Ex-post evaluation

Rural poverty in Brazil is concentrated in the Northeast region of the country. Per capita income in this region is only half the average for the country. Seventy percent of Brazilian farms with less than five hectares are in the Northeast. It lags behind the southern region in many social indicators. For instance, 55 percent of its rural population are illiterate or have less than one year of schooling.

 

These small farmers face very harsh conditions for making a living out of that semiarid area. Rain variability among and within years makes agricultural production extremely risky. Subsistence of the farmers is constantly at jeopardy. Over the centuries, small farmers have adjusted to these conditions with production systems intercropping a cash crop, cotton, with beans and corn. Cassava, also an important crop in the region, makes up with beans the basis of nutrition for the local population.

The area was colonized by portuguese citizens who were granted large tracts of area as private property. This was the way Portugal used to guarantee control over the colony. Private colonization of the plantations required labour provided by small, subsistence farmers living around the larger states. This was the origin of the dual agricultural structure of a few plantation owners and large farmers, and many small, subsistence, part time farmers part time agricultural workers. The labour market was the link between the two groups, but their relationship was one of dependency due to the lack of alternative employment for small farmers.

Despite Brazil's high rate of growth during more than four decades up to the end of the 1970s, Northeast poverty did not change significantly. The region had its economic and social infrastructure improved, but poverty reduction is a permanent challenge. "Colonialism" remains in the dependency of small farmers on large landowners that concentrate political and economic power.

The driving forces of the initial colonization path by portuguese settlers shaped today's land distribution and power, and economic, social, and political relationships between peasants and landlords.

By the time the project began to be executed, Brazil was facing a difficult economic situation. Oil prices had increased twice during the 1970, interest rates in the international capital market had jumped threefold within a short time, agricultural commodity prices had fallen. Previous tentative to isolate the internal economy from those external effects aggravated the internal fiscal situation. In this context, many development projects will have problems with counterpart resources.

The project

The Second Ceara Integrated Rural Development project had as objective to improve income and living conditions of small farmers through increased productivity in agriculture, and expansion of small scale, nonagricultural activities. Institutional strengthening also was an important objective, given the continued need for rural development efforts in the State of Ceara. IFAD's project focused on one of the poorest regions of the world, an area where poor small farmers make up a large share of the population. This is in line with IFAD's mandate.

To achieve its objectives the project included the following components: agricultural services of research and extension; social infrastructure improvements, both for health and for education purposes; improvement of physical infrastructure, mainly rural roads, small irrigation schemes, marketing facilities; marketing services to control and improve produce quality, guaranteed crop purchasing mechanism; incentive to small-scale non-agricultural enterprises to diversify the local economy and expand employment opportunities; other activities complementary to the project, like credit, were taken completely by the Brazilian government.

By the late 1970s, development experts considered integrated projects to be the best way to address rural development in poor areas. The Second Ceara project is an example of this kind of thinking. In terms of prevalent conditions in the rural area of the State of Ceara, the rationale of the project was correct. It addressed all the technical, economic, and institutional constraints for development of small farmers potential for more productive employment and better living conditions.

Some lessons and special aspects

The project tried to do too much in too many places. Covering the whole state and involving so many activities would be difficult even in normal periods. Project execution had several problems. Counterpart resources, due to the fiscal crisis of the 1980s, were not forthcoming as programmed and frequently were available only after long delays. Local institutions were not prepared to take charge of a large project, where so many components and activities had to be executed in many places at the same time. Boll weevil destroyed cotton production, historically the local cash crop for large and small farmers. Five years of droughts disrupted local capacity to maintain livestock, another important activity in the local production system.

In response to the extreme drought conditions during project implementation years, the federal government created a large emergency programme with resources equivalent many times the total cost of the project, deviating institutions from their responsibilities with project execution to the work in the emergency programme. These adversities occurred during the period of project execution. Despite all these events, several components could be executed and some exceeded targets. However, execution of the project fell far below targets. Agencies efficacy was low, and coordination difficult.

Contracting services out for specialized institutions was not used. Project resources were seen more like additionals to regular budgets of the executing agencies. In some cases resources were used mainly for support of salaries of professionals. No real commitment or responsibility could be exacted from those agencies in this way. The project worked well when the Governor of the State of Ceara, by his personal commitment and presiding over the project created State Rural Development Council, pressed for results.

Had conditions been favourable, however, project results would still fall short of targets. Some assumptions of the project were too optimistic to allow achievement of expected results. The main problem was the assumption that there were technologies "appropriated" for small farmers, and that only a small adaptive research effort would be sufficient to provide the extension service with a "good product" to pass on to small farmers. Efforts for generating and for diffusing technology were unbalanced in the project.

Technological problems of small farmers are more, not less, difficult than those for large, commercial farmers. Because technology adoption has to do with technical, economical, and psychological aspects, it is a complicated process to understand and influence. The logic of subsistence farmer is more complicated than the profit maximizing assumption usually applied for large agricultural entrepreneurs. Moreover, expected timing between beginning a specific research programme focused on small farmers and availability of results was untenable.

For these reasons, even if conditions had been favourable, targets for agricultural production and productivity could not be achieved during project life. However, the project initiated the research institution in the effort to focus research on technological needs of small farmers, and this is an important and sustainable accomplishment. Many simple technological solutions already have been developed and adopted by small farmers in the semi-arid zone of the Northeast.

The promotion of small scale nonagricultural enterprises was a component well executed. It counted with the energy of a mission oriented agency, which had done a good work in the capital city of Fortaleza and was able to transfer and adapt its experience to conditions in the interior of the state. This is an effort that deserves continued support.

Land access was an important objective for this area of skewed land distribution. The sensitivity of the subject and the small amount of resources dedicated to the component resulted in little accomplishment in terms of land access. On the other hand, titling was a success, and the reason is that national land policy and programmes were focused on land titling at the time. A strong drive for titling at the national level had obvious reflexes in the region and was the cause for the project surpassing its targets.

Water management is the most serious physical constraint in the area, not only to increase production and yields but also for animals and people subsistence. However, this component was not well executed. Neither water supplying for home consumption in the health component nor small irrigation schemes reached targets. The problem of rain variability and scarcity in the region requires a plan for water management. However, local solutions to small irrigation needs cannot wait for a long term plan, and future agricultural projects should have small irrigation as a basic component. Without it, technology cannot be improved, for risks make it uneconomical.

The project had several positive points. It introduced the idea of targeting small farmers, a change with respect to previous projects in the region. Organization of farmers for participation, an idea politically difficult in the area, was introduced by the project. The project also served as a link and learning process in the series of projects that have been implemented in the State of Ceara, training professionals in planning and executing rural development projects.

There is now the capacity to organize farmers and promote participation. There is the capacity to organize and promote participation of county people for defining local needs and prepare and setting priorities for projects.

Conclusions and recommendations

The Second Ceara project was important for introducing among local rural people the idea of organization and participation. Through the project, the beneficiaries and the professionals involved in project execution gained experience on how to work in a participative way.

For this fact alone, for bridging the transition between old and new concepts, the project has contributed to poverty reduction and to promotion of socioeconomic progress for the rural people in Ceara.

The region is witnessing transformations and future projects will have to deal with these facts. A rapid decrease in the rural population is occurring in the area of the project. People are migrating in search of better working and living conditions. Future projects will have to deal with emigration, its meaning in terms of agriculture in the region, and possibilities. Future perspectives for employment and income in the region will have to be adequately assessed. It is difficult for a project to achieve results when trends point to other directions.

Besides specific projects defined by the communities, and economic infrastructure projects, it will be necessary to finance projects that create processes that are basic to development. Agricultural research, health, and education services have to be strengthened to the point of making returns in the medium term viable. Research results, health, and education require a much stronger commitment than just the building of new facilities.

Like in PAPP now, responsibility for definition of needs and priorities, and for project design and execution, has to rest on local organized groups. International development agencies have to balance the attention they give to appraisal and to execution.

They have to pay more attention to the rational of proposed projects and to the execution capacity of proponents and less to the traditional appraisal methods, and also have to be more involved in project execution. International agencies have to move emphasis and resources from appraisal to execution. IFAD has to adjust to these new trends.