%
Jayawijaya	9 657 128 042	36 984 992 416	1 293 000 000	7 156 142 500	13.39%	19.35%
Yapen Island	14 716 883 863	28 716 432 903	603 357 000	1 049 904 000	4.1%	3.66%
Nabire	14 129 902 990	21 577 964 109	514 046 000	696 158 000	3.64%	3.23%
Sarmi	0	9 053 349 000	0	565 625 001	0	6.25%
Yahukimo	26 247 328 035	18 643 491 568	1 623 459 401	2 703 747 800	6.19%	14.50%
<b>West Papua</b>	<b>93 228 658 689</b>	<b>80 428 634 208</b>	<b>5 567 807 580</b>	<b>5 588 871 852</b>	<b>5.97%</b>	<b>6.95%</b>
Fak-Fak	23 397 108 327	21 247 652 259	1 817 911 890	2 302 041 256	7.77%	10.83%
Kaimana	20 930 144 938	18 354 442 923	1 291 027 000	1 102 280 000	6.17%	6.01%
Raja Ampat	20 210 101 715	14 659 709 201	2 135 856 034	716 021 024	10.57%	4.88%
Manokwari	5 229 015 165	3 417 368 895	13 012 656	205 322 000	0.25%	6.01%
Maybrat	8 353 956 973	9 739 641 500	310 000 000	663 527 522	3.71%	6.81%
Manokwari Selatan	11 361 851 204	4 376 435 008	0	66 600 000	0	1.52%
Arfak Mountains	3 746 480 367	8 633 384 422	0	533 080 050	0	6.17%
<b>Total</b>	<b>173 753 859 975</b>	<b>213 159 464 265</b>	<b>10 397 993 650</b>	<b>18 433 987 622</b>	<b>5.98%</b>	<b>8.65%</b>

Source: VDP M&E Portal.

Table 4

**Allocations to economic activities in sample villages selected by the evaluation<sup>24</sup>**

Village	Groups	Allocation to economic activities from village fund (in IDR) (a)	Total village fund available (in IDR) (b)	Percentage of village fund allocated to economic activities ((a/b)*100)	Year**	Did sample group interviewed get allocation?
V1	A	116 133 000	1 305 643 000	8.9	2017	Yes
V2	B/C	7 149 000	1 735 827 474	0.4	2018	Yes
V3	D	10 000 000	968 870 000	1.0	2017	No
V4	E	NA****	NA****	NA****	-	No
V5	F	NA****	NA****	NA****	-	No
V6	G	3 000 000	957 540 000	0.3	2017	No
V7	H***	160 993 800	1 003 919 000	16.0	2018	NA
V8	J	182 400 000	1 105 330 230	16.5	2017	Yes

\*Some villages have more than one beneficiary group; \*\* Data in the portal are inconsistent; some of these allocations are for 2017 and some for 2018; \*\*\* Failed to make village contact; \*\*\*\* Marked as N/A because no information is available on M&E portal.

Source: VDP M&E portal.

54. From table 4 it is clear that none of the villages selected by the evaluation as a sample had allocated 20 per cent of village funds for economic activities in 2017 or 2018. In some cases, such as villages E and F, there were no data available for 2017 or 2018. It is unclear as to why data are available for only one of 2017 or 2018 for all of the villages sampled.
55. Such allocations could not be confirmed at village level for the sample groups as village heads who were interviewed were evasive and groups shared that they did not get any support (see table 4) or they received support "in kind"<sup>25</sup> and had no idea of the value of the allocation. For example, group J in table 4 received boats and fishing nets in 2017 but did not know the value of this support.
56. **Recording of village fund allocations was weak.** The VDP PCR noted that in "2018, 2 per cent of village fund reports were regarded as satisfactory, 44 per cent were average, and 54 per cent were poor". The PPE was unable to undertake field visits and verification of village-level data. However, interviews suggested a lack of clarity on allocations, which in turn raises questions on the veracity of the data recorded on the VDP Portal. Only three of the nine sample groups had received any kind of allocation from village funds.
57. The PCR commented positively on the allocation of village funds for economic activities. It noted that "achievements by 2018 ranged from 13.1 per cent (Papua) to 8.6 per cent (West Papua), which reflects the challenge of multiple, competing village demands, as well as the priority given to infrastructure in villages often lacking basic services or physical access". It further noted that analysis of the distribution of village fund resources, however, revealed that "over the two years of VDP implementation (2017-2018), resources allocated to economic activities increased in Papua and remained stable in West Papua. It should be noted that the figures quoted in the PCR are different from those in the M&E portal, cited in table 3 above.
58. **VDP groups found it difficult to access village funds as they were not earmarked for economic/livelihood activities** (unlike PNPM-Agriculture village grants) but were expected to come from the village funds allocated for village infrastructure and were subject to village-level deliberations (*musrenbang*). This

<sup>24</sup> Group name I is not used to avoid confusion with Roman numeral one (i or I).

<sup>25</sup> This is common in infrastructure projects.

was also pointed out in the PCR. Not only does this assume that farmers/producers would need to be proactive in demanding allocations for economic activities, garnering support from the community, but also assumes a willingness of the village government to consider such an investment. Among the eight villages included in the PPE interview cohort, none actually held *musrenbang* to decide allocations and there were only three places where village funds were allocated for economic activities, as noted in table 4. In others, village governments refused to use their own money or complained that VDP wants to take a portion of their village funds or had other priorities such as housing. Group members shared how it was easier to persuade the village government to provide support if their Programme for Development and Rural Community Empowerment (P3MD) facilitator<sup>26</sup> was supportive, as the facilitator would provide the village government with the necessary support to defend and account for such expenditure.

59. **Other problems relate to village government motivations and poor synchronization of VDP with planning and budgeting cycles.** Village budgets would have already been allocated for 2017 by the time VDP had started, in March 2017, and it would have been challenging to expect these to be altered. District and village facilitators were unable to provide adequate socialization to persuade village governments and their constituents of the value of using village funds for agricultural investment. The VDP intended to provide village heads with a one-day training conducted by district facilitators to orient them to the VDP, in addition to planning and budgeting training by VDP facilitators. However, none of the village heads or farmer groups interviewed in the PPE could recall that this had taken place. There was insufficient guidance and training of village government staff in deciding priorities and assessing risk, and the PCR commented that village head training, which was supposed to be undertaken by P3MD facilitators “*was not sufficiently coordinated with VDP*”. As the theory of change (in annex VII) demonstrates, the organizing of *musrenbang* remains a precursor to the systematic allocation of village government funds for economic activities and, in turn, livelihoods.
60. Prioritizing agricultural investment over others relies on the village government and community being able to make informed choices. The discussion of benefits – household income and assets; human and social capital and empowerment; and food security and agricultural productivity – must be clear and the way the programme can support the achievement of these benefits must also be clear. This is asking a lot from facilitators but also implies a need for better monitoring of how *musrenbang* proceed and the basis for the investment decisions. Given the lack of M&E in VDP and PNPM-Agriculture, such prioritization did not happen.
61. **Field-level interviews highlighted the need for the endorsement of P3MD facilitators** for allocating money from the village funds. This suggests that they too should be oriented about the programme and benefits and given support to help village governments make informed choices and feel confident about accounting for expenditures. Both PNPM-Agriculture and VDP recruited and trained their own facilitators. But, as P3MD gathered momentum, more could have been done to include the civil service-paid P3MD facilitators in VDP. The lack of coordination between different programmes, especially between P3MD and VDP, and the resulting problems in the inability to leverage village funds, are also noted in the implementation support mission report of 2018. There was no indication in the programme documentation or in the interviews that any socialization of P3MD facilitators took place. The willingness of village governments to allocate village funds is a crucial assumption in the theory of change reconstructed by the evaluation team.

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<sup>26</sup> P3MD stands for *Perencanaan Partisipasi Pembangunan Masyarakat Desa* (Programme for Development and Rural Community Empowerment). It is one of the ongoing parallel government programmes.



## Outcome 2 – Effective facilitation for developing planning and economic empowerment activities

62. The design of both PNPM-Agriculture and VDP emphasized the need for quality facilitation, and considerable investment was targeted towards recruiting, training and supporting facilitators at village, district and regency levels. The VDP redesign document noted that *“the key to successful facilitation outcomes is hiring locally, training thoroughly, and providing a robust district-level support structure for facilitators, including promotion pathways for high performing and talented facilitators”*.

Table 5

### Planned\* vs actual number of facilitators

Level	Papua		West Papua	
	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual
Regency	6	10	6	7
District	31	63	15	42
Village	155	147	75	78

Source: PCR.

\*As noted in the VDP redesign document 2016, table 1.

63. **The understanding of what facilitation entails was found to be weak among the facilitators interviewed.** Among 14 village and district facilitators interviewed during the PPE, only four (district facilitators) satisfactorily explained the term and only one actually interpreted it in action (refer to table 1 in annex X). This particular facilitator (referred to as district facilitator (DF)-A) had worked for an NGO before and was clear about his role in terms of linking groups to existing services and markets; the other three facilitators still regarded their role as providing training, inputs and direct marketing support. Among village facilitators, there was no understanding of facilitation and, at best, they saw themselves only in the role of group mobilizers, although others took control and became gatekeepers, sometimes even being members of the group they were supposed to be supporting. Some were basically acting only as contact people in the village. This is attributed to a lack of good-quality basic training at the start of the project as well as refresher trainings as the project advanced. This is highlighted in the implementation support mission of 2013 and the supervision report of 2018. The lack of clarity of roles was also recognized in the MTR of PNPM-Agriculture undertaken in 2012.
64. Community facilitation is a specialist field and requires knowledge of social science and excellent people skills. Both PNPM-Agriculture and VDP fell short in terms of community facilitation. The MTR for PNPM-Agriculture noted two significant problems in the facilitation at village level: (i) whereas PNPM-Rural had employed social facilitation specialists, this role was included in the job description for agriculturalists for PNPM-Agriculture. This failed to recognize the importance of social and participatory skills and how combining these two skills was too time-consuming for any one person; and (ii) the 12-day training course they were provided was insufficient to prepare them for the tasks envisaged in the design.
65. The supervision mission report (2013) and the implementation support mission in the same year highlight the need for better backstopping of the facilitators at the district and subdistrict levels. Interviews for this PPE suggested that training of facilitators remained weak and former PNPM facilitators who subsequently worked for VDP shared that they were not given additional training and repeated what they had previously done in PNPM-Agriculture, while new recruits were *“not oriented well”* and received less technical training than PNPM facilitators had received.
66. **The project did not assess the quality and usefulness of the trainings.** Information available to the PPE suggests that training provision was supply-driven

rather than responsive to group needs, partly because modules had been centrally produced within the project and partly because other training opportunities were availed by linking farmers to existing courses. The farmer groups interviewed did not find the training particularly useful and had not benefited from any follow-up. Village-level training was only said to be useful when it was *in situ*, but it was also clear that more formal training carried out at village level (such as on group formation) was perceived largely as an opportunity to enjoy refreshments and cigarettes provided by the facilitators. The concerns about attendance at training merely to receive refreshments, "sitting money" or free inputs (e.g. seeds) have persisted since this was first pointed out in the 2010 supervision mission report.

67. **Emphasis on linkage rather than direct provision of technical assistance was poorly understood.** PNPM-Agriculture had been designed to introduce new components to the traditional PNPM programmes, namely agriculture training and marketing. This was envisioned to be undertaken through the use of facilitators as well as village agriculturalists. The specific focus on agriculture and the combination of block grants with technical capacity-building had the objective of establishing a stronger basis for developing agriculture and improving farmers' livelihoods. As a result, district facilitators were agricultural specialists. With the evolution to VDP and an increased emphasis on linking farmer groups to existing technical services ("*forging durable linkages between villages and subdistrict and district technical departments, so villages could continue accessing support beyond the short project duration*"), the role of district facilitators was expected to change. However, PPE interviews with district facilitators suggested that those who were formerly employed in PNPM-Agriculture framed their roles as before and provided training and inputs directly (see table 1 in annex X).
68. **Facilitation** as a linking function connecting demand for and supply of technical services was often not possible because of gaps in existing technical service provision. The PPE found that although there were examples of successful brokering of links to technical assistance, there was no local expertise available to help with several other issues facing farmer/producer groups (e.g. no specialists on seaweed disease). If this was not available, the facilitators noted that the only recourse was to hope that assistance might be budgeted for in subsequent annual plans. This inevitably led to delays in providing assistance to farmers. Together with the issues of persuading government officers to visit villages when they are under-resourced and unmotivated, it is unsurprising that programme facilitators filled the gap and sometimes provided direct technical assistance.
69. As can be seen from table 2 in annex X, the support for economic activities through facilitation was highly scattered. In nearly all cases there was one-off support in the form of inputs, technical capacity-building, technical advice or governance training but no combination of any of the above. In addition, as noted above, barring one group, none of the groups had any follow-up to the interventions that they received from the VDP facilitators.
70. Resource materials provided to facilitators to encourage participatory processes at village level (e.g. social and spatial mapping, seasonality diagrams) do not seem to have been applied in the communities. None of the facilitators mentioned that they facilitated these processes when asked what activities they conducted with communities, and none of the farmer group members mentioned they had taken part in any kind of participatory activity using visualization techniques of this kind.
71. The framing of this objective as facilitation to promote economic empowerment *activities* rather than economic empowerment emphasizes the intention to support process rather than actual achievement in terms of group or individual's economic position. The PCR therefore concentrates on inputs identified in the logframe targets such as *delivery of "product support packages"* (fully achieved, as all 149 communities that had planned agricultural activities received these) and changes in

cultivation practices by adoption of demonstrated practices (68 per cent against the target of 70 per cent). The PCR noted an outcome on the training and advisory services provided, stating that 68 per cent (of a total of 627 farmer groups) had agreed to change cultivation practices. This represents approximately 10,000 men and women and 1,053 lead farmers in 149 villages. The data were said to be accessed from the project M&E dashboard. It is unclear what “*agreeing to change cultivation practices*” actually means and how this was reported.

72. **Facilitation failed to assist village governments and groups in thinking strategically and beyond provision of inputs.** The PNPM-Agriculture MTR noted that most of the village grants provided were used for consumption and inputs rather than strategic investments in priority crops and activities that enhanced productivity with the goal of enhancing incomes. For example, several groups spent funds on wheelbarrows, tools and boots rather than arguably more strategic needs of crop productivity, e.g. improved root stock, quality production and post-harvest technology training, market studies, and financial analysis. The MTR concluded that in the absence of effective guidance on economic planning and investment (the PPE team reads this as lack of facilitation), the programme risked becoming a cash transfer programme. The VDP supervision mission (2018) indicated that the problem persisted even in the redesigned VDP. The PCR noted, for example, that “*where funds are allocated to agriculture, they tend to be one-off payments focusing on inputs, showing that villagers and facilitators lack technical capacities and information to select investments that can support longer-term development.*” PPE interviews resonated with these findings. Of the three groups which obtained village funds, funds were used for boats, fishing nets, fuel for the boats, security guard huts, and seeds. One coffee-growing group which never received village funds anticipates provision of storage facilities and grinding equipment directly from MoV.

### **Outcome 3 - Improved local governance**

73. **The expectations of improved local governance are not well defined** despite the fact that the programme is framed in terms of contributing to the outcome “*Villagers in PNPM-Agriculture locations benefit from improved socio-economic and local governance conditions*”. The inference from project documents is that operating the programme within the framework of the Village Law and adopting CDD principles will lead to improved governance at village level. Additional understanding of the intentions of the programme are only gleaned from examination of the logframe (VDP design document, Appendix 1), which includes key performance indicators as follows:
- (i) Village plans formulated reflecting agreed priorities of all community members, including agricultural activities (outcome 1);
  - (ii) Village fund expenditure properly recorded, subject to audit. Accounts and audit reports available to all villagers (outcome 1); and
  - (iii) Sixty per cent of participating communities with development plans prepared and implemented based on inclusive consultation process (outcome 2).
74. This implies that improved village governance is to be measured by enhanced democratic and participatory consultation and accountability.
75. As pointed out by the PCR, without a theory of change, the pathway to achieving objectives had to be assumed and this is particularly so for the outcome of improving local governance. The PPE team constructed a simple theory of change (ToC) and proposed that local governance outcomes would comprise: (i) “*increased capacity and confidence of village governments to plan, implement and evaluate agriculture projects funded by village funds*”; and (ii) “*village governments more participatory, democratic and held to account*”.

76. **The lack of synchronization with local government planning cycles perhaps explains why the project made a convenient selection of both the groups and the commodities without due focus on inclusion.** The VDP implementation support mission report (2018) noted that while all community representatives should be involved in planning processes and budgeting decisions, it was observed that in many village meetings, participation was limited to men and village elites. Women and marginalized community members rarely attended the meetings, and when they did, their voices were rarely heard. The MTR 2012 also noted this to be the case in PNPM-Agriculture, wherein village leaders (traditional, religious leader, government and project leaders) were involved in deliberations around the use of village grants, and consultations were held largely to fulfil administrative requirements.
77. In none of the VDP villages where the PPE team interviewed farmers had there been any *musrenbang* process to identify the intervention or the intended group for programme support. It is noted that annual *musrenbang* meetings (development planning deliberations) usually take place in December/January and the VDP commenced in March 2017; meetings held later that year would have been considered too late for the project implementation period. The lack of focus on inclusion was also noted in the PNPM-Agriculture implementation support mission report of 2013. This was because the need for inclusion in planning processes was not understood by different stakeholders, including target communities and facilitators themselves (table 1 in annex X). In addition, as the country context section mentions, the benefits of public programmes are typically channeled to communities by local elites.
78. **Village government capacity-building programmes did not work in parallel with VDP as expected in the design.** Government-funded P3MD facilitators are tasked with building the village governments' capacity to plan and manage village development initiatives using village funds. However, the hiatus caused by their redeployment to MoV from MoHA and lack of coordination with VDP facilitators and orientation to the programme meant that there was a gap in terms of village government capacity. New protocols, and monitoring and reporting systems were introduced but were not fully functioning throughout the VDP period.
79. There was no evidence to support the intention for village governments to become more transparent and accountable to the communities. The PNPM-Agriculture MTR indicated that even leaders invited to participate in deliberations around allocation of village grants were not aware of the allocations made. The PPE interviews also found that group members did not know how much money was allocated, and there was no evidence that village plans were displayed for the community, budgets shared, or grievance mechanisms established. The lack of reliable M&E data (noted in annex VIII) points to a lack of a robust evidence-driven and accountability-oriented approach to interventions.
80. **Local governance improvements required to support decentralization to village governments were in infancy during the VDP period.** As MoV only started operating from 2015, its district and subdistrict structure and operations were still in their early days when VDP commenced. Not only was the governing system new to village facilitators, it evolved during programme implementation and, as the PCR pointed out, "*with multiple regulations, sometimes contradictory, being issued by MoV and MoHA*". The PCR noted that coordination with subdistrict and district departments, in particular with P3MD, was minimal.
81. Overall, three important caveats need to be highlighted by the PPE when looking at the effectiveness of the programme. First is that PNPM-Agriculture was implemented by PSF along with other PNPM programmes. PNPM-Agriculture shared similar shortcomings as other programmes in terms of lack of focus on M&E and results and lack of robust facilitation. IFAD supervision missions repeatedly highlighted these shortcomings (see under performance of IFAD). Second, VDP was a programme of

very short duration (two years) and was envisaged as a pilot programme to provide workable models for TEKAD. This is a short duration for a CDD project in a context characterized by policy changes as well as governance challenges. In addition, while VDP characterized itself as a pilot, it functioned as a conventional project (refer to relevance). Third, the programme operated in a highly challenging context as Papua and West Papua. The governance and socio-economic challenges in Papua and West Papua, as covered in the project context, also had an impact on the project's effectiveness.

82. **Achievement of objective and summary.** VDP's overall objective was "to reduce poverty and improve local-level governance in rural areas through the provision of investment resources to support productive proposals developed by communities, using a participatory planning process". This objective contains two main elements: local governance and economic livelihoods. In addition, it implicitly refers to the need for facilitation structure to achieve these elements when it refers to provision of investment resources and participatory planning.
83. The presence of robust facilitation is a precursor to an improved governance environment and improved livelihoods. This is clear from the theory of change, where facilitation structure precedes economic livelihoods and participatory governance. Facilitation structure is expected to promote access to advisory services, inputs and markets to ensure that project target groups can enhance their livelihoods and incomes. Facilitation structure was also expected to promote: participation of target groups in local government decisions; utilization of local government funds for economic livelihood activities; and linkages with other programmes. The absence of such structure thus impeded achievement of the objective at large. Facilitation was found to be lacking, with no common understanding of what the facilitation role should entail. Even when facilitators had clear ideas on what their role was, they seemed to have logistical constraints to visiting villages. Village facilitators were largely restricted to being a focal point in their villages.
84. As a result, village funds were rarely used for productive economic activities. When they were used, it was in a one-off manner, without a systematic plan for ensuring follow-up and backstopping. There was no substantive effect on the existing livelihoods of target groups, nor were any new avenues for livelihoods created. In addition, improved participation in local government processes could not be promoted. Decisions around utilization of village funds did not involve substantial participation of target groups under VDP and PNPM-Agriculture. There was little harmonization and dovetailing with ongoing government programmes as was intended, especially in VDP's design.
85. In light of the above, effectiveness is rated as **moderately unsatisfactory (3)**.

### **Efficiency**

86. **Project management costs.** As shown in table 2, under VDP the actual total project management costs were US\$2.94 million out of the total budget of US\$13 million. Thus, programme management costs are roughly 22.5 per cent of the total project costs. However, as the country and project contexts elaborate, VDP is embedded in the national programmes such as PNPM-Rural and interventions financed through village funds (central government block grant transfers), and district government block grant transfers (*alokasi dana desa*). The literature on efficiency in government programmes mentions that, in Indonesia at large, most of the village government administration, including management costs, are charged to block grant transfers from district governments. According to the Indonesia Public Expenditure Review 2020,<sup>27</sup> in 2017 an average of 74 per cent of the block grants from districts were used for village administration costs while only 2 per cent of the central block grants were used towards village administration costs. This is due to the fact that central

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
<sup>27</sup> <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/33954/148209.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.

funds are eligible to be used only for certain expenditure categories. Thus, the actual administration costs might be higher than the 22.5 per cent that VDP incurred, with incremental administration costs being absorbed by other funds available to village governments.

87. **Process efficiency.** PNPM was approved in September 2008 and became effective in March 2009, with a lag of six months. IFAD’s financing for the project was expected to be about US\$68.5 million at approval (SDR<sup>28</sup> 42.28 million), including a loan and a grant. As can be seen from figure 2 below, the disbursement of funding over the life of the project was uneven. The spike in disbursement between 2010 and 2011 is due to the fact that IFAD provided the bulk of its share of financing for PNPM-Rural in North, Central and South Sulawesi in 2010-2011 itself, and financing towards PNPM-Rural composed roughly 85 per cent of IFAD’s total financing at approval. The disbursement schedule, while not a perfect indicator of activity, is symptomatic of the slow implementation of PNPM-Agriculture and the disruption between PNPM-Agriculture and VDP. PNPM-Agriculture did not receive much attention from PSF until MTR, as the MTR report itself mentions. By the time a separate desk for focused implementation of PNPM-Agriculture became operational, PNPM had been closed by the Government. In the aftermath of PNPM-Agriculture there was a gap of two years when the project was redesigned into VDP and handed over to MoV for implementation, at the request of the Government.
88. **Economic internal rate of return (EIRR).** The Implementation Completion Report of PNPM did not disaggregate the EIRR for PNPM-Rural and PNPM-Agriculture and arrived at a median EIRR rate for PNPM-Rural as a whole. The PCR had calculated the IRR for VDP. The analysis states that if the success rate of the project were assumed to be 15 per cent, the IRR comes to 14 per cent. It is unclear what “success rate” implies. Nevertheless, the calculations were made on the assumption that all 627 of the groups received the “requisite support”. However, as table 2 in annex XI of the PCR shows, most of the groups received one-off trainings or inputs and very few groups received any village funds, as covered under effectiveness. The overall estimated economic rate of return is 19 per cent with a 60 per cent success factor, and 12 per cent if the success rate dropped to 15 per cent overall.

Figure 2

**Disbursement profile of IFAD financing to PNPM and VDP**



Source: Operational Results Management System (ORMS) and IFAD supervision mission reports.

<sup>28</sup> Special Drawing Rights.

89. **Procurement.** The PCR states that VDP was affected by lengthy tendering and procurement processes due to delays in obtaining No Objection from IFAD. This was due to the poor quality of the bidding documents prepared and submitted by VDP; for example, bidding documents lacked conformity with government procurement regulations, or errors were made in computing evaluation scoring. Similar delays were also noted as a part of PNPM-Rural and PNPM-Agriculture. PNPM MTR noted that the main reason for delays was the cumbersome process for No Objection from the World Bank, which was the cooperating agency. This resulted in delayed staff recruitment, training delivery and appointment of consultants.

90. In light of the analysis in this section, efficiency is rated as **moderately unsatisfactory (3)**.

### **Rural poverty impact**

91. **The M&E system provides little meaningful data on project impacts.** VDP laid much emphasis on aspects of human and social capital and empowerment – capacity-building, and building agency and voice. However, the indicators provide no insights into what this means for people, what skills, confidence and capabilities have been built, what new relationships have been forged/strengthened (bridging social capital), what cooperation and collaboration have been developed (bonding social capital) and what voice and agency have been strengthened as a result of the programme. There is a need to understand how different programme participants experienced these changes differently.

92. Indeed, there are no reliable data presented on the changes in the lives of the rural poor (whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended) and it is therefore not clear how the PCR reached its conclusion. This lack of M&E data also hampers the assessment of the PPE on the impact domains and meant that the evaluation team relied much more on the inputs from interviews with target groups.

### **Household income and assets**

93. Among the eight groups interviewed, only groups A, D, G and J reported any profits from their respective group activities (refer to table 3 in annex X). Hence, there is some evidence of profits. However, all of these groups (or individual enterprises) were existing (intermittently in some cases) even before VDP and throughout PNPM (two of the groups were formed in 2006 and 2007). Therefore, the incremental attribution to PNPM-Agriculture and VDP cannot be established. The PCR quotes unverifiable household income data from the programme's M&E dashboard that incomes increased by an average of 20 per cent over VDP's two-year period, with seaweed, cacao and coffee production being particularly lucrative, but also noted that *"It is not possible to further quantify all the impacts as surveys of household income were not conducted"*.

### **Human and social capital and empowerment**

94. As the theory of change lays out, facilitation is key to ensuring inclusion and empowerment and also inculcating training and capacity-building. However, as has been covered in the section on effectiveness, a robust facilitation structure was found to be missing in PNPM-Agriculture and VDP. This meant that none of the 26 product-based booklets produced by VDP and available on the M&E website of the project were used to build the technical capacity of the target groups.

95. **Little human capacity was built.** The PCR stated that about 32,200 farmers under PNPM-Agriculture and VDP combined (respectively, 17,200 and 15,000) received functional skills training (e.g. farmer group dynamics, internal organization, and objective setting) as well as technical training, mostly related to improved agricultural techniques. The PPE was not given access to data which could confirm this. It is also not known if this only included formal training provision following training modules delivered at training centres and at village level, or also included informal advice *in situ*. PPE field interviews indicated that very little technical training

was provided (refer to table 2 in annex X). One coffee-growing group received training on better cultivation twice, another such group only once; one banana-growing group received training once on banana chip manufacture; two others received finance and administration training once, but one group said this was “*superficial and not helpful*”; three received no training at all, including one group receiving no training according to the district facilitator “*because they were too far away*”. Also, technical capacity-building is not seen among many facilitators as a part of their role (refer to table 1 in annex X). The training was undertaken in district/regency capitals and hence involved only one or two members of the group. As covered under effectiveness, the trainings were often found to be not useful.

**Social capital accumulation benefits were not realized.** Given the preference to work individually or in existing family/kinship associations, as noted in the PCR and by this PPE in the section on relevance, the bonding social capital benefits of forming groups are not valued. None of the men interviewed shared any sense that having a formal group structure was beneficial and they did not meet, cultivate or market as a group. Some women indicated that they did like meeting their group as an opportunity to “*share stories and burdens and also laugh a lot*”. The groups’ dynamics were not found to have been affected in sampled groups except for the sea cucumber group (group A), which shared that they were now recognized as an entity and “*students and officials come to learn from us*”. This particular group benefited from direct MoV grant assistance (see table 2 in annex X).

#### **Food security and agricultural productivity**

96. **There is no systematic and reliable data on food security and agricultural productivity,** yet the PCR made the broad and unsubstantiated statement that “*PNPM-Agriculture has contributed to further improvements by supporting increased production through expanded cultivated areas, increases in yields, diversification of food crops, increased consumption of fresh vegetables in lowland and highland villages, and increased and more regular consumption of fish in coastal villages*” and asserted that “*Similar improvements have been initiated by VDP*”. The PCR assessment of this evaluation criteria as *moderately satisfactory (4)* relies on anecdotal data for both PNPM-Agriculture and VDP.
97. **Anecdotally, of the PPE-sampled farmer groups, only three of the eight groups indicated that yields had increased.** Two of these groups were coffee-growing groups and they indicated that applying what they had learned about spacing coffee bushes had helped productivity. The third group was the thriving sea cucumber group (refer to table 3 in annex X). These three groups made profits, and the resultant increased household incomes would have the potential to improve food security. One coffee-growing group does not withdraw individual incomes from the group funds but rather ensures that the children of group members are fed properly. Two vegetable groups and the fishpond group shared that they eat the produce themselves. The fish group was doing this before the project, and the others did not note any particular benefit of growing vegetables as it was a seasonal activity that they were already occasionally engaged in before the project. With the exception of two of the sample groups, none of the other groups noted any programme benefits related to agricultural productivity or food security.

#### **Institutions and policies**

98. **As noted under relevance, both PNPM-Agriculture and VDP were closely aligned with and embedded in national institutions and policies.** VDP was fully integrated with the intentions of the Village Law. While PNPM relied on local facilitators to prepare funding proposals, VDP was designed to build the capacity of village governments to do this for themselves and, therefore, was intended to build local institutional capacity. However, as has been covered previously, there was minimal interaction with public programmes and local government institutions.



99. **Policy engagement was timely and led to important policy outcomes.** PNPM-Agriculture was strategically placed to inform the then ongoing policy formulation regarding the roll-out of the Village Law. The PCR noted that an external study on IFAD's policy engagement in 2017<sup>29</sup> had found that despite the challenges faced by the programme related to political and institutional change, VDP was able to “*be opportunistic, capitalize on successful institutional repositioning, and engage in responsive, ad hoc, country-level policy engagement, building on the success of a programme that largely spoke for itself*”, providing the Government with a model for how the tenets of the Village Law could be operationalized.
100. PNPM-Agriculture's presence in Papua and West Papua and its model<sup>30</sup> of ensuring assured grants to village governments, instead of competitive grants at block level (in the rest of the country), informed the Village Law, wherein a similar model of fund availability was foreseen for rest of Indonesia. Consistent engagement with MoV since its inception also helped IFAD to form a strong partnership with the ministry and foster long-term planning, even beyond the life of the programme. This manifested in the planning of TEKAD even before VDP was designed. Such collaboration is especially important given the fact that MoV is a relatively new ministry which was formed in 2015 to take over the CDD interventions from MoHA.
101. **In summary**, VDP and PNPM-Agriculture had no substantial impact on the incomes of the households. In cases where increased profitability and yields were observed, they were mostly due to the fact that these groups had already existed before PNPM and VDP and were present in the project area and were oriented towards markets. The impact on human and social capital is also marginal, as the facilitators were found to not give priority to technical capacity-building and training. Groups were found to be formed for the purpose of availing project benefits without any particular affinity to the group. The impact on food security and nutrition is uneven. PNPM-Agriculture did have a positive influence on policies, and their operations fed into the creation of the Village Law; VDP had a positive influence on the experiences of MoV in the form of feedback into the design of TEKAD. In light of the analysis above, rural poverty impact is rated as **moderately unsatisfactory (3)**.

### **Sustainability of benefits**

102. Sustainability of programme results can be framed in terms of building capacity of village governments, farmers and others to be able to make their own informed decisions (institutional sustainability), make investments rather than underwrite expenses, find ways to make the village funds work for them (generate income, add value) and forge market and other external linkages which can be sustained without outside support. Clearly, the short length of VDP precluded the provision of intensive and sufficient training, mentoring and hand-holding required for empowerment and consequent sustainability outcomes, while the abrupt closure of PNPM-Agriculture did not provide for a seamless transition from PNPM-Agriculture to VDP.
103. **Institutional sustainability is a key element of the approach adopted by VDP**, which depends more on existing and permanent government structures than predecessor PNPM projects. The PCR noted that the design of the VDP was inherently more sustainable in the sense that small-project funding is facilitated through village fund allocations mandated by the Village Law rather than relying on uncertain allocation of block grants.
104. **There were constraints to achieving institutional sustainability beyond the short duration of the programme.** The PCR notes constraints to institutional sustainability which include: (i) insufficient linkages with district and subdistrict

<sup>29</sup> Exploration of a methodology for assessing the impact of policy engagement: What impact and how to assess it?: [https://www.ifad.org/documents/38714170/40318454/26\\_research\\_series.pdf/00433575-a1fb-48d9-bfed-b3b9825bda4a?eloutlink=imf2ifad](https://www.ifad.org/documents/38714170/40318454/26_research_series.pdf/00433575-a1fb-48d9-bfed-b3b9825bda4a?eloutlink=imf2ifad).

<sup>30</sup> PNPM-Agriculture operated alongside PNPM-RESPEK which was the version of PNPM-Rural implemented in Papua and West Papua. PNPM-RESPEK followed a similar model of grant transfer wherein village government got grants without competing.

public departments; (ii) poorly functioning coordination teams at provincial and district levels, without the appropriate membership or financial resources to meet quarterly; (iii) insufficient decentralization of authority in order to achieve ownership of project implementation; (iv) inadequate M&E and management information systems; and (v) lack of village government awareness of the use of village funds for economic development.<sup>31</sup> Interviews with village, district and regency facilitators confirm all of the above (and have been noted earlier in this report).

105. **Some constraints can be attributed to the early stages of implementation of the Village Law.** The law requires a range of different roles to be understood and enacted, including transforming supervision roles to advisory roles at subdistrict and district levels. The top-down control is challenged by the tenets of localization imbued in the Village Law, and these are difficult hierarchies to dismantle. The PCR notes that one limitation of VDP was the inadequate support provided to forge durable linkages between villages and subdistrict and district technical departments so that villages could continue accessing support beyond the short project duration. This also links back to the lack of a robust and comprehensive facilitation structure, which has been a defining gap in VDP and PNPM-Agriculture. As covered under effectiveness, there was no linkage to existing government programmes and funds. The PCR noted that since village facilitators were unable to build collaboration with P3MD facilitators or agricultural extensionists, it meant that villagers would have no sustainable sources of support to access services once project support was over.
106. **Project-paid facilitators meant that they were accountable to the project rather than the communities and worked only with bodies identified as important for the project.** In the PCR, under lessons learned, it is noted that “VDP activities were entirely village-focused, with project-paid facilitators and limited involvement of villages’ existing structures, whether traditional or created for the implementation of the Village Law”. Facilitators concentrated their focus on the village government, i.e. the actors responsible for the village plans and village funds, and did not include the traditional authorities (village council and village assembly<sup>32</sup>), which in the view of the PCR are more representative of community views. Project design for the successor programme TEKAD endorses the idea of local cadres (facilitators) being identified within villages and potentially paid for from village funds<sup>33</sup> and takes a stronger orientation to sustainability from the outset with a number of supporting strategies to achieve this.
107. A second consequence of the project paying facilitators and their resultant accountability to the project structures was that when PNPM-Agriculture was suspended and subsequently redesigned into VDP and after VDP was closed, the facilitation structure, to the extent that it was effective, became dysfunctional; facilitators, especially district facilitators and upwards, went to other jobs or remained unemployed. Thus, the facilitation structure of VDP ran parallel to that of ongoing government programmes such as P3MD. During the PPE meetings, most of the facilitators, at all levels, were expecting to be hired back for TEKAD. Thus, the facilitation approach remained highly “projectized”.
108. **Technical and economic sustainability.** The PCR noted that while technical skills were imparted to farmers,<sup>34</sup> productivity would not increase without farmers’ access to finance or assurance of remunerative markets. The PPE concurs with this assessment and attributes this to a lack of a robust theory of change. A well-designed ToC would have clearly shown the importance of both access to finance and markets,

<sup>31</sup> Despite a circular issued by the Governor of Papua suggesting that 20 per cent of village funds be used for economic development, allocations (2018) were 13 per cent (Papua) and 9 per cent (West Papua).

<sup>32</sup> Both have a consultative rather than executive function.

<sup>33</sup> “Village cadres and community leaders will build on existing social and economic village structures and particularly seek to mobilize young people to promote a network of village activists who will further support broad-based village participation. It is expected that, building on good achievements, a larger number of village cadres could be hired using Village Fund resources” (TEKAD Project Design Document, p. 12).

<sup>34</sup> Through demonstration plots and farmer field schools.

which were key to achieving the intended agricultural production outcomes. The PCR also notes that in Papua/West Papua there is a high expectation of free inputs, which was perpetuated by the use of village funds to provide free inputs to the detriment of longer-term investment in equipment or infrastructure. While market specialists helped identify and forge market linkages, they were appointed too late to influence the informed selection at village level of projects.

109. In the groups interviewed that were still functioning and making profits, irrespective of magnitude, were those which had pre-existing or project-coordinated linkages to markets. In two out of the three cases, the groups have existed since before both PNPM-Agriculture and VDP started and were also linked to markets. The access to markets made the groups economically viable and ensured their sustainability. Thus, the lack of a market orientation and lack of incentive (whether social or economic) precludes sustainability of many of the groups.

**In summary**, the project's modus operandi of stand-alone facilitators accountable to project structures did not support mechanisms for continued backstopping of groups. The lack of focus on market-driven economic activities resulted in weak sustainability beyond the closure of the project, except in groups where the commodities of focus were market-driven and the group was market-driven. However, the PPE also recognizes that given VDP's short duration it would have been difficult for VDP to put in place the enablers of sustainability. In light of this assessment, sustainability is rated as **moderately unsatisfactory (3)**.

## **B. Other performance criteria**

### **Innovation**

110. **PNPM-Agriculture in Papua/West Papua was innovative** in that it was designed differently from PNPM elsewhere, as villages did not have to compete for funds. Every village (nearly 4,000) received annual funds from PNPM-Rural. This meant that IFAD concentrated efforts and innovation on the soft, process-side of the programme, especially training and facilitation. This was, as noted above, a direct forerunner of the Village Law, which scrapped competition for funds in favour of universal annual allocations towards village funds.
111. **The innovation of PNPM-Agriculture became the model for implementation of the Village Law.** The PCR notes that an internal government review of the performance of PNPM-Agriculture led to the decision to use PNPM-Agriculture as a model to implement the Village Law going forward.
112. **VDP innovations have been taken up in design of the successor TEKAD project.** These include: (i) the promotion of new marketing arrangements in collaboration with farmer groups; (ii) the use of social media as an advertising and brokering platform (Wamena District); (iii) the forging of direct, informal marketing linkages with supermarkets (a first in Papua); and (iv) alternative conflict resolution mechanisms (Wamena District), which have subsequently been adopted by a number of villages.<sup>35</sup>
113. **Internet has been used for knowledge management, communication and M&E.** A number of success stories have been promoted widely using social media, including YouTube and Facebook. This use of social media recognizes the innovations inherent in the stories but also the innovation in communicating these stories and generating interest. Among the groups interviewed by the PPE team, the group growing sea cucumbers pointed towards a video made on the group and available on YouTube.
114. The programme portal also contained a web-based monitoring system<sup>36</sup>. It provided a transparent manner for tracking results of the programme. However, innovation in

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<sup>35</sup> TEKAD project design, p. 6.

<sup>36</sup> <http://ppdm.kemendes.go.id/progress>

web-based monitoring and evaluation has not been successful in ensuring accurate data, and the system was found by the evaluation team to not be user-friendly. In addition, the portal reveals the names of group members and their village of residence publicly, which is not ideal as pertains to data protection safeguards.

115. In light of the analysis above, innovation is rated as **satisfactory (5)**.

### **Scaling up**

116. **VDP was conceived as a pilot and transition project with a view to scale it up.** The Government indicated a preference for IFAD by encouraging the development of VDP with the undisbursed balance from PNPM-Agriculture and endorsed this by ensuring a transition from VDP until the start of TEKAD and provided bridge financing of approximately US\$3 million to cover VDP activities in 2019.
117. **The successor programme TEKAD is designed to enable rural households to “develop sustainable livelihoods, taking advantage of strengthened village- and district-level governance”<sup>37</sup>.** Notably, lessons learned from VDP have been addressed in the project design. The PPE specifically acknowledges that TEKAD is designed to provide “a temporary intervention that aims at boosting the capacities of existing players”.<sup>38</sup> It also states that the programme strategy and activities are driven “by the primary concern that, by the end of project implementation, **sustainable mechanisms** have been established to ensure **sustainable** planning and implementation of village resources for economic growth” (PPE emphasis in bold). In order to achieve this, in addition to promoting effective use of village funds, more emphasis has been placed on establishing an enabling environment through access to qualified technical and business development services, including financial service providers beyond those provided in VDP. TEKAD represents a much bigger cofinancing of over US\$560 million by the national government.
118. Significantly, TEKAD is designed to complement and extend the potential impacts of the Institutional Strengthening for Improved Village Service Delivery Project (*Program Penguatan Pemerintahan dan Pembangunan Desa - P3PD*) negotiated with the World Bank and implemented through MoHA. P3PD focuses on strengthening governance capacities at district, subdistrict and village levels. TEKAD therefore will take advantage of tools and guidelines developed under P3PD, extend the scope to focus on improved agriculture-based livelihoods, and enhance market linkages and geographic coverage to Papua and West Papua.
119. In light of the analysis above, scaling up is rated as **satisfactory (5)**.

### **Gender equality and women's empowerment**

120. **Assumptions around gender dynamics specific to Papua and West Papua were not carefully examined in programme design.** Both PNPM-Agriculture and VDP were hampered by the lack of recent research carried out in Tanah Papua on gender and how gender dynamics are evolving. Both adopted the conventional wisdom, which suggests there is pervasive patriarchy. However, the literature review and research in Papua presents a more nuanced picture, and family roles may be constructed differently. For example, in many parts of Papua, it is women who traditionally farm to feed their family, often leaving their children in the care of older people for several days while they collect and harvest. They also traditionally take excess produce to markets. Thus, they have an important economic role to play in the households and communities.<sup>39</sup> Consequently, there was need for differentiated analysis of women’s roles in different communities.
121. **PNPM-Agriculture and VDP did not adopt a workable women’s empowerment focus.** Neither programmes benefited from a specialized component

<sup>37</sup> IFAD. *Transformasi Ekonomi Kampung Terpadu - Integrated Village Economic Transformation (TEKAD): Project Design Report. Main report and annexes* (Rome, IFAD: 2019).

<sup>38</sup> TEKAD design, p. 1.

<sup>39</sup> Jupp, *Universal Child Grant Baseline Qualitative Review*.

with dedicated women's empowerment facilitators and did not undertake a detailed situation analysis of women in order to identify what elements of inclusion and empowerment should be addressed. Programme documents do not contain a gender equality and social inclusion strategy although aspirational targets, including reducing domestic violence, were loosely made. There was no evidence of formative research being undertaken to understand the particular situation of Papuan gender dynamics. There was no analysis contained in the design or supervision documents of the roles of women and men in communities, the division of labour and the nature of economic activities undertaken by them. The PPE recognizes that this might not have been possible to capture under the PNPM-Rural given its nationwide scope. However, in a narrower geographic context such as Papua and West Papua, in PNPM-Agriculture and VDP, such analysis would be expected to have been undertaken.

122. **Metrics used in PNPM-Agriculture and VDP were weak indicators of women's empowerment.** They identify only the numbers of women registered as members of farmer groups (in PNPM-Agriculture and VDP) and numbers of women proposing projects for funding under PNPM, and incorrectly refer to these metrics as participation. The PCR noted that, under VDP, women's groups "*have been very dynamic and among the groups that carried out activities such as marketing [and] food processing*" but did not provide the percentage of women's groups active in this way and gave only one example of women involved in food-processing.
123. The PNPM-Agriculture MTR (2012) stated that women's groups usually had a lower per capita grant allocation for no apparent economic reason. The VDP supervision mission report (2018) found women's participation to be non-existent in village groups, with most of the representation being from village elites and men. The PCR states that women made up 43 per cent of the outreach under PNPM-Agriculture and 44 per cent of total outreach under VDP.
124. **Despite intentions to promote gender equality, little was achieved in terms of group dynamics.** The 2016 redesign of VDP document indicated that women would be treated as a specific target "*through socialization of gender equality, social inclusion strategies to communities and use of agriculture extension approaches tailored to the needs of groups with high rates of illiteracy*". From interviews with men and women group members, the PPE team understood that little effort had been made to ensure that women were included and supported to participate equally with men. None of the groups interviewed were women-only groups, although one group was men-only, as table 4 in annex X lays out.
125. One group shared that they "*bring our wives along because every project wants women in the group*". Only two groups had any women in positions of authority in the group, and in both cases they were secretaries. It was not possible to clarify whether there were gender-defined differences in expected roles within the group. However, in the banana-growing group, it was the men who attended the training on banana chip-making in the city, arguably a role which might have been expected to have been taken on by women. Triangulation through interviews with VDP facilitators did not reveal that any specific activities were undertaken to enhance the inclusion of women except registration as members of groups, irrespective of whether they were active in the group.
126. **The target for hiring women facilitators was not met.** PNPM-Agriculture achieved close to its target in the recruitment of district facilitators (29 per cent women against a 37 per cent target) and village facilitators (46 per cent against a 50 per cent target).<sup>40</sup> The VDP redesign noted an intention to ensure that 30 per cent of facilitators were women but achieved only 12 per cent of women facilitators. This was attributed to the fact that women had insufficient formal education to fulfil the requirements for village facilitators and a lack of availability to take on new, full-

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<sup>40</sup> PCR, paragraph 47.

time responsibilities.<sup>41</sup> PPE interviews indicated that extensive travel and requirements to stay overnight in villages also limited women's willingness to apply for district facilitator roles.

127. **Facilitators did not focus on the inclusion of women.** The VDP redesign document noted that training of "*community facilitators will include: (i) gender aspects – particularly relevant for highlands communities where women are marginalized*" but this was not confirmed through PPE interviews. Only one of the facilitators interviewed indicated the adoption of any special measures to encourage women's participation or build their confidence and skills, and this facilitator explained that his orientation to this came from his previous training and experience working with an NGO, rather than from VDP.
128. In light of the analysis above, gender equality and women's empowerment is rated as **moderately unsatisfactory (3)**.

### **Environment and natural resource management**

129. **The PCR noted that the programme contributed to positive change**, pointing out that while not a specific objective in either project, both VDP and PNPM-Agriculture contributed to positive changes in land and marine natural resources, especially by raising community awareness and introducing more sustainable crop practices, such as composting to improve organic matter, reducing shifting agriculture and, in the highlands, keeping livestock away from family living quarters. It also stated that project activities have not contributed to any negative impact on the environment. VDP produced 26 booklets which pertained to different products on which the project wished to train the target groups. A review by the evaluation team of these booklets reveals that none of these booklets contain instructions on sustainable natural resource management.
130. **There is no ongoing monitoring of environmental impacts** (positive or negative) and, as far as the PPE can ascertain, no routine environmental assessments were conducted prior to individual interventions with village funds, although compliance with legal covenants related to environmental issues is stated in the design document for VDP (see Appendix 6 of Project Design Report).
131. In light of the analysis above, environment and natural resource management is rated as **moderately satisfactory (4)**.

### **Adaptation to climate change**

132. **The PCR states that there has been some improvement in the resilience of local communities to climate-related shocks and stresses.** It particularly cites: "*(i) raising the levels of soil organic matter is helping to reduce run-off and improve soil health by encouraging worm and microbe activity; (ii) VDP agriculture technology messages to promote more sustainable agricultural practices and natural resource management on sloping land; (iii) encouraging continued cultivation of sweet potato using traditional methods, which are very effective at reducing the rate and speed of water run-off in major rainfall events; (iv) farmers were strongly discouraged from establishing tree crops, especially cacao, on land developed from primary forest; and (v) successful promotion of seaweed in Yapen Island and Fak Fak contributed to sustainable carbon sequestration.*" The PPE was unable to verify these claims except to acknowledge that booklets produced under VDP did include some of the above aspects on adaptation to climate change. No mention of improved resilience as an outcome of the programme was made in field interviews by farmer groups or facilitators and no reference was made to any training resources or booklets. Therefore, IOE will not be able to rate this criterion.

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<sup>41</sup> PCR, paragraph 50.

## C. Overall project achievement

133. The PCR, programme documents and stakeholders see the programme as "*one of the few having achieved tangible results in the remotest and most disadvantaged provinces in Indonesia*"; this achievement is attributed to the fact that the programme was carefully "*tailored to the cultural and social characteristics of the local context*". The PPE validates this statement to some extent, in that Papua and West Papua have unique economic, cultural and social realities as compared to rest of Indonesia. This is a demonstration of the difficulties that are pervasive in the Papuan context and the challenges that VDP and PNPM-Agriculture had to tackle around geography, cultural norms and existing governance structures. Thus, any achievement of PNPM-Agriculture and VDP, or lack of it, should be seen against this backdrop.
134. PNPM-Agriculture and VDP design reports foresaw working with existing donor-financed and national programmes such as PNPM-Rural, PNPM-RESPEK and P3MD. Such dovetailing led to an incorporating of some of experiences of PNPM-Agriculture into national legislation (Village Law of 2014). The numerous stakeholders interviewed by the evaluation team have stated that the fact that these two programmes, PNPM-Agriculture and VDP, have been lauded by the Government as models for promoting sustainable local social and economic development and that a follow-on scale-up programme (TEKAD) has been designed is a demonstration of their relative relevance. This remains the IFAD and VDP/PNPM-Agriculture's biggest achievement irrespective of the extent to which the results of the programme(s) informed TEKAD.
135. PNPM-Agriculture and VDP were found to be affected by a lack of robust facilitation structure which could promote community-based planning, implementation, monitoring and learning. Support from facilitators for community groups was found to be largely disjointed and one-off. Elaboration and articulation of community needs and inclusion of different segments of the community (such as women and youth) were largely missing in PNPM-Agriculture and VDP, and the absence of robust facilitation played a role in the lack of such inclusion.
136. There was a lack of impact on social capital and incomes for target groups. The only groups that saw success in attaining profitability were those which had a market orientation and a shared orientation to make profits. The stand-alone nature of interventions also led to a lack of leverage with and ownership from village governments. This led to a lack of sustainability of benefits and backstopping for community groups after closure of the project(s). To that end, further activities and backstopping of group activities are only foreseen when TEKAD starts its operations.
137. Notwithstanding all of the limitations noted above, PNPM-Agriculture and VDP also worked in highly challenging policy and geographic contexts. The remoteness of Papua and West Papua, and governance challenges, affected the programme's performance. The change in policy environment (Village Law), the resultant transition from PNPM-Agriculture to VDP, and the change in the institutional structure (change of charge from MoHA to MOV) hampered the implementation of VDP.
138. In light of the assessment above, overall achievement is rated as **moderately satisfactory (4)**.

## D. Performance of partners

### IFAD

139. IFAD took on the challenge to support PNPM activities in one of the most challenging parts of Indonesia, with poor access and communications, as well as promoted agricultural investment where this had largely been marginalized within PNPM. Against the backdrop of the nationwide PNPM-Rural programme which was providing grants primarily to develop community infrastructure (e.g. roads, water tanks and

piped water supplies, toilets, schools and health facilities),<sup>42</sup> various IFAD supervision missions pushed for more attention by PSF towards implementation of PNPM-Agriculture through the establishment of a separate desk in PSF for Papua and West Papua. In addition, IFAD proposed a discontinuation of the partnership with the World Bank in light of the insufficient attention to PNPM-Agriculture during implementation. IFAD also piloted a different and more equitable funding approach that was appropriate to more disadvantaged districts. The approach did not require competition for funds, as it did in the rest of Indonesia under PNPM-Rural.

140. IFAD undertook periodic missions. A review of supervision mission documents shows a consistent approach towards bringing up issues of focus and inclusion. In addition, IFAD's supervision missions consistently emphasized the need for focus on agriculture-related livelihoods and provided recommendations to that end. However, the follow-up to the recommendations was rare throughout the life of PNPM-Agriculture and VDP. This was because PNPM-Agriculture was implemented by PSF, which was implementing the larger PNPM-Rural and paid little attention to PNPM-Agriculture. This lack of attention to PNPM-Agriculture was prominently recognized in the MTR of 2012. On the other hand, VDP's implementation period was too short to implement the supervision mission recommendations.
141. In terms of design of VDP, IFAD intended to carry out the project as a pilot exercise before scaling up through TEKAD. This would have ideally required IFAD to have a more focused geographic area to better demonstrate outcomes for scaling up. However, VDP had a wider geographic area compared to PNPM-Agriculture. This led to the implementation of VDP as a conventional project with constraints similar to PNPM-Agriculture (e.g. deficient M&E, procurement delays, lack of facilitation) being observed in VDP. IFAD missed the opportunity to pilot innovative models and instead tried to implement a conventional project in a short time period of two years.
142. With the experience of PNPM-Agriculture, IFAD was well positioned to assist MoHA and subsequently MoV in rolling out the principles of the Village Law, which expected village governments to fund community development projects from their own village funds. The abrupt closure of PNPM-Agriculture and the confusing environment that followed tested IFAD's engagement with the project. However, IFAD demonstrated patience and flexibility in responding to the Government's changes in policy, establishment of the new MoV and the roll-out of the Village Law. To that end, IFAD has engaged in a long-term association with MoV, first with VDP as a pilot intervention and then TEKAD as a longer-term and scaled up version of VDP.
143. In light of the assessment above, IFAD's performance is rated as **moderately satisfactory (4)**.

#### **Government**

144. PSF was integrated and embedded in the structures of the Government, which helped in rapid disbursement of funds and implementation of the PNPM programme. However, the PNPM umbrella of programmes in general and PNPM-Agriculture and VDP in particular suffered from weak M&E data at outcome level and, in many cases, even at output level. In addition, there was a general lack of capacity provided in terms of facilitation services. This remained a problem in PNPM-Agriculture and subsequently in VDP. While the project implementation unit of VDP placed higher emphasis on facilitation services, such emphasis did not yield sufficient results due to the short period of implementation.
145. The project's M&E was found wanting in PNPM-Agriculture and VDP even though a more systematic emphasis on M&E was foreseen in the design of VDP. The M&E portal designed for VDP was found to be unwieldy for the purpose of assessing project performance. There were inconsistencies even in terms of data at the output

<sup>42</sup> Integrating community driven development principles in to policy: From PNPM Mandiri to the Village Law: <http://www.tnp2k.go.id/images/uploads/downloads/Integrating%20Community%20Driven%20Development%20Principles%20into%20Policy%20From%20PNPM%20Mandiri%20to%20the%20Village%20Law.pdf>.



level. Many of the indicators which were measured were not clearly defined and their accuracy could not be verified (refer to annex VIII).

146. As has been covered under efficiency, VDP was found to be affected by lengthy tendering and procurement processes, due to delays in obtaining No Objection from IFAD. The delays were due to the poor quality of the bidding documents prepared and submitted by VDP. Such documents lacked conformity with GoI procurement regulations, or errors in computing evaluation scoring. Similar delays were also noted as a part of PNPM-Rural and PNPM-Agriculture, but they were due to delays from the World Bank in providing No Objections to procurement requests. The PCR noted that the quality of financial management was satisfactory.
147. The Government has scaled up VDP with US\$560 million financing for TEKAD, with IFAD cofinancing of US\$35 million. To that extent, the Government has taken a planned approach to scaling up, with VDP being declared as an interim, pilot project during the redesign of PNPM-Agriculture. Thus, MoV took a strategic view of its engagement in Papua and West Papua and also of its engagement with IFAD.
148. In light of the assessment above, government performance is rated as **moderately satisfactory (4)**.

#### **E. Assessment of the quality of the project completion report**

149. **Scope.** The PCR covers all the criteria laid out in the PCR guidelines. It also provides ratings on all the criteria that are required as per the PCR guidelines. The narrative in the PCR also tries to answer the evaluation questions which are required for assessing the criteria. The scope of the PCR is rated as **moderately satisfactory (4)**.
150. **Quality (data).** Given the lack of M&E throughout the project life, most of the criteria did not contain any impact or outcome data. Even where such data is laid out, the source of such data is unclear. For example, paragraph 60 of the PCR says, *"With regard to the second indicator '70 per cent of farmers adopt demonstrated technologies', 68 per cent of a total of 627 farmer groups have agreed to change cultivation practices, representing approximately 10,000 men and women and 1,053 lead farmers in 149 villages."* The source of the data is unclear and none of the M&E sources of data that the PPE team was able to access have these data. The quality of the PCR is rated as **unsatisfactory (2)**.
151. **Lessons.** The lessons learned in the PCR lay out, inter alia, the importance of: a long-term approach; access to markets and finance; and accountability within the project. These are also the findings of the PPE and are elaborated in various parts of the report, including in conclusions and recommendations. Thus, the lessons elaborated are pertinent. The lessons learned is rated as **satisfactory (5)**.
152. **Candour.** The PCR narrative was found to be forthright. However, most of the ratings were provided without substantial evidence in light of the lack of M&E data. The average rating deviation between IOE ratings and PCR ratings is found to be 0.36. Candour is rated as **moderately satisfactory (4)**.

**Key points**

- Assessment of results and achievements was seriously challenged by the lack of accurate M&E data even at the output level.
- The project saw little impact in terms of social capital, empowerment and incomes.
- Lack of robust facilitation services significantly compromised of project performance.
- The project's biggest achievement was the scaling up by the Government through the successor project TEKAD.
- PNPM-Agriculture and VDP's performance were affected by the evolving policy environment and challenging governance issues in Papua and West Papua.

## IV. Conclusions and recommendations

### A. Conclusions

153. **IFAD made a bold choice in engaging with the government flagship CDD programme in Papua and West Papua**, which had the advantage of IFAD being in close interaction with policymakers and development partners and helping in scaling up of interventions, as has happened in the case of VDP being scaled up through TEKAD. On the other hand, it came with risks of programmes being disrupted due to policy changes or IFAD having little control over the quality of implementation of projects. In PNPM-Agriculture and VDP, project performance was affected by the changes in policy environment (Village Law) and the nascent capacities of partners such as MoV and the World Bank.
154. IFAD also chose to focus its programmes on the outer islands of eastern Indonesia: Papua and West Papua. Such a focus on relatively marginalized geographies with development and governance challenges impinges on expected results during the life of the project, whether in terms of programme performance, accountability or results reporting. The influence of such context-specific factors on performance was clearly witnessed in VDP and PNPM-Agriculture.
155. **Linking CDD and livelihood generation requires an iterative process of feedback and facilitation.** CDD projects were historically meant to provide a participatory mechanism for the provision of basic services such as village infrastructure in areas with a weak government presence. PNPM and VDP overlaid CDD onto economic livelihoods generation. Such an orientation requires an iterative process of feedback between the programme and its target groups for a bottom-up elaboration of beneficiary priorities, market linkages, input provision and M&E. It also requires coordination with various players and development programmes. This calls for the presence of a robust and permanent facilitation structure embedded in local communities which can respond to the needs of the communities during the life of a programme and after its closure. PNPM-Agriculture and VDP's weak facilitation structure meant that most of the interventions were stand-alone and one-off in nature. The lack of such facilitation structure also prevented PNPM-Agriculture and VDP from substantial coordination with existing public programmes.
156. **Accountability, learning and feedback system in a CDD programme is a prerequisite to ensure adaptive, relevant and participatory programming.** A robust M&E framework is key to measuring results periodically and adapting programme activities in real time in CDD programmes. For a CDD programme, M&E systems need to equally emphasize measuring participatory process as much as outputs and outcomes (see annex IX). This was found to be missing in VDP and PNPM-Agriculture. A robust M&E system is also key in providing evidence of results of programmes and helps in the scaling-up process. Such a system rests on the presence of a robust facilitation structure which collects data and feedback for programme implementation. In PNPM-Agriculture and VDP's case, the lack of a functioning M&E led to an absence of feedback and learning between PNPM-Agriculture and VDP, for example, on the importance of facilitation.

### B. Recommendations

157. **Recommendation 1: IFAD should invest in a long-term and well-resourced cadre of facilitators and facilitation services which can maintain a presence in project area(s) after a project exits.** This should include coordination and harmonization with existing programmes which also use facilitation services. The facilitators should be well resourced to carry out their duties in the communities and have provisions for receiving support in the form of refresher trainings, mentoring, coaching and backstopping throughout the project life. This becomes important in the context of TEKAD, which envisages engagement in building sustainable livelihoods.

158. **Recommendation 2: Livelihood enhancement interventions should have a market orientation.** Future projects should include a detailed diagnostic analysis of the existing market demand and map it with existing production patterns in the project area. Commodities and activities of focus should be selected with a view to meeting the market gaps identified in the diagnostic analysis. Additional emphasis should be placed on those groups that are already market-oriented, in terms of product quality and quantity. This would provide demonstration and learning for other community members and groups on critical building blocks for market-oriented livelihoods.
159. **Recommendation 3: Future CDD programmes working in challenging geographies such as Papua and West Papua will need to take a phased, longer-term view of operations.** As a consequence of the two recommendations above, a market orientation of livelihood activities and a strategic view of facilitation services in challenging environments such as Tanah Papua will require a systemic and transformational change in institutional capacities. This will require a long-term and phased engagement of IFAD's interventions. To that end, IFAD should make a strategic choice to look beyond one project cycle and plan its interventions/projects over a longer time horizon.
160. **Recommendation 4: Monitoring and evaluation systems of future CDD projects should be built to create downward accountability to target groups and place sufficient emphasis on measuring the quality of participatory processes in addition to economic outcomes.** This would involve target groups having a role in defining the indicators of their interest and having a role in measuring the progress on those indicators. This requires project staff to adopt the role of advisors and facilitators, providing capacity-building, guidance and linkages to markets and public and private services and is thus contingent on project(s) having a robust facilitation structure (refer to annex IX).

## Basic project data

			Approval (US\$ m) <sup>1</sup>		Actual (US\$ m)	
Region	Asia and the Pacific Region	Total project costs				
Country	Indonesia	IFAD loan and percentage of total <sup>2</sup>	68.53		66.07	
Loan number	L-I-755 G-I-C-1053	Government of Indonesia	-		881	
Type of project (subsector)	Rural Development	World Bank	-		1 397.5	
Financing type	Loan and Grant	Beneficiaries	-		41.2	
Lending terms <sup>*</sup>	Highly Concessional Loan Loan Component Grant					
Date of approval	11/09/2008					
Date of loan signature						
Date of effectiveness	17/03/2009	Other sources:				
Loan amendments	-	Number of beneficiaries: (if appropriate, specify if direct or indirect)	82 000 (PNPM-Agriculture) 14 000 (VDP)		125 000 (PNPM-Agriculture) 10 000 (VDP)	
Loan closure extensions	2					
Country programme managers	Ronald Thomas Hartman Ivan Cossio-Cortez Youqiong Wang	Loan closing date				
			31/09/2016		30/06/2019	
Regional director(s)	Nigel Brett Hoonae Kim	Mid-term review				
			2012		2012	
Lead evaluator for project performance evaluation	Prashanth Kotturi	IFAD loan disbursement at project completion (%)				99.81% <sup>3</sup>
Project performance evaluation quality control panel	Fabrizio Felloni Johanna Pennarz Fumiko Nakai Robert Anderson (External resource person)	Date of project completion report				2019

Source: PCR, ORMS.

<sup>1</sup> Financing envisaged at approval is only provided for IFAD funding.

<sup>2</sup> The numbers of planned and actual financing pertains to IFAD financing for PNPM-Rural, PNPM-Agriculture and VDP. It was not possible to isolate the actual and planned financing of PNPM-Agriculture and VDP alone.

<sup>3</sup> In terms of SDR.

## Definitions and ratings of the evaluation criteria used by IOE

Criteria	Definition *	Mandatory	To be rated
<b>Rural poverty impact</b>	Impact is defined as the changes that have occurred or are expected to occur in the lives of the rural poor (whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended) as a result of development interventions. <i>Four impact domains</i>	X	Yes
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Household income and net assets: Household income provides a means of assessing the flow of economic benefits accruing to an individual or group, whereas assets relate to a stock of accumulated items of economic value. The analysis must include an assessment of trends in equality over time.</li> <li>Human and social capital and empowerment: Human and social capital and empowerment include an assessment of the changes that have occurred in the empowerment of individuals, the quality of grass-roots organizations and institutions, the poor's individual and collective capacity, and in particular, the extent to which specific groups such as youth are included or excluded from the development process.</li> <li>Food security and agricultural productivity: Changes in food security relate to availability, stability, affordability and access to food and stability of access, whereas changes in agricultural productivity are measured in terms of yields; nutrition relates to the nutritional value of food and child malnutrition.</li> <li>Institutions and policies: The criterion relating to institutions and policies is designed to assess changes in the quality and performance of institutions, policies and the regulatory framework that influence the lives of the poor.</li> </ul>		No
<b>Project performance</b>	Project performance is an average of the ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.	X	Yes
Relevance	The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, institutional priorities and partner and donor policies. It also entails an assessment of project design and coherence in achieving its objectives. An assessment should also be made of whether objectives and design address inequality, for example, by assessing the relevance of targeting strategies adopted.	X	Yes
Effectiveness	The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.	X	Yes
Efficiency	A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results.	X	Yes
Sustainability of benefits	The likely continuation of net benefits from a development intervention beyond the phase of external funding support. It also includes an assessment of the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the project's life.	X	Yes
<b>Other performance criteria</b>			
Gender equality and women's empowerment	The extent to which IFAD interventions have contributed to better gender equality and women's empowerment, for example, in terms of women's access to and ownership of assets, resources and services; participation in decision making; work load balance and impact on women's incomes, nutrition and livelihoods.	X	Yes
Innovation	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have introduced innovative approaches to rural poverty reduction.	X	Yes
Scaling up	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have been (or are likely to be) scaled up by government authorities, donor organizations, the private sector and others agencies.	X	Yes
Environment and natural resources management	The extent to which IFAD development interventions contribute to resilient livelihoods and ecosystems. The focus is on the use and management of the natural environment, including natural resources defined as raw materials used for socio-economic and cultural purposes, and ecosystems and biodiversity - with the goods and services they provide.	X	Yes
Adaptation to climate change	The contribution of the project to reducing the negative impacts of climate change through dedicated adaptation or risk reduction measures.	X	Yes

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Definition</i> *	<i>Mandatory</i>	<i>To be rated</i>
<b>Overall project achievement</b>	This provides an overarching assessment of the intervention, drawing upon the analysis and ratings for rural poverty impact, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, gender equality and women's empowerment, innovation, scaling up, as well as environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change.	X	Yes
<b>Performance of partners</b>			
• IFAD	This criterion assesses the contribution of partners to project design, execution, monitoring and reporting, supervision and implementation support, and evaluation. The performance of each partner will be assessed on an individual basis with a view to the partner's expected role and responsibility in the project life cycle.	X	Yes
• Government		X	Yes

\* These definitions build on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management; the Methodological Framework for Project Evaluation agreed with the Evaluation Committee in September 2003; the first edition of the Evaluation Manual discussed with the Evaluation Committee in December 2008; and further discussions with the Evaluation Committee in November 2010 on IOE's evaluation criteria and key questions.

## Rating comparison <sup>a</sup>

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Programme Management Department rating</i>	<i>Project Performance Evaluation rating</i>	<i>Rating disconnect</i>
<b>Rural poverty impact</b>	4	3	-1
<b>Project performance</b>			
Relevance	5	4	-1
Effectiveness	4	3	-1
Efficiency	4	3	-1
Sustainability of benefits	4	3	-1
<b>Project performance <sup>b</sup></b>	<b>4.75</b>	<b>3.25</b>	<b>-1.5</b>
<b>Other performance criteria</b>			
Gender equality and women's empowerment	4	3	-1
Innovation	4	5	+1
Scaling up	5	5	0
Environment and natural resources management	4	4	0
Adaptation to climate change	4	-	-
<b>Overall project achievement <sup>c</sup></b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Performance of partners <sup>d</sup></b>			
IFAD	4	4	0
Government	4	4	0
<b>Average net disconnect</b>			<b>-0.36</b>

<sup>a</sup> Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable.

<sup>b</sup> Arithmetic average of ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.

<sup>c</sup> This is not an average of ratings of individual evaluation criteria but an overarching assessment of the project, drawing upon the rating for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, rural poverty impact, gender, innovation, scaling up, environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change.

<sup>d</sup> The rating for partners' performance is not a component of the overall project achievement rating.

### Ratings of the project completion report quality

	<i>Programme Management Department rating</i>	<i>IOE rating</i>	<i>Net disconnect</i>
Scope		4	
Quality (methods, data, participatory process)		2	
Lessons		5	
Candour		4	
<b>Overall rating of the project completion report</b>		<b>4</b>	

Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.a. = not applicable.



## Approach paper (extract)

### Background

1. For completed investment projects financed by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the Independent Office of Evaluation (IOE) undertakes project performance evaluations (PPEs) involving country visits for selected projects (about five to eight in a given year).<sup>1</sup> A PPE is conducted after a desk review of the project completion report (PCR) and other available documents, with the aim of providing additional evidence on project achievements and validating the conclusions of the PCR. The Village Development Programme (VDP) (the ex-National Programme for Community Empowerment–Agriculture [PNPM]) in Indonesia has been included in the 2020 IOE work programme and budget and will be undertaken between April and December 2020.

### Programme overview

2. **Description and evolution of the programme.** PNPM was a countrywide community-driven development (CDD) programme, initiated in 2007, which brought together a number of existing programmes and projects under a single umbrella, with the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) as the government counterpart ministry. It included a diverse range of programmes under different ministries and with different sectoral and/or geographical foci, out of which IFAD cofinanced two programmes. Under the PNPM umbrella, IFAD financed two programmes: PNPM-Rural and PNPM-Agriculture.
3. PNPM-Rural was designed as the main conduit for CDD block grants and it financed small infrastructure projects in rural areas across Indonesia. Of the total financing (refer to para. 20), 85 per cent of the funding was earmarked for financing PNPM-Rural in North, Central and South Sulawesi regions, cofinanced with the World Bank and the Government of Indonesia. The remaining 15 per cent of the funds were allocated towards the PNPM-Agriculture programme in Papua and West Papua. PNPM-Agriculture provided parallel financing for an ongoing programme titled PNPM-RESPEK (Respect in Bahasa Indonesia).<sup>2</sup> The idea behind this pilot was to enhance the use of grants provided at village level specifically for agriculture, especially as such use was minimal at the time.
4. In 2014, a new government was elected in Indonesia and, on its request, PNPM umbrella programme and its component subprogrammes, including PNPM-Rural, were closed down. The only exception was the IFAD-financed PNPM-Agriculture, which was requested to be put on hold until the Government legislated a new village law. The new “Village Law” (Law 6/2014) stipulates increased devolution of responsibilities and power to the village governments. In light of the Village Law, IFAD was asked to redesign the PNPM-Agriculture in Papua and West Papua so as to be consistent with the new law. IFAD redesigned the project and relaunched it in 2017 as VDP, using remaining funds from PNPM-Agriculture. The redesigned project was launched with the Ministry of Villages Development of Disadvantaged Regions and Transmigration (MoV), as opposed to PNPM-Rural and PNPM-Agriculture which had MoHA as the counterpart ministry. VDP closed in June 2019. Table 1 will clarify and summarize the details of PNPM-Rural, PNPM-Agriculture and VDP.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The selection criteria for the PPE include: (i) information gaps in PCRs; (ii) projects of strategic relevance that offer enhanced opportunities for learning; (iii) a need to build evidence for forthcoming corporate level evaluations, country strategy and programme evaluations, or evaluation synthesis reports; and (iv) a regional balance of IOE's evaluation programme.

<sup>2</sup> It differed from the PNPM-Rural national programme by providing grants universally to all villages while PNPM-Rural was administered as competitive grants at the block level.

<sup>3</sup> In Indonesia, four to five villages form a block, and four to five blocks form a district.

Table 1  
**Difference between PNPM-Rural, PNPM-Agriculture and VDP**

<i>Programme</i>	<i>PNPM-Rural</i>	<i>PNPM-Agriculture</i>	<i>VDP</i>
Geographic area of the project	Whole country	Papua and West Papua	Papua and West Papua
Cooperating institution <sup>4</sup>	World Bank	World Bank	None
Part of PNPM umbrella	Yes	Yes	No
Counterpart ministry	MoHA	MoHA	MoV
Timing of implementation	2008-14	2008-14	2017-2019
Effect of Village Law 2014	Closed	Paused and redesigned	Redesigned version of PNPM-Agriculture
Financiers	World Bank, IFAD and Government of Indonesia	IFAD	IFAD and Government of Indonesia

5. The VDP redesign document indicated that “processes will need to be put in place to ensure continued follow-up, either through Government activities or a follow-on IFAD-supported project’.<sup>5</sup> VDP was, therefore, regarded by both IFAD and the Government of Indonesia as a transition project that would initiate support to MoV and the development of the larger-scale follow-up project – Integrated Village Economic Transformation Project (Transformasi Ekonomi Kampung Terpadu in Indonesian language, or its acronym of TEKAD) due to commence in 2020. The geographic scope of the above-mentioned programmes is depicted in annex 2.
6. **Programme area.** IFAD financing to PNPM-Rural was provided to North, Central and South Sulawesi even though PNPM-Rural was operational throughout Indonesia. PNPM-Agriculture (later VDP) was operational in the far eastern provinces of Papua and West Papua.
7. **Programme objectives.** The overall rationale for IFAD investment in the programme was to support the Government of Indonesia’s long-term objective to reduce rural poverty by empowering rural communities and by providing them with investment resources to support productive initiatives developed through participatory planning. Due to changes in the political and institutional landscape, the programme objectives evolved through two distinct phases of the project: PNPM-Rural & Agriculture and then VDP. PNPM-Rural had two development objectives: (i) Villagers in PNPM locations benefit from improved socio-economic conditions; and (ii) Improved local governance conditions.
8. PNPM-Agriculture, which operated only in Papua and West Papua, shared the same objectives as PNPM-Rural but stipulated support for the investment of resources (from PNPM Respek block grants) which were to be used in agriculture. The redesigned pilot, VDP, had an overall goal “to reduce poverty and improve local-level governance in rural areas through the provision of investment resources to support productive proposals developed by communities, using a participatory planning process” and, with limited resources, focused on provision of facilitation and technical assistance to help communities utilize village funds effectively and preferentially for agriculture-related objectives.
9. **Target group and targeting approach.** The nationwide **PNPM-Rural** target group was the total rural population of Indonesia, estimated at 117.8 million people in 4,290 rural subdistricts in 363 districts, of whom 49 per cent were estimated to live below or just above the poverty line. IFAD financing targeted three provinces – South

<sup>4</sup> In IFAD terminology, this usually refers to the cofinancier of the project.

<sup>5</sup> IFAD redesign and implementation support mission report, 2016.

Sulawesi, Central Sulawesi and North Sulawesi – but there was no specific number for the target population for the subset of provinces.

10. **PNPM-Agriculture** targeted the population of 140 villages in 28 rural subdistricts and 8 districts (later extended to 11) in Papua and West Papua, or 82,000 people. Target villages were selected by MoHA in consultation with provincial authorities, to achieve a proportionate distribution of target groups in the highlands and coastal agroecological zones.
11. **VDP** targeted 13 districts (the same as in PNPM-Agriculture plus two more), 46 subdistricts and 224 villages over two years. The target group consisted of around 14,000 beneficiaries, of whom at least 30 per cent came from households with limited or no productive assets. Within this group, the primary target consisted of male and female smallholder farmers and livestock keepers, indigenous Papuans, females and female-headed households, youth, and particularly marginalized persons. Other priority target groups included: single-parent households, minority clans, households with members with special needs, households which have no access to land and capital, and households with large numbers of children or additional dependents.
12. The difference in definitions of target beneficiaries in the three programmes reflects the nature of the investments envisaged: PNPM-Rural was expected to support infrastructure development which benefited the entire community; PNPM-Agriculture also expected to benefit all those living in target villages; whereas VDP defined beneficiaries as those who directly participated in farmer or community groups.
13. **Programme components.** PNPM-Rural, PNPM-Agriculture and VDP all comprised community facilitation and financing of village/block grant financing outlined below. However, the economic livelihood empowerment component (outlined below) was introduced in the process redesigning PNPM-Agriculture.
14. **Component 1 – Financing small community-based projects through: (a) block grants (PNPM-Rural/PNPM-Agriculture); or (b) village funds (VDP).** Villagers participated in a process to plan, select and manage basic social and economic infrastructure provided through small grants. In VDP, output 1 was “inclusive community-driven planning processes are implemented as outlined in the Village Law, including transparent fund management at village level”. A fundamental difference between PNPM-Rural, PNPM-Agriculture and VDP was the grants funding mechanism: IFAD funding was to be (i) used as block grants in North, Central and South Sulawesi (PNPM-Rural); (ii) used to complement universal block grant provision by PNPM-RESPEK Papua and West Papua (PNPM-Agriculture); and (iii) used for community planning and technical assistance to complement universal village funds provided through the Village Law (VDP). Thus, while PNPM-Rural and PNPM-Agriculture funding was made available as grants to use for village-level activities for agriculture and non-agriculture activities (mostly infrastructure), VDP funding was used for household and community-level activities such as capacity-building and service provision to complement the provision of village grants by the Government. Another difference was the level at which grants were available: (i) one grant per approximately five villages which had to be competed for (PNPM-Rural); and (ii) universal grants available to all villages through government funding (PNPM-Agriculture and VDP).
15. **Component 2 – Effective community facilitation and technical support.** The purpose of this component was to establish a facilitation structure, staffed with well trained, locally recruited individuals at village and subdistrict levels, supervised and managed at district and national levels. This component involved recruiting facilitators at district and subdistrict levels. Training packages for district and subdistrict facilitators included a pre-service training of 12 days that provided an induction into the objectives and operation of PNPM-Agriculture and VDP; and 21 days (originally planned for three months) for a “barefoot agronomy” course that covered social mobilization issues but was mainly focused on agronomy. In addition,

VDP trained village agriculturists. The facilitators alongside village agriculturists mobilized the communities and imparted trainings for specific economic activities.

16. **Component 3 – Economic livelihood empowerment.** This component was introduced during the redesign of the project and introduction of VDP with a higher emphasis on livelihood activities. The aim of this component was to support villagers to more effectively and sustainably use their natural resources, making them more secure by transitioning them further along their respective product value chain. The economic empowerment component was funded from village grant funds under the aegis of the Village Law and individual village priority crops and the villagers themselves selected products. Some of the main modes of promoting livelihood activities were through demonstration plots, savings and credit groups, and farmer field schools.
17. Given the diverse topography and accompanying agroclimatic zones, the programme had a menu of different kinds of economic activities planned.<sup>6</sup> In the highlands, the programme had planned sweet potato, vegetables, coffee and small livestock. The priority crops/products in the lowland regions of Papua were cacao, nutmeg, copra and small livestock. In coastal areas, VDP envisaged support for seaweed production, squid-fishing, salted fish and squid/fish cracker production.
18. **Implementation arrangements.** PNPM-Rural and PNPM-Agriculture were implemented by the MoHA, through the Project Management Division located in the General Directorate of Community Empowerment. The World Bank was the cooperating institution. At the national, provincial and district levels, programme oversight, coordination and management were undertaken by project management units, while technical consultants (at the provincial level) and facilitators (at the district and subdistrict levels) were responsible for technical support. At the village and subdistrict levels, community facilitators (volunteers receiving an incentive fee) promoted the planning and implementation of community investments. A ministerial steering committee was to provide oversight and policy guidance. The committee was chaired by the coordinating Ministry of Social Welfare with a membership comprising all the members of the coordinating team for poverty reduction (Ministries of Development Planning, Home Affairs, Public Works, Finance and Social Development).
19. In February 2015, the Government created MoV. While MoHA remained responsible for organizing and supporting village governance structures, MoV was tasked with promoting village development and community empowerment and became the counterpart ministry for VDP, through its general directorate of Village Community Development and Empowerment. The process of setting up the new ministry and developing basic implementation instruments for the Village Law, transferring PNPM-Agriculture to MoV, redesigning PNPM-Agriculture in alignment with the Law, and signing the new financing agreement for VDP took about two years, during which all activities were put on hold. VDP activities started in March 2017, with a largely similar structure to that of PNPM at the provincial level and downwards. The project duration was limited to two years, in accordance with the remaining funds and in line with both government regulations, whereby project implementation cannot extend past the beginning of loan repayment, and IFAD's rule that project extensions are only allowed for up to two years.
20. **Project financing.** At design, IFAD financing was planned to be US\$68.53 million, including a loan of US\$68.13 million and a grant of US\$0.4 million. The design report envisaged World Bank cofinancing of US\$32.95 million. In 2016, IFAD approved an extension of PNPM-Agriculture, now VDP, for two years. To ensure a smooth transition until the start of VDP's successor project, the Government provided bridge financing of approximately US\$3 million covering VDP activities in 2019 to ensure

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<sup>6</sup> The crops were selected based on their suitability to the agroclimatic conditions and given that they already exist in those areas.

continuity of operations until the follow-on project was approved. The Government's contribution was initially envisaged at US\$98.86 million and beneficiaries' contribution at US\$16.42 million. The redesigned project was completed in December 2018 and closed in June 2019. Table 2 below notes the actual contributions of IFAD, the Government of Indonesia, beneficiaries and the World Bank towards PNPM and VDP.

Table 2  
**Actual project costs by component and financier (in million US\$)**

<i>Component</i>	<i>IFAD</i>	<i>Government</i>	<i>World Bank</i>	<i>Beneficiaries</i>	<i>Total</i>
<b>PNPM</b>					
Block grant	55.7	875.2	1 112.5	41.2	2 084.5
Facilitation support	1.9		205		206.9
Implementation support/technical assistance, goods, consultant services, training and workshops	1.2		80		81.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>58.8</b>	<b>875.2</b>	<b>1 397.5</b>	<b>41.2</b>	<b>2 372.6</b>
<b>VDP</b>					
Implementing the Village Law for Livelihood Activities	0.391				0.391
Effective community facilitation and technical support	3.93				3.93
Economic empowerment		5.806 <sup>7</sup>			5.806
Project management	2.94				2.94
<b>Total</b>	<b>7.27</b>	<b>5.806</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>13.06</b>

Source: Project Completion Report.

21. **Timeframe** In 2014, the newly elected Government in Indonesia closed down the umbrella PNPM programme and requested IFAD to pause the implementation of PNPM- Agriculture in Papua and West Papua while the government planned to enact the Village Law to decentralize the governance in Indonesia at large. PNPM-Agriculture was renamed as the Village Development Programme (VDP) and redesigned and resumed in 2016.

### **PPE Scope, methodology, key issues and limitations**

22. **Objectives.** The main objectives of the PPE is to: (i) assess the results of the VDP; (ii) generate findings and recommendations for the design and implementation of ongoing and future operations in the country, especially to feed into the follow-on project TEKAD; and (iii) identify issues of corporate, operational or strategic interest that merit further evaluative work.
23. **Scope and focus of the evaluation.** The structure of the programme is complicated, with PNPM being the umbrella programme and multiple subprogrammes under it. IFAD's financing to PNPM was to two particular subprogrammes. About 85 per cent of the US\$68.5 million went towards financing block grants in North, Central and South Sulawesi as part of PNPM-Rural. The remaining 15 per cent went initially towards implementation of PNPM-Agriculture and later towards the redesigned VDP in Papua and West Papua.<sup>8</sup> This evaluation exercise

<sup>7</sup> The component to which government financing contributed is unclear. The PCR does not explicitly mention the same. However, given that the economic empowerment component had no financing allocated for it in the PCR, it was assumed that the economic empowerment component was financed through government financing.

<sup>8</sup> PCR.

will be focused predominantly on the operations of PNPM-Agriculture and VDP, in Papua and West Papua. There are four reasons for such focus.

24. First, the implementation of PNPM-Agriculture and redesigned VDP was more recent. IFAD funding for PNPM-Rural in North, Central and South Sulawesi was disbursed in 2010 while the larger PNPM programme was closed in 2014.<sup>9</sup> Thus, a long time elapsed since IFAD funding had been utilized in PNPM-Rural, and the PNPM project implementation unit was closed. In terms of logistics, organizing the field visits and locating project staff and IFAD-financed interventions would be very challenging.
25. Second, for the block grants used on PNPM-Rural it would be difficult to distinguish and attribute or credibly establish contribution of IFAD funding to the project's outcomes because they were cofinanced with much larger financing from the Government and the World Bank.
26. Third, IFAD is financing a follow-on project of VDP in Papua and West Papua (TEKAD), with the Government's planned investment of US\$560 million and IFAD's investment planned at US\$34 million (approved in October 2019). The new project is expected to draw on lessons from VDP and PNPM-Agriculture and scale them up further in Papua and West Papua. To that end, a focus on Papua and West Papua and, by function, PNPM-Agriculture and VDP would provide more pertinent recommendations for future programming in Indonesia. The IFAD country team and the Government of Indonesia have been consulted on such focus.
27. Fourth, ample literature is available on the PNPM umbrella programme and its subprogrammes.<sup>10</sup> An evaluation undertaken by Independent Evaluation Group of World Bank is also available on the larger PNPM-Rural programme.<sup>11</sup> Thus, IOE's focus will complement the literature by adding lessons from PNPM-Agriculture and VDP.
28. **Key issues for PPE investigation.** Key selected issues to be reviewed, identified based on the initial desk review, are presented below. These may be fine-tuned based on further considerations or information availability, and on consultation with Asia and the Pacific Region in IFAD and the Government.
  - (i) **Linkage between facilitation and economic activities.** The project's intervention theory rests on "socialization"<sup>12</sup> of village groups through facilitation services. The facilitation prepares the groups to utilize the block/village grants, which help them finance their identified economic priorities. The PPE will attempt to understand the success of the project in ensuring that the facilitation provided by PNPM-Agriculture and, subsequently, VDP was undertaken in a manner consistent with the social and economic objectives of the projects. In addition, the success of facilitation in ensuring access to livelihood activities for target groups will be assessed. Another dimension of such linkage is that PNPM-Agriculture included investments in small-scale infrastructure, while VDP appeared to invest more heavily in training/facilitation/demonstration. An understanding of people's views on these approaches and their efficacy would be valuable in designing TEKAD.
  - (ii) **Gender, social inclusion and targeting.** Papua and West Papua are characterized by the existence of numerous tribes. The PPE will assess how the project has been able to enhance the inclusion of traditionally excluded people in existing norms and practices. The level of inclusion and active participation

<sup>9</sup> Joint review mission, 2013.

<sup>10</sup> PNPM/Community-driven development in Indonesia, Governance and Social Development Resource Center: <http://gsdrc.org/docs/open/hdq838.pdf>. Indonesia's Programme for Community Empowerment: <https://www.centreforpublicimpact.org/case-study/indonesias-programme-community-empowerment-pnpm/> Negotiating impossibilities in community driven development in Indonesia: <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0169796X17753001>.

<sup>11</sup> IEG, World Bank: <http://documents.banquemoniale.org/curated/fr/653551475783228388/pdf/000180307-20150108103559.pdf>.

<sup>12</sup> Term used widely in Indonesia to refer to mobilization, awareness-raising and extension activities.

of women and excluded segments of the target villages in producer groups and their access to economic opportunities will also be assessed. This will inevitably involve looking closely at the nature of activities that have been undertaken using village and block grants. It will also entail looking in detail at possible unintended and unforeseen effects of group-based production which may differentially affect men, women, old and young, those with disabilities, and others.

- (iii) **Additionality of project activities and uniqueness of IFAD approach.** Papua and West Papua are provinces known to have multiplicity of donor- and government-financed projects as well as many corporate social responsibility and compensation initiatives. Project documents reviewed seem to indicate that such concentration has led to dependency on aid.<sup>13</sup> PNPM-Agriculture and, subsequently, VDP were small-scale projects with only 15 per cent of the IFAD funding for PNPM going towards them. In addition, these projects were operating in the context of much larger government programmes such as PNPM-RESPEK in Papua and West Papua. The PPE will assess the value added of PNPM-Agriculture and VDP operations in an environment characterized by heavy presence of other development projects.
  - (iv) A risk emanating from the wide range of projects operating in Papua and West Papua lies in the approaches adopted by these projects, especially where such approaches are not congruous with one another – for example, projects adopting free distribution of resource vis-à-vis projects requiring community contribution; projects providing per-diems (*uang duduk* in Indonesia) for attendance at project events or training vis-à-vis those who do not pay per diem; and distribution of resources equally vis-à-vis targeted or prioritized distribution. The PPE will try to unpack the incentives/disincentives to participate in order to understand the political economy in which the projects are operating and how future IFAD project(s) could navigate such complexities.
  - (v) **Participatory approaches and interventions.** Best practice notes that successful CDD must have a high level of local participation, which includes having common interest, clear understanding and information on which to make informed choices, and good horizontal and downward accountability and transparency. The programmes are aimed at improving village governance, transparency and accountability (including reducing corruption and elite capture) and promoting sustainability. This is underscored by assumptions that need careful review (see annex 1; ToC). It will be particularly important to understand the extent to which communities could influence project decisions/activities and provide feedback. In terms of livelihood activities, VDP offered a fixed menu of interventions for communities to pursue. The PPE will seek to understand the basis of this menu of livelihood options and the perceived appropriateness and level of consultation at local level.
  - (vi) **Moving from a group-based production group approach to a family-production group.** The follow-up project of TEKAD proposes engaging with family as the production unit instead of producer groups as the unit of targeting. This is a major shift, and the evaluation team will attempt to understand the underlying reasons for such change, and the lessons learned from the targeting strategy of VDP at large.
29. **Methodology.** The PPE exercise will be undertaken in accordance with the IFAD Evaluation Policy<sup>14</sup> and the IFAD Evaluation Manual (second edition, 2015). The detailed criteria are laid out in annex 3 of this approach paper. Analysis in the PPE will be assisted by a review of a reconstructed theory of change (ToC), as depicted in annex 1, to assess the extent to which the PNPM and VDP's objectives were

<sup>13</sup> 2010 PNPM joint review mission and 2018 VDP supervision report.

<sup>14</sup> <http://www.ifad.org/pub/policy/oe.pdf>.

effectively achieved. The PPE team has reconstructed the PNPM and VDP's preliminary ToC based on the original design and logframe, and a review of the documentation on the project. The ToC of the project depicts the causal pathways from project outputs (the goods and services that it delivers) through changes resulting from the use of those outputs made by target groups and other key stakeholders (outcomes) towards achievement of project objectives. The ToC further defines assumptions which influence change along the major impact pathways. The ToC will be revised, as necessary, based on inputs from the field visits and/or phone/Zoom interviews.

30. **Scenario-planning.** As of the time of writing this approach paper, there are significant restrictions on travel to and from Indonesia, and even within Indonesia, due to the global outbreak of COVID-19. It is uncertain if and when travel to and within Indonesia will be opened up, although limited domestic and limited international flights have already resumed as of the time of writing this report. Hence, the PPE team has envisaged three possible scenarios, presented in the table below.

Table 3  
**Scenarios for conduct of field visits**

<i>Milestones</i>	<i>Current action</i>	<i>Scenario 1 – Full field visits</i>	<i>Scenario 2 – Spot checks undertaken by local consultant</i>	<i>Scenario 3 – No field visits or spot checks</i>
Meetings with in-country stakeholders	Stakeholders being identified	In-person meetings	Consultations and meetings through Zoom or phone	Consultations and meetings through Zoom or phone
Field visits	Field itinerary being planned	Field visits to go ahead as per field itinerary	Spot checks to be undertaken on the basis of field itinerary drawn up for field visits	Phone interviews of selected community leaders and group members to be undertaken by evaluation team
Report-writing	Planned to be drafted in second half of year	Report to be drafted based on inputs from field visits	Preliminary report to be drafted based on analysis of data available in programme documents. Report to be finalized based on inputs from spot checks by local consultant	Preliminary report to be drafted based on analysis of data available in programme documents. Report to be finalized based on inputs from phone interviews

31. In view of the time and resources available, the PPE is generally not expected to undertake quantitative surveys or to examine the full spectrum of project activities, achievements and drawbacks. Rather, it will focus on selected key issues (mentioned above). The PPE will take account of the preliminary findings from a desk review of the PCR and other key project documents and interviews at IFAD headquarters. During the PPE mission, additional evidence, data and insights will be collected in person or remotely to triangulate and extend the evidence presented in the PCR in order to reach an independent assessment of performance and results as well as lessons learned for future programming.
32. **Rating system.** In line with the practice adopted in many other international financial institutions and UN organizations, IOE uses a six-point rating system, where 6 is the highest score (highly satisfactory) and 1 is the lowest score (highly unsatisfactory).
33. **Data collection.** The PPE will be built on the initial findings from a review of the PCR and other documents. In terms of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) data, there are no baseline data and neither is there an end-of-project survey for the purpose of assessing impact. Therefore, in order to obtain further information, interviews will be conducted both at IFAD headquarters and in the country. If scenario 1 identified



above becomes feasible, then additional primary and secondary data will be collected through informal interactions in selected villages with families, farmers, fishers (both those who participated in VDP activities and those who did not) and village officials, triangulated with observations of context and outcomes of small-scale community projects and a review of village government records in order to reach an independent assessment of performance and results.

34. If scenario 2 becomes the feasible option, then some additional data might be collected during spot checks by the local consultant, guided by the lead evaluator and international consultant. The project implementation unit of VDP is also implementing the TEKAD programme and will be contacted to collect any additional M&E data that might be available. If scenario 3 is the only feasible option, then the desk review will be complemented with phone interviews of selected community leaders and farmer group members. Thus, data collection methods will mostly include a desk review of existing documents and individual interviews. In the event of field visits materializing, group interviews and focus group discussions with project stakeholders, beneficiaries and other key informants and resource persons will take place, along with direct observations.
35. Triangulation will be applied to verify findings emerging from different information sources. Criteria for selection of study locations include: the time the village was involved in the programme; different agro-geographic zones (coastal and highlands); nature of projects undertaken; and population size and diversity. The PPE intends to make efficient use of the field time available but also intends to include more remote locations to offset location bias. It should be noted that a combination of methods mentioned in any of the three scenarios may be used to accomplish the data collection, depending on the situation.
36. **Limitation(s).** In view of the scenarios discussed above, there will be implications for how thoroughly certain evaluation criteria (refer to annex 3) can be covered. For example, evaluation criteria such as relevance and efficiency can be covered almost entirely through a desk review and stakeholder consultations, whether online or in person. However, certain other criteria such as rural impact, effectiveness, climate change adaptation, environment and natural resource management will require a combination of field visits and access to robust M&E data. Hence, undertaking the evaluation under scenario 3 will require the evaluation team to conduct the assessment on certain criteria using data from existing documents and telephone interviews alone, even if primary data through field visits are more suited for assessing them. This will have an effect on the overall scope of assessment of the evaluation report.
37. **Stakeholders' participation.** IOE Evaluation Policy stipulates that the main project stakeholders should be involved throughout the PPE process. Given the situation with COVID-19, the PPE will involve wide range of stakeholders to the extent that the situation permits. Regular interaction and communication will be established with the Asia and the Pacific Division of IFAD (APR) and with the Government. As the counterpart and implementing ministry of VDP, MoV will also be one of the main stakeholders. In addition, MoHA will be consulted, given that it implemented PNPM-Agriculture. The Ministry of National Development Planning will be consulted for inputs, given its planning and coordination role vis-à-vis development partners and the Government. Formal and informal opportunities will be explored during the process for the purpose of discussing findings, lessons and recommendations with all stakeholders.

### **Evaluation process**

38. Following a desk review of PCR and other key project documents, the PPE will involve the following steps:
  - (i) **Country work.** The PPE mission dates have not been finalized as of the time of writing this approach paper. This is due to the travel restrictions currently in

place in light of the spread of COVID-19. IOE will decide on the dates for the mission, if at all possible, by August. Irrespective of the field visits happening, the evaluation team will interact with representatives from the Government and other institutions, beneficiaries and key informants, in Jakarta and in the field. The preliminary ToC of the project constructed by the evaluation consultants will be developed further and validated during the field mission through interaction with project stakeholders. If a field mission takes place, a wrap-up meeting will be held in Jakarta and Jayapura (capital of Papua) to summarize the preliminary findings and discuss key strategic and operational issues.

- (ii) **Analysis, report-drafting and peer review.** After the field visit and the analysis of collected data, a draft PPE report will be prepared and submitted to an IOE internal peer reviewer for quality assurance.
- (iii) **Comments by APR and the Government.** The draft PPE report will be shared simultaneously with APR and the Government of Indonesia for their review and comments. IOE will finalize the report following receipt of comments by APR and the Government and prepare the audit trail.
- (iv) **Management response by APR.** A written Management response to the final PPE report will be prepared by the Programme Management Department. This will be included in the PPE report, when published.
- (v) **Communication and dissemination.** The final report will be disseminated among key stakeholders and the evaluation report will be published by IOE in both online and print formats.

39. **The tentative timetable** for the PPE process is as follows:

<i>Date</i>	<i>Activities</i>
May 2020	Approach Paper and desk review
To be decided subject to travel restrictions. Final decision by August 2020	Mission to Indonesia
September-October 2020	Preparation of draft report
October 2020	IOE internal peer review
November 2020	Draft PPE report sent to APR and Government for comments
December 2020	Finalization of the report
February 2021	Publication and dissemination

40. **Evaluation team.** The team will consist of Prashanth Kotturi, IOE Evaluation Officer, Diana Jupp, IOE evaluation consultant and Iqbal Abisaputra, IOE national consultant. The team will be responsible for the final delivery of the report. Serena Ingrati, IOE Evaluation Assistant will provide administrative support.

## **List of key persons met**

M. Suprapedi Eng, Former Director VDP

Anastutik Wiryaningsih, Head of Sub Directorate, Ministry of Villages

Leroy Samy Uguy, Former Director VDP and Current Director TEKAD

Velix Vernando Wanggai, Director, Disadvantaged Regions, Transmigration and Rural Areas BAPPENAS

Khairul Rizal, Deputy Director, Disadvantaged Regions, Transmigration and Rural Areas BAPPENAS

Benni Irwan, Director, Village Government Financial and Asset Facilitation, Ministry of Home Affairs

Arli Arief, Former M&E Officer VDP

Desi Matakupan, Former VDP Coordinator, West Papua (2017-19)

Petris Dimara, Former VDP Coordinator, Papua (2017-19)

Scott Guggenheim, Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University. Former head of PNPM Support Facility, World Bank, Jakarta

## Methodology of the evaluation

### Purpose

1. The main objectives of the PPE are to:
  - (i) assess the results of VDP;
  - (ii) generate findings and recommendations for the design and implementation of
  - (iii) ongoing and future operations in the country, especially to feed into the follow-on
  - (iv) project TEKAD; and
  - (v) identify issues of corporate, operational or strategic interest that merit further evaluative work.
2. Given that there has been considerable review of the overall PNPM umbrella programmes and PNPM-Rural as well as the fact that IFAD has already committed to contributing funding to a follow-on programme, TEKAD, in Papua and West Papua, this IOE review focuses on PNPM-Agriculture and VDP only, since this will likely provide the most useful lessons learned for the follow-on programme.
3. The PPE team has reconstructed the PNPM and VDP's theory of change (ToC) based on the original design, logframe and a review of the documentation on the projects. The ToC shows the causal pathways from project outputs (the goods and services that it delivers) through changes resulting from the use of those outputs made by target groups and other key stakeholders (outcomes) towards achievement of project objectives. The ToC further defines assumptions which influence change along the major impact pathways.

### Research questions

4. In addition to using IFAD's Evaluation Framework for the evaluation, it was agreed that special focus would be given to the following areas, as these were considered useful for the follow-on TEKAD programme.

### Appropriateness of facilitation

5. Good facilitation is vital in CDD projects as are a good understanding of the role of facilitators and the existence of an enabling environment to promote facilitation.
  - Was facilitation appropriate to enable groups to utilize the block grants/village funds for economic gain?
  - Was facilitation appropriate in terms of achieving the social and empowerment objectives of a CDD programme?
  - Without provision of small-scale infrastructure projects (as provided by PNPM-Agriculture), were VDP facilitators able to garner support at the village level?

### Participatory approaches and interventions

6. CDD best practice requires local participation and good horizontal and downward accountability and transparency.
  - To what extent did communities influence project decisions/activities and provide feedback.

### Gender, social inclusion and targeting

- To what extent has the project been successful in promoting inclusion of traditionally excluded people?
- To what extent has elite capture occurred?
- What is the basis of TEKAD's decision to move from a group-based approach to a family-based approach?

### Additionality of project activities and uniqueness of IFAD approach

- In a situation with high aid provision from Government Special Autonomy Funds, government projects, donors, NGO and private sector corporate social responsibility and compensation initiatives, what difference has IFAD made?
- Where there is a lack of convergence in design of interventions and many programmes which basically provide “hand outs”, how easy has it been for IFAD to promote capacity-building rather than hardware or cash provisions?

### Adaptations for COVID-19

7. Originally the evaluation was envisaged to be a mix of key informant interviews with stakeholders in Indonesia and a detailed field visit which would have been to both West Papua and Papua and would have started with visits to villages and groups and triangulating the insights obtained through the vertical system of support. Given the COVID-19 pandemic and restrictions on travel, the approach paper proposed three scenarios for undertaking this evaluation (see table) but finally had to adopt scenario 3, as travel for Indonesians within the country was also restricted.

Table 1  
Scenarios for conduct of field visits

<i>Milestones</i>	<i>Current action</i>	<i>Scenario 1 – full field visits</i>	<i>Scenario 2 – spot checks undertaken by local consultant</i>	<i>Scenario 3 – no field visits and spot checks</i>
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
### Selection of key informant interviews

#### Sampling for project level interviews

8. There are 222 villages included in the programme (78 villages in West Papua and 144 villages in Papua) as recorded in the document provided by MoV.
9. Based on the time limitation and remote research procedure, it was agreed within the IOE team that two villages in West Papua and five villages in Papua would be selected for the evaluation research.
10. The village samples were selected employing a simple random sampling procedure within each province, using the village database available, which was then subject to random sampling of the group in each selected village. Once a village was selected, if there was more than one group in a village, groups were also picked randomly. A vertical hierarchy of facilitation support was identified and all relevant facilitators in the vertical chain were included for interviews (see graphic below).

Table 2  
Sample sizes

Province	Group	Village head	Village facilitator	District facilitator	Regency facilitator
Papua	5	1	5	5	2
West Papua	3	2	2	2	2
Total	8	3	7	7	4



## Village-level interviews

### Farmer group members

11. A total of seven men and seven women farmers were interviewed over the phone from eight different groups (seven villages). The interviews were often conducted over several consecutive calls and were guided by the following questions:
  - How did you come to be in the group? (probe issues of eligibility/inclusion)
  - If you were in a farmer group before (under PNPM), what happened during the period before VDP started?
  - How did you choose what commodities to grow together, and do you think it was the right choice? Why?
  - How does the group organize its work and responsibilities and share profits?
  - What do you like/not like about working in a group?
  - Regarding the kinds of support the group received from outside, from village government and others, which support was most/least helpful?
  - Is the group still working together (why/why not?)
  - What one thing do you do differently as a result of the programme?

### Village heads

12. Originally it was hoped to contact two village heads from "successful" villages and two from "less successful" villages. However, the team was only able to speak with two village heads, as others either declined the calls or could not be reached. The following questions were used to guide the interview:
  - Who actually made the decision about allocating money for the group(s)? Was the right choice made (of group, of commodity)?

- Do you think they made good use of the funds? Could they have done more/done things differently?
- Is the group still working together (why/why not)?
- If you could change one thing about the programme, what would it be?

*Village facilitators*

13. A total of seven village facilitators (including two women) were interviewed over the phone. The following questions were used to guide the interview:

- Could you tell us a bit about yourself and how you came to be a village facilitator? Did you work for PNPM before? What happened in the time between the two programmes?
- Could you tell us a bit about the job of village facilitator (how did they make new/energize old groups, encourage participation in meetings, how were decisions made about who should be in groups, etc.)?
- What did you feel was the intention of VDP?
- What did you like/didn't like about your job?
- What do you think the group (s) you work with has been able to do? (Provide examples)
- Can you show us via video? Can you take photos to show us some of the things we have discussed in the call?

*District facilitators*

14. A total of seven district facilitators (including two women) were interviewed over the phone. The following questions were used to guide the interviews:

- Can you tell us a bit about yourself and how you came to be a district facilitator? How long have you been associated with VDP/PNPM? What happened in the transition from PNPM to VDP?
- Can you tell us a bit about the job of district facilitator? (Main activities/responsibilities)? Why are you called a facilitator (rather than project officer or development worker)?
- What did you feel was the intention of VDP?
- If you previously worked with PNPM, what is the key difference?
- One of your responsibilities is to ensure inclusion. Who should be included, how does this happen, how well did it happen, and what problems did you face?
- What did you like/didn't like about your job?
- Which group do you think has done well/less well, why do you think there is a difference? (Were the commodities selected the right ones? Profitable?)
- Can you tell us about the village that has done well/less well and why?
- If you were able to advise TEKAD one thing that they should do differently to VDP, what would this be?

*Regency facilitators*

15. A total of four regency facilitators (including one woman) were interviewed over the phone. The following questions were used to guide the interviews:

- Can you tell us a bit about yourself and how you came to be a regency facilitator? How long have you been associated with VDP/PNPM? What happened during the transition between PNPM and VDP?


- Can you tell us a bit about the job of regency facilitator? (main activities/responsibilities) and why you are called a facilitator (rather than project officer or coordinator or whatever)?
- How supportive has the district government been? Can you give examples of the kind of support they have provided?
- If you previously worked with PNPM, what is the key difference?
- What do you like/don't like about your job?
- Can you tell us a bit about participatory activities you promote - what sort of participation makes you feel good?
- Can you tell us about the support you have received to do your job properly?

**Data recording and analysis**

16. Some of the phone calls were recorded with the permission of the respondent while detailed notes were taken in Bahasa by the Indonesian members of the PPE team. Three videos were recorded based on questions provided to farmers, as with limited phone reception this was the preferred option. The PPE team undertook two four-hour Zoom workshops where the IFAD criteria for evaluation were examined through the lens of the respondents.



# Theory of change



STRATEGIES						
Application /fine-tune CDD principles - integration into Village Law.	Strong emphasis on good facilitation/CDD processes	Responsive range of actions - from encouraging enhanced subsistence (highlands) to supporting agribusiness (developing villages)	Piloting (what works, why -> lessons learned for scaling up)	Group-based extension approach	Strong gender equality and social inclusion focus	Demonstration of potential to enhance use of village funds for genuine economic development (rather than short-term gains)
ASSUMPTIONS						
Short implementation time of VDP will nevertheless enable demonstration of achievement	The “pemekaran” process of re-organizing district, subdistrict and village boundaries does not inhibit access to village funds	Facilitators facilitate rather than control; relations with village government remain cooperative	Willingness of village governments/citizens to allocate village funds to agricultural / aquaculture activities	Timely and sufficient village funds for productive investments	Market and financial trends remain conducive	Security and peace maintained /conflict contained
Alternative sources of support - handouts, grants, cash transfer schemes, CSR, compensation schemes, etc. do not undermine motivation/ engagement in project activities	Communication networks for market information and market access maintained and affordable	Availability and affordability of agricultural/aquaculture inputs	Urban migration, non-farm employment are not increasingly attractive/profitable options	Elite capture can be adequately mitigated in project design/CDD principles	Household incomes/food security gains not undermined by national/international shocks/crises	Technical expertise provided through technical assistance diverse, responsive and adequate

## Description of the theory of change

1. The VDP theory of change has been inferred based on review of the programme documents and the programme's nature as a low investment "bridging" programme between the end of PNPM-Agriculture and the start of TEKAD.
2. Given the short time frame and low investment, the intentions of this programme were purposefully less ambitious than either the predecessor PNPM-Agriculture or the successor TEKAD programmes. VDP intentionally sought to: (i) test out the modality of using village funds (*dana desa*) rather than external grants for local investments; and (ii) enhance facilitation services with a view to building on existing services to contribute to sustainability of benefits (in line with CDD principles). It also sought to enhance the image of Papua in terms of demonstrating the potential for economic activities at village level.
3. This suggests that there should be two levels of impact to which VDP contributed: (a) long- term impact (i.e. (a.i) reduced poverty and (a.ii) community empowerment); and (b) more immediate intended impact for the VDP programme itself. These included the linked impacts of (b.i) improved local governance and (b.ii) effective use of village funds as well as (b.iii) enhanced interest (especially) from the private sector in doing business with village based agro-enterprises in Papua.
4. The causal pathway for (b.i) and (b.ii) is one of **enhanced local governance**. The annual *dana desa* deliberations (*Musrenbang desa*) happen every December/January. These are participatory community-wide events intended to agree on the budget/expenditures for the following fiscal year. The *dana desa* is financed under the provisions of the Village Law and it is therefore shown in red in the ToC as non-programme costs. VDP's role was to encourage **good local governance** through facilitation, including:
  - a. participatory and inclusive annual deliberations on use of *dana desa*;
  - b. opportunities for requests for investment in village-based agro-enterprises and small-scale agro-employment schemes included in the deliberation process;
  - c. transparency in selection of projects for funding with *dana desa* funds;
  - d. encouragement to use as much as 20 per cent of *dana desa* for village-based agro- enterprises and small-scale agro-employment schemes.
5. In order for village based agro-enterprises and small-scale agro-employment schemes to be able to present plausible schemes for funding, VDP facilitation was also directed at the **demand side of good governance**, including:
  - a. re-energizing former PNPM-Agriculture farmer/producer groups or helping form new groups and establish operating procedures (including opening bank accounts);
  - b. facilitating group planning so that they could submit their ideas for funding to the *musrenbang*/participate in the *musrenbang* and subsequently report back to the village government on use of funds.
6. Combining the support for both the demand and supply side of local governance was expected to produce behaviour changes within village governments and the community described in the outcomes (i) increased capacity and confidence of village governments to plan, implement and evaluate projects funded by village funds (supply side) and (ii) village governments more participatory, democratic and held to account (demand side).
7. In parallel with the strategy to enhance local governance, VDP technical facilitation was directed at helping village based agro-enterprises and small-scale agro-employment schemes to identify **priorities for investment in order to enhance**

**productivity and profitability** – in other words, providing sound options for investment by village governments. This facilitation included:

- a. conducting market analysis to identify promising products (appropriate for lowland/highland area);
  - b. providing technical assistance through “how to” guidebooks, farmer field schools, demonstration plots and class-room training;
  - c. forging reliable market linkages.
8. This causal pathway is one of **technical assistance** leading to long-term impact of (a.i.) reduced poverty and short-term impact of (b.iii) enhanced interest (especially) from the private sector in doing business with village based agro-enterprises in Papua.
  9. Technical assistance directly intended to lead to the outcome (i) farmer/production groups producing high-quality profitable produce in sufficient quantities and timely to meet market demand. This requires working again on the supply and demand sides – enhancing quality and quantity of produce to market standards ( supply side) and linking this to market demand (demand side) through promotions, produce fairs and brokering producer-market links.
  10. For farmer/producer groups to benefit financially, the market analysis undertaken by the programme needed to ensure profitability. If this was done adequately, then households would have been expected to benefit with increased household incomes, savings and asset accumulation (outcome).
  11. However, given the difficulties faced, especially in remote highland villages where financial profitability could not necessarily be guaranteed, the causal logic intended for families/households to benefit from enhanced food security and resilience to shocks as well as improved child nutrition.
  12. The differences in expectation from the programme between established farmer/producer groups and those in different agroecological and remote areas led to VDP adopting a responsive range of strategies encouraging enhanced subsistence (highlands) to supporting agribusiness (even piloting use of the village-owned enterprises/*badan usaha milik desa* facility) for groups which were more advanced. This multipronged inclusive approach suggests the need to apply differentiated and disaggregated indicators of achievement, something which was not done in the programme.

## **Desk review – data available in M&E system of VDP**

### **Monitoring and evaluation documents compilation**

#### **Working paper**

##### **A. Background**

1. The working paper was prepared to support the desk review process of the project performance evaluation (PPE) conducted by the Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD (IOE) on the Village Development Programme (VDP) in Indonesia.
2. The aim of this working paper is to provide clarity on what M&E data exists in the project and gather more insights from the local-level documents and VDP website ([ppdm.kemendes.go.id](http://ppdm.kemendes.go.id)) for additional evidence for the final product of the VDP PPE.
3. Due to the limitations of the field visit caused by the COVID-19 outbreak, this document was used as a guiding document on in-depth interviews, sample selections and identifying tools on the other documents that might be available.

##### **B. List of documents and available data**

4. There are 13 documents currently gathered from four sources, ranging in location, commodities and activities at the provincial to group level.
5. The evaluation team gathered most of the documents from Ms Anastutik Wiryaningsih (refer to list of people met in annex V) from MoV as the former Project Manager of VDP.
6. The location selection and group selection are not captured in any of the documents provided.
7. There is no clear information in the documents on each village's typography and the only way to recognize the differences is by referencing it further to a map or VDP website. The differences between highland, lowland and coastal area commodities cannot be determined.
8. There are no documents to specify the differences between groups on women, youth and the marginalized groups. The documents also have no information on how the different approaches taken suit different group needs.
9. The most consistent data currently available are number of provinces, regencies and districts where the project is operational. A lot of data are missing (or incomplete). Even here the documents differ slightly on the number of villages and the number of groups.
10. Most of the data gathered were from 2017 onwards and thus pertain to VDP.

Table 1  
List of documents available

Code	Title of the document	Source	Contents	Link to the document	Comments
Document 1	Papua and West Papua Contact Person	Anastutik Wiryaningsih Project Manager VDP	Name and contact number of two provincial team leader and four regency in West Papua and three in Papua.	<a href="https://bit.ly/3mtFrvm">https://bit.ly/3mtFrvm</a>	There are missing contact persons on three other regencies in West Papua and three other regencies in Papua.
Document 2	VDP Activities	Anastutik Wiryaningsih Project Manager VDP	Summary of activities that being done in Papua and West Papua.	<a href="https://bit.ly/3c4j5M8">https://bit.ly/3c4j5M8</a>	No indication on the person in charge in each activity and no details of how the activities are being implemented.
Document 3	Papua and West Papua VDP Location	Anastutik Wiryaningsih Project Manager VDP	List of seven regencies, 21 districts, 78 villages and 216 groups in West Papua. List of six regencies, 33 districts, 144 villages and 411 groups in Papua.	<a href="https://bit.ly/2ZJxPLE">https://bit.ly/2ZJxPLE</a>	No details of commodities and activities. Total of two provinces, 13 regencies, 51 districts, 222 villages and 627 groups.
Document 4	Commodity Profile	Anastutik Wiryaningsih Project Manager VDP	List of regencies, districts, villages, groups, commodities, production capacities per year, selling price, gross income.	<a href="https://bit.ly/3kHUikf">https://bit.ly/3kHUikf</a>	The document - not all of the groups have the information on commodity, production capacity, selling price and gross income. The number of groups is 543.
Document 5	Activities in Papua and West Papua and The Summary in English	Anastutik Wiryaningsih Project Manager VDP	Tabulation of 10 main activities in village level; Socialization, Promotion and Increasing Awareness, Village Deliberation, On The Job Training School, Workplan Preparation, Facilitation, Marketing Facilitation, Coordination, Capacity Building, Reporting, Monitoring and Evaluation.	<a href="https://bit.ly/3ciltPI">https://bit.ly/3ciltPI</a>	Some tabs have almost 1000 entries (the coordination) but others have 5 or 6 entries only (the marketing facilitation). There is no uniformity on how the data was input, so you can find "Selection of Local Facilitator/Village Facilitator" entry in the Socialization, Promotion and Increase Awareness tabs and Village Deliberations tabs, "Monitoring and Evaluation" on every tab.
Document 6	Activities in West Papua (best practice)	Anastutik Wiryaningsih Project Manager VDP	Photos and activities in six regencies.	<a href="https://bit.ly/2RMqqqb">https://bit.ly/2RMqqqb</a>	Missing one regency.

Document 7	Activities in Papua (best practice)	Anastutik Wiryaningsih Project Manager VDP	Photos and activities in six regencies.	<a href="https://bit.ly/2RKQHFA">https://bit.ly/2RKQHFA</a>	
Document 8	The Differences Between VDP-Agriculture and VDP	Anastutik Wiryaningsih Project Manager VDP	The different approach, activities and Key Performance Indicators of VDP and PNPM Agriculture.	<a href="https://bit.ly/2FTtZsv">https://bit.ly/2FTtZsv</a>	
Document 9	List of Villages of PNPM Agriculture and VDP	Anastutik Wiryaningsih Project Manager VDP	List of PNPM-Agriculture in West Papua 74 villages and in Papua 140 villages, VDsP in West Papua 77 villages and in Papua 146 villages.	<a href="http://tiny.cc/7tnxsz">http://tiny.cc/7tnxsz</a>	
Document 10	West Papua Performance Evaluation (2017)	Arli Arief Co-Team Leader VDP M&E	Assessment in 2017 on the West Papua group's structure and abilities to make plan.	<a href="http://tiny.cc/oxpxsz">http://tiny.cc/oxpxsz</a>	No data from 2018.
Document 11	Papua Performance Evaluation (2017)	Arli Arief Co-Team Leader VDP M&E	Assessment in 2017 on Papua group's structure and abilities to make plan.	<a href="http://tiny.cc/rpxpsz">http://tiny.cc/rpxpsz</a>	No data from 2018.
Document 12	Data Consolidation of West Papua and Papua Performance Evaluation	Arli Arief Co-Team Leader VDP M&E	Assessment in 2017 on Papua group's structure and abilities to make plan with chart at the last tab.	<a href="http://tiny.cc/txpxsz">http://tiny.cc/txpxsz</a>	No data from 2018.
Document 13	End-year Report VDP in Papua Province (2019)	Petris VDP Coordinator in Papua	The achievements, activities, stories from the field, problems faced and recommendations.	<a href="http://tiny.cc/9ytxsz">http://tiny.cc/9ytxsz</a>	Good source of more local data in a report format.

11. Based on the PPE team's discussion with Mr. Arli Arief, Co-Team Leader of VDP M&E, all the M&E data are in the VDP website. The website link is <http://ppdm.kemendesa.go.id/>.
12. On the website, the top five commodities that the project is said to have supported are mustard greens (IDR 9 billion in sales), red chilli (IDR 5 billion in sales), oranges (IDR 4.9 billion in sales), red fruits (IDR 3.6 billion in sales) and beans (IDR 1.5 billion in sales), all of them are agricultural products.
13. The use of village funds for productive activities by region is given in table 2 below.

Table 2  
**Spending of village funds on productive activities**

Province/ Regency	Spending		Funds for Productive Enterprise		Percentage	
	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018
<b>Papua</b>	<b>80.525.201.286</b>	<b>132.730.830.057</b>	<b>4.830.186.070</b>	<b>12.845.115.770</b>	<b>6%</b>	<b>9.68%</b>
Boven Digoel	15.773.958.356	17.754.600.061	796.323.669	673.538.469	5.05%	3.79%
Jayawijaya	9.657.128.042	36.984.992.416	1.293.000.000	7.156.142.500	13.39%	19.35%
Yapen Island	14.716.883.863	28.716.432.903	603.357.000	1.049.904.000	4.10%	3.66%
Nabire	14.129.902.990	21.577.964.109	514.046.000	696.158.000	3.64%	3.23%
Sarmi	0	9.053.349.000	0	565.625.001	0	6.25%
Yahukimo	26.247.328.035	18.643.491.568	1.623.459.401	2.703.747.800	6.19%	14.50%
<b>West Papua</b>	<b>93.228.658.689</b>	<b>80.428.634.208</b>	<b>5.567.807.580</b>	<b>5.588.871.852</b>	<b>5.97%</b>	<b>6.95%</b>
Fak-Fak	23.397.108.327	21.247.652.259	1.817.911.890	2.302.041.256	7.77%	10.83%
Kaimana	20.930.144.938	18.354.442.923	1.291.027.000	1.102.280.000	6.17%	6.01%
Raja Ampat	20.210.101.715	14.659.709.201	2.135.856.034	716.021.024	10.57%	4.88%
Manokwari	5.229.015.165	3.417.368.895	13.012.656	205.322.000	0.25%	6.01%
Maybrat	8.353.956.973	9.739.641.500	310.000.000	663.527.522	3.71%	6.81%
Manokwari Selatan	11.361.851.204	4.376.435.008	0	66.600.000	0	1.52%
Arfak Mountains	3.746.480.367	8.633.384.422	0	533.080.050	0	6.17%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>173.753.859.975</b>	<b>213.159.464.265</b>	<b>10.397.993.650</b>	<b>18.433.987.622</b>	<b>5.98%</b>	<b>8.65%</b>

Table 3  
**VDP M&E website content on region and village profile**

Main	Indicator	Number	Type	Comments
Region profile	number of provinces	2	1 in Papua and 1 in West Papua	
	number of regencies	13	6 regencies in Papua, 7 regencies in West Papua	
	number of villages	224		78 in West Papua (provided by conversation with Ibu Desi)
	Number of groups	627		No clear number in Papua and West Papua
Village profile	type	169	agriculture village	
		50	fishery village	
		1	other	
		<b>220</b>	<b>total</b>	The total of the villages on the website is 224
	topography <sup>1</sup>	100	genealogy	
	91	territorial		

<sup>1</sup> No explanation is provided on the VDP portal on what this means.



<i>Main</i>	<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Type</i>	<i>Comments</i>
		15	mix	
		14	other	
		<b>220</b>	<b>total</b>	The total of the villages on the website is 224
	settlement patterns	39	highland	
		51	mountainous	
		72	lowland	
		57	costal	
		1	other	
		<b>220</b>	<b>total</b>	
	village category <sup>2</sup>	75	stretched	
		37	gathered	
		12	encircled	
		95	scattered	
		1	other	
		<b>220</b>	<b>total</b>	The total of the villages on the website is 224
	market scale <sup>3</sup>	106	village market	
		54	regency market	
		20	district market	
		1	global market	
		5	inter district	
		27	inter regency	
		7	other	
		<b>220</b>	<b>total</b>	The total of the villages on the website is 224

14. Most of the villages are agricultural villages with genealogy type of lowland, scattered settlement and most of the product being sold in the village market.
15. The data of total number of group members, men and women group member numbers, year the was group established, name of the group head, secretary, treasurer and the commodity profile can be accessed one by one through the group profile tab and selecting the specific group name.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> It is unclear what this means and how the entire village can be expected to sell at only one market and how certain households selling in markets other than the one recorded are captured in the M&E data.

Table 4  
**VDP website content on overall key performance indicators**

<i>Reported data</i>	<i>Data available</i>
Total village allocation of village fund for economic activities	55%
Actively involved in group meetings	70%
Programme beneficiaries satisfied with improved livelihoods	86%
Farmers adopt technology that they were trained on	57%
Agreed support for agricultural communities	80%
All training covers gender and nutrition materials	100%
Recruitment, training and mobilization of community facilitator teams (April 2017)	100%
Community participates in village development planning deliberations	20%

16. All of the above indicators remain unclear and no explanation is provided on what these indicators mean. In addition, there is no indication on whether an indicator pertains to 2017 or 2018. Also, there is no comparison on achievement and development on this data.

### **C. Consistency of information**

17. There is some inconsistency on the number of village and groups in different documents and on the website itself. In document 3, the number of villages is 222, but on the website on village profiles the number is 224 with no further information on the number of village in each province.
18. The most coherent data on group numbers is on document 3 and the M&E portal website wherein it is stated that there are 216 groups in West Papua and 411 groups in Papua, with the total being 627 groups.
19. The groups' commodities from document 4 are unable to be verified by comparing them with the website groups' commodities. The PPE team has taken a sample of 10 groups to be compared in terms of data in the M&E portal and in document 4 and compared them as below.

Table 5  
**Example of comparison of groups' commodities sample from document 4 and the M&E website**

Location	Group's Name	Commodities	
		Website	Document 4
FakFak Tengah Air Besar	Pala	No data	Nutmeg
Buruway Tairi	Nazaret	Pineapple	Nutmeg
Teluk Arguni Weswasa	Pertanian Weswasa	Pineapple	No data
Manokwari Selatan Manokwari	Teratai	No data	No data
Teluk Mayalibit Warsandim	Bakitem 2	No data	Vegetable (mustard greens)
Musatfak Temia	Kopi Temia	Papaya	Coffee
Musatfak Temia	Temia Bersama	No data	No data
Musatfak Temia	Temia Jaya	No data	Pigs
Musatfak Siapma	Kukulem	No data	Pigs
Wanggar Wiraskan	Harapan Mulia	Red chilli	Soy

20. From a random sample of 10 groups, only three have the commodity listed on the M&E portal and none have the same commodity listed on the M&E portal and M&E documents. One explanation could be that one group has more than one commodity. However, this could not be confirmed in stakeholder consultations.
21. The inconsistency of data and the limited information on data available also need to be verified further in the interview process.
22. In summary, the M&E system of the project does not contain any outcome data. Even output-level data are inconsistent at times and indicators remain unclear and unexplained in many cases. Thus, the M&E data cannot be used by PPE for undertaking the assessment. It was only used for undertaking a sampling of the groups.

## Good practices for M&E in CDD programmes from literature


### Framework for improved community-led M&E for CDD

Community driven development (CDD) addresses how a programme is implemented. It is just one of many approaches which can be adopted to meet the intended goals and outcomes of community-targeted development assistance. Its perceived strength lies in its ability to contribute to sustainability, making benefits last beyond the duration of the programme.

A key intention of adopting a CDD approach is to build the confidence and capacity of community groups to manage local resources effectively and account for these resources with their wider constituency. So, while immediate positive impact is intended in terms of what is done/actions taken by the community, the approach also expects that communities are empowered to continue to mobilize local resources effectively and make the necessary connections (for example, with financial institutions, markets, technical advice, local government) to maintain, perpetuate and further develop the enterprise, services or infrastructure started under the project so they can continue to derive benefits after the project has finished.

There is an important distinction to be made between CDD and community-based development and this can best be illustrated by where they would be placed on the participation continuum.

Graphic 1  
Levels of participation/community engagement



Adapted from International Association for Public Participation Spectrum of Participation 2014.

CDD projects always sit on the 'empower' end of the continuum by actively engaging communities in the design, management and implementation of projects. The stress on actual control of decision-making and project resources at nearly all stages of a subproject cycle distinguishes CDD from community-based development projects. This requires project staff to adopt the role of advisors, facilitators and brokers providing capacity-building, guidance and linkage but not doing things for people.

### **CDD orientation to M&E**

CDD gives control of decisions and resources to communities. They are expected to make informed decisions about how they want to use local resources, who will benefit and how they will benefit. It therefore follows that they should participate in M&E from the outset, and most advocates of CDD recommend participatory M&E as a key element of a mixed-methods suite of evaluation tools. Some CDD programmes rely entirely on data generated at community level while others combine community-led monitoring with a programme implementation results framework. Either way, the key is to support the monitoring of what matters to people.

Relevance (a key element of IFAD evaluation<sup>1</sup>) includes the idea that a programme should be relevant to and defined by people themselves. The change in terms of knowledge, values, behaviour, attitudes and practice is best described by those directly experiencing that change.

The community/citizen-led approach (CLA) is one approach to M&E which has been proven to work in CDD programmes. It differs from participatory M&E, which makes space for people to participate in a process which is essentially facilitated externally and feeds into a pre-determined programme or project evaluation framework. CLA, on the other hand, is driven primarily by the needs of citizens themselves to describe and measure the change they wish to see. Information is generated by citizens themselves and used by citizens themselves. Any other use of information generated is subordinate to this fundamental principle. The onus of defining and tracking change is people's own and is based on the principle that if the monitoring and tracking of change is intrinsically useful to people themselves, they will give it their time and energy so that the process is likely to be sustainable and ultimately independent of the project. People become the subjects not the objects of monitoring.

### **What needs to be measured in CDD?**

To limit metrics to those typical of rural development programmes without a CDD approach is a disservice to the efforts made to add value by adopting a CDD approach. Therefore, it is not enough to measure only such things as increase in household incomes and assets, diversification of livelihood activities, and reduction in child malnutrition, as this provides no evidence of the advantages of using CDD. Not only is CDD supposed to improve the way rural development is done, but, as the Asian Development Bank (2008) notes, '*Some of the principles of CDD—such as participation, empowerment, accountability, and non-discrimination—are also worthy ends in themselves.*'

This implies there must be metrics to demonstrate:

- How the principles of CDD are applied
  - Is control/decision-making handed over to the community? Does an enabling framework exist for this to happen?
  - Do programme staff act as facilitators?
  - Is there evidence of more democratic processes happening in the community?
  - Is there greater downward accountability and transparency?
  - Is community decision-making inclusive?
- The results of CDD approaches having been applied
  - Was the project demand-responsive and therefore the "right one"?
  - Was there reduced misuse of resources/corruption? Has trust in local governance increased?

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<sup>1</sup> The IOE Evaluation Manual notes that relevance is assessed both in terms of alignment of project objectives with country and IFAD policies for agriculture and rural development and the needs of the rural poor, as well as project design features geared to the achievement of project objectives.

- Were resources used efficiently (including local resource mobilization)?
- Are services or infrastructure of better quality?
- Is maintenance better? Are projects sustained/still operating well?
- Have new productive relationships been forged (e.g. with banks, markets, local government, technical assistance)?
- Has the representative community group (e.g. village government) gained confidence and capacity to plan, resource, implement and account for local-level development projects?
- Are there new community projects in the pipeline?

A wide range of tools can be used to answer these questions, including focus group discussions, perception surveys, participant observation, review of local-level documentation and site visits. However, these still perpetuate the idea that M&E is somehow the privilege of outsiders and might be viewed as checking up rather than empowering.

In CLA, the control of what is measured and how should be transferred to the community. People are encouraged to imagine the future when, for example, their local-level governance has improved, there are new opportunities to earn money, or there is construction of a new community storage facility or feeder road. The description of the future – both positive and negative changes – provides the basis for describing the change the community wants to see. The Guidelines for CLA (2016) note that there are several ways to encourage people to imagine change through informal participatory approaches, including informal conversations, dramas, use of pictures, debates and discussions, and photos. All work well to encourage informality, inclusion and open discussion on what change might look like. Through these means, people are encouraged to describe what it feels like during and after the change happens. Collating these “statements of change”, which as noted above may be both positive and negative, can lead to the development of indicators which matter to people. They can be worded in such a way so as to enable local monitoring to be conducted.<sup>2</sup> This may be through regular monitoring by the representative group (e.g. village government, farmer groups) in specially designed record books or through regular village-wide reflection sessions where groups of people score the achievement of a range of indicators that are meaningful to them.

In both cases, these processes are intended to be of use to the community and to help motivate people towards increasing the pace and quality of change they want to see. The records kept, for example by the village government or farmer groups, are intended to be useful for them and a necessary way to ensure transparency at the community level. As soon as they become templates for upward accountability, the dynamic changes and the potential for bias increases (e.g. pleasing future sponsors or, conversely, underplaying achievement as a means to get more from sponsors). Experience with CLA has shown that there is arguably no incentive to manipulate data if the data are entirely for their own use.

The community-led process of M&E focuses on two key types of measurement:

(i) Measurement of benefit

In this PPE, a number of statements of change were made by farmers themselves such as “*Students came to see us and learn from us*”, “*Other villages saw we had knowledge on nutmeg cultivation and recognized this*”, “*We want to form a cooperative next*”, “*We got no benefits, we just know we need to be in a group to get future benefits*” and “*Nothing has changed, we still have to sell produce ourselves*”. Both positive and negative statements provide insights on the kinds of indicators which might be valued by the

<sup>2</sup> See (i) Dee Jupp and Sohel Ibn Ali, *Measuring Empowerment? Ask them Measuring Empowerment? Ask Them – Quantifying qualitative outcomes from people’s own analysis*. Sida Studies in Evaluation (Stockholm, Sida: 2010); (ii) Dee Jupp, *Guidelines for promoting the Citizen-led Approach to Development* (Maynooth, Trocaire: 2016); (iii) Dee Jupp and Sohel Ibn Ali, “Who Counts?” in *Accountability downwards, count-ability upwards; quantifying empowerment outcomes in Bangladesh* (Rugby, Practical Action Publishing UK: 2013).

community, e.g. being recognized as a source of information; intention to register as *bon fide* organization; moving from individual to collective marketing; group vs non-group access to resources.

These can be compiled across communities and sorted to provide change statements which are more or less applicable to all communities and will resonate with what they hope to achieve. These can be scored (as simply as using smiley faces) once per year and preferably with project participants and non-participants. Experience has shown that this is best facilitated internally and not by programme staff or those paid by the programme.

(ii) Measurement of community systems

Using the same principle whereby the future of, say the village government, is imagined (in Malawi, drama worked very well with village committees<sup>3</sup>), aspirational statements are collected and then compiled into record templates which belong to the village government itself and are not means to be reported upwards. Progress against these aspirations form part of the village government's feedback to the community as well as provide performance measures for their own internal use.

**How to collate people's own indicators to fulfil programme M&E?**

Ideally, people's indicators (i.e. the indicators monitored by the local structures such as village government or farmer groups) should be included in the project and programme results framework, and these should become the most important indicators of change. However, the way programmes are approved and funded usually requires an *a priori* results framework. Ideally, the indicators should only be established *after* facilitating the informal participatory approaches which generate change statements to ensure that the programme only uses people's indicators of change. This would need to be explained to those approving programme investment so that indicators are only fixed at baseline and any used in preliminary documentation such as project proposals are agreed to be indicative only (until the baseline is conducted).

"*Measuring Empowerment, Ask Them*" (2010) describes in detail how programmes can dip in and use some of the data generated for the communities' own purposes (lateral and downward accountability) to build evidence of overall achievement of the programme for upward accountability purposes. For example, the programme can collect (with the agreement of the group) data that may be being collected in record books or some of the data generated through community-level reflection sessions. These can be collated, weighted and analysed in ways that are useful for the programme's need to demonstrate upwards accountability but not used to compare or judge communities. A key issue here is that communities do not necessarily follow the same path for development/change. Using a normative, externally framed prescription of steps towards empowerment is inadvisable. Composite indicators can instead provide a clear picture of the overall trajectory of change within the entire cohort of communities/groups while still recognizing that context will affect some aspects of change differently for different groups.

The programme will not be spending huge resources on collecting lots of data as the communities will be collecting the data themselves for their own purposes. The programme only collects a minimum of indicators from the communities which will demonstrate key impacts and achievements. Field staff are therefore released from the burden of M&E and freed up to spend quality time supporting the growth of the groups rather than filling in forms and writing monitoring reports.

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<sup>3</sup> Trocaire, Malawi.

## Tables from field interviews

Table 1  
Perception of facilitators of their respective roles

	<i>Understands role of facilitation (Yes or no)</i>	<i>Group formation</i>	<i>Gives training</i>	<i>Links to internal VDP training</i>	<i>Links to external training</i>	<i>Provides inputs</i>	<i>Links to input provision</i>	<i>Direct market support</i>	<i>Links to market support</i>
West Papua									
VF A									
DF A									
VF B/C									
DF B/C									
Papua									
VF D									
DF D				RF job					RF job
VF E				also attended					
DF E				also attended					
VF F									
DF F									
VF G									
DF G									
VF J				also attended					
DF J				also attended					

Red: negative response; green: positive response.  
DF: district facilitator; VF: village facilitator.

Table 2  
Nature of interventions to farmer groups

<i>Farmer group</i>	<i>Technical Training</i>	<i>Governance training</i>	<i>Technical Advice</i>	<i>Agricultural inputs</i>	<i>Fishery inputs</i>	<i>Follow up</i>
West Papua						
A						
B				Seeds		
C				Seeds		
Papua						
D						
E						
F						
G						
J						

Red: negative response; green: positive response.



Table 3  
Farmer groups reporting benefits

Farmer group	Social capital		Increased productivity			Nutrition	
	Values the group (bonding)	Has new linkages (bridging)	Yields	Profit	Equal share of profits	Direct	As assumed by increased HH income
West Papua							
A							
B						Grew vegetables and ate them. One-off benefit	
C						Grew vegetables and ate them	
Papua							
D						Profits used to provide food to children of group members	Only landowner has made profit
E							
F						Eating own fish before VDP	
G							Owner & employees
J			Got new boat and fish net			Caught more fish	

Red: negative response; green: positive response; yellow: indirect benefit.

Table 4  
**Women's participation in groups**

<i>Farmer group</i>	<i>Any women members?</i>	<i>Any youth members?</i>	<i>Any of the women holding positions in group?</i>
West Papua			
A			Secretary
B			Secretary
C			
Papua			
D			
E			
F			
G			
J			

Red: negative response; green: positive response.

## **Bibliography**

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