

# Project completion report validation of the Post-Crisis Programme for Participatory Integrated Development in Rainfed Areas in the Republic of Indonesia

## A. Basic project data<sup>1</sup>

<i>Approval</i>	<i>4 May 2000</i>	<i>Project costs</i>	<i>At approval (US\$ million)</i>	
Loan signature	21 June 2000	Total	27.4	
Effectiveness	31 January 2001	IFAD loan and percentage of total	23.5	85%
Mid-term review	July 2004-February 2005	Borrower	3.2	12%
Closing	30 September 2009	Beneficiaries	0.7	3%

Source: Project Completion Report, Project and Portfolio Management System, President's Report.<sup>2</sup>

## B. Project outline

1. The concept and design of the programme were based on earlier IFAD-supported projects such as the *East Java Rainfed Agriculture Programme* and the *Income-Generating Project for Marginal Farmers and the Landless*. At the time, the Government was formulating a proposal for sustainable rainfed agricultural development in nine provinces.<sup>3</sup> It was decided that IFAD would support three priority provinces: East Java, Nusa Tenggara Barat and Nusa Tenggara Timur.
2. The programme objective was to increase incomes and food production and sustainably improve the living conditions of 100,000 low-income households. This was to be achieved through: (i) setting up new farmers' and women's village self-help groups (SHGs) or strengthening existing groups; (ii) promoting the conservation and improvement of natural resources; and (iii) improving village infrastructure. The programme covered 14 districts in the three provinces of East Java, Nusa Tenggara Barat and Nusa Tenggara Timur. The Post-Crisis Programme for Participatory Integrated Development in Rainfed Areas (PIDRA) was selected as one of the 15 pilot projects to be included in the IFAD direct supervision pilot programme approved by the IFAD Governing Council in 1997.
3. PIDRA had four components: (i) community and gender development (25 per cent of base costs); (ii) agriculture and livestock development (19 per cent); (iii) village infrastructure and land management (30 per cent); and (iv) institutional support and programme management (26 per cent).
4. The programme was governed by the IFAD Flexible Lending Mechanism (FLM, currently discontinued). The overall objective of FLM is to introduce greater flexibility into the Fund's project design and implementation. The specifics of an FLM loan include: (i) a continuous and evolving design process through implementation of distinct three- to four-year cycles; and (ii) clearly defined preconditions, or "triggers", for proceeding to subsequent cycles.<sup>4</sup>
5. In line with FLM provisions, PIDRA was divided into two phases:
  - Phase I concentrated on group development and capacity-building; it aimed at increasing the capacity of communities to plan and manage their own livelihood strategies by building their institutions, personal skills and confidence, and provided infrastructure and technical support to meet basic needs and undertake small-scale income-generating activities (trading, livestock, etc.).

<sup>1</sup> See annex II for detailed project data.

<sup>2</sup> Report and Recommendation of the President to the Executive Board on a Proposed Loan to the Republic of Indonesia for the Post-Crisis Programme for Participatory Development in Rain-fed Areas (EB 2000/69/R.24/Rev.1).

<sup>3</sup> East Java, Nusa Tenggara Barat, Nusa Tenggara Timur, South Sulawesi, Southeast Sulawesi, West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, West Java and Central Java.

<sup>4</sup> Funding of Phase II of PIDRA was to be contingent on achieving a number of triggering indicators to be agreed upon by the Government, NGOs and IFAD.

- Phase II began with the mid-term review undertaken jointly by the Government and IFAD between July 2004 and February 2005.<sup>5</sup> Phase II focused on the economic development of groups and infrastructure development for villages; it aimed at generating incomes beyond subsistence through microenterprises, marketing and the creation of a natural resource base to ensure sustainable increases in the productivity of rainfed agriculture. Phase II was designed around three components:

**Component 1** focused on the development of sustainable livelihoods and had three subcomponents: (i) community empowerment and gender equity, including support for SHGs, federations/cooperatives, village development associations (VDAs) and gender mainstreaming; (ii) rural microenterprise development; and (iii) community-based natural resource management.

**Component 2** concentrated on village infrastructure development.

**Component 3** included institutional strengthening and programme management, monitoring and evaluation (M&E), and improving organizational structure.

- The targeting strategy adopted by PIDRA was to identify remote villages in upland areas that have limited access to capital and other resources (such as service providers) and have attracted comparatively low investment from private and public sources. Within these villages, the poor were then identified and invited to form SHGs. The members of SHGs were to be united by an affinity based on mutual trust and support, with each group itself selecting its members. The programme would then invest in building the institutional capacity of these SHGs and in their chosen livelihoods. The focus of the programme was to build the self-confidence of the poorest members of the rural population and promote self-help among them in order to generate a mechanism for community-level decision-making and strengthen the ability of communities to manage their own development. The strategy also focused on setting up VDAs with most of the members elected from SHGs. The VDAs were expected to ensure that the needs of the poor, particularly women, were given priority in infrastructure investments by PIDRA and the Government; they were also expected to lobby local government bodies on behalf of the poor.

## **C. Main assessment – review of findings by criteria<sup>6</sup>**

### **C.1. Relevance:<sup>7</sup> moderately satisfactory (rating 4)**

- The programme was relevant in terms of its alignment with Government priorities, IFAD country strategy and the needs of the rural poor in Indonesia. PIDRA provided timely support to the Government's decentralization efforts by building grass-roots organizations to promote the priorities of the poorest in local planning. The three provinces targeted by PIDRA had the highest percentage of vulnerable population groups (although the PCR provided no pertinent statistical evidence of this). PIDRA was an appropriate response to the need to: (i) support the poor through establishing SHGs or institutions able to command stronger bargaining power and community influence; (ii) compete in the marketplace through economies of scale; (iii) develop the confidence of these population groups to exercise their rights, particularly the right to benefit from government services. The relevance of the PIDRA strategy was confirmed by the growing demand from villages outside the

<sup>5</sup> The mid-term review emphasized the need to strengthen SHGs and other community organizations and to reduce the number of village institutions. It advocated building appropriate linkages with financial institutions and markets and developing training packages to cope with the need for new technical and managerial skills, the larger-scale of production and new livelihood investments. It stressed the need to lobby provincial and district governments to put in place supportive policies to create an enabling environment for micro business.

<sup>6</sup> Detailed definition of criteria available at [http://www.ifad.org/evaluation/process\\_methodology/doc/manual.pdf](http://www.ifad.org/evaluation/process_methodology/doc/manual.pdf).

<sup>7</sup> The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, institutional priorities and partner and donor policies. Relevance also assesses the strategy defined by a project to achieve the intended objectives.

PIDRA area for assistance in training to start SHGs. At the same time, the programme faced a number of design-related constraints to achieving its objectives: (i) the complexity of the programme (for example, the complex institutional setting and the need to implement multiple components in situations of limited local capacity); (ii) the insufficient time allowed for agricultural activities; (iii) the absence of a strategy to link organized groups to sustainable sources of financing for economic activities; and (iv) the lack of marketing support for enterprises. A high percentage of project costs was allocated to management: 26 per cent in the President's Report and 31 per cent in the design of Phase II. The complex implementation structure, which included many local partners and NGOs at the design stage, also contributed to the high transaction costs. All of the above led to a lower rating for relevance by the PCR (4) than the one accorded by PMD (5).

## **C.2 Effectiveness:<sup>8</sup> moderately satisfactory (rating 4)**

8. Effectiveness is assessed against programme objectives, as specified in the President's Report.
  - **Setting up new or strengthening existing farmers' and women's village self-help groups (SHGs), rendering them self-reliant and capable of undertaking their own development activities.** The President's Report estimated that about 5,000 sustainable SHGs would be formed. The PCR used the number of household beneficiaries as an indicator of effectiveness. The total number of households in the 2,384 SHGs was 41,108. A total of 59,441 households were considered "indirect beneficiaries" of infrastructure investments such as roads, markets and drinking water systems. The total number of households reached is therefore in line with the target of 100,000 households. The most challenging aspect of the SHGs was whether the PIDRA succeeded in making them self-reliant. This issue is discussed in section C.9.
  - **Promoting the conservation and improvement of natural resources.** The PCR provides very little information about this objective.<sup>9</sup> The most recent supervision mission notes that the area under shifting cultivation has decreased whereas fields on high slopes have been supported by soil conservation measures. A total of 19,834 hectares of land was treated under PIDRA (against the target of 7,308 ha) and in 969 villages (target 449) the community prepared a natural resources management plan. Of these, 277 plans were submitted to the district government for financial support.
  - **Improving village infrastructure.** The PCR reports the following output results: 463 km of road (target 528 km; 88 per cent), 61 market centres (target 50; 122 per cent); 383 water supply systems (target 531; 72 per cent), 304 km gravity piping (target 707 km; 43 per cent); 561 water catchment ponds (target 416; 135 per cent) providing access to drinking water for 44,892 households.
9. Overall, the programme was relatively successful against the Phase I targets; the progress against Phase II objectives was below expectations. The analysis of the purpose of loans to SHGs indicates that beneficiaries prioritized loans for livelihood activities or attempted to slightly increase the scale of their business. Phase II focused on the next step of the strategy – introducing microenterprises. Twenty-one per cent of SHG members successfully graduated to micro or small enterprises. Some of the enterprises supported by the programme were described as "struggling for existence", with their profitability prospects undermined by: (i) low quality of products; (ii) limited markets; (iii) lack of value added; (iv) low

<sup>8</sup> The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.

<sup>9</sup> Under effectiveness, reference is made to "good performance in soil and natural resources management, crop development, crop diversification and livestock development" but no further details are provided.

technology usage; and (v) high labour input. The mid-term review recommended creating sustainable linkages with mainstream financial institutions to facilitate access to credit. This was in line with the findings of the Indonesia country programme evaluation conducted by IOE in 2004, which found that IFAD placed little emphasis on sustainable access of the rural poor to financial services. This remained a challenging area: the PCR noted that limited access to credit curtailed the growth and diversification of non-farm livelihoods.

10. The programme objective of increasing incomes and food production and sustainably improving the living conditions of 100,000 low-income households was achieved only in part mainly because of issues related to the sustainability of results – hence the “moderately satisfactory” rating for effectiveness, which matches the rating accorded by PMD.

### **C.3 Efficiency:<sup>10</sup> moderately satisfactory (rating 4)**

11. The PCR provided a detailed analysis of efficiency. On the positive side, the period of time between loan approval and PIDRA’s date of effectiveness was shorter than the global and regional averages of IFAD-financed projects. Delivery of social investment was described as efficient thanks to the decentralized management of expenditures. According to the Indonesia country programme evaluation, PIDRA also had the lowest cost per beneficiary (household) ratio among all IFAD-financed projects in Indonesia.
12. On the negative side, there was a long gap between the implementation of Phases I and II of PIDRA, from July 2004 to May 2006 when the effectiveness conditions for Phase II were met.<sup>11</sup> More importantly, the PCR shows that 41 per cent of programme resources were classified as “transaction costs”, meaning that close to half of such resources were spent on project management, service provider costs, NGOs, etc. Although there is no official benchmark for the share of transaction costs in IFAD projects, this is a very high percentage, which negatively affected the final rating for efficiency.<sup>12</sup> In addition, the PCR tried to analyse the cost-benefit ratio of some on-farm, off-farm and non-farm activities. Although these results were considered positive, several investments (especially on-farm) have not been associated with a commensurate increase in income generation and value-added.
13. The PCR reported an ex-post economic internal rate of return (EIRR) of 40–49 per cent in the three targeted provinces, based on the cost-benefit analysis of the various on-farm, off-farm and non-farm investments. On this basis, efficiency is rated by PMD as satisfactory (rating 5). However, this calculation does not take into account the very high share of management costs (41 per cent), which would have led to a significantly lower EIRR. On this basis, efficiency is given a rating of 4 by IOE, one point lower than the PMD assessment.
14. **Project performance: moderately satisfactory (rating 4).** The IOE rating for overall project performance is lower than the PMD assessment because of a number of design-related constraints (relevance), sustainability risks for the achieved results (effectiveness) and the high share of transaction costs (efficiency).
15. **Rural poverty impact:<sup>13</sup> moderately satisfactory (rating 4).** IOE accorded a rating one point below the PMD score based on the insufficient evidence attributing stated changes to programme activities, difficulties in creating sustainable linkages with financial markets, and lack of data on specific impact domains (productivity, natural resources and environment).

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<sup>10</sup> A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results.

<sup>11</sup> There were two main reasons for this: (i) internal IFAD delays in endorsing the conclusions of the Phase I review; and (ii) the Government reduced budgetary allocations to PIDRA after the tsunami.

<sup>12</sup> In the IFAD supervision report 2006, reference is made to the ratio between operational and investment expenditures: the proportion of operational expenditures at the national, provincial and district levels ranged between 23 and 70 per cent during the period 2001–2005, and between 35 and 43 per cent in other years.

<sup>13</sup> Impact is defined as the changes that have occurred or are expected to occur in the lives of the rural poor (whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended) as a result of development interventions.

16. The analysis of the impact of PIDRA presented in the PCR is based on the focus group discussions held with programme beneficiaries in three provinces. The five impact domains defined in the IFAD Evaluation Manual were used. Results are presented as a percentage of focus group discussion respondents reporting a positive change in selected indicators. The number of respondents for each focus group discussion is relatively low (between 34 and 125) and no indication is provided of whether this can be considered representative of the beneficiary population. The PCR did not include an analysis of the results (or discuss the so-called *why factor*) nor did it attempt to establish a causal relationship between the stated changes and programme activities.

#### **C.4 Household income and net assets: moderately satisfactory (rating 4)**

17. Beneficiaries participating in the focus group discussions reported an increase in household equipment (between 46 and 74 per cent of respondents across the three provinces), modernization of their home (between 35 and 71 per cent), increased savings (between 57 and 82 per cent) and purchase of agricultural tools (between 71 and 100 per cent). According to the 2008 IFAD supervision mission report, 71,050 households benefited from the construction of roads (432 km of village roads) and improved access to markets (49 market centres were constructed). These activities may have had an impact on household income but no data are available to corroborate any definitive impact statements. The PCR also refers to an increase in livestock assets following SHG loans.
18. The main impact on the income of villagers was in the form of a decrease in the number of high interest loans from money lenders. The PIDRA instilled a strong savings culture among SHG members and contributed to reducing the presence of money lenders in the villages. This can be regarded as the most substantial contribution of PIDRA to improving household financial assets.
19. The total common fund of the SHGs was US\$2.21 million.<sup>14</sup> Of this amount, savings totalled US\$0.43 million and the interest earned on loans to group members that was added to the common fund totalled US\$0.37 million. Profits from group income-generating activities that were used as capital for lending amounted to US\$0.85 million. Savings, interest, profits from income-generating activities, loans from banks and grants from the Government amounted to US\$1.76 million, which represented the total capital raised by the SHGs. With this capital (and the matching grants from the programme amounting to US\$0.28 million), the SHGs advanced loans amounting to US\$13.72 million. This constituted a significant injection of financial resources into the local economies. The common fund was a well-accepted instrument for supporting household livelihood strategies.<sup>15</sup>
20. The capacity of the programme to generate an impact on income was constrained by the initial poverty status of SHG beneficiaries. As noted by IFAD supervision missions, priority was therefore given to activities aimed at stabilizing livelihoods or mitigating food insecurity rather than those aimed at increasing income. The programme succeeded in promoting linkages with markets in only a few areas. These constraints and the limited amount of evidence available adversely affected the rating assigned by the PCR for this component, which was "moderately satisfactory" and one point lower than the PMD score recorded in the PCR.

#### **C.5 Agricultural productivity and food security: moderately satisfactory (rating 4)**

21. A total of US\$4.05 million in SHG loans was directed to agriculture. The PCR provided limited information about the impact of these loans on agricultural practices. The total area in which crops were intensified or diversified was 23,445

<sup>14</sup> All data are from the project completion report. US\$1.0 = 10,000 Indonesia Rupees (IDR).

<sup>15</sup> Sectoral distribution of loans by volume was: (i) trade (US\$5.03 million or 36 per cent of the total); (ii) agriculture (US\$4.05 million or 29 per cent); (iii) livestock (US\$1.45 million or 10 per cent); (iv) consumption (US\$0.87 million or 6 per cent); and (v) education (US\$0.74 million or 5 per cent).

hectares. Altogether, 14,000 farmers were involved in adaptive trials and 34,000 adopted organic farming practices. The 2007 IFAD supervision mission reported significant improvement in crop productivity and (to a lesser extent) diversification following SHG loan disbursement. However, it is not clear how the programme contributed to these results.

22. The PCR emphasized the need to provide adequate veterinary care as there were several villages where livestock and poultry had died of disease. Village-level veterinarians were trained under PIDRA and operated on a fee-for-service basis. Despite problems encountered in their graduation into viable service providers, this can be considered an important contribution of PIDRA to agricultural development.
23. According to the PCR, between 71 and 87 per cent of focus group discussion respondents reported an increase in income from agriculture and livestock; all respondents reported better marketing of produce and increased food security; between 33 and 82 per cent reported an increase in cultivable area. An important dimension of the programme impact was the fact that, according to the 2008 IFAD supervision mission report, 4,888 families have access to land – a pre-condition for any programme aimed at agricultural advancement. Unfortunately, these results are not analysed in the PCR. The same applies to the impact of water catchment tanks, small reservoirs, etc.
24. The PCR did not provide a comprehensive assessment of the impact of the programme on food security. The 2007 IFAD supervision mission report contains interesting, yet anecdotal, evidence<sup>16</sup> that cannot be used to formulate general findings. Given the weakness of available evidence, the impact of the programme on agricultural productivity and food security is rated as moderately satisfactory, which is one point lower than the PMD assessment in the PCR.

#### **C.6 Human and social capital and empowerment: satisfactory (rating 5)**

25. PIDRA made a substantial contribution to improving human health through the construction of drinking water systems that benefited 34,000 households. Training delivered under PIDRA generated a positive impact on technical capability. In terms of social capital, the PCR refers to the “systematization” of maintenance of village infrastructure. This is probably a reference to the efforts made under the programme to support VDAs and promote maintenance of infrastructure.
26. The most important contribution of PIDRA has been the formation of SHG and VDAs, and the promotion of participation by women in formal and informal organizations. A total of 2,384 SHGs (with over 42,000 members) were formed on the basis of affinity among members. A total of 235 federations/cooperatives were formed and have become an important instrument for marketing/saving/lending. PIDRA interventions helped rural people to raise their social status and improve their confidence and self-reliance; pioneered participatory processes to forge and foster group and community development actions; empowered communities to plan and prioritize their community infrastructure needs, and then to contribute to the cost-effective and timely construction of the infrastructure and subsequent organization of its operation and maintenance.

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<sup>16</sup> The report noted that food security was a major issue in Nusa Tenggara Timur when the programme began. Families produced food that was barely sufficient to last 6-8 months a year. When the programme started, they took out loans from the SHGs to purchase inputs and meet consumption needs so that they did not have to borrow from money lenders. Field extension workers and NGOs then introduced technology and management practices in agriculture that have been adopted elsewhere. This resulted in: (i) the production and use of organic fertilizers; (ii) changes in farming practices; (iii) simple instruments already available locally being used for new purposes; (iv) improvement in soil conservation; and (v) plantation of free crops in shifting cultivation areas. Following the introduction of these measures, all the families in two villages visited by the 2007 IFAD supervision mission were able to produce adequate food for the year and most families had stopped shifting cultivation since their home gardens were now adequate to provide corn and vegetables.

### **C.7 Natural resources and the environment: moderately satisfactory (rating 4)**

27. The PCR used two indicators to assess achievements in the management of natural resources and the environment: (i) the number of focus group discussion respondents using land conservation methods; and (ii) the number of respondents reporting use of organic fertilizers. All participants responded positively. A total of US\$3.0 million was allocated under the village infrastructure development component for community-based natural resources management. As documented in the 2008 IFAD supervision mission report, initiatives taken by SHGs with the support of VDAs and local government have resulted in better management of vulnerable areas such as traditional springs and fields on high slopes. As noted under section C.2 on effectiveness, the PCR reported a decrease in the area under shifting cultivation. The formulation by communities of plans for natural resources management is an indication of the increasing awareness of the value of natural resources and the environment. The 2007 IFAD supervision mission report referred to the increase in the awareness shown by communities of the importance of watershed management. This was evident in the soil conservation initiatives undertaken in areas where community land was most vulnerable.
28. Overall, data and analysis relating to the impact of the programme on natural resources and the environment is somewhat limited. For this reason, the overall rating of moderately satisfactory by the PCR for this criterion is one point lower than the PMD assessment given in the PCR.

### **C.8 Institutions and policies: moderately satisfactory (rating 4)**

29. The PCR used two indicators to assess institutions and policies: (i) the number of focus group respondents reporting an increase in extension services; and (ii) the number of respondents who consider the Government response to needs to be much improved. All respondents reacted positively to these statements of change. Nonetheless, the above indicators are not sufficient to formulate any hypotheses on the impact of PIDRA on institutions and policies. The section of the PCR on sustainability provided more details on the effect of the programme on policies and institutions. In particular, the PCR referred to the success of PIDRA in encouraging the Government to introduce some of the beneficial aspects of the PIDRA strategy in its poverty reduction programmes. The PCR also underlined the importance of PIDRA in supporting the decentralization process initiated by the Government; promoting the participation of the poor in local planning; and enhancing the role of NGOs and other social structures in local government plans.
30. The PCR provided very limited information about changes in the institutional relationship between NGOs and the Government. It reported that PIDRA contributed to developing the relationship between the Government and NGOs into one of mutual trust and openness. The 2008 IFAD supervision mission report referred to the fact that NGOs cooperating with PIDRA had agreed to remain in the programme area.<sup>17</sup> This is an important institutional change to which PIDRA contributed. According to the same supervision mission report, linkages between the programme and the private sector remained an “unresolved issue”; similarly, PIDRA lacked a strategy for linkages with financial institutions and banks. These issues can be considered missed opportunities to generate change in the institutional setting in the programme area. However, no information is available on this topic in the PCR. In 2006, IFAD recommended conducting an evaluation of the performance of partner NGOs based on the quality of services delivered. There was no follow-up to this recommendation. The final rating by IOE is one point lower

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<sup>17</sup> The following functions were performed by NGOs: (i) hiring and managing community development facilitators; (ii) mobilizing capital and technical support from the Government and private donors both to sustain the NGO programme, SHGs, federations/cooperatives and to provide technical support when required; (iii) monitoring the federations/cooperatives; (iv) training the federations/cooperatives to monitor SHGs, scrutinize their books and resolve conflicts; and (v) promoting marketing initiatives at the village, sub-district and district levels.

than the PMD score, partly as a result of limitations in the evidence presented in the “institutional impact” section of the PCR.

### **Other performance criteria**

#### **C.9 Sustainability:<sup>18</sup> moderately satisfactory (rating 4)**

31. The PCR provided a detailed and comprehensive statement of the PIDRA exit strategy – a recommendation followed by all IFAD supervision missions since 2006. The 2007 supervision mission report analysed the sustainability prospects of SHGs, VDAs, service providers and federations/cooperatives. In the last two years of the programme IFAD and PIDRA management endeavoured to strengthen SHGs, upgrade the skills of service providers, mobilize further funds and lobby the Government to support NGOs after PIDRA completion. As noted in the 2008 IFAD supervision mission report, some of these initiatives have been successful. For example, all 14 district governments agreed to provide continued support to PIDRA villages and oversee the extension to additional communities. The PCR also acknowledged the sense of ownership among village institutions towards SHGs and NGOs that were committed to remaining in the programme area.
32. Sustainability of SHGs is an important element in determining PIDRA sustainability performance. PIDRA was one of the few projects that left grass-roots institutions in possession of significant financial resources over which they had control and could use to generate investments to support their livelihood strategies. According to the PCR, only 6 per cent of the SHGs formed by PIDRA were classified as “poor” and therefore were unlikely to continue operating in future. This figure contrasts with the IFAD supervision mission report that stated that “there are several weak ones, even more than the assessment records”. At the time of this evaluation, there was no evidence that the programme had developed a realistic plan for the institutional sustainability of SHGs. Another problematic area related to sustainability, noted in the PCR and in supervision mission reports, was the maintenance of infrastructure. The most recent IFAD supervision mission identified several cases of village infrastructure maintenance not being addressed on a regular basis or being neglected.

#### **C.10 Pro-poor innovation and scaling up:<sup>19</sup> satisfactory (rating 5)**

33. The PCR does not explicitly refer to **innovation**. Nevertheless, the innovative content of the programme is evident. PIDRA incorporated a participatory and people-centred development model based on cooperation between the Government and NGOs. This is presented in the President’s Report as a substantial change from a large number of past and current projects in Indonesia in which the target group was offered specific investments that were decided on the basis of perceived needs or opportunities by government officials or outsiders. As noted in the PCR, at the time of programme preparation there were many projects “placing food and money in the hands of people”, whereas few initiatives had a long-term approach focused on establishing institutions and encouraging a savings culture such as that followed under PIDRA. The programme introduced local NGOs (previously engaged mainly in activism) to building institutions and participating in local development. The PCR highlights the fact that it took time for the concept, structure and objectives of SHGs to be accepted: this was a new concept not only to the Government and NGOs but also to donors. The innovative nature of PIDRA was also reflected in the reference made in the PCR to the difficulties faced by the programme in promoting the view that institutions managed by the people should decide on infrastructure.

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<sup>18</sup> The likely continuation of net benefits from a development intervention beyond the phase of external funding support. It also includes an assessment of the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the project’s life.

<sup>19</sup> The extent to which IFAD development interventions: (i) have introduced innovative approaches to rural poverty reduction; and (ii) have been (or are likely to be) replicated and scaled up by government authorities, donor organizations, the private sector and others agencies.



34. **Scaling-up** is not treated in the PCR. Nevertheless, IFAD supervision mission reports provide regular updates on the scope for replicating the PIDRA approach. In these documents, reference is made to the commitment of district and local governments in all three provinces to financing SHGs, federations and watershed management groups and to the possibility of the concept and operations of PIDRA being expanded with their own resources. District governments could retain the core elements of self-help and the savings culture, promotion of participatory institutions of the poor, recognition of and respect for people's institutions in managing their own affairs, partnership between Government and NGOs, participatory approaches, targeted investment for the poor and multisector support. The provision of grants to build the capacity of SHGs is regarded as an indication of the strength of commitment among such governments.

**C.11 Gender equality and women's empowerment: moderately satisfactory (rating 4)**

35. The PCR does not include a section dedicated to gender issues. In the presentation of the programme context and challenges, reference is made to the fact that "issues related to gender balance caused considerable debate in 2000–2001".<sup>20</sup> Nevertheless, the programme continued to attach importance to gender equity and to support gender mainstreaming by training and exposure of staff and village institutions, hiring gender specialists, maintaining gender-disaggregated data and encouraging women's SHGs to take the lead in public meetings. The PCR pointed out, however, that "impact was not equally successful in all of these areas". Unfortunately, no further details of the reason for limited impact are provided. According to the PCR, PIDRA did not implement a comprehensive and planned gender strategy. The PCR also noted that women's participation in local government meetings had improved but was still very limited and had little influence.
36. The IFAD supervision mission report (2007) mentioned that PIDRA recognized the important role of women in on-farm and off-farm productive activities. The most comprehensive presentation of gender issues is available in the 2008 supervision mission report, which contained a full section on gender mainstreaming, empowerment, the presence of women in leadership positions and the impact on gender. The report noted that, despite many achievements, PIDRA did not implement a comprehensive and planned gender strategy. Nevertheless, "during interaction of the supervision mission with members of SHGs and federations, a number of women reported that thanks to the capacity-building activities within the groups, they have acquired more self-confidence and self-esteem and they are no longer shy and scared to openly express their opinion".<sup>21</sup> Home gardening had a positive impact on women's empowerment as it provided an opportunity for women to engage in farming activities and exercise full control over production decisions. The same report also noted the central role of social infrastructure in reducing the daily workload of women and saving their time.
37. Gender-disaggregated data were available in other sections of the PCR. PIDRA promoted 1,076 men's SHGs, 1,122 women's SHGs and 186 mixed. Of the total of 22,000 microenterprises supported by the PIDRA, almost half were led by women. There were 725 women on the boards of federations, 379 on VDA boards and 388 in leadership positions other than women's SHGs. Gender-disaggregated data were presented in terms of the number of people trained in technical skills (total of 77,000 people, of whom 36,000 are women), leadership, bookkeeping and record maintenance (19,000 men and 22,000 women).

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<sup>20</sup> While some NGOs held the view that women, and especially poor women, had little say in the public life of villages, that their contribution to the household was not recognized, that domestic violence existed but was not acknowledged and that women were bound by stereotypes, others objected to this position.

<sup>21</sup> See IFAD (2008), paragraph 60.

### **C.12 Overall project achievement:<sup>22</sup> moderately satisfactory (rating 4)**

38. PIDRA achieved several important results especially in terms of the formation/strengthening of SHGs and the promotion of a new model for identifying and managing infrastructure construction through VDAs. PIDRA also promoted a strong savings culture among SHG members that allowed the presence of money lenders in the villages to be reduced. It is important to bear in mind that at the time PIDRA was implemented, very few of the initiatives financed had a long-term development vision focusing on building institutions. At the same time, programme efficiency was adversely affected by high implementation costs. Similarly, evidence of the sustainability prospects of SHGs is mixed and there are continuing issues in infrastructure maintenance.
39. There are many important elements of PIDRA that could have justified a fully satisfactory rating. However, the basis of data for impact assessment is very weak and this calls for a more conservative judgement on programme performance.

### **C.13 Performance of partners**

40. **IFAD: satisfactory** (rating 5). IFAD performance on this programme deserves a fairly positive assessment. Despite the design issues and delays in implementation referred to earlier, PIDRA was an innovative programme with high potential for scaling up. As in most cases involving innovation, there were evident performance risks, albeit with the possibility of high rewards, taken by the staff. The programme employed a highly participatory approach, consulting the end beneficiary groups while also being able to engage government structures in a sustainable manner. Programme supervision mission reports prepared by IFAD were of good quality, especially with regard to the emphasis on gender issues and sustainability. IFAD supervision mission reports generally provided a candid, detailed and technically sound account of the state of programme implementation, the way forward, and particular achievements or lack thereof. Among the areas for improvement stressed in the PCR were the excessively detailed requirements by IFAD regarding the format of the annual workplan and budget, and complicated procedures for the procurement of goods and services, which slowed down implementation. The PCR recommended that greater attention be given to such requirements, a proposal supported by this review.
41. **Government of Indonesia: moderately satisfactory** (rating 4). The PCR provides a relatively positive assessment of the performance of the Government of Indonesia. The Government supported PIDRA by: (i) assigning full-time staff at the national, provincial and district levels; (ii) allocating financial support from national and local budgets; (iii) providing work facilities for programme implementers; (iv) organizing coordination among intervening agencies; and (v) arranging contributions in services and finance from various institutions. The decision to keep the national programme coordinator, two provincial coordinators and several district managers in place for eight years was instrumental in the performance of the Government. According to the PCR "the lead given by these officials in keeping dialogue open and respecting all stakeholders played a major role in developing coordination and effectiveness of interventions". On the other hand, the programme was affected by the considerable turnover of government staff in the field. Looking at the implementation history of PIDRA and ratings assigned during supervision missions, the performance of the Government was undermined by weaknesses in the M&E system (over several years), the quality of accounts (in 2006–2007), and the timing of audits and reporting (in 2006–2007). On the basis of these factors, in the PCR the performance of the Government is rated one point below the score allocated by PMD in the PCR.

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<sup>22</sup> An overarching assessment of the project, drawing upon the analysis made under the various evaluation criteria.

#### **D. PCR quality: moderately unsatisfactory (rating 3)**

42. **Scope: moderately unsatisfactory** (rating 3). The scope of the PCR was not commensurate with the information requirements of an important programme such as PIDRA. In particular, the section on programme impact relied on a small sample of focus group discussions held with programme beneficiaries. The impact of the programme on institutions and policies required a more comprehensive discussion given the support provided under PIDRA for the Government's decentralization policies. Being an innovative exercise in itself, the programme carried a high learning content. Nevertheless, important evaluation criteria (such as innovation and gender) were not treated in the PCR, and impact data were presented in a relatively simplistic manner. The PCR did not include analysis of the proximate causes for good or less good performance (including the so-called *why factor*), and did not attempt to establish a causal relationship between the stated changes and programme activities. Hence, the PCR rates the scope of the PCR as moderately unsatisfactory, which is two points below the rating given by PMD in the PCR.
43. **Quality of data, methods and participatory process: moderately unsatisfactory** (rating 3). The quality of data presented in the report was negatively affected by the weaknesses in the programme M&E system. On several occasions, the statistical data required to back up qualitative statements were lacking. Therefore, the PCR rates this criterion as moderately unsatisfactory, which is one point below the rating given by PMD in the PCR.
44. **Lessons: moderately satisfactory** (rating 4). The PCR identifies a long list of lessons learned. These are well-articulated, but many of them are rather generic development statements. The lessons learned cover issues of design, strategy and project management as well as broader development issues. They could have been better prioritized to facilitate the sharing and dissemination of knowledge. The programme was intended to introduce significant long-lasting institutional changes in relationships between the Government and the communities, yet this aspect was not covered by the PCR.
45. **Candour: moderately satisfactory** (rating 4). The PCR is candid about the shortcomings in design and implementation, and presents the setbacks of the programme in a consistent and technically sound manner. At the same time, it shows a slightly positive bias in describing the performance of partners.

#### **E. Lessons learned**

46. **A simple, yet credible and effective M&E system needs to be developed early on and embedded into project design.** The implementation history of the PIDRA shows a situation in which SHGs and other grass-roots organizations were formed with the objective of supporting a broad range of livelihood strategies. However, limited information is available on the results achieved. With hindsight, better M&E could have enabled more prompt identification of groups in need of support from PIDRA partners.
47. **An institutional setting involving successful cooperation of local community organizations and related governmental structures is key to the smooth implementation and sustainability prospects of a project.** PIDRA was correct in undertaking the risk of putting resources in the hands of local community organizations. Ensuring that they were sustainable would be a function of their successful cooperation with the local authorities.
48. **PIDRA experience demonstrated the great potential of knowledge-sharing among countries (this case being an example of South-South cooperation), and the importance of understanding the local political economy.** The SHG model, initially supported by IFAD in India, was introduced and adapted to the Indonesian context through cooperation with Indian trainers and study tours to India. At the same time, PIDRA took advantage of both the political opening

afforded by the presence of the new Government, which enabled NGOs to be engaged as implementing partners, and the decentralization efforts of the Government.

49. **Investment in infrastructure needs to be accompanied by arrangements for sustainable maintenance.** Upgrading or introducing new infrastructure is often a popular measure that generates quick outputs. However, without proper steps to ensure sustainability it could lead to wasteful use of project resources and bring only short-term benefits.
50. **Sustainable links to local financing institutions for access to credit and markets are key to the success of a rural finance project.** The rural finance component of PIDRA provided valuable assistance to farmers and participating groups, yet there was little evidence of continuing support through local sources once project funds dried up. The programme was able to help villagers avoid the predatory lending practices of local money lenders by providing alternative, fairer arrangements. However, lack of sustainable longer-lasting financing mechanisms could jeopardize this important achievement.

**F. Issues for IOE follow-up**

51. None.

## Annex I

### Rating comparisons

<i>Criterion</i>	<i>PMD rating</i>	<i>IOE rating</i>	<i>Net rating disconnect (IOE - PMD)</i>	<i>Rationale for rating difference</i>
<b>Project performance</b>	<b>NR</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>N/A</b>	
Relevance	5	4	-1	A number of design-related constraints: complexity of the project; insufficient time allowed for development of appropriate agricultural activities; absence of a defined strategy to link groups to sustainable sources of financing for economic activities; and lack of marketing support for enterprises.
Effectiveness	4	4	0	
Efficiency	5	4	-1	Very high share of transaction costs (41%).
<b>Rural poverty impact</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>-1</b>	Insufficient evidence attributing stated changes to project activities, difficulties in creating sustainable linkages with financial markets, and lack of data on specific criteria (productivity, natural resources and environment).
Household income and assets	5	4	-1	
Human and social capital and empowerment	5	5	0	
Food security and agricultural productivity	5	4	-1	
Natural resources and environment	5	4	-1	
Institutions and policies	5	4	-1	
<b>Other performance criteria</b>				
Sustainability	4	4	0	
Innovation and scaling up	5	5	0	
Gender equality and women's empowerment	4	4	0	
<b>Overall project achievement</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>0</b>	
<b>Performance of partners</b>				
(a) IFAD	5	5	0	
(b) Government	5	4	-1	Weakness of M&E system (over several years), quality of accounts (in 2006-2007), and timing of audits and reporting (in 2006-2007).
<b>Average net disconnect<sup>a</sup></b>			<b>-0.53</b>	
<b>PCR quality</b>	<b>NR</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>N/A</b>	
(a) Scope	5	3	-2	The PCR did not include analysis of the proximate causes for good or less good performance (or of the so-called "why" factor), and did not attempt to establish a causal relationship between the stated changes and project activities. Important evaluation criteria (such as innovation and gender) were not addressed in the PCR, and impact data were presented in a rather simplistic manner.
(b) Quality (methods, data, participatory process)	4	3	-1	The quality of data presented in the report was undermined by weaknesses in the programme's M&E system. On several occasions, important statistical data needed to back up qualitative statements were lacking.
(c) Lessons	4	4	0	
(d) Candour	4	4	0	

Note: Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; NR = not rated; N/A = not applicable.

<sup>a</sup> The difference between the average rating by IOE and PMD.

## Annex II

### Project data

<i>Basic project data</i>			<i>Approval (US\$ million)</i>		<i>Actual (IDR billion)<sup>a</sup></i>	
Region	Asia and the Pacific					
Country	Indonesia	Total project costs, US\$	27.4		287.7	
Loan number	539					
Type of project	Rural	IFAD loan and percentage of total	23.5	85%	235.3	82%
Financing type	E					
Lending terms <sup>b</sup>	HC	Borrower	3.2	12%	52.4	18%
Date of approval	04.05.2000					
Date of loan signature	21.06.2000	Beneficiaries	0.7	3%	-	-
Date of effectiveness	31.01.2001					
Loan amendments	-	Number of beneficiaries (household)	50,000 direct 50,000 indirect		41,000 direct 59,411 indirect	
Loan closure extensions	-					
Country programme managers	M. Prayer-Galletti R. Bartoloni Y. Wang R. Hartman	Loan closing date			30.09.2009	
Regional Director(s)	P. Roy T. Elhaut	Mid-term review			July 2004 to February 2005	
PCR reviewer	L. Cuna	IFAD loan disbursement at project completion (%)			100%	
PCR quality control panel within IOE	A-M. Lambert A. Muthoo K. Atanesyan					

<sup>a</sup> Accounts reported in the PCR are in Indonesian Rupiah (IDR): US\$1.0 = 10,000 IDR. The difference is explained by the increase in Government financing.

<sup>b</sup> According to the IFAD Lending Policies and Criteria, there are three types of lending terms: highly concessional (HC), intermediate (I) and ordinary (O). The conditions for these are as follows: (i) special loans on highly concessional terms shall be free of interest but bear a service charge of three fourths of one per cent (0.75 per cent) per annum and have a maturity period of forty (40) years, including a grace period of ten (10) years; (ii) loans on intermediate terms shall have a rate of interest per annum equivalent to fifty per cent (50 per cent) of the variable reference interest rate, and a maturity period of twenty (20) years, including a grace period of five (5) years; (iii) loans on ordinary terms shall have a rate of interest per annum equivalent to one hundred per cent (100 per cent) of the variable reference interest rate, and a maturity period of fifteen (15) to eighteen (18) years, including a grace period of three (3) years.

## Annex III

### Definition of the evaluation criteria used by the Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Definition<sup>a</sup></i>
<b>Project performance</b>	
Relevance	The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, institutional priorities and partner and donor policies. It also entails an assessment of project coherence in achieving its objectives.
Effectiveness	The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.
Efficiency	A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results.
<b>Rural poverty impact<sup>b</sup></b>	
	Impact is defined as the changes that have occurred or are expected to occur in the lives of the rural poor (whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended) as a result of development interventions.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Household income and assets</li></ul>	Household income provides a means of assessing the flow of economic benefits accruing to an individual or group, whereas assets relate to a stock of accumulated items of economic value.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Human and social capital and empowerment</li></ul>	Human and social capital and empowerment include an assessment of the changes that have occurred in the empowerment of individuals, the quality of grass-roots organizations and institutions, and the individual and collective capacity of the poor.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Food security and agricultural productivity</li></ul>	Changes in food security relate to availability, access to food and stability of access, whereas changes in agricultural productivity are measured in terms of yields.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Natural resources and the environment and climate change</li></ul>	The focus on natural resources and the environment involves assessing the extent to which a project contributes to changes in the protection, rehabilitation or depletion of natural resources and the environment. It also assesses any impacts projects may have in adapting to and/or mitigating climate change effects.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Institutions and policies</li></ul>	The criterion relating to institutions and policies is designed to assess changes in the quality and performance of institutions, policies and the regulatory framework that influence the lives of the poor.
<b>Other performance criteria</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Sustainability</li></ul>	The likely continuation of net benefits from a development intervention beyond the phase of external funding support. It also includes an assessment of the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the life of the project.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Innovation and scaling up</li></ul>	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have: (i) introduced innovative approaches to rural poverty reduction; and (ii) the extent to which these interventions have been (or are likely to be) replicated and scaled up by government authorities, donor organizations, the private sector and others agencies.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Gender equality and women's empowerment</li></ul>	The efforts made to promote gender equality and women's empowerment in the design, implementation, supervision and implementation support, and evaluation of IFAD-assisted projects.
<b>Overall project achievement</b>	This provides an overarching assessment of the project, drawing upon the analysis made under the various evaluation criteria cited above.
<b>Performance of partners</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>IFAD</li><li>Government</li><li>Cooperating institution</li><li>NGO/Community-based organization</li></ul>	This criterion assesses the contribution of partners to project design, execution, monitoring and reporting, supervision and implementation support, and evaluation. The performance of each partner will be assessed on an individual basis with a view to the partner's expected role and responsibility in the project life cycle.

<sup>a</sup> These definitions have been taken from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee *Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management* and from the IFAD Evaluation Manual (2009).

<sup>b</sup> It is important to underline that the IFAD Evaluation Manual also deals with "lack of intervention". That is, no specific intervention may have been foreseen or intended with respect to one or more of the five impact domains. In spite of this, if positive or negative changes are detected and can be attributed in whole or in part to the project, a rating should be assigned to the relevant impact domain. On the other hand, if no changes are detected and no intervention was foreseen or intended, then no rating (or a notation of "not applicable") is assigned.

## **Annex IV**

### **Sources**

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