Executive summary

Introduction

Evaluation objectives, methodology and process. The Office of Evaluation (OE) of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) undertook the Country Programme Evaluation (CPE) in The Sudan with the following main objectives: (i) assess the performance and impact of IFAD country programme in The Sudan; and (ii) formulate a series of findings and recommendations to serve as building blocks for the preparation of the next Country Strategic Opportunities Programme (COSOP) for The Sudan. This CPE includes ten IFAD operations that were still ongoing at the time of the evaluation or were designed after the 1994 Country Portfolio Evaluation.

In November 2007, a preparatory mission was conducted to discuss with The Sudan authorities the evaluation approach, methodology and process. The main mission was undertaken from 27 January to 25 February 2008, and worked with beneficiaries, the Government of The Sudan (GoS), civil society and development partners in Khartoum. Four projects were visited [North Kordofan Rural Development Project (NKRDP), South Kordofan Rural Development Programme (SKRDP), Western Sudan Resources Management Programme (WSRMP) and Gash Sustainable Livelihoods Regeneration Project (GSLRP)]. In compliance with the IFAD Evaluation Policy, a Core Learning Partnership (CLP) was established. A national roundtable workshop was organised in The Sudan on February 25-26 2009 to discuss the main learning issues emerging from the evaluation.

Economy and poverty context. Despite its rich endowment of natural resources, The Sudan remains a low-income and food deficit country. In 2005, The Sudan ranked 147 out of 177 countries on the Human Development Index. This was below Madagascar but higher than Kenya. Poverty was exacerbated by the harsh policy and institutional environment, the prolonged wars and its dramatic consequences on the livelihoods of the rural poor. Poverty is presumed to be higher in the rural areas due to low agricultural productivity and high unemployment. The Sudan is characterized by high inequality, including among regions, gender and socio-economic groups. The economic growth experienced by The Sudan in recent years has not significantly benefited the poor.

The development of the oil sector in the late 90s resulted in double digit GDP growth rates and significant expansion of the federal government revenue. However, the boom in the oil sector masks the importance of the agricultural sector: it is estimated that about 70 per cent of The Sudan's population derive their economic livelihood from agriculture. The appreciation of the Sudanese currency exchange rate due to increased international demand for oil products negatively affected agricultural exports due to their high cost at export. Nevertheless, agriculture still accounts for about 80 per cent of non-petroleum exports.

Development spending in the agricultural sector increased substantially in recent years. The irrigated sector received most of these investments, while the rainfed crop and livestock sectors, on which most of the rural poor depend for their livelihood, received the least. This imbalance is being addressed under the current strategy for agricultural development – the Green Mobilisation. In 2003, the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper for 2004-2006 was presented which provided for higher assistance to rainfed areas and rural poverty. The Joint Assessment Mission of 2004 reaffirmed the importance of an equitable distribution of national wealth to restore peace in the country.

The country strategy in the Sudan

Approximately 30 per cent of the poor in the Near East and North Africa region live in The Sudan, making this country a priority for IFAD, both at the global and regional level. The presence of IFAD in The Sudan began in 1979 and has been uninterrupted despite the country's long running conflict. To date, IFAD has funded 15 projects for a total cost of US$558.62 million of which 38 per cent were IFAD loans.

The 2002 Sudan COSOP was prepared at a time when the country's prospects for re-engaging the international aid community appeared promising and when most donors focused on humanitarian rather than development aid. In this context, the IFAD COSOP can be considered one of the first strategic and innovative documents in The Sudan which explicitly recognised the linkage between development and peace. Furthermore, the COSOP recognised the multiple elements affecting human vulnerability including access to natural resources and financial assets, food security, gender equity, education, health care and peace. The key innovative element of the COSOP is that it is the first strategic document in The Sudan to expressly call for the linkage between development and peace as well as for greater support to the rainfed areas for effective poverty reduction.

The 2002 COSOP continued consolidating the orientations established in the 1994 Country Portfolio Evaluation. Three strategic thrusts were established: (i) support for the livelihood strategies of the target groups; (ii) empowering men and women to fully participate in the development process; and (iii) promoting good local governance. The overall goal of the COSOP was to: "improve living conditions of 3 million rural poor in rainfed agriculture areas, particularly in central-west and eastern regions". These strategic objectives were aligned to the IFAD regional strategy and Government general development priorities. They included a strong focus on gender, provided the basis for promoting women's access to decision making and for institutionalising community-based service delivery mechanisms. Livestock development was prioritised as the key strategy for supporting the livelihoods of the rural poor although the environmental consequences of livestock expansion were not examined. The COSOP identified geographic niches for IFAD intervention in central-west and eastern regions. These areas are among the poorest in The Sudan and are characterised by poor infrastructure and weak administrative institutions.

The COSOP complied with the IFAD requirements and standards of the time. It was however elaborated in a context of lack of information on key poverty data and a high level of uncertainty about the future of the country. The COSOP was unclear on how innovative solutions to rural poverty reduction were expected to be replicated or up-scaled. An overambitious and unfocussed set of policy dialogue issues were established: setting such an unfocused agenda for policy dialogue cannot be considered as a useful framework for strategic direction. It contrasts with the principle of selectivity that should guide IFAD operations aimed at maximizing rural poverty reduction impacts. The contribution of grants, partnership building activities and knowledge management to the delivery of the IFAD strategy was insufficiently analysed. It should however be noted that at the time in which The Sudan COSOP was designed, the corporate policies on grants, partnership and knowledge management were not yet approved.

As in the case of most pre-2006 COSOPs, The Sudan COSOP was open-ended with respect to the pipeline. The COSOP established that in order to comply with the IFAD's strategic niche and proposed thrusts in The Sudan, area-based rural development projects would represent the majority of projects in the IFAD portfolio. The evaluation expresses its reservation on the extent to which area-based integrated rural development projects constituted the most appropriate intervention modality in The Sudan. In particular, in a context characterised by limited institutional capacities and a volatile policy environment, a more focused approach could have been more appropriate. Although criteria for project selection were listed, these were not actually applicable in a context characterised by lack of poverty data. Some degree of open-endedness and flexibility was nevertheless required in order to respond to country volatility and uncertainty.

At the time of COSOP formulation, IFAD was the only funding development agency with a substantial presence in The Sudan, along with the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) and the Arab Fund. At the same time, the Sudanese government was benefiting from rising oil earnings. This constituted an exceptional situation of great opportunity for the Fund in The Sudan. Although the COSOP recognised the marked improvement in the growth rate of the economy starting in the early 90s and the prospects for increasing oil exports, it did not sufficiently analyse how IFAD-financed operations could benefit from The Sudan's improving economic perspective. In particular, the COSOP did not sufficiently capitalise on the Fund's privileged status in The Sudan and how this could be used through policy dialogue for promoting further investments in its ongoing projects in rainfed areas

Performance and results of IFAD-supported operations

Portfolio performance. IFAD-funded projects scored as moderately satisfactory with regards to relevance. The projects were relevant to the needs of The Sudan's poor and were aligned to the country's national policies and institutional context. However, conflict issues were not sufficiently addressed during design. Design flaws were also found in terms of under-financing of natural resources compared to the magnitude of the problem; dependence on unidentified co-financiers for priority activities; and overoptimistic expectation on implementation preparedness and management capacity of partner stakeholders.

The effectiveness of IFAD-funded projects in The Sudan has been moderately satisfactory. In the NKRDP, beneficiaries experienced improvement of their production capacity. These achievements were possible through initiatives of support for extension workers, demonstrations and technical training. Positive effects on women empowerment were achieved through nutrition, literacy classes and increased women participation in community groups. The establishment of Locality Extension Teams (LETs) was an important result of IFAD programmes. Effectiveness of projects was however negatively affected by implementation un-preparedness, weak institutional capacity, and lack of coordination among key stakeholders.

Efficiency has been moderately unsatisfactory. Overall, the overstretched and scattered nature of the interventions increased the amount of resources needed to generate results. The complex administrative structure, problems of coordination and complex management boards also affected efficiency.

The rural poverty impact of the IFAD country programme is rated moderately satisfactory. Important achievements were noted in terms of higher endowment of physical assets of rural poor households, agricultural productivity, and improved capacity of grassroots organisations in planning and management, and women empowerment. IFAD-funded programmes also contributed to orient policy and institutions in better servicing the rural poor, especially through support to land and water governance. In contrast, effects on market access were rated moderately unsatisfactory due to the fact that this domain was not treated in a systematic manner. The impact of the IFAD Country Programme on environment was also rated moderately unsatisfactory: despite the good results achieved with awareness raising campaigns and initiatives for rangeland and pasture protection, the evaluation noted the high exposure to environmental risks including land erosion and livestock overgrazing.

Sustainability was found to be a continuing problematic area for IFAD operations in The Sudan. This is due to the fragile and volatile environment, weak execution capacities and recurrent conflicts. The assumption that the revenue base of locality governments would increase sufficiently to take over responsibility for project activities proved unfounded. In this context, it is unlikely that State Governments will be able to consolidate most of the successes of the IFAD supported projects, particularly those related to sustaining rangeland rehabilitation and improvements. At the same time, the evaluation found a high degree of social ownership which constitutes an important supporting factor for sustainability. 

The performance of non-lending activities was moderately unsatisfactory. The Fund did not grasp the opportunities for policy dialogue to augment overall development effectiveness at a time when IFAD remained the only international financial institution in the country. Its sphere of influence at policy level was mostly limited within the scope of project activities. Policy dialogue was limited, partly because IFAD allocated few resources and efforts for the purpose and partly because of a lack of a more permanent country presence (until 2005). However, IFAD established good relations with ministries and institutions both in the federal and state governments. Its privileged status facilitated partnering with GoS officials both with national and state authorities and notably at project level. IFAD has no significant partnership with international financial institutions except for the IsDB in the NKRDP. Better coordination among the Kordofan programmes and other projects active in the region would have been beneficial in reducing duplication of efforts. The mechanisms in place for knowledge generation, management and dissemination were not adequate: although some knowledge sharing events have taken place among projects, there have been few systematic efforts to document IFAD's experiences on a periodic basis, or to mobilize relevant learning and experiences from other countries in the region or elsewhere. Impact studies have been undertaken in the SKRDP for assessing the effects of project operations.

The performance of partners. Through its operations, IFAD has supported the national decentralisation process by working with local communities to sustain the livelihoods of the rural poor and strengthening local governance. The Fund's privileged status facilitated partnering with GoS officials, both with National and State authorities and notably at the project level. Since 2005, IFAD has introduced a field country presence in The Sudan which has significantly contributed to its visibility, and is providing some benefits to non-lending activities. So far, the Fund has effectively undertaken direct supervision in one project (NKRDP).  Direct supervision will be extended to all other recent projects in The Sudan in 2009. While the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) performed well in the supervision of fiduciary and operational aspects, supervision missions gave more limited ttention to the follow-up and assessment of certain technical aspects of project implementation.  Government performance has generally been as satisfactory as could be expected within the limitations imposed by its capacity constraints.

The table below provides the average score of the evaluation ratings expressed on a 6 point scale where 6 corresponds to highly satisfactory whereas 1 to highly unsatisfactory. These scores are benchmarked against the 2002-2006 Annual Report on the Results and Impact of IFAD Operations (ARRI)¹ ratings (for example, the 88 per cent under relevance means that 88 per cent of the projects evaluated by The Sudan CPE had a moderately satisfactory or better rating).

 

MS = Moderately Satisfactory     MU = Moderately Unsatisfactory.

Though the portfolio performance ratings in Table 13 are lower when compared to the Annual Report on the Results and Impact of IFAD Operations (ARRI) ratings, the IFAD portfolio in support of the GoS efforts has nonetheless been moderately satisfactory overall² . Similarly, the performance of partners has also been moderately satisfactory. The Sudan Country Programme brought hope to largely marginalized populations following a period of conflict in some areas, and much needed support to state governments and localities where few other donors existed.

Conclusions

Agriculture as a key sector of intervention

Though the Fund's Official Development Assistance (ODA) contribution in support of The Sudan's rural poverty reduction efforts may seem modest relative to total ODA, IFAD is still the largest donor in the agriculture sector, making the Fund a major partner in the current period of rising agricultural commodity prices. The Evaluation notes that the agricultural sector budget, which had declined to low levels in 2001, has since regained its former position of 2000 (45 per cent of total development expenditure). However, the irrigated sector received most of these investments, while the rainfed crop and livestock sectors, on which most of the rural poor depend for their livelihood, received the least. The CPE also indicates that components to strengthen rainfed agricultural services are explicitly present in only two out of the five ongoing IFAD projects, but subsumed under different components in all projects. Components to strengthen agricultural services in ongoing projects received 19 per cent of IFAD financing. This is less than institutional support (27 per cent) or community development (20 per cent) components, which are present in all five projects. Considering that smallholder agriculture in The Sudan generates economic growth that builds peace and reduces poverty, a key lesson of this CPE is that IFAD strategy and activities in The Sudan could further address the root causes of smallholder low productivity by focussing more on agriculture.

Promoting pro-poor agricultural innovations

The Evaluation found that though the programme had performed moderately satisfactorily with regards to rural finance or institutional innovations [e.g. development of Community Development Committees (CDCs) in project areas], little technical innovation has been developed by research, under the impulse of IFAD and GoS, to be adopted as technical packages by the projects. More support to research is needed.  For example, the evaluation found that farmers are already beginning to experiment themselves with more intensified use of manure and could be assisted with technical advice for on-farm trials, with pastoralists assisted with corral systems for manure collection. Where innovative models for development are adopted within IFAD projects from previous Non Governmental Organisation (NGO) experience in the field (as with stock route demarcation in WSRMP from Save Our Souls Sahel, and village CDCs that have a similar structure and purpose to Village Development Committees (VDCs), that first emerged from CARE's 30 year experience in the area), greater emphasis and resources are required to support further adaptation and evolution of the innovation.

Scaling up policy dialogue

The COSOP did not capture the privileged status of IFAD at the time of its preparation in 2002, when IFAD remained among the few funding development agencies in The Sudan. There was a missed opportunity for IFAD to systematically follow-up on policy issues at the national level. The Fund's sphere of influence remained mostly constrained within the project scope. Lack of real country presence and little engagement on higher national level policy issues reinforced the narrow role of policy dialogue initiatives undertaken by the Fund during implementation of the Country Programme.

Most results at policy level have taken place within the project context. This comprises measures to improve access to land and water resources, the development of community organisations, or the promotion of gender equity. This is considered a positive characteristic of IFAD in The Sudan and should be used for building forthcoming institutional and policy change objectives in the Results-Based COSOP. They also attest to IFAD's ability to influence policy, an aptitude which could well be exercised beyond the project context.

Tackling sustainability

The Evaluation confirmed that project sustainability, which has been identified as a key weakness since the Portfolio Evaluation of 1994, requires broader efforts beyond the simple scope of project activities. The COSOP did not provide a comprehensive strategy for ensuring sustainability of IFAD-financed activities. Some IFAD-financed operations, such as increased livestock development, have translated into additional concerns. These tend to introduce substantial changes over a short time period in fragile environments with a weak carrying capacity, often resulting in adverse environmental effects.

Despite laudable efforts, there has been a gap between the IFAD intent in the 2002 COSOP seeking to promote conflict resolution as well as peace-building and outcomes on the ground. In addition, the fragile and volatile environment, weak implementation capacities and recurrent conflicts increase the exposure of existing project benefits to risks that may hinder the continuation of benefits after completion of IFAD support.

Recommendations

Agriculture as a key sector of intervention

The Evaluation recommends that IFAD further address the root causes of smallholder low productivity by focussing more on agriculture in the next COSOP. Localities where basic services and infrastructure that have proved to support labour productivity and market access are available could be favoured.  In today's environment of rising prices, the issues of value-chain marketing and market access require more consideration than these issues received in the past. IFAD could also build on current efforts such as the decentralised agricultural extension services which have been beneficial to smallholders. Land tenure, irrigated cultivation, overgrazing and livestock should continue to be addressed.  However, consideration should be given to pursuing these in a more focused and systematic manner to ensure greater integration and synergies in these areas.

Promoting pro-poor agricultural innovations

The Evaluation recommends that IFAD redouble efforts in promoting pro-poor agricultural innovations.  These have been weaker than innovations in the other programme components. The Fund's focus on agricultural innovation should be realised within projects through allocation of greater resources for suitable staffing, links to relevant research organisations and to undertake adaptive research components. A more systematic approach to replication and scaling up of agricultural innovations should also be developed. In particular, technical innovations need to be developed by research, under the impulse of IFAD and GoS, and be adopted as technical packages by the projects. Greater practical support to innovation in the agricultural sector should be given both at research level and in support to farmer's own experimentation and innovation.

Scaling up policy dialogue

Building on project-level policy dialogue initiatives that are currently being pursued, the division should scale up agricultural policy dialogue to the national level. This could be done by presenting a limited set of strategic themes for dialogue in the forthcoming Sudan COSOP, which could include, inter alia, such themes as:  Agricultural Pro-poor Innovation, Partnership and Sustainability. Policy dialogue on these strategic themes could then be enhanced and sustained through the life of the next COSOP through the regular follow-up and analysis mandated in the RB-COSOP framework, including annual workshops and the mid-term review exercise. Regularly revisiting dialogue on policy issues also presents the potential to establish a more transparent partnership and consultation mechanism, making it possible to better engage with national and local level authorities, civil society and the wider donor community. The end result would be a more holistic country programme and, ultimately, more sustainable development impact.

Tackling sustainability

The Evaluation recommends that the next COSOP ensure sustainability is incorporated in the broad framework of the strategic elements of the Country Programme in terms of design (e.g. clarity of exit strategies), and partnership (e.g. stakeholder ownership) at the outset of the new country programme. Also, recognizing the contextual realities of The Sudan, where conflict over natural resource is an integral part of the daily reality of farming and pastoral communities, IFAD should include the capacity building of the field staff in conflict prevention and disaster management as an integral component of its programmatic interventions in The Sudan in order to enhance sustainability.

---

1/ The ARRI aims to provide a consolidated picture of the results, impact and performance of IFAD projects each year:

2/ Overall portfolio achievement reflects the combined assessment of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, rural poverty impact, sustainability and innovation.